

SAŽECI / ABSTRACTS



How to Teach Introduction to Philosophy?

BORAN BERČIĆ
(Sveučilište u Rijeci)

If you want to teach Introduction to Philosophy, and if you want to do it right, here are the rules. You should do it in accordance with the following 16 rules:

- 1) Forget about didactics! Forget about methodics! Forget about pedagogy! Just do philosophy!
- 2) Do not underestimate your students!
- 3) Don't try to teach history of philosophy in the introductory course!
- 4) Choose the right textbook!
- 5) Prepare your lectures!
- 6) Repeat! Repeat! Repeat!
- 7) Present theories in the best possible light!
- 8) Present theories in contrast to each other!
- 9) Focus on the arguments!
- 10) Make students talk!
- 11) Always interpret students' questions and comments in the best possible light!
- 12) Introduce the philosophical toolkit when it is needed!
- 13) Spend needed time on distinctions!
- 14) Keep things apart!
- 15) Give them questions!
- 16) There is no difference between teaching philosophy and doing philosophy!

What is Enlightenment? A Personal Update

WOLFRAM EILENBERGER

(Germany)

Two hundred years after the publication of Immanuel Kant's *What is Enlightenment?*, Wolfram Eilenberger returns to this legendary text in order to seek yet another exit from self-incurred immaturity in an age of non-reason.

Kritičko mišljenje i relativizam

MAJDA TROBOK
(Sveučilište u Rijeci)

Relativizam se standardno definira kao teorija o nepostojanju univerzalnih načela. No pitanje je implicira li takvo stajalište nužno ideju o nepostojanju objektivne istine te o dopuštanju da svatko za sebe bude mjerilo vrijednosti na osnovi vlastitih želja ili potreba.

Catalysts and Exemplars

NIGEL WARBURTON

(England)

There is a very long history of philosophers speaking to non-philosophers. In ancient Greece philosophical debate took place in the marketplace as well as within the schools of philosophy. Many of the greatest philosophers in the history of Western philosophy have spent much time and energy writing for and speaking to general audiences. Think of Aristotle, David Hume, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer, John Stuart Mill, Bertrand Russell, and more recently, Simone de Beauvoir, Thomas Nagel, Peter Singer, Michael Sandel, Martha Nussbaum, Kwame Anthony Appiah, and many other eminent thinkers, all of whom have wanted their ideas discussed widely and have taken pains to make their writing accessible beyond the academy.

One model of public philosophy is of dissemination of ideas. But there is a much more important role this activity can perform: it can be a catalyst to thought and debate. This is consistent with some of the thoughts John Stuart Mill expressed in Chapter Two of *On Liberty*, about the difference between dead dogma and living thought. Public philosophers can also provide influential models of clear thinking and communication in an age that is so often content with superficial rhetoric and woolly argument. The best public philosophy exerts its influence both directly and indirectly; the worst is a waste of readers' time and can be dangerous. Some people seem to believe that the more public philosophy the better. That is not my view. What we need is more public philosophy of a high quality.

Public Philosophy as Metacognitive Practice: Pedagogical, Epistemic, and Ethical Implications

LUCIA ZIGLIOLI
(University of Pavia)

In this contribution, I will argue that public philosophy is, first and foremost, a distinct way of understanding the nature of philosophy itself and only consequently a way of practicing it. More specifically, I will claim that behind the public philosophy movement lies a conception of philosophy as the activity of sense-making and sense-problematization. As an examination of our structures of thought, philosophy, thus, has a distinctly metacognitive nature: It helps us to become aware of and test our understanding of ourselves and reality.

I will then demonstrate that this way of understanding and practicing the discipline has various potential outcomes. First, there is a pedagogical impact for those involved: the formative dimension is central to the public philosopher's work, and it is possible to view the universe of public philosophy initiatives as forms of philosophical education (or didactics of philosophy). Secondly, there are epistemic consequences not only for individuals but also for the discipline as a whole: thanks to the contribution of citizens, philosophy advances its disciplinary knowledge. Finally, the philosophical education promoted by public philosophy aims to generate an ethical and a political impact. Behind the invitation for everyone to engage in philosophy lies the conviction that the metacognitive exercise promoted by philosophical work is a necessary prerequisite for developing both moral autonomy and cognitive citizenship. Ultimately, this ethical commitment is what, perhaps above all, drives public philosophers.

A Systematic Framework for Analyzing Engaged Philosophy

LEYLA ABBASI
(Heidelberg University)

From an outside perspective, academic philosophy is often perceived to have withdrawn to the ivory tower and philosophic research thus seeming disconnected from everyday experiences and irrelevant to society. Contrary to this perception, there are innumerable forms of *engaged philosophy*, referring to any project or format whereby philosophers engage with actors or organizations beyond the confines of disciplinary philosophy to instigate philosophical reflection or address real-world issues using philosophical means. At the current moment, these engaged approaches of socially relevant philosophical practice are still fragmented and disconnected from each other. This paper, therefore, seeks to develop a systematic framework for analyzing various formats of engaged philosophy, categorizing them, and establishing connections between them. It proceeds by drawing both on current literature concerning public philosophy and other forms of engaged philosophy as well as John Dewey's pragmatism, expanding an existing framework from a Deweyan perspective. The proposed framework allows to integrate different forms of engaged philosophy, putting endeavors such as public philosophy, bioethics, or field philosophy into relation with one another. A systematic understanding of non-disciplinary forms of philosophy may facilitate a collective reflection on how to have philosophic impact beyond the confines of academia, including the articulation of outcomes and challenges, the documentation of successes and failures, and the development of best practices. The expansion of philosophic practice through engaged forms of philosophy aligns with the pragmatist "renewal of philosophy" aimed at identifying, problematizing, and overcoming social ills to shape society for the better.

