SREĆKO KOVAČ

MARKOVIĆ I ALGEBARSKA LOGIKA

Sažetak

Franjo pl. Marković se u svojoj *Logici*, nastaloj uglavnom sedamdesetih i osamdesetih godina prošloga stoljeća (sačuvani su litografirani primjerci), na više mjesta kritički osvrće na algebarsku logiku G. Boolea i W. S. Jevonsa, čemu posvećuje i cijelo završno poglavlje. Booleov formalizam (i »platonizam«) relativizira sa stajališta psihologijske ostvarljivosti pojmova i realne određenosti pojmova samim predmetima na koje se odnose, a Jevonsovu opsegovnomu (ekstenzijskomu) pristupu logici suprotstavlja sadržajni (intenzijski). Smatra da se logika ne može svesti na načelo istovjetnosti, sudovi na jednadžbe, zaključivanje na supstituciju, nego da se logika mora proširiti teorijom »stvarne indukcije« (po uzoru na J. S. Milla) te da, polazeći od »načela razložnosti«, treba objasniti tvorbu pojma i referenciju njegovih sastavnih oznaka na isti predmet. Kroz to je Marković postavio ili dotakao niz pitanja koja su poticala upravo rani razvoj simbolične logike kao i neka koja su u središtu suvremenih diskusija u logici (modalna logika, logika vjerovanja).

MARKOVIĆ AND ALGEBRAIC LOGIC

Abstract

Franjo pl. Marković in his *Logika* ('Logic'), written mostly in the 70s and the 80s of the 19th century (the lithographic copies are preserved), in many places critically takes into consideration the algebraic logic of G.

Boole and W. S. Jevons, which he also dedicates the entire final chapter to. Boole's formalism (and 'Platonism') he makes relative from the point of view of the psychological feasibility of ideas and the realistic determination of ideas by the very objects that they refer to, whereas to Jevons' extensional approach to logic he opposes the intensional approach. He holds that logic cannot be reduced to the principle of identity, syllogisms to equations, inference to substitution, but that logic should be extended by the theory of 'real induction' (on the model of J. S. Mill), and that, starting from 'the principle of reasonableness', the formation of ideas and the reference of their constituent attributes to the same objects need to be explained. Through the previous, Marković has set or touched a series of questions, which prompted exactly the early development of symbolic logic, and also some others, which are at the centre of contemporary discussions in logic (modal logic, logic of belief).

Translated by **Ana Janković**