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
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Studies



»DENN ES IST SCHÖNHEIT IN DER WELT«

Ästhetische Momente im Werk *De essentiis* des Hermann aus Dalmatien. Ein ausgelassenes wichtiges Kapitel in der kroatischen mittelalterlichen Ästhetik

ZLATKO POSAVAC

(Zagreb)

Original Paper

UDC 18 Hermann of Dalmatia

Seit dem Erscheinen des zweibändigen zentralen Originalwerks des Hermann aus Dalmatien¹ *De essentiis* in Kroatien ist ein halbes Jahrzehnt vergangen. Der erste Band enthält einleitende Abhandlungen, Literaturangaben und den in kritischer Lesart bearbeiteten (»wiederhergestellten«) lateinischen Text, der zweite die kroatische Übersetzung mit Kommentaren. Obwohl die Veröffentlichung dieses wichtigen Werkes nicht unbeachtet blieb und sich auf die neuere kroatische Historiographie der Philosophie, noch deutlicher vielleicht sogar auf die der Naturwissenschaften auswirkte, rief es in Kroatien, soweit dem Verfasser dieser Zeilen bekannt, keine nennenswerten einschlägigen Diskussionen zur ästhetischen Problematik hervor. Von einem regen Interesse gar kann überhaupt keine Rede sein. Die Erklärung ist teilweise in der bizarren Tatsache zu suchen, dass die gedruckten Exemplare dieses Buches selten in Umlauf und im Grunde schwer zugänglich sind, obgleich weder die Auflage besonders gering noch die Ausstattung außergewöhnlich exklusiv waren. Der Fall erinnert stark an die Bücher von Franc Petrić *Della retorica dieci dialoghi* und *Della historia diece dialoghi*, die im selben Verlag (»Čakavski sabor« aus Pula mit einigen Partnern) erschienen sind².

¹ Hermann aus Dalmatien, auch bekannt als Hermann de Carint(h)ia, Hermann Dalmata, Hermannus Secundus, in der kroatischen wissenschaftlichen Literatur gewöhnlich Herman Dalmatin (Anm. d. Ü.).

² Ironisch könnte man anmerken *Habent sua fata libelli*. Obwohl unter anderem aus öffentlichen Mitteln Kroatiens finanziert, waren die genannten Bücher von Hermann aus Dalmatien und Petrić weder im normalen Handel in Buchhandlungen noch beim Verlag noch bei den Mitverlegern erhältlich. Es schätzte sich jeder glücklich, dem es per Zufall (!) gelungen war, die ganze Reihe von 10 bis 12 Büchern zu erwerben. Die seltenen Besitzer hüteten ihre Exemplare mit größter Eifersucht. Eigenartigerweise landete sonst der überwiegende Teil dieser Auflagen

Das kann und darf trotzdem kein Grund dafür sein oder bleiben, dass wir dem *ästhetischen Aspekt* des Werkes *De essentiis* des Hermann aus Dalmatien nicht die gebührende und gerade für das Mittelalter so wichtige Aufmerksamkeit widmen. Schließlich handelt es sich um einen Autor und dessen gesamtes Opus, die, wie die reichhaltige Bibliographie der kroatischen Ausgabe bezeugt, einen beachtenswerten, geradezu unverzichtbaren Teil in der Historiographie des europäischen Denkens darstellen. Für die kroatische philosophische und allgemeine kultur- und kunstgeschichtliche wie auch soziologisch-politologische Historiographie ist das Werk des Hermann aus Dalmatien von besonderer Bedeutung, nicht nur weil es in den monumentalen Ausmaßen einer gedanklichen Synthese, sondern auch in einem für die kroatische Geschichte schicksalhaften Augenblick der Epoche erschienen ist.

Nach dem Untergang des mittelalterlichen selbständigen kroatischen Staates und dem Eintritt in die Union mit der ungarischen Krone im Jahre 1102 wurde die kroatische Krönungsstadt Biograd 1125 (lange vor den Übergriffen der Osmanen) von Venedig schrecklich und mit weitreichenden Folgen zerstört, was die Verhältnisse in Kroatien wesentlich beeinflusste. Die damals mächtigste und schönste Stadt an der Adria Zadar erlebte in der Folge eine wechselhafte, von langwierigem und mühsamem Aufstieg und Fall gekennzeichnete Geschichte. Dennoch blieb das Rad der Geschichte nicht stehen, wie auch die Mitwirkung der Kroaten an der Entwicklung der eigenen und der europäischen Kultur, einschließlich ästhetischer Artefakte und ästhetischen Denkens, nicht aufhörte. Man darf den epochalen Wandel, der eintrat, als die Entstehung einer ethnischen kroatischen politischen und kulturellen Metropole endgültig historisch unterbunden wurde, allerdings nicht unterschätzen. Denn die Königsstadt Biograd, die Stadt König Krešimirs, war eine von den Kroaten errichtete und ausgebaute Stadt, sie war nicht griechisch, nicht byzantisch und auch nicht römisch. In Biograd wurde der ungarische Herrscher zum kroatischen König gekrönt. Die Zerstörung der Stadt lenkte auch die damaligen Kommunikationswege um: Menschen wie Gottschalk konnten in Kroatien keine Zuflucht mehr finden, und in seiner Begleitung konnten auch seine berühmten »Mitbrüder, Bekannten und Freunde, mit ihm kamen Hrabanus Maurus, Ratramnus und Scotus Eriugena«³, nicht mehr in Kroatien gesehen werden; Menschen wie der Abt Martin blie-

nach dem Druck (wie im Voraus geplant!) in der Makulatur: Dies nur als kleines Detail aus der Geschichte eines »kleinen« Volkes (des kroatischen) mit großen Folgen. Ein Detail, das zur (vom kroatischen Publizisten B. Donat gestellten) Frage berechtigt: Quo vadis, kroatische Historiographie? Auch 1997 noch.

³ Zitiert nach Dr. Kruno Krstić, *Hrvatska filozofija u prošlosti i sadašnjosti, Zbornik HFD-a iz 1968. godine* (Die kroatische Philosophie in der Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, Zeitschrift der Kroatischen Philosophischen Gesellschaft aus dem Jahre 1968), Zagreb 1992, S. 81.

ben aus. Die Kroaten konnten niemandem mehr sicheren Schutz bieten und begannen auch selbst, ihr Land zu verlassen. Das war der erste kroatische europäische Kataklysmus. Auch nach 1102 und 1125 aber, noch im 12. Jh. sollte dennoch der erste große kroatische Name in die kroatische und europäische Kulturgeschichte des Mittelalters eingehen – jedoch *außerhalb des Heimatlandes!* Deshalb ist zu bedenken, dass es sich in der Tat um eine Form von Exodus handelte, eine fatale Form von *Emigration*, da die Hoffnung, ein eigenes nationales politisches, intellektuelles und geistiges Zentrum von einigem Einfluss bilden zu können, denkbar schwach war. (Im heutigen Sprachgebrauch könnte man sie als die erste fatale »Abwanderung der Intelligenz«, den Verlust des »Denkpoools« oder von »intellektuellen Ressourcen« aus Kroatien bezeichnen.) Dass dies nicht zufällig nach der Zerstörung Biograds geschah, die ja geplant, absichtlich und ganz offenkundig sehr gründlich durchgeführt wurde, bezeugt textual *per analogiam* etwas später die *Obsidio Iadrensis*, da die Intentionen und Gründe identisch waren. In jenem Jahrhundert hießen die Kroaten zwar im Jahre 1177 den Papst mit einem Lied »in eorum slavica lingua« in ihrer Mitte willkommen, es ist zwar die Zeit der Vollendung der schönsten kroatischen romanischen Kirchtürme, 1105–1111 der Marienkirche in Zadar und 1177 in Rab, aber die bedeutendste Persönlichkeit der kroatischen geistlichen und philosophischen Kultur, ein Kind des 12. Jh.s, HERMANN AUS DALMATIEN (geboren um 1110, gestorben nach dem 26. Februar 1154), erntete die Früchte seiner Arbeit, buchstäblichen Ruhm und die Anerkennung seiner Verdienste um die gesamte kroatische und europäische Kulturgeschichte außerhalb seines Heimatlandes.

Außer dem gewichtigen Beitrag des Hermann aus Dalmatien zur Philosophiegeschichte und insbesondere zur Wissenschaft des Abendlandes ist als sein vielleicht größtes Verdienst die erste europäische Übersetzung des Koran anzusehen! Er übersetzte ihn (gemeinsam mit seinem englischen Freund Robert von Ketton) aus dem arabischen Original ins Lateinische und lieferte so den ersten praktischen Beitrag zum wünschenswerten und erforderlichen abendländisch-christlichen Verständnis des Islam in der Geschichte. Zudem verdanken wir Hermann aus Dalmatien nicht nur Übersetzungen arabischer wissenschaftlicher Werke, die zu jener Zeit den europäischen überlegen waren und die Errungenschaften der antiken Philosophie tradierten, sondern auch des antiken und zeitgenössischen Wissens überhaupt: So sind die Kenntnis und Bewahrung der wichtigsten Schriften u.a. des Euklid und des Ptolemäus sein Verdienst. Hier steht für uns jedoch sein eigenes 1143 abgeschlossenes Originalwerk *De essentiis* im Vordergrund, und zwar in erster Linie mit dem Schwerpunkt auf denjenigen Gedanken, die ästhetische Momente enthalten bzw. das, was wir aus neuzeitlicher Perspektive als ästhetische Problematik bezeichnen.

Das Traktat *De essentiis* stellt eine systematisch konzipierte Weltanschauung dar, ein gedanklich abgerundetes philosophisches Werk, ohne jedoch weder das Schöne noch die Kunst gesondert zu erörtern. Dennoch werden diese Themen an einigen Stellen behandelt. Das ästhetische Denken des Hermann aus Dalmatien ist seinem Wesen nach einer der beiden Hauptströmungen des europäischen ästhetischen Denkens im Mittelalter zuzuordnen, und zwar derjenigen, die den Historiographen zufolge im 12. Jh. in Chartres, auf den Anschauungen des Boethius basierend, ihren Höhepunkt erlebte (Schule von Chartres) und in ihrem Verständnis der Schönheit von platonistischen Ideen durchdrungen war.⁴

Hermann aus Dalmatien stammt aus Istrien und erlangte »die ersten Elemente des Wissens in der Heimat, höchstwahrscheinlich in einer benediktinischen Klosterschule« in einem der seinerzeit recht angesehenen istriischen Klöster, die überwiegend während des 11. und Anfang des 12. Jh.s entstanden waren. »In den Lehrplänen der Klosterschulen aus jener Zeit wurde vor allem *lateinische Grammatik* unterrichtet, die Grundvoraussetzung für das Verständnis der klassischen Literatur und der patristischen Texte, der Grundlage der damaligen humanistischen Bildung. Dazu gehörte noch die *Logik*, die den menschlichen Geist formt und ausrichtet, *Rhetorik*, *Poesie*, *Musik* und *Gesang*, die den Menschen zum Schönen hinführen, und *Astrologie-Astronomie*, die ihm den Akt der Schöpfung vor Augen führen und die Unermesslichkeit des Universums offenbaren«⁵ – so die Deskription der Schulbildung, die für Hermann, wie wir annehmen, noch in der Heimat begann und unsere vorangegangenen, schon früher versuchten Ableitungen der ästhetischen Thematik aus der realhistorisch bestehenden *Benediktinerregel* und der Aktualität der *septem artes liberales* als System in Kroatien bestätigt. Das höhere Studium der »*artium*« setzte Hermann aus Dalmatien von 1130 bis 1135 fern der Heimat in der damals noch nicht so großen Universitätsstadt Paris fort, um sein Wissen schließlich im damals bedeutenden und einflussreichen Zentrum der Bildung, des Intellekts und der Wissenschaft Chartres zu vervollständigen, in der Stadt der großartigen Kathedrale, eines Meisterwerkes der westlichen Kultur, dessen Bau gerade zur Zeit seines dortigen

⁴ Die Behauptung, das Mittelalter sei von einem so oder ähnlich konzipierten ästhetischen Charakter geprägt, geht auf J.-A. AERSTEN zurück (s. *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, hrsg. von Joachim RITTER und Karlfried GRÜNDER, Bd. 8, Darmstadt-Basel 1992, unter *Das Schöne* II, Mittelalter. Spalte 1352).

⁵ Franjo ŠANJEK, *Herman Dalmatin (oko 1100-poslije 25. II. 1154); bio-bibliografski priloz;* aus dem Buch I–II HERMAN DALMATIN, *Rasprava o bitima – De essentiis*, Pula, 1990, Bd. I, Biblioteka: Istra kroz stoljeća, Čakavski sabor, Deseto kolo, knjiga 55, S. 16. Band I enthält den lateinischen Text, Band II die kroatische Übersetzung. Der lateinische Text wiederhergestellt, die kroatische Übersetzung und kritische Anmerkungen von Antun Slavko KALENIĆ. Einleitende Abhandlungen von Franjo ŠANJEK, A.S. KALENIĆ, Žarko DADIĆ und Franjo ZENKO.

Aufenthalts in Vorbereitung war. In Chartres befand sich zu jener Zeit eine philosophisch-theologische Schule, deren Hauptmerkmal eine Art *ästhetische Kosmogonie* war: die Vorstellung von der Schöpfung aufgrund des alttestamentlichen Buches Genesis, philosophisch bearbeitet mit Hilfe von Platons *Timaios* und der unumgänglichen *Consolatio* des Boethius, so dass Gott als Schöpfer (»Architekt«) aufgefasst wurde, der im Einklang mit mathematischen Grundsätzen erschafft, weil weder er (Gott) noch sie (die Mathematik) irgendetwas anderes sind als Harmonie und Geist. Der bekannte Vertreter dieser Schule Thierry (Theodorik) von Chartres, ein direkter Lehrer des Hermann aus Dalmatien, behauptete wörtlich *creatio numerorum, rerum est creatio* (die Schöpfung der Zahlen ist die Schöpfung der Dinge), während Bernardus Silvestris, den Auffassungen Boethius' folgend, der Ansicht war, dass der Stoff die Schönheit der Zahlenkunst bzw. des »musikalischen« Bindemittels der Struktur verlange; *artifices numeros et musica vincla*⁶. Da viele Beziehungen in diesen spekulativen Zusammenhängen Ausdruck von Übereinstimmung und Harmonie des Kosmos waren, so erlebten die ursprünglichen heimatlichen Bildungsanstöße des Hermann aus Dalmatien in seiner weiteren Schulung nur ihre höhere logische Fortsetzung.

Der philosophische Ausgangspunkt des Hermann aus Dalmatien ist von der platonistischen Lehre von der »Weltseele«, von der Bewegung und ihrem Anfang (*Phaidros*) gekennzeichnet, was ihm ermöglichte, erkennbare Einflüsse der islamischen arabisch-hebräischen Philosophie und verschiedener östlicher Lehren, die Aristoteles in der Konzeption der fünf Essenzen (*de quinque essentiis: causa, motus, locus, tempus, habitudo*) berührt, in den Rahmen der abendländischen christlichen Weltanschauung einzufügen: Gott als allgegenwärtiger Schöpfer. Für Hermann aus Dalmatien ist die betonte Verwendung des mittelalterlichen Vergleichs zwischen göttlicher Schöpfung und der des Künstlers charakteristisch. Aus dieser Analogie geht auch die allgemeine platonistische Idee von der göttlichen Herkunft und Beschaffenheit des künstlerischen Schaffens hervor. In diesen mittelalterlichen Vergleichen des Künstlers mit Gott (und *mutatis mutandis* natürlich auch umgekehrt) ist Gott für Hermann aus Dalmatien der *allerhöchste Künstler – summus artifex*⁷.

⁶ Die Zitate nach der Angabe aus Fußnote 4.

⁷ HERMAN DALMATIN, *De essentiis – Rasprava o bitima – secundus liber*, Kapitel 49, Pula, 1990; Bd. I. lateinischer Text, S 245; Bd. II kroatische Übersetzung S. 113. Wegen klassisch-philologischer Akribie bezüglich des lateinischen Originals scheint in der im allgemeinen korrekten kroatischen Übersetzung die sprachliche Norm ein wenig vernachlässigt worden zu sein, was eine vorsichtige und kritische Rezeption erforderlich macht. Eine ebenso kritische Haltung scheint hinsichtlich der in letzter Zeit vorkommenden und zumindest verfrühten Behauptung angeraten, wonach Hermann aus Dalmatien der »Begründer der kroatischen Philosophie und Wissenschaft« sei, und insbesondere hinsichtlich der Bezeichnung Hermanns als »Schöpfer der kroatischen Philosophie« (der kroat. Begriff lautet *začinjavac*, Anm. d. Ü.); Franjo ZENKO,

Daher erachtet Hermann aus Dalmatien die Struktur der Welt als ästhetische Kosmogonie. Bezeichnend ist deshalb auch seine Behauptung, dass »bei Hermes dem Perser die Form wirklich eine Zier des Stoffes, der Stoff aber eine Notwendigkeit der Form ist«; *apud Hermetem Persam forma quidem ornatus est materiae, materia vero formae necessitas*⁸. Es gilt, einen evidenten Unterschied festzustellen: Der Stoff benötigt die Form, die Materie bedarf der Form, aber die Formung des Stoffes ist keine bloße Erfüllung dieses Bedürfnisses, sondern der Stoff wird durch die Formung wirklich veredelt. Für formlosen Stoff ist die Form keine bloße Gestaltung, keine einfache Ausstattung, sondern zugleich auch seine *Zier*; die Form schmückt den Stoff: *forma... ornatus est materiae!* Das lateinische Substantiv »ornatus« bedeutet nicht nur »Gerät« und »Ausstattung«, sondern auch Schmuck, Zier. Wenn wir uns auf das klassische Latein berufen (obwohl es sich hier um das mittelalterliche handelt), so bildet dieser *ornatus* im auf die Rede übertragenen Sinne Tropen und Figuren, also sprachliche und rhetorische Ausschmückungen, die als Form also ein ästhetisches Moment enthalten, indem sie das Reden, gleich welcher Art, schön machen. Nehmen wir uns die Freiheit, den Sachverhalt vor dem Hintergrund der neuzeitlichen Terminologie zu erklären, so können wir sagen: Die Form verleiht Stoff und Ding Schönheit; Schönheit und Pracht der Gestaltung schmücken also beim Schaffen Stoff und Ding.

Alle Dinge und natürlich jedes Werk (d.h. Opus) erschafft nämlich der Schöpfer. Die Analogie zwischen göttlichem und künstlerischem Schaffen empfiehlt es sich auch bei späteren Ableitungen im Auge zu behalten, obwohl selbstverständlich auch der Kroatte Hermann aus Dalmatien wie die Schule von Chartres und das europäische Mittelalter immer als Schöpfer und Verursacher, Urheber und Begründer von allem, das da ist, in erster Linie Gott den Schöpfer, den ersten und größten Künstler denken, der, wie wir sahen, der *summus artifex* ist. (Den Vergleich, dass Gott wie ein Künstler schafft, sollte später sogar Thomas von Aquin vertreten und lebendig halten, wenn er zum Beispiel in seinem Werk *Summa contra gentiles* schreibt: »Alle

Stanja hrvatska filozofija (Ältere kroatische Philosophie), Zagreb, 1997, »Hrestomatija filozofije« erschienen bei »Školska knjiga«, Bd. 9, S. 21 u. 30. Die Zeit vor Hermann aus Dalmatien ist allerdings noch nicht gründlich erforscht. Die Kenntnisse über Hermann aus Dalmatien und seine Arbeit sind ohnehin überwiegend im Ausland gewonnen, wo er schon früher als Hermann de Carnthia bekannt war, so dass es unseres Wissens Prof. Sanjek zu verdanken ist, dass seine kroatische, istrische Herkunft (wie auch K. Krstić vermutete) argumentiert aufgezeigt wurde. Die Zeit vor Hermann und vor dem 12. Jh. in Kroatien betreffend, gibt es im Bereich der Philosophie kaum Untersuchungen, wiederum mit der Ausnahme von K. Krstić. Umso mehr gilt es, einmal einen Anfang zu machen, wenn auch bei Fragmenten, analog zur Philosophiegeschichte Europas bzw. der Welt (»Vorsokratiker«)!

⁸ Op. cit., erstes Buch, Kapitel 7,4, lateinischer Text S. 204; kroatische Übersetzung S. 69.

Geschöpfe verhalten sich zu Gott wie Kunstwerke zu ihrem Künstler... Daher ist die gesamte Natur gleich einem Kunstwerk Gottes; *Omnes creature comparantur ad Deum sicut artificata ad artificem... Unde tota natura est sicut quoddam artificiatum divine artis...* Bd. II. cap. 100; Zagreb, 1993, S. 461.)

Hermann aus Dalmatien unterscheidet zwei Formen der Schöpfung, die immer eine Bewegung bedeutet: *Schaffen* und *Gebären*. »Das Schaffen ist wirklich das vom Ursprung ausgehende Schaffen aus dem Nichts; das Gebären aber ist das Gebären aus vorgegebenen Prinzipien bis jetzt.«⁹ Beim Schaffen vom Ursprung an, also durch die Bewegung irgendeines Stoffes bzw. Dinges, *ex nihilo*, kann man schließen, dass der Schöpfer nur »einer allein und der Letzte, ein allmächtiger, ein Mehrer (*auctor*) des ganzen Universums ist, jener, der wirklich in der Gesamtheit seines Wesens außerhalb jeder Bewegung ist; denn jede seine Bewegung befindet sich in seinem Werk, wie sich im Mehrer wirklich immer dieselbe Tugend befindet, sei es, dass er zusammenfügt oder teilt.«¹⁰ Da nun die Bewegung »außer in Bezug auf das, was entsteht, gar nicht denkbar ist«, wobei wir bei allem, was entsteht, zwingend einen Unterschied sehen »zwischen dem Begründer und dem, was wir begründet nennen. Denn wenn der Begründer wirklich ewig ist und daher aus sich selbst, so ist alles, was er in sich hat, auch er selbst. So hat er in sich Weisheit, Güte und Segen und ist somit selbst reine Weisheit, Güte und Segen. In diesem ist es (jedoch) weit anders: denn es ist Schönheit, Rundheit und Bewegung in der Welt; da diese aufgrund zufälliger Zugehörigkeit in ihr sind, ist nichts davon zugleich die Welt selbst.«¹¹

Aus dem zitierten Auszug sowie aus dem darauf folgenden Text im Buch ergibt sich Hermanns Behauptung »denn es ist Schönheit in der Welt«. Die Welt, diese unsere Welt ist also nicht ohne Schönheit. *Denn es ist Schönheit in der Welt!* Aber sie ist nicht die Welt selbst, sie ergibt sich nicht aus der Welt, sondern ist in der Welt (per accidens!), so wie die Weisheit, wenn sie denn in der Welt ist, von ihrem »weisen Künstler« ist, also nach ihrem Schöpfer, dem *summus artifex, prudentissimus artifex*. Die Schönheit ist nicht weltlich, son-

⁹ HERMAN DALMATIN, op. cit., Kapitel 15,2, kroatische Übersetzung S. 74; lat. *creatio quidem a primordio principiorum ex nichilo; generatio autem rerum ex antedatis principiis usque nunc*. Bd. I, S. 209.

¹⁰ Op. cit., Kapitel 14,3, S. 74; lat. *quod unus ipse primus et novissimus, unus omnipotens, unus totius universitatis auctor; omnis quidem in essentiae suae integritate motus extraneus; omnis namque motus eius in opere eius, quemadmodum virtus quidem in auctore semper eadem et componens et resolvens*. Bd. I S. 209. Kursiv im Zitat von Z.P.

¹¹ Op. cit., Kapitel 13,3-5, S. 73 (Kursiv im Zitat von Z.P.); lat. *conditor etenim, siquidem aeternus ideoque a se ipso est, quidquid in se habet, idem ipse est. (4) sic sapientiam, bonum, beatitudinem, ut idem ipsa sapientia, bonum, beatitudo. (5) in his longe aliter: inest enim mundo pulcritudo, rotunditas, motus; quae cum illi per accidens insint, nec aliquid eorum ipse mundus est*, Bd. I, S. 208 f.

dern göttlich, dennoch finden wir sie in der Welt, und das ist eben jene schöne und einträchtig harmonisch geordnete Welt der Bewegung, die Ordnung des Universums, wo »vom Ursprung an durch Vermischung die *bewunderungswürdige Ordnung der Natur* gewoben wird«¹², von der Hermann aus Dalmatien am Ende seines Werkes mit Begeisterung spricht.

Jetzt verbleibt nur noch zu zeigen, welches das Prinzip ist, das die Schönheit bzw. Eintracht, Harmonie und Ordnung der Dinge in der Welt und der Welt selbst ausmacht. Dabei hält sich Hermann aus Dalmatien, so könnte man sagen, an die »pythagoreisch-platonische Sekte« und spricht von »jenem himmlischen Rhythmus, den die Pythagoreer feiern«¹³. Die Harmonie und Schönheit der Welt machen die *zahlenmäßigen Verhältnisse als rechtes Maß aller Dinge* aus. Daher stammt auch die mehr als eine Analogie darstellende Identifikation mathematischer Zahlenstrukturen mit der Sphäre der Musik oder umgekehrt der Musik der Sphären. Und obwohl sich Hermann aus Dalmatien nicht in herkömmliche, traditionelle Distinktionen der »*musica mundana*«, »*musica humana*« oder »*musica coelestis*« flüchtet, ist die Art seiner Anschauungen in dieser Hinsicht unverkennbar.

In seinen Erörterungen auf dem Gebiet der »Musik« (natürlich unter Beachtung der historischen Unterschiede in der Auffassung des Termins »*musica*« in der Antike und im Mittelalter gegenüber unserem zeitgenössischen Sprachgebrauch) ist Hermann aus Dalmatien unmissverständlich, denn am Ende des ersten Buches seiner Abhandlung *De essentiis* schreibt er: »Wenn also, wie es den Musikern genhm, jede starke Bewegung Klang verursacht und wenn es keine musikalische Harmonie gibt außer in Stimmen, die sich proportional unterscheiden, so verleiht jenem himmlischen Rhythmus, den die Pythagoreer feiern, die Umdrehung der Erde das rechte Maß, weil die Stimmen auf die Entfernung der Intervalle antworten und sich in *harmonischem Rhythmus* mit der Dauer der einzelnen Bewegungen im Einklang mit dem Aufgang und Untergang der Sterne verändern«¹⁴. Es handelt sich hier offensichtlich um Harmonien in Musikstrukturen, diejenige Schönheit, die als Musik der Sphären gegeben ist, aber dennoch so, dass es erforderlich ist, die *Analogie* zu erkennen zwischen dem, was *musica mun-*

¹² Op. cit., Kapitel 101,3, S. 164. (Kursiv im Zitat von Z.P.); lat. *a commixtionis origine mirandus naturae textitur ordo*, Bd. I, S. 290.

¹³ Op. cit., Kapitel 48,1, S. 112; lat. *caelestem illam modulationem, quam Pitagorici canunt*, Bd. I, S. 243.

¹⁴ Op. cit., Kapitel 48,1, S. 112 (Kursiv im Zitat von Z.P.). Lat. *Si ergo, ut musicis placet, omnis validus motus sonitum reddit nec ulla consonantia nisi sonorum proportionaliter differentium, caelestem illam modulationem, quam Pitagorici canunt, mundi circumactio temperat sonis ad intervallorum distantiam respondentibus singulis momentis iuxta ascensus et descensus stellarum harmonica modulatione variatis*, Bd. I, S. 243.

dana, und dem, was *musica humana* ist; ergo die Analogie zwischen der »bewunderungswürdigen Ordnung der Natur« und der Kunst.

All die Bewegungen aber, von denen früher und soeben die Rede war, all die Bewegungen, die die Harmonie der Welt, der himmlischen Sphären, Sterne und aller Dinge ausmachen, haben als Ursache, in ihren gegenseitigen Beziehungen, »die Macht der Liebe«, *vis amoris*¹⁵. Für Hermann aus Dalmatien ist das offenbar ein metaphysisches Prinzip, das gesondert behandelt werden sollte. Die Musik als durch Zahlenverhältnisse ausgedrücktes Harmonieprinzip hat dabei auch ihre wörtliche und für uns heute auch eine metaphorische und nicht selten symbolische Bedeutung. Da nun die Musik im ursprünglichen Sinne doch wörtlich gemeint ist, lediglich mit dem Unterschied, dass wir die eine Art von Musik kennen, sie aber als Menschen nicht hören, während wir die andere Art tatsächlich vernehmen, so fällt gerade der Musik als Kunst eine privilegierte Stellung zu, denn schon »(Hermes) Trimegistos erkannte, dass den Göttern hinsichtlich menschlicher Ehrerweisung nichts lieber ist als eine musikalische Gabe, und die erprobte Erfahrung fast aller Jahrhunderte bezeugt, dass allein die Musik der Anbetung eines göttlichen Wesens würdig ist, (die Musik), die natürlich für den Bund der allumfassenden Welt in unaufhörlichem Einklang jene wunderbaren Reigen himmlischer Jungfrauen einträchtig singen«¹⁶.

Davon, dass es sich in der Tat – unter anderem – auch um die Musik als einer der menschlichen Künste handelt, ist deshalb auszugehen, weil Hermann aus Dalmatien trotz unterschiedlichster Einflüsse bemüht war, mit den offenbarten Wahrheiten des Christentums im Einklang zu sein, also auch mit der Bibel, wo es im Buch *Genesis* unzweideutig heißt, die Kunst und namentlich die Musik sei ein Werk des Menschen, das, wie ausdrücklich im *150. Psalm* verlangt, zum Lobe Gottes eingesetzt werden soll. Ebenso unzweifelhaft verstand er die Musik auch im Sinne der traditionellen *septem artes liberales*, wo die Musik außer als ein *Können* auch als *Wissen* den Charakter astrologisch-mathematischer Erkenntnisse besitzt. Dem fügt Hermann aus Dalmatien allerdings gerade im oben zitierten Schluss des ersten Buches seiner Abhandlung eine weitere, dritte Dimension, nämlich die der mythologisch-symbolischen Bedeutung hinzu, die am Beginn der Abhandlung in der Einleitung ebenso wie am Ende des zweiten Buches zu finden ist,

¹⁵ Op. cit., Kapitel 48,3.

¹⁶ Op. cit., Ende des ersten Buches der Abhandlung *De essentiis*, Kapitel 48, 4. Absatz. Lat. *Trimegistos intellexit nichil superis ex hominum officio musicae munere gratius et omnium fere saeculorum usus expertus solam musicam divinitatis veneratione dignam, quippe quam admirabiles illae caelestium choreae virginum in universi mundi foedus perpetuo concentu modulantur*, Bd. 1, S. 244. Hermann aus Dalmatien spielt offensichtlich auf den Chor der Engelsstimmen an und suggeriert zugleich den antiken Chor der Muses.

wodurch er, man könnte meinen absichtlich, das Problem komplizierter macht und uns in die Suche nach neuen, adäquaten resp. der adäquatesten Lösungen entlässt. Die assoziative Verflechtung »himmlischer Jungfrauen« und von Engelschören, die (zugleich!) den Musenchor suggerieren, sollte als wohl unsichere und schwache, aber doch reale historische Brücke zwischen entfernten Jahrhunderten, der fernen Antike und der bevorstehenden Renaissance aufgefasst werden. Daher auch neben dem metaphysischen manchmal sogar das mystische Musikverständnis, das als Paradigma der irdischen Kunst mit oder ohne göttliche Attribute dienen muss und kann¹⁷.

Insbesondere wegen der soeben aufgezeigten Sinnschwankungen dürfen wir eine wichtige Stelle in Hermanns Abhandlung nicht vernachlässigen, wo von einer Kunst die Rede ist, die nicht verschiedene Antithesen beinhaltet, sondern einfach, im strengen Sinne des Wortes, die Kunst als irdische ästhetische Aktivität des Menschen darstelle. Es geht um die Poesie. Hermann aus Dalmatien spricht von der Poesie im Zusammenhang mit philosophischen Problemen der Seele, wobei er uns beiläufig mit der damals verbreiteten mittelalterlichen Auffassung von der Poesie, aber zugleich auch mit seiner eigenen vertraut macht und den seines Erachtens richtigen Zugang zur Poesie vorträgt.

Bemerkenswert ist der Umstand, dass Hermanns Poesieverständnis mit der Frage nach den Erkenntnisvermögen der Seele verknüpft ist, mit der Frage, was und wie die Seele sehen kann, im Besonderen mit der Frage: »Sieht sie (die Seele) auch ohne Augen«. Hermanns Antwort fällt vollkommen eindeutig aus. Die Seele sieht dann nämlich »auch in einem Körper ohne Augen trotzdem – obgleich auch der sehende Geist selbst ruht – (sogar) viel leichter, da sie schon keiner Anwesenheit der Dinge und keiner Hilfe von der äußeren oder körperlichen Welt bedarf, denn sie *sieht naturgemäß auch das, was der fernen Zukunft angehört*, und sie hat *dieselbe Kraft in der möglichen Existenz der Dinge wie in der realen*«. Er fährt fort: »Denn sollte sie einmal anders sehen, als die *Wahrheit von den Dingen* ist, so kommt dies von der körperlichen Hemmnis. Deshalb hat die *P o e s i e* den Träumen eine Tür aus Elfenbein hinzugefügt, denn sie sieht am besten *das Wahre*, aber da sie behindert ist vom körperlichen Bund, sieht sie *durch andere Gestalten und auf Umwegen, durch Rätsel und wie in einem Spiegel*. So ist es also folgerichtig,

¹⁷ Eine mögliche Interpretation der Musik bei Hermann aus Dalmatien lieferte seinerzeit Stanislav TUKSAR, *Glazbeno-teoretski fragmenti dvaju hrvatskih autora srednjega vijeka: Hermana Dalmatina i Petra Pavla Vergerija st. Zbornik radova četvrtog simpozija iz povijesti znanosti, Hrvatsko prirodoslovno društvo, Zagreb 1983.* (Musikalisch-theoretische Fragmente zweier kroatischer Autoren des Mittelalters: des Hermann aus Dalmatien und Petar Pavao Vergeri d. Ä., Veröffentlichung der Arbeiten des vierten Symposiums zur Geschichte der Wissenschaften. Kroatische Naturwissenschaftliche Gesellschaft.)

dass die Seele in ihrer Aktualität auch die übrigen Sinne mit ihren Leiden enthält, mit deren Hilfe sie, ungeachtet ihrer natürlichen Körperlosigkeit, dennoch körperliche Kraft spürt und erleidet...«¹⁸.

In der Behandlung der Seele legt Hermann aus Dalmatien also zugleich seine ästhetischen Anschauungen, genauer seine Kunstauffassung dar. Explizit ist die Rede von der Poesie, doch da er vom Sehen spricht, das sich nicht zwangsläufig ausschließlich auf die Poesie bezieht, und ausdrücklich die »übrigen Sinne« erwähnt, ist die Schlussfolgerung berechtigt, dass auch alle anderen (klassischen) Künste gemeint sind. Hermann stellt die Frage, ob die Seele auch ohne körperliche Augen sehe (oder, was dasselbe ist, ob die Seele ohne körperliches Ohr höre), und beantwortet sie affirmativ, was praktisch bedeutet, dass sich seine Anschauungen nicht im Bereich der Poesie erschöpfen, sondern sich gleichermaßen auf die Musik und alle bildenden Künste beziehen. Aber was bedeutet die Aussage, die Seele sehe ohne körperliche Augen sogar besser? Auf die Kunst angewandt, meint sie offenbar eine Art Intuition und das, was wir Imagination nennen. (Mit einer gewagten Projektion in die Moderne könnte sogar der Begriff der »conceptual art« ins Spiel kommen.)

Hermann aus Dalmatien weist jedoch explizit auf die Poesie hin, in der sich die althergebrachte Kunstauffassung am deutlichsten offenbart, und hebt hervor, dass die Seele in ihrem Sehen ohne Augen die »Wahrheit von den Dingen« erkennt, so dass die Poesie auch in ihren oneirischen Aspekten »vor allem das Wahre sieht«. Demnach verbindet Hermann aus Dalmatien neben der pythagoreisch-platonischen Tradition der mathematisch-zahlenmäßig idealen Determinierung der Schönheit (als Harmonie, Symmetrie, Proportion, Maß, Verhältnismäßigkeit usw.) mit der Kunst offensichtlich die wiederum platonische (!) These von der Verbundenheit von *Wahrheit* und Kunst bzw. mittelbar auch von Wahrheit und Schönheit.

Wie bereits hervorgehoben, muss all dem noch ein charakteristisches Merkmal von Hermanns eigener Kunstauffassung und der seiner Zeit hinzugefügt werden, und zwar das allgemeine Verständnis ästhetischer Phäno-

¹⁸ HERMAN DALMATIN, *De essentiis – Rasprava o bitima*, kroatische Übersetzung, Pula, 1990, zweites Buch, Kapitel 68, 5–8, S. 130. (Kursiv im Zitat von Z.P. Das Wort *Poesie* im Zitat ebenfalls von Z.P. hervorgehoben.) Lat. *igitur videtne etiam sine oculis? videt plane et multo purius, cum plerumque et in corpore sine oculis tamen ipso etiam spiritu visibili auxilio egens, quippe cum et longe futura videat et aequam habeat vim tam in potenciali quam actuali existentia rerum. (6) nam si quandoque aliter videat quam rei sit veritas, corporei est obstaculi. (7) unde et portam eburneam sompniis poesis addidit, quod vero plerumque verum quidem sed per alias figuras et ambages corporeo nexu obducta per aenigma et quasi in speculo videt. (8) ita ergo animam et ceteros sensus cum suis passionibus actu ipso retinere consequens est, quibus, licet naturaliter incorporea, vim tamen corpoream sentiat et patiatur*, Bd. I, S. 259.

mene in der Epoche des Mittelalters. Wenn nämlich die Poesie (oder die Kunst allgemein) »das Wahre« oder »die Wahrheit« nicht unmittelbar und klar sehen kann, so sieht man sie »durch andere Gestalten und auf Umwegen«. Hermann aus Dalmatien weist eindeutig auf den *allegorischen* bzw. *symbolischen Charakter* der mittelalterlichen Texte oder der Kunst überhaupt hin. Das ist ein Phänomen, das eine spezifische Hermeneutik verlangt, denn anders, als nur zu oft gedacht wird, war die Kunst vergangener Zeiten nichts immer und in allem aus der eigenen Zeit und für die eigene Epoche an sich und bis zuletzt Selbstverständliches. Symbolik und allegorischer Charakter der Kunst ist im Gegenteil das, was man immer vor Augen haben sollte, wenn man es mit Kunstwerken des Mittelalters zu tun hat, auch wenn sie uns beeindruckten, selbst wenn wir die Komplexität ihrer Bedeutung nicht immer und in allem zu entziffern vermögen.

Hermann aus Dalmatien macht darauf aufmerksam, dass die Kunst seiner Zeit, die Poesie vor allem, »durch Rätsel und wie in einem Spiegel« zu uns spricht. Natürlich bedeutet auch der Begriff des Spiegels hier primär den Bezug auf die mimetische Theorie, doch die Konvention des Spiegelillusionismus ist viel tragender und gehört in diesem Sinne zu den *loci communes*, den Gemeinplätzen des Mittelalters, die mit all ihren Implikationen und zu kristallklarer Schärfe evoluierend bis in Shakespeares Zeit gültig bleiben sollten, wo dann im »Hamlet« der Vergleich mit dem Spiegel die Funktion und Aufgabe des Schauspielers wiedergibt, wie im übrigen auch in der kroatischen glagolitischen Literatur, deren Ursprung im Mittelalter liegt (etwa die Texte aus der Petris-Sammlung von 1468), wo ein anonymes Scriptor schreibt: »Und nun meine lieben Brüder nehmt diese Bücher und haltet sie euch wie Spiegel vor die Augen«. Diese Art von gespiegeltem literarischem (ästhetischen) »Illusionismus« und mimetischer Wiedergabe der Dinge hat offensichtlich den Charakter der Mahnung, Belehrung und des ethisch-moralischen Appells und eröffnet über die physische, materielle Wirklichkeit die Dimension der seelisch-geistigen Welt. Deshalb sieht nicht nur die Seele, sondern auch die Poesie »viel leichter, da sie schon keiner Anwesenheit der Dinge und keiner Hilfe von der äußeren oder körperlichen Welt bedarf, denn sie sieht naturgemäß auch das, was der fernen Zukunft angehört, und sie hat dieselbe Kraft in der möglichen Existenz der Dinge wie in der realen«. Ohne die Verknüpfung zwischen der Poesie und dem Dinglichen zu leugnen, hat die Öffnung des Blickes in die Zukunft nicht nur eine kosmologisch-astrologische Komponente, sondern man sollte darin zweifellos die Begründung der These sehen, die den Poeten, da er außer in der vergangenen auch in der gegenwärtigen und zukünftigen Welt »das Wahre am besten sieht« – eigentlich zum *poeta vates* erklärt.

Nach diesen Ausführungen kann kein Zweifel mehr bestehen, dass uns eine sorgfältige Lektüre und gründliche Auseinandersetzung mit dem sinn-

trächtigen Reichtum von Hermanns lapidaren Aussagen und Formulierungen zu der Überzeugung führen muss, dass er es in seiner Weltanschauung nicht unterlässt, zu ästhetischen Phänomenen bzw. zu den Fragen wie der Schönheit so auch der Kunst Stellung zu beziehen.

Abschließend steht jedoch fest: auch trotz der Unvollständigkeit des »Registers wichtigerer Wörter« (angestrebt war wohl ein sog. Sachregister, *index rerum*) in der kroatischen Ausgabe, das *den Begriff der Schönheit nicht enthält* (*pulchritudo* oder zumindest *ornatus*), während das Lexem *artifex* für unabkömmlich befunden wurde, ist hier, wie wir hoffen, ausreichend klar und explizit dargestellt worden, dass Hermann aus Dalmatien und sein Traktat *De essentiis* auch unter ästhetischem Aspekt interpretiert werden können und *müssen* und es daher erforderlich und unverzichtbar ist, sie in das Corpus der ästhetischen Anschauungen, die herkömmlicherweise die kroatische Ästhetik bilden, aufzunehmen. Der Umstand, dass es nicht stets möglich war, Hermanns Lehren unmittelbar zu lesen und zu studieren, ist sicherlich als bedauerenswert zu beurteilen, jedoch kein Grund, ihn nicht in die kroatische Ästhetik einzugliedern oder gar, was noch schlimmer wäre, aus seinen Erörterungen deduktiv nicht auch seine »Ästhetik« abzuleiten. Denn zusammen mit den Anschauungen der Schule, der er angehörte, wurden seine ästhetischen Standpunkte während des 12. Jh.s als epochale Vorwegnahme der Thesen des sich ankündigenden bahnbrechenden Zeitalters von Humanismus und Renaissance in die europäische Ästhetikgeschichte tradiert.

Es soll noch erwähnt werden, dass einige Autoren Hermanns Zeitalter wörtlich als *The Renaissance of the 12th Century*¹⁹ bezeichneten und es als analog, in der Intensität jedoch der sog. »Karolingischen Renaissance« als überlegen bewerteten. Erkannt wurden die historischen (nicht nur ästhetischen!) Momente, die den dynamischen Charakter jener Zeit (Peter Hübner) in zwei Richtungen offenbarten: zum einen hinsichtlich neuer naturalistisch-vitalistischer Vorstellungen, zum anderen im Sinne der weltanschaulichen erneuerten und bereicherten reformorientierten Tradition, die sich vorwiegend auf den heiligen Paulus und Augustinus berief, aber auch auf spätantike und allgemein antike Komponenten. Es handelt sich um Erkenntnisse, die, wie wir den Resultaten neuerer spezialisierter Untersuchungen entnehmen können, im Gegensatz zu den herkömmlichen Vorstellungen vom Mittelalter als einem finsternen Zeitalter, das von einer unüberwindbaren Statik gekennzeichnet war, den dynamischen Charakter der Gedankenwelt und Weltanschauung des ausklingenden 11. und beginnenden 12. Jh.s unterstreichen, einer Zeit, in der auch Hermann aus Dalmatien aktiv war, obwohl er, soweit uns bekannt, sich persönlich weder für noch gegen diese oder jene Orientie-

¹⁹ HASKINS, Charles Homer, *Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science*, Cambridge 1924.

rung aussprach und offensichtlich in beiden Richtungen wirkte. Dabei wird besonders vor einer voreiligen Gleichsetzung der »Renaissance des 12. Jh.s« und dem, was historiographisch üblicherweise unter dem Begriff Humanismus und Renaissance im 15. und 16. Jh. verstanden wird, gewarnt²⁰. Trotz der verständlichen Ablehnung von Gleichsetzungen, Analogien und inhaltlich engeren »Verknüpfungen« dieser Epochen geben uns einige andere neuere Untersuchungen und Datierungen der Renaissance Anlass zu der Behauptung, dass gerade auch Hermanns intellektuell-philosophisches Wirken unter anderem die anbrechende Epoche des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts vorbereitete, in der, wenn auch ohne direkte Namensnennung, Reflexe der Lehren Hermanns und der Schule von Chartres in ihren Folgeerscheinungen am Horizont der europäischen Renaissance und damit auch bei anderen kroatischen Autoren und Autoren im national-geographisch verstandenen Kroatien auftauchen sollten.

Im übrigen brachte Hermann aus Dalmatien, dem die Schwierigkeiten und Missstände des Lebens im Mittelalter gewiss nicht verborgen geblieben waren und ihn wohl auch nicht verschonten, die Kraft, den Mut und die Verstandesschärfe auf zu erkennen: »denn es ist Schönheit in der Welt«, eine Erkenntnis, die er für seine Epoche feststellte und bekräftigte, ohne zeitliche und offensichtlich auch räumliche, territoriale Einschränkung, weshalb sein Gedanke fast wie ein Memento nicht nur in die Zeit des Humanismus und der Renaissance in der ganzen Welt (des Abendlandes) nachklingt, sondern sogar bis in unsere »dürftige Zeit« an der Schwelle vom zweiten zum dritten europäischen Millennium. Im Gedenken an Hermann aus Dalmatien sollte es immer wieder möglich sein, imperativisch zu behaupten: »denn es ist Schönheit in der Welt« (oder es sollte sie zumindest sein)! Wenn wir sie in dieser unserer Welt und Zeit nicht sehen, sollten wir sie entdecken, wenn sie nicht mehr da ist, sollten wir sie wieder erschaffen! Doch trotz all der Schrecken und hässlichen Dinge unserer Zeit, trotz des schwindelerregenden Aufschwungs der Technik (und Wissenschaft?), einhergehend mit dem Zerfall der Werte, mit dem »progressiven« Verlust von Sinn und Würde der Kunst, dürfen wir nie wieder die ausgesprochene Erkenntnis und positive Behauptung, sozusagen das Memento des Hermann aus Dalmatien vergessen, nämlich jene bekannte Präsenz von Schönheiten in der Welt; dass es sie noch gibt; dass es unzulässig ist, sie zu vernachlässigen, verlassen, verkommen zu lassen; dass wir es lediglich vermögen müssen, sie als echt und wesentlich, als

²⁰ Vgl. Peter HIBST, *»Renaissance« und »Reform«; Begriffsgeschichte; Untersuchungen zu Vorstellungen von Wandel und Erneuerung im späten 11. und 12. Jahrhundert*, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, Bd. XXXIX, Bonn, 1996, Akademie der Wissenschaft und Literatur zu Mainz, herausgegeben in Verbindung mit Hans Georg GADAMER und Karlfried GRÜNDER von Günter SCHOLTZ.

wahr zu erkennen, als solche zu entdecken, zu empfinden, zu erleben, zu verstehen, zu schätzen, zu bewahren und zu leben.