The Role of Philosophers in Rebuilding Trust in Science

VITO BALORDA
TAMARA CRNKO
(University of Rijeka)

In this paper, we explore the role of public philosophy in addressing the challenges surrounding the current crisis of knowledge, which is particularly evident in science. Numerous examples of conspiracies targeting scientific endeavors (e.g., climate change denial; chemtrails) are driven by the spread of misinformation, fostering unwarranted skepticism. We focus on a specific conspiracy related to the anti-vaccine movement. Although there is a scientific consensus advocating that vaccines are beneficial and significantly contribute to public health, the spread of misinformation continues to undermine their achievements. For instance, there is a resurgence of measles, particularly in Europe, despite the availability of a safe and effective vaccine that prevents the disease. Philosophy can address these challenges from various standpoints. Among others, it can examine how scientists collaborate with each other and make new discoveries. It can facilitate epistemic integration and employ diverse philosophical methodologies. Moreover, it can study how scientists engage with the public and present their ideas. However, we focus on a different aspect, namely the role of philosophy in addressing the communication gap between scientists and the public. Particularly, philosophers can serve as liaisons, mitigating the crisis by engaging with the public and conveying scientific ideas more effectively to broader audiences.

We highlight two approaches by which philosophers can improve communication between scientists and laypeople, namely: (i) *content transmission*, and (ii) *context engagement*. Approach (i) emphasizes how philosophers are adept at identifying fallacies and translating concepts across various domains and scientific disciplines. We argue that philosophers' ability to clarify concepts and address differences in vocabulary

can significantly enhance understanding and reduce miscommunication between scientists and laypeople.

Approach (ii) outlines how philosophers can identify the relevant personal values, beliefs, and identities that shape public opinions about science and its claims. We assert that philosophers are trained to adopt a neutral stance in debates, taking into account various arguments and positions. By employing methods of openness and mindful discussions that consider personal values and identities, philosophers can foster a positive relationship with the public. This, in turn, can reshape public opinions related to scientific claims.

We believe that by integrating these two approaches, philosophers can bridge the gap between scientific knowledge and public perception. This integration can significantly aid in counteracting misinformation, preventing the ongoing crisis, and rebuilding trust in science. Finally, we propose potential methods for philosophers to foster a more positive and informed public discourse. These methods include producing papers that consider the two advocated approaches, conducting workshops that address public concerns, and creating podcasts and cafes aimed at reaching wider audiences.

What is Public Philosophy?

NOEL BOULTING
(London)

How can public philosophy be characterized? This is a difficult task given that defining philosophy in terms of wisdom's pursuit today appears somewhat pretentious.¹ Again, within its practice, there is no agreement as to what constitutes philosophical activity, since competing 'schools' have emerged within Western culture. Yet these 'schools' have one element in common: philosophical activity arises out of a concern for rationality, even if no agreement exists as to how that can be characterized. Four notions of rationality illuminate that concern.

The first, a *Substantive Rationality*, is governed by an appraisal of given goals or ends regarded as valued for their own sake alone. Their desirability is quite independent of any beliefs or wants a person might have. Max Horkheimer refers to this form of rationality as involving *an objective sense of reason*; it appeals to some principle taken to be intrinsic to reality which can be used to interpret a hierarchy of beings within which humans take their place.²

Opposed to it, a *Procedural Rationality*, is governed by appropriate processes of deliberation that generate some outcome. Such an outcome – regarded as desirable by the agent – can be attained in the light of the desires and beliefs s/he presently enjoys. Horkheimer casts this as involving *subjective reason* since it focuses on means to ends and with procedures for attaining certain take-it or leave-it purposes.

Mediating between these two standpoints is *Constitutive Rationality*, a developed form of procedural rationality governed by an adherence to certain value claims, embodied in language use, making critical argumentation and discussion possible since within such activities participants seek to achieve agreement.³ So a form of justification can be regarded as

¹ R.G. Collingwood, *The Principles of Art* (1938), Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1964, p. 197.

² M. Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason* (1947), New York: Continuum, 1974 chap. 1.

³ J. Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms* (1996), Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009.

transcendental in kind since its adherents attempt to ground rationality by reflecting on the conditions which make genuine critical argument or serious rational discussion possible.

Finally, a *Critical Qualitative Rationality* does not seek to justify itself either in terms of an ontology – as does Substantive Rationality – nor in terms of appeals to language-use as in the case of a Constitutive Rationality. Like Procedural Rationality it recognizes that the rational enterprise can't be grounded. It remains quite critical of the Enlightenment's ideals, particularly the pursuit of means-to-end reasoning, appealing instead to *the qualitative nature of first hand experiencing*. It thereby focuses on the aesthetic dimension within human experience.⁴

Given these four stances, the implications for the practice of philosophy in the public domain thereby require articulation.

⁴ Cf. T.W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory* (1970) (R. Hullot-Kentor tr.), London: The Athlone Press, 1999.

What Public Role for the Climate Ethicist? Integrationist vs. Isolationist Climate Philosophy

FAUSTO CORVINO
(Université catholique de Louvain)

The debate on climate justice is divided between those who advocate an isolationist approach and those who contrast it with an integrationist approach (see Caney 2012, 2018; McLaughlin 2023, 2024). Proponents of the first approach argue for normative principles that apply to the climate sphere independently of more general issues of socio-economic justice, and these principles can be either distributive (i.e. concerning the fair distribution of sustainable emission permits, the so-called carbon budget) or compensatory (i.e. concerning cost responsibility for present and future climate damage caused by greenhouse gas emissions). Proponents of the second approach argue that the fair distribution of the climate burden must be derived from more general theories of global justice, and that it makes no sense, from a normative perspective, to argue for principles of justice that apply only to the climate sphere in abstraction from everything else.

In this paper, I argue that the integrationist approach to climate justice is theoretically correct, but that in practice it suffers from at least five of the problems that Jonathan Wolff (2019) ascribes to what he calls applied philosophy, and which he contrasts with engaged philosophy: dogmatism, underdetermination, implausibility of recommendations, the problem of the second best, and blindspots.

The isolationist approach, on the other hand, is immune to some of the above problems and addresses others better than the integrationist approach. Moreover, given the realities of climate change (e.g. the fact that the biggest historical polluters are also the richest who have committed and/or benefited from other historical injustices), any reasonable isolationist principle of climate justice, if applied, is likely to be a step towards the realisation of any reasonable account of global justice.

For all these reasons, I propose the dual labour thesis, according to which there must be room within normative climate philosophy for both integrationist and isolationist research. The former does long-term work, so to speak, by swaying public opinion towards a more just world in all respects. The latter, on the other hand, is better suited to serve the international policy-making processes on which the course of the urgent climate crisis depends. Moreover, the former provides the theoretical foundations for the latter, and the latter is functional to the realisation of the former.

Gramscijev *demokratski* filozof i javno u filozofiji „kasnog“ Wittgensteina

ANELI DRAGOJEVIĆ MIJATOVIĆ
(Sveučilište u Rijeci)

Ako krenemo od pretpostavke da javna filozofija nije pleonazam, nameće se i pitanje kakva je onda filozofija koja nije javna. Je li ona zatvorena (u akademske okvire), ekskluzivna, privatna? Riskira se tu neka vrsta hijerarhijskog odnosa gdje se ova *čista* može činiti kao „bolja“, ekspertnija, elitnija, dok je njena „*light*“ varijanta prilagođena tržištu i (ograničenoj) percepciji masa. Hijerarhijski odnos tipičan za klasni, kapitalistički sustav teži se uspostaviti i unutar same discipline i na relaciji filozofi-društvo. Talijanski lingvist i filozof Antonio Gramsci uočava spomenuti problem hijerarhijsko-pedagoškog, a samim time i hegemonijskog odnosa, u ovom slučaju filozofa i javnosti, te ga rješava uvođenjem pojma *demokratskog filozofa* kao „novog tipa filozofa“ koji ne nameće svoju individualnu ekspertizu „običnima“, već odnos sa sredinom tumači kao „aktivno jedinstvo“ u kome se, navodi Gramsci, „jedino i može ostvariti sloboda misli“. Svaka od strana ovdje je i učitelj i učenik. U izlaganju će se obuhvatiti i gramscijevska perspektiva na tzv. spontanu, narodnu filozofiju, onu koju posjedujemo svi jer proizlazi iz zdravog razuma (*common sense*) ugrađenog u jezik, ali i uloga *organskog* u odnosu na *tradicionalnog intelektualca*, u suvremenom kontekstu. Pojasnit će se i Gramscijeva distinkcija između pojma zdravog razuma i zdrave pameti, ključna za razumijevanja njegove filozofije prakse. Terapijska uloga filozofije sastoji se u tome da se osvijesti da je kroz jezik plasiran i stanoviti pogled na svijet koji je dijelom talog prošlih vremena i tuđih stavova (*common*). Cilj je prepoznati to anakrono i hegemonijalno, prevladati ga i, kako Gramsci kaže, voditi samog sebe. Povuci ću potom paralelu s terapijskim pristupom koji se uočava i kod kasnog Wittgensteina (o vezi Gramscija i Wittgensteina pišu Sen, Davis, Crehan) koji pak govori o jezičnoj zbrci, problemu nesnalaženja u jeziku, što je ustvari problem otuđenja gdje *jezik radi u prazno* jer ne pogađa trenutnu (životnu) po-

trebu pa onda ni adekvatnu upotrebu. Time onda nema ni etičkog djelovanja. Wittgenstein svoj terapijski pristup temelji na jezičnim igrama (*Sprachspiel*), sugerirajući govorniku da se pri upotrebi bilo kojeg pojma, nekog sasvim „običnog“, ali i onog s aureolom metafizike, poput recimo pojma *dobro*, na posve jednaki način zapita u kojim je jezičnim igrama, na kakvim jezičnim, životnim primjerima (*Beispiel*) tu riječ već sreo, a da bi onda mogao analogijom, (obiteljskom) sličnošću, upotrijebiti je ispravno u novom kontekstu. Razbija tako hijerarhije između *običnog* i *nečeg višeg*, zamršenog, teško dokučivog. U izlaganju će se naglasak staviti i na Wittgensteinov doprinos filozofiji politike i ekonomije te javnoj sferi kontra privatne.

Jacques Maritain – istina, sloboda i filozofija u politici

DAN ĐAKOVIĆ
(Sveučilište u Zagrebu)

Jacques Maritain pruža iznimno svjedočanstvo o ulozi filozofa u društvu. Kao profesor na Princetonu (gdje je došao u zreloj dobi na osobni poziv predsjednika sveučilišta) i francuski ambasador pri Svetoj Stolici (što je prihvatio na posebnu zamolbu Charlesa de Gaullea), bio je jedan od najutjecajnijih filozofa prošlog stoljeća. Osim što je objavio izuzetno velik broj tekstova, njegov utjecaj i rukopis bili su uočljivi u procesima političkih integracija nakon Drugog svjetskog rata – smatra ga se npr. glavnim filozofskim arhitektom Univerzalne deklaracije o ljudskim pravima iz 1948. Njegove ideje značajno su utjecale i na procese u Crkvi prije, za vrijeme i nakon Drugog vatikanskog koncila u čijim je dokumentima razvidan njegov rukopis. Bio je prijatelj s papom Pavlom VI. koji se čak nazivao i njegovim učenikom.

U ovom izlaganju posvetit će se pozornost nekim aspektima Maritainove filozofije politike, osobito s obzirom na odnos istine i slobode, što je on smatrao najvažnijim aspektima funkcije koju ima filozof u zajednici. Oslabljeni osjećaj za istinu vidio je kao golemu opasnost koja prijeti modernim društvima. Filozof koji vjerno slijedi svoju spekulativnu zadaću ne obraća pozornost na partikularne interese pojedinca, neke grupe ili države, nego podsjeća društvo na apsolutni i nepopustljivi karakter istine – koja nije preveliki zadatak za ljudski um, kao što mnogi (cinično) misle. Istina je, dakako, veća od ljudskog uma pa i od svih ljudskih umova zajedno, ali je dramatična razlika ako je um ispunjen istinom i ako je ispunjen zabludom.

Kad je pak riječ o slobodi, filozof podsjeća društvo da je sloboda uvjet mogućnosti samog mišljenja. To je po sebi zahtjev zajedničkog dobra ljudskog društva koje se raspada čim strah počne zamjenjivati stvarna osobna uvjerenja i time nametati cenzuru našem umu. Filozof, čak i uz rizik da je krivu, barem treba slobodno kritizirati mnoge pojave koje

muče ili privlače njegove suvremenike i sugrađane. Kao i mnogi drugi, i Maritain vidi Sokrata kao arhetipskog svjedoka te kritičke uloge koja je inherentna filozofiji. Nije slučajno da svi tirani i diktatori mrze filozofe koji su vjerni ovoj svojoj ulozi. Ostaje pitanje – gdje su, ako postoje, granice te vjernosti? Je li moguće dosljedno i javno se baviti filozofijom bez spremnosti na žrtvovanje vlastite egzistencije? Treba li filozof uvijek zadržati neki vid neprilagođenosti sustavu? Na čemu ultimativno počiva autoritet filozofa u društvu?

Can Public Philosophy Enhance Interdisciplinary Understanding?

MAJA FERENEK KUĆA
(University of Zadar)

In the presentation, I want to show that public philosophy can highlight philosophy as relevant and important (science) and that, in this respect, it can be considered as the “good spirit” of philosophy. “Good spirit” of philosophy means that public philosophy enriches philosophy as a discipline by making it more visible, more relevant, more recognizable, more dynamic and, most importantly, engaged with the world. It helps to demonstrate the value of philosophical inquiry beyond academic boundaries, fostering a more philosophically informed and reflective society. By bridging the gap between theory and practice, public philosophy can ensure that philosophical insights contribute meaningfully to addressing the complex challenges of contemporary life. To achieve this, a method is needed, of course. In contrast to the ancient, even modern understanding of philosophy, the previous 20 years or so made it possible to re-engage the public, using new media and platforms to reach wider audiences. A big role was played by the internet and social media, which transformed the way philosophers can actually engage with the public, allowing broader and more immediate interaction. But in this context, one has to be also very careful, so the good initial idea of public philosophy doesn’t become a trivialization of philosophy.

I imagined the presentation as a three-part one. In the first part, I would like to talk about the challenges with which public philosophy is faced, choosing three of them to which I would dedicate several lines in the second part. Those problems would be in the context of the relevance of philosophy for contemporary issues, then the perception and value of philosophy in general, and at last, interdisciplinarity. I would refer to interdisciplinarity the most because it is the “media” within which philosophy can and must be maintained, and public philosophy could be of great help in that transition. That demands engagement with

various sectors of society, including education, policy-making, industry, and the general public. In the last part, I will say something about the problem of trivialization, which to the greatest extent concerns the depth of philosophical content that is disseminated through the channels of public philosophy, and try to offer several arguments that tackle such a problem.

Javna filozofija u Hrvatskoj

FILIP GRGIĆ

(Institut za filozofiju, Zagreb)

U izlaganju ću pod javnom filozofijom shvaćati filozofsku refleksiju o važnim kulturnim, znanstvenim, umjetničkim, društvenim, političkim itd. pitanjima napisanu ili izgovorenu tako da je razumljiva i nespecialistima, tj. i onima bez formalnoga filozofskog obrazovanja. Javna se filozofija od primijenjene filozofije razlikuje po tome što se primijenjena filozofija koristi specijalističkim diskurzom, dok se od popularne filozofije razlikuje po tome što glavni cilj javne filozofije nije popularizacija filozofije. Popularizacija filozofije može biti jedan od njezinih popratnih ili sporednih ciljeva.

Nakon što predstavim nekoliko primjera onoga što razumijem pod javnom filozofijom, okrenut ću se hrvatskomu kontekstu. Najprije ću razmotriti nekoliko primjera iz hrvatske filozofije prve polovice 20. stoljeća i tvrditi da su npr. Franjo Marković, Gjuro Arnold ili Albert Bazala bili (i) javni filozofi. Potom ću se kratko osvrnuti na razdoblje između 1945. i 1990. godine kako bih uputio na oblik što ga javna filozofija poprima u nedemokratskim društvima.

Na koncu ću se osvrnuti na suvremenu hrvatsku filozofiju i mogućnosti javne filozofije u Hrvatskoj. Precizan odgovor na pitanje o tome postoji li danas u Hrvatskoj (ali i šire) javna filozofija, koji su njezini oblici i kolik je njezin utjecaj na društvo nemoguće je dati, prvenstveno zbog iznimne širine značenja izraza „filozofija“, koji upućuje na krajnje raznolike vrste intelektualne aktivnosti, kako akademske tako i izvanakademske. Ipak, ograničimo li se na akademsku filozofiju, argumentirat ću u prilog pesimističnog zaključka: javna filozofija u Hrvatskoj gotovo da i ne postoji, kako zbog nepostojanja javnosti u relevantnom smislu riječi tako i zbog niske razine akademske filozofije u Hrvatskoj.

Moral Philosophizing and Moral Progress: Embracing the Weak Separation View

VIKTOR IVANKOVIĆ
(Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb)

The argument that academic moral philosophy is a primary vehicle of moral progress is likely as naïve as the argument oft-raised in Bachelor programs that academic philosophy's social mission is to safeguard critical thinking. The primary social drivers of moral progress, similarly as with critical thinking, should probably be sought elsewhere. Moral philosophizing, it is argued, is too divorced from ongoing moral plights to reliably produce engaged moral inquirers (Moody-Adams 1999), too speculative and atomized to orient joint moral action (Anderson 2014), and lacks both intellectual cogency and emotional power to change ordinary people's beliefs and behavior (Posner 1998). Not only is the kind of moral reasoning, in which moral philosophers excel, argued to be insufficient to achieve moral progress (Tam 2020; May and Kumar forthcoming), but some even regard it unnecessary for moral progress (Frank 2020), as emerging moral technologies can now alleviate the struggle associated with moral deliberation. There are yet further reasons for secondguessing moral philosophy's role in moral progress that I explore in the presentation. The question, then, is whether moral philosophers take any crucial part in social tendencies that we consider morally progressive.

Some relief may be offered by the suggestion that *true* or *full* moral progress can only be attained if both moral beliefs and moral practices are improved (Moody-Adams 1999; Buchanan and Powell 2018; Sauer and Klenk 2021). Call this the *unity* view. On the unity view, an instance of social change would not be considered truly progressive if it lacked a reasoning component, one in which moral philosophers particularly excel. I claim that there are good reasons to resist the unity view. Not only is it too demanding – too few instances of social changes would “make the cut” of moral progress – but some instances of morally progressive

change are grounded in only rudimentary conceptual understandings of moral facts, which hardly requires the services of philosophers.

Instead, I propose a *weak separation* view about moral progress. It claims moral progress in beliefs and moral progress in practices can come apart, and can be considered valuable regardless of not living up to the standard of the unity view. There is some cost to endorsing the weak separation view. It may confine the role of moral philosophers, in many if not most cases, to inquirers of intricate moral curiosities that bear little weight on the moral lives of ordinary citizens, and divorce their activities from the kinds of social change we standardly take to be morally progressive. The positive upshot of the weak separation view is that philosophers can contribute to moral progress in beliefs, even if that progress bears little weight on moral practice.

Yet, it is still compatible with the weak separation view to claim that the activities of moral philosophers make them particularly well-placed to become “moral entrepreneurs” (Posner 1998), and aid in the efforts of primary agents of moral progress – political institutions and civil society. While I suggest some ways in which academic philosophy can and should better engage in the production of moral entrepreneurs, I concede that moral entrepreneurs are not obviously doing “public philosophy”.

Public Philosophy in the Early German Enlightenment

DINO JAKUŠIĆ
(University of Warwick)

The views on public philosophy of the High Enlightenment period in Germany are today well known and widely discussed. Few are unaware of, for example, Immanuel Kant's view, expressed in his *Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung*, that the only way humanity can liberate itself from "self-imposed immaturity" is through the free *public use of reason*. What is less widely known is the role which both the philosophy and the persona of Christian Wolff played in the development of German Enlightenment and its views on public philosophy. In this talk, I will reconstruct the Wolffian model of public philosophy, as well as explicate its theoretical underpinnings.

Christian Wolff died 30 years before Kant published his famous essay. He was a professor at the University of Halle until 1723 when he was expelled from Prussia for allegedly teaching atheism and immorality. This prompted him to argue that "there is no progress in the sciences without the freedom to philosophise,"¹ by which he understands having "permission to state publicly our own opinion on philosophical issues".² However, even before this, Wolff has attempted to make his philosophy more publicly available by being one of the first (along with Christian Thomasius) to lecture and publish his philosophy in German, rather than Latin.

By focusing on Wolff's key texts, such as the *German Logic* and the *Latin Logic*, as well as some of his minor texts such as *De Habitu philosophiae ad publicam privatamque utilitatem aptae* I will try to answer two questions. The first question concerns who constitutes 'the public' in Wolff's philosophy. While Wolff clearly states that a philosopher must be free to publicly express their views, it is less clear whether the public in question

¹ C. Wolff (1963), *Preliminary Discourse on Philosophy in General*. Trans. R.J. Blackwell. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, §169.

² *Ibid.* §151.

should be understood in the narrow or the broad sense. Specifically, does 'the public' consist exclusively (or essentially) of the *academic* community, or whether it also encompasses more general public? Independently of this, the second question concerns the way that philosophy is to relate to the wider public. While Wolff argues that philosophy will be useful for "every other art" including the "lowest manual art" such as "the cutting of wood"³ it is unclear what relation philosophy is supposed to have to other professions and everyday activities. Specifically, the question is whether Wolff sees philosophy as *legislating over* other activities or as *empowering* them. In the former case, public philosophy (understood in the broader sense) consists in dictating to the public how they should live and behave. In the latter case, it consists in engaging with the public to enable them to think philosophically for themselves, thereby improving their condition.

Since Wolff's philosophy is today widely perceived as dogmatic and elitist, one would expect his view on public philosophy to amount to experts being free to dictate their discoveries to the public. However, by understanding Wolff's view on epistemic autonomy and the nature of concepts, I believe we can understand Wolff's philosophy as an attempt to develop methods of epistemic emancipation available to the wider public. By investigating how public philosophy has been conceived of by Wolff we can gain better understanding of the development of this idea throughout the period of German Enlightenment, as well as develop a historical comparison for contemporary discussions regarding the utility of public philosophy.

³ Ibid. §39*.

Public Philosophy and AI: Clarifying the Conceptual Landscape

NINO KADIĆ

(Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb)

In the rapidly evolving landscape of artificial intelligence (AI), the role of philosophy often remains overshadowed. However, I contend that philosophers can play a crucial role in providing conceptual clarity and illuminating possibilities and challenges posed by AI, which are frequently overlooked in technology-centric discussions. My argument centres on the intersection of technology and philosophy, emphasising the need for interdisciplinary engagement. At the crux of the issue lies the hard problem of consciousness: the question of why subjective experience emerges from configurations of matter. Sceptics often dismiss the possibility of AI, particularly large-language models (LLMs), possessing consciousness based on the properties of the underlying technology used to instantiate these models. If LLMs are nothing more than glorified text-prediction tools, it seems intuitive that there is no real possibility of them being conscious. However, this argument remains unconvincing. Consider a functionalist perspective, where mental states are defined via their functions within causal and informational structures. Such an approach allows for the multiple realisability thesis, implying that hierarchical information structures like LLMs could indeed harbour mental states. Ontological considerations related to the nature of information further enrich the discussion, revealing possibilities that technology circles often neglect, which should be particularly alarming in the context of moral considerations. In academic circles, philosophy should serve to clarify concepts and explore possibilities, while in the public sphere, it should inform and warn about deep-cutting issues that can arise with AI. Philosophers challenge assumptions, raise ethical concerns, and widen the epistemic landscape, while also eliminating certain epistemic possibilities. Technology-centric circles should therefore embrace philosophical methodology to better understand and address

possible issues, beyond concerns about mere efficiency, usability, and the properties of the underlying technologies. Because of that, I believe that philosophers and tech experts must collaborate, ensuring that an AI-driven future is not only efficient but also conceptually robust, ethically sound, and profoundly human.

Jürgen Habermas and Peter Sloterdijk's Humanism Debate: Implications for Public Philosophy and Society

TATJANA KOCHETKOVA
(O. P. Jindal Global University)

In contemporary times, much like in Ancient Greece, philosophy plays a crucial role in public debates and shaping public opinion. This presentation delves into a significant philosophical debate on humanism and the future of humanity that took place in Germany at the turn of the 21st century, involving two eminent public philosophers, Jürgen Habermas and Peter Sloterdijk.

The debate commenced with Peter Sloterdijk's response to Habermas's essay, *The Letter on Humanism*, in his provocative 1999 lecture titled *Rules for the Human Zoo*. Sloterdijk's lecture proposed the controversial idea of using genetic modification as a means of human enhancement, sparking vehement opposition from Habermas.

Sloterdijk, in his response to Heidegger's *Letter on Humanism*, raises fundamental questions about the objectives of politics, governance, and civic solidarity. He draws from the philosophical traditions of Plato, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, arguing that humanism has historically aimed to 'tame' humans into becoming good citizens. He contrasts humanism with what he terms 'archivism', suggesting that contemporary society has shifted away from the wisdom of the humanists to merely preserving their works without engaging with them meaningfully.

This presentation explores the implications of Sloterdijk's argument that traditional humanism, characterized as a 'literary society', is now obsolete. Sloterdijk advocates for a new form of humanism, emerging from what he calls the 'anthropotechnic turn', which aligns with modern discourses on human enhancement. This concept of humanism, with its endorsement of genetic modification and enhancement, was met with significant media backlash and concerns about its eugenicist undertones.

The presentation will outline the key points of contention between Sloterdijk and Habermas, focusing on the ethical, philosophical, and societal implications of their debate. Habermas's opposition centers on the fear of reintroducing eugenics, questioning the moral and ethical ramifications of genetic manipulation and enhancement.

Moreover, this presentation will examine how this public philosophical debate on human enhancement has resonated with both German and global audiences. It will explore the extent to which the current discourse on human enhancement can be considered a philosophical debate. Are the public polemics between bioconservatives and transhumanists genuinely philosophical, or do they serve other purposes? What are the potential consequences of these debates for society?

This discussion will also address the underlying assumptions and values inherent in these debates and their impact on the role of philosophy in contemporary society. Finally, it will consider how this polemic reflects the increasing flexibility and changeability of the human condition in the 21st century.

In conclusion, this presentation aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the public philosophical debate on human enhancement, examining its implications for public philosophy and society. It will assess how the ideas of Habermas and Sloterdijk contribute to our understanding of humanism, governance, and the ethical boundaries of human enhancement in an era where technological advancements continually reshape our conceptions of humanity.

Javna filozofija kod Marthe Nussbaum

MARIJANA KOLEDNJAK
(Sveučilište u Zagrebu)

Martha Nussbaum dobro je poznata i poštovana filozofkinja i aktivistica čiji doprinosi variraju od praktične feminističke teorije i ljudskih prava do prava i etike. S jedne strane filozofiju opisuje kao „praktičnu i suosjećajnu“ dok na drugom mjestu govori kako je „posao učitelja i filozofa učiniti ljudski život boljim“. Nije isključivo vezana za akademski svijet. Naime, za nju je posebno važno savjetovanje koje je obavila sa Svjetskim institutom za istraživanje ekonomije razvoja (WIDER) i Razvojnim programom Ujedinjenih naroda (UNDP). U WIDER-u je generirala i vodila, s Amartyom Senom, projekt koji je preispitivao neke ekonomske pojmove (kvaliteta života, razvoj, ravnopravnost spolova) koji su oblikovali politike u nacijama diljem svijeta. Paralelno su o tim temama raspravljali i drugi filozofi s razvojnim ekonomistima u oblikovanju humanističke koncepcije o tome što ekonomski razvoj može biti. U UNDP-u u Delhiju (Indija) radila je na projektu o suzbijanju diskriminacije i o upravljanju.

Za Marthu Nussbaum javna filozofija je pristup filozofiji koja je usmjerena na primjenu filozofskih ideja i principa u javnom prostoru s ciljem promicanja pravde, jednakosti i ljudskog dostojanstva. Naglašava važnost uključivanja filozofa u javne rasprave i političke procese kako bi se potencijalno riješila pitanja koja se tiču društvene pravde, ljudskih prava i dobrog života za sve članove društva. Za nju javna filozofija nije samo teorijsko razmatranje već i praktična primjena filozofskih načela u stvarnom svijetu radi poboljšanja života ljudi.

Martha Nussbaum smatra da se filozofska načela primjenjuju u stvarnom svijetu kroz aktivno sudjelovanje filozofa u javnim raspravama, političkim procesima i društvenim promjenama. Njen pristup javnoj filozofiji uključuje sljedeće ključne elemente:

- *Analiza društvenih problema*: filozofi trebaju analizirati društvene probleme koristeći se svojim teorijskim alatima kako bi razumjeli njihove uzroke, posljedice i moguća rješenja.

- *Razvoj normativnih principa*: na temelju svojih analiza filozofi mogu identificirati normativne principe koji bi trebali voditi konkretno djelovanje i akcije kao i politike za poboljšanje društva.
- *Edukacija i osvještavanje*: filozofi imaju ulogu u educiranju javnosti o filozofskim konceptima i principima te osvještavanju o društvenim nepravdama i problemima.
- *Sudjelovanje u političkim procesima*: filozofi bi trebali sudjelovati u političkim raspravama i procesima kako bi promovirali ideje pravde, jednakosti i ljudskog dostojanstva te kako bi, na taj način, utjecali na donošenje politika.
- *Zauzimanje za ljudska prava*: Nussbaum naglašava važnost zauzimanja za ljudska prava i borbu protiv svih oblika diskriminacije i postojećih oblika nepravde.
- *Obrazovanje*: Nussbaum promiče ideju obrazovanja usmjerenu na razvoj kritičkog mišljenja, suosjećanja (sućuti) i sposobnosti razumijevanja različitih perspektiva. Filozofski pristup obrazovanju pomaže u formiranju autonomnih pojedinaca sposobnih za aktivno sudjelovanje u društvu.
- *Pravda i jednakost*: Nussbaum se zalaže za filozofski temeljen pristup pravdi i jednakosti koji prepoznaje univerzalne vrijednosti ljudskog dostojanstva i poštovanja. To uključuje borbu protiv diskriminacije na osnovi spola, rase, seksualne orijentacije i drugih osobnih karakteristika.
- *Politička teorija*: u svojim radovima istražuje političku teoriju s fokusom na demokratske vrijednosti, sudjelovanje građana i zaštitu ljudskih prava. Ona zagovara inkluzivnu demokraciju koja osigurava jednak pristup političkoj participaciji za sve članove društva.
- *Etika brige*: razvija koncept etike brige koji naglašava važnost suosjećanja, empatije i brige za druge. Filozofski pristup etici brige pomaže u promicanju solidarnosti i socijalne pravde.
- *Filozofija i emocije*: istražuje ulogu emocija u ljudskom životu i njihovu povezanost s moralnim i političkim ponašanjem.

Filozofski pristup psihologiji pomaže u razumijevanju ljudskih motiva i osjećaja te njihovog utjecaja na društvene interakcije.

Kroz ta područja primjene Nussbaum promiče ideju da filozofija može biti korisno oruđe – alat – za rješavanje složenih društvenih problema i ostvarivanje pozitivnih društvenih promjena odnosno kako filozofi mogu (i trebaju!) ostvariti stvaran utjecaj na društvo te doprinijeti izgradnji boljeg i pravednijeg svijeta.

Philosophy for the Digital Age

ROMAN KRZANOWSKI

(The Pontifical University of John Paul II in Krakow)

In this presentation, we discuss how practical philosophy can serve as a guide for demystifying digital technology and unveiling the reality behind the Internet cave. At its core, philosophy has always aimed to explain the world, elucidate our place in the cosmos, clarify our actions, and help us understand ourselves. This was the pursuit of early philosophers like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, but this original mission has been obscured or lost. This is partially the fault of philosophers themselves, who out of sheer hubris, fear, or an unwillingness to tackle real problems, have taken cover behind a wall of esoteric wisdom that is often referred to as academic philosophy. In the digital age, we are bombarded by false and exaggerated claims about who we are, who we should be, and what we should do. Should we change our nature to accommodate machines, or should machines serve us? Should we defer to machines as our intellectual superiors and relinquish our ontological primacy, or should we relegate and restrict machines to the status of tools? In this presentation, we discuss philosophy's role as an active inquiry into our reality, where we navigate a world filled with confusing messages and news, information overload, and unjustified claims made by the proponents of digital technology. These claims extend to the very essence of humanity in areas like synthetic consciousness, superintelligence, transhumanism, and whole brain emulation (WBE), with these technologies promising immortality and infinite wisdom. Such things are voiced by a few who dominate key computing, software, hardware, and energy resources for reasons that are not obvious to the general public. Through philosophical analysis and insights, we can demystify the myths and promises of AI and expose the logical errors, incoherent arguments, outright lies, oversimplifications, and manipulations in the digital language. We argue that philosophy should be thought of, and promoted, in terms of its traditional role, which is to serve as a tool for inquiring into reality and the human condition. We finish the paper

with the appeal to philosophical community that we should engage in a deep analysis of the real problems we face, particularly within the realm of digital technology and AI, rather than escape into the realms of academic philosophy, play abstract conceptual games that are detached from life, or migrate into digital fantasies and false promises.

Public Philosophy and the Prison Population

JASON MILLER
(Warren Wilson College)

A major challenge in pursuing philosophy as a public practice lies in the question of what constitutes “the public.” Which public (or publics) are we specifically trying to reach, and why? Even where the aim is to reach and engage with underserved communities, the philosophical conception of the public (e.g. the Rawlsian “public sphere”) often overlooks a significant demographic whose access to public goods and civic participation is severely restricted, namely, the community of incarcerated. Philosophy has played a significant role in debates about incarceration, and the idea of state-sanctioned punishment more generally. From Plato to Bentham to Foucault to Angela Davis, philosophers have shaped public discourse concerning the rationale, morality, and effectiveness of penal institutions. But historically there has been relatively little engagement with the incarcerated community most impacted by these debates. More recently, this has begun to change, with a range of initiatives to introduce philosophy into prison education programs reflecting a growing and laudable effort to make philosophy relevant and accessible to broader audiences. This is also reflected in a range of recent literature focused on the value and impact of these initiatives. My aim in this essay is, first, to contribute to this conversation in a way that articulates both the extrinsic and intrinsic value of practicing philosophy in prisons. Specifically, I’ll argue that this value should be understood as having a mutual benefit, serving both a community as well as the discipline of philosophy in general. That is, engaging with incarcerated populations can both improve civic life within and beyond the context of the prison, as well as a philosophical practice that aims to be a public good. The further aim of this essay is to address some of the challenges those who may have interest or experience in practicing philosophy in prisons might face.

Kako se stvara javno mnijenje, čak i kad ono to nije – Precht i Welzer o novinarstvu u doba krize

RONI RENGEL
(Sveučilište u Zagrebu)

Richard David Precht je od 2011. godine profesor filozofije na Sveučilištu Leuphana u Lüneburgu te od 2012. godine profesor filozofije i estetike na Visokoj glazbenoj školi Hanns Eisler u Berlinu. Autor je više knjiga – od kojih je najveći uspjeh postigla *Wer bin ich – und wenn ja, wie viele?* – a svoju javnu ulogu ostvaruje sudjelovanjima u javnim debatama, podcastima („Jung und naiv“, „Lanz & Precht“ itd.) i televizijskim emisijama. Njegov glavni filozofijski interes je organiziran oko povijesti rada, odnosno filozofije tehnologije. Harald Welzer je socijalni psiholog koji od 2022. godine kao vanjski suradnik predaje na Europa-Univerzitetu u Flensburgu te na Sveučilištu St. Gallen, članom je mnogih znanstvenih udruga, pri čemu je osnivačem zaklade „Futurzwei“ i direktorom „Centra za interdisciplinarno istraživanje memorije.“ Objavio je 21 knjigu, a svoj je profesionalni portfolio gradio oko tema pamćenja, grupnog nasilja i klimatskih promjena. Welzer često sudjeluje u televizijskim emisijama i to u povećanoj frekvenciji od početka rata Ukrajine i Rusije, s obzirom na njegovu ekspertizu u povijesti ruske države. Dva su autora, potaknuta prije svega istraživanjima provedenima 2021. i 2022. godine, a koja pokazuju dramatični pad (20%) vjere u slobodu izražavanja te povjerenja u novinarstvo, udruženim snagama napisali i objavili knjigu *Die vierte Gewalt*, u kojoj analiziraju ponašanje medija u doba krize.

Precht i Welzer tvrde kako je izvještavanje vodećih medija neodoljivo slično – kada su u pitanju veliki događaji i krize, često izgleda da uvijek postoji samo jedna ispravna perspektiva. Taj se dojam ne stječe zato što su masovni mediji pod kontrolom „države“, već zato što posebni mehanizmi i razvoj dovode do ovakvog stanja. Štoviše, pored pojmova poput „twitterizacije novinarstva“, neke su od konvencionalno prihvaćenih perspektiva okrenute za 180 stupnjeva – u *Četvrtoj moći* politička vlast ne

uvjetuje sadržaj medija, već mediji uvjetuju sadržaj politike. Eklatantan primjer mogao se čuti i na zasjedanjima Hrvatskoga sabora, u trenutku kad zastupnik izgovara „Kad mi to mislimo riješiti – ta o tome mediji pišu već tri dana!“

U presudnim trenucima krize za autore odluka nije nešto što mora biti donešeno hitno, već nešto što nikako ne smije biti pod pritiskom hitnosti – tu se vidi/otvara prilika za razmatranje strana i dogovor – kao što je to bilo u vrijeme COVID-a, ili u jeku rata Rusije i Ukrajine, tijekom čega su Precht i Welzer postali sve češćim i atraktivnijim gostima televizijskih emisija, novinarskih intervjua i slično, te simbol borbe za objektivnost i racionalnost kod rasprava koje su polarizirale njemačko društvo.

S obzirom na to da demokracija raste i razvija se na dobronamjernim sporovima i borbi za najbolja rješenja, pitanje je djela što mehanizmi oblikovanja javnog mnijenja koji se u njemu čine razvidnima znače za našu demokraciju.

Knowledge's Work

PEDRO TABENSKY

(Rhodes University)

Academic philosophy has for some time been working its way towards irrelevancy given that it is increasingly becoming, to borrow from John Dewey, a "sentimental indulgence" for its practitioners, largely divorced, as it is, from life and its vicissitudes and quite incapable of contributing to the ongoing enhancement of experience. Following Dewey and Alfred North Whitehead, I will explain what makes knowledge, including philosophical knowledge, worth pursuing. My argument will focus on the idea that knowledge's work and value directly relate to its role in enhancing human experience. For Whitehead and Dewey, irrelevant knowledge lacks a proper relationship to life, meaning it plays no positive role. Relevancy, for them, should not primarily be understood as expediency. Instead, knowledge's relevancy should be understood mainly in relation to its constitutive role in enhancing human experience. Knowledge, in other words, should help open our eyes to the world and serve as a guide to action. It should ultimately be at the service of life. Because knowledge's value is related to its work, the distinction between public and professional philosophy must be challenged. All knowledge must be useful to life, enmeshed in life, and hence should, in a crucial sense, be public. For knowledge to be enmeshed, the abstract and the concrete must be in continual dialogue. So, the public/non-public distinction becomes empty once the proper place of knowledge is understood. And since knowledge's work is meant to enhance human experience, it must respect the conditions that allow for experience to be enhanced.

Knowledge is at its best when it flows out of open and free conversation. This open and free conversation space is democratic in the sense Dewey envisaged, namely, a social system constituted by and constitutive of freedom. I will show why Richard Rorty, one of Dewey's most influential followers, is right to encapsulate a basic Deweyan thesis as

follows: “Take care of freedom and truth [or knowledge] will take care of itself”. To take care of freedom is to take care of a social order that fosters open and ethical conversation that promotes the joint growth of all. This is the ideal order that simultaneously allows for individual and collective enhancement of human experience.

Friends in Strange Places: Industry Engagement as Public Philosophy

NICK TREANOR
(University of Edinburgh)

In this talk, I discuss my experience developing collaborative research projects with senior practitioners in the construction industry, construction engineering, and forensic engineering. These fields, unlike for example law and medicine, typically have little connection to analytic philosophy, even though they have an enormous impact on the lives and lived experience of people. The explanation for this is, I think, largely sociological, rather than because of any real difference in how relevant philosophy is to these disciplines. Law, for example, has a porous boundary with philosophy as many philosophy students end up later studying and working in law, and both law and medicine are perceived as paradigmatic 'white collar' professions, which academic philosophers tend to see themselves as more naturally in harmony with compared with construction and construction engineering.

The research projects include a funded PhD studentship for research on 'The Epistemology of Construction Product Certification', research in the ethics and epistemology of disasters, research on how construction engineering and the training of construction engineering can benefit from philosophical insight, and joint work to develop and teach a 'Philosophy and Engineering' course as part of a Master's degree in Leading Major Programmes, which focuses on the procurement, design and delivery of major infrastructure projects.

The talk will briefly describe these projects and focus on highlighting 'lessons learned' – what challenges we faced given our very different disciplinary backgrounds and how they were overcome. In particular, I will draw out what I think is an underappreciated point by many philosophers who are interested in public engagement. Often, there is a tendency to think of public engagement as either outreach or impact; to put it bluntly, the expectation from philosophers often is that we

have great things to say and people should listen and learn, either just for edification or so they might find ways our insights are relevant to them. In my experience developing collaborative research, a different approach is much more fruitful: As philosophers we should first listen and learn about other disciplines, about their shape and character, about the problems they tackle, about their methodology and norms. We can then identify interesting problems that have both a public/practical character and a philosophical character. This approach benefits philosophy, in that it enlarges the scope of its cares and brings insight from the 'real world' to philosophical theorizing, and it results in a public philosophy that is most likely to have a genuine impact on the public realm. Moreover, it's especially useful for seeing how areas of philosophy such as epistemology and metaphysics, and not merely ethics and political philosophy, are an important part of public philosophy.

