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Epistemologija kao normativna znanost

Sažetak

Osnovna teza članka jest da je epistemologija normativna u znatno slabijem smislu nego što to pretpostavljaju tradicionalni i neki suvremeni normativisti pa čak i neki suvremeni umjereni deskriptivisti. Epistemologija je pozvana da utvrdi kriterije znanja i opravdanog vjerovanja, ali nije u stanju pružiti epistemički savjet. Njezina se normativnost stoga ne može manifestirati u formuliranju epistemičkih propisa o tome kako postupati u traženju istine, nego samo u utvrđivanju uvjeta koje neki slučaj vjerovanja mora ispunjavati da bi bio slučaj znanja. To jasno slijedi iz karaktera epistemičkih norma, koje se ovdje shvaćaju kao analitički iskazi. One, prema tome, nisu iskazi iz kojih se mogu izvesti preskriptivne posljedice. Konačna plauzibilnost tog shvaćanja međutim ovisi o rješenju niza temeljnih filozofskih problema, prvenstveno problema opravdanja a priori i analitičnosti.

Epistemology as a normative science

Abstract

The main thesis of the article is that epistemology is normative in a rather weaker sense than it is assumed by traditional and contemporary normativists, and even by some contemporary moderate descriptivists. Epistemology is qualified to establish the criteria of knowledge and justified belief, but cannot give epistemic advice. Its normativity, therefore, cannot be manifested in

formulating epistemic prescriptions for the pursuit of truth, but only in specifying conditions, which an item of belief must fulfil in order to be an item of knowledge. This clearly follows from the character of epistemic norms, which are here understood as analytic statements. Therefore, they are not statements from which prescriptive consequences can be drawn. The final plausibility of this conception depends, however, on the solutions of some fundamental philosophical problems, primarily on the solutions of the problems of a priori justification and analyticity.