

***SPOZNAVANJE KAO NAGAĐANJE(PREMA NIKOLI KUZANSKOM)***

Sažetak

Od samih svojih početaka filozofijsko mišljenje Zapada uspostavlja razliku među oblicima spoznaje, prije svega s obzirom na stupanj izvjesnosti spoznaje. Razlikovanje pak stupnjeva u korelaciji je s predmetom spoznavanja (ono što zbiljski, uistinu jest kao predmet sigurne spoznaje i ono što postaje i propada kao predmet mnijenja). No, razlikovanje oblika spoznaje provodi se onda i s obzirom na subjekt spoznavanja kao razlikovanje božanskog i ljudskog znanja. U svjetlu tih početnih uvida, a vezano uz temu ovog skupa, postavlja se pitanje: ako je filozofija upravo ljubav spram mudrosti i tek težnja za dosezanjem istine što se realizira svagda na način pojedinačnog projekta koji nikad ne doseže cjelinu, ne iskazuje li se onda cjelokupna povijest filozofije zapravo kao povijest Filodoksije, dakle kao povijest mnijenja? To je onda naravno najuže vezano uz pitanje o mogućnosti, odnosno nemogućnosti spoznavanja i uopće karaktera ljudskog znanja. Zaoštreno to pitanje biva tematizirano u djelu Nikole Kuzanskog, mislioca »prijelaza« u svakom pogledu. Premda je njegova koncepcija ljudskog znanja kao tek nagađanja, coniectura, na tragu onakvog početnog (grčkog, točnije parmenidovsko-platonovskog) viđenja spoznaje i spoznavanja, ona sadrži i elemente koji jasno upućuju na to kako se ta početna koncepcija transformira, pokušavajući odgovoriti na pitanja jednog drugog vremena. U tekstu se pokušava osvjetliti specifičnost Kuzančeve pozicije, prije svega u odnosu na onu antičku tradiciju na koju se nesumnjivo nadovezuje, a potom onda i u odnosu na onu koncepciju spoznaje i znanja što se tek imala uspostaviti.

## *Cognition as Conjecture*(*ACCORDING TO NICOLAS OF CUES*)

### Abstract

From its very inception, the philosophical thought of the West has been differentiating between forms of cognition, first and foremost with respect to the degree of certainty of cognition. This differentiation between the degrees of cognition stands in correlation with the object of cognition (that which is in reality, truly as the object of irrefutable cognition, and that which comes to be and ceases to be as the object of thought).

Yet, the differentiation between the forms of cognition is then also done with respect to the subject of cognition as differentiation between divine and human knowledge. In the light of these initial insights, and with relation to the topic of this symposium, the following question is posed: if philosophy is precisely the love of wisdom and only an aspiration to attain the truth, which is always realised through individual projects which never attains the whole, is not, then, the entire history of philosophy disclosed, in fact, as the history of philodoxy, that is as a history of doxa? This question is then, of course, most closely related to the question on the possibility, or impossibility of cognition and the character of human knowledge in general. This sharpened question is the topic of the work of Nicolas of Cues, a thinker of »transitions« in every respect. Irrespective of the fact that his conception of human knowledge as only conjectures, *coniectura*, is at the trace of such an initial (Greek, or more precisely Parmenidean Platonic) perspective of cognition and cognising, it also contains elements which clearly point to the way that this initial conception transforms, attempting to provide answers to the questions of some other time. The text intends to illuminate the specificity of the position of Nicolas of Cues primarily in relation to the ancient tradition, of which it is unquestionably an extension, and then also in relation to the conception of cognition and knowledge which was yet to be established.