AUS DEM KROATISCHEN VON
VESNA IVANČEVIĆ JEŽEK

»JEST NAIME LJEPOTA U SVIJETU«

Estetički momenti u djelu *De essentiis* Hermana Dalmatina.

Jedno izostavljeno važno poglavlje u hrvatskoj srednjovjekovnoj estetici

Sažetak

Nimalo zanemariv događaj objavljivanja tiskom glavnog djela Hermana Dalmatina *De essentiis* s izvornim latinskim tekstom i paralelnim hrvatskim prijevodom u Hrvatskoj nije pobudio nekih ozbiljnijih znanstvenih razmatranja pripadne mu estetičke problematike čak ni u obliku upozorenja na (ne)postojanje takve tematizacije u svjetskoj literaturi. Donekle iznenadujuće jer je riječ o važnom udjelu Hermanova opusa u povijesti zapadnoeuropske kulture uopće! Zbog toga je proučavanju glavnog djela Hermana Dalmatina, filozofa i učenjaka koji je prvi na Zapadu preveo *Kur'an*, potrebno dodati još i estetičku dimenziju kao konstitutivnu komponentu spisa *De essentiis*. Hermanovi estetički nazori razmatrani su stoga neodvojeni od njegove filozofije u cjelini, u obzoru »dinamičkog karaktera epohe« koja prema shvaćanjima nekih historiografa strukturira svojevrsnu »renesansu 12. stoljeća«. Hermanovi su estetički nazori prikazani u svjetlu neposrednih utjecaja teologijske i filozofijske škole u Chartresu, unutar sklopa srednjovjekovno-kršćanskih estetičkih nazora nastalih pod utjecajem tragova pitagorejsko-platonske struje mišljenja. Upozoreno je na nekoliko najvažnijih pojmovno-kategorijalnih kompleksa.

Za Hermana se npr. pojam forme očituje i u estetičkoj funkciji. Nadalje, Herman se služi ključnim toposom srednjovjekovnog tumačenja Božjeg stvaranja usporedbom s umjetnikom (*summus artifex*) i umjetnošću iz koje će u obratnom izvodu tijekom povijesti proizići poimanje umjetnosti kao stvaralaštva. U tom kontekstu postaje razumljivim zašto je umjetnost srednjovjekovlja, navlastito pjesnička, impregnirana simboličkim i alegorijskim značenjima. Herman osim toga slijedi vrlo tipičnu tradiciju koncepta estetičke kozmologije, svijeta kao matematički određive harmonije manifestne u fenomenu *musica coelestis* (glazba sfera) s jedne, i u distinktivno korespondentnim fenomenima *musica humana* s druge, ovozemaljske strane. Otud je Hermanu moguća za srednji vijek važna tvrdnja o postojanju ljepote u svijetu, koja doduše nije ovosvjetska *sui generis*, ali pripada onome što uistinu jest u svijetu. Tako je srednjovjekovlje, iz čije se tradicije i Hermanovom zaslugom prepoznala mogućnost preporoda antike, na estetičkom planu imanentnom smislenu-povijesnom pretpostavkom dolazećoj epohi humanizma i renesanse.

THE REFLECTIONS OF PETRIĆ'S IDEAS AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE IN THE CREATION OF JAN AMOS KOMENSKÝ'S PANSOPHICAL IMAGE OF THE WORLD

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Original Paper
UDC 19 Petrić, Komenský

Many of Petrić's ideas and concepts, especially the concept of the totality of the world, Petrić's concept of philosophy as the knowledge of totality, the totality of knowledge, Petrić's epistemology of history, the system of natural philosophy, metaphysics of light, the concept of establishing a universal language, were either assimilated in the works written by various authors during his century and the centuries which followed (G. Bruno, J. A. Komenský, G. W. Leibniz), or they can be identified as forming elements of their philosophies. Moreover, not even as central problems, but as the framework of questions within which modern thought is established, deliberating the world and man.

In the center of one of the dialogs written by Annibale Romei¹, in the discussion led on the seventh day («Dell'arme e delle lettere»), and in which Petrić took part as one of the most noble and distinguished participants, a »vero campione di tutti i letterati«² (he also participated in the first, third, fourth, and fifth dialogs, discussing beauty, honor, peace, and nobility, and in which Romei was under dominant influence of Petrić's philosophical views concerning beauty, love, the philosophy of light, and harmony), is man and his true aim, happiness³, and man can reach it by the speculative intellect (philosophy, wisdom) and by the practical one (*artes liberales*). »Signor

¹ *Discorsi di Annibale Romei*, in: A. Solerti, *Ferrara e la corte Estense nella seconda metà del sec. decimosesto*, Città di Castello, 1891.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 275.

³ *Ib.*, p. 261.

Patrizi enumerando le scienze e le arti liberali» was rebuked in the dialog for »non l'ha posta nel suo catalogo«⁴. Romei felt the crisis of humanist criteria on Petrić's case, leaving us a note on the issue as a witness of the historical change, a total crisis that Petrić had responded to with his new philosophy, rhetoric, and poetics. In particular, with the notions of *ingenium*, *concetto*, and *meraviglioso*, fantasy, the fictional, creative freedom, the basic notions of the poetics of mannerism, the notions of an expression of the baroque spiritual feeling best represented in painting, notions which express the supremacy of the speculative factor in surpassing two contradictory regions, the realms of reality and language. Petrić's intellectual independence from authority opinions depicts the novel spiritual climate of the time, the creation of new criteria of truth. Petrić's entire philosophy, a contemplation or a science of truth⁵, his (encyclopedic) system of a novel universal philosophy is intended to grasp the truth of the Universe and the universal truth of things, the theater of the world. This model of a Renaissance epistemological program guided the authors of great, and not accidentally not completed encyclopedic and pansophical schemes, like Komenský, or Kircher who had been searching for the bond between mundane and secret knowledges (*Ars magna*, 1648)⁶. The *orbis doctrinae* of the humanist image of the world lasted uninterruptedly to Komenský's *Orbis pictus*, and the concept of encyclopedia remained in connection with the philosophical tradition of thought, as well as the concept of philology, until the semantic changes which were established at the end of the seventeenth century, canceling their past sinonimity. It is not hard to discern traces of Petrić's thought in the new organization of knowledge, based on a real knowledge of facts and the experience of the reality of the century of scientific and philosophical naturalism. Numerous titles of works published at the end of the sixteenth century and throughout the seventeenth century, concerning the function of knowledge in man's life, *uomo universale*, bear witness to that.

The aim of the pansophical endeavors is a unity of all men in knowledge, abolition of borders, an ultimate pan-harmony. The images of a universal book, universal school, universal language, as expounded in his works, from the early *La Città felice* to his conception of a philosophical system, are Re-

⁴ *Ib.*, p. 275.

⁵ »... recte vero, philosophia scientia veritatis dicitur. Contemplativa philosophia, cuius finis veritas est«, Ioannis Philoponi Breves sed apprime doctae et utiles *Expositiones In omnes XIII. Aristotelis libros eos qui vocantur Metaphysici* quas Franciscus Patricius de Graecis, Latinas fecerat, Ferrariae, apud Dominicum Mamarellum MDLXXXIII, in: *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca versiones Latinae temporis resuscitarum litterarum* (CAGL), Ch. Lohr (ed.), Vol. 2, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1991, p. 7.

⁶ A. Kircher, *Parisinus capucinus, Digestium sapientiae... scientiarum omnium rerum divinarum atque humanarum nexus et ad prima principia reductio*, Paris, 1648.

naissance metaphors of man – *the magnum miraculum, mysterium magnum* (the letters are in man, not in books!), a praise of human creative thought, unlike mere erudition, a humanist ideal of the past.

A number of Petrić's ideas, transformed by the Reformation in Europe, by a general social and political insecurity, the Thirty Year's War, the Swedish-polish war, constant Turkish threat, and the spiritual, religious, political, and educational crisis, the conflict between knowledge and faith, philosophical thought and ignorance, by a corrupted world, were reflected in the fundamental philosophical tenets of Jan Amos Komenský / Comenius (1592–1670), the basis of his entire pedagogical and reformatory work.

Jan Komenský from Moravia⁷, a European reformer, writer, pedagogue, philosopher, linguist, and a humanist proper, was familiar with the philosophical-theological heritage of European humanism, with alchemist works, mystical and Caballistic works, with Classical, Christian, and Aristotelian Scholastic traditions, the tradition of Renaissance Neo-Platonism, Utopian literatures of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as well as with Cartesian philosophy, and he partly adopted their elements, partly opposed them, and partly transformed them. He was able to do so because of his studies: the Latin school in Přešov, philosophical and theological studies in Herborn and Heidelberg (1611–1618), scientific circles, and travel. Inspirations stemming from the Renaissance Neo-Platonists and great works of the »new epoch of philosophy«, as he wrote about Bacon's and Campanella's works, have indubitably had effects on Komenský's knowledge and world-view in the philosophical perspective, and were ultimately the decisive factors in his program of a future renewal of knowledge and education. His large opus⁸ testifies to the resuscitated ancient humanist hope for the realization of the ideal of a great united humanity, a community of free people. The basis of this is philosophy, in the sense of »scientia rerum divinarum et humanarum«⁹. As he

⁷ On the occasion of the 400th anniversary of J. A. Komenský's birth, A. Vukasović wrote about his work in 15 articles in the »Školske novine«, from January 1 to April 21, 1992, with special concern to the presence of his ideas among Croats and his significance in Croatian education and pedagogical thought.

⁸ We shall list some of his works relevant for this paper: *Theatrum divinum; Theatrum universitatis rerum*, 1623; *De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio catholica*, 1644; *lanua linguarum reserata*, 1631; *Labyrinth der Welt und Paradies des Herzens*, 1631; *Prodrromus pansophiae*, 1639; *Via lucis*, 1641.

⁹ There is a large body of literature on the significance and the role of religion and philosophy in J. A. Komenský's pedagogy and his philosophical views; we list several works published in the last decades: H. B. Lentzen-Deis, *Die Rolle und Bedeutung der Religion in der Pädagogik des Jan Amos Comenius*, Ratingen, 1969; J. Červenka, *Die Naturphilosophie des Johann Amos Comenius*, Praha-Hanau, 1970; J. Patočka, *Die Philosophie der Erziehung des J. A. Comenius*, Paderborn, 1971; G. N. Dschibladse, *Filosofija Komenskogo*, Moskva, 1982; *Comenius Erkennen-*

wrote in the Foreword to his »Orbis pictus« (Wien 1776), the true, complete and thorough knowledge / erudition (*eruditio vera, plena et solida*) can form the man, his spirit, and thus improve human relations; it is only through wisdom (*uřemoudrost*), and with faith, that man can achieve well-being and happiness. Komenský expressed his anthropological tenets, ethic doctrines, and world-view in mannerist images, metaphors and symbols. The labyrinth is a symbol of the struggle between the good and wisdom on the one hand and the torments and ignorance on the other, an allegory of man's pilgrimage through a chaotic world, the town – a labyrinth of Komenský's time, a voyage to the castle of happiness, a quiet port, as he wrote to his patron K. Žerotínski, accompanied by justice, virtue and safety. It is with the help provided by mind, reason, and the Revelation that man strides toward light; in the pansophical vision of a renewed world, it is but an international academy of arts and crafts. *De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio* expounds his basic philosophical tenets, analogous to Petrić's ones in many ways, even formally, in Komenský's manner of construing and structuring of the work, like Petrić's *Nova de universis philosophia*, in seven parts (PANERGESIA, universal awakening; PANAUGIA, universal understanding; PANSOFIA or PANTAXIA, universal wisdom; PANPAEDIA, common education; PANGLOTTIA, common language; PANORTHOSIA, universal scientific, religious and political improvement; PANUTHEsia, universal deliberation, a scheme of his universal renewal)¹⁰. In the symmetric arrangement of all the parts (with the center in »Panpaedia«), and in the place of »Panorthosia« in this order of the world, the new universal philosophy, universal wisdom, is not merely formally evident – in the structural analogy with Petrić's major philosophical work – but also in its internal, organic, problem-ideational interdependence. The theses Komenský uses to build his philosophy (pansophy) on point at Petrić as one of his sources: his concepts of the creative principle of nature, creationism, and the very understanding of philosophy as a knowledge of wisdom – in Komenský, the temple of wisdom – the wisdom that is a knowledge of the entirety of the world – in Komenský, a universal view of the world, knowledge of the comprehensiveness of the world, a universal encyclopedia – the thought of the entirety of knowledge – the reflection of the world, pansophy in Komenský, the knowledge of the reason and the purpose of the world,

Glauben. Con. Colloquium Herborn, 1984; J. Popelova, *Filozofia Jana A. Komenského*, Bratislava, 1986; J. Pánek, *Comenius Lehrer der Nationen*, Prag, 1991. On the literature on Komenský, see: J. Sedlak, *O zahraničnich komentologických bibliografiach z let 1652–1988*, in: »Studia Comeniana et historica«, 1991, 43, pp. 115–161.

¹⁰ Two sections of this work, comprising nearly three thousand pages, albeit uncompleted, were published during Komenský's life; the rest of the manuscript, as well as his pansophical lexicon, *Lexicon reale pansophicum*, was found in a library in Halle in 1934.

of God, man, and human society, the science of sciences. Man, in his relation with nature, Komenský believes, follows Aristotle's philosophy and Neo-Platonic doctrines, directed to light and knowledge. Knowledge (light, philosophy) expounds the essence of the world, the visible things (*omnium fundamentalium in Mundo rerum, rerum omnium visibilium*) and the first, the One (*Unum necessarium*) reflected in them (Petrić's omni-light, Panaugia). The philosophical concept and the methodological approach (a synthesis of various separate knowledges), Komenský's pansophy is a praise of thought, its comprehensiveness, the foundation and the source of all the disciplines of knowledge.

Komenský's gnoseological deliberations also correspond to Petrić's at the speculative level. The roots and sources of all knowledge are sensory. Komenský's philosophical tenets concerning nature, man, and society, his ideas about the good, knowledge, the light of the physical world and the world of ideas, reflect the Classical Greek philosophical doctrines, Plato and Aristotle, and the influences of many traditions, the Platonic-Aristotelian and other schools of thought, and in particular the Christian theological concept of man and the Renaissance-Humanist heritage in which Komenský, a child of his time («the golden epoch of science»), found the source of his novel ideas. The ultimate aim and the function of all human knowledge and education are the achievement of human happiness, a kingdom of peace and Paradise on Earth. It is the comprehensively educated man, the cultured man, a harmonic unity of the physical and the spiritual, of perception and reason, who can understand the principles of the macro-cosmos:

»Everyone at all times and everywhere has the great book of Creation before them, the World. We have to learn how to read it then! Everyone also has a smaller book within themselves, that is, their spirit, which, due to innate truths, wishes, and stimuli, opens gladly. Everyone should therefore learn how to turn over the leaves of that book. And the third, divine book, the book of divine Revelation, is available to all the nations, for it has either been translated into all the languages or so it could be.«¹¹

This Platonic-Böhmenian-Patrizian figure of thought, describing the *universal book of the world*, was also used by Komenský. That is, in the third of his »Dialogs on History«, Petrić mentions the study of an invisible book of the soul, that all the men in the world have, yet not all men can delve into it. Petrić uses the term »heliotrope«, and Komenský the term of »pansophic light« shining on all the souls, objects and languages («Pandoxia»), the wisdom that does not belong in books but in souls instead. Human education,

¹¹ J. A. Komenius, *Pages choisies*, UNESCO, 1957.

culture, has the purpose of making the man able to read the book of the world, in other words, capable of knowledge: »... for, when not educated, men are like ungrafted trees, thorns, weeds, and nettles... they should be nourished, watered and grafted.«¹²

In Campanella's metaphysical-mystical image of the world, that Komenský knew very well indeed, and that had obviously influenced his own views to a great degree, light is reflected in the universal order of things, and so it is also reflected in man's soul; this is an image of divine beauty in everything, and man partakes in it as well. God speaks to man in two ways, through nature and through the Scripture. The world is a book of nature and as a temple of God, knowledge is a reflection of the divine; partaking in the divine, man himself becomes God-like. Sensory and intuitive knowledge merely approach the absolute knowledge, deciphering its signs in the world.

The senses are the prerequisites of knowledge and understanding of the world to Komenský, just like to Petrić. Komenský added a rationalist view to his sensory one. The senses serve reason, the reason serves faith, yet it is only through the unity of sensory and rational knowledges that one can reach the unity of the world (God) manifested in beings. Arguing for sensationalism (and in a way, for the seventeenth-century subjectivism), yet also for the possibility of objectivity of human knowledge, although his arguments were based on Christian theological doctrines, not leaving the realm of metaphysics, and considering God to be the basic constitutive element of all things, Komenský aims to solve the problem of the two orders of the world, the material and the possible (*mundus materialis* and *mundus possibilis*), the worlds of reality and of ideas, and man's product as well, in a pan-harmony. It was on a tripartite concept of the universe – God, man, things (*Deus, homo, res*) – that Komenský had based his universal renewal on, which included three types of knowledge, the philosophical, the political, and the religious one. Knowledge, wisdom, and piety, are the bases on which the three virtues of man are built – thinking, language, and activity (*cogitatio, sermo, operatio*), man's happiness. It is only through knowledge, thinking about everything, from general to the single, from the whole to its parts, Komenský concludes (»Pandidaxia«), that man's mind is enlightened by the Wisdom subordinated to divine providence. The world, which Komenský compares to a divine theater (together with human spirit and the Holy Scripture), is filled with light, it just has to be seen. There are three possible ways of shining light on things for men, by education (the works of various authors) – the easiest, yet also the most fallacious way, and Komenský compares it to people who feed on bread obtained by begging – by deeds (art, science) – a less easy, but safer way, although based on sen-

¹² Op. cit.

sory proof – and by the comprehension of ideas (knowledge of God, the philosophers and the prophets) – the hardest way, but also the shortest. Relying on Socrates, Cicero, Quintilian, Seneca, Augustine, Alsted, Castiglione, Erasmus, Vives, Bacon, Campanella, and numerous other ancient and contemporary authors, Komenský created his concrete humanistic program of education, not just for the sons of his century, as he wrote, but also for the followers of divine life. In many issues adhering to Bacon's philosophical ideas, modifying his concept of philosophy as an universal science and its division (natural theology, philosophy of nature, anthropology), as well as his concept of man (*minister et interpres*) and his view of nature, it must be noted that Komenský's central philosophical ideas are found in Petrić's philosophy, in its time a significant and influential element of European thought. This applies to his idea of nature as the life of the entire world, ruled by the principle of sympathy and harmony, knowledge, and universal gradation of the world, panpsychism, pancosmism, a creative mind co-existing with the word, pan-*augia* – the light of the primordial Reason – the doctrine of the One as the cause of all things and all entirety, that is neither a body, nor nature, nor soul, nor reason, nor life, nor a being; the idea of the essence of things and nature that exists by the soul, the soul by reason, reason by life, life by singleness, singleness by the One. These ideas constituted the speculative basis of Komenský's philosophical views, built into his entire work, his ideas of the entirety of nature (*unum necessarium*), the feeling for the dynamics of history and the creative nature of the universe and man (all life is an »essence, seething and knowing«), the idea of a universal artificial language based on a common logical basis of things and words, an idea in the function of the renewal of human society and its fundamental values. In the basis of his attempt at a re-evaluation of all knowledge, indispensable in the process of acquisition of the true one, there is the modern philosophy of man who masters things by his knowledge, the ideal of a scientific rationalism of Bacon's type (a theoretician of knowledge) and the future reality of technological-scientific type that would confirm it (practice), with all the ensuing Promethean-Epimethean doubts regarding the very aim of knowledge: is the light human reason, knowledge (a garden, i.e., nature, *natura – nosco*, as the highest perfection of human progress), or an objective fact (a republic of scientists, as Komenský conceived it and brought it about), in which being a man is either destiny or an expert choice?

Although Komenský's thought, as well as his intentions, were largely determined by the political crisis of contemporary Europe, the fundamental aim of philosophy, as shown by his works, remained the same as denoted by the entire history of thought, namely, to attempt to contemplate reality and define it, with the knowledge of the potentialities of human knowledge and the ungraspable quality of reality in mind (as Petrić wrote in the dedication

of the final eight chapters of his *Panarchia* to Cardinal Paleotto, »... I can devote the work of my reason, reasoning on reason and reasons.«¹³) Both Komenský (pansophical light) and Petrić (elampsis) intended to reconcile the existing opposites in a single idea of the world. Philosophers' schemes bear witness to that, the *mathesis divina*, *ars combinatoria*, *pan-harmony*, *pan-sophy*, *un-omnia*, the symbolic and allegorical language of artists, of the anthropological-theological show. It was the same path of thought on which Petrić used to meet those he had polemized with, and those who had assimilated his ideas, adopted many of the elements of his philosophy, like Bruno, Komenský, or Leibniz, those who were impressed with his philosophical system in the course of the entire European philosophical thought.

TRANSLATED BY SREĆKO PREMEC

ODJECI PETRIĆEVIH FILOZOFSKIH IDEJA I NJIHOVO ZNAČENJE ZA STVARANJE PANSOFIJSKE SLIKE SVIJETA J. A. KOMENSKOG

Sažetak

U radu se analizira jedan od vidova europske povijesno-filozofske recepcije bogate i višeslojne misli renesansnog filozofa Franc Petrića (Franciscus Patricius, Patrizzi, Cres, 1529 – Rim, 1597). Odjeci, podudarnosti i očigledno asimiliranje temeljnih Petrićevih filozofskih ideja, koncepcija i stajališta ogledaju se i u opusu filozofa, humanista, pedagoga i pisca Janosa Amosa Komenskog (Komenský, Comenius, Nivnice 1592 – Amsterdam, 1670). U Comeniusovom enciklopedijsko-reformatorskom programu prati se recepcija dominantnih ideja Petrićevog filozofskog sustava, poimanje filozofije, znanosti, te koncepcije univerzuma, prirode, znanja, jezika i unjetnosti. Kozmološke, gnoseološke, antropološke usporednice u opusima dvojice autora upućuju na neke konstante filozofsko-idejne međuzavisnosti europskog kulturno-povijesnog dijaloga, na njihove posebnosti, srodnosti, ali i razlike koje taj dijalog obogaćuju i proširuju, posebice s obzirom na razvoj europske filozofije i znanosti sve do našeg vremena.

¹³ F. Patricius, *Nova de universis philosophia, Panarchia*.

EIN VERSUCH ZUR GRUNDLEGUNG EINER »PIA PHILOSOPHIA«

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Original Paper
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Obgleich das Hauptthema dieser Untersuchung die Probleme sind, die mit dem Versuch zur Grundlegung einer »pia philosophia« verbunden sind, wollen wir dennoch einige Konstatationen zum Verhältnis von Philosophie und Theologie vorausschicken, zumal die Voraussetzung für das richtige Verständnis der genannten Probleme die Transparenz einiger wesentlicher Bestimmungen dieses Verhältnisses ist.

Wir wollen versuchen, das Verhältnis von Philosophie und Theologie anhand zweier Schlüsselmomente oder *Komplikationspunkte* zu betrachten, welche unserer Meinung nach dieses Verhältnis wesentlich bestimmen. Auf den ersten Blick scheint es einfach, dieses Verhältnis zu bestimmen, geht man nämlich von den Grunddefinitionen der Philosophie und der Theologie aus: hiernach bezeichnet man Erstere als die *Liebe zur Weisheit* (wobei sie in ihrem Wahrheitsstreben alles zum Gegenstand ihrer Untersuchung und kritischen Hinterfragung machen kann) und Letztere als *das Denken und die Rede über Gott*. Betrachtet man diese Bestimmungen aber etwas eingehender, so wird klar, wo mögliche Probleme liegen und tatsächlich auftauchen, welche wir dann auch als die *erste Komplikation* des Verhältnisses betrachten. Diese erste Komplikation tritt dann auf, wenn die Philosophie das zu ihrem Gegenstand macht, was der eigentliche Gegenstand der Theologie ist, wenn sie also die *Gestalt einer philosophischen Theologie* annimmt; dies geschieht im Augenblick, wenn sie – fragend nach der Ganzheit des Seienden, nach dem Seienden als Seiendem sowie danach, nach dem dieses Seiende ist – das Prinzip, *arhè*, als Göttliches, mehr noch: als Gott bezeichnet. Dabei wird einsichtig, dass sich bei dieser ersten Komplikation dieses Verhältnis von Philosophie und Theologie als ein der Philosophie selbst inhärentes Verhältnis meldet, zumal auch der Begriff Theologie auf das griechische philosophische Denken¹

¹ Vgl. Wilhelm Weischedel, *Der Gott der Philosophen*, WB, Darmstadt 1983.

zurückgeht, wobei sich erweist, dass die Grundfrage des Verhältnisses von Philosophie und Theologie in engem Zusammenhang mit dem Wesen selbst der Philosophie und mit ihrem Selbstverständnis steht. Diese erste Komplikation wird auch in historischer Form offenbar, wobei die geschichtliche Erkenntnis zeigt, dass sich im Grunde die gesamte Tradition der abendländischen Philosophie, sofern man von der Form der Metaphysik ausgeht, überwiegend als philosophische Theologie abspielt. Aufgrund dieser Tatsache wird klar, dass bei der Ausarbeitung der Komplikationen im Verhältnis von Philosophie und Theologie es unumgänglich sein wird, die Diskussion sowohl auf systematischer als auch auf geschichtlicher Ebene zu führen. Die aus dieser Einsicht hervorgehende Grundfrage lautet: Wie und warum kommt es dazu, dass die Philosophie in der Rolle des Denkens und der Rede über Gott auftritt? (Die Frage stellt sich in um so schärferem Ton, als man der Erkenntnis, wonach die Philosophie nicht nur nicht notwendigerweise eine Theologie ist, sondern vielmehr dadurch, dass sie die Gestalt einer Theologie annimmt, aufhört, im eigentlichen Sinne eine Philosophie zu sein, die Thesen jener Philosophen gegenüberstellt, denen zufolge gerade dies der eigentliche und höchste Gegenstand der Philosophie ist; gemeint sind Philosophen jener Tradition, die von der These ausgeht, dass die erste Philosophie sogar gerade die Theologie gewesen sei.) Aus dieser Frage nun ergeben sich alle übrigen Fragen über die Philosophie als Theologie bzw. über die Philosophie und die Theologie, allen voran etwa folgende: »Was ist für die philosophische Rede über Gott bestimmend?« Dies impliziert *eigentlich* auch die Frage, wie denn die philosophische Theologie überhaupt möglich sein wird, erwägt man erst einmal die Bestimmung der Philosophie (welche als Liebe zur Weisheit eigentlich stets nur ein Streben nach der Wahrheit ist und als Streben nach Weisheit stets und in Form unvoreingenommenen Fragens auf der radikalen Untersuchung des als wirklich Gegebenen bestehen will).

Mit diesen Fragen wird im Grunde auch die ganze Aktualität dieser Problematik heute aufgedeckt, wobei die Schlüsselfrage folgendermaßen lautet: Was geschieht mit dem philosophischen Denken und mit der philosophischen Rede über Gott, und sind dieses Denken und diese Rede überhaupt noch möglich – und wenn ja, wie? –, wenn die Philosophie erst einmal die Gestalt einer Metaphysik verloren hat? Ist es denn nicht so, dass sich in einer Zeit wie der unsrigen alle Rede über Gott erübrigt, oder besteht etwa noch die Hoffnung, die Philosophie könne sich, nachdem sie die Gestalt einer Metaphysik verloren hat, zu einer neuen Gestalt, d.h. neuen Denkweise wandeln, welche auch eine andere Art und Weise des Nachdenkens über Gott und des Sich-Beziehens auf Gott mit einschliesse?

In den ersten Jahrhunderten unserer Zeitrechnung jedoch ereignet sich etwas, das für die Philosophie und die philosophische Theologie – gerade *bezüglich* ihres Gegenstands – ausschlaggebend sein wird; und das gerade

sehen wir als die *zweite Komplikation* im Verhältnis von Philosophie und Theologie. Während man im Falle der ersten Komplikation von einem der Philosophie inhärenten Verhältnis sprechen konnte, geht es jetzt tatsächlich erst um die Herstellung eines Bezugs zwischen Philosophie und Theologie (nach Meinung vieler ist hier die Theologie im wahren Wortsinn gemeint, d.h. jene Theologie, über die Thomas von Aquino in *Summa theologiae* ausagt: »Theologia sacra differt secundum genus a theologia naturali; id est a metaphysica«); es wird also ein Bezug hergestellt zwischen der Philosophie (und der philosophischen Theologie) einerseits und der Offenbarungstheologie andererseits. Wenn wir auf der Andersartigkeit dieses Verhältnisses bestehen, so unterstreichen wir hiermit die Tatsache, dass es sich dabei nicht mehr ausschließlich um ein der Philosophie inhärentes Verhältnis handelt. Im Nachdenken und Reden über Gott wird die Philosophie mit etwas anderem konfrontiert, und zwar mit einem modifizierten Zugang zu demselben Gegenstand. Hier muss jedoch auf Folgendes hingewiesen werden: Es ist die Rede von einer für die Philosophie sowie überhaupt für die gesamte Geschichte des abendländischen Denkens äußerst wichtigen und schwerwiegenden Angelegenheit, so dass im Grunde alle Versuche, diese Verbindung zu definieren, im Voraus dazu verurteilt sind, lediglich Vorentwürfe zu bleiben – Skizzen für weitere Überlegungen. Es geht um etwas, das für das philosophische Denken stets eine Herausforderung ist und es auch bleiben wird. Das einzig Angemessene scheint uns daher die Konstatation zu sein, dass dieses Aufeinandertreffen der Philosophie, als der Wahrheitsliebe und dem Wahrheitsstreben, und der Theologie, welche im Christentum eine Offenbarungstheologie und vor allem die offenbarte Wahrheit ist, für die Philosophie ein Moment größter Versuchung darstellt. Diese Erfahrung sollte sich ganz besonders im 13. Jahrhundert intensivieren, als man auf der *Trennung* des philosophischen und des theologischen (im Sinne der *doctrina sacra*) Erfassens von Gott bestand, und zwar durch die strikte Bestimmung und Trennung entsprechender Gegenstandsbereiche. Nicht allein als unvoreingenommenes Hinterfragen der Wirklichkeit, sondern zumindest auch als fragender Bezug zur Wirklichkeit war die Philosophie durch diese Trennung der Versuchung ausgesetzt; gerade die philosophische Theologie war es, die nun eine klare Stellung hinsichtlich ihres Gegenstands beziehen, und das heißt: in ihrer Spezifität bestätigen sollte.

Es gibt bei diesem Aufeinandertreffen eine ganze Reihe von Momenten, in der Offenbarung selbst, im Glaubensgegenstand und sodann auch in der Offenbarungstheologie, die für das philosophische Denken ein »skandalon« darstellen (»das Ungeheuerliche!«, wird Jaspers sagen), etwas Un-erhörtes, das der antiken Erfahrung des Göttlichen und des Gottes Unbekannte. Als ausschlaggebender Unterschied kann hierbei dennoch das betont werden,

was am stärksten bei den Vertretern des nominalistischen Voluntarismus zum Ausdruck kommen wird. Die Grundvoraussetzung der antiken Philosophie, dass nämlich das Vernünftige der Welt, und so auch das Vernünftige des Menschen, mit dem Vernünftigen des Gottes korrespondiert, wird in Frage gestellt durch die Thesen des absoluten Voluntarismus, denen gemäß die absolut höchste Instanz: der allmächtige Wille Gottes eine gewisse Erkenntnis der Welt unmöglich macht (wie H. Blumenberg dies in *Säkularisierung und Selbstbehauptung* so schön aufgezeigt hat).² Die bei weitem größte Herausforderung für die Philosophie stellten jedoch Thesen dar, wonach es dieser versagt bleibe, Einsicht zu gewinnen in das größte Geheimnis und Mysterium des Christentums, in den erhabendsten Glaubensgegenstand (Mysterium der Dreieinigkeit, Schöpfung aus dem Nichts, Transsubstantialisierung – »mysterium Trinitatis«, »mysterium incarnationis«, »creatio ex nihilo«), was übrigens auch eine bestimmte Auslegung der Wirklichkeit impliziere. Wie konnte die Philosophie überhaupt auf eine solche Situation reagieren, in der strikt bestimmt war, was ihr Untersuchungsgegenstand sein konnte und was nicht, und in der überdies galt, »dass der natürliche Verstand sich dem Glauben unterzuordnen habe«, wollte die Philosophie gerade Philosophie bleiben?

Ein möglicher Weg hätte sein können, die auferlegte Trennung anzunehmen (was notwendigerweise auch einen Verzicht auf den erhabendsten Glaubensgegenstand als den Gegenstand philosophischen Denkens implizieren musste), d.h. die Trennung des natürlichen und des übernatürlichen Lichts: »lumen naturale« und »lumen supernaturale«. Dies bedeutete zugleich, sich in der Frage Gottes und des Glaubensgegenstandes auf die Auslegung der »preambula fidei« zu beschränken. Aus dieser Möglichkeit (Akzeptanz der Trennung) werden im geschichtlichen Verlauf zwei Entwicklungslinien realisiert: die erste reduziert die Philosophie auf eine Begriffssystematik der Theologie (von der jedoch die meisten Philosophen auch ausgehen und behaupten, dass eine »christliche Philosophie einfach nicht möglich« sei), die zweite wiederum konzentriert sich auf die Erkenntnis der Welt und der ihr immanenten Gesetze, wobei sie auf die höchsten Fragen, etwa nach dem Urprinzip, nach Gott usw., verzichtet. Der dritte Weg, den die Philosophie einschlug, als Reaktion auf die gegebene Situation, offenbarte sich in jener Entwicklungslinie, welche die wesentliche Möglichkeit, das höchste Mysterium des Christentums auf philosophischem Wege zu erkennen, unter Beweis stellt; diese Entwicklungslinie versucht zu zeigen, dass es sich hierbei gerade um den allereigentlichsten Gegenstand der Philosophie handelt.

² Hans Blumenberg, *Säkularisierung und Selbstbehauptung* (erweiterte und überarbeitete Neuauflage von *Die Legitimität der Neuzeit*, erster und zweiter Teil), Suhrkamp 1983.

Diese Entwicklung, die eine Lösung der Krise (die nicht allein eine Krise der Philosophie war) herbeiführte, bestand in den Bestrebungen jener Philosophen, die nach der großartig vollbrachten Synthese des Thomas von Aquino, in der sich die Philosophie im Grunde zufrieden stellen musste mit ihrer im Vorhinein bestimmten Rolle bezüglich des Glaubensgegenstandes, die Rolle und die Position der Philosophie zu verändern suchten und dabei auf der Übereinstimmung des Glaubensgegenstands und des Gegenstands des philosophischen Denkens über Gott bestanden (hierbei musste sich bereits in der Art und Weise, in der die Identität der beiden Gegenstände nachgewiesen wurde, notwendig ein wesentlicher Unterschied im Ansatz manifestieren). Gemeint ist die Methode, die sich von derjenigen, mit der die aquinatische Synthese vollbracht wurde, wesentlich unterscheidet. Hier geht es nämlich nicht mehr um die Trennung – als die Voraussetzung für eine »Aussöhnung« – der »doctrina sacra« und der Gotteserkenntnis, welche dem »lumen naturale« nach geschieht, sondern es geht gerade um das Bestehen auf der wesentlichen Verwandtschaft in der Art der göttlichen Erkenntnis, einmal auf dem Wege der Offenbarung, das andere Mal auf dem Wege der Philosophie.

Zur genannten Entwicklungslinie gehört auch der Versuch, anhand dessen wir zeigen werden, welche Implikationen eine solche »Aussöhnung« von Philosophie und Theologie enthalten konnte. Gemeint ist ein in der Renaissance entwickeltes Projekt zur Konstituierung einer »pia philosophia«, einer frommen Philosophie – ein Projekt, das von Franc Petrić durchgeführt wurde.

Hierbei folgender Hinweis: Petrićs Versuch, eine »pia philosophia« zu konstituieren, ist weder in der Geschichte der Philosophie noch in der Renaissancephilosophie der einzige dieser Art und also auch nicht ganz originell. Uns liegt hier aber nicht daran, den Originalitätsgrad seines Projekts zu untersuchen und es mit ähnlichen Versuchen, die ihm vorausgingen und ihm folgten, zu vergleichen. Am Beispiel von Petrićs Versuch wollen wir in erster Linie sehen, inwiefern die Realisierung eines solchen Projekts überhaupt möglich ist.

Hält man sich den geistesgeschichtlichen Kontext und die Problematik jener Zeit vor Augen, in der Petrić das Projekt der Begründung einer »pia philosophia« verwirklichen möchte (hierbei denken wir in erster Linie an die Trennung von Philosophie und Theologie, von »lumen naturale« und »lumen supernaturale«), so erscheint es, als ziele das Denken Petrićs auf etwas ab, das, wenn schon nicht unmöglich, so doch der auferlegten Trennung völlig gegensätzlich ist. Petrić möchte nämlich argumentiert aufzeigen, dass das philosophische Denken auch in das erhabendste christliche Geheimnis vordringen kann und, mehr noch, dass es eine unerlässliche Voraussetzung dafür ist, diesen Inhalt durch Glauben anzunehmen – dass demnach das philosophische Denken die Voraussetzung für wahrhaftige Frömmigkeit sei.

Während wir uns die bereits angeführte These zahlreicher Philosophen vor Augen halten, der zufolge eine »christliche Philosophie« so etwas wie hölzernes Eisen ist, schreiten wir gerade mit folgender Frage zur Analyse von Petrićs Entwurf einer »pia philosophia«: Ist sein Versuch denn nicht unmöglich? Um das Gelingen oder Scheitern von Petrićs Entwurf überhaupt beurteilen zu können, werden wir uns auf drei Schlüsselmomente konzentrieren, d.h. auf die *Absichten* und *Motive*, mit denen er die Grundlegung seiner »pia philosophia« in Angriff nimmt, um sodann das für die *Art und Weise* seiner Projektausführung Bestimmende zu zeigen und um schließlich zu versuchen, die wesentliche Einsicht, auf der Petrić sein Unterfangen gründet, zu identifizieren.

Um jedoch zu sehen, wie Petrić die Grundlegung seines Projekts sichert, wollen wir vor allem auf jenen Teil seiner *Nova de universis philosophia* (*Neue Philosophie über das All-Umfassende*) zurückgreifen, den der Verfasser »Pancharchia« nennt (sämtliche Zitate sind der zweisprachigen Ausgabe *Nova sveopća filozofija*, Zagreb 1978, mit der von Tomislav Ladan angefertigten kroatischen Übersetzung entnommen).

Gleich zu Beginn seiner *Neuen Philosophie* hebt Petrić hervor, dass er Papst Gregor XIV. seine »pia philosophia« unterbreite, welche er neben den anderen vier frommen Philosophien; denen von Hermes Trismegistos und Zoroaster, ferner der mystischen ägyptischen und der Platon'schen, zum Unterricht an den Schulen empfehle anstelle »jener gottlosen Philosophie«, d.h. der aristotelischen, dank deren Dominanz sich an den Schulen die Überzeugung von der notwendigen Trennung zwischen dem katholischen Glauben und der Philosophie eingebürgert habe. Diese frommen Philosophien, einschließlich seiner eigenen, stellten zugleich eine *wahrhaftigere Philosophie* dar, anhand deren »die Menschheit zu Gott zurückkehren kann« und mit deren Hilfe wir »reine Vernunftwesen und fast Götter« werden können! Und gerade »die Seele, die ihren Schöpfer erkannt hat, wird zur reinen Vernunft oder wird Gott«! (Sämtliche Zitate aus dem Vorwort zu *Nova de universis philosophia*.)

Im selben Vorwort folgt die These: »Nur durch Verstand wird der menschliche Verstand geführt [...] daher gilt es, durch Verstand die Menschen zu Gott hinzuführen.« Schließlich greift Petrić auch auf die Worte des Hermes Trismegistos zurück, denen zufolge es »unmöglich ist, höchste Frömmigkeit ohne Philosophie zu erreichen«. Nachdem wir nun schon ein Zitat aus der *Hermetik* angeführt haben, müssen wir darlegen, wie Petrić diese frommen Philosophien bestimmt; dies gilt insbesondere für die chaldäische und die hermetische Philosophie (die Petrić als Grundlage für seine »fromme Philosophie« nimmt und die er auch als Anhang in seiner *Neuen Philosophie* übersetzt und veröffentlicht hat). Petrić stellt so die Behauptung auf: »[...] sie alle bezwecken den Beweis, dass Gott der Begründer, Lenker,

Fürsorger und Bewacher aller Dinge ist. Und dass die Menschen sowohl ihn als auch sich selbst erkennen; dass sie ferner erlernen, auf welche Weisen die menschlichen Seelen zu Gott zurückkehren und in ihm ewige Seligkeit erfahren.«³ Petrić hält ihren Inhalt für die »von Gott geoffenbarte Philosophie« (»a Deo revelata philosophia«) – ein Syntagma, das an sich bereits Aufmerksamkeit erregt und eine ganze Reihe von Fragen auslöst, das jedoch zugleich schon die Umrisse von Petrićs »pia philosophia« erkennen lässt. Aus der weiteren Analyse wird klar werden, worum es hier geht.⁴

Petrić ist also nachdrücklich um die Konstituierung einer solchen Philosophie bemüht, die nicht nur die Menschen zu Gott hinführen, sondern sie auch, haben sie erst einmal die Erkenntnis erreicht, zu Göttern machen wird. Was bedeutet das nun?

Petrićs Absicht und die Art, in der er seine »pia philosophia« ausführt, sind in jenem Teil der »Panarchia« am klarsten erkennbar, in dem er nach der Bestimmung des höchsten Prinzips aller Dinge (»universitatis«), das er das Eine nennt, sucht und ausdrücklich die Frage des dreieinigen Gottes thematisiert, wobei der Ausgangspunkt und die Voraussetzung dazu im Text über die *Dreieinigkeit des Prinzips aller Dinge* zu suchen sind. Diesem Teil der »Panarchia« gibt Petrić die Überschrift »Von der höchsten Dreiheit und Gottheit«.

Schon allein aufgrund der Tatsache, dass Petrić im Rahmen seiner Diskussion über das Urprinzip und das All-Prinzip, sowie über die ersten Prinzipien (so die Bestimmung der »Panarchia«) das Mysterium der Göttlichen Dreiheit (»mysterium Trinitatis divinae«) elaboriert, werden der *Ausgangspunkt*, der *Diskussionshorizont* und der *Weg* ersichtlich, auf dem er zum zentralen Teil und Gegenstand seiner Diskussion – zur Erörterung nämlich des

³ Vorwort zu *Nova de universis philosophia*, S. 2.

⁴ An dieser Stelle sei bereits folgender Kommentar angefügt: Bei seinem Rückgriff auf jene frommen Philosophien und bei der Konstituierung seiner eigenen frommen Philosophie bewegt sich Petrić ganz sicher auf den Spuren der gnostischen Tradition. Elemente jener Gnosis, an die wir hierbei denken, sind nicht allein in den sog. gnostischen Evangelien und Schriften der christlichen Gnosis gegenwärtig, sondern auch in Schriften heidnischen Ursprungs, wie etwa den hermetischen Texten und den sog. »Chaldäischen Prophezeiungen«, auf die Petrić sich gerade beruft. Gnosis verstehen wir hier also als universales, über den Rahmen des Christentum hinausgehendes Phänomen, wie es von G. Quispel in *Gnosis als Weltreligion*, Zürich 1951, bestimmt wird. Hierbei wird die Gnosis vor allem als Versuch bestimmt, die Momente der Glaubensunterweisung, der Heilsgeschichte, der Barmherzigkeit als metaphysische Realitäten, als ontologische Kategorien zu definieren. Bezüglich der Rezeption dieser Tradition kann man Petrić als den Repräsentanten dieser in der europäischen philosophischen und geistesgeschichtlichen Tradition klar erkennbaren Entwicklungslinie betrachten. Im Kielwasser derselben Tradition werden wir später, bei bedeutenden Vertretern der neuzeitlichen »Gnosis« (wie Hegel und Schelling) auf Ansichten stoßen, die in vielerlei Hinsicht mit denen Petrićs übereinstimmen.

dreieinigen Prinzips bzw. der Göttlichen Dreiheit – gelangt. Es sei an dieser Stelle angemerkt, dass das erste Buch dieses gesonderten Teils der »Panarchia« (eigentlich das neunte Buch der »Panarchia«) die Überschrift »Über das eine dreieinige Prinzip« trägt, das zweite Buch wiederum die Überschrift »Über das zweite und dritte Prinzip«, und dass ferner in diesem Teil noch die »Ordnungen der Seienden«, »göttliche Einsheiten oder Ideen« sowie »das Wesen und das Seiende« erörtert werden. Im zweiten Teil dieser Abhandlung wird sich zeigen, dass Petrić die Dreiteilung des Prinzips so ausführt, indem er die Elemente des All-Prinzips oder die einzelnen Aspekte des Urprinzips (wobei er auch von drei Prinzipien spricht) den Personen der Göttlichen Dreiheit gleichstellt. Doch bereits in den ersten Büchern der »Panarchia« hebt Petrić hervor, dass er mit seiner Diskussion über das Urprinzip zugleich nach dem ersten »Instandsetzer und Einrichter aller Dinge« sowie nach dem »Erbauer und Schöpfer der Welt« (effector et opifex mundi) suche. Hieraus sind zugleich die ideellen Voraussetzungen der Diskussion über das Urprinzip und die Prinzipien klar ersichtlich. Es ist offenbar nämlich gerade von einer philosophischen Theologie die Rede.

Auf der Suche nach dem Urprinzip, das zugleich der Einrichter und der Schöpfer aller Dinge wäre, und wenn wir uns über den aristotelischen Bewegungsgrund – die Vernunft erheben, dringen wir vor zu dem »Ersten von allem«, das »vor allem« und »über allem« ist und von Petrić als das Eine bezeichnet wird. Dieses Urprinzip, in dem alles ist, dem nach alles ist und nach dem alles folgt, ist zugleich die Ursache (causa) des Seienden und der gesamten All-Umfassendheit (universitatis).

Sodann wird in den ersten Büchern der »Panarchia« für das Urprinzip – das Eine die Eigenschaft der wesentlichen Transzendenz festgestellt: »es hat keinen Namen, man kann nicht darüber sprechen; man kann es nicht erkennen« (V, 9. v.).

Das Eine ist an sich unbestimmbar, sofern es für alles und jedes Einzelne bestimmend konstitutiv ist (die Seienden sind nämlich, indem sie Eines sind). Daraus ist bereits ersichtlich, dass das Eine, auch wenn es nicht eines der Seienden ist, so dass es folglich auch nicht als ein Seiendes (auf die Weise eines Seienden) bestimmt-erkannt werden kann, notwendigerweise in Bezug steht zu jenem, dessen Prinzip es ist. Laut Petrić gilt also: »das Urprinzip ist vor allem und alles ist im Prinzip und gemeinsam mit dem Prinzip« (Panarch. IV, 8. v.). Als das Überwesentliche ist es zugleich nichts, doch ist es dies nur bezüglich des Seienden bzw. hinsichtlich der Bestimmbarkeit gemäß dem Seienden. Das Eine jedoch ist zugleich als ein Konstitutives für alles und jedes Einzelne – alles (»Und es selbst, dadurch, dass es eines ist, ist [zugleich] auch alles«, VII, 13).

Das Eine ist *potentia omnium* – das Vermögen aller Dinge, und alles in ihm ist Vermögen. Es ist das All-Vermögen, d.h., es ist allmächtig (omnipo-

tens), da es das Vermögen besitzt, alles hervorzubringen. »Als das unendlich Vermögende wird es auch der höchste Gott und der Vater [aller] Dinge genannt« (Panarch. VI, 14. v.).

Nachdem auf diese Weise alle Möglichkeiten der Dialektik des Einen bzw. des All-Einen («Un-omnia« nennt Petrić das Urprinzip aller Dinge und folgt somit der langen Tradition der Lehre vom Eine-und-Allem-Prinzip) erschöpft sind, geht Petrić über auf die Elaborierung des Bezugs des Urprinzips zu dem, was dem Urprinzip nach ist.

Damit nämlich das Urprinzip funktionieren kann als das Urprinzip all dessen, was ist; als das, in dem sich alles konstituiert und das selbst das konstitutive Element eines jeden Seienden ist, muss es zugleich auch das Prinzip des Unterscheidens und die Grundlage des Wesens (essentiae) sein. Jedoch ist das erste Eine auch das Allereinfachste.

Mit Spekulationen über die Zahl sowie unter Berufung auf Aussagen bei Hermes Trismegistos und Zoroaster, denen zufolge »es notwendig ist, dass die Einsheit und das Eine, solange sie ihre Ganzheit bewahren, aus sich sowohl zwei und drei als auch die Übrigen hervorbringen«, etabliert Petrić also neben dem überwesentlichen ersten Einen – das zweite Eine. Dies ist die erste Einsheit, die aus dem ersten Einen emaniert. Man kann es zugleich auch den Sohn Gottes nennen, »den der Vater geboren hat, damit er ihm nach Seiende hervorbrächte«.

Auf die Frage nun, warum der Vater überhaupt (Seiende) hervorbringt oder warum er zulässt, dass Seiende erscheinen (denn auch Hermes Trismegistos sagt ja: »Er selbst ist sowohl die Seienden als auch die Nicht-Seienden. Er macht, dass die Seienden erscheinen, während er die Nicht-Seienden in sich hat«; »Die Nicht-Seienden nämlich hat er in sich zurückgehalten, damit er sie hervorbringe, wann es ihm beliebt«), antwortet Petrić: Der Vater bringt *notwendigerweise* hervor, und diese Notwendigkeit zeitigt den Willen zum Hervorbringen (voluntatem producendi). Die Notwendigkeit des Schaffens geht hervor aus dem Wesen des Urprinzips, sofern dieses selbst das Gute ist.

Das zweite Eine ist das Vermögen (potentia) des Vaters, mittels dessen er als Erzeuger hervorbringt; es ist außerdem das In-Bewegung-Versetzen und das Herausgehen aus dem Einen, das zugleich auch das Verbleiben im Einen ist. Das zweite Eine ist kon-subsstantiell mit dem ersten Einen. Das Hervorbringen ist das Hinaustragen von allem aus dem ersten Einen in das zweite Eine im Sinne der Absonderung. Und »während die Dinge aus ihm hervorgehen, bleibt es selbst in sich selbst«. Die Analyse der Bestimmung des Urprinzips ergibt also, dass sich das Urprinzip notwendigerweise, um tatsächlich als das Prinzip aller Dinge – der All-Umfassendheit – und eines jeden Einzelnen funktionieren zu können, als dreieiniges Prinzip strukturiert. Es enthält in sich das Moment des Einen – des nur Einen, das Moment

des vielheitlich Einigen – in dem das Moment des Unterschieds und zugleich der Kon-substantialität mit dem Ersten enthalten ist, welches im Grunde die Idee der Ideen und die Vernunft ist, und alles enthält, in abgesonderter Form zwar, letztlich auch das Moment der Umkehr, d.h. der Rückkehr zum ersten Einigen, was sich in der Sehnsucht nach dem Ursprung, dem Vater, dem ersten Einigen und in der Liebe dafür konstituiert.

Petrić spricht auch weiterhin von den *drei Prinzipien* und fährt fort: Das zweite Eine unterscheidet sich vom ersten Einigen durch seine Andersheit (*alteritas*), doch sind sie als Sohn und als Vater zugleich dieselben. Von wesentlicher Bedeutung ist dabei, dass der Sohn gemäß der Tradition jener »a Deo revelata philosophia« zugleich *das Wort und die Vernunft Gottes* ist, was Petrić in seinen weiteren Darlegungen der Struktur des dreieinigen Urprinzips als die Kennzeichen für das zweite Prinzip übernehmen wird. Wiederum die *Liebe* und das *Streben*, mit denen »der Geborene nach seinem Erzeuger trachtet und sich mit ihm verbinden will«, sind jenes Dritte unter ihnen, das sie verbindet. Es folgt der Schluss: »Es sind also die drei Personen (*hypostases*) sowohl die allerseligste Dreieinigkeit als auch [...] die drei Prinzipien (!).« Jene beiden (gemeint sind die erste und die zweite Vernunft), die unter dem Gottvater sind, stellen laut Petrić, in Büchern, die »*das Mysterium der göttlichen Dreieinigkeit*« bestärken wollen, die Väterliche Tiefe dar. Das Werden all dessen, das ist, das Absondern, das Hervorbringen, geschieht zuallererst als dynamischer Prozess innerhalb der Väterlichen Tiefe, als das Verhältnis der Personen der Dreieinigkeit bzw. der drei Prinzipien untereinander. Das Wesentliche in diesem Prozess ist das Verstehen.

Das aus dem ersten Einigen Geborene ist nämlich der Verstand-die Vernunft, und es ist »die Eigenschaft des Verstands, sich zu wenden oder umzukehren sowohl zu sich selbst als auch zu Höherem«; der Verstand-die Vernunft wendet sich also verstehend zu sich und zum Vater, und bei diesem Verstehen werden alle die Dinge abgesondert, die im ersten Einigen noch unabgesondert sind. Und diese Vernunft ist die ursprüngliche Einsheit – welche das zweite Prinzip der Dinge ist! (Petrić wird sagen: »dasselbe, das die Kirche den Sohn, die zweite göttliche Person nennt.«) Und die wesentliche Liebe, mit der sich diese ursprüngliche Einsheit dem Vater zuwendet, ist die dritte Person, »die sowohl ihr [selbst] als auch dem Vater konsubstantiell ist«. Der Prozess der Absonderung nun, der sich innerhalb der Väterlichen Tiefe als Emanation, als Prozess des Sich-Darlegens des Urprinzips in der All-Umfassendheit außerhalb der Väterlichen Tiefe abspielt, was wiederum nach dem Willen des Vaters geschieht, erfolgt als Prozess der Schöpfung. Aus dem Einigen gehen nämlich neun Stufen-Grade innerhalb der All-Umfassendheit hervor, die nach der »Nähe und Entfernung« bezüglich des ersten Prinzips angeordnet sind (die Stufen heißen: das Eine, die Wesen, Leben,

Vernunft, Seele, Natur, Eigenschaften, Formen, Körper). Somit geschieht, dass sich das Eine in der All-Umfassendheit »darlegt« – und daher kann man im Falle der neuen Philosophie über das All-Umfassende, das Allgemeine auch im Sinne des Sich-Darlegens »totae divinitatis« sprechen (welche – nota bene! – bereits im Untertitel von *Nova de universis philosophia* mit der »universitas« in Verbindung gebracht ist).

Dies wäre also in kurzen Zügen die Art und Weise, in der Petrić sein Projekt der »pia philosophia« ausführt. Um daraus einen Schluss über die *Einsicht* zu ziehen, auf der das gesamte Gebäude von Petrićs »neuer Philosophie« beruht, müssen wir uns auf die drei Schlüsselmomente seines Projekts konzentrieren, die in einem wesentlichen Zusammenhang zueinander stehen: das sind die *spezifische Auffassung der Erkenntnis*, die *spezifische Auffassung der göttlichen Offenbarung* sowie die *Philosophie des Lichts* als Voraussetzung der ersten beiden Momente, sofern sich gerade aufgrund der Voraussetzung, dass alles, was ist, nach jenem ursprünglichen Licht (lux) ist – welches selbst unsichtbar, intelligibel ist und nach dem alles primär sichtbar und erscheinungsmäßig ist –, die Möglichkeit ergibt, den Unterschied zwischen »lumen naturale« und »lumen supernaturale« aufzuheben.

Die Ausarbeitung einer spezifischen Konzeption verstandes- und vernunftmäßiger Erkenntnis (was Petrić im Grunde nicht unterscheidet, wie er selbst ausdrücklich festhält),⁵ auf der das Projekt einer neuen universalen Philosophie als einer »pia philosophia« aufbaut, gründet sich auf wesentlichen Thesen der soeben dargelegten Lehre Petrićs von den Prinzipien bzw. von dem dreieinigen Prinzip. Ausschlaggebend ist in diesem Moment nämlich für den Menschen, für die Erkenntnis jene mittlere Person – der Sohn Gottes, der gemäß der von Petrić gewahrten Tradition das Wort und die Vernunft Gottes, und sogar auch die Welt ist, dessen »kennzeichnendes Tun es ist, sich zu sich selbst und zu seinem Muster hinzuwenden«. Seine Selbsterkenntnis ist die Erkenntnis der eigenen Ursache-des Vaters und zugleich die Hinwendung zum Vater »in glühender Liebe«, wobei die Hinwendung gleichzeitig Ausdruck des Strebens nach Vereinigung ist. Das, was für den erstgeborenen Verstand gilt, gilt für jeglichen Verstand, der ihm teilhaftig ist, so dass die Erkenntnis die »Hinwendung des Erkennenden zum Erkennbaren« ist. Die verstandesmäßige Erkenntnis wird demnach als eine Vereinigung – *coitio* bestimmt. Und eben solche Erkenntnis ist nach den Anschauungen der Griechen *gnosis*, was laut Petrić gleichbedeutend ist mit *néa genesis*, Neu-geburt, und zugleich auch *nóesis*. Das ist die Erkenntnis, in der »das, was hervorgegangen ist, zurückkehrt zu dem, woraus es hervorgegan-

⁵ »Und uns bedeuten diese zwei Namen (Vernunft und Verstand) eins« (Panarch. III, 2).

gen ist«. Die verstandes- und vernunftmäßige Erkenntnis ist demnach wesentlich ein »Aufeinandertreffen« jenes ursprünglichen Lichts (das sich als Ideen-Einheiten und Lichter in alle Dinge als deren wesenhafte Form ergießt) und des Lichts des Verstands, welcher als von Licht erschaffen erkennt und dabei das Erkannte erleuchtet, so dass bei dieser Erkenntnis »durch das Licht im Licht das Licht sichtbar« wird. »Die Erkenntnis in der Hinwendung zur eigenen Ursache ist die Erleuchtung (*collustratio*) und das Eindringen von Lichtheit aus dem Erkennbaren in das Erkennende« (Panarch. XV. 31. v.). Die Hinwendung zur eigenen Ursache vollzieht sich bei dieser Erkenntnis zugleich als Hinwendung zum Guten, dem nach alles besteht und welches das *appetibile* ist, das – obgleich von allen Seienden getrennt – »allen gegenwärtig« ist, ebenso wie und sofern es erwünscht ist. Das Trachten nach der Vereinigung mit der Ursache der Erkenntnis erfolgt also nach dem Prinzip, sofern es das Gute ist für alles, das ist. Und »die Philosophie [...] bewegt sich mit der gleichen Bewegung auf das Gute zu wie die Liebe« (XIX, 42. v.). Ferner: »Aus der Schönheit der Wahrheit und hin zur Schönheit der Wahrheit, sowohl die Liebe zur Erkenntnis als auch die Philosophie – trachten [beide] mit höchstem Fleiß« (*ibid.*). Wiederum die Aufnahme der so erreichten höchsten Wahrheit, d.h. der Wahrheit selbst, was zugleich das einzig Erwünschte ist: nämlich das Gute – das ist laut Petrić der *Glaube*.

Aufgrund des Gesagten ist bereits annähernd klar, wie sehr im Grunde eine solche Auffassung der Erkenntnis als einer »Erleuchtung« aufs engste verbunden ist mit einer spezifischen Auffassung der *Offenbarung*, welche Auffassung wiederum von Petrićs Philosophie des Lichts, wie dieser sie in »Panaugia« dargelegt hat, abhängig ist.

An zwei Stellen der »Panarchia« führt Petrić als den letzten Zweck des Hervorgehens des Seienden aus dem Vater-dem Urprinzip-dem Einen den Wunsch Gottes an, sich durch alles zu offenbaren, um durch *alles* erkannt zu werden. Hier greift er wieder auf die Worte des Hermes Trismegistos zurück: »Zu diesem Zweck hat er alles erschaffen, damit du an allem ihn erkennst. Dies ist das Gute selbst von Gott. Dies ist seine Tugend, sich selbst durch alles zu offenbaren« (XX, 43. v.). Ferner: »Er hat alles erschaffen, damit du ihn in allem siehst. Dies ist das göttliche Gute, dies ist seine Tugend: dass er selbst sich offenbare in allen Dingen« (XVI. 35. v.).

Mit dieser Auffassung des Verhältnisses des Urprinzips und dem, was ihm nach ist, nähert sich Petrić im Grunde jener Konzeption an, der gemäß die All-Umfassendheit »*explicatio*« und Selbstoffenbarung ist, die Manifestierung (Offenbarung) des Urprinzips, dem nach alles ist. In diesem Sinne würde auch die Philosophie selbst eine Art Offenbarung darstellen (»Die Philosophie ist [...] ein Kind des Lichts«, *Panaugia* I, 1. v.). Ebenso würde auch die christliche Offenbarung nur eine Form der göttlichen Offenbarung

darstellen.⁶ So lässt sich im Grunde der Inhalt aller Offenbarungen unter der höchsten und breitesten Bestimmung der Offenbarung zusammenfassen, der zufolge allein durch die Erkenntnis, dass etwas ist und nicht nichts, darauf geschlossen wird, nach dem etwas »ist«. Dieses Denken nun, das vor allem fragt, »warum überhaupt etwas ist«, fragend aus der Erkenntnis heraus, »dass etwas ist«, weiß schon allein dadurch, »dass es fragt«, von sich in seiner *Gegebenheit* und schließt daraus auf jenen Ursprung und das Urprinzip, nach dem sowohl es selbst ist als auch das, von dem es erkannt hat, »dass es ist«. Demgemäß ist auch die Erkenntnis dieses Urprinzips zugleich seine Offenbarung, da es sich gerade in ihr erschließt. (Hierbei ist ersichtlich, dass sich Petrić darin auf den Spuren jener augustinischen Linie in der Auslegung der Offenbarung und Erkenntnis Gottes bewegt, die von der Einsicht ausgeht, dass auch die natürliche menschliche Erkenntnis Gottes nach Gottes Gnaden erfolgt.)

Auf welcher Einsicht baut also die Grundthese Petrićs auf, der zufolge erst die philosophische Einsicht eine (notwendige) Voraussetzung des Glaubens an den höchsten Glaubensinhalt (*mysterium Trinitatis divinae*) ist? Auf welcher Einsicht basiert die These, dass die Philosophie »mit Gründen das festige, was nur durch den Verstand gefestigt werden kann«, wenn diese Philosophie sich selbst zugleich als »*pia philosophia*« bestimmt?

Das Wesentliche dieser Einsicht ist gerade, dass sich der Inhalt der christlichen Offenbarung, der als wesentliches Moment auch die Offenbarung durch das *Wort*, die *Vernunft* mit einschließt, nicht wesentlich unterscheiden kann von der philosophischen Einsicht in das Wesen des Urprinzips aller Dinge, das sich dieser Einsicht nach notwendig als dreieiniges Prinzip enthüllt. Das Wesentliche der Einsicht liegt in der Tatsache, dass gemäß dem Wort, der Vernunft die Offenbarung eine wesentliche Hinwendung zum Menschen, zu seiner Erkenntnis darstellt, geradezu eine *Botschaft*, welche also sinnvoll und der verstandesmäßigen Auffassung zugänglich ist, da sie der Vernunft-dem Verstand nach ist.

Gerade daran, dass Petrić die Rolle des Wortes und der Vernunft betont, denen nach die Offenbarung im weitesten Sinne, und so auch die christliche, erfolgt, wird klar, dass in seiner frommen Philosophie die Betonung auf der verstandes- und vernunftmäßigen Erkenntnis liegt (welche als Selbsterkennt-

⁶ Es muss angemerkt werden, dass Petrić mit einer so breit angelegten Konzipierung der Offenbarung eigentlich an eine andere Tradition anknüpft, der gemäß die göttliche Offenbarung, außer in der Heiligen Schrift sowie in der Menschwerdung Gottes, auch in der Schöpfung und im Geschöpf selber vollzieht. Zu den bekanntesten Vertretern dieser Tradition kann man Marcion, Maximus Confessor, Eriugena, Hugo von St. Victor, Petrus Lombardus, Nicolaus Cusanus und viele weitere zählen. Über eine ähnliche Auffassung der Offenbarung könnte man ferner auch im Deutschen Idealismus sprechen, dessen Vertreter die Vernunft als ein Offenbarungsmoment ansehen.

nis zugleich die Erkenntnis des Urprinzip-des Gottes ist) als jenem Moment, in dem sich die philosophische Einsicht in das göttliche Prinzip und der Offenbarungsinhalt berühren. Es ist aber auch klar, dass eine solche Annäherung der philosophischen Einsicht in das göttliche Prinzip und (der Theologie) der Offenbarung bei der Argumentierung, auf der sie sich gründet, einerseits notwendig eine spezifische Interpretation des Glaubensinhalts, aber auch eine spezifische Konzeption der Philosophie benötigt. In der Beweisführung, die die wesentliche Zugänglichkeit des Glaubensinhalts (des Mysteriums) für die philosophische Einsicht offenlegen soll, wird, wie die Ausführungen Petrićs zeigen, dieser Inhalt notwendig des Konkreten, Einmaligen, Geschichtlichen entledigt und in philosophische Kategorien überführt, auf die Ebene der Idee erhoben, und wird so der menschlichen Vernunft nicht nur erreichbar, sondern eignet ihr vielmehr auch wesentlich an. Man kann tatsächlich sagen, dass sich in Petrićs Darlegung des Mysteriums der göttlichen Dreieinigkeit im Sinne des dreieinigen Urprinzips dessen, was ist, das Einmalige völlig verliert (wobei meistens dessen Ausschließlichkeit gegenüber allen übrigen Glaubensinhalten zum Vorschein kam). Dieses Besondere des christlichen Glaubensinhalts erwähnt Petrić nur an zwei Stellen der »Panarchia«, wo er von Christus und dem Wort als einer historischen Persönlichkeit und Erscheinung, als einer wirklichen Begebenheit spricht, welche zugleich den Glaubensinhalt darstellt, um sodann auch Ursprung einer bestimmten Lehre zu sein, die bewiesenermaßen in Form einer ewigen Wahrheit verschiedenen philosophischen und religiösen Traditionen angehört (in Buch IX der »Panarchia«, wo er über die Vertreter jener Tradition spricht, welche das Mysterium der Dreieinigkeit kennt, wird Petrić sagen, dass dies »auch Christus selbst, eine der drei [Personen], lehrte, solange er unter den Menschen weilte«).

Ausgehend von einer solchen Interpretation des Glaubensinhalts, schließt Petrić sich jener Entwicklungslinie der Renaissancephilosophie an, welche bei ihrem Nachweis einer »philosophia perennis« unter anderem zeigt, dass die Dreieinigkeitslehre als Idee ein allgemeinemenschlicher Besitz ist, der in verschiedenen, insbesondere vorchristlichen philosophischen und religiösen Traditionen gegenwärtig ist. Das Mysterium der Dreieinigkeit, in Gestalt der Idee vom dreieinigen Prinzip und dem dreieinigen Gott – was den Kern der christlichen Lehre und des christlichen Glaubens darstellt –, war laut Petrić auch den ältesten Weisen vor Moses bekannt (hierbei denkt er an Hermes Trismegistos und Zoroaster, wie an mehreren Stellen der »Panarchia« zu erkennen ist); gelehrt wurde es auch von Orpheus, Philolaos und Platon sowie später von den neuplatonischen Philosophen.⁷ Wie wir ge-

⁷ Eine solche Auffassung des höchsten christlichen Mysteriums wird vielleicht am prägnantesten bei F. W. J. Schelling zum Ausdruck gebracht: »Sie sehen: wir haben von unseren Prin-

sehen haben, beweist er dies einerseits unter Berufung auf die Tradition, zu deren wesentlichen Elementen diese Lehre gehört, und andererseits durch die Darlegung der Struktur des (dreieinigen) Prinzips, nach dem alles ist.

Beim Nachweis der philosophischen Einsehbarkeit des Glaubensinhalts (der laut Thomas von Aquino zur »sacra doctrina« gehört) wird, wie bereits gesagt, auch die Philosophie selbst notwendigerweise auf eine ganz bestimmte Weise konzipiert. Es ist nämlich von einer Philosophie die Rede, welche über die verstandesmäßige Erkenntnis hinaus auch eine höhere Einsicht in das Wesen selbst der Philosophie mit einschließt und sich eigentlich darauf gründet, und die also die Selbsterkenntnis des philosophischen Denkens darstellt, welche zugleich auch die Erkenntnis des eigenen Ursprungs ist. Diesen Ausgangspunkt ihrer selbst identifiziert sie zwar als transzendentes, dem Zugriff des Denkens sich entziehendes Prinzip, doch sowie dieses Prinzip sich gerade dieser Erkenntnis enthüllt, wird es von ihr als solches erkannt, das sich nach dem Vernunftmäßigen offenbart und als seinen wesentlichen Bestandteil das Vernunftmäßige enthält. So strebt also diese Erkenntnis, sofern sie dieses Prinzip gleichzeitig für das Göttliche, für Gott hält, nach eben diesem Prinzip, erkennt es als ihren Ausgangspunkt und trachtet danach, *sich zu vereinigen mit ihm* als ihrer Ursache und zugleich als der Wahrheit selbst. Da sie dieses Prinzip erlangen will, trachtet sie nach ihm, um ihr eigenes Wesen zu erfüllen, und dieses Trachten selber nun ist Liebe. Gerade diese »höhere« Form philosophischer Einsicht ist das, was Petrić als etwas im Sinne einer »pia philosophia« Mögliches nachweisen will.

Es ist also offensichtlich, dass Petrić, indem er aufzeigen möchte, dass auch der Glaubensinhalt, das höchste Geheimnis, der philosophischen Einsicht zugänglich ist, dass er vielmehr noch zu vorchristlicher Zeit den ureigentlichsten Gegenstand der Philosophie darstellt, im Grunde um die Reaffirmierung der Philosophie bemüht ist. Paradox ist hierbei gerade der Umstand, dass Petrić die Philosophie zu affirmieren sucht, indem er für sie den als ihr wesentlich zugehörigen Inhalt fordert, welcher das Kriterium zur Trennung der philosophischen und der theologischen Erkenntnis Gottes gewesen war, und dabei von der Philosophie verlangt, gerade eine »pia philosophia« zu sein. Übertreibt denn nun Petrić nicht, wenn er die Philosophie

zipien aus den unmittelbaren und natürlichen Übergang zu einer Lehre gefunden, welche die Grundlehre des ganzen Christentums ist. Wenn ich in der Philosophie der Mythologie schon darauf aufmerksam gemacht habe, dass die Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit Gottes ihrem Grunde, ihrer Wurzel nach keine speziell christliche sei, so zeigt sich dies in dem gegenwärtigen Vortrag, denn hier wird sich uns der in der All-Einheitsidee liegende Keim nun völlig, in der ganzen Entwicklung, deren er fähig ist, entfalten... Dass die Idee der Dreieinigkeit keine speziell christliche ist, erhellt ja auch daraus, dass man so viele Spuren und Andeutungen derselben anderwärts hat finden wollen« (*Werke*, Ergänzungsband 6, S. 20).

dadurch zu reaffirmieren sucht, indem er nachweist, dass sie mit der Vereinigung mit Gott ihr Ziel erreicht? Wird denn dadurch die Philosophie nicht ihres eigenen Wesens beraubt, das darin besteht, stets nach Wahrheit zu streben, und das sich in der Fragestellung selbst konstituiert? Laut Petrić jedoch bestätigt die Philosophie, wie wir sehen, ihr eigenes Wesen, indem sie zugleich nämlich Frömmigkeit ist. Frömmigkeit aber wird sie, indem sie das Streben und die Liebe nach der Wahrheit selbst, nach Gott ist.⁸

Aufgrund dieser Einsicht »greift [Petrić] auf die Absicht zurück, jene vom Dogmatismus der Religion und der Nicht-Philosophie des Glaubens sich angeeigneten Gegenstände wiedereinzufordern [zugunsten] der Vernunft und der Philosophie« (ibid.). Petrić erkennt dabei als etwas ganz Wichtiges, dass die philosophische Theologie sich gerade dadurch als Philosophie bestätigt, dass das (göttliche) Prinzip bzw. Gott für sie transzendent, nicht faßbar bleibt, also lediglich das stets Erwünschte; aufgrund dieses Verhältnisses nun, aufgrund des Strebens nach diesem Prinzip konstituiert sie sich als Philosophie. Während sie nun aber gleichzeitig nach der Erkenntnis selbst dieses Prinzips strebt, weiß die Philosophie um sich als um bereits ewig schon in der Wahrheit seiende, da sie erkennt, dass sie nach jenem Prinzip ist, das die Wahrheit selbst und somit von Gott gegeben ist.

Indem er gerade auf der »*pia philosophia*« beharrt, möchte Petrić offensichtlich, dass die Philosophie, für deren Affirmierung er sich verwendet, mehr als eine rein verstandesmäßige Einsicht in das göttliche Prinzip bzw. Gott, mehr als ein reines Sich-Beziehen darauf ist. Worin müsste also dieses »mehr« seiner Philosophie, das sich im Qualifikativum »fromm« äußert, bestehen? Dies wäre zweifelsohne das Beharren auf der Philosophie als einem Streben, vor allem aber als einer Form der Liebe, was bei Petrić, der ja darum bemüht ist, die philosophische Einsehbarkeit des höchsten Glaubensinhalts nachzuweisen, auch ganz spezifische Konnotationen hat (insbesondere bezüglich der Liebe des Sohnes zum Vater). Die Philosophie als Wahrheitsliebe wird hier nämlich, da sie als vernunftmäßige Erkenntnis der göttlichen Vernunft teilhaftig ist, zugleich verstanden als das Streben nach der Rückkehr zum eigenen Ursprung, als Streben nach der Wiedervereinigung mit dem Vater, dem transzendenten Urprinzip, das gleichzeitig die Wahrheit selbst ist.

Wie bekannt, endete der Versuch Petrićs zu seiner Zeit mit einem Fehlschlag. Das Werk, in dem er den Entwurf seiner »*pia philosophia*« dar-

⁸ Es muss betont werden, dass Petrić mit seiner Auffassung nicht allein ist. Es genügt, sich der Worte Schellings zu besinnen, der in *Philosophie und Religion* (1804) daran erinnerte, dass der Philosophie von der Religion allmählich jene Gegenstände entzogen worden seien, die gerade sie in der Vergangenheit bearbeitet habe. Dadurch sei die Philosophie allmählich auf das beschränkt worden, »was für die Vernunft keinerlei Wert hatte«.

legt, wird auf den Index der verbotenen Bücher verbannt.⁹ Abstrahiert man jedoch vom geistesgeschichtlichen Kontext, in dem es zu dieser Verurteilung kommt, und geht man der Sache selbst nach, bleibt die Frage: Bedeutet dieser Misserfolg also doch, dass Petrić etwas Unmögliches versucht? Diese Frage trifft auch uns heute in unmittelbarer Weise. Daran schließt folgende Frage an: Ergibt sich aus Petrićs Versuch zur Grundlegung einer »pia philosophia« überhaupt die Möglichkeit eines zukünftigen philosophisch-theologischen Nachdenkens über Gott, die Möglichkeit der Gotteserfahrung auf diesem Wege, und wenn ja – wie? Wir vertreten die Ansicht, dass Petrićs Versuch zur Grundlegung einer »pia philosophia« in erster Linie vor dem Hintergrund eines ganz bestimmten geistesgeschichtlichen Kontexts (Tendenz zur Grundeinstellung, dass alles, was ist, durch menschliche Erkenntnis vermittelt wird; Grundlegung des neuzeitlichen Rationalismus usw.) gedeutet werden muss, worauf im Grunde auch sein Bestreben zurückzuführen ist, den Beweis zu erbringen für das Bestehen eines Urprinzips, das der Garant für Einheit, Vernunftmäßigkeit, Ordnung und Gesetzmäßigkeit innerhalb der All-Umfassendheit wäre, worauf sich auch die Auslegung des Verhältnisses Gottes-des Urprinzips und der All-Umfassendheit (*universitatis*) gründet. Dennoch scheint es uns, als wolle uns Petrićs »neue« Philosophie, wenn man sich auf das Wesentliche beschränkt, eine Botschaft vermitteln, die äußerst zeitgenössisch anmutet und auf Folgendes verweist: die Wahrung des Bewusstseins vom Transzendenzcharakter des (göttlichen) Prinzips, nach dem wir sind; das Erhöhen des Worts als der Offenbarung dessen, dem nach alles ist, was sich aber lediglich verbirgt und zu entdecken gibt durch das, »dem es erlaubt zu erscheinen«; schließlich also die Offenheit für das Myster-

⁹ Tatsache ist, dass Petrić selbst, gemäß den Ausführungen in »*Apologia ad censuram di Francesco Patrizi*«, das von T. Gregory veröffentlicht wurde (*Rinascimento* IV, 1953), von der These ausgeht, dass ein großer Unterschied bestehe zwischen der göttlichen Theologie (»*quae constat primum revelatione, apostolicis traditionibus, oecumenicis conciliis, theologorum dogmatibus et summorum Pontificum decretis*«) und der Philosophie, welche gänzlich »*humanum inventum*« und »*humanae rationis ac naturae lumine rerum contemplatio*« sei. Petrić jedoch gibt seine Grundeinsicht nicht auf und beruft sich auch hier auf die Wortes des Hermes Trismegistos, »dass es unmöglich ist, ohne Philosophie fromm zu sein«, und: »*Qui vero pius est summe philosophatur*«. Er vertritt also auf jeden Fall einen auf verstandesmäßiger Einsicht sowie auf verstandesmäßigen Beweisen fundierten Glauben. Ferner ermittelt Petrić in der »*Apologia*« selber zwei mögliche Wege, über die man Gott erreichen kann (und daher auch Unterschiede): »*aliud esse per rationes humani ingenii per ea, quae facta sunt ad invisibilia Dei admitti et faciem eius semper hae via quacere et aliud esse fide sola circa theologiam versari*« (S. 97). Somit stellt er im Grunde die Distinktion zwischen der philosophischen Theologie und der Offenbarungstheologie fest. Seinen eigenen Weg wiederum, und somit auch seine »*pia philosophia*« bestimmt er ausdrücklich als Weg der Philosophie (»*me his libris de Sacrissima Trinitate deque mentium divinarum ordinibus et coelestibus corporibus et animis quibusdam, quae philosophi divina vocant, philosophice tractasse*«, S. 98).

rium, das eng mit dem Staunen darüber, »dass überhaupt etwas ist«, verbunden ist. Mit einigen Elementen seines Philosophierens gibt Petrić auf diese Weise also den Anstoß zu einem neuen, anderen philosophischen Denken – zu einer neuen, anderen Erfahrung Gottes, die den metaphysischen und traditionellen theologischen Ansatz in der Bestimmung Gottes überträfe.

ÜBERSETZT AUS DEM KROATISCHEN VON SILVIA SLADIĆ

JEDAN POKUŠAJ UTEMELJENJA »PIAE PHILOSOPHIAE«

Sažetak

Na samom početku svoje »Nove filozofije o sve-općem« (»Nova de universis philosophia«) Petrić ističe kako svoju filozofiju koncipira kao jednu »pobožnu« filozofiju (»pia philosophia«). U tekstu se, kroz analizu prije svega njegove »Panarchije«, pokazuje kakvo se značenje »pobožne filozofije« može iščitati iz Petrićeva nacrt »nove« filozofije.

Pritom će se pokazati kako je pretpostavka utemeljenja njegove filozofije kao jedne »pobožne filozofije« recepcija cjelokupne neoplatoničke, ali i kaldejsko-hermetičke tradicije. Tek iz razumijevanja motiva posezanja za tom tradicijom, srž koje je po Petriću, koji nadovezuje na neke od najznačajnijih predstavnika neoplatoničke tradicije, jedna »a deo revelata philosophia«, daje se razumjeti na što Petrić zapravo »cilja« pri konstituiranju pobožne filozofije.

Iz sagledavanja odrednica upravo *njegove filozofije kao jedne »pia philosophia«* jasno je da Petrić nastoji oko takove filozofije koja će, ne samo biti sukladna s kršćanskom naukom, nego štoviše biti mišljenjem kojem je moguće proniknuti u najvišu tajnu kršćanskog vjerovanja, u tajnu Trojstva.

Pritom će se, međutim, pokazati da tradicija, čijim se nastavljacem drži Petrić, kao ujedno tradicija jedne »philosophiae perennis«, rastvara ono jednokratno kršćanskog vjerovanja u filozofijskom uvidu, koji doduše premašuje puko razumsko spoznanje Boga, ukoliko filozofiju poimlje u njenoj višoj funkciji, a zapravo u njenom iskonskom značenju kao ljubav prema istini, pri čemu filozofija prepoznaje sebe kao težnju i ljubav koja jest upravo po Istini (Bogu) ka kojoj (koje) teži.

Time se ujedno pokazuje, da Petrić, trudeći se dokazati kako je najviša tajna vjerovanja dostupna filozofijskom uvidu i štoviše predstavlja njegov najvlastitiji predmet, teži zapravo reafirmaciji filozofije poglavito u odnosu na teologiju. Paradoksalno je pritom to da je on afirmira insistirajući na jednom specifičnom liku filozofije, tj. upravo na njenu pobožnom karakteru.

PETRIĆ'S ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL THINGS

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UDC 19 Petrić

The fourth volume of his *Discussionum peripateticarum* (which he grades as a censorship – *censura*) Petrić dedicates to the problems of Aristotle's natural philosophy, and the first book of that volume to the principles of natural things (*De principiis rerum naturalium*). Petrić establishes that Aristotle had, all in all, set forth fifteen theses – claims – on the principles of natural things. Out of the fifteen claims, seven are negative, and these Petrić does not discuss; eight are positive, and these Petrić wants to discuss. Petrić asserts Aristotle's eight theses on the principles of natural things in the following way: 1. *The principles (of natural things) are finite* (finita). 2. *The principles must be permanent, lasting* (permanentia). 3. *The principles are not generated from others*. 4. *The principles are not derived from one another*. 5. *All results from the principles*. 6. *The principles are contrary* (contraria). 7. *There are three principles. Two are contrary, and the third is subjected* (subiectum) *to the contrary two. Matter is subjected, placed under* (subiectum), *while privation* (privatio) *and form are contrary*. 8. *Other than these, there are the efficient principle and the final principle*.¹

Petrić opens the examination with a statement that within peripatetism in itself there are controversies regarding the issue whether a discussion on the principles (of natural things) belongs to the subject matter of the first philosophy (i.e. metaphysics) or to that of physics. Aristotle himself discussed, anyhow, the principles (of natural things) both in metaphysical books and in physics. Peripatetism interprets the previous in a way that a philosopher physicist considers the principles relatively – insofar as they are in rela-

¹ See F. Petrić, *Discussionum peripateticarum*. T. IV, Basel, 1581, p. 365.

tion to motion. Others, then again, think that it is the pursue of philosophers metaphysicist.²

In order to resolve this preliminary issue, Petrić constitutes that Aristotle had made, in many places, a distinction between the first philosophy and physics. That distinction is founded on a differentiation between two (categories of) substances: natural substances and unmoved substances, secondary substances and primary substance. The first philosophy is, in this context, defined as a science which discusses beings as beings, substances, the principles and the causes of substances – and these are, Petrić stresses, matter and form. Contrary to the old philosophers (*contra antiquos*), i.e. unlike the sofar interpretations, Petrić, nonetheless, states that the above is discussed in the first book of *Physics* and in the first book of *Metaphysics*; indeed, *Metaphysics* discusses the principles of natural things in greater depth than *Physics*. Petrić, however, accepts that fact neither as something plausible and acceptable, nor as something strange which needs to be solved or interpreted, but as something *unacceptable*, as an unnecessary reiteration, and what is more, in a place which it does not belong to (*alieno loco*). The exposition that Aristotle discussed the principles (of natural things) in *Metaphysics* – insofar as they are the principles of beings in general (*in universum*), and in *Physics* – insofar as they are the principles of physical beings, Petrić does not accept, because the first philosophy, according to Petrić, discusses beings as beings, substances – including physical substances, too. The exposition that Aristotle discusses the principles of substances in *Physics* – insofar as those substances are connected to motion, Petrić disputes by an exposition that motion is an accident of substance, i.e. an accident of a being. According to Petrić, *Metaphysics* should be concerned with motion as an accident of beings. Namely, *Metaphysics* discusses accidents of beings, i.e. that which belongs to beings as beings (*inexistentia enti uti ens*). Furthermore, motion is either activity or passivity (*actio aut passio*) which belong to predicaments (categories) – and *Metaphysics* is, according to Aristotle, concerned with all beings included in categories (*omnia entia praedicamentis comprehensa*). Petrić also directs to the discussion of the concept of potentiality in *Metaphysics*, which is important in physics in the sense that without the same, motion and generation are unthinkable. From all this, Petrić concludes that the discussion on the principles of natural things belongs to the first philosopher (metaphysicist). In the same way, the discussion on potentiality and motion also belongs to the first philosopher or metaphysicist. Motion, thus, is not a subject matter of physics, but of metaphysics. *Est igitur ex hac disputationum serie, ex Aristotelis doctrina, facto, ratione, primi philosophi munus, de principiis naturalium rerum,*

² Ibid.

est de potentia, est de motu tractare. Alieno ergo loco inter physica tractata sunt, eodem legum auctore, leges suas transgrediente.³

After that brief introduction, there follows a subtitle which covers the rest of the book: *Principiorum conditiones* – conditions or fundamental constitution of principles. It is a fundamental question, then, what the principles of natural things are like, or which conditions they need to meet so that they could be the principles of natural things. Petrić considers Aristotle's principles of natural things in regard to conditions or fundamental constitution which determine principles as the principles of natural things.

The discussion, however, presupposes an introductory conclusion, i.e. that the principles of natural things characteristically, distinctly, and not accidentally, belong to the subject matter of the first philosophy – metaphysics. Such a thesis represents a double opposition to traditional thought. 1. The first philosophy, i.e. (Aristotelian) metaphysics is not a science of the eternal and the unchangeable, of the constant and the same, is not a theology, but is a science of motion (*est de motu*)⁴ and 2. Peripatetical physics is not a (theoretical) science, insofar as it is renounced to discuss the principles (of natural things).

Petrić starts off with Aristotle's exposition that the principles of natural things are contrary, and that all of the old philosophers (the pre-Socratics) thought so, and he disputes that Aristotle's 'historical-philosophical' thesis. Some have posited contrary principles, but it is not the case with Anaxagoras and Parmenides.⁵ Beside this 'historical-philosophical' remark, Petrić considers Aristotle's explanation why the principles of natural things have to be contrary. Namely, the first contrary principles fulfil those conditions which principles need to fulfil in order to be principles. ('Quia contrariis primis conditiones eae insunt, quae principiis debent inesse.')⁶ Here, Petrić quotes three of Aristotle's conditions:

1. The principles need not (must not) generate from one another ('Prima, non oportere principia ex se invicem generari'),
2. The principles need not (must not) generate from others ('Secunda, non oportere principia ex aliis generari'),
3. All must be generated from the principles ('Tertia, omnia oportere ex principiis generari').⁷

³ Ibid., p. 366.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., p. 367.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

Hereafter, Petrić investigates the truth-value of the above criteria of Aristotle's, which principles as principles need to meet ('Haec vera ne sunt').⁸ Petrić's investigation of the criteria of principles so they could be principles is neither abstract nor formal. Petrić wants to, first of all, determine whether Aristotle's principles, those which he expounds, meet the propositions which Aristotle proclaims as the criteria of principles. The first contrary principles of natural things are, according to Aristotle, privation and form (*privatio, forma*), and matter is the second (i.e. the third) principle which is subjected (*subiectam*), which lies in the basis of the contrary principles. Petrić, hence, poses the question whether Aristotle's contrary principles – privation and form – meet the first condition, i.e. the criterion that they do not generate from one another. The first contrary principles – privation and form – do not generate from one another, according to Aristotle, because they are *contrary* principles, and not because they are *the first* principles. The attribute of the contrary, and not the first principle, is, thus, why they do not generate from one another. By this, the following questions or difficulties are raised by Petrić: Does the opposition of artificial or natural principles have that attribute, i.e. the non-generation from one another? And how does this thesis relate to another of Aristotle's assertions, i.e. the thesis that contrariness generates contrariness? Aristotle asserts that the principles do not generate from one another, and, simultaneously, that that which is generated (is degenerated) is generated (is degenerated) from an opposition (into an opposition). Peripatetism tries to resolve this contradiction by way of an assertion that the attribute of non-generation from one another does not belong to opposition as such, but to opposition as a principle. The first contraries, i.e. the contraries which are at the same time a principle, are privation and form.⁹

Petrić, however, proves that, according to Aristotle, privation and form generate from one another. For that proof, Petrić calls upon Aristotle, i.e. the method of Aristotelian induction, argumentation from singulars to universals. Petrić quotes Aristotle's examples that out of black white is generated, from an uneducated man an educated is generated, from disproportional (*anarmostas*) proportional, shaped out of unshaped. These are examples by way of which Aristotle shows that a singular contrary is generated from a contrary. Petrić, on the other hand, employs Aristotle's method of induction, and from Aristotle's singular examples he wants to point to that which is universal, i.e. to determine what is mutual in all the examples. Petrić finds that the first contrary states (black, uneducated, disproportional, unshaped) relate to the latter contrary states which they generate into (white,

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

educated, proportional, shaped) in the same way that privation does to form. Arguing from singulars to universals, Petrić asserts that from these very examples it follows that privation generates into form.¹⁰ Aristotle's examples more or less relate, Petrić emphasises, to artificial generation (uneducated – educated, disproportional – proportional, unshaped – shaped). Therefore, Petrić supplements his examples which relate to natural generation of contraries into contraries. According to Petrić, man is generated from a non-man, horse from a non-horse, cattle from a non-cattle, monkey from a non-monkey, tree from a non-tree.¹¹

If we compare Aristotle and Petrić's examples for generating contraries from contraries, we notice crucial differences. Aristotle quotes immediate evident examples from everyday experience which presuppose a substratum, a perceptible being that changes attributes through some time. Dirty clothing becomes clean (by washing), an uneducated man becomes educated (by learning), etc. The situation is different with Petrić. His examples compare the perseverance, existence of a being (man, horse, cattle, monkey) with the time in which that being was not yet in existence. Aristotle's examples are of the possibility and the manner which a being changes by, Petrić's examples are of the first inception of a being, i.e. of the time before the inception, or the non-being state of a being. Petrić, however, equates his examples with those of Aristotle, claiming that they only differ by the fact that Aristotle talks of artefacts, while he, Petrić, talks of natural beings. On the basis of equalling his and Aristotle's examples, Petrić holds that he can put forward a thesis which opposes Aristotle's proposition that principles do not generate one from another, the thesis: 'Ergo ex privatione cuiuscunque rei, fit forma rei eiusdem.'¹² However, Petrić does not think that thesis his own, but rather Aristotle's and quotes his examples of decay, i.e. of transition from form to privation, from a human to a non-human, from a horse to a non-horse. According to Aristotle, every generation in individual beings (*in individuīs*) happens 'from privation to form', and every decay 'from form to privation'.¹³ According to Petrić, on the other hand, on the basis of generation and decay in individual beings, and in line with Aristotle's method of abstraction, of inference from singulars to universals, it can be concluded that generation and decay – as a course from privation to form and from form to privation – also happen in species and in genera. Therefore, Petrić concludes that in origination from privation as such (*in genere*) form as such (*in genere*) is originated,

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 367–368.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 367.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

and vice versa, in decay from form as such (*in genere*) privation as such is originated.¹⁴

Petrić's course of proof is the following: he first starts off with Aristotle's thesis that the contrary principles (privation and form) do not ascend one from another, then he discloses Aristotle's explication according to which ascents and descents in individual beings happen contrariwise, from privation to form and vice versa. Thirdly, Petrić applies Aristotle's method of abstraction, of inference from singulars to universals, and maintains that that which holds of ascents and descents in individual beings, also holds of universals, i.e. holds of ascents and descents of form and privation *in genere*. Petrić contested, thus, Aristotle's opening thesis (that the principles of privation and form do not follow one from the other) by Aristotle's very own method.

Here, Petrić takes two crucial steps. The first is that he equates Aristotle's examples of generation (from uneducated to educated, from black to white, from simple to complex) from privation to form, which presuppose an individual and unchanged subject of generation, with his own (from a non-horse to a horse, from a non-human to human) which refer to the generation of the very subject, i.e. which compare the prior non-existence, the privation of a substance with its posterior existence, form. The other step is the application of abstraction. Since in generations of singular beings from privation (a non-human) form is generated (a human), it can be deduced, Petrić holds, that in general (*in genere*) form ascends from privation. On the basis of Aristotle's examples, by abstraction it could only be deduced that all the possible singular subjects change in the above mentioned way, i.e. from privation to form. However, Petrić's examples, those which accentuate the first inception or the ascent of the very subject, make it feasible for Petrić to deduce from the sphere of sense-perception to the sphere of principles, which can be formulated in the following way: The form of (all) beings ascends from the prior non-being or privation, and, on the basis of abstraction or inference from singulars to universals, it can be concluded that in general (*in genere*) the form of a being ascends from privation.

Aristotle's second and third properties (conditions) of principles, i.e. that principles do not proceed from others and that all proceeds from them, Petrić accepts. Those properties could correspond to, Petrić allows, Aristotle's first contrary principles.¹⁵ Yet Petrić poses the question whether those properties, as irrefutable and accepted properties of principles, would rather correspond to similar principles (*similibus*) then they do to (Aristotle's) con-

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 368.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

trary principles. Hence Petrić here asks which argument is used by Aristotle, i.e. Aristotelians for the thesis that the first principles are contrary (and not similar). As an argument for the thesis that the first principles are contrary (and not similar) Petrić quotes the thesis from *Physics* (book VI, chapter I); one opposite (contrary) is in one genus, and substance is one genus, the first one – as it stands in *Metaphysics* (book IV).¹⁶

From the above, Petrić infers that the first contrariness is the one which is in substance. The problem is, though, that in substances, according to Aristotle, there is no contrariness. Petrić solves the problem by stating that one substance is not contrary to another substance, but, nevertheless, there is contrariness in substances, because a substance is one genus and, therefore, there is a contrariness in it, too. As possible contrarities in the genus of substances, Petrić cites privation and form. Regarding form, Petrić holds that form is substance in peripatetic philosophy. If, on the other hand, one accepts that privation too is in the genus of substances (so form and privation are the first contraries in the genus of substances), then a conclusion follows that a non-being is substance, and that a substance is a non-being. Namely, privation is a non-being.¹⁷ Considering that it is a completely unacceptable thesis both for peripatetism and for Petrić, he judges that in the genus of substances there is no contrariness, and that the thesis – that in every single genus there is a contrariness – is false. Specifically, that is Aristotle's thesis also, and he maintains that in the category of substances and in that of quantity there is no contrariness, which only occurs in the category of quality. But, not only contrariness, but similarity (*similitudo*) too, are both characteristic of that category (i.e. quality). At the end of that inference, Petrić poses the following question: Why would the properties of principles, i.e. that they do not ascend from others and that all results from them, rather correspond to that first contrariness than to that first similarity – when both contrariness and similarity belong to the same genus, i.e. to the category of quality.¹⁸

The thesis that the first principles are contrary is founded on the understanding that generation (*generatio*) happens from contrariness and not from similarity, and is expressed by the example that from black white ascends. Petrić (together with the old philosophers) has a different interpretation of origination, i.e. that similarity is a result of (is originated from) similarity which he expresses by the examples that white is originated from white, black from black, a human from human, a black person from a black person, a

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., 'Ergo aliquod non ens, substantia est, et aliqua substantia, est non ens ...'

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 369, 'Cur ergo, non fieri ex aliis, magis primis contrariis convenit, quam primis similibus: cum utraque in eodem genere sint.'

white person from a white person. Whereupon, a white person is not originated from a black person, and vice versa. The peripatetic thesis – that contraries result from contraries – is not confirmed in nature, though peripatetics most often strive for evidence from nature. (The examples of origination from contraries, which Aristotle cites, are most often examples of artificial origination.) If the thesis that contraries originate from contraries is true, then it is impossible that substance ascends. In substances there is no contrariness, and neither substance is contrary to another. Even if there is a contrariness in substances (Petrić cites the possibility: physical – non-physical, spiritual – non-spiritual, rational – irrational) – then it is accidental origination. 'Sed ita, ut plurimum fieri, uti natura opera sua facit, ostendere non poteritis?'¹⁹

If substance originates, it does so from similarity, and not from contrariness: physical originates from physical, spiritual from spiritual, rational from rational, irrational from irrational, a human from a human, a horse from a horse, etc. Nature originates its substances from similarities to similarities. 'Non ergo vere, contrarium ex contrario, sed simile ex simili, natura rerum res suas generat.'²⁰

In Petrić's previously mentioned inferences, the thesis itself is not as interesting, i.e. that the principles of natural substances are similar, and not contrary (as Aristotle held), as is the fact that Petrić treats an idea of a principle or cause distinctly differently from Aristotle. The thesis that the first principles are contrary follows from the perceived fact that origination, i.e. change happens from contraries to contraries. The above, Petrić does not dispute, but confirms. On the other hand, the contrariness which is observed in origination-change is not, Petrić maintains, the principle or cause of that very origination-change. The cause of origination is the cause which is responsible or sufficient to bring into reality or existence the newly formed substance or being. Within the frames of peripatetism, the closest idea to Petrić is the idea of the efficient cause – not just in the sense of the cause of motion, but also in the sense of the cause of existence of a substance. The conceptual couple of privation and form, as the principles of motion, change or origination, indicate a different idea of a principle. Aristotle specifies them through the ideas of possibility and reality, and they are the result of the reflection on mere possibilities, thinkability or rational transparency of motion, change, origination. Privation and form are not principles in the sense of the efficient cause, but they follow from reflection on the condition of possibility that motion, change, origination are at all, and that they can be comprehended.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

Petrić, at any rate, does not dispute the fact that motion, change, origination happen from contraries to contraries, from privation to form, from possible to actual. What he does dispute is, in fact, the philosophical dignity of that fact, i.e. he renounces the status of a principle or cause of motion to those ideas. Petrić does not note the reflexive point of view of the supposition which those ideas have resulted from, and holds them as observed evidence. As we shall see in later inferences, he holds them as fragments of time perceiving, as constituting fragments of time flow. Aristotle's reflexive ideas have become perceivable, indubitable ideas for Petrić.

Nevertheless, Petrić here wants to, in some way, justify Aristotle before his very own objections. He states the hypothesis that the difficulties, regarding Aristotle's thesis that the first principles of substances are contrary and that they do not originate from one another, maybe result from the polysemy of the word 'from' in the phrase 'origination, ascend from'. Aristotle primarily uses the term 'from', Petrić explains, in regard to matter, e.g. when he says that *from seed* a plant originates, and a house *from stone*. On the other hand, Petrić says that, in the thesis *from contraries, from privation originates*, Aristotle does not have in sight either the efficient, the formal, the material or the final cause. On the contrary, when one says that it *originates from similarity*, then either the efficient or the formal cause is in sight. But, if Aristotle, by the use of the term *from*, does not have in view one of the four mentioned causes in the thesis 'originates from contraries', then, Petrić inquires, what does a principle mean to Aristotle anyhow?²¹ Here Petrić states that Aristotle has not defined a principle anywhere, and that, anyhow, Aristotle very rarely uses definitions. The reason why Aristotle so rarely uses definitions is, Petrić comments, because that enables him to expound contradictory theses, to leave aside an issue which he wanted to discuss and to pass onto another.²²

Instead of a definition of a principle, Aristotle, according to Petrić, enumerates significances (*significatorum enumeratio*) of principles – seven of them. Petrić cites Aristotle's significances of principles – A principle is: 1) *that by which a substance is firstly set in motion*, 2) *that whence something originates in the most beautiful way*, 3) *that whence firstly something originates in that way so to sustain itself in that substance*, 4) *that whence firstly something originates in that way so not to sustain itself in that substance*, 5) *that where substances set in motion move by choice*, 6) *the arts*, 7) *that whence a substance is firstly intelligible*. From these seven significances, Aristotle has contracted, according to Petrić,

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 369–370, 'Quid est igitur principium, bone Aristoteles? Encomia, laudes magnas et pulchras ab eo principii habemus ... significata principii septem, ordines duos 5. metaphysico habemus capite 1. definitionem nullam.'

²² *Ibid.*, p. 370.

an opinion that the common attribute of the principles is that they are that ultimate whence something either is, originates or is intelligible.²³

Notwithstanding, Petrić confirms that Aristotle does have a definition of a principle. It is, however, not to be found in the discussions where Aristotle reflects on principles, but in *Poetics*. Petrić cites: 'A principle is that which necessarily is not after another. Rather, after a principle itself, another is apt to ascend or descend.'²⁴ This thesis Petrić varies as his own in the second book of *Panarchia*, where he says: 'Principium absolute, id esse dicimus, ante quod nihil est, in quo, et a quo, et post quod omnia sunt.'²⁵

Here, on the other hand, in *Discussionum peripateticarum. T. IV*, it seems that Petrić rates the definition as poor, probably circular, because he comments it ironically: 'Mitto excutere qualis nam sit haec definitio.'²⁶ However, regardless of what range Petrić assigns to that definition, it is obvious that he accepts it as that which essentially expresses what a principle is.

Petrić, thus, inquires whether Aristotle's contrary principles (privation, form) are included in that definition, or whether they meet the conditions which are set forth by that definition. Those principles (privation, form) do not necessarily precede all things. If one presupposes that they only maybe precede substances, then it is possible that certain other principles precede them too.²⁷

Petrić also inquires to which one of Aristotle's previously mentioned seven significances of principles do the first contrary principles correspond to? Do they subsist in things or are they exterior to them? The only possible answer is that one is in things (form), and the other is exterior to them.²⁸

This thesis Petrić does not consider in principle further on, but through perceptive examples. An example is a tree which is at first cold, and when a fire gets near by, the tree gets warmer and starts to blaze. Petrić asks whether the initial coldness of the tree is outside or inside the tree before it gets on fire. It is a perceptive fact (*nulli sensato dubium*) that the coldness is within the tree. Warmth is, thus, exterior to the tree. But, Petrić asks, which warmth? The warmth of the fire is exterior to the tree, but the warmth of the tree is interior to the tree. Which one of the two (the warmth of the fire, the warmth

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ F. Petrić, *Nova sveopća filozofija*, Panarchia, Zagreb, 1979, p. 3v.

²⁶ F. Petrić, *Discussionum peripateticarum. T. IV*, p. 370.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid., 'Reliquum ergo est dicere, contrariorum alterum extra rem esse, alterum rei in-esse.'

of the tree) is contrary to the coldness of the tree? Both – Petrić replies. However, which warmth is originated? Obviously the warmth of the tree which was previously outside the tree. And now, Petrić poses the key question: What does the warmth of the tree originate from; is it the prior coldness of the tree, or the approaching warmth of the fire? Under the assumption that contraries originate from contraries, it should be claimed that the warmth of the tree originates from the coldness of the tree. Why would then, Petrić inquires, a fire need to approach so the tree could get warmer (on fire), when it is already getting warmer and blazes by its very own coldness, and heats us in winter? That was maybe so in ancient Greece, Petrić ironises, but in our times it is funny, he says.²⁹

In this exposition, in which Petrić by a manifest example brings to *absurdum* Aristotle's doctrine on contrary principles, it can be seen, on the one hand, how much Petrić distanced himself from Aristotelian physics and Aristotle's understanding of principles (of motion), and, on the other, what Petrić, in fact, requests of a science on natural things and how he conceives of the notion of the principles of natural substances.

Petrić, above all, does not follow Aristotle in his differentiation of foundations, principles (ἀρχή) and causes (αἰτία). Petrić, to be sure, does use the term *principium* (foundation, ἀρχή), but in Aristotle's meaning of the term of cause (αἰτία). For Petrić, a principle of a being or of motion is a direct or indirect cause of its existence. It is in this sense that Petrić's example of the blazing tree is to be understood. The cause of the tree's warmth and blazing is fire – the form of fire. The coldness of the tree is that which the whole process starts off from, but is not the cause of the process, because – Petrić explains – in that case the processes would be spontaneous, would happen all by themselves and would not need any exterior causes. Fire would not be necessary in order for a tree to get on fire, Petrić ironises, if the contrary principles, i.e. the coldness of the tree and the warmth of the tree, were the causes of trees getting on fire.

Aristotle, however, by asserting privation and form as the contrary principles of motion, change, has something else in mind. Namely, the presupposition of motion and change in general is that the form which is originated was never before. If all was formed from the outset onward, there could not be either motion, or change, ever. Privation or the non-presence of future forms is the condition of the possibility that motion or change take place. Pri-

²⁹ Ibid., 'Si vera est positio, contrarium a contrario generari, ligni caliditas a ligni frigiditate generatur. Quid igitur opus fuit ignem adferre ut lignum incalesceret? quandoquidem frigiditate sua incalescit, accenditur, hiemeque nos frigentes calefacit. Sed id quidem nostra tempestate evaserit ridiculum, forte in Graecia olim fuit in usu, atque ex usu.'

vation, as a contrary state to a future form, is the condition of the possibility of motion and change, and therefore the principle of motion and change, but is not the cause of the existence of that which in future will have changed – that is, namely, form. Though, Petrić does not reflect upon the possibility that beings change, but demands to be established *why* it changes or which *causes* initiate changes. In peripatetic words – Petrić is after formal, material, efficient and final causes and, hence, he places Aristotle's idea of privation as the principle (and not the cause) of change into margins.

Petrić, one could say, does not consider motion-change from the standpoint of contrary principles, but from the standpoint of similar causes. As applied to the example of the blazing tree, that means that for the tree to get on fire, there are two causes. One exterior – the warmth of the fire, and one interior – the warmth of the tree. And these two causes are similar, and not contrary. In the jargon of peripatetics – those are the efficient (the warmth of the fire) and the formal (the warmth of the tree) causes which explain this specific motion, change – i.e. the tree getting on fire, but do not explain the fundamental possibility of motion-change.

It seems that the meaning of the contrariness-thesis of principles and the difference of those principles, in relation to the efficient and formal causes, were, in a way, present in peripatetic discussions. Petrić directs to the peripatetics saying that they might polemise against his teaching by introducing a difference between origination *from* (*ex*) and origination *of* (*ab*). In that sense, contraries would originate from (*ex*) contraries, but would not originate of (*ab*) contraries. 'From' would thus imply a particular significance of a principle as a contrary principle (in relation to the final cause).

'... necesse est istud (ex contrario) in aliquam principii significationem incurrere.'³⁰

Petrić investigates what particular significance a principle as a contrary principle can have. If a (contrary) principle is a natural principle (*principium ut natura*), i.e. a principle of natural things (Petrić is concerned about the previous, and is not about the principles of artificial things), then that principle must be, Petrić maintains, either form, matter or the efficient cause. Petrić also adds that a contrary principle, according to Aristotle, can also both be that by which a substance is intelligible and the final cause (*cuius secundum electionem moventur mota*). But, the characteristic prescription of contrary principles as principles 'from' would not correspond to neither of the mentioned causes. The prescription of principles 'whence something originates, and which does not remain in the newly formed' (*unde fit primum*

³⁰ Ibid., p. 371.

non inexistente), in relation to Aristotle's examples which he relates to the prescription of this principle, does not correspond, also. Aristotle, namely, gives the example of father, mother and son, a quarrel and a fight. The prescription of principles which remain in the newly formed (*unde primum sit inexistente*) does not fit, too – also in respect of Aristotle's examples, e.g. a foundation and a house which originates. A contrary principle is not adequate for the idea of cause by which something originates in the most beautiful way (*unde pulcherrime unumquodque fiat*).³¹

The only idea which the prescription of contrary principles would correspond to is the idea of that whence initial motion sets forth (*unde aliquid moveatur primum*). But, Petrić continues, that is not an idea of a cause, but a state-determination which was prior to motion. The principle of motion or change is contrary, though not in the sense of a principle or cause of that motion-change, rather in the sense of the initial point, as it can be said that the beginning of the course is the principle of motion.³² It is the initial point where motion commences, but not the cause, principle or reason of that motion. Thus, Petrić alters the thesis and says that whatever is originated, it is originated *in contraries* (*quidquid gignitur, in contrario gignitur*).³³ The beginning of change is contrary in the final result, though that beginning is not the cause of that motion or change in any sense or determination of causes, but is rather the place where motion will happen in, or the starting point where it will commence from.

In the basis of those expositions of Petrić lies a correct observation and a fundamental misunderstanding. Petrić fully correctly notes that Aristotle's contrary principle does not correspond to Aristotle's understanding of the four causes (material, formal, efficient, final). Contrary principles or the contrariness of the first principles do not enter the category of causes. The misunderstanding, though, hides in the fact that Petrić does not realise the meaning and the necessity of foundations, principles which are not causes (but are the condition of possibilities). The contrariness, which can be seen in motion-change, is the contrariness of the beginning and ending of motion. The place where motion sets forth from, Petrić determines by a spatial-temporal conception as the beginning of the course (*initium viae*), but the conception is irrelevant in the sense of the cause (reason why) of motion.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid., 'Atque ita contrarium est principium generationis, ut viae initium est principium motus gradientis.'

³³ Ibid., 'Quidquid gignitur, in contrario gignitur, quidquid corrumpitur, in contrario corrumpitur, et contraria, talia principia rerum dicuntur, ut in quibus generatio et corruptio fiat: non autem ex quibus, aut a quibus.'

The fact that motion simply commences from somewhere and that it is, in relation to the final outcome, contrary to the result, represents for Petrić, it seems, a mere given, an evident fact which, in respect of the fact that it cannot be viewed from the aspect of the cause (the reason why) of motion, constitutes an unquestionability, does not require and does not enable any investigation. The fact that a being simply is different prior to the acquired causes for its change, one should not and cannot pose questions about.

That which represents a scientific problem for Petrić and requires an investigation, those are the causes, i.e. that which is 'the reason why', in each and every specific case, motion-change happened, which produced exactly such – descriptive – and not any other effect, result. Petrić, to be sure, notes the contrariness of motion, but he places it in margins in the 'temporal-spatial irrelevance of the beginning' sense, so that the final thesis also runs as such: whatever is originated, is originated posterior to contraries ('Quidquid generatur ex contrario, id est post contrarium, sonaret.').³⁴

After the investigation of the thesis of the contrariness of (the first) principles in the aspect of the notion of causes, Petrić considers that thesis of Aristotle's in the aspect of the notion of origination (*generatio*). Within the framework of peripatetism, Petrić differentiates between three types of origination. *The first notion* of origination (*generatio*), excluding *motus localis*, includes all motion (*motus*) which a magnitude (*magnitudo*) or quality (*qualitas*) is originated in. *The second notion* is a particular specification of the first, i.e. it includes motion in the qualities of some substances, which is a presupposition for the introduction of the new substantive form. *The third notion* of origination is a further specification and represents the final introduction of the very substantive form.³⁵

Petrić states that in this third origination, i.e. in the introduction of the new substantive form, one can firstly talk of a contrary principle. The question is, though, whether one should talk of origination 'from' contraries, 'of' contraries or 'posterior to' contraries. It is also a question how to talk of contraries in regard to substances which there are no contraries in. Nevertheless, Petrić investigates the applicability of the thesis on contrary principles, i.e. of the principle of privation and the principle of form in respect of the origination of the new substantive form. If one can talk of a relation of privation and form at all in the origination of substantive form, then it can only be said, Petrić claims as a continuation of the former inferences, that form is originated *after* privation. In the same way also, in regard to the origination of magnitude and quality, it can be said that warmth is originated *after* coldness

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 372.

(privation). The same can be said in the same way also, in regard to the first notion of origination.³⁶

In respect of the fact that a triply generation takes place in a subject (*in subiecto aliquo*), it can be said that, Petrić holds, the origination happens in a *contrary subject*. In this sense magnitude, warmth and form is generated in a small, cold or medium subject which is deprived of that form which will be originated or is originated, and which firstly has the contrary form of the one which will later be generated.³⁷

Here it can be inquired in what measure Petrić's understanding of a subject (ὄποκεῖμενον), i.e. that which lies in the basis of change and itself remains unchanged is peripatetic, and what is more, meaningful at all.

Aristotle introduces the idea of matter (ὕλη) as hypokeimenon, of subject (ὄποκεῖμενον) by the argument that one is to stop at a point. It is not possible that all is generated; in the process of generation it is necessary to establish that which lies in the foundation, the basis of change – and that is matter.³⁸

One should not use modern natural scientific associations in regard to Aristotle's ideas of substance-matter and hypokeimenon-subject, but should look at the context which the ideas were formulated in. Namely, that is an attempt of intelligibility, a conceptual reaching of a phenomenon which (i.e. motion) the earlier philosophy (Parmenides, Plato) held not to be rationally understandable. Matter as subject (hypokeimenon) or the border-line idea of every motion is, in its basis, without a determination or any form, even though, through experience one always observes an already shaped, formed matter which changes its form. On the other hand, formed matter as a subject or the hypokeimenon of motion-change are apprehended as something invariable and unchangeable, as that which lasts through change. In that case, motion-change is accidental. So, for example, a human is the subject or hypokeimenon of the change from an uneducated human to an educated human. A human is conceptualised as that invariable and unchangeable in that change – the essence of a human does not change when an uneducated human is generated into an educated one. In that sense, a human is conceptualised as that invariable and unchangeable in motion-change – regardless of the fact that a human is liable to generation and decay.

In respect to Aristotle's exposition of the idea of the subject of motion, in connection with privation and form, with Petrić there is an essential shift.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 372–373.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 372, "Tenendum ergo et hoc nostrum. In contrario subiecto scilicet contrarium ante possidente, sive id privatio sit, sive qualitas, sive etiam quantitas."

³⁸ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1069b 35–1070a 4.

The generation (*generatio*) of magnitude, warmth and form, thus quantitative, qualitative and formal generation, is perceptible – by the sense of sight (*oculis obiectum est*) it is observable. It is also observable that that origination takes place 'in' a subject (hypokeimenon) which is contrary to that which will later be originated, e.g. the origination of fire takes place in a cold or medium (tepid) subject. The origination occurs in a subject which is (preparatorily) deprived of (*in subiecto forma privato*) that form which will henceforth be originated. From this, Petrić concludes that every origination happens (posterior to contraries) in a contrary subject.

In respect to Aristotle, the determination of a subject or hypokeimenon is completely changed here. A subject is no longer that which one needs to stop at when analysing motion (change), is not that invariable or unchangeable in changes. A subject or hypokeimenon is neither that which one arrives at in the analysis of motion, i.e. is not the idea which is a result of the effort that motion is to be scientifically-philosophically understood or intelligibilised. The idea of a subject is not, as with Aristotle, a reflexive, but an empirical notion. It is observable, Petrić says, we see that the origination occurs in a subject which was previously contrary to that which will later have happened. The subject of motion or change is not that which is invariable in motion, change, but is that which itself changes observably. When we use the words 'subject' and 'that', and when we are in temptation to think of a being, then we really think of hypokeimenon in Aristotle's way. Petrić's fundamental misunderstanding lies precisely here. Namely, Petrić employs the idea of a subject (of motion, change), which fundamentally means that which remains constant through change, but only in respect of those parts which undergo change. By way of that, the fact that he simultaneously assumes and negates that which is constant (hypokeimenon) stays out of his perspective.

These remarks should not be understood as objections and criticism of Petrić. On the basis of that insight into Petrić's re-interpretation of the investigation of motion, change, the following question can be posed: How does Petrić conceptualise the investigation of natural motion, change?, or: In what sense does Petrić conceptualise the principles of natural motion, as differing from Aristotelianism? Petrić does not doubt the possibility that natural motion-change is to be intelligibilised or rationally comprehended. Petrić sets forth from the evidence that motion, change is and that it results from conceivable causes. Petrić expounds that insight not as a hypothesis but as an immediate observable fact. By way of that, the need for the idea of privation as the condition of the possibility of motion-change is abandoned by Petrić, and deserted is the need for reflection on the possibility of rational comprehension of motion, and so is the reflection on the principle which formulates that possibility. The investigation of motion-change arises from the reflexive

standpoint of the investigation of principles, and inclines toward the direct standpoint of the search for causes. And these are – if natural motion and change are at matter – primarily empirical, perceptive: warmth, a human, seed, etc. In that sense, Petrić's criticism of Aristotle's contrary principles is founded on a misunderstanding of the need for a reflexive point of view, and on the evident insight that motion-change is comprehensible. Therefore, Petrić conceptualises the investigation of natural motion-change as bringing into a connection or discovering the correlation between empirical effects and their immediate, empirical and observable causes. That which here changes fundamentally is the idea of a subject. A subject no longer expresses the reflexive-rational certainty that it must be something invariable in motion, if motion-change can be apprehended at all, but the immediate empirical fact of change of a subject, whose change is made a theme and wants to be expounded. The moment of the constant and the unchangeable is not focused here, but is correlated in the evidence of the subject (of investigation), in the identity of territory of a natural being in motion-change which is under scrutiny.

Petrić's criticism of Aristotle's contrary principles of motion-change and his thesis that principles are similar, and not contrary, are based on the insight (and on the task of the investigation) that the causes of natural, empirical motion-change are themselves part of the empirical framework.³⁹

Here Petrić ends his inquiry into Aristotle's contrary principles of privation and form, and approaches the analysis of the notions of 'that which is active' (*agens*) and 'that which is passive' (*patiens*) as possible contrary principles of motion (change). In every origination, Petrić says, both of the above mentioned notions are present. 'That which is active' acts, while 'that which is passive' endures, and, it seems, that they are contrary principles, because 'being active' and 'being passive' are reciprocally contrary.⁴⁰ Petrić investigates the meaning of that contrariness by an empirical example. When a blaze sets a tree on fire, then a blaze is 'that which is active' in relation to the tree, it acts upon the tree and sets it on fire. On the other hand, the tree is 'that which is passive' because it endures the heat of the blaze which is active. In the phenomenon of setting a tree on fire, one can differentiate between the *contrariness of the passive tree* and the *active blaze*. Petrić, however, inquires which type is that contrariness between the passive tree and the active blaze? A passive tree and an active blaze are not reciprocally contrary in the

³⁹ F. Petrić, *Discussionum peripateticarum*. T. IV, p. 373, 'Eiusdem speciei sunt homo generans cum homine genito, ignis generans cum genito igne ...'

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 'In omni generatione est agens, est patiens, ut alterum agit, alterum patitur, contraria videntur, namque actio et passio contrariae.'

generic sense (*contraria genere*). Both the tree and the blaze are substances and bodies, and their ideas are homogeneous (*homogenea*). Though, a blaze is simple and a tree is complex (*mistum*), and that can be understood as a contrariness.

But, in what sense, Petrić asks, does that contrariness act between a blaze and a tree, so that origination (i.e. a tree getting on fire) occurs? Petrić proposes two possibilities. A tree getting on fire can follow from the contrariness of the tree and the blaze in two ways: 1) the complex form of a tree endures the simple form of a blaze, or 2) an entire tree endures an entire blaze. In the first case, the act and change do not happen on the subject, hypokeimenon (as peripatetics hold) – here Petrić translates hypokeimenon as *suppositum* – but in the very forms. The second presupposes that a simple body, as opposed to a complex one, acts upon a complex body. That, however, is neither in line with peripatetism, which claims that a blaze also acts (sets on fire) in relation to air, earth and water – and these are all simple bodies. The empirical fact that a complex body endures not only simple bodies, but complex ones too, joins the above. As an example, Petrić quotes that a tree endures an axe and a stone, too. So he surmises that an act between a blaze and a tree (i.e. getting on fire) does not follow from the *contrariness* of a blaze and a tree, but in some other way.⁴¹

Petrić further investigates the possibility that the contrariness between a blaze and a tree is the cause of generation, action, i.e. a tree getting on fire, if not in the generic sense, then in the sense of species (*specie*). Aristotle's thesis that 'that which is active' and 'that which is passive' (*agens, patiens*) must be homogeneous (*homogenea*), and that in respect to species (*specie*) they are not similar but contrary, could, in this way, be expounded.

Petrić firstly states that that possible contrariness of species between a blaze and a tree is not immediately evident. Then he considers the possibility that that contrariness of species between a blaze and a tree is a contrariness between form and privation, because the tree is deprived of the form of the blaze. However, in that sense, a contrariness (of form and privation) would not be a contrariness of species. A species of blazes and a species of trees are both beings, and privation is a non-being. If, on the other hand, the contrariness between a blaze and a tree is understood as a contrariness between hot and cold, then at issue is not a contrariness within species, but qualitative and accidental contrariness.⁴²

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., 'Si fatebimur, adiungemus, eam contrarietatem non in ... re eiusdem speciei, sed in qualitatibus, in accidentibus fuisse.'

The contrariness of hot and cold, as a possible principle or cause of a tree getting on fire Petrić ridicules on an empirical example, too. Will not the blaze, Petrić ironically asks, set on fire a tree which the Sun had previously heated – so, thus, there is not any longer a contrariness between hot and cold? If peripatetics say that a blaze will not set on fire such a tree, then they have not kept their head, because that it is a clear empirical fact. If, on the other hand, they admit that a blaze will set on fire a tree which the Sun had previously heated, then the contrariness between hot and cold cannot be the cause of a tree getting on fire. A blaze sets on fire both a cold and a hot tree, and a tree's coldness or warmth are accidental.⁴³ Even if there is a contrariness in origination (it is not necessarily present), e.g. the coldness of a tree in relation to the warmth of a blaze, then that contrariness is accidental, and therefore, in accord with Aristotle's own principles, it cannot be the principle of (natural) sciences (*scientia naturalis*).⁴⁴ The principles of sciences, according to Aristotle, must be in themselves (*per se*), must be ordered (*esse ordinata*) and must be permanent (*esse permanentia*).⁴⁵

Petrić sets forth also from experience an additional reason why the contrariness between a warm blaze and a cold tree (which is possible and accidental) is not the cause of a tree getting on fire. Namely, a blaze by its heat does not act, does not set on fire all that is cold, and – Petrić provides an example – a blaze does not set either iron or Salamander on fire. Also, in accord with the principle of contrariness, all that is cold should act upon that which is warm, but coldness does not act upon the warmth of the blaze at all. In the same way, that which is moist does not act upon all that is dry, and vice versa; neither does lightness on heaviness, etc.⁴⁶ However, it would have to be necessary that the above happens, if the contrariness of each and every natural origination, i.e. passivity and action, was the formal cause (*formalitas*), i.e. the principle of that origination. Even though passivity and action are present in origination (Petrić does not deny this), they are not the formal cause (*formalitas*) of the origination, i.e. they, by their mere form, do not lead to origination. That means that mere contraries of hot and cold, moist and dry, etc., do not act, but origination results when certain distinct conditions are met. If contrariness is present in origination, it is not a cause in itself and simply (καθόλω, *primo*), but is accidental, i.e. it is present, but not in a way

⁴³ Ibid., 'Deinde quaeremus si lignum calidum calore solis sit, postea ignis accedat, an ideo ignis calidus, in calidum illud lignum, quia contraria non sunt, non aget? non accendet? non comburet?'

⁴⁴ Ibid., 'Ideoque per accidens istud, cum e scientiis ab Aristotele eiectum sit, reiici debere e scientiae naturalis principii, asseremus, de rerum generationis principii eximi debere.'

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 375.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 374.

of essential causation.⁴⁷ As evidence of the fact that mere contrariness is not the cause of origination, Petrić also quotes facts from experience – dry earth never dries out moist air, and cold earth never cools (extinguishes) fire. If this is objected by way of stating that the efficiency (*maioris activitatis causa*) of moist air and hot fire is greater (than that of dry earth and cold earth), then the thesis of qualitative contrariness as the principle of origination is abandoned and is substituted by the thesis of quantitative contrariness. However, that thesis can be objected to by way of stating that all that is 'greater' does not act in relation to all that is 'smaller' and vice versa.⁴⁸

From the previous inferences and conclusions, Petrić gathers a general conclusion: '... non est ergo contrarietas principium actionis et passionis, non omnis generatio ex contrario fit, non a contrario, non post contrarium, non in contrario ratione contrarietatis scilicet per se primo, καθόλου, necessario. Et si qua contrarietas intercedat, ea per accidens intercedit, quia scilicet actio, generatio in rebus fiant quae contrariae sint, non tamen qua contrariae sunt.'⁴⁹

If, thus, origination does not result from contrariness, is it not possible that it results from similarity?, Petrić inquires. 'Quid ergo, generatio, actio, si non ex contrarietate est, est ne ex similitudine?'⁵⁰ Then he briefly considers possible objections. Where the similarity is, it could be asked, between a blaze and a tree (in a tree getting on fire), between a man's seed and a woman's blood (in a birth of a child). There is no similarity, Petrić admits, but, when a tree gets on fire, that fire is similar to the one that set it on (i.e. of the same species – *eiusdem speciei*), and a born child is also of the same species (ὁμοειδῆ) as its father and mother. A man inseminates a similar-to-himself woman, whereas a blaze does not act upon a similar-to-itself tree, but that which later on occurs – burning – is similar to a blaze.⁵¹

The philosophy of the old philosophers, who maintained that the principles of things are similar, is, hence, more plausible, Petrić claims, than Aristotle's philosophy which maintains that the principles of things are contrary.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid., 'Si aiam. interrogabunt, quid ergo ignis ligno est similis? viri semen, sanguini mulieris? negabo sane id. Sed maxime omnium affirmabo, ignem in ligno genitum, similem ὁμοειδῆ, eiusdem speciei generanti igni effectum, natum ex foemina simile ac ὁμοειδῆ generanti patri ac matri effectum, atque ita simile a simili, simile ex simili, primo, per se, καθόλου effici: in simili etiam mas sibi foemina generat atque ὁμοειδῆ, non tamen ignis in simili sibi ligno, post simile etiam.'

That which is contrary does not have the properties which enable that to be a principle of things; even if it is understood as a principle of things in some way, that principle is not such and would not have the power (*robur*) or the virtue (*virtus*) to produce things (*nullum robur; nullam virtutem ad res generandas habent*), does not contribute to the origination of things.⁵² While contrary principles do not have the power of generating, producing, similar principles do. In what way they have it, by their similarity or else, this consideration Petrić promises to undertake in his philosophy. 'Sua ne similitudine id agat, an alia quapiam virtute, id nostrae philosophiae reservamus.'⁵³ Here it can be seen that Petrić determines the power of causation or the property of principles as a virtue – *virtus*. For Petrić, *to be a principle* means to have the power, strength or virtue to produce certain effects.

Here Petrić concludes the debate on the contrariness of principles, and further on briefly considers the rest of Aristotle's attributes of principles. 'Sed reliqua prosequamur principiis attributa.'⁵⁴

First, he considers Aristotle's thesis that it is better to state that the principles are determined and limited (*melius esse finita et terminata ponere principia*). Aristotle details this thesis by saying that a being itself would not be intelligible, if the principles were not finite (*finita principia*). Petrić objects to that by saying that nature in its creation (origination) does not follow human cognition and does not please it by producing these, rather than those things, so that they could be understandable. 'Quid est hoc, non scibile ens?' an vero natura in rebus universi huius fabricandis nostrae cognitionis rationem ullam habet ut hoc potius quam illud faciat, hoc quam illo modo agat? Ut nostrae cognitioni inserviat, ut nobis faciat satis?⁵⁵

In this criticism of Petrić, the shift away from Aristotle's way of putting forward the problem of motion and nature is very clear. He shows both the justification and limitation of his perspective.

If Petrić's thesis – that nature does not please us and does not take care of our cognitive possibilities – represents a criticism of the teleological explanation of nature – peripatetism's explanation was the same – then it points in the direction of modern non-teleological natural sciences. But Petrić does not formulate that thesis as a criticism of either the final, the first or any other cause. Petrić formulates it as a counter-balance to Aristotle's statement that the causes must be limited, finite (*terminata, finita principia*), and not in-

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 375.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

finite. An infinite chain of causes would disable not just the intelligibility of beings, but the very possibility of existence of beings. This is not a teleological thesis, but follows from a reflection on what the conditions of motion (change, origination, decline) really are and how it is possible to be comprehend. It is a critique of Aristotle's understanding that motion maybe is not at all, because it is not intelligible. By way of formulating Aristotle's thesis on the finiteness of principles in the teleological manner, Petrić clearly distances himself from the teleological approach in natural philosophy, and one can understand this as a modern element in Petrić's thought. Misinterpreting, on the other hand, Aristotle's thesis on the finiteness of principles of natural motion (and of natural philosophy) in the teleological manner, with Petrić the basic style or conception of Aristotle's natural philosophy falls into oblivion. The question on the possibility, i.e. on the intelligibility of sublunar motion, on the reinstatement of the possibility of subject matters of the natural or the second philosophy – is no longer topical, does not represent a problem. Motions are, and have their (intelligible) causes. What is to be posed as a question is the following: Which are these causes? Whatever they are, they are not such that they take care of whether we could comprehend them (easier). The question on the possibility of a scientific subject matter has been reformulated (or misinterpreted) in the teleological manner, degraded and excluded from the field of sciences. By excluding certain peripatetic inquiries from the field of scientific interest, Petrić also looks in the direction which will later on become the direction of modern natural sciences. What remains hidden from Petrić is the fact that those inquiries (on the possibility and intelligibility of nature and natural sciences) are not abolished or meaningless, but have become, for him, tacitly accepted and indubitable, and have crossed over to his idea of nature. It is not the problem of natural science that natural motion is and that it is intelligible, because it reaches its subject matter as real and intelligible in advance, or prior to its real task of establishing individual causes. What is at issue is not an original and eternally present evidence, but the way to it led via Aristotelianism.

After having considered Aristotle's thesis that the principles of natural things must be finite, Petrić analyses Aristotle's thesis that the principles must be eternal (*semper manere*). Not any contrary is to be taken as a principle of natural things, but only that contrary which is eternal. Such contrary principles are those which cannot be generated (*ingenerabilia*), either one from another, or from other principles. Such a contrary is that first contrary, or the first contrary principles. Where can one, Petrić now asks, find such principles? 'At ubi ea inquiremus?'⁵⁶ That question – 'where' those principles

⁵⁶ Ibid.

are – for Petrić means that it is necessary to find those principles in the scheme which in peripatetism includes and categorises beings – in Aristotle's categories. Petrić engages in the search for the first eternal contrary principles of natural beings, starting off with the first category, i.e. substance. It would be meaningful (*non absonum a ratione*) if the first contrary principles were to be found in the category of substance, if the first substances were 'some human' or 'some horse' (*aliquis homo, aliquis equus*). It is impossible because if the first substances were such, then they would all fall apart, and would not be eternal.⁵⁷

The following possibility could be that the first contrary principles of substances are of species or genera (*species, genus*). That, however, is also impossible because species and genera are universal, and that which is universal, according to Aristotle, is secondary (derived) or even nothing (*aut nihil, aut posterius est*). Petrić also investigates the possibility that the first contrary principles are the total absolute substance (*in tota substantia absoluta*). Then, that substance contains a contrary, which is the first contrary whence all other contraries are derived. Petrić holds that, according to Aristotle, it is possible to explicate that contrary in two ways. It can either be 'privation and form' or 'one and many'. If it is assumed that the first contrary is 'one and many', then that contradicts Aristotle's doctrine that principles must not result from one another. Namely, 'many' results from 'one'. This also contradicts the doctrine that all follows from principles, because there is nothing else apart from many and one. 'One' and 'many', thus, cannot be the first contrary principles.⁵⁸

It is a further possibility that privation and form are the first contrary principles. Petrić, though, holds that privation and form (as the principles of natural things) are not, according to Aristotle, eternal and non-originated, but rather follow one from the other (privation from form, form from privation). As opposed to them, Aristotle has conceptualised *matter* as eternal, as that which is not originated from another, and which all originates from. 'Materiam nobis Aristoteles tradidit, quae principium rerum generatarum sit, semper maneat, ex contrario nullo fiat, ex nulla re alia fiat, ex ea omnia fiunt.'⁵⁹ For Aristotle, Petrić holds, not a single natural privation or form has the characteristics of eternity and non-generation, the property that all is originated from it. Nonetheless, Petrić admits, Aristotle has determined another form (but not a natural one) to be the principle of all. But, Aristotle has excluded it from considerations which deal with natural things, and has

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 375–376.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 376.

discussed it in the first philosophy. 'Quandam aliam formam, quae principium sit nominavit. Sed huic physico negotio, non attinentem, ad primam philosophiam reiecit.'⁶⁰ What is more, that form has not a contrary of its own. Petrić does not want to discuss that form here – because physical form and the principles of physical things are at issue here, and the science of physics and physical things is being discussed. '... de physica forma sermo nobis esto, physicarum enim rerum principia quaeruntur, physica scientia tractatur, physica materia proponitur, physica etiam et principia et contraria in quaestione sunt.'⁶¹ *Matter* is the subject of contrary principles (privation and form) and it is the only one which remains forever (*semper manens*), eternal. 'Materia contrariis istis subiecta est. Esto. Materia est principium semper manens. Esto.'⁶²

Having, thus, established matter as eternal and non-generated (in this sense it has the property of a principle), and also as a subject or that which lies in the basis of privation and form, Petrić expounds further relations between matter, form and privation. Matter is by its very nature deprived of any form, but, at the same time, it is never deprived of all forms (or any of the forms). From the above it follows, according to Petrić, that all matter, by its very nature, is occupied (*occupatur*) by the privation of forms. As a contrary principle, however, the totality of privation is contrary to form – this is seen in experience, Petrić maintains; when, for example, the form 'me' is originated in matter, then the privation 'me' descends, which was beforehand in 'my' matter. What happens in each and every particular origination, necessarily happens also in general. Therefore, form, which shapes the entire substance, is contrary to the totality of privation. That total or universal form is the form of the world (*mundi totius forma*); even though Aristotle has not mentioned or announced the possibility of such form anywhere, according to Petrić, it is necessary in Aristotelianism as a consequence of the idea of the first contrary principles. But, when the form of the world approaches, the totality of privation perishes, and there is no privation in any way, at all, in the world. How can, hence, privation (which is not any longer) be a principle, an eternal principle – Petrić inquires.⁶³

However, Petrić also varies the possibility that the principle of natural things, an eternal principle is not the totality of privation, which is associated

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid., 'Forma ver privationi universae contraria ea est, quae totam materiam format. Ea est, ut opinor (quando Aristoteles nullam ne innuit quidem) mundi totius forma. Ad adventum ergo formae mundi, tota privatio perit. Nulla ergo in mundo privatio amplius est. Si nulla, quomodo ergo principium est?'

(*socia*) with matter, but is only that fragment of privation which is associated (*socia*) with the fragment of matter, which the forms of the elements enter (*quam elementa informant*).⁶⁴ A disunion between a form of heavens and an elementary form, i.e. the sublunar world, is emphasised by this differentiation, and Petrić questions the possibility and justifiability of this differentiation. Petrić claims that, on the basis of this differentiation, it is possible to inquire whether privation is associated with all matter, which is shaped by the forms of the elements, or only with a certain fragment of that matter. If privation is associated with all matter, which the forms of the elements approach to, then privation, after the forms approach matter, is no longer and cannot be an eternal principle. On the other hand, it is not clear whence that difference in matter is (which is shaped by the forms of the elements) so that privation is only partially associated with it.⁶⁵

In line with Aristotle's teaching, Petrić concludes that the entire elements are not liable to either origination or decay, they decay or are originated only partially. And what is under scrutiny here and is sought for, i.e. the principles of natural things, are the principles of precisely this partial origination and decay. 'Corruptionis ergo huius et generationis partialis principia quaeruntur.'⁶⁶ In partial origination and decay, partial privation and partial form decay and are originated. Is it possible, Petrić doubts, *to understand that partial privation and partial form as the principles of natural origination and decay, i.e. as eternal and contrary?* If partial privation decays when form approaches, it is not eternal, and if it does not decay, then it is not a contrary (of form), because all that is contrary according to Aristotle, Petrić expounds, decays. If, on the other hand, partial form is eternal (which Aristotle requires of a principle), no origination can take place once and for all – because all forms are already present. And if this partial form decays, then Aristotle's property of principles does not belong to it – i.e. eternity. *Out of the three principles of natural things (privation, form, matter) which Aristotle has set forth – only matter has – according to Aristotle – the property of a principle, i.e. eternity (semper manens), permanens.*⁶⁷

By ending the chapter, Petrić not only doubts the three of Aristotle's principles of natural things (privation, form and matter), but also generally requires that it is investigated what properties (*conditiones*) the principles of natural things should have. Petrić's conclusive sentence is very short and con-

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid., '... unde ista in ista materia differentia?'

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 377.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 376, 'Materiam nobis Aristoteles tradidit, quae principium rerum generatarum sit, semper maneat, ex contrario nullo fiat, ex nulla re alia fiat, ex ea omnia.'

cise, but it seems to me that it contains more questions and problems than at first sight noted. Petrić concludes that the true conditions of principles and the true principles, one needs to question (further) – in other words, that Aristotle has not questioned them, that he has not solved the problem. But, he also doubts whether they can be questioned at all. Maybe they cannot be inquired about (*inquirere*), i.e. sought for and found in experience. Maybe they should simply be taken, rationally placed and postulated. 'Verae ergo principiorum condiciones, vera principia inquirenda, si modo sunt inquirenda, et non sumenda.'⁶⁸

Petrić's announcement that the principles maybe cannot be investigated at all, cannot be sought for and found in experience follows from the understanding that Aristotle's ideas of privation, form (and matter) are empirical notions, which have resulted from the analysis of partial origination and decay. By this, Petrić, in principle, correctly surmises Aristotle's starting point. However, Petrić holds that the ideas, which have resulted from the analysis of partial origination and decay, are empirical ideas, which do not meet the criteria which Aristotle requires, in principle, of principles. What is more, Petrić does not even notice the possibility that these ideas are not empirical ideas, but that they are constructions which are to explain how such experience is (rationally) understandable. This fact, what is more, means that Petrić's experience or his preliminary, non-reflected idea of experience is already beforehand peripatetically prepared. Or, that which Aristotle reaches through reflection as the possibility that motion is to be rationally grasped – for Petrić it is immediately perceivable and represents a fact of experience. Petrić requires that the principle of experience does not follow from experience – by way of which, he, in fact, does not oppose Aristotle's teaching (as to how we understand Aristotle). Petrić, though, unlike Aristotle, does not require that these ideas explain the possibility of rational understanding of motion – because, for him, that is already insured and indubitable. Petrić does require that the principles of motion correspond to or meet the criteria which is required of principles. However, here the question remains open as to what these criteria are; those of Aristotle's as, for example, eternity, non-generation from others, that all results from them, or some other.

TRANSLATED BY ANA JANKOVIĆ

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 377.

PETRIĆEVA ANALIZA PRINCIPA PRIRODNIH STVARI

Sažetak

U članku se izlaže i tumači prva knjiga četvrtog sveska *Peripatetičkih rasprava* Frane Petrića. Ta knjiga nosi naslov: »O principima prirodnih stvari« a Petrić u njoj podvrgava kritici Aristotelove principe fizike, odn. prirodne filozofije. Rasprava se centrirá oko kritike prvih kontrarnih principa, oko kritike principa forme i lišenosti (*privatio, steresis*) i njima podmetnutog subjekta (*hypokeimenon*). U svojoj kritici Petrić pokazuje odmak od ideje peripatetičke fizike. On ne prati Aristotelovo razumijevanje kontrarnih principa koji su uopće pretpostavka da bi se inteligibiliziralo kretanje. Petrić već unaprijed pristupa kretanju kao nečemu što se može racionalno dohvatiti i traži *uzroke* (a ne principe) kretanjem novonastalog bića. Pritom dolazi i do promjene u pojmu subjekta. Petrićeva kritika ukazuje na interes za empirijska istraživanja, iako ne doseže do pojma novovjekovne znanosti.

THE EVALUATION OF ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL PHILOSOPHY IN PETRIĆ'S *DISCUSSIONES PERIPATETICAE*

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Original Paper

UDC 19 Petrić

The long professorship (1577–1592) at the Ferrara University in teaching Platonic philosophy contributed to the moulding of Frane Petrić's own philosophical system, constituting the original natural philosophy. His philosophical effort on the study of nature may be observed through three phases:

- (1) challenged by the bulk of Aristotle's philosophy, Petrić first wrote a series of treatises in which he also examined Aristotle's *dogmata* on natural philosophy;
- (2) later, in his intent to build »new geometry«, he refuted Aristotle's concepts of the divisibility and continuity of mathematical space, particularly line – implying also path in mechanics;
- (3) he incorporated his mature views on natural philosophy into an authentic philosophical system, producing a masterpiece on »new philosophy«.

Each of the aforementioned stages was crowned by an impressive book. In the same period Petrić wrote and published shortly afterwards the preparatory and supplementary works on the same topic. Petrić's contributions to natural philosophy are to be found in the following writings:

1. *Discussionum peripateticarum tomi primi libri XIII.* (1571);
2. the letter »Franciscus Patricius Bernardino Telesio, philosopho omnium eminentissimo, salutem dicit.«, Venice, 26 June 1572, first published in: Francesco Fiorentino, *Bernardino Telesio ossia studi storici su l'idea della natura nel Risorgimento italiano*, Volume secondo (Firenze: Successori le Monnier, 1874), pp. 375–398;
3. *Discussionum peripateticarum tomi IV.* (1581);

4. *Apologia contra calumnias Theodori Angelutii eiusque novae sententiae quod Metaphysica eadem sunt, quae Physica* (1584);
5. *Della nuova geometria ... libri XV* (1586);
6. *Philosophiae de rerum natura libri II. priores. Alter de spacio physico, alter de spacio mathematico* (1587);
7. *Nova de universis philosophia* (1591);
8. introduction to the edition *Mystica Aegyptiorum et Caldaeorum, a Platone voce tradita. Ab Aristotele excepta, et conscripta philosophia. Ingens Divinae sapientiae thesaurus*, or, in short, *Mystica philosophia* (1591), together with the paper »Aristoteles exotericus«;
9. the manuscript *Prima philosophiae liber primus de principiis* (1596).

Therefore, to discuss the topics and achievements of Petrić's natural philosophy means to consider the features and value of these books and manuscripts, paying particular attention to their chronological order and interrelatedness. The aim of this paper is to examine the views Petrić exhibited and elaborated in *Discussiones peripateticae* and are related to natural philosophy.¹

Petrić's four approaches to Aristotle's works on natural philosophy

It was in Venice in 1571, »only three years following his return from Cyprus«,² that Petrić conceived a magnificent work in which he was to challenge Aristotle's thought in a most exhaustive and comprehensive way. As his intent was to write it in Latin, he entitled the work *Discussiones peripateticae*, considering it would comprise treatises on Peripatetic philosophy, that is, Aristotle's philosophy together with his earlier and later commentators, and not the treatises written in the spirit of Aristotelian philosophy. Translated into English as *Disputes on Peripatetic Philosophy* would most faithfully render the true nature of Petrić's work.³

¹ Franciscus Patricius, *Discussionum peripateticarum tomus II* (Basileae: Ad Perneam Labyrinthum, 1581), particularly the fourth tome: »Francisci Patritij Discussionum peripateticarum tomus quartus. Aristotelis dogmatum censuram continens.«, pp. 361–479. – In citations I have used the abbreviation DP and the system of collocation originally employed by Petrić in »Rerum et verborum maxime memorabilium elenchus.«: the first number designates the page, and the second, separated by a comma, indicates the line on the same page.

² »Ad Zachariam Mocenicum M. Antonii Senatoris Optimi Filium.«, in: DP, ff. 4r–5r, on f. 4r.

³ The title of Petrić's remarkable work witnessed its first Croatian translation in this form by Veljko Gortan in his essay »Franjo Petrić / Franciscus Patricius (1529–1597)« in: *Hrvatski latinisti / Croatici auctores qui Latine scripserunt* I, digesserunt Veljko Gortan et Vladimir Vratović, *Pet stoljeća hrvatske književnosti* 2 (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska and Zora, 1969), pp. 709–713, on p. 712.

Petrić delineated his acquaintance with the entire body of Aristotle's philosophy in four tomes. The introductory one deals with Aristotle's life, works, and influence. The contents and composition of the tome demonstrate the wealth of author's philological and historical erudition. In the second tome the philosopher from the town of Cres discusses the common positions of Greek philosophy, while in the third tome he highlights the differences between Aristotle and his Greek predecessors. The fourth and last tome Petrić dedicated to his concluding evaluation of Aristotle's thought, singling out ten most significant topics, mainly from natural philosophy and, to a lesser extent, ontology.⁴ In Petrić's approach to the Greek natural heritage, one should point to the methodical gradation: concord, discord, criticism (Lat. *concordia, discordia, censura*). He published the first tome of his *Discussiones* in 1571 in Venice, while the complete work, consisting of four tomes, was to see the light in Basel in 1581.⁵

The ten years, during which the philosopher from the town of Cres dedicated most of his effort to the study of Aristotle's work, mirror vividly in Petrić's portrait printed on the verso of the title page of *Discussiones peripateticæ*, where Petrić is depicted at the time he completed the book on Aristotle's philosophy. According to the date in the oval border enclosing the portrait, it »was taken at the age of 51, A.D. 1580«.

The approach Petrić decided on in each tome of his *Discussiones*, he applied most attentively to natural philosophy by using seven affiliated terms:

⁴ Cf. the description of the structure of Petrić's *Discussiones peripateticæ* in: Maria Mucillo, »La storia della filosofia presocratica nelle *Discussiones peripateticæ* di Francesco Patrizi da Cherso«, *La cultura* 13/1–2 (1975), pp. 48–105, on p. 48; Mihaela Girardi Karšulin, »Petrićevo tumačenje predmeta Aristotelove *Metafizike*«, *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine* 5 (1979), on p. 241. On the genesis of *Discussiones peripateticæ* see: Antonio Antonaci, *Ricerche sul neoplatonismo del Rinascimento: Francesco Patrizi da Cherso*, Volume I: La redazione delle opere filosofiche – Analisi del primo tomo delle *Discussiones*, Pubblicazioni dell'Istituto di Filosofia e Storia della filosofia 2 (Galatina (Lecce): Editrice Salentina, 1984), pp. 41–90.

⁵ Franciscus Patricius, *Discussionum peripateticarum toni primi libri XIII*. (Venetiis: Apud Dominicum de Franciscis, 1571); Franciscus Patricius, *Discussionum peripateticarum toni II*. (Basileae: Ad Perneam Lecythum, 1581). Cf. Šime Jurić, *Croatiae scriptores Latini recentioris aetatis* (Zagrabiae: Institutum historicum Academiae scientiarum et artium Slavorum meridionalium, 1971), p. 8, which contains the bibliographic description of the copies housed at the National and University Library in Zagreb. In addition to Jurić's findings, I contribute one of my own: the copy of the Basel edition kept in the Library of Baldo Bogišić in Cavtat classified as B VII. 3/1. – There are scholars who overlook the fact that 1571 saw the publishing of tome one only, to be followed in 1581 by the second edition of tome one and the first edition of tome two, three, and four of Petrić's *Discussiones peripateticæ*. See, for instance: Franco Volpi, »*Exercitationes paradoxicae adversus Aristoteleos*, Pierre Gassendi«, in: Franco Volpi und Julian Nida-Rümelin (hrsg.), *Lexikon der philosophischen Werke* (Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1988), p. 270, in which Volpi claims that the first three tomes were published in Venice in 1571. – The title-page of each tome of the Basel edition was provided with complete publishing data. Evidently, the printer had individual circulation of the tomes in mind.

physiology (Lat. *physiologia*, DP 337,9), physics (Lat. *physica*, DP 227,28), physical science (Lat. *physica scientia*, DP 228,7), natural science (Lat. *scientia naturalis*, DP 235,20), philosophy of nature (Lat. *philosophia naturae*, DP 337,10), natural philosophy (Lat. *philosophia naturalis*, DP 235,32 and 364,25), and physical philosophy (Lat. *philosophia physica*, DP 365,16). In the light of this terminology, Petrić refers to a Greek philosopher who does or may study nature as a physiologist, physicist, natural scientist, or natural philosopher. Being immersed in Aristotle's writings in natural philosophy and the entire Greek natural science, Petrić came forward with four of his own positions on natural philosophy, having examined Aristotle's doctrine on nature from four different aspects.

In the ninth book of the first tome Petrić was determined to solve a demanding task: to establish the »true and genuine order of Aristotle's natural books« (»verum et germanum Aristotelicorum naturalium librorum ordinem«, DP 124,46). Aristotle's heritage in natural science, as Petrić epitomizes this controversy among the Aristotelians, comprises at least 52 books. The leading among them are: 1. eight books of *Physics*; 2. four books of *De caelo*; 3. two books of *De generatione et corruptione*; 4. the first three books of *Meteorologica* (DP 112,28-37). The order of other books remains the subject of lifelong disputes among those studying Aristotle's philosophy, the Greeks and Arabs alike. Although Petrić provided the order of thirty Aristotle's books on nature, arranged in a descending order from the more to less general subjects (DP 127,1-19), he concluded his examination with the statement that the problems related to the order of Aristotle's writings cannot be solved easily. Namely, that was the last marginal subtitle of the ninth book: »Problemata in ordinem redigi non facile possunt.« (DP 127,18-23).

The concurrence in Greek natural philosophy

In comparing Aristotle's position in natural philosophy with that of his Greek predecessors, Petrić started with the problems upon which it was generally agreed in Greek natural heritage. He discusses the common positions in the second tome of his *Discussiones*, in books five and six.⁶ Here is a sentence that illustrates Petrić's approach in the best way: »As Aristotle's physical science comprised in 50 books examines ten general theorems – on the principles, on common accidents, on the world, on the heavens, on elements, on action, on exhalation, on the soul, on animals, on plants – none of which, according to a series of testimonies by Aristotle himself, had been disre-

⁶ »Liber V. conformia cum antiquis Physiologiae capita complectens.« and »Liber VI. qui Physicorum dogmatum concordiam continet.«, in: Patricius, *Discussionum peripateticarum tomus secundus* (Basileae: Ad Pernean Lecythum, 1581), pp. 227-235, 235-257.

garded by those old physicists.«⁷ According to Petrić's understanding of the development of natural science and natural philosophy, Aristotle was not to invent but perfect the doctrine on nature («non ad inventionem, sed ad perfectionem», DP 228,49). Thus the professor of the Ferrara University devalues the role of Aristotle in the development of Greek natural thought, and, at the same time, casts light on himself as a natural philosopher and scientist: What was his true attitude towards the evolution in the knowledge of nature? How he did envisage the latest achievements in natural science?

Among the problems that the Greek natural scientists agree upon, Petrić included two important astronomical problems: the position of the Earth »in the middle of the universe« and the bounded heaven (DP 230,19–21). Was Petrić, while writing the closing paragraphs of his work back in 1581, familiar with the fact that in 1543 Copernicus' work *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium* had been published with the description of the heliocentric system? Was it, perhaps, during Petrić's talks with his Basel publisher that he learnt of the 1566 edition of Copernicus' epoch-making work with the identical heliocentric picture of the universe?⁸ Two valuable supplements accompanying Petrić's work, the list of sources »Auctorum nomina quibus in hisce libris Fr. Patritius usus est.« and the subject index »Rerum et verborum maxime memorabilium elenchus.« make no reference to Copernicus. However, Petrić must have changed such an attitude in 1589 at the latest, for shortly afterwards, in 1591, he published his masterpiece *Nova de universis philosophia*. In the book entitled »De astrorum motu.« of *Pancosmia*, the fourth tome of his philosophical synthesis, he describes the tradition of the heliocentric system, citing Copernicus as the last and the »greatest astronomer of our age,« who claims that the Earth does move.⁹

⁷ DP 228,6–11: »Cum enim quinquaginta libris Aristotelis physica scientia contineatur, in iisque 10. generalia Theoremata examinentur, De principiis, De communibus accidentibus, De Mundo, de coelo, de Elementis, de Actione, de Exhalatione, de Anima, de Animalibus, de Plantis, nihil horum Aristotelis ipsius testimoniis multis, Physici illi veteres praetermiserunt.« Cf. a similar presentation of themes in natural philosophy in DP 235,32–38: »omnia naturalis philosophiae Theoremata«; also in DP 364,27–31: »non plura quam novem omnino generalia Theoremata, seu Theses, seu problemata«. See Cesare Vasoli, *Francesco Patrizi da Cherso* (Roma: Bulzoni, 1989), particularly the chapter »Il ritorno alle origini e la difesa della 'libertas philosophandi': Aristotele e i filosofi 'antiquiores' nelle *Discussiones peripateticae*«, pp. 149–179, on p. 166.

⁸ Nicolaus Copernicus Torinensis, *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium libri VI*. (Basileae: Ex officina Henricpetrina, 1566), notably chapter ten of book one entitled »De ordine coelestium orbium.«, ff. 7v–10r and figure on f. 9v.

⁹ See on Copernicus in: Franciscus Patricius, *Nova de universis philosophia* (Ferrariae: Apud Benedictum Mammiarellum, 1591), in book 17 of *Pancosmia* entitled »De astrorum motu,« on f. 103rb of the second foliation; also on f. 104rb.

Apart from astronomy, Petrić also sought concord in the Greek natural heritage in three branches of natural philosophy, which were later to become independent disciplines: meteorology, zoology, and botany.¹⁰

While discussing the very core of Aristotle's natural philosophy, Petrić, like Aristotle and all of his followers, made the distinction between »principles« (Lat. *principia*) and »elements« (Lat. *elementa*).¹¹ »Principles are to be neither out of each other, nor of another thing, and from them all exists. ... Verily the principles always remain.«,¹² wrote Aristotle in the first book of his *Physics*, in which, according to Petrić, Aristotle described four conditions by which a thing can be considered the principle. The principles are to be understood as causes: the material, formal, efficient, and final cause. It is then that Aristotle is able to define nature and its finality by inferring that »God and nature never act in vain.« (»Deus et Natura nihil frustra facit.«, DP 241,28; 241,51). Thus, Aristotle had said nothing of universe in terms of its structure. To do so, he introduces the elements of the physical world pointing out that Empedocles was the first to have stated: »Four are the elements.« (DP 252,24–25)

The differences between the natural philosophy of Aristotle and his Greek predecessors

In the third tome of his *Discussiones peripateticae* Petrić provides a systematic approach to the differences between the natural philosophy (Lat. *physiologia*) of Aristotle and his Greek predecessors. In the tradition of Greek natural philosophy before Aristotle, the thinker from Cres distinguished three approaches which he described respectively in the three books of the third tome: (1) book 2 is devoted to Aristotle's views on the three earlier Greek physiologists: Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus; (2) in the third book he examines Aristotle's arguments against the followers of Pythagoras; (3) in book 6 he focuses on the differences between Plato-the-teacher and Aristotle-the-pupil.¹³

¹⁰ DP 231–234.

¹¹ Cf. Ivica Martinović, »Petrićeva prosudba Aristotelove prirodne filozofije«, *Obnovljeni život* 52/1 (1997), pp. 3–20, on p. 8; Ivica Martinović, »Uz Petrićev *Index Pancosmiae*«, *Filozofska istraživanja* 19 (1999), pp. 139–191, on p. 162.

¹² See the Greek citation and Latin translation in DP 235,46–48: »Oportet enim principia neque ex se invicem esse, neque ex aliis, & ex his omnia. ... Principia vero semper oportet manere.« Cf. Aristoteles, *Physikvorlesung* 1,5–6 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983), on pp. 17 and 20.

¹³ »Liber II. Aristotelis cum tribus Physiologis dissensionem.«, »Liber III. Aristotelicas contra Pythagoram obiectiones, earumque solutiones.« and »Liber VI. Aristotelica contra Platonem obiecta in Physiologiam, eorumque dilutiones.«, in: Patricius, *Discussionum peripateticarum tomus tertius* (Basileae: Ad Perneam Lecythum, 1581), pp. 301–306, 306–312, 337–349.

Among the earlier Greek natural philosophers Petrić concentrated on the three »whom Aristotle mangled more furiously than others« (DP 301, 13–14): Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus. The main and only reason why he singled them out was their being the victims of Aristotle's most severe criticism, having adjusted his investigation of Greek natural heritage to these attacks. He first presented Aristotle's objection, then argued against Aristotle's attack, remaining ever absorbed in the writings of Aristotle and the testimonies of other authors and commentators. For instance, Aristotle wrote: »Empedocles asserts that none of the elements are out of each other.« (DP 301,24–25). According to his verses, Empedocles believed in alternate generation of one element into another.¹⁴ Furthermore, Petrić observed the contradiction in Aristotle's criticism of Anaxagoras for having termed the element of fire ether: »What Aristotle rejects in the third chapter of book 1 of *De caelo*, he praises in the third chapter of book 1 of *Meteorologica*.« (DP 303,50–53). Or, Aristotle pointed to three different starting-points of Democritus's natural philosophy: there are infinite principles of nature (DP 305, 10–11); the principle of nature is one – the single common body (Lat. *unum commune corpus*, DP 305,15–17); two are contrary principles of nature – solid and vacuum (Lat. *solidum et vacuum*, DP 305,26–27). Petrić defended Democritus with the conclusion: »From this variety of assessments of Democritus's principles we are unable to establish whether Democritus determined the infinite number of principles, or one, or two contrary principles.« (DP 305,27–29)

Discussing Aristotle's position towards Pythagoras, Petrić underlined two of the former's objections pertaining to the philosophy of nature. Following the line of attack laid down by Aristotle, his commentators, notably Simplicius, rejected harmony the Pythagoreans attributed to heavenly bodies (DP 307,16). Aristotle's second objection was directed against the role some of the Pythagoreans assigned to numbers: »Nature consists of numbers.« (DP 307,37–38). Petrić interpreted that, thus, the Pythagoreans, according to the testimony of the Aristotelian Simplicius, expressed themselves »symbolically, mystically, allegorically.«¹⁵ Mathematics (Lat. *mathemata*) – that is, numbers, figures, and harmonics – represented, as Petrić states, their system

¹⁴ DP 301,29–39. See Petrić's conclusion in DP 301, 27–28: »generat enim Empedocles elementa alterum ex altero.« Cf. fragment 17 from book one of Empedocles' poem *On nature* in: Hermann Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* 1, herausgegeben von Walther Kranz, Weidmann, 1974, pp. 315–318. See Muccillo, »La storia della filosofia presocratica nelle *Discussiones peripateticæ* di Francesco Patrizi da Cherso,« on pp. 90–91.

¹⁵ DP 307,33–35. Cf. Mihaela Girardi Karšulin, »Petrićevo tumačenje Aristotelova određenja predmeta teorijske znanosti (matematika, metafizika)«, *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine* 13 (1987), pp. 31–69, on pp. 37–38; see also: Mihaela Girardi Karšulin, *Filozofska misao Franje Petrića* (Zagreb: Institut za povijesne znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 1988), pp. 88–89.

of symbols employed to convey a message, just as the Egyptians used hieroglyphs or Orpheus fables (DP 308,1-2). In addition, Pythagoras understood them as *symbola cogitationum*, the way Aristotle described the relationship between language and thinking in his opuscle *Peri hermeneias* (DP 308,3-6).

In his evaluation of the discord between the natural philosophy of Plato and that of Aristotle, Petrić started with the observation based on the preponderance of jeering remarks Aristotle addressed to Plato, his master, in the philosophy of nature as compared to the philosophy of God.¹⁶ He examined all the objections Plato's natural philosophy was exposed to, arguing forcefully against Aristotle's »sophistry« in interpreting Plato's statements and against Aristotle's »open lies«.¹⁷ Aristotle's attacks focus mainly on the dialogue *Timaeus*, in which Plato set the basis of his own natural philosophy, but also on *Philebus* and Plato's unwritten doctrines. In order to explain Petrić's approach to the objections to Aristotle, Plato's three statements, interpreted differently by Aristotle and Petrić, could be used as an illustration:

- (1) According to Aristotle, Plato's unwritten *dogmata* contained the statement that »the great and the small« are the principles of nature (Lat. *principia naturae rerum*); moreover, they are two infinities (Lat. *duo infinita*). Contrarily, according to Petrić, Plato asserted something completely different: »Out of the great and the small the infinite is made as a composite.« (DP 338,21-22)
- (2) According to Aristotle, in *Timaeus* Plato stated that the elements moved disorderly prior to the forming of the world. Petrić, however, asserted that Plato, while elaborating the change »from disorder to order« (Lat. *in ordinem ex inordinatione*) did not mention elements (DP 338,41).
- (3) Aristotle, according to Petrić, claimed that Plato failed to discuss increment and wrote nothing of alteration.¹⁸ Realizing that alteration (Lat. *alteratio*) was one of the prevailing themes of every natural philosophy, Petrić was determined to find the quotations on alteration in Plato's four works: *Timaeus*, *Phaedo*, *Theaetetus*, and *Laws* (DP 343,22; 343,38; 343,46; 343,49; 344,4).

¹⁶ DP 337,11-12: »Plures in naturae philosophia quam in divina Aristoteles contra praecptorem cavillos effinxit ...«

¹⁷ See particularly DP 338-342, where Petrić repeatedly referred to Aristotle's approach to Platonic philosophy with the following terms: *calumniā, reprehensio, obtrectatio, mendacium*.

¹⁸ 343,47-49: »... Aristotelis mendacium, quo asserebat, Platonem de incremento nihil tractasse. Nec minus mendacii convincitur, cum ait [Aristoteles], illum [= Platonem] de alteratione non scripsisse, ...«. See also the subject index »Rerum et verborum maxime memorabilium elenchus.«, in: Franciscus Patricius, *Discussionum peripateticarum tomi II* (Basileae: Ad Perneam Lecythum, 1581), f. S1v: »alterationis doctrinam non intermisit Plato«.

The professor of Platonic philosophy defended Plato in the field of optics too, although he was familiar with the general, not exclusively Aristotle's objection concerning the obscurity in Plato's interpretation of the origin of sight when he adverted to the tenet that »similar is with similar cognized.« (»Simile simili cognoscitur.«, DP 346,5-6). In 1581 Petrić was puzzled by the problem of image or vision (Lat. *visio*). »Is vision the result of emission of the rays from the eyes or admission of the species into the eyes, is a great question,«¹⁹ which remains open despite considerable efforts of Aristotelians and Platonists, Petrić was to write nine years before the young *magister* Marko Antun de Dominis of the city of Rab started his optical experiments with Alhazen's glass spheres filled with water at the Padua Jesuit College.²⁰

Systematic research of Aristotle's natural philosophy

Containing the evaluation of Aristotle's doctrines (see the title-page of tome 4), tome 4 of Petrić's *Discussiones peripateticae* is largely concerned with his research of topics relating to natural philosophy, as clearly exemplified by this tome's table of contents:

- I. On principles of natural things.
- II. On privation and form.
- III. On the first matter.
- IV. On eternity of the world and time.
- V. On eternity of motion.
- VI. On eternity and essence of heaven.
- VII. The first book on elements.
- VIII. The second book on elements.
- IX. On generation and corruption.
- X. On six directions of heaven.²¹

Why was Petrić particularly drawn by Aristotle's natural philosophy? He considered it one of the four cornerstones of Aristotle's philosophical system: »naturalis, divina, civilis, logica« (DP 364,15-16). Moreover, he believed it to

¹⁹ DP 346,43-44: »An visio per radiorum emissionem ex oculis, aut per specierum intro-
missionem in oculos fiat, magna quaestio est, ...«

²⁰ Cf. August Ziggelaar, »Das Gymnasium der Jesuiten in Padua um 1590 in Verbindung mit dem Buche von Marcantonio de Dominis 'De radius visus et lucis', 1611«, *Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu* 49 (1980), pp. 255-264; Ivica Martinović, »Filozofska i prirodnoznanstvena istraživanja hrvatskih isusovaca od Marka Antuna de Dominisa do Josipa Franje Domina«, in: *Isusovačka baština u Hrvata* (Zagreb: MGC, 1992), pp. 77-97, on pp. 77-78.

²¹ »Toni quarti librorum elenchus.«, DP 362.

be the best of Aristotle's thought, commenting Aristotle's philosophy in the following way: »Its part relating to natural philosophy made him famous far and wide.«²² Petrić's zealous and long-standing study was to determine »how veracious and how exact Aristotle's natural philosophy is.«²³

In evaluating Aristotle's philosophy of nature and, at the same time, submitting his own views on the topic, Petrić experienced Aristotle's writings on nature in accordance with the generally established attitude prevailing since the days of Averroës: »The whole natural philosophy is comprised in 52 books that have survived out of many Aristotle had written, being divided into 618 chapters. It is assumed that despite the impressive number of books and chapters, no more than nine entirely general theorems or theses or problems have been established.«²⁴

The professor of Platonic philosophy in Ferrara expounded his systematic research of Aristotle's doctrine on nature in ten books. The first three are devoted to the principles of natural things. While opening his discussion on principles, Petrić had to clarify an important methodological question: who would it suit better to elaborate »the principles of physical philosophy« (*de principiis physicae philosophiae*, DP 365,16) – the »physical« or »the first« philosopher, physicist or metaphysicist? He opted for the physicist as long as these principles were related to motion (*principia ad motum*, DP 365,19–20). Aristotelian distinction »the principles are discussed by the metaphysicists as the principles of beings in general, and by the physicists as the principles of physical beings«²⁵ failed to satisfy Petrić. He inferred that in the background of this distinction there stood a conclusion according to which »the task of the first philosopher is to consider the principles of natural things, hence the *potentia*, hence motion.«²⁶ These principles, according to Aristotle, are three:

²² DP 364,20–21: »Naturalis autem [philosophiae] pars cum [= Aristotelem] longè in-clytum fecit.« Cf. Girardi Karšulin, *Filozofska misao Frane Petrića*, particularly the chapter »Petrićeva ocjena Aristotelove (aristotelovske) filozofije prirode«, pp. 172–199, on p. 172; Anto Mišić, *Metafisica della luce in »Nova de universis philosophia« di Franciscus Patricius* (Roma: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1995), p. 36.

²³ DP 364,31–35: »Singula haec novem Theoremata si vita atque ocium supersit, erunt à nobis diligenter discutienda: ut quam magnus Aristoteles, quam admirandus vir fuerit, quam vera, quam exacta eius naturalis philosophia sit, ...«

²⁴ DP 364,25–29: »Ea naturalis philosophia omnis comprehensa est LII. totis libris, qui de multis quos conscripserat, supersunt. Ii sunt a quibusdam DCXVIII capitibus distincti. His tam numerosis et capitibus et libris, non plura quam novem omnino generalia Theoremata, seu The-ses, seu problemata mavis nuncupare, pertractantur.«

²⁵ DP 366,30–31: »In metaphysicis tractata esse principia uti sunt entium principia in uni-versum. In physicis, uti sunt entium physicorum principia.«

²⁶ DP 366,46–48: »Est igitur ex hac disputationum serie, ex Aristotelis doctrina, facto, ratione, primi philosophi munus, de principiis naturalium rerum, est de potentia, est de motu tractare.«

matter, privation, and form, the meaning of which Petrić subjected to most attentive evaluation.²⁷

In his assessment of Aristotle's concept of matter in book three, Petrić mentioned the notion of experiment (Lat. *experimentum*) for the first time while discussing transmutation of elements, that is, the position held by Greek philosophers that the four elements – earth, water, air, and fire – can transmute from one into another. »What reasons will they persuade me with, or what experiments will they perform? I do not speak of the whole elements, but demand it implies their parts. Most certainly, not ever has anyone beheld a part of the sphere of fire transmute into air, nor has a single person ever witnessed the whole sphere of fire, nor observed a part of air transmute into the said fire.«²⁸ Contrarily, another experiment was available to everyone: »I have here the experiment with pots. On their lids, the vapour that evaporates, not the air, condenses into water.«²⁹ »In true philosophy,« Petrić concludes, »we shall not permit the arguments to disagree with the experiments.«³⁰

In the next three books of his *Discussiones peripateticae* Petrić investigates Aristotle's concepts of the eternity of the world, time, motion, and heaven. At the very beginning of the dispute he draws attention to Aristotle's distinct term – infinity – (DP 401,3) and the way he employs the concept of infinity in physics and mathematics. The philosopher of Cres objected to Aristotle's inadequate application of the conclusions on infinity in mathematics to physics: »The infinity of a mathematical number and mathematical magnitude is alien to natural things.«³¹ Moreover, he explicitly refuted infinity in

²⁷ DP 364–399. Cf. detailed analysis of Petrić's criticism of Aristotle's principles in: Girardi Karšulin, *Filozofska misao Frane Petrića*, pp. 179–189; Vladimir Premec, *Petrićeva kritika Aristotelesa* (Zenica: Hijatus, 1996), pp. 81–87; Cesare Vasoli, »La critica di Francesco Patrizi ai »principia« Aristotelici«, *Rivista di storia della filosofia* /4 (1996), pp. 713–787; Luc Deitz, »Falsissima est ergo haec de triplici substantia Aristotelis doctrina.« A sixteenth-century critic of Aristotle – Francesco Patrizi da Cherso on privation, form, and matter«, *Early Science and Medicine* 2 (1997), pp. 227–250; Mihaela Girardi Karšulin, »Petrićeva analiza principia prirodnih stvari«, *Pri-lozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine* 23 (1997), pp. 55–79.

²⁸ DP 395,50–55: »quibus nam rationibus id mihi persuadebitur? aut quibus experimentis ostendetur? Non dico de totis elementis, de partibus eorum quaero. Certè nemo unquam vidi partem Sphaerae ignis, in aërem conversam, quando etiam totam ignis Sphaeram nema aspexit unquam, aut vidit unquam quisdam aeris partem in eum ignem transire, ...«

²⁹ DP 396,27–28: »Habeo ego ollarum experimentum, in quarum operculis, vapor exhalans, non aer, in aquam concrevit.«

³⁰ DP 396,40–41: »Nisi ergò rationes experimentis non consonabunt, in vera philosophia, non admittemus.«

³¹ DP 404,15: »Concludamus ergo primo loco hanc numeri mathematici & magnitudinis mathematicae infinitatem alienam esse a naturalibus rebus.« Cf. a more exhaustive analysis of Petrić's understanding of the relationship between mathematics and physics in: Girardi Karšulin, *Filozofska misao Frane Petrića*, p. 190.

mathematics itself: »We however negate ... that a mathematical number can grow in infinity. We also refute that a mathematical magnitude can be infinitely either diminished or divided.«³²

How to interpret Petrić's approach to infinite quantities? According to Aristotle, infinity manifests itself in two ways: in the addition of numbers and in the division of geometrical quantities. This particular kind of infinity – potential infinity – is attained in the process which can always be repeated. The meaning of Petrić's objections should be sought in the forceful argumentation against potential infinity. The Platonist could not but object to the true achievement of Aristotle's *Physics*. By introducing the concept of potential infinity, Aristotle referred to conceivable processes, while the Platonist saw them as actual if related to the natural things themselves.³³ In the nature of mathematical objects, as expounded by Plato, one should search for the reason that led Petrić to the conclusions on infinity in mathematics.

Petrić views that the same objections ought to be made about time, »which Aristotle conceived as the third infinite« (»tempus ipsum, quod tertium infinitum Aristoteli erat«, DP 404,26). Is time an infinite? Aristotle proposed six reasons in favour of the affirmative answer, all of which Petrić rejected. Having refuted the infinity of time, Petrić could easily do the same with the infinity of motion: »What has been said of time could rightly be said of motion too.«³⁴ Was he aware at this point of actually subscribing to Aristotle's ascertainment that time and motion have the structure of the same kind?

In view of motion Petrić made the distinction between the motion of a movable body and the motion of a mover (*motus mobilis* and *motus motoris*, DP 416,12–13). In addition, he differentiated the prime from secondary movers (*primus motor* and *secundarii motores*, DP 416,20–26). He forcefully argued against Aristotle's doctrine of the privileged position of circular motion in relation to all other motion, by posing the following question: »By what reason should Aristotle's thesis, according to which *no motion either is or can be continuous and one except circular motion*, be considered false?«³⁵

In the seventh and eighth book of tome 4 Petrić examined the ancient problem of the composition of the world: how many are the elements of the

³² DP 402,34–37: »Negamus tamen nos, ut in genere eodem persistamus, verum esse, mathematicum numerum in infinitum posse exrescere. Negamus etiam, mathematicam magnitudinem infinite vel minui vel dividi posse.«

³³ DP 404,5–6: »Sed etiamsi mente & cogitatione dividi possit, & augeri, re tamen ipsa nec dividi nec augeri ulla ratione poterit.«

³⁴ DP 408,45: »Quod de tempore dicimus, idem dicendum de motu.«

³⁵ DP 420,55–56: »Quae igitur falsitas Theseos istius Aristotelicae, *nullum motum esse vel esse posse continuum et unum praeter circularem?*«

world and which are they? Empedocles was the first to teach that elements are four: fire, air, water, and earth. In addition to the aforementioned elements of the terrestrial or sublunary region Aristotle introduced the elemental sphere of fire (Lat. *elementalis ignis sphaera*, DP 437,30–31) or spherical fire (Lat. *ignis sphaeralis*, DP 441,5 and 441,38) in the region of heavens which, as critically remarked by Petrić, »no man has ever touched, no man has ever seen.«³⁶ Referring also to Aristotle's statements on the role of senses in the perception of natural things, Petrić commented: »It was not necessary to reject the senses.«³⁷ Pointing to a citation from *De caelo*, in which Aristotle inferred that the stars proceed under »his« orb of fire, Petrić concluded about Aristotle's fifth, intangible and invisible element: »Stars that exist lower are a sufficient sign that no spherical fire should be invented.«³⁸

Moreover, Petrić also discussed Aristotle's doctrine on tending the elements to their »natural places«. He refuted this doctrine by a simple counter-example, jeering at Aristotle: »Flame ascends, hence the sphere of fire is up. Flame descends, hence the sphere of fire is down. Flame wavers sideways, hence the sphere of fire is positioned diagonally.« (DP 445,47–49) Petrić's objection to Aristotle was further intensified with the question which struck the very core of mechanics: »How can the circular motion of heaven be the cause of rectilinear motion?«³⁹

However, it caught Petrić's attention to point to the consequences of Aristotle's doctrine in that elements have their own natural places and that they, if absent from the position, tend to reach it. If a body, most commonly, is composed of a number of elements, each of which having a tendency to move to its natural place, what is to be deduced about the motion of such a body? (DP 450–451) On the basis of Aristotle's answers to the above question, Petrić propounds: »Philosophy, drawn on Aristotle, on simple and composite motions is vain, inconstant, infirm, and false.«⁴⁰

Petrić's ninth book dedicated to the generation and corruption of the world opens with an ontological thesis taken from book 2 of Aristotle's work

³⁶ DP 439,49–52: »Non ambigo nunc, de igne hoc nostrate culinario, aut subterraneo, sed illo qui in quadam sphaera supra aerem, sublunae orbe, est ab Ocello, deinde etiam ab Aristotele collocatus, quem nemo unquam tetigit, nullus hominum unquam vidit.«

³⁷ DP 440,29–31: »Non ergo opus fuit in naturali re, sensum dimittere, ut rationem combinationum [qualitatum primarum], sine ulla necessitate, sine ulla etiam veritate, construeret.«

³⁸ DP 442,28–29: »Concludam ego contra suos discurrentes, stellas quae inferius fiunt, signum sufficiens esse, nullum Sphaeralem ignem necesse esse fingere.«

³⁹ DP 447,42–43: »At rogabo ego ut primo modum commonstrent, quo motus circularis coeli rectum possit causare motum?«

⁴⁰ DP 451,17–18: »Vana ergo est philosophia ab Aristotele nobis tradita, de motibus simplicibus et mistis, inconstans, infirma, falsa.«

De generatione et corruptione: »It is better to be than not to be.« (»melius autem, ipsum esse, quam ipsum non esse.«), which inspired Petrić to reformulate it in the following manner: »Nature desires to be, hence avoids and resists not to be.«⁴¹ The Platonist of the Ferrara University focuses his dispute on Aristotle's interpretation of generation which implies a continuous and not a successive process. Conversely, Petrić is convinced that the succession rather than continuum describes the instant of generation more adequately (DP 469,38–41).

In the tenth, closing book of his evaluation of Aristotle's thought on nature, Petrić discusses directions in cosmos. He first describes the position of Pythagoreans who distinguished six directions: up, down, front, back, right, left, considering »left« and »right« principles (DP 470,44–45), thus recognizing the importance of symmetry. In the introduction of his *De caelo*, Aristotle proved that all bodies have three distances: length, width, and depth. Rarely was he to characterize »up« as the edge of the cosmos, contrary to Plato who rejected the idea of cosmos having up and down (DP 479,32). Petrić, however, was to defend his own radical position: »Nothing in heaven is left or right by nature, nothing is up or down by nature, nothing is back or front by nature.« (DP 479,18–19) He viewed space as isotropic, a concept he already adopted in 1581 and remained loyal to in his later works from 1587 and 1591.⁴²

The first draft of Petrić's natural philosophy

As long as a decade, or at least so, Petrić spent devoted to the study of Aristotelian thought, and, simultaneously, entire heritage of classical Greek natural philosophy, writing his *Discussiones peripateticae*. What were the results of his laborious research?

Firstly, in *Discussiones peripateticae* Petrić established certain starting-points of his natural philosophy he remained faithful to, an attitude rightly

⁴¹ DP 455,45: »Natura, esse cupit, non esse ergo refugit et abhorret.«

⁴² Franciscus Patricius, *Philosophiae de rerum natura libri II. priores. Alter de spacio physico, alter de spacio mathematico* (Ferrariae: Excudebat Victor Baldinus Typographus Ducalis, 1587), in the chapter »An Spacia duo, quod extra, & quod intra mundum sunt, eiusdem sint naturae.«, ff. 12v–14r, on f. 13r; Franciscus Patricius, *Nova de universis philosophia* (Ferrariae: Apud Benedictum Mammarellum, 1591), in the first book of *Pancosmia*, on f. 64va of the second foliation. Cf. the assessments of Petrić's argumentation in the first book of *Pancosmia* in: Tomislav Petković, »Petrićev kozmološki model i moderna kozmologija«, *Kučerin zbornik* (Šibenik: Gradska knjižnica »Juraj Šižgorić« i Astronomsko društvo »Faust Vrančić«, 1995), pp. 43–64, on pp. 54–55; Tomislav Petković, »Petrićeva slika svemira i moderna kozmologija«, *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine* 23 (1997), pp. 103–117, on p. 113; Tomislav Petković, »Petrićevi kozmološki koncepti i moderna kozmologija«, *Filozofska istraživanja* 18 (1998), pp. 59–74, on p. 71; Vladimir Paar, »Problemi suvremene evaluacije Petrićeve prirodnoznanstvene filozofije i Petrićev vacuum«, *Filozofska istraživanja* 19 (1999), pp. 97–110, on p. 101.

expected from a true Platonist. For instance, he explicitly argued against potential infinity in mathematics and physics. He described generation by means of succession, unlike the Aristotelians who turned to continuity. Searching for concurrence in the ancient Greek natural philosophy from Thales to Aristotle, Petrić conceived the basic structure of every natural philosophy, including his own.

Although a Platonist, he also examined the problem of alteration in nature, proving thus that this topic was not reserved for the Aristotelians only. He rejected Aristotle's argument that circular motion deserves a privileged position among all motion. Moreover, he ironized Aristotle's entire doctrine on the existence of natural places of elements, and the natural tendency of elements to these places. The laws of mechanics were, therefore, to be sought outside the Aristotelian picture of the world.

He named some problems great. One of them he inquired as early as in 1581: how do we see what we see? This question did not lead him to gnosological investigation, but a discussion *de visu* and *de visione*, preparing himself for the topic of light in his »new philosophy«, the topic which this Renaissance philosopher received greatest credit for.⁴³

He objected to Aristotle for having invented the spherical fire as the fifth, intangible, and invisible element. It is here that Petrić's view expresses his genuine attitude towards observation, sense, and experiment.

In his work *Discussiones peripateticae* Frane Petrić outlined, for the first time, the basis of his very own natural philosophy. It was perfectly clear from the very start that natural philosophy would occupy the most outstanding place in Petrić's philosophical system, as, according to Petrić, it already did in that of Aristotle.

TRANSLATED BY VESNA BAČE

⁴³ Frederick Copleston, *A history of philosophy III: Late medieval and Renaissance Philosophy* (1953; Doubleday: Image Books, 1993), pp. 254–255; Paul Oskar Kristeller, *Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1964), on pp. 118–121; Brian P. Copenhaver and Charles B. Schmitt, *Renaissance Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1992), p. 192; Ivica Martinović (ed.), »Od Telesija do Fortisa: Znameniti odjeci Petrićeva djela 1572.–1771.«, *Dubrovnik* 8/1–3 (1997), pp. 249–384, on pp. 287, 294–297, 333–360.

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PETRIĆEVA PROSUDBA ARISTOTELOVE PRIRODNE FILOZOFIJE U *DISCUSSIONES PERIPATETICAE*

Sažetak

Cijelo jedno desetljeće 1571.–1581. ili, točnije, najmanje toliko Franc je Petrić proveo zadubljen nad cjelinom Aristotelova mišljenja i, istodobno, nad cjelinom antičke prirodoslovne baštine. U *Discussiones peripateticæ* (1581) ustanovio je neka trajna polazišta svoje prirodne filozofije. Izričito je bio protiv potencijalne beskonačnosti u matematici i fizici. Pojavu nastanka opisao je s pomoću slijeda, a ne, kao aristotelovci, s pomoću neprekinutosti. Kao platoničar nije zatvarao oči pred problemom promjene u prirodi, dapače nije dopustio da bi to bila tema pridržana samo Aristotelovim sljedbenicima. Usprotivio se aristotelovskom stavu da gibanju po kružnici pripada povlašteno mjesto među svim gibanjima. Štoviše, ironizirao je cijeli Aristotelov nauk o postojanju prirodnih mjesta za prvotnine i o prirodnoj težnji prvotninā prema tim mjestima. Prigovorio je Aristotelu da je sferičnu vatru kao peti, nedodirljivi i nevidljivi element jednostavno izmislio. U *Discussiones peripateticæ* Petrić je učinio prvi korak prema vlastitom filozofskom sustavu. Ali je već pri tom prvom koraku bilo jasno da će u njegovu filozofskom sustavu prirodnoj filozofiji pripasti odlikovano mjesto.

THE NATURAL-PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS OF FRANJO PETRIĆ

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UDC 19 Petrić

Petrić lived in an age when great changes took place in natural philosophy and natural science. In the 16th century, Aristotle's natural philosophy, which had had a dominant role up to that time, became the subject of criticism from two different perspectives. There were two different groups of philosophers and scientists who critically viewed Aristotle's philosophy and who laid the foundations for a new conception of the world. The first group followed the tradition of Archimedes, which, though not pronounced, had existed in the Middle Ages and now, in the 16th century, was gaining momentum. This quantitative and experimental tradition, supplemented by the Platonic insistence on the importance of mathematics, yielded a new quantitative, mathematical, and experimental approach. In the 16th century, this new approach still had not gained ground and was supported by few scientists. Among them special mention should be made of Giambattista Benedetti, whose work, together with that of others, prepared the ground for the attainments of Galileo Galilei in the 17th century. The other criticism came from the perspective of the non-Aristotelian philosophies, especially from the Neoplatonic philosophies. These philosophers questioned certain concepts that hampered the development of new natural-scientific ideas. Franjo Petrić belonged to the latter group. He had contacts with many of the philosophers of his time, and exchanged polemics with them on natural scientific concepts and views. He rejected the ones he considered too naturalistic, while adopting or correcting the others.

Aristotle's natural philosophy was closely related to the geocentric system. Indeed, it was inseparable from the geocentric system, while at the same time it provided a physical justification for it. The geocentric system included certain tenets that nobody questioned, one of them being that the fixed stars were attached to a sphere, and that the planets and the fixed stars moved be-

cause the spheres they were attached to moved. A tenet that all the planets moved uniformly along the circular paths also existed. They took such deep root that the greatest scientists of the 16th century also followed them, Nicolas Copernicus included.

Copernicus conceived a heliocentric system which could not be physically justified by Aristotle's natural philosophy, so he introduced certain Neoplatonic views, especially those on force, in order to explain his system. He did not fully succeed. His heliocentric system had many deficiencies. He thought that the planets moved uniformly along the circles, that they were attached to the spheres, and that there was a sphere with the fixed stars.¹ Those were all obstacles to the full reception of Copernicus' system. Petrić did not support these views because he did not depend on any philosophy that advocated them. He drew upon philosophies older than Platonism and Pythagoreanism, more precisely on those of Zoroaster and Hermes Trismegistus, and shaped a new philosophy, which did not rest upon Aristotelian, Platonic or Pythagorean views. All that Petrić did in this respect was a prerequisite for the later attainments of Kepler, the achievements in the 17th century and, finally, the theories of Newton. Petrić, therefore, did not belong to that group of natural philosophers and scientists who established the necessary background for the experimental and mathematical interpretation of natural science, but rather to those who questioned certain natural-philosophical and natural-scientific concepts, which was also a prerequisite for the development of the new physics.

Petrić presented his philosophy in its final form in his *Nova universis philosophia*, published in Ferrara in 1591. His natural philosophy, presented within his philosophical system in the same book, was based on two points of support. One was his scale of beings, and the other was the four elements. His natural philosophy cannot be understood without taking into account these two premises and their interrelationship. All his natural-philosophical, natural-scientific, and physical concepts followed from those two premises. The scale of beings included two groups: incorporeal beings and corporeal beings.

Incorporeal beings were unity, essence, life, mind or intellect, while corporeal beings were nature, quality, form, and body. The soul is located between them and it is corporeal and incorporeal at the same time. On the top of the scale is the One, or God, the origin of everything. The sequence in this scale is as follows: One (*unum*), or the God, unity (*unitas*), essence (*essentia*), life (*vita*), mind (*mens*), or intellect (*intellectus*), soul (*animus*), nature

¹ Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Copernican Revolution. Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought*, New York 1959, pp. 134–155.

(*natura*), quality (*qualitas*), form (*forma*), and body (*corpus*). Every grade in this scale is a consequence of that which is above it, and the cause of that which is below it. Petrić assumed that the four elements were space (*spacium*), brightness (*lumen*), heat (*calor*), and fluid (*fluor*). Each of these elements had its roots in earlier philosophical systems, but Petrić gave them a new interpretation in his natural philosophy. In this respect his system was original, since only Petrić based his natural-philosophical system on these four elements.

Just as each of the beings in the above-mentioned scale originated from the One or God, so did the four elements. There was, however, a difference. The beings in the scale originated from one another, starting from the One, while the elements originated from the One according to the precisely determined sequence, but they were not the cause or the consequence of each other. According to this sequence, space was the first element originating from God, followed by brightness, heat and, finally, fluid.

Space, which originated from God, was infinite just as God was infinite. Moreover, space was actually infinite, and homogeneous and, what is important, it had an existence of its own, which meant that it could exist independently of anything else. The concept of infinite space had already been introduced by the medieval Scholastics, but they viewed it as a dimensionless space identical to God. Such a dimensionless space surrounding Aristotle's finite space was conceived by Thomas Bradwardine and Nicole Oresme in the 14th century, whose intention was to preserve Aristotle's concept of finite space, rather than to criticize it.² The concept of three-dimensional infinite space was introduced in the 15th and 16th centuries, as an answer to critiques of the definition of place in Aristotle's physics. The first of these critiques was written by the Jewish philosopher Hasdai Crescassa, followed by that of Nicolaus Cusanus in the 15th century.³ Bernardino Telesio was the first to introduce the concept of the independent existence of infinite space in the 16th century. This concept of space was accepted by Petrić, who turned it into a fundamental concept and the first of his elements. The concept of space, therefore, had a very important role in Petrić's natural philosophy, but it was even more important as regards his understanding of mathematics, since he based mathematics on the concept of space in a manner different from any other philosophical system up to that time.⁴

² Edward Grant, »Medieval and Seventeenth-Century Conceptions of an Infinite Void Space beyond the Cosmos.« *Isis*, vol. 60., part 1, no 201, Washington 1969, pp. 39–60. Edward Grant, »The medieval cosmos: Its structure and operation,« *Journal for the History of Astronomy*, vol. 28, part 2, Cambridge 1997, pp. 147–167 (see p. 153 in particular).

³ Max Jammer, *Concepts of Space*, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1954, pp. 74–80.

⁴ F. Petrici, *Della nuova geometria*, Ferrara 1587.

The concept of space introduced by Petrić had a considerable bearing on the views of philosophers and scientists in the following century. In the 17th century, it was accepted by Pierre Gassendi and the English Neoplatonist Henry More.⁵ The latter had a great influence on Isaac Newton, who took over the concept of actual infinite space from More. In Newton's physics, the concept of absolute space was the same as that of Petrić. Newton also used the concept of absolute time which, according to him, also had an independent existence. This concept could not have been borrowed from Petrić, who thought that time, in contrast to space, did not have an independent existence. In Petrić's opinion, time followed the concept of motion, and motion was possible only when there was a body which could move. Space, as already noted, preceded everything, including a body. Newton must have adopted the concept of absolute time from someone else, but it is certainly worth pointing out that Telesio thought that time had an independent existence, just like space.⁶

The concept of brightness (*lumen*) was part of many philosophical systems. Like Zoroaster and Hermes Trismegistus, Petrić also thought that God was light (*lux*). From that light or God, brightness originated, entered and spread over all of infinite space. But God was also fire (*ignis*) in these earlier philosophies, so that heat (*calor*) originated from that fire or God, occupied the whole infinite space, and was a constant accompaniment to brightness. Brightness and heat were active agents and their existence required the existence of something passive on which light and heat could act. Fluid, which was passive, was first introduced as primeval fluid (*primaevus fluor*) in infinite space. Telesio also thought that, in addition to active agents, there had to exist a passive body, and he called it bodily mass (*moles*) or matter. In Telesio's philosophy, active agents were not brightness and heat, but rather heat and cold. Petrić abandoned the concept of cold altogether, not just as an agent. Therefore, Petrić's actual infinite space was filled with brightness, heat, and primeval fluid which were all corporeal and incorporeal. This infinite space was the world in its fundamental meaning. The term was also used in a more restricted sense, in accordance with the accepted usage of his time. Primeval fluid, which was the basis of every shaped fluid, was called matter (*materia*).

This infinite world was also called the fiery world (*mundus empyreus*), because it burnt slowly and invisibly. It contained a finite part which was filled with ether. Since ether originated from the primeval fluid with the in-

⁵ John Henry, »Francesco Patrizi da Cherso's Concept of Space and its Later Influence,« *Annals of Science*, 36(1979), pp. 549–575 (see p. 569 in particular).

⁶ Paul Oscar Kristeller, *Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance*, Stanford, California 1993, Chapter 6, Telesio, pp. 91–109 (see especially pp. 98–99).

volvement of forms, it was a shaped fluid. In this ether, thickened fluid existed in places, ignited by brightness and heat: these were visible stars. They were scattered all over finite space that was filled with ether, and which was also called the sky. Stars differed from one another in the quantity of fluid, which made them shine more or less brightly. In the middle of the sky, there was a material world (*mundus hylaeus*), which was also a shaped fluid though in a different manner from that of ether. Petrić distinguished the general concept of matter, which he called *materia*, from the terrestrial region, which was material in a different way. He called the matter of this earthly region *hyle*, in order to distinguish it from the general concept of matter.

This material world was in the centre of the whole world, and, therefore, in the centre of the ethereal world. He composed it in the way Aristotle had conceived the composition of the terrestrial world, so that in Petrić's natural philosophy, earth, water and air followed in this sequence, starting from the centre. In Aristotle's picture of the world, fire was above air. In Petrić's philosophy, as previously mentioned, fire did not have the same role as in Aristotle's. Nevertheless, Petrić did not adopt the sequence of earth, water, and air from Aristotle, but from the earlier philosophers, from Zoroaster and Hermes Trismegistus in particular.

Petrić's basic conception of infinite space and a finite ethereal world within it had a number of important consequences. Stars scattered over this finite ethereal world or sky could not be attached to a sphere. Planets moved in an intricate way but not without an order, since their motion derived from their souls. Petrić was not encumbered by the idea that the planets should move uniformly along circles, because he looked for a solution within the philosophical systems of Zoroaster and Hermes Trismegistus; he did not much care what Aristotle, Ptolemy, Copernicus or even Plato had thought about it. Consequently, neither the stars nor the planets were attached to the spheres, and so the spheres did not exist. However, stars, including planets, had motions of their own. Fixed stars also moved in different directions, some getting closer, some going away from the Earth, and some moving in other directions. A sphere of fixed stars was incompatible with such a concept, as it stood in contradiction to the assertion that stars were scattered all over the sky. Petrić had no idea what the motion of planets should be like, which is a deficiency of his natural philosophy. Indeed, he expressly rejected all astronomical systems, including those of Ptolemy and Copernicus, and offered no substitute for them. However, it is to his credit that he rejected the theory of the uniform motion of planets along circles.

In Petrić's conception of the universe, the difference between the celestial and terrestrial worlds as viewed by Aristotle did not exist, and therefore changes were not restricted only to the terrestrial world. According to

Petrić's opinion, the world was a whole, and as a whole it was subject to changes. Aristotle regarded earth, water and air as elements and, therefore, simple. For Petrić, they were neither elements nor simple, but changeable like everything else. Stars and the Sun could change too. The sky and the earth were also subject to change in Petrić's natural philosophy.

Petrić perceived the Earth as a kind of residue (*faex*) of ether. The Moon was also such residue, and in this it resembled the Earth. There were also other dark places, or the residue of ether, in the sky, which suggested the existence of other bodies resembling the Earth.

The term *body* referred to a body on the Earth and a star or a planet in the sky. The body was at the bottom of the scale of beings, having neither an independent existence nor a motion of its own. The body, therefore, had to move along something else, along something that was above it in the scale of beings. It had to be something corporeal and incorporeal at the same time, and that was the soul. The soul performed that function in the following way. It received some of what was above it in the scale of beings, that is, a bit of essence, since essence was above it. There was force in the essence, and so the soul received some essence and some force. But since the soul was incorporeal and corporeal, it had to contain something corporeal that corresponded to the force; that was action. The soul, therefore, contained force that was derived from essence, and action that existed in the corporeal world. The force moved a dependent body, regardless of whether it was a stone on the Earth or a star. When Petrić says that the body moves by the soul and intellect, he does not mean that the body moves directly by intellect, but rather indirectly through the soul, because the intellect, as an incorporeal being, cannot have a direct contact with the body. The soul also contains some of the intellect because it is above the soul, and that is why it is possible to say that a star has intellect. But Petrić says that bodies also move by nature. Nature is the corporeal being placed highest in the scale of corporeal beings and just below the soul. That is why nature receives some of the soul, which enables it to perform the role that is also performed by the soul. Motion is generated by the action contained in the soul.

In the essence, the force also manifests itself as sympathy which holds a special role in the world. Sympathy, which is harmony, kinship and benevolence, generates action between all parts of the universe. Sympathy is universal; it exists among the stars, and between the Moon and the seas; it makes the sea water rise, causing high and low tides. Petrić denied the existence of weight in the Aristotelian sense, and viewed it as a result of sympathy.

The concept of sympathy had existed in philosophy and natural philosophy since the times of ancient Greece. Stoics used it and so did Plotinus. In the 16th century, various authors adopted and elaborated it, Girolamo Fra-

castoro and the Portuguese Antonio Ludovicus (*Luis*) among them. Both these authors had their own interpretations of the concept which differs from that of Petrić.⁷ Petrić did not mention either of the two authors in connection with the concept of sympathy. He may not have been acquainted with the work of Ludovicus, but he had certainly read Fracastoro's works because he mentioned him in connection with some other points. Fracastoro's interpretation of sympathy may have seemed too naturalistic for Petrić. In this respect Petrić followed on the Stoics as well as Plotinus. He made this concept an integral part of his philosophy, including it in his scale of beings. In any case, this concept was much more important for Petrić than it was for the Stoics or Plotinus.

In Petrić's philosophy and natural philosophy, the concept of sympathy was generalized, implying a widespread and mutual attraction between all parts of the universe. Petrić did not make the next step. The concept had to be »mathematized« to the extent that other physical concepts were mathematized in the second half of the 17th century. Petrić could not do that, because his approach did not include mathematical interpretation of physical concepts. The next step was, thus, made by Johann Kepler who, in his work *Astronomia nova*, published in 1609, mathematized this attraction and considered it a universal force. On the basis of Kepler's results, Newton elaborated the mathematical expression for universal gravitation and built it into the foundations of his physics. Petrić and other 16th century philosophers who introduced the concept of attraction between all parts of the universe into their philosophical systems constituted a link in the development of this concept, from its conception by the Stoics to its »mathematization« by Kepler.

The universe functions by means of two agents: brightness and heat. The brightness is a carrier of the seeds that cause all change in the universe, in the terrestrial and celestial worlds. The brightness carrying the seeds is accompanied by heat that makes all changes possible throughout the world. The seeds originate from unity, and Petrić makes a comparison, saying that ideas are to unity what the seeds are to nature. The seeds enter space and are carried by brightness, which is spread all over infinite space. The seeds can produce changes throughout infinite space and not only in its finite part, which means that such changes could be generated in the fiery, ethereal, and material worlds. The seeds can produce various beings all over this infinite universe, such as stones or animate beings.

Petrić, therefore, thought that animate beings could exist on some celestial bodies. Some ancient philosophers were of the same opinion. Pythagoras

⁷ Max Jammer, *Concepts of Force. A Study in the Foundations of Dynamics*, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1957, pp. 73–75.

also argued in favour of this view. In the 15th century, Nicolaus Cusanus expressed a similar idea in his work *De docta ignorantia*. Petrić, however, substantiated his assertion better than the earlier philosophers, and incorporated it much better into his philosophy. If the brightness carries seeds throughout space, there is no reason why animate beings should be generated only in the material world (*mundus hylaeus*). They can similarly appear anywhere in the world, especially on the stars in the ethereal region. Matter is not shaped in the same way everywhere in space, so the animate beings in the material world will differ from those in the ethereal world, and even more so from those which may appear in the fiery world. There would be animate ethereal beings on the stars, in contrast to those in the material world, and they would be more perfect than the terrestrial ones. Animate beings could also exist on the Moon, and because they are in the ether, they would also be more perfect than those on the Earth.

The Earth, which is the material world consisting of earth, water and air, must be in the centre of the world. Nevertheless, it is not still. In Petrić's opinion, there are numerous reasons why a motion of the whole sky around the Earth should be considered apparent, rather than real. Petrić argues that the Earth rotates, while the rotation of the sky around the Earth is a semblance resulting from the rotation of the Earth.

The Earth, therefore has a privileged position in the centre of the world. It is placed there by the will of God. Only the Earth is material, and it differs from the ethereal world by its position and by the manner in which the primeval fluid was shaped there. It is placed in the centre because it is the coarsest part of the ether, which Petrić called residue. Being in the centre of the world, the Earth is farthest from the most noble parts of the world. The Earth's position in the centre of the world is in accordance with the geocentric system and the Aristotelian view. Petrić did not draw upon the Peripatetic philosophy, he rather adjusted it to the views of Zoroaster and Hermes Trismegistus, who also held that the Earth was in the centre of the world.

Petrić rejected all Aristotelian ideas that were not contained in earlier philosophical systems which suited his views. Petrić also rejected the qualities from Aristotle's natural philosophy. He did not accept the contrast between warm and cold, contained in the Peripatetic natural philosophy and in Telesio's philosophy. The concept of cold did not exist in Petrić's philosophy. According to Petrić, cold was just less warm. Petrić also rejected the contrast between heavy and light, which had an important place in the Peripatetic natural philosophy. The concept of light does not exist in Petrić's natural philosophy, while the weight of the body on the Earth as well as in free fall should be understood as an attraction between the similar, which fits in the context of general sympathy between all parts of the world.

Petrić considered earth to be solidified fluid and the residue of ether. This residue was crumbled into tiny atoms, and while it was in atoms it was still part of the fluid. The air also consisted of atoms. So Petrić introduced the concept of atom, accepted by many Neoplatonists, into his natural philosophy. Atomism of matter was related to mathematical atomism. Petrić accepted mathematical atomism, and argued that, e.g., a line consisted of tiny indivisible parts. On the basis of this concept, Petrić built his whole geometry.

As shown in this paper, Petrić played an important role in the rejection of the established views concerning the motion of celestial bodies, which was a prerequisite for the formation of a new conception. He introduced the concept of actually infinite space, later accepted by many philosophers and scientists. He included many views from earlier philosophies into his natural-philosophical system, justifying them in this way. He especially eliminated the difference between the celestial and terrestrial regions as it was understood by Aristotle. That is, he conceded that there were also changes in the sky – a view that was inconceivable in the Aristotelian natural philosophy. Among other things, Petrić's philosophy also advocated the idea that animate beings may exist on celestial bodies.

He, therefore, took a few important steps towards new conceptions of the universe. His efforts were oriented in the right direction, towards even more important conclusions and results. The most discordant note in his natural philosophy is the difference between the sky and the Earth in the material sense. The sky is ether or primeval fluid shaped in a different way from the primeval fluid in the material or terrestrial part of the universe. Because of this difference, Petrić imagined animate beings on the Earth as different from those on certain celestial bodies, since the former were material while the latter would be ethereal. On the other hand, Petrić argued that the Moon was the residue of ether, just like the Earth, and that it resembled the Earth in this respect. He also argued that there were dark places in the distant regions of the sky which were also the residue of ether. He should have regarded the Moon and the dark places in the sky as material, shaped in the same way as the residue which was the Earth. Following that conclusion, it would not have been necessary to place the Earth in the centre of the universe. In that case, he would have had fiery and bright stars, and the dark bodies, that is, the Moon, the dark places in the sky, and the Earth which, then, would have also been a celestial body. Petrić should have gone a step further, and his initial tenets would have yielded far-reaching results. This step was later made by other scientists and philosophers, mostly in the 17th century. However, this deficiency of Petrić's philosophy should not be looked upon too harshly, since other natural philosophers of Petrić's time, and those

active in the first half of the 17th century, also had many inconsistencies in their natural philosophies. Many other natural-philosophical systems were less consistent than that of Petrić. His was a time of many doubts requiring patient study in order to be resolved. On the whole, Petrić's work bears witness to his dedicated pursuit of a new conception of the world, for which he holds an important place in the history of human thought.

TRANSLATED BY BRANKA ŽODAN

PRIRODNOFILOZOFSKA GLEDIŠTA FRANJE PETRIĆA

Sažetak

Petrićeva filozofija sustavno je iznesena u njegovom djelu *Nova de universis philosophia* koje je objavljeno u Ferrari godine 1591. Njegova prirodna filozofija temelji se na njegovoj ljestvici bića i na četiri počela koji su prostor, svjetlost, toplina i fluid. Svi njegovi prirodnofilozofski, fizikalni i uopće znanstveni pojmovi proizlaze iz toga. Petrić preuzima u svoju prirodnu filozofiju pojedine tvrdnje iz ranijih filozofija, ali svaka od njih je u Petrićevoj filozofiji utemeljena na općim načelima njegove filozofije. Petrić odbacuje Aristotelovu filozofiju, a svoja izlaganja često potkrepljuje stavovima iz Zoroasterove i Hermesove filozofije. Odbacuje neka uvjerenja o gibanju nebeskih tijela koja su bila smetnja uvođenju novih astronomskih shvaćanja. U svojoj slici svijeta zamišlja da je Zemlja u središtu svijeta ali da rotira. Po njegovom shvaćanju promjene mogu nastati ne samo u zemaljskom području nego i u nebeskom. Posebno je važno njegovo uvođenje, aktualno beskonačnog prostora koji ima samostalnu egzistenciju. Takvo shvaćanje pojma prostora imalo je veliki utjecaj na kasnije filozofe i znanstvenike. Pojam apsolutnog prostora Newton je posredno preuzeo od Franje Petrića. Od velike je važnosti također Petrićevo uopćavanje pojma opće međusobne privlačnosti između svih dijelova svijeta. Petrićeva prirodna filozofija ima veliko značenje za uvođenje novih znanstvenih shvaćanja koja se pojavljuju od kraja 16. stoljeća i tijekom 17. stoljeća.

SCHOLASTIC AND NEWTONIAN CONTEXT OF BOŠKOVIĆ'S CONCEPT OF FORCE

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In this essay, I try to draw attention to some scholastic and Newtonian moments in Bošković's conception of force. The scholasticism in question is that of the Jesuits from the end of the 17th and during the 18th century, with particular emphasis on Giovanni Battista Tolomei's *Philosophia mentis et sensuum*, a very influential textbook among the Jesuits through the entire 18th century. Bošković, himself a Jesuit, was rather close to that philosophical tradition (a lot of his not only natural-philosophical, but also methodological and epistemological concepts, terms and standpoints are evidence of the previous). On the other hand, Bošković does not fail to emphasize the exact Newtonian origin of some of his fundamental physical concepts in a number of his papers – not only after 1757 when Newton's natural-philosophical theory was taken off the *Index librorum prohibitorum*, but even earlier (for example, in 1740 in the paper *De motu corporum projectorum in spatio non resistente*). Here, I draw attention to that context of Bošković's philosophizing, too, particularly in accordance with his fundamental natural-philosophical concept – the concept of force.

Scholastic Concepts of Cause and Condition

Beings are one before another (*prius*), or one after another (*posterius*), found in a series (*series*), a succession (*successio*). The phrases 'a priori', 'a posteriori', 'prius', 'posterius', etc., do not refer to beings in themselves, but to beings in a series, a succession, or more precisely, to beings countable ac-

ording to some order. *Prioritas* and *posterioritas* designate exactly the relation (*relatio*) which beings have one to another found in a succession.¹

The clearest of all classes of successions is the succession of time (in other words, the temporal succession, *series temporis*).² We say that today is before tomorrow, this year after the last, youth before agedness, death after life, etc. Thus, with regard to time, we differentiate that which is before from another which is after, previous from following, past from future.

The priority regarding time is most often, most easily and completely wrongly equated with, confused with the priority of origin (*prioritas originis*), or the priority regarding nature (*prioritas naturae*).³ For example, there is no fire which does not emit warmth (even if completely without sensation of the same). This is to say that there cannot be a single moment in which there is fire, yet simultaneously, there is not a consequential emission of heat of the same (even if completely without sensation of the same). Hence, warmth does not result from fire subsequently (i.e., after the fire already is), but simultaneously, the same moment that the fire originated in. In other words, in

¹ See Tolomei, *Philosophia mentis et sensuum*, p. 190: 'Termini, *a priori a posteriori* in sua latissima significatione non solum designant causam et effectum: sed quidquid numerari ordinatum potest cum fundamento et merito objectivo in ipsis rebus: hoc est, designant seriem rerum naturalem: hoc est [...] rerum quarundam continuatam progressionem et successionem: demque clarissime dixeris terminos *prius, posterius, series* etc. significare *relationem in longum* ut contradistinctam a relatione *in latum*, quae relatio vulgariter dicitur *successio objectiva unius post alium*, ubi itaque datur series, seu successio; datur prius et posterius, hoc est una res aliquo modo est prior, alia posterior, et loquendo in abstracto datur *prioritas, et posterioritas*, quae formae nil aliud sunt quam quaedam relationes.'

² See Tolomei, *Philosophia mentis et sensuum*, p. 190: '... omnium notissimam esse prioritatem temporis, et inde multae aequivocationes, quod reliquas prioritates, et posterioritates praesertim in serie originis ad instar seriei temporis aliqui cogitent.'

³ See Tolomei, *Philosophia mentis et sensuum*, p. 325: '... diligenter cave, ne confundas cum prioritate temporis prioritatem naturae uti etiam originis, immo ne compares quidem: sola enim est in vocibus, et periculosissima similitudo. Caeterum in eodem ipsissimo instanti temporis (in quo certe dari non potest prius, et posterius tempore) vel centum prioritates, et posterioritates natura esse possunt, quae in re nihil aliud sunt, quam totidem actuales productiones, hoc est verae relationes denominantes terminos diversos: sicuti aequalitas, et inaequalitas est una collectio, et relatio, quae diversos terminos, et subjecta distincta denominat: ut autem non repugnat inaequalitas, et aequalitas in eodem temporis instanti; ita neque prioritas, et posterioritas natura.' The same is also emphasized by the neoscholastics, e.g. Gredt: 'Haec/se. prioritas naturae/potest obtinere etiam sine prioritate durationis; potest enim contingere, ut causa prioritate durationis non praecedat, semper tamen praecedat prioritate naturae, quia effectus necessario pendet a causa, ac proinde secundum causalitatem est posterior.' (See Gredt, Josephus, *Elementa philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae* I, no. 206, p. 165 – Herder, Freiburg im Breisgau/Barcelona, 1956) or Hugon: 'Prius autem natura dicitur quod est simul duratione et in eodem instanti reali cum alio, ita tamen se habet ut esse alterius pendeat ab ipso, qua ratione essentia est prior facultativus.' (See Hugon, Eduard A.R.P., *Cursus philosophiae Thomisticae. I. Logica*, 'sumptibus P. Lethielleux', Paris, 1934, p. 86).

that origination there is no priority of fire in relation to warmth regarding time; both fire and warmth originate simultaneously, at the same time, yet warmth results from fire, and not vice versa – because by the fact that there is fire, warmth results also; however by the fact that there is this same warmth, fire does not result also (e.g., if the fire is extinguished, a new fire does not derive from the remainder of warmth). In short, the priority of fire in relation to warmth is at matter only regarding origin, and not regarding time.

In the same way, light is issued from the Sun, pain from a needle prick, sound from the vibration of violin strings, etc. Namely, the same moment that the vibration is produced in, sound is issued (even if completely without hearing the same), the exact moment of a needle prick is the same moment of the origin of its respective pain (even if completely without feeling the same), the precise moment which the Sun originated in is when its light had started emitting. Thus, there is no priority regarding time in respect of the origin of the above mentioned, yet a prick is before pain, the Sun before light, vibration before sound, fire before warmth, etc. Therefore, the issue is that of the priority regarding origin (*prioritas originis*), without any issue of the priority regarding time.

If there was fire that both could and could not heat, while heating it would be prior to warmth (which is issued) not only regarding its origin, but nature, too. Similarly, if the Sun was such that could both shine and not-shine, while shining it would be prior to light (which is emitted) not only regarding its origin, but nature, too.⁴

A tree on fire is prior to fire not only regarding origin, but nature, too – because it is even without being on fire. Water that flows is prior to its own flow not only regarding origin, but nature, too – because it is even without flowing. A stone falling is prior to its own fall not only regarding origin, but nature, too – because it is even without falling.

The very potential of a stone to fall, to slide (e.g., down a slope), to press (e.g., a base it is on), etc., is called *actus primus*, or *potentia* in scholasticism. The potential, in this case, is weight (*pondus*). Because it weights, a stone falls (if without support), or it slides (if on a slope), presses (if on a base), etc. Only one potential is at issue – weight – yet its effect is different in different

⁴ See Tolomei, *Philosophia mentis et sensuum*, p. 325: ‘...principium [...] a quo aliquid est; taliter tamen, ut sine eo principium illud quodcumque sit, esse non possit, eo ipso proprie loquendo non dicitur esse prius natura, sed origine: sicuti terminus ille, posterior origine, non natura appellatur: quare si lux solaris respectu Solis esset hujusmodi, Sol esset prior origine, non natura respectu lucis, et vice versa: sed quia saltem per miraculum potest existere Sol, et non producere lucem; ideo tuto Sol prior natura dici potest ipsa luce.’

conditions. The action of a potential, the action by which it produces an effect in found conditions is called *actus secundus* in scholasticism.⁵

For all that, a stone that falls is nature-prior only in relation to its own fall. In relation to its possible sliding, pressing, etc., a stone can only be nature-prior.⁶ Hence, only *actus secundus* makes the relation of nature-priority real, actual (not only potential) to the relation of priority regarding nature. That is why Tolomei concludes that nature-priority necessarily includes not only *actus primus* but *actus secundus* also.⁷

The concept of principle (*principium*) is closely linked to the concept of priority (*prioritas*).

⁵ On the difference between *actus secundus* and *actus primus* see, e.g. Tolomei, *Philosophia mentis et sensuum*, p. 155: 'Verbum *possum* significat primum actum, seu primum exercitium, quod praerequiritur et praecognoscitur semper ad omnem actum significatum per caetera verba, etiam per verbum *sum*. Ille autem primus actus in abstracto dicitur *potentia*. [...] ideo dicitur causa est in actu primo: cum, inquam, causa potest quidem, sed non dum facit, quod potest, aut non dum intelligitur facere, quod potest: cum vero facit, et intelligitur facere, dicitur *causa est in actu secundo*; hoc est se exercet per actum illum secundum respondentem suo actui primo, nempe potentiae.' See also Tolomei, *Philosophia mentis et sensuum*, p. 324: 'Causa in actu primo, seu actus primus causae est ipsa potentia, seu foecunditas, seu virtus causae, hoc est causam posse effectum causare. [...] Causa in actu secundo seu actus secundus causae est ipsum actu causare, seu actuale exercitium causandi effectum, seu ipsa causalitas, et causatio.' See also Jaszlinszky, *Institutiones metaphysicae*, no. 132, p. 55: '...potentia activa causae a Philosophis, et Theologis Scholasticis actus primus causae, et causa sumpta cum sua potentia causa in actu primo nuncupatur; sicut causa actu agens dicitur causa in actu secundo, et ejus actio, actus secundus causae.' See also Redlhamer, *Metaphysica*, no. 57, p. 61: '...per actum secundum causae intelligitur ipsa actualis efficientia, seu influxus causae in suum effectum: qui alio nomine dicitur actio productiva. Actus primus est virtus seu potentia causae ad effectum ponendum: Sic mens nostra dicitur esse in actu secundo, quando actu cogitat, et in actu primo, quando spectatur mens habens virtutem cogitandi.' See also Horvath, *Institutiones metaphysicae*, p. 68: 'Causa efficiens dupliciter considerari solet: nempe vel ut actu agens, vel ut potens agere. Ut actu agens dicitur esse in actu secundo, seu in ipsa actione: ut potens agere est in actu primo.'

⁶ See Tolomei, *Philosophia mentis et sensuum*, pp. 324–325: '...causa dicitur prior natura respectu ejus effectus, quem actu causat, non vero respectu ejus, quem solum et pure potest causare: respectu enim hujus possibilis effectus dicitur tantum causa posse esse prior natura, non vero de facto esse, sicuti ille effectus potest esse posterior natura, sed de facto non est: hoc est non datur series, sed potest dari inter illa duo.'

⁷ See Tolomei, *Philosophia mentis et sensuum*, p. 324: '...prius itaque in serie naturae seu prius prioritate naturae est illud principium, quod specificative sumptum potest esse sine illo termino, qui ab illo de facto est. Haec est genuina descriptio prioritatis naturae [...] ad omnem prioritatem naturae requiritur tum actus primus, tum actus secundus: quia series ad prioritatem requiritur: series autem esse non potest, nisi utrumque actum includat. Itaque duo requiruntur ut causa sit prior natura: primum quod aliquid actu ab illa fit, et producat: hoc est quod causa sit in actu secundo: secundum quod causa ipsa specificative accepta possit esse in rerum natura sine illo determinato effectu, qui de facto ab illa causatur. Si unum ex istis requisitis tollas perit prioritas naturae [...] Utrumque tamen illud praedicatum simul sumptum, veluti duplex differentia constituit hanc speciem *prioritas naturae*, cui correspondet *posterioritas naturae*, per quam dicitur posterior natura id, quod a tali principio est, ita ut hoc tale principium specificative sumptum potuerit esse sine illo suo posteriori natura, hoc est effectu suo.'

In a wider sense, a principle is all that is, in any way possible, before something else, and a consequence is all that which, in any way possible, becomes after something else.⁸

In a narrower sense, a principle is all that precedes something else by origin or by nature, and a consequence is all that which follows something else by origin or nature.

The sequence of priority and posteriority by origin or by nature is, in fact, a sequence of dependency and concerns the very existence of beings, their very generation, being and corruption. Fire is the principle of warmth (which it emits), because the origination of that warmth depends on fire; fuel is the principle of fires, because the origination and the endurance of those fires depends on that fuel; fire is a consequence of fuel, because fuel enables the origination and endurance of fire; warmth is a consequence of fire, because the origination and the endurance of warmth depends on fire; etc.

Therefore, in a narrower sense, a principle is all that upon which depends, in any way possible, the very existence of something else, and a consequence is all that which for its very existence depends, in any way possible, on something else.⁹

(In the following text, I use the concepts *principle* and *consequence* in the narrower sense only.)

Tolomei distinguishes between effective and non-effective principles. Effective principles are those which consequences result from, i.e., those because of which consequences result. Fire is, for example, an effective principle of flame and warmth. A person's decision to jump is an effective principle of a jump. Non-effective principles are those from which (or because of which) consequences do not result, yet, nevertheless, the latter do not result without the former. Light is, for example, a non-effective principle of darkness – an object, indeed, does not get darker because it is light, but if it was not light, it could not get darker (as, for example, taste, pain, sound, etc., cannot get darker).¹⁰

⁸ See Tolomei, *Philosophia mentis et sensuum*, p. 323: 'Principium est id, unde aliquid est quomodocunque latissimus terminus latissime definitus est, ita ut per illam particulam unde comprehendatur tum id ex quo, tum id a quo, tum id ad quod, vel per quod, vel propter quod aliquid est. Quidquid enim in aliquo recto sensu construi potest cum ullo ex illis relativis. recte dici potest principium: nec curio utrum analogice, vel univoce dicatur.'

⁹ See Horváth, *Institutiones metaphysicae*, no. 92, p. 66: 'Principium generatim est omne id, unde aliquid quoquo modo pendet. Illud vero, quod a principio pendet, principiatum solet in Scholis nominari.'

¹⁰ In Tolomei words: 'Principium divide in foecundum, et non foecundum: primum designat id unde aliquid est, ita ut per illud unde idem significetur, ac si diceret, ex cuius foecunditate,

Tolomei differentiates effective principles into pure effective principles and causes. A pure effective principle is that which precedes its consequence only by origin, and not by nature.¹¹ Fire is a pure effective principle of flame and warmth. The Sun is a pure effective principle of light. A cause is an effective principle which precedes its consequence not only by origin, but by nature, too.¹² Weight is a cause of falling, sliding, rolling, pressing, etc. A person's free will is a cause of jumping, walking, running, etc. (In the following text, I name consequences as effects, as long as they are causal consequences.)

Tolomei discernes non-effective principles into conditions and pure non-effective principles. Conditions are those non-effective principles which precede their consequence not only by origin, but by nature, too.¹³ A slope is, for example, a condition that enables sliding, height is a condition that enables falling, etc. Even though a slope conditions sliding, in other circumstances it could condition non-sliding (e.g., rolling) – this, of course, means that, as a condition to slide, it precedes its consequence (sliding) not only by origin, but by nature, too. Even if height conditions falling, in other circumstances it could condition something other than falling (e.g., flying or hovering) – this, naturally, means that, as a condition to fall, it precedes its consequence (falling) not only by origin, but by nature, too.

hoc est virtute communicativa essendi aliquid est. Secundum designat per illam particulam *unde* principium, ut ita dicam, sterile, et non energium, qualia multa sunt, quae nihilominus dicuntur principia, e.g. privatio dicitur principium, unde est mutatio rerum, et vicissitudo.' (See Tolomei, *Philosophia mentis et sensuum*, p. 323).

¹¹ See Tolomei, *Philosophia mentis et sensuum*, p. 324: '...purum principium foecundum [...] definitur: principium foecundum exercens foecunditatem cum sola prioritate originis.'

¹² See Tolomei, *Philosophia mentis et sensuum*, p. 324: 'Divide principium foecundum in causam, et purum principium foecundum. Prima exponitur brevissime: principium foecundum exercens foecunditatem cum prioritate naturae.' See also Jaszlinszky, *Institutiones metaphysicae*, no. 121, pp. 51–52: 'Causa generatim sumpta est, quod rationem in se continet rei alterius, a se secundum naturam distinctae; sive principium rei, a principio secundum naturam distinctae. Res haec suo a principio secundum naturam distincta ejus effectus appellatur. Ouapropter cum in creatis pater filii existendae rationem in se contineat, filiusque ab eo secundum naturam distinctus sit (non sunt enim eadem numero natura) pater est filii sui causa, hic vero ejus effectus est.' See also Redlhamer, *Metaphysica*, no. 55, p. 59: 'Causa in rigore dicitur principium influens esse contingens in aliud, id est in aliam naturam: Ubi principium loco generis sumitur, nam licet omnis causa sit principium, non tamen omne principium est causa. Additur influens esse in aliud, id est, in aliam naturam saltem numero distinctam, ut Pater in humanis dicitur causa filii, quia alia est ipsius, et alia filii natura. [...] Effectus est id, quod ab alio accipit esse contingens.'

¹³ See Tolomei, *Philosophia mentis et sensuum*, p. 324: 'Conditio itaque difficillime humano modo discernitur a causa, licet ab ea diversissima sit. Definitur autem *principium infoecundum cum prioritate naturae* [...] conditio igitur non causat: non enim est foecunda, sed requiritur ut causa exerceat foecunditatem suam, et causet.' See also Redlhamer, *Metaphysica*, no. 56, p. 60: 'Causa convenit cum conditione in eo, quod sicut causa natura sua est prior effectui, ita prior quoque sit conditio tenens, se ex parte causae: Discrepant autem inter se, quod causa suo modo in effectum influat, conditio vero ideo tantum requiritur, ut causa in effectum influere possit.'

Unlike conditions, pure non-effective principles precede their consequences only by origin, and not by nature. Lightness is, for example, a pure non-effective principle of darkness, warmth is a pure non-effective principle of coldness, etc. If lightness could get cold, bitter, etc., and not only dark, when getting dark it would precede its consequence (darkness) not only by origin, but by nature, too – this means that it would be its condition (and not its pure non-effective principle). If warmth could get dark, sour, etc., and not only cold, when getting cold it would precede its consequence (coldness) not only by origin, but by nature, too – this means that it would be its condition (and not its pure non-effective principle). Thus, because it cannot get either cold or sour, etc., when getting dark, lightness precedes its consequence (darkness) only by origin, and not by nature – this means that it is not its condition, but only its pure non-effective principle. Since it cannot get either bitter or dark, etc., when getting cold, warmth precedes its consequence (coldness) only by origin, and not by nature – this means that it is not its condition, but solely its pure non-effective principle. In general, it should be said that any kind of privation (*privatio*) is actually (or at least potentially) a pure non-effective principle (and not a condition) of an actual (or at least possible) origination of its very own opposition.¹⁴

According to Tolomei, the very effectiveness (*foecunditas*) of effective principles is completely unclear and inconceivable. There is not a harder thing for one's mind to comprehend, but the way one thing produces (*producere*) another.¹⁵ Some try to explain that way metaphorically – they compare it, for example, with the way that water flows from a river into a canal.¹⁶ Tolomei rejects such explanations, holding that they only make the problem more complicated and obscure.¹⁷ It is better to call effectiveness as it is, than to 'explain' it by way of a metaphor.

¹⁴ See Tolomei, *Philosophia mentis et sensuum*, p. 324: '...principium mere infoecundum /.../ est quiddam conditio non est /.../ et tamen principium vocari utcumque solet: e. g. privatio est principium infoecundum, nec tamen est conditio.'

¹⁵ See Tolomei, *Philosophia mentis et sensuum*, p. 323: '...nil esse difficilius humano intellectui ad intelligendum, quam quid sit rem unam producere aliam: quia vero ab actu cognoscitur potentia perinde obscurum, et difficile est intelligere, quid sit rem unam posse producere aliam.'

¹⁶ See Tolomei, *Philosophia mentis et sensuum*, p. 323: 'Solent nonnulli ad haec explicanda hujusmodi terminis uti *influere, influxus, influens* ex metaphora aquae, quae ex lumine in canalem molendini influit.'

¹⁷ See Tolomei, *Philosophia mentis et sensuum*, p. 323: '...me iudice metaphora hujusmodi rem obscurat, et rectius ex terminis notioribus, et principis licet specificis genus explicatur. hoc est per hunc terminum *foecunditas* hic alter *virtus productiva*.'

Bošković's concept of force

The central issue of Bošković's natural-philosophical investigation was *locomotio*, the change of place during time; in Bošković's words *motus localis*, local motion – its velocity and direction, its principles (which both its velocity and direction depend upon). By way, even rest is understood as a *motus localis* – the velocity of which is equal to zero. Here, I set forth, first of all, Bošković's concept of local motion velocity, then, also, his concept of force as a principle by way of which this motion is determined (both in terms of velocity and direction), and, finally, in the context of Bošković's law of (active) forces existing in nature, his physical concept of distance as a principle by way of which active forces of potentials get determined (both in terms of its magnitude and direction).

Bošković distinguishes between actual velocity (*velocitas in actu secundo*) and potential velocity (*velocitas in actu primo*).¹⁸

He defines *velocitas in actu secundo*, actual velocity, as a relation between covered distance (*spatium*) and time which that distance was covered in; the relation at matter is a quantitative relation between that distance and time; as a ratio between covered distance quantity and time quantity, which that distance was covered in: »*Velocitas in actu secundo est relatio quaedam spatii, quod perecurritur, et temporis, quo perecurritur: nec ejus idea quidquam aliud involvit praeter tempus, spatium, et eorum relationem quandam, qua haec celeritas eo major dicitur, quo plus spatiis eodem tempore perecurritur motu uniformi, et quo minus tempus in eodem spatio perecurrendo impenditur; ac proinde est ut spatium divisum per tempus.*«¹⁹

Velocitas in actu primo, potential velocity, is a propensity for actual velocity, i. e. a determination (*determinatio*) to cover some definite distance in some definite interval of time. Bošković equates that determination (*velocitas in actu primo*, potential velocity) with force of inertia: »*Velocitas in actu primo est ipsa determinatio, quam habet corpus ad hanc celeritatem in actu secundo; sive est determinatio perecurrendi dato tempore determinatum spa-*

¹⁸ On the scholastic origin of the notions of *actus primus* and *actus secundus* by Bošković see Zvonimir Čuljak, *Nastanak Boškovićeve filozofije prostora i vremena*, pp. 67–68. See also Ivica Martinović, 'Boscovich on the Problem of *Generatio Velocitatis*: Genesis and Methodological Implications', in: Piers Bursill-Hall (ed.), *R. J. Boscovich. Vita e attività scientifica. His life and scientific work*, p. 60. See also the commentary by Josip Talanga in Boscovich, Rogerius Iosephus / Bošković, Ruder Josip, *De continuitatis lege / O zakonu neprekinitosti*, pp. 203–204.

¹⁹ See Bošković, *De viribus vivis*, no.11, p. 11. See also Bošković, *Supplementum II* 5, 428: '...velocitatem actualem, sive, ut ego ipsam appello, in actu secundo, quae consistit in relatione spatii percursi motu acquabili, ad tempus, quo perecurritur' (in: Stay, *Philosophiae recentioris*, vol. I, p. 429).

tium. Hanc velocitatem retinet corpus in motu uniformi vi inartiae; immo ea nihil est aliud, nisi ipsa vis inertiae determinata a precedentibus dispositionibus, nimirum vel a primo statu, in quo eam materiam Conditor posuit, dum conderet, vel ab actionibus potentiarum, quae in illam egerunt prius.²⁰

Bošković distinguishes force of inertia from active forces of potentials.

He defines force of inertia as a determination (*determinatio*) of a body to preserve the state it is in (the state of rest or uniform rectilinear motion).²¹ Such a concept of force of inertia he explicitly ties to Newton's conception of forces of attraction. So he cites a moment when Newton emphasizes that he is considering forces of attraction only mathematically and not physically, and how he does not consider them either a way of action or a physical cause. Inclining towards such a Newtonian concept of force in general, Bošković specifies force of inertia precisely as a determination (*determinatio*), and not as a real, physical action.²²

²⁰ See Bošković, *De viribus vivis*, no. 12, pp. 11–12. See also Bošković, *Supplementum II* 5, 428: '...velocitatem [...] potentialem, nimirum determinationem ad illam velocitatem actualem' (in: Stay, *Philosophiae recentioris*, vol. I, p. 429). See also Bošković, *Supplementum I* 14, 138: '...velocitas illa, quam [...] appellavi in actu primo, sive potentialem. Eam puto, nihil aliud esse, quam vim inertiae ipsam a praecedentibus omnibus puncti statibus determinatam.' (in: Stay, *Philosophiae recentioris*, vol. I, p. 371). On Bošković's notions of *velocitas in actu primo* (potential velocity) and *velocitas in actu secundo* (actual velocity) see Ivica Martinović, 'Boscovich on the Problem of *Generatio Velocitatis*: Genesis and Methodological Implications', in: Piers Bursill-Hall (ed.), *R. J. Boscovich. Vita e attività scientifica. His life and scientific work*, p. 60. See also Stupe Kutleša, *Prorodnofilozofijski pojmovi Rudera Boškovića*, pp. 279–280.

²¹ See Bošković, *De viribus vivis*, no. 10, p. 11: 'Ea /sc. vis inertiae/ est determinatio quaedam materiae ad perseverandum in eo statu quietis, vel motus uniformis in directum, in quo semel est posita.' See also Bošković, *Supplementum I* 13, 108: 'Vim inertiae esse determinationem, quam habeat materiae punctum perseverandi in eodem statu quietis, vel motus uniformis in directum, in quo semel est posita' (in: Stay, *Philosophiae recentioris*, vol. I, p. 363). See also Bošković, *Theoria philosophiae naturalis*, no. 8, pp. 4–5: 'In hisce punctis admitto determinationem perseverandi in eodem statu quietis, vel motus uniformis in directum [...] in quo semel sint posita [...] In ea determinatione stat illa, quam dicimus, inertiae vis.' (Compare the same text also in Bošković, *Philosophiae naturalis theoria*, no. 8, pp. 4–5).

²² See Bošković, *De motu corporum projectorum in spatio non resistente*, pp. 3–4: '... irritus videtur esse conatus Leonardi Euleri Doctissimi Viri, qui in ipso exordio suae Mechanicae [...] nititur demonstrare hanc ipsam inertiam corporum, nec tamen evincit. / Satius videtur eam ipsam vim in Mechanicam admittere eo tantum pacto, quo Newtonus Attractionem, Impulsam, ac Propensionem admisit Princip. I. 1. def. 8. sic enim habet: *Voces autem Attractionis impulsus, ac Propensionis cujuscunque in centrum indifferenter, et pro se mutuo promiscue usurpo, has vires non physice, sed mathematice tantum considerando. Unde caveat Lector, ne per hujusmodi voces cogitet, ne speciem, vel modum actionis, causamve, aut rationem physicam alicubi definire*: et paulo superius dixerat: *Mathematicus dumtaxat est hic conceptus; nam virum causam, et sedes physicas hic non expendo.* / Licebit igitur in ipsa corporis idea mechanice tradita assumere determinationem retinendi eum statum quietis, vel motus uniformis in directum, quem semel habuit.'

Euler's *Mechanics* that Bošković mentions is the double-volume *Mechanica, sive motus scientia analytice exposita* from 1736 (St. Petersburg). Euler's proof of the law of inertia – which

Bošković defines potentials (*potentiae*) as causes which change the state of bodies which they are in (the state of rest or uniform rectilinear motion), i.e. as causes which produce, accelerate, slow down or change direction of motion of a body. In other words, potentials determine bodies to reach a new actual velocity. Into potentials he includes: impenetrability, gravity (*gravitas*), elasticity, adhesion cause, softness, magnetism, electricity, cohesion, fermentation, etc.²³

He defines active forces as actions of potentials.²⁴ It is said that potentials, determining a body to reach a new actual velocity, produce a new potential velocity. The momentary action, by way of which that potential velocity is produced, is called active force.²⁵

Bošković mentions – is found in vol. I, chapter 'De motu in genere', propositions 7–9, definition 9, §56–76 (see *Leonhardi Euleri Opera omnia*, series II, vol. I, pp. 27–32).

More extensively, on Bošković's notion of the force of inertia see Željko Marković, *Rude Bošković*, vol. I, pp. 134–142. See also Ivica Martinović, 'Boškovićev prijemor o jednostavnosti pravca iz god. 1747.: izrečeni i prešućeni argumenti', in: *Vrela i prinosi / Fontes et studia* 16, p. 167. See also Ivica Martinović, 'Boscovich on the Problem of *Generatio Velocitatis*: Genesis and Methodological Implications', in: Piers Bursill-Hall (ed.), *R. J. Boscovich. Vita e attività scientifica. His life and scientific work*, pp. 59–60.

²³ See Bošković, *De viribus vivis*, no. 13, p. 12: 'Potentiarum nomine intelligimus eas causas, quae per actiones suas statum corporis mutant [...] Ejusmodi potentiae sunt impenetrabilitas in collisione corporum, si per contactum fiat: gravitas in accessu ad centrum. vel ad aliud corpus: ea causa, quae, si partes quorundam corporum ad se plus aequo accedant, eas repellit, si recedant plus aequo, ad se invicem adducit, et dicitur vis elastica; causa pariter adhaesionis particularum corporum, qua unius motum altera sequitur; causa obsistens compressioni quorundam aliorum corporum, quae figuram amissam non recuperant, et mollia dicuntur; et aliae ejusmodi, si quae sunt.' See also Bošković, *Supplementum I 14, 133–134*: 'Causas, quae motum gignunt, accelerant, retardant, detorquent, ego quidem potentias appello [...] Hujusmodi causae sunt Impenetrabilitas in aliorum corporum impulsu, Gravitas, Magnetismus, Elasticitas, Electricitas, Cohaesio partium, Fermentatio, atque aliae ejusmodi.' (in: Stay, *Philosophiae recentioris*, vol. I, p. 370). On Bošković's notion of potentials see Ivica Martinović, 'Boscovich on the Problem of *Generatio Velocitatis*: Genesis and Methodological Implications', in: Piers Bursill-Hall (ed.), *R. J. Boscovich. Vita e attività scientifica. His life and scientific work*, pp. 59–60. See also Stipe Kutleša, *Prirodnofilozofijski pojmovi Rudera Boškovića*, pp. 280–281.

²⁴ See Bošković, *Supplementum I 14, 133*: 'Causas, quae motum gignunt, accelerant, retardant, detorquent, ego quidem potentias appello, earum actiones dico vires.' (in: Stay, *Philosophiae recentioris*, vol. I, p. 370).

²⁵ See Bošković, *De viribus vivis*, no. 13, p. 12: 'Potentiarum nomine intelligimus eas causas, quae per actiones suas statum corporis mutant, quae cum illud determinant ad habendam aliam celeritatem in actu secundo, dicuntur producere in ipso novam celeritatem in actu primo. Actio momentanea, qua haec velocitas generari concipitur, dicitur vis activa.' Bošković does not take the notion of force as an action of a cause (a potential) always strictly, but the very forces he sometimes names as causes – see what he himself says in *Supplementum I 14, 133*: 'Causas, quae motum gignunt, accelerant, retardant, detorquent, ego quidem potentias appello, earum actiones dico vires, licet ipsae etiam causae virium nomine appellari soleant, et viceversa, potissimum ubi agitur de effectu producto, ut et ipsae causae quandoque per translationem quandam pro effectibus in communi etiam sermone accipi solent.' (in: Stay, *Philosophiae recentioris*, vol. I, p. 370).

However, in the emergence of potential velocity, at issue is not any real, physical generation of the same, not any real, physical action.²⁶ Bošković apprehends active forces of potentials the same way newtonians apprehend the force of gravity. The force of gravity is, according to newtonians, a determination (*determinatio*) of bodies to approach one another by as greater velocity as smaller is the square of their mutual distance. It is sufficient that bodies are in an mutual distance, and so, by that very fact, originates their determination to approach one another. There is not, thus, any real, physical action of body on body, any real, physical action at a distance (*actio in distans*) – the reciprocal approach of those bodies already results by the very fact that they are in an mutual distance.²⁷

One should understand in the same way Bošković's active forces – simply as a determination (*determinatio*) of bodies to approach one another when in some mutual distances, or, when in some other distances one from another, to recede from each other. In the first case, that determination Bošković names, naturally, as force of attraction, and in the latter, as force of repulsion.²⁸

²⁶ See Bošković, *De viribus vivis*, no. 14, p. 12: 'Quanquam autem hic et actionis, et generationis nomine utimur; tamen nulla vera, et physica actione, aut productione est opus, in ea generatione velocitatis in actu primo; ut ipsa celeritas juxta ideam, quam de ea tradidimus, non est aliquid, quod physice producat, et de novo adveniat.' See also Bošković, *Supplementum I 14, 137*: 'In hac sententia nullum materiae punctum exercet in aliud punctum ullam actionem physicam, qua ejus statum perturbet [...]/ Ad mutuas sive accedendi, sive recedendi vires, quae attractivae dicantur, vel repulsivae, nulla est necessitas actionis physicae in distans.' (in: Stay, *Philosophiae recentioris*, vol. I, p. 371).

²⁷ See Bošković, *De viribus vivis*, no. 14, pp. 12–13: 'Quanquam autem hic et actionis, et generationis nomine utimur; tamen nulla vera, et physica actione, aut productione est opus, in ea generatione velocitatis in actu primo; ut ipsa celeritas juxta ideam, quam de ea tradidimus, non est aliquid, quod physice producat, et de novo adveniat. Habetur abunde per praesentem combinationem illius vel legis, vel exigentiae conditionatae, in qua vis inertiae sita est, et illius alterius, in qua sita est potentia ipsa, ac per circumstantiam loci, vel aliam ejusmodi, quae conditionem in potentia ipsa imbitam determinet. Sic Gravitatio per Newtonianos est quaedam vel determinatio ipsorum corporum naturae, vel potius libera Dei lex, qua si bina corpora posita sint in quacunq; distantia etiam in vacuo, statim acquirant determinationem accedendi ad se invicem, et acquirendi novam celeritatem in actu secundo eo majorem, quo minus est quadratum distantiae. Intelligantur ea corpora existere: intelligatur vis inertiae, qua priorem celeritatem retineant si nulla potentia agat: intelligatur tanta determinata distantia; intelligatur genita nova celeritas in actu primo, determinatis conditionibus omnibus: et intelligatur nova celeritas perpetuo advenire, si intelligantur perpetuo determinari conditiones eadem. Nulla in hac idea involvitur vera productio cujusdam, quod sit velocitas in actu primo, nulla actio physica; quod quidem hic semel ita praemittimus, ut intelligatur semper, quo sensu actionem velocitatis generativam accipiamus.'

²⁸ See Bošković, *De viribus vivis*, no. 50, p. 39: 'Utimur autem virium attractivarum, et repulsivarum nomine, non quod aliquam physicam actionem ponamus particulae distantis in distantem, sed ut hisce vocabulis exprimamus determinationem illam, [...]/ qua particulae ad se invicem conentur accedere, vel a se invicem conentur recedere.' See also Bošković, *Theoria philoso-*

Hence, Bošković comprehends the force of potentials as simply a determination of bodies to approach one another or to recede from each other, by a precisely determined velocity depending on their mutual distance. So, it is sufficient that bodies are in an mutual distance, and by that very fact (without any real, physical action) they will be set (determined) to approach one to another, or to recede one from another by a precise velocity. That determination without any real, physical action, Bošković names as active force of potentials – the exact way that he names force of inertia as determination, and not action.

'Determinatio' is, thus, the *genus proximus* of Bošković's concept of force in general (both of force of inertia and the force of potentials) – where 'determinatio', determination is opposed to action, 'actio'.²⁹

Such a concept of force by Bošković is of Newtonian origin (even though, it is not distant from Tolomei's doctrine of the inconceivability of the very action by way of which a cause produces its consequence).³⁰

In respect of direction, active force can be that of attraction or that of repulsion, depending on the distance between the bodies. In some mutual distances, bodies are determined to approach one another. In some other mutual distances, on the other hand, bodies are determined to recede from one another. There are distances, however, in which forces between bodies are neither that of attraction, nor that of repulsion, i.e. distances in which bodies do not get determined either to approach one another, or to recede from each other.

The measure of force (either that of attraction or that of repulsion) depends also on the mutual distance between bodies. In some mutual distances between bodies, the force is greater, and in some other, it is smaller. There are also distances in which the measure of force between bodies is equal to zero.

In line with Bošković's law of (active) forces, in entirely minute mutual distances bodies are determined to recede from each other, the force between them is that of repulsion; in vast distances, however, bodies are determined to approach each other, the force between them is that of attraction.

phiae naturalis, no. 9, p. 5: 'Censeo igitur bina quaecunque materiae puncta determinari aequè in aliis distantis ad mutuuum accessum, in aliis ad recessum mutuuum, quam ipsam determinationem appello vim, in priore casu attractivam, in posteriore repulsivam, eo nomine non agendi modum, sed ipsam determinationem exprimens.' (Compare the same text in Bošković, *Philosophiae naturalis theoria*, no. 9, p. 5).

²⁹ On the importance of the notion of *determinatio* for Bošković's understanding of force see Stipe Kutleša, *Prirudnofilozofijski pojmovi Rudera Boškovića*, p. 116.

³⁰ See footnotes 15–17.

The force of repulsion between bodies in their minute mutual distance is as greater as that distance grows smaller; and if that distance gets smaller and smaller into infinity, the force of repulsion gets greater and greater into infinity.

The force of attraction between bodies in their vast mutual distance is as smaller as the distance is greater; and if that distance gets greater and greater into infinity, so the force of attraction grows smaller and smaller into infinity. (Bošković does not exclude the possibility that this force of attraction in some extremely huge distances between bodies may, in fact, transform into the force of repulsion).³¹

The force of repulsion, in greater minutely small mutual distances between bodies, gets all that smaller, until it translates into the force of attraction, which, again, by growth of distance between bodies gets all that greater, and then again all that smaller, until it changes into the force of repulsion, etc.; many times so, from that of repulsion into that of attraction, and vice versa, until extremely huge distances between bodies, in which the force becomes – as is already discerned – that of attraction, and by growth of those distances, all that smaller, by measure approximately equal to Newton's force of gravity.³²

(Distances in which the force of repulsion changes into that of attraction, or vice versa, are those distances in which the force between bodies is neither that of attraction, nor that of repulsion, i.e. those distances in which the measure of force is equal to zero.)³³

Because there is no jump by increment or decrement of measure of either the force of attraction or that of repulsion between bodies – or by change, both ways, of one to another – Bošković points out that all the above mentioned continuing changes, both of direction and measure of force between bodies, one must be able to express algebraically by a single formula, and to draw geometrically by a single uninterrupted and unique curve of all

³¹ See, e.g. Bošković, *Theoria philosophiae naturalis*, no. 405, p. 185: 'Fieri enim potest [...] ut postremus ille curvae meae arcus, qui exhibet gravitatem, posteaquam recesserit ad distantias majores, quam sint cometarum omnium ad nostrum solare systema pertinentium distantiae maximae a Sole, incipiat recedere plurimum ab hyperbola habente ordinatas reciprocas quadratorum distantiae, ac iterum axem secet, et contorqueatur.' (Compare the same text in Bošković, *Philosophiae naturalis theoria*, no. 400, p. 208).

³² On Bošković's law of forces as a whole see, e.g. Bošković, *De lumine II*, no. 41–48, or Bošković, *Theoria philosophiae naturalis*, no. 10, etc.

³³ See, e.g. Bošković, *De lumine II*, no. 46, p. 20: '... a vi repulsiva in majoribus distantiiis imminuta ad attractivam non transitur nisi per vim nullam; cum quantitates decrescentes ex positivis in negativas non transeant, nisi transcendendo per nihilum.' See also Bošković, *Theoria philosophiae naturalis*, no. 181, p. 83: 'Illa puncta, in quibus curva axem tangit, sunt quidem terminus quidam virium, quae ex utraque parte, dum ad ea acceditur, decrescunt ultra quoscunque limites, ac demum ibidem evanescent.' (Compare the same text in Bošković, *Philosophiae naturalis theoria*, no. 180, p. 93).

the (active) forces existing in nature.³⁴ He extensively discusses the formula and the curve in, for example, *De lege virium*, no. 55–124, in *Theoria philosophiae naturalis*, no. 167–188, and elsewhere.

It is easy to see – even from this rather concise review – that Bošković's law of active forces existing in nature (by that also the possible algebraic equation and the geometric curve of those forces) concerns exactly their complete *dependency* on mutual distances between bodies – both regarding direction and measure. In the spirit of the scholastic concept of principle,³⁵ from the above it should be clearly and unequivocally concluded that in Bošković's natural philosophy the distance between bodies is not just a quantity, length (as, for example, in geometry), but, at the same time, a *principle* on which both direction and measure of active forces depends (with that indirectly both direction and velocity of motion of bodies).³⁶

Conclusion

Bošković's differentiation between force (as *actus secundus*) and potential (as *actus primus*) is of scholastic origin. His conception of that force (that *actus secundus*) as a determination (*determinatio*), as opposed to real, physical action, is distinctly of Newtonian origin (even though such a concept of force is not too distant from Tolomei's doctrine of the unconceivability of action by which a cause produces its consequence). Because that force, that determination (*determinatio*), both regarding its direction and measure, *depends* precisely on the mutual distance of bodies in question, it should be concluded – in the spirit of the scholastic concept of principle – that in Bošković's natural philosophy the distance between bodies should be understood exactly as the principle of their mutual forces (with that indirectly as the principle of their motion, *locomotio*).

TRANSLATED BY ANA JANKOVIĆ

³⁴ See, e.g. Bošković, *Theoria philosophiae naturalis*, no. 11, p. 6: 'Hujusmodi lex primo aspectu videtur admodum complicata, et ex diversis legibus temere inter se coagmentatis coalescens; at simplicissima, et prorsus incomposita esse potest, expressa videlicet per unam continuam curvam, vel simplicem Algebraicam formulam.' (Compare the same text in Bošković, *Philosophiae naturalis theoria*, no. 11, p. 6).

³⁵ See the chapter entitled 'Scholastic Concepts of Cause and Condition'.

³⁶ Even though he does not name distance a principle, the same is – in fact – pointed out by Ivica Martinović: '...the following fundamental concepts remain permanently valid: *The force acting between physical objects: points and particles of matter, physical bodies, planets and fixed stars, depends exclusively on the distance between these objects [...]. The dependence of the force on the distance is represented by the continuous curve [...], which Bošković usually called the law of forces...*' (See Ivica Martinović, 'The Fundamental Deductive Chain of Bošković's Natural Philosophy', in: *The Philosophy of Science of Ruder Bošković*, Proceedings of the Symposium of the Institute of Philosophy and Theology, S. J., Zagreb, 1987, pp. 92–93 – pointed out by D. Š.).

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SKOLASTIČKI I NEWTONOVSKI KONTEKST BOŠKOVIĆEVA POJMA SILE

Sažetak

Članak nastoji upozoriti na neke skolastičke i newtonovske momente u Boškovićevu poimanju sile. Pritom se pod skolastikom razumije isusovačka skolastika s konca sedamnaestog i tijekom osamnaestog stoljeća. Autor zaključuje, prvo, da je Boškovićevo razlikovanje između sile (kao *actus secundus*) i potencije (kao *actus primus*) skolastičkoga podrijetla, drugo, da je Boškovićevo poimanje te sile (tog *actus secundus*) kao određenosti (*determinatio*), nasuprot stvarnom, fizičkom djelovanju, izrazito newtonovskoga podrijetla, treće, da – u skladu sa skolastičkim pojmom počela – u Boškovićevoj prirodnoj filozofiji treba udaljenost među tijelima shvatiti upravo kao počelo njihovih uzajamnih sila.



PHILOSOPHY OF FREEDOM OF ANTE STARČEVIĆ

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Although the political ideas of Ante Starčević, as well as his works, have been repressed for decades, and even proscribed, it is astonishing how the substance of his teachings on the Croatian statehood became almost a part of the sub-consciousness of the Croatian people. One could definitely say that through his works, in a very specific way, a certain political and spiritual substance came into open, and at the end of the Twentieth century served as the basis for bringing to life the idea of the Croatian state. When one reads the works of Starčević today, one can recognize many points that almost seem to be an immanent part of the Croatian national tradition. His importance is precisely in the fact that in his work he managed to develop the Croatian legal heritage of rights and the overall historical experience to the level of a political idea, at the same time managing to form the national memory into a substance of the collective consciousness.

He revived the historical Croatian State constitution, and he enriched it with modern ideas of bourgeois as well as with democratic principles. In a similar way in which Plato in his *State* summarized the nature of Greek tradition and the Greek character, one could similarly say that in his work Starčević brought to consciousness the Croatian tradition, the Croatian national character and its morality. The reversal of the self-confidence of the Croatian people done by Starčević could be illustrated with the saying which he once defined as follows: before him the Croats subscribed to the legal principle *Take it, and than give to us!* They always gave, and never got anything in return. Starčević overturned this principle into a political demand: *First you give to us, and than take from us!*

For more than a century »the lonely man from the Lika region« has represented the crucial watershed which divided political and intellectual streams in Croatia. The attitude toward his person and his work has been

marked by extremes which have shed more light on the conflicting opinions continuously caused by this distinctive character from his own times until today. He was honored and elevated among the widest possible circle of the common people as a wise man and a prophet. At the same time, another part of the public opinion criticized and belittled him because of his unbending moral attitude, as well as because of his political vehemence and rigidity. There were periods when his supporters competed in elevating his person above his work, although during his lifetime he had been clearly against it. On the other hand, during some other periods he was publicly portrayed in the blackest possible terms, and this was done by using his fierce satirical figures in order to sketch a picture of a person subscribing to problematic political and moral values.

The reasons for such an ambivalent attitude could be seen, first of all, in his somewhat unusual life history as well as in the role on the political stage of this, as Krleža called him, »maniacal« speaker in the parliament and a publicist. Also, one should bear in mind the fact that his work is similarly complex and multi-layered, not only in terms of various forms of presentation, but also in terms of its content. In his work we have the interweaving of literary fiction and political reality, scientific discourse and satirical irony, rhetorical ecstasy and realistic prose.

If, however, one puts aside the arguments based exclusively on Starčević himself and his work, one should not underestimate the inclination of his contemporaries and their descendants to exaggerate in praising and overdo in criticizing him. Starčević was aware of this and on one occasion he distanced himself from the excessiveness of praising his own personal merits, and with the following symptomatic words anticipated the future attitudes toward his work: »I am sorry to see that my services for my homeland have been so exalted and augmented. According to my experience, exactly this has been the main deficiency of Croats, that they so light-mindedly both praise and criticize. In the case of such praising, they commit themselves beyond any limits and lose their independence, in the case of criticism they lose their fairness, and in both cases they just manage to harm themselves.«¹

Kerubin Šegvić in the Preface to his monograph *Dr. Ante Starčević, njegov život i njegova djela* (»Dr. Ante Starčević, His Life and His Works«), points toward this visible division within the Croatian public opinion regard-

¹ *Pismo uredniku Slobode* (»Letter to the Editor of Sloboda«), June 15, 1883, published in: Blaž Jurišić (ed.), *Ante Starčević, Izabranu spisi* (»Selected Works«), HIBZ, Zagreb, 1943, p. 407. A more comprehensive review of Starčević's propositions is available in my book *Filozofija prava Ante Starčevića* (»Philosophy of Rights of Ante Starčević«), *Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo* (»Croatian Philosophical Society«), Zagreb, 1996.

ing evaluation of both the personality and the works of this »legendary« person. He begins with the statement that there is no name that is so well known among the Croatian people today as is the name of Ante Starčević. Before Šegvić's book on Starčević and his work was published, there had not been many written works on him, and we had particularly been in demand of more systematic over-views of his basic ideas. Yet, regardless of that, Šegvić concludes that there is no »self-aware Croat« who would say that he had never heard of this man. In such circumstances of clearly broad influence on the common people, and especially living in their oral communication, in the imagination and the memory of the people, step by step he became a »legendary person«. The fate of such persons, who live in the oral tradition of their nation, is that various interpreters of their work always try to portray them and judge them from their own point of view and their own point of judgment. Within such a framework Starčević was portrayed in a strictly black-and-white manner, without those specific and rather characteristic elements which indeed show us his real mark, his importance and the significance of his work, in other words, those elements which had differentiated him from his contemporaries. The foundation of his popularity was exactly in the substance of his teachings, in his practical philosophy of freedom and in the way in which he lived this particular science of life in his own personal life, through his own personal example.

As opposed to a realistic judgment of Starčević's work and values reviewed on the basis of the background of his own time, he was judged based on liking and disliking, and this has been true ever since his time. Trying to show the attitude of the Croatian public opinion toward Starčević, Šegvić used the words of Manzoni, and stated that for some people he was »segno d'immensa invidia, i d'instinguibil odio«, the subject of immense envy and insatiable hatred, while for the others he was »segno di pietà profonda i d'indomato amor«, the subject of deep feelings and uncontrollable love. The first ones argued against him stating his numerous weaknesses, and fabricating fairy tales about his youth and his atheism, and tried to make his contemporaries hate him, while the others, on the contrary, shouted »Long live!« while he was still alive, and »May his memory live!« after his death, and thus were confident that they fully repaid him for his name and for his work². Together with certain exclusivity which marks his work, it was especially because of his moralistic and very sharp satire and even lampooning, that a great deal of his works remained fairly unknown to the wide majority of the Croatian people.

² Kerubin Šegvić, *Dr. Ante Starčević, njegov život i njegova djela* (»Ante Starčević, Ph. D., His Life and His Works«), *Tiskara Hrvatske stranke prava* (Printing-House of the Croatian Party of Rights), Zagreb, 1911, p. 1.

In portraying Starčević's personality Šegvić already noted certain mythological straits that came as a result of both his rather unbending world-views and his persistent character. In this context it is especially interesting to note the way in which his pupils, his supporters and his followers related to him as to some legendary Greek wise man, and thus called him, with great respect, the genius and the wise man of the Croatian people. They emphasized the prophetic spirit and the visionary ethos with which he brought into open the political and the spiritual past, and also portrayed a future of the nation, emphasizing its identity rooted in its historical state rights.

It is an unquestionable fact that Starčević continues to have a peculiar suggestiveness and an almost charismatic persuasiveness, as well as influence on the most diverse circles of Croatian intellectuals both within political and literary circles. They related to him as apostles relate to their teacher, trying to spread his consecrated teachings. Even during Starčević's lifetime, within the political establishment throughout the Empire people noted this unusual messianic phenomenon of »the Croatian Diogenes«, as they call him in a popular way, and his influence on the widest circles of especially younger intellectuals and the common people. In *Biografski leksikon Carevine Austrije* (»A Biographical Lexicon of the Austrian Empire«), an event was mentioned when in 1867 the followers of »the Croatian Diogenes« had shown him their respect and trust and had given him their *Address of Confidence*, while the authorities officially banned the torch parade in his honor: »When in the Spring of 1867 Pozoraši /the followers of the political circle gathered around the journal 'Pozor'/ organized a serenade gathering in front of the Ban Jelačić monument in his honor, the followers of »the Croatian Diogenes«, as opposed to the above praise to the Statue of Ban Jelačić, wanted to show the expression of their own trust and praise, and decided to organize in his honor a brilliant torch parade. However, as the authorities denied a permission for such a torch parade, they handed him their *Address of Confidence*, signed by his supporters.«³

The atmosphere of Starčević's charisma is definitely most clearly visible in the accounts of Kerubin Šegvić. Although in the Preface to his monograph he emphasized his own aspiration to portray a »faithful picture, a photography of a man who left such a deep imprint in the public life of Croatia, that even in a century these traces will not be erased«, the picture left by his pen nevertheless loses realistic dimensions and crosses the boundary, entering the world of biblical motives and comparisons. The very words he uses show that he is not talking about a real man with his individual strengths and weak-

³ *Biographisches Lexikon des Kaiserthums Oesterreich* (»Biographical Lexicon of the Austrian Empire«), Vol. 51, p. 153, Vienna, 1885.

nesses, but about a character of a prophet who lives for the others and preaches the truth that comes to our reality from the other side. Due to that fact the things he had done or the words he had uttered have not been a part of any critical analysis, which was exactly what Starčević himself had so often insisted upon.

What controversy such an approach can bring to our efforts to understand Starčević's often ironic and multiple-meaning statements and stories can be clearly seen on the example of the well-known story about Filip Barišević. According to a story which became an unavoidable part of the biography of Starčević, in his youth he had an emotionally very powerful and important encounter with a man whose both arms were amputated to his elbows. This person was Filip Barišević who was, as the story goes, due to his complaints to the higher-level authorities against wrongdoings and lawlessness throughout the Border region, sentenced by the Karlovac court and punished that his left arm should be cut. After he continued with his written complaints to the Ministry of War in Vienna and the King himself, his right arm was cut too.

However, it is interesting that Starčević himself never mentioned this particular story in any of his works, but it became known primarily through the retelling by Šegvić. Šegvić, on the other hand, does not discuss the questioned authenticity of the story, but retells it with all the details, as if indeed he is just providing an authentic testimony from Starčević's mouth, »remembering his every word«⁴. Josip Horvat confirmed that Starčević had indeed told this story in a close circle of his friends and followers, where Šegvić was also present. Neither Horvat nor Šegvić doubted the authenticity of this story, explaining it as a result of a very specific organizational structure as well as special circumstances reigning throughout the Border region.

However, neither of the two asked a question whether Starčević indeed had told them a true story, or maybe he had just used it as a metaphor to emphasize his own position and the attacks he had to sustain due to his own written complaints and addresses which he had been sending to the King in Vienna against injustices and wrongdoings against the rights of his homeland Croatia. As, one should keep in mind, his own works are indeed full of such literary interweaving of reality and fiction, in which he used an ironic detachment in order to show more clearly the truth beyond its very appearance.

The lonely man from the Lika region is definitely not only an exaggerated image of a man of inexpressible spiritual virtues, but is also a man with his own weaknesses and a thinker with some wrong judgments as well. For

⁴ Josip Horvat, *Ante Starčević. Kulturno-povijesna slika* (»Ante Starčević. Cultural and Historical Review«), *NZMh*, Zagreb, 1990, p. 77.

many people, based on his specific and solitary way of life, as well as his unconventional attitudes, he was a somewhat strange, odd man, with his own peculiar character, but precisely because of this he was also someone considered as an inspiration and a model. Starčević himself was rather aware that every man is a sinful being and as such has his own shortcomings, and thus he often showed understanding for different attitudes. Yet, he was also known to had gotten very angry against people with slave-like attitudes and characters, when he clearly overdid his satire and was sometimes way too unfair in his offensive judgments. With his Rousseau-like element of criticism of corruptive elements of the civilization he sometimes unjustly idealized the past and exalted the natural state of things which, of course, did not exist as such. He was sometimes also wrong in his political judgments and expectations from certain individuals, for example from Napoleon III.

In his series of articles on Starčević, the Father of the Homeland, Antun Gustav Matoš managed to present us in the most picturesque way all the contradictory elements visible in his personality and his character. Stating that the Old One was not only the greatest Croat and patriot of the XIX century, but also the wisest thinker and the best publicist this country had ever had, Matoš pointed toward the very interconnection of his strengths and his weaknesses. Among other things, he pointed out Starčević's exaltation for the Roman humanistic ideals, while at the same time he had unjustly belittled the spirit of the Greece. At the exact point where the source of his political philosophy is most visibly and strongly rooted – in the natural relation between moral principles and politics – the criterion in the everyday pragmatic politics of balancing the interests and compromises shows to be defective. With his faith in ideal values he underestimated the power and the role of money and economic values. He one-sidedly exalted the French ideals of freedom and revolutionary principles, while at the same time unjustly belittling the Germans and their metaphysics. Yet these examples of his one-sidedness are for Matoš just mere shadows of an indeed »classical« greatness:

»Yes indeed, a classic, a classical person he was, not only by his education, his style, thinking and inclinations, but by his life as well, a life of a Pythagoras, Socrates and Marcus Aurelius... Such a great person does not have enough space in a biography of a modern politician. He is for Plutarch to write about him. His place is with Epaminondas and the defeated Hannibal. Among us, in the times of despair, suspicion, corruption and slavery, he showed what a man alone can do, what an individual can do in spite of poverty and all the obstacles, when he is a true hero, when he knows no fear, when he is a distinctive person, when he serves only his ideals, only his people! They say there are no saints any more among us today, and among us we had a Leader with the soul of the Virgin of D'Orleans and with the mind of

an encyclopaedist, a man who was more deserved by Croatia than Croatia deserved him!»⁵

The extensiveness of Starčević's influence on recent political and cultural history of Croatia is most clearly visible through the fact that he represents an inexhaustible intellectual source from which the thirst was satisfied of not only many of the political but also many of the literary and other intellectual trends of the modern times. This is particularly visible in an entire generation of Croatian writers of the Age of Realism. Among them Šegvić pointed out Josip Eugen Tomić, August Harambašić, Silvije Strahimir Kranjčević, Ante Kovačić, Eugen Kumičić, as well as a number of younger writers such as Tresić Pavičić, Dragošić, Miletić and Rikard Katalinić Jeretov, Alaupović, brothers Ostojić, Dr. Marin Sabić and Ante Petravić. In this particular context, as Šegvić points out, Starčević is important not only due to his political influence through propagation of the freedom-aspiring ideas of the state and the nation rights, but he also represented a source of inspiration through his own literary works, where in a very specific way he sublimated the spiritual tradition, thus establishing the beginnings of the aesthetic modernism, as shown by Zlatko Posavac⁶ in his work on the interference between tradition and modernity in Starčević's *Steklish** aesthetics. Of course, not only writers were under the influence of Starčević, but also historians like Vjekoslav Klaić, as well as artists such as sculptor Rendić and painter Medović.

If we analyze more thoroughly the reception of Starčević's ideas, we cannot escape a conclusion that, as a rule, those who indeed had read his works and had tried to understand the essence of his message, ended up being enchanted by the philosophical depth of his analysis of the Croatian reality as well as its spirituality. Together with the above mentioned names, throughout the XX century we have had a long list of intellectuals from various disciplines who analyzed Starčević's works and who have found inspiration in his ideas: from Matoš and Krleža, Šegvić and Horvat, Lukas and Šimić, Drechsler and Makanec, Juričić and Ladan, Nehajev and Posavac, Jelčić and Mirjana Gross.

As an illustration we could use the example of Miroslav Krleža and the way in which he was inspired by the genius of the Elder. According to a comparative analysis done by Ante Kadić, among many historians of culture,

⁵ Antun Gustav Matoš, »Dr. Ante Starčević,« in: *Sabrana djela* (»Ante Starčević, Collected Works«), *Librer/Mladost*, Zagreb, 1973, p. 125.

⁶ Zlatko Posavac, *Novija hrvatska estetika* (»Modern Croatian Aesthetics«), *Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo* (»Croatian Philosophical Society«), Zagreb, 1992, p. 41 onwards.

* *Steklishes*, the radical followers of rightism. Rightism (*Pravaštvo*), a political movement stemming from Starčević's Party of Right.

writers and interpreters who wrote about Starčević, it seems that »none of those who wrote about the Elder produced pages ‘so inspired’ as Krleža did«⁷. Without entering into discussion on how Krleža later retouched his early fascination with Starčević and his teachings, as noted by Kadić, we should here point out Krleža’s judgment of Starčević in his Preface to the map *Podravski motivi* (»Motives from Podravina«) from 1933. Indeed, by exemplifying Starčević’s characteristics Krleža brought to light his own worldview as well as the principal goal of an artistic creation:

»And, no matter how paradoxical it may seem, it still remains true: the most lucid of all of our heads, the one who viewed our reality with the most precise insight, and the one who produced pictures of that reality which, for an entire century, proved to be the most precise and plastic ones, both in literary and in rhetorical terms, was the head of the old Ante Starčević. He was a man who clearly saw our hopeless ‘serpentine’ and by defending ‘a spoon of our sea’ and a foot of our hungry maritime area against those crooks of Hungarian earls, throughout decades had spat on our own spongers, cheap bastards and rascals, on scoundrels who force our ‘cattle-like peasants’ to browse thorns below foreign, disgraceful Hungarian and Viennese flags. Within our overall mindlessness and lawlessness of the XIX century, between our Bačka-Croatian* dogmatics, our rags, our patches, our incongruous rag attachments and the all-embracing cultural patching and patchwork, devastated by deadly premonitions Starčević looked at the Hungarian cunning thieves of our freedom, he looked at the conspiracy of our stupidity, our christened first-class cattle, our brood, our litter, and the cursed breed of our last century in tight-fitting braid jackets of new industrialists, who were selling our interests for pitiful Pesta scholarships, and there was no artist of that time who understood our reality so clearly as Starčević did.«⁸

The political dimension of Starčević’s work was here of less importance for Krleža. Positioning to the front his moralistic role and his literary-satirical subversion, his artistic and rhetorical message, Krleža views direct lack of concrete results of daily-political efforts as a verbal rebellion of a state-rights-focused, one-sided »maniacal speaker in the parliament«. Yet, even when looking at him from his XX century viewpoint Krleža could not deny that Starčević was indeed »the only temperament and the only head who was able to elevate himself sometimes even to a prophet-like strength of his expression.«

⁷ Ante Kadić, *Matoš i Krleža o Starčeviću* (»Matoš and Krleža on Starčević«), in: *Hrvatska Revija* (»Croatian Review«), 1973, No. 4, p. 521.

* Bačka-Croatian (Bunjevci), an ethnic group of Croats.

⁸ Miroslav Krleža, *Introduction*, in: *Krsto Hegedušić, Podravski motivi* (»Motives from Podravina«), *Minerva*, Zagreb, 1933, p. 20.

On the opposite side, as noticed already by Antun Gustav Matoš, there were always those who criticized him, yet without really knowing and studying him. Even today, for example, there are those who criticize him, thus indeed really expressing their negative attitude toward the very idea of the Croatian state independence. And there are those who »abuse« him by calling themselves his true followers, and yet they are not really on the level of his idea of justice and freedom of an individual and a community.

1. Philosophy of Freedom

Under the influence of ideas of the French Revolution, one of the main concepts discussed by Starčević in his works was a concept of freedom. Almost as a kind of an underlying leitmotif the idea of freedom runs through various semantic contexts. And here it is not only a political definition of freedom, but also a widest possible metaphysical category of freedom understood as one of the cardinal determinant of man's existence in the world. Rooting himself in metaphysical preconditions of a modern-world definition of freedom, Starčević talks about man as an essentially free being. A man who did not reach that level of self-awareness, self-determination and self-governing – the autonomy in the sense of Kant – he indeed cannot be called a man in the right sense of that word. He is a servant or a slave.

Mirjana Gross emphasized the ethical foundation of Starčević's teachings, and pointed out the fact that his idea of a nation is »above all, a spiritual category, and that its enemies (that is, the opponents to his ideology) are, from that point of view, incarnated evil identified with slavery in a sense of a specific interpretation of ideas of the French Revolution on freedom«.⁹ Gross here provides a background sketch of the romantic national ideology and the principles of the French Revolution on the state-related creation of a national union as the main foundations of Starčević's political philosophy: »Due to that reason both Starčević and Kvaternik understood nation-personality and nation-state as the only legitimate form of political organization, as the principal source of any legality and any ethics. They were confident that morality and freedom could exist only in an independent national state understood as a materialization of the spirit of freedom, the will of a nation and the virtues of individual citizens. State had to be the basis for survival of a nation as a source of culture, economic values and creative energy in general. Starčević and Kvaternik followed the doctrines of the French Revolution on the nation-state that arises through agreement and involvement of a

⁹ Mirjana Gross, *Povijest pravaške ideologije* (»History of the Rightist Ideology«), Zagreb, 1973, p. 5.

people. The natural right of every nation to establish its own state – as an essential part of the romantic national ideology – represented an important aspect of the rightist* thinking, lying in the background of the historical state right of the Croatian people.¹⁰

The starting point of Starčević's rightist philosophy of freedom is in Rousseau's criticism of the rights of the one who is stronger. One thus rejects the unjust and illegal rule of force that is not rooted in the rights. The rightist principle is that submission might come as a result of a necessity at a certain period of time, but this is not an expression of free will. No man agrees of his own free will to be a slave. For Rousseau only a madman could willingly agree to become a slave, because to subordinate one's own free will to somebody else, and not to one's own comprehended law, at the same time means giving up one's authentic human attributes, rights and duties, and this goes against the human nature. Starčević – exactly in this, Rousseau's sense – defines his own ideas on a natural right of man to be free. In exactly this sense he in his satirical exchanges denies human attributes to those who have a slave-like nature.

The basic assumption of modern philosophy, which Starčević deduces from Rousseau's practical science, is based on understanding that, in fact, the freedom represents the crucial anthropological element through which the spiritual essence of the soul is expressed and not, as the classical metaphysics claims – the mind. Freedom is understood in the widest possible sense, from the natural freedom positioned within boundaries of individual forces, to the moral and the civil freedom that is limited by common will, which is being established through contractual surrendering of individual freedom in favor of the freedom of all. The highest form of freedom, defined by Starčević as an ideal, is clearly freedom as autonomy. According to the republican understanding of freedom, and using as a model morality and customary practices of a Greek *polis*, a man begins to rule over himself only when by his free will he decides to subordinate himself to the law which he prescribed to himself.

From Rousseau's framework of categories Starčević also took over the identification of rights with freedom. As opposed to use of force in relationships among people, freedom opens up in a form of rights defined as a law established on the basis of customs and deeply rooted regulations of the ways people live by. The opposition to right is force, and the opposition to freedom is serfdom or slavery. Rousseau explicitly stated that the words slavery and freedom are opposed and in fact exclude each other. Man is by his nature free and cannot reject his freedom without at the same time rejecting his

* Rightism, a political movement stemming from Starčević's Party of Right.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 10.

essential characteristics that make him a human being. For Rousseau this starting point represents the foundation of the natural rights as the intellectual basis of the world of man: »To reject one's freedom means to reject the distinctive traits of man, the rights of man, and even his responsibilities. There does not exist such a reward for the sake of which one would reject all that. Such a rejection is incompatible with the nature of man, and it is more moral to take away all morality from one's action than to take away all freedom from one's will.«¹¹ Therefore, here we have a specifically human concept of freedom, defined as a basic determinant of man, who thus absolves God in the theodicy of any responsibility for the evil in the world.

In his moral teachings Starčević especially tries to point out negative elements of serfdom or slavery of people who did not elevate themselves to the stage of free will. Here he somewhat differs from Rousseau's definition of individual freedom and insists on moral self-determination of man. In formation of his popular and newly invented construction »slavoserbi«, which refers to an un-free sort of people, it is indicative how he confronted the attitudes of Aristotle and Rousseau. By defining slaves or serfs Starčević ironically played with Latin terms *sclavus* and *servus* as the basis for a coined word *slaviserbi* or *slavoserbi*, and thus he followed Aristotle's understanding of slaves as that sort of people who by their nature don't belong to themselves but to other people: »Therefore, from this it is clear what the nature of a slave and his abilities are. Because one who by one's own nature does not belong to oneself but to other man, by one's nature one is a slave; and a man, by being a man, who belongs to another man, is also property. Whereas, property is a separable and performing instrument.«¹²

If we analyze with more attention Starčević's frequent satirical attacks and criticism of people who are willing, for money or for position, to submit themselves to the rule of other people, and like slaves to alienate themselves from and give up their freedom to the others, than in the background of his argumentation we clearly see Aristotle's differentiation between those who are slaves by their nature and those who belong to a category of free men. This becomes clearly visible and is rather sharply defined at those moments when he calls upon Aristotle's definitions in the context of his own definition of slavoserbs viewed as doubly defined serfs or slaves. For example, in his paper *Stranke u Hrvatskoj* (»Parties in Croatia«), he begins with Aristotle's assumptions and based on them explains the five types of slaves, adding to the list a peculiar Croatian type of slaves – *madarolci* (the followers of the pro-Hungarian Unionist Party): »Even Aristotle was aware that there are

¹¹ Jean Jacques Rousseau, *Društvem ugovor I*, 4 (»Social Contract I, 4«), *Školska knjiga*, Zagreb, 1978, p. 98.

¹² Aristotle, *Politika* (»Politics«), 1254 a 13–17, HSN, Zagreb, 1992, p. 6.

men whose nature is those of slaves. He knew about Tracia, where there were peoples like that. It must be that from that unclean breed come those Slavoserbs (*slavus*, people whose nature is to be slaves), who are not only slaves in every aspect, but who also do everything they can in order to enslave everybody else, or to do all they can to make slaves remain in that position... Into one of these five types of slaves comes every Slavoserb, every Magyarol. But in fact they are all the same: slavery is their essence, and they are the essence of slavery. Because of that, as long as there will be slavery, there will also be Slavoserbs, and as long as there will be Slavoserbs, there will be slavery.«¹³

When Rousseau in the chapter on slavery in his work *Društveni ugovor* («Social Contract») discusses the foundations of power based on law in political union, he proves that there is no legal way for a man to renounce his basic characteristic of freedom. For him this would be something absurd and beyond comprehension, and such an act in a society, even if it would happen, would indeed be of no account and illegal, because it goes against the human nature. Every man is born free and nobody else can have power over his freedom except he alone. The one who renounces his basic human characteristic out of his free will lacks common sense and Rousseau proclaims him mad. And in exactly the same way Starčević tried to provide a satirical description of «madness» of those people who by their own free will allow others to use them, without trying to liberate themselves from such a position of slavery. Effectively ironizing Aristotle's and Rousseau's statements Starčević into his own discourse introduces categorial difference between slaves as such and those with a slave-like nature: «The basis of Aristotle's politics is the principle which states that there are people who are slaves by their nature. When he heard that, Rousseau the noble started crying and attacked Aristotle that he mixed ideas, causes and results. All people are – says Rousseau – the same by their nature. However, the one who is born, raised and who lives in slavery, that one becomes a slave, an outcast from humanity. This thus means that a man would become a slave, he would not be born as one; slavery would be the mother, the cause of slave being a slave, and a slave would not be the cause of slavery.

If Rousseau would know slavoserbs, he would undoubtedly agree with Aristotle. And indeed, slavery degrades a man, slavery kills his most noble distinctiveness, it makes him like a dog. But the real human nature cannot

¹³ *Stranke u Hrvatskoj* («Parties in Croatia»), in: *Ante Starčević, Djela* («Works»), published by *Odbor kluba Stranke prava* («Board of the Club of the Party of Rights»), Zagreb, 1894, Vol. III, pp. 107–108. More on Starčević's concepts of freedom and history see in Zlatko Posavac, *Duro Arnold kao estetičar u kontekstu kontroverza moderne* («Duro Arnold as an Aestheticist in the Context of Controversies of the Age of Modernity»), *Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo*, Zagreb, 1997.

come into terms with this evil. A real man endures slavery only as long as he has to; but when an occasion arises, he stands against slavery and for freedom. Do we, Croats, need an evidence of the difference between a slave and one with a slave-like nature? To get plenty of proof it would be enough to take a closer look at the Croatian Parliament in the year 1861.¹⁴

Some earlier interpreters pointed toward a rich meaning of Starčević's satirical newly invented words in the context of philosophical discussions of categories of freedom and slavery. Mirjana Gross in her criticism of Bogdanov's argumentation, in trying to interpose between the two presumed extremes in interpretation of this particular viewpoint, points out, for example, toward attempts of the followers of Frank to use the coined word »Slavoserbi« and bring it into direct connection with ethnic denotation: »Rightly opposing the attempt by the followers of Frank to identify a negative term »Slavoserbs« with the Serbs, Bogdanov went into the opposite extreme, claiming that this particular label has nothing to do with Serbs or Slavs.«¹⁵ Even many of the Serb interpreters have been unable to move away from the connotations that were imposed on this multiple-meaning satirical newly coined word.

However, it is indeed definitely true that the thesis on ethnic meaning of this satirical concept is exaggerated and cannot be defended as true. In this context, before anything else it is an ironic allusion on quasi-scientific ethimological theses of Pavel Josef Šafarik and Vuk Karadžić, whose theories had stated that there is a common and indeed Serbian name for Slavs, thus negating the historical substance and identity of the Croatian people. And indeed it is primarily an ethical label for that sort of people of unhealthy mind in regard of their own freedom, and it applies for any nation. Starčević primarily criticized the madness of those Croats who tried to keep the entire nation in unlawful state of slavery, bondage and lack of freedom.

Within the boundaries of a modern political horizon one of Starčević's elements particularly stands apart from the others, and that is his argumentation, based on modern principles of freedom of the nation, through which he undoubtedly showed that on the basis of the historical constitution as well as on the basis of natural rights Croatia will sooner or later become an independent state, a state with its own supreme power in its own hands. The idea of the freedom of a nation, and the right to self-determination, lies in the basis of efforts to establish one's own state union, which indeed became a reality, yet only one hundred years after Starčević's death.

¹⁴ *Bečki ugovori godine 1815. i Napoleon III.* («The Vienna Treaty of 1815 and Napoleon III»), cited per B. Jurišić, *Izabrani spisi* («Selected Papers»), Zagreb, 1943, p. 155.

¹⁵ Mirjana Gross, cited work, p. 5.

Starting with a demand for political self-reliance and independence of the Croatian people, Starčević emphasized that the final purpose of historical survival of a nation is: to become a political nation, equal among the others within the international community. For him the issue of supreme power, which comes as a result of the nation which is itself constituted as a political union, that issue comes before any other issue and indeed constitutes that particular consensus of a state union on which all political opinions and all parties must be based.

In the above mentioned paper *Stranke u Hrvatskoj* (»Parties in Croatia«), Starčević provides argumentation on self-reliance and independence as preconditions for survival of a nation, and emphasizes that a question of which of the various ways of resolving the internal life of a nation could start to be thoroughly discussed only when the basic precondition of its freedom and its sovereignty is fulfilled: »In addition to the independence of a nation in resolving internal and international issues, there can be different opinions, parties; however, when it comes to the sovereignty of a nation, there cannot be but defenders and traitors of a nation. And to draft laws and resolve at least internal issues without being a sovereign province or kingdom, means only madness and obscenity.«¹⁶

However, Starčević did not remain confined only to the issue of definition of freedom of a union. For him that is only one part of the idea of freedom, indeed a precondition, a framework which should be filled with democratic content. And the main content of freedom is based on fundamental rights of people and citizens, individuals understood as personalities. In developing his concept of justly constituted society and state Starčević further develops the above mentioned ideas of Enlightenment and Liberalism on freedom of man defined through basic human rights. The ultimate purpose of state as a political union of life is to realize freedom, happiness and wealth of its citizens. It is explicitly emphasized that it is not important how big a state is or how many »souls« he has, but what is important is that each and every of these souls is free and happy, and that none of them suffers unjust harm.

Developing his concept of adequate construction of the Croatian political community, Starčević tried to reach to and define the very substance of the idea of state. He tried to provide an answer to the question of the essence of that what makes a political community a specifically human habitat. In his trials he discussed, on the one hand, the classical teachings on politics, from Plato, Aristotle and Cicero to modern theoreticians of the French Enlightenment. On the other hand, he analyzed the historical tradition of Croatian ethics. In this context the foundation of his understanding of freedom is the

¹⁶ *Djela III* (»Works III«).

idea of a just constitution of a political community based on constitution and law which comes as a result of a specific historical foundation, that is from the very spirituality of a people. Starting with a view that *freedom cannot be without a law*, Starčević positions in the center of his discussions on freedom of citizens of a state the issues of rights and justice, law and legality.

2. Moral Foundations of Politics

In the focus of Starčević's opus is man, his virtues and moral duties, therefore the issues which belong to traditional area of ethics. His political teachings are also based on the classical unity of ethics and politics. In his analysis of life in a state established as a political community Starčević starts with moral and custom principles. In his works, therefore, ethics is established as the science on human moral virtues which defines foundations of norms and criteria of a science of politics.

In the process of developing his rich practical science Starčević started with classical philosophical principles, and his ethical discussions he based on metaphysical postulates of Plato and ethical and political postulates of Aristotle. In his discussions on moral issues his first ideal is the personality of Socrates, but he also often quotes Cicero and the entire tradition of Stoicism, as well as occasionally some of the modern philosophers. However, his philosophy is without strict scholarly models, it is an original reflection on issues which, as he said, *flow into life*. He thus wrote in a letter to a friend that he had written almost 30 sheets of his *Ethics*, but clearly sees that the book is not going to be published, because in issues of mind he does not respect any authorities, and even without that he tends to develop terribly new approaches to the most important questions. Starčević's philosophy is led by one principal motif: *to teach people how to live*. The wisdom he tries to find is *the science of life*. The real science of life is based on Socrates' teachings on man and the *way man's deeds are ordered*. The old Croatian name for ethics indeed is – *činorede* (čin, deed; red, order).

From his own experience Starčević realised a significant appearance in the history of a nation, that those men who are teaching the science of life as it should be taught, had always been persecuted. While they were discussing metaphysical issues of the beginnings of the world and the birth of gods, wise men did not know any enemies outside of the circle of their colleagues. Yet for Starčević his real ideal is Socrates, philosopher who left cosmological issues and begun to deal with the science of how to order deeds, ethics, the science of life. At this point Socrates started encountering real problems when he begun to argue that a shepherd who is having less and less cattle, and the remaining cattle is more and more thin, that one is not a good shepherd. They than forbade him to speak about shepherds. And when Socrates begun

to argue, in accordance with this science, that a ruler under whose rule his people get corrupted and extinct, that this is not a good ruler, they than forbade him to discuss the affairs of the state. When he started discussing home life, they forbade him to discuss handicraftsmen. At the end they forbade him to talk to young men. And when at the end he forced them with his questioning, they finally told him what they really want: »If you care about your head at all, Socrates, do not talk to anybody about anything!«¹⁷ This is how the things were in Athens long time ago, and it is exactly the same at other places at our time as well, concludes Starčević. As he ended up in court, and twice in jail due to his ideas, Starčević confirmed through his own example that it is indeed dangerous to thoughtfully teach about things that directly influence life.

At the moral level Starčević in his satirical works especially criticized deterioration of good customs, weakness of character and luxury. Starčević himself lived a life of modestly and virtue. He lived his life in one room, with minimal expenditure for food and cloth. They called him the Cato of Croatia, due to his moral persistence and ascetic way of life. In times of aspirations for wealth and luxurious life, he preached continuously to his pupils and his followers: »You should be satisfied with little, because than you will have true character, you will be honest as well.« In many of his works he argues for original values of traditional popular ethics. In a similar way in which Cato, a Roman of the old style did it, Starčević defended ancient Croatian customs and moral values: honesty, justice, integrity, diligence, and frugality.

Starčević wanted to win over for his practical ethics the widest possible audience, to whom he would convey his own ideas on morality and just organization of political community. Because for Starčević, who was a true follower of Soerates, it was of primary importance to achieve direct moral effects of his own philosophy of life, both at the main square and in the circle of his pupils. Starting from his basic viewpoint that any political action must be rooted in moral principles, Starčević writes his most well known paper, the political program from 1871 – *Naputak za pristaše stranke prava* (»An Instruction for the Followers of the Party of Rights«), in a form of an ethical doctrine developed through 30 points. Here we have a rich ethical codex of rules of a proper way of living in a political community. He presents the basic virtues as an introduction into political freedom, which at the same time represents preconditions of a free state. The most important virtues are *work, frugality and unity*. Special place is reserved for *justice and incorruptibility*.

The true purpose of a state, understood as a union based on certain customs, is to use customs, laws and institutions in order to enable good and

¹⁷ *Poslanica pobratimu D.M. u B.* (»Address to a Bossom-Friend D.M. in V.«), in: Jurišić, p. 337.

moral life of its citizens. In this context ethics and morality enable realization of freedom in a state union, because – as Starčević paraphrases Aristotle: »Man enters into a state union in order to achieve his being, his life, and he stays in a state union in order to continue living in abundance of all good.«¹⁸ By abundance of all good he means moral good and a notion of happiness which is realized through moral actions in a free political union.

A more precise understanding of how a state should be founded in rights and moral principles is clearly visible in his speech in the Croatian parliament held on October 16, 1884. Explaining the current state of affairs in the state, and trying to disentangle the mess of the ruling lawlessness strangling the homeland, Starčević comes with his sword directly to the very core of the way a state is constituted on the basis of laws, customs, character and virtues of its free citizens. A democratic type of constitution and survival of state is possible only on the basis of the substance of freedom that is developed on the principles of a lawful and just system of relationships in a political union. Because, if such a substance does not exist, than it is not possible to defend such a state from its destruction rooted in the lack of morals of its citizens. In this context Starčević uses a well-known quotation from Plutarch:

»If I recall correctly, Plutarch said: you would more easily build a city in the air, than a state without belief in God.« To this statement Starčević added additional argumentation in order to further explain his judgment that »it is even harder to build, or to preserve an already built state in good conditions without faith in God, but also in honesty, in virtue, and in service for public welfare, and in love of thy neighbour, and in reward for good deeds and punishment for the evil ones: state that does not have justice at home, reputation abroad, strength nowhere, and everywhere just lawlessness, curse and scandals.«¹⁹ And Starčević distances himself from such a state, concluding that it is not possible to defend a situation of lawlessness in a state, and nobody is able to provide any argumentation for defending such a situation. He aspires to build on ashes of such a state of lawlessness a new state, built on ethical and legal foundations, a state permeated before all with the substance of freedom of its citizens.

3. *The Concepts of Rights and State*

The originality of Starčević's political thinking lies primarily in the fact that in the XIX century Croatia he tried to develop a new theory of rights

¹⁸ *Politika* (»Polities«), in: Jurišić, p. 129.

¹⁹ Speech held on October 16, 1884. *Djela I* (»Works I«), p. 267.

and, based on this new theory, to establish an idea of an independent and self-reliant Croatian state. This idea was rooted in a specific concept of rights viewed as an original and authentic affirmation of human dignity, dignity developed in categories of the modern-age metaphysical rise of humankind on the basis of freedom.

The very foundation of Starčević's philosophy of rights and state is the principle – which in fact is in an original way further developed famous principle of Aurelius Augustinus – that where there is a state, there justice must reign. He talks about a people and a state in the first place starting from their historical rights and their historical constitution, emphasizing the way they are connected in a union of law. In the time and again posed question on whether rights come before state, or state comes before rights and is above them, Starčević opts for priority and seniority of rights and justice. The idea of justice enables and builds state understood as justly constituted union of people living together.

The political party established and in terms of the political program defined by Starčević had a peculiar name in comparison with other European political orientations: *Stranka prava*, »Party of Rights«. It hasn't been known that in any of the other countries of the Danubian Empire, or indeed within any of than current political streams there was a political party with such a name and such a program. Starčević thus develops his original philosophy on the basis of the European tradition of natural rights. His starting point is rather close to Hegel's idea of a system of rights understood as a kingdom of in reality realized freedom.

The issues of rights and justice, law and the state of law, these issues for Starčević are the crucial questions important for the process of establishing a union of human beings where indeed the basic value is going to be decided upon: the value and the idea of freedom. Briefly defined axiom of his philosophy of rights begins with an assumption by which man is position within the framework of rights as within his own second nature – *altera natura* – which is visible through activities of free human will.

The rights, the laws, these are indeed God's creations, established for the sake of man and in order to enable his free activities as well as life in a union with other people. The foundation of the philosophy of rights and law on the idea of freedom is confirmed in a specific way by Starčević's well-known statement which is a recurring theme in many arguments advanced by the followers of the idea of rights: *There cannot be freedom without a law*.

For example, when in his letter *Adresa na kralja* (»Address to the King«) from 1878 he provides arguments for his demands for Croatian – both the national and the state – independence and completeness, there he calls upon universal principles of natural rights, before all the rights the right of free-

dom of individuals and peoples. He is, however, aware of the fact that most people are neither able to comprehend nor to directly and clearly see the real content of these rights. This fact, on the other hand, does not really question either their existence or the intellectual substance of just human life, which consequently arises from the principle of the eternal divine *logos*.

The way in which Starčević uses the term *prava narave* (»natural rights«) in its plural form points toward one of the basic axioms of modern-age theories of human rights. If we want to properly understand Starčević's concept of »natural rights« at this point we have to bear in mind that the basic human rights are in fact derived from the discourse of natural rights which positions itself as an intellectual foundation below or as a superstructure above the legal rights enacted only by will of those who are in power. In contrast with a modern-age tendency of defining legal rights through enacted laws, as defined in a famous statement by Hobbs: »Auctoritas non veritas facit legem«, Starčević on the one hand uses the basic rights of man as a certain line of defense of those rights that exist before the very existence of state, and on the other hand he talks about protective rights that should be guaranteed by state.

When providing his argumentation on human rights Starčević has in his mind primarily the way in which the American and the French declarations on basic rights of man and a citizen have been inaugurated. In fact, based on their content and the form in which they were written, his letters of complaint and his addresses to the King could indeed be considered as sort of specific Croatian declarations on human rights and freedoms.

In this very tradition one should, for example, view the way in which Starčević provides argumentation to »His Majesty«, where he admits that he does not recognize any type of a ruler »by Divine mercy«, but that he subscribes to the principle of freedom. He points out that the Croatian parliament – after »the Kingdom of Croatia« becomes geographically complete and regains all of its historical state rights – should first develop its own constitution, based on the principle of the basic rights of man: »We judge that it goes without saying that this parliament, established by the power of God and the people, would vote for and would consecrate those sacred principles, which provide the most firm foundations of both peoples and rulers, and these are the principles of the freedom of an individual, freedom of his spirituality, freedom to join together with other people, freedom of thought and expression, be it oral or written...«²⁰

When he talks about positive or »voted and enacted« rights, Starčević views them as a historical realization of natural rights within a framework of

²⁰ The Rijeka region petitions, *Djela II* (»Works II«), p. 13.

a concrete political union. These voted and enacted rights use the natural substance of rights and build upon them and maintain a concrete system of human freedom. On the one hand, legal institutions and laws must correspond to the principles of a natural mind. On the other hand, Starčević keeps emphasizing the historical foundation of law, the ancient constitution which remains remembered in the mind and the spirit of the people.

In searching for a just system of governance one ancient idea is clearly visible, and that is the idea of rights, the idea which has been present in this context since the very beginnings of that search. Here we are talking about the confirmed power of rights against force, even at times when force suppresses and destroys these rights. For example, as early as in the Introduction to the Law of Hamurabi we can find an argument stating that the enacted laws represent revelation of Divine orders on our Earth about just life within human community. The laws are represented as a vehicle through which the light of justice shines upon our land. And this just light has a double purpose. One of them is to punish a criminal and to destroy the evil. The other is even more important: to disable a stronger one to take away the rights of a weaker one.

Precisely in this very idea lies the core of Starčević's philosophy. The point is that rights will become a system of freedom when they defend those who are weaker against the tyranny of those who are stronger, regardless of whether we are talking about peoples or about individuals. In the times of the French Revolution one of the crucial issues was the right to stand against the power of despotism and lawlessness. Starčević replied to this question in a characteristic rightist or radical rightist manner. Since he does not recognise either force or despotism as lawful, when he is aware 'that he is right', then he emphasizes that in order to regain the power of law and freedom against brutal force, *rebellion* represents a consecrated instrument. It is therefore a duty of every man who becomes aware of how those »sacred« rights have been obstructed and how just aspirations to reach happiness of individuals and of peoples have been destroyed, it is a duty of such a man to fight against the injustice.

In contrast to another great person on the Croatian political scene, Stjepan Radić, Starčević was in principle and very firmly opposed to a Tolstoy-like attitude and its posture of suffering and strictly peaceful attitude in the face of evil, with the following argumentation: I would like to ask this noble person whether he fights against wolves who attack his sheep, or against a thief who enters his house, etc. Because he knew too well the renowned principle that Machiavelli deducted from historical experience: Perish will a prophet without arms.

That is why Starčević summarizes his life philosophy of law through the following words: »We confess that we will not waste any chance to destroy

similar despotism, and fight for maintaining the rights of our kingdom in full, or when a force destroys these rights, we will not hesitate to use any means to regain them, any means that our God or our people provide us with;... we confess that against an unlawful force a rebellion is a sacred vehicle in the face of God and in front of the character of our people.«²¹

TRANSLATED BY ZORAN MILOVIĆ


FILOZOFIJA SLOBODE ANTE STARČEVIĆA

Sažetak

Ocrtavajući glavna obilježja recepcije Starčevićeva djela, autor u članku ukazuje na bitna mišljenja u literaturi od K. Šegvića, A. G. Matoša, M. Krleže do suvremenih interpretata M. Gross i Z. Posavca. Potom se razmatra pojam slobode kao jedna od osnovnih kategorija u Starčevićevu djelu, naznačujući osobito utjecaj načela francuske revolucije i J. J. Rousseaua. Starčević u političkoj satiri ironično koristi Aristotelovo razlikovanje robova po naravi od slobodnih građana u svojoj originalnoj kovanici »slavoserbi – slaviserbi«, dvostruki robovi (sclavus/servus), a njegova je politička teorija zasnovana na osebnijoj modernoj pravaškoj ideji ozbiljnija ljudske individualne slobode. Na koncu se razlaže misaono ishodište Starčevićeve ideje prava kao supstancije slobodnoga življenja u pravednoj, čudoredno uređenoj političkoj zajednici.

²¹ Ibid, p. 14.

*On the Idea of
Croatian Philosophy*



THE PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

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When on the basis of his remark, which Bernard Willms, a contemporary German philosopher, sets forth in his article 'Antaios – oder die Lage der Philosophie ist die Lage der Nation'¹, which states that the condition that the contemporary Western philosophy fell into is desperate, he attempts to find that new starting point of philosophising – which philosophy could again regain its dignity from, then that is to truly be 'the child of his time', and to 'embrace the totality of contemporary reality by an idea'; reminding one of the classical story of Anteus – he finds it in the philosophical bringing into consciousness of an actual situation, of that which is 'here' and 'now' and which all philosophising arises from. That 'here' and 'now', amongst other things, makes one belong to a nation. Slightly ironically alluding to Heidegger's 'Seinsvergessenheit', this philosopher finds the offender of the desolate state of contemporary philosophy precisely in the *oblivion of the nation* ('Nationvergessenheit'), and suitably, he sees the possibility of a way out too, in the re-nationalisation of philosophising.

However, that which, above all, interests one the most is the question as to how he applies this request to his own situation, that is to say, the question as to how he defines German philosophy. 'Deutsche Philosophie besteht ... aus Namen' ... 'Deutsche Philosophie ist zunächst die Gesamtheit deutscher Philosophen von Meister Eckhart bis Heidegger...' This is how his reply runs.

It is a fact, though, that such a reply opens up a whole new range of questions; moreover, important questions regarding the relation of philosophy

¹ The article is published in the book *Wer hat Angst vor der Philosophie? Eine Einführung in Philosophie*, Hrsg. N. W. Bolz, Paderborn–München–Wien–Zürich, 1982.

and that which is national, which, up to today, there are no definite answers to, in spite of the great many number of works on national philosophies written during the 19th and the 20th centuries.

If today, on the other hand, we were to follow Willms' recommendation on the *re-nationalisation of philosophising*, and were to ask ourselves how things stand with Croatian philosophy then, we would have to, first of all, state that we, in Croatian philosophising, have attempts of thinking through the relation of philosophy and that which is national, or in other words, attempts of thinking through the possibility of establishing a national philosophy. In all these attempts, the most significant are those which are connected to the work of the pioneers on the study of the Croatian philosophical tradition – *Franjo Marković*, the first professor of philosophy at the re-established University in Zagreb (1874), and his successor of the professorship of philosophy, *Albert Bazala*.

Even though, in Marković, the pursue around the constituting of the idea of national philosophy is not fully explicitly stated, but the lines of direction of this pursue are mostly inferable from his work on the establishing and reconstructing of the Croatian philosophical tradition, which is, in Marković, in the function of the affirmation of the national cultural-historical identity, we shall point out the basic characteristics of that pursue in brief lines, since we consider them to be the realisation (though, systematically not inferred in theory) of a possible concept of approach towards national philosophy, as it can be fully expounded, when its presumptions are put into a relation to and are compared with the presumptions of Bazala's concept, though being an extension of, yet transcending the latter.

In respect of the way of outlining these two conceptions of establishing a national philosophy, preliminarily it must be *noted* that when we attempt to estimate the range and the results of the attempts of the constituting of the idea of national philosophy, and subsequently the realised appearance of the Croatian philosophical thought on the above mentioned presumption, we primarily try to view them as answers to *some important questions*, which, in general, pose themselves concerning the possibility of constituting a national philosophy. The difference of the conceptions of a national philosophy too, is constituted in exactly these answers to those questions. Above all, it is the question of *the subject of national philosophy* (which necessarily responds to the question of the relation between an individual – bearer of philosophical action – let us use Marković's term – and a nation, i.e. the national spirit as the subject of a national philosophy); thereupon, it is the question of determining the significance and the scope of the philosophical function (as Bazala will characterise it), insofar as the national spirit is the subject of a national philosophy, and finally the key question of *the philosophical relevanc*

of that which is national as the moment which determines the actual situation of a philosophising individual. By the previous, we think of two key moments concerning philosophy and philosophising: on the one hand, we think of that which is general, universal as the subject matter of philosophy, and on the other, we think of that which is always actual, the 'here' and 'now', which as a defined historical situation determines the existence of a philosophising individual, and, in accord with the thesis on *the relevancy of that which is national* for philosophising, it should determine the individual's philosophy, too. These are, thus, the fundamental questions, with regard to which we approach the analysis of Marković and Bazala's attempts of establishing of a national philosophy, or in other words, their conceptions of a national philosophy.

Marković's fundamental aspiration is (this follows from his *Rectorial speech*, which is given in 1881, under the title 'Filosofijske struke pisci hrvatskoga roda s onkraj Velebita u stoljećih XV. do XVIII.' /Writers of the Philosophical Profession of the Croatian Kind from the Other Side of Velebit from the 15th to the 18th Centuries/)² the bringing into consciousness and the reconstruction of the philosophical tradition of the Croatian people and the re-establishing of a continuity of Croatian philosophy, by which the approach to the philosophical tradition is conditioned, too. The primary effort is to prove the existence of the tradition of 'the scientific history of our kind' as Marković will say; it is the effort to gain, 'to obtain the homeland of thought', 'because only the nation, which has obtained the homeland of thought, has also strongly won over its worldly homeland' (p. 33, or *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, 1–2/1975, p. 273). According to him, 'the old philosophical writers' 'of our kind', the works of the sons of our nation need to be translated into the national language for this purpose, so they could 'enter the organism of the spiritual collectivity of the nation'. Thus, according to him, the work on national philosophy has got to be directed at, before all else, on the following: the works of the old Croatian philosophical writers need to be 'wrenched from the darkness', 'secured for us' by translation into the national language, they need to be, first of all, 'gathered in the worldly and spiritual sense', 'researched in their thought for the purpose of creating a collective national spiritual peculiarity' and 'our renewed work' on philosophy needs to be 'joined to their work' (*Rectorial speech*, p. 33). Only then and by the previous we could enter 'the cosmopolitan intellect'.

Concerning national philosophy, and precisely as the function of his basic intention, Marković's interest is, hence, mostly directed at tradition

² The mentioned 'Rectorial speech' has been published for the first time in 1882 in the reports of the University in Zagreb, and for the second in *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, no.1–2/1975, pp. 257–279, with the original pages numbering 17–39.

(which Bazala will expressly reproach in his *Filozofijski portret Franje Markovića* /Philosophical Portrait of Franjo Marković/ from 1921). What interests us is, however, what criteria Marković employed in the determining of the Croatian philosophical tradition, i.e. its members. He has, for example, stated that Petrić (Petriš, according to him) and Bošković are 'two adornments, which gave the Croatian people to the history of cosmopolitan philosophy', though we know that both worked, philosophically and scientifically, mostly abroad, and that they wrote on foreign languages a lot. For the criteria, in the above mentioned 'Rectorial speech', Marković will *explicitely* pronounce the following: '... and we also know of, from reliable sources, *their authentic Croatian names, native towns, familial origins*, and of some others we know that, by their work in foreign lands or in foreign languages, they braced a faithful reminiscence of their native language and that they wrote in it' (Ibid., p. 18, i.e. 258). Thus, the philosophical tradition of the Croatian nation consists of *philosophers* and their philosophising, and the criteria, according to which he determines their belonging to the Croatian tradition, are their authentic names, familial origins, native towns, or in other words, the belonging to a language and land.

Within the framework of his fundamental aspiration to activate all the spheres of cultural activity in a national language, within the process of bringing into consciousness the significance of the national philosophical tradition that is in the function of the affirming of the national identity, Marković will, first and foremost, insist on a *fact-oriented investigation* of the Croatian philosophical tradition, insofar as philosophy is a 'fragment of the cultural programme of the national being' for him. In accord with the already mentioned text that is in line with the programme, in the *Rectorial speech*, he brings forth some basic bibliographical facts on the most significant Croatian philosophers.

Only in relation to such an approach to the research of the tradition of national philosophy, and to the establishing of a fundamental national philosophy, which is, before all, an effort to 'cultivate knowledge on philosophy in the national circle', and is, thus, denotable as a significantly *enlightenment-like* oriented approach, it is only then possible to integrally ponder upon all the characteristics of Bazala's concept of national philosophy, too.

As a matter of fact, only in Bazala, who at the beginning wants to continue Marković's work on national philosophy, all the difficulties that pose themselves concerning the establishing of a national philosophy are brought into consciousness, but first and foremost, the fact that all talk on national philosophy has, as its presumption, a distinct, clearly articulated or assumed concept of a national philosophy. This will manifest itself in his work as well. Namely, in 1936 he writes the text 'Filozofijska težnja u duhovnom životu

Hrvatske (od pada apsolutizma ovamo)' ('The Philosophical Aspiration in the Spiritual Life of Croatia (from the Fall of Absolutism onwards)'), and in 1938 he publishes the text 'O ideji nacionalne filozofije' ('On the Idea of National Philosophy'), which he will work out thoroughly the problem of the idea of national philosophy in, endeavouring to think over the presumptions of the establishing of a national philosophy. The point in question is, namely, 'the thinking over of the philosophical function in its ideal quality and role, hence in formal perfection and purposefulness'. But before we endeavour to set forth the characteristics of his concept of national philosophy, it is necessary to understand his standpoint towards Marković's concept, because the latter is the point of departure of Bazala's work also, on the problem of national philosophy.

Even though he is aware of the fact that Marković, in respect of the circumstances, had a rather specific task facing him – namely, to work on 'the cultivating of the scientific and philosophical spirit' as a pioneer, and 'by philosophy to introduce the Croatian nation into the circle of the culturally self-aware nations' – in 'The Philosophical Aspiration', he will, nevertheless, object to Marković in three things: 1) that he has referred to only 'writers from the other side of Velebit' in 'the renewed work on philosophy as a science, and that (2) not even conceptually,' but as onto a historical document ('travel list'), by which completely narrowly defining the philosophical function, and 3) primarily, that he has turned to the past mostly in the work on national philosophy. Bazala says: 'Marković has also entered our cultural life at a point, where mediation was needed. This place in our cultural life defines his point of view, too: he does not sustain either time or energy, so to offer an independently developed personal view on life and the world, but is in a hurry to gather the cultural threads from the past, overcasts them with contemporary thinking, and sets the first foundations, leaving to later generations a further development.'³ Thus, he searches in the past for the 'travel list' 'by which he will introduce his people into the circle of enlightened nations.' Whereas, according to Bazala, 'the idea of a national philosophy too, embraces more than just a heap of scientific works on the problems and the history of discerning into life and the world, written in the national language by home-born authors' (*Idea*, p. 7). Citing Nietzsche's thesis on the significance of 'historical meaning', Bazala emphasises that the work on national philosophy cannot be lead only by 'the interest for a historical account of philosophical thought', and it cannot be reduced to the knowledge of the past, but has to

³ See *Filozofski portret Franje Markovića* ('Philosophical Portrait of Franjo Marković'), p. 29. The paper *O ideji nacionalne filozofije* ('On the Idea of National Philosophy') is quoted as *Ideja* (*Idea*) further in the text.

be founded on a 'lively feeling for the essential tendencies of the temporally continued being.' From this criticism already, aimed at Marković's concept of national philosophy, one can see that Bazala will oppose the previous not only with a diverse concept of national philosophy, but with a diverse definition of philosophy in general, too.

Even though that, on the basis of the analysis of the fundamental characteristics of the concept of national philosophy both in Bazala and Marković, it seems to us that at scrutiny are two (though not completely different) concepts, because at certain moments they can be viewed as mutual supplements, it looks as if Bazala does not denote their relation as such. Namely, by interpreting Marković's standpoints concerning the determination of the function of a national philosophy, he, in fact, already sees the nucleus in Marković's efforts, around which he will further develop his own concept. Thus, in the *Philosophical Portrait of Franjo Marković* (from 1921), he emphasises: 'Marković was deeply convinced that a clear, live and strong consciousness is the condition for the maintenance and the active role of the people in the history of mankind.' (p. 16), and further: 'Marković saw very well how much our nation needs to think over its *essence* and its future in this way' (Ibid., p. 22). Bazala interprets this in such a way as if Marković has clearly defined the function of a national philosophy, in the sense that it would be '*the expression of national self-awareness*', and that in it, as a reflective portrait of life and the world, the essence of a nation could be 'clearly discerned'. According to Bazala, this is precisely what Marković *hoped* for and *wanted*. In Marković's formulation of the tasks concerning the constituting of a national philosophy, Bazala, thus, distinguishes two phases: the first would be to 'cultivate' the people's spirit on foreign philosophy, and the second, to build a 'self-aware reflective portrait of life and the world by our own strength'. According to that which Bazala objected to in Marković, it follows that Bazala holds that Marković has realised the first phase of the task only.

Concerning this Bazala's interpretation of Marković's concept of national philosophy, the following could be stated: Marković truly places the accent on 'the creating of a collective spiritual peculiarity of the people' in elaborating the function of a national philosophy. Yet, it seems to us that, in regard to Marković's explicit and persistent emphasising of precisely *the eirenic* (Greek, eirene, peace) *moment* concerning the philosophical function in general and then the function of a national philosophy too, in regard to his defining of philosophy as *the uniting spirit*, in regard to emphasising how philosophy crosses out differences, even between nations, by exactly the universal significance of its subject matter, in regard to his aim at 'creating an ideal republic of self-aware goods', and then particularly in regard to the fact, which Bazala himself emphasises in his interpretation too, 'that from Marko-

vić's work, one cannot ... distinguish how it is that he conceived of *the collective spirit*' (which will, in fact, become the skeleton of Bazala's concept of national philosophy), it is obvious that Bazala's interpretation of Marković's standpoints is 'impregnated' by his very own concept in a large part.

Therefore, by trying to *conceptually* continue from the old Croatian philosophical writers, Bazala attempts to establish a different concept of national philosophy, by which he endeavours to realise precisely that which Marković did not arrive at, i.e. the establishing of a national philosophy as 'the self-awareness of the nation'.

The peculiarity of Bazala's concept follows from the defined function of a national philosophy in such a way, which is specified in two essential moments – in the determining of the subject of a national philosophy, and in the determining of the subject matter of philosophy in general, and of national philosophy, too.

Namely, according to Bazala, regarding the above mentioned determining of the function of a national philosophy, a national philosophy is not represented only by national philosophers, who are proclaimed as those who belong to a distinct national philosophical tradition, in accord with the criteria as Marković has determined them. That is to say, if one talks of a *national* philosophy *at all*, then, according to Bazala, that will be meaningful only insofar if the accent is placed on that which the *national peculiarity* is constituted in; thus, in the case of philosophy, on that which is collective to the spirit of a nation, which *specifically* includes the contribution of individuals to the national philosophising, too.

So, at the very beginning of the working out in detail of the concept of national philosophy, Bazala will be forced to solve the fundamental problem of every attempt to constitute a national philosophy, i.e. the problem of the relation between an individual – bearer of philosophical action – and a nation – or in other words, the national spirit as the subject of a national philosophy. Even though he will point out, in the *Idea of National Philosophy*, that 'the kingdom of spirit is built and held a supplement to personality', he will, nevertheless, mention that, regardless of how a 'consciously qualified life' in the form of 'I' is always an individual act, 'a subjectively held world' (which means 'to be in consciousness') is possible at the level of a social being, too. What is more: '... It is a fact that the relation that is generated between 'I'-denoted entities by an exchange of conscious meanings and values is differentiated from the collective natural-necessary formation by the fact that their bearers feel as 'pals', who make up the society – a collection of existences mutually connected under the name 'we', as a word for a number of subjects 'I', who meet together in *the actual-real integral*, which is signified as *collective consciousness, collective will, collective spirit*' (Ibid., p. 43).

‘It is neither any being *for itself*, nor any force *outside* the subjective bearer, but is a *dynamic unity* formed by the energies from certain circles, just as an individual consciousness (‘Ich-Bewusstsein’) too, *and yet it is more than their sum...*’ In the educating of the collective consciousness towards a ‘self-aware, and then a self-owned and self-ruled *personal social entity*’, the crucial role is played by both the philosophical function and ‘its embodiment, individual personality’ – he will write on pp. 43–44 of the quoted work.

Collective consciousness is, by way, defined as ‘the sum of dependencies and relations of spiritual attitudes in life’, as ‘the consciousness elevated above subjectivity’, which, starting from individual points of departure, ‘is gathered into *the collective spirit*’. As the central notion, the notion of ‘*personal structure*’ emerges, which is the presumption and the skeleton of *the self-aware formation of a social being*, and, at the same time, the key term of Bazala’s concept of national philosophy. Bazala will say: ‘Namely, a social being too, ... regardless of the way and shape of gathering the multitude of individuals into a mutual life organisation, always has a certain convergence point, which their spiritual motion (conception, thought, perception, want) is gained at’ (quoted work, p. 48). The individuals in such a community make the collective consciousness, and precisely ‘the collectively excited or spread around from individual circles philosophical aspiration ... then elevates the collective intrinsic activity up to the self-aware formation and fulfilment of the community with meaning and values all up to personal structure’ (Ibid., p. 48). To this notion then, the notions of ‘national personality’, spiritual national personality, ‘national collectivity’ and national spirit as the subject of a national philosophy, are connected to. By way, the former is defined as ‘the collection of self-confidently managed actions for the *personal* formation of the life of the nation, and its self-owned *declaration*, in a completely and fully built system of spiritual aspirations (‘Idealbestrebungen’) of the developmental historical and cultural sign’ (Ibid., p. 51). Hence, a national philosophy will be, first and foremost, an aspiration to reach, in the self-consciousness of the national spirit, *the peculiar lines* of discerning into life and the world, whose both its subject and object is the national being, or the national spirit.

By instituting such foundations to his concept of national philosophy, Bazala, in fact, joins the tendency present in European philosophy from the end of the 18th to the middle of the 20th century (from Herder, Fichte to Wundt and Scheler), of which it is characteristic that when dealing with the problem of the relation between that which is national and philosophy, and mostly in speeches on national philosophies of great European nations, it concentrates on *the national character, national spirit* as key terms, which the *differentia specifica* of a particular national philosophising is constituted in,

and then the thesis is built on them, according to which nations are 'geistige Subjekte von bestimmten Weltanschauungen und Ethosformen eigener Art' (Scheler).⁴

By applying the notion of personal structure to the national being, and by making it the bearer of the philosophical function, Bazala, at the same time, rather specifically conceives of philosophy too, which is then at issue.

Namely, what is at issue is the specific conception of the scope and range of philosophy, by which philosophy is not confined to a 'scientific scholarly philosophy', but it rather represents a live, 'a never really calmed enthusiasm, which is set in motion from all the sides of life ... which discloses the concocted-purposeful extreme horizons, observed, discerned, conjectured, and points to the fulfilled, desire and achievement worthy *goal* of human aspirations' (*Idea*, p. 6). Philosophy is also the resolving of the worries of life, and is, shortly, 'a discerning into life and the world, and a resourcefulness in a concrete reality of experience, founded on it', the way 'that one finds and feels the world ... the way that life is borne, ... the way that conscious findings and revenues in cultural creations are *objectified*, that the picture of human possibility in the composition of the world is *projected* and portrayed in its completeness' (*Ibid.*, p. 10). At the same time, Bazala emphasises: 'One should also consider that the spiritual quintessence, which is drawn from the reality of experience, is not unravelled in reflective tractates only. An attitude towards the world and the prospect of human aspirations in it, are both determined equally *from feelings and wants*, even though reflection plays an important role in the education of a concocted-purposeful being' (*Ibid.*, p. 9). In regard to such a widely conceived of significance and determination of the philosophical function, whose task is, first of all, 'to form life by ideas, to point to the concocted direction of motion and purpose of aspiration', a further task is added – the task of a national philosophy as 'the self-cognition of the national spirit.'

In such a way, 'the complete account of the philosophical thought ... of a life community' will embrace '*all sides* of spiritual creation', and also, amongst other things then, 'the inferred views on life and the world or in specific problems (of the science on philosophy).' Further on, according to Bazala, 'the philosophical conception is inferred from all the manifestations of a certain life circle, which follow from a specifically disposed (structured) *spirituality*' (*Ibid.*).

Namely, all the wisdom of the world 'is conjectured from experience', and 'life, consciously exalted, demands that all manifestations result from *the*

⁴ Max Scheler, 'Nation und Weltanschauung'. *Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre*, Leipzig, 1923.

depth of the spirit for the pith and marrow of life's instinct, and that it takes them to the altitude of the mind's reach.' Thus, the analysis of *the being of the national spirit* also enters the consideration of the national philosophical thought, insofar if the former elevates itself into the spiritual sphere in literature, fine arts, science, moral, social, political, and juridical order of that religion. In brief lines, a national philosophy, as the self-cognition of the national being, will be a study and an account of 'the typical way of observing and condensing the impressions', and an account of 'the distinct direction of discerning.'

Of 'national entities', Bazala will say that 'to the totality ... of human aspirations, they enter with a *historical and cultural identification*, by way of how much they arrange their specific *spirituality in the personal structure*, which their wisdom of life and the world is reflected in' (italics, E.B-P).

A national philosophy, which is to be 'the self-cognition of the national being, or rather, of the national spirit', insofar if it desires to be constituted as truly 'national', hence, will have to necessarily go to identify those characteristics of the national spirit and spirituality, which the *specific quality*, peculiarity of the national discerning into life and the world follow from, thus for the extraction of that which is *collective*, which will be present as a *fundamental note and dominant line* (Bazala's terms) in all the manifestations of the national spirit, by way of which one will be able to talk then of a determined philosophy, which the national spirit develops in the same way that an individual develops a certain life philosophy of his own (in accord with Wundt's attitude 'Das Wort Fichtes 'Die Philosophie die man hat, zeigt was für ein Mensch man ist', läßt sich daher *vor allem* auch auf Nationen anwenden').⁵

The *differentia specifica* of the discerning into life and the world, which a national philosophy, in all its particularities, is constituted in, is founded on, according to Bazala, that which is *a priori* of the national being, the national spirit. '... the national being is' – he will say – 'older than the national consciousness, and is based on a certain 'a priori' as a *primordial (innate) possibility of its kind*, which is pronounced in poems and fables, in the opinions and beliefs, in the habits and statutes, in the active behaviour and creation' (*Idea*).

It should be noted, though, that *only* then the *fundamental* problem of the constituting of a national philosophy is observable, in respect of the so defined concept of national philosophy, tied to the relation between the universal significance of the subject matter of philosophy and that which is *diverse*, which is founded in the moment of that which is *national*, where thus, that which is 'national' is to be the foundation of diversity.

⁵ W. Wundt, *Die Nationen und ihre Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1915.

In order to determine that certain *a priori* of the national being, which manifests itself in a dominant line, Bazala searches for the criteria of the determining of *national-spiritual lines*. Namely, according to him, there is always a 'fundamental note', which that '*particular direction of discerning*' is inferred from, and by which one can then talk of a world-view in 'the Indian sense', in 'the Roman spirit', in 'the Gaulish, the Anglo-Saxon, the Germanic perspective', in 'the Slavic soul'. By way, the characterising of that dominant line 'in the terminology of scientific philosophy' (such as rationalism, realism, mysticism, etc.) is always insufficient, because 'the characteristic, on the basis of intellectual exposition, forever remains only approximate', not encompassing 'the creative originality of concrete spirituality'. Bazala will not be satisfied by 'a certain *dominant psychological function or disposition*' either (which *Wundt's concept* of the narrative of national philosophies is based upon). In the end, Bazala finds that the dominant line, which is decisive in 'the determining of the particular national being and spirit', is to be found in the relation between generality and particularity, though unfortunately, he does not work it out further in detail in the example of Croatian philosophy, either in the *Idea*, or earlier in the *Philosophical Aspiration*.

That *a priori* of the national being, in line with Bazala's concept of philosophy, could be determined as a '*strikingly coloured feeling of life*', and also as a 'distinct direction of discerning and of life determination' (as it follows from his essay *Metaloški korijen filozofije* /The Meta-logical Origin of Philosophy/, Zagreb, 1923). Sometimes it seems that, notwithstanding, this *a priori*, which is defined as a *primary, dominant line of the collective being*, even though it is always defined as the common denominator of a number of singular discernings, in a way determines ahead and conditions them. However, just as in the case of the specific determining of the relation between an individual and the collective being in the sense of *dynamic unity*, in which 'the multitude lives as one, where a number of individual consciousnesses construct a *single spirit*', in the case of determining the role of this *a priori* too, which consists of a *specific arrangement of processing impressions*, Bazala exerts himself to bring the latter into a specific relation towards *circumstances, fate*, and not until this combination, the peculiarity of the national spirit will then discern itself. Thus, in the *Philosophical Portrait of Franjo Marković*, by outlining the moments, which 'define the standpoint towards the problems, and influence the direction, in which Ariadna's thread, through the labyrinth of human circumstances, will be pulled', Bazala, on the one hand, emphasises the '*particularly arranged nature*' (*physis*) – which means that a man, by his peculiarity, responds to the received stimuli, and then that nature determines the *way of observing* – and on the other hand, fate (*tyche*), by which an 'individual course of life' is signified, which, in a specific way, determines the 'acc-

umulating of experiences', and which the *direction of observing* is determined by (p.51).

In the *Idea* too, he will find that *a priori* of the national being to be determinative for its peculiarity of the discerning of the national spirit, but only in combination with the circumstances, which the national being is formed and grows in. In this way, this peculiarity is, in fact, pronounced in the '*constant of experience*', *world discerning* and '*an active attitude*'. From the *Philosophical Aspiration* it clearly follows that, in determining the constant, at issue is, first and foremost, a particular permanency of *reacting to exterior stimuli*, because the philosophical conception is, amongst other things, 'a principally constructed *composition of meaningful inspections* and values as answers to exterior stimuli', too. A national philosophy too, is the self-cognition of the national being 'in life's reality of a distinct style, in specific circumstances built on a *personal thought*'. It seems that Bazala, in the above, approaches then Scheler's concept, which recognises this constant as a special *structure* of the national discerning into the world, which makes the essence of the national spirit, and the history of a nation is understood by these spiritual structures, which represent the constants of the national spirit in combination with the accidental, variable causal succession.



At the end, concerning Bazala's concept of a national philosophy, we could conclude the following: even though Bazala with his concept mostly follows that tendency of accounts of national views of the world and philosophies that is present on the philosophical scene of Europe through the 19th and the 20th centuries, whose skeleton is the notion of *national spirit* (*Volksgeist*), which the peculiarity of a particular national philosophy is constituted in, still he, by exactly his determination of the function and significance of a national philosophy – requiring of it to be the self-cognition of the national spirit, through all its manifestations – deviates from that tendency to a certain degree. That is, by insisting on such a determination of philosophy, which exceeds the notion of a 'scientific, scholarly philosophy' to a large extent, he avoided the trap, which a number of the followers of that tendency have fallen into, who, like Wundt and Scheler, went to identify that which is typical of a particular national thought, or so that, to the rank of typically national items, they have elevated thoughts, ideas of a more significant national philosopher, or so that that, which is typical of a national thought, they found represented in some national philosophers formulated beforehand. In this way, for example, W. Wundt of John Lock will say 'keiner ist wie er der vollendete Typus des englischen Geistes', and of Descartes that he is 'der voll-

deten Typus des französischen Geistes'.⁶ Thus, of Descartes' 'cogito', Scheler will say that it is '*ein französischer Gedanke, ein gallischer Exzess kat exochen!*' He will also say that the three ideas – the idea of infinity, the elaborated heliocentric teaching, and the idea of congruity of events in the macrocosm and microcosm – are ideas of German origin, which have penetrated the entire reflective development of the modern world.⁷

After the paper *On the Idea of National Philosophy* from 1938, which, according to his own words, he thinks over 'the philosophical function in its ideal quality and role' in, Bazala never returned to that problem ever again. However, regardless that in the *Idea* he points out that, in elaborating the idea of national philosophy, he only cared to 'warn of the importance of philosophical contemplation for the educating of the national being and its pronouncement in a truly national culture', to formulate the task of a national philosophy as the self-cognition of the national being, so that by it a nation could truly become the 'subject of spiritual-historical events', nevertheless, insofar as that entire effort is motivated by an aspiration to give a 'characteristic of the spirit, which is mirrored from the cultural property of the Croatian nation', he owes us some answers to some questions regarding national, and especially Croatian philosophy. Thus, Bazala did not elaborate in more depth either the very significant problem of language and national philosophy, or the problem of language from a specific aspect of the relation of the different forms of the manifestation of the national spirit (literature, fine arts, religion, philosophy, etc.), and exactly in language, according to him, 'the native spirits' are most distinctly manifested.

In the same way, he owes us a detailed elaboration of the relation of the 'scientific, scholarly philosophy' towards national philosophy, in the sense as he defines it. That is, in the *Idea* he clearly says that the question of 'how much, in the historical-cultural reality, the essence of the national spirit succeeded to express, and to bring out the philosophically ripened self-owning views of life and the world' (*Idea*, p.19), he leaves aside.

For us today, the question and by it the task remains: does the fact that Bazala owes us answers to some important questions concerning national philosophy result from specific circumstances and motives, which are the determinants for Bazala's scientific and professional activity, or from the weight of the fundamental question itself on the possibility of the founding a national philosophy?

Yet, for us today, alongside the above mentioned open questions concerning the, just in recent times, or more precisely in the last eighteen years

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ See *Nation und Weltanschauung*.

re-presented topic of national philosophy,⁸ the problem of the relation of the contemporary Croatian philosophy towards the philosophical tradition (and that which is in the past twenty years approximately, more or less systematically investigated as the 'Croatian philosophical heritage', without scrutinising all the important questions regarding the relation of philosophy and that which is national, and without reflecting on and intellectualising the presumptions of the work on that heritage) is added; it is then also a question of integrating that 'heritage' into the contemporary Croatian philosophy, and particularly in the framework of a critical self-reflection of the Croatian philosophy, which would necessarily include a reflection on the problem of our very own homogeneity and continuity.

The fact that both Marković and Bazala owe us some answers to some questions on national philosophy does not, naturally and in itself, mean that it is impossible to find answers to all the unanswered questions. To try to answer them remains precisely a challenge to us today. And, let us return to the beginning, it seems that Willms' 'recipe' for the renewal of philosophy, in the sense of its re-nationalisation, stimulates one to accept that challenge.

TRANSLATED BY ANA JANKOVIĆ

PROBLEMI NACIONALNE FILOZOFIJE

Sažetak

Osvrnemo li se na neke značajnije tokove suvremene zapadnjačke napose evropske filozofije, uočit ćemo jednu čuđenja dostojnu i ozbiljna promišljanja vrijednu činjenicu: u jeku, naime, intenziviranja integrativnih procesa što obilježavaju posljednje desetljeće evropskog dvadesetog stoljeća susrećemo u filozofiji tendenciju reaktualiziranja pitanja »nacionalnog« i to u kontekstu rješavanja krize u koju je dospjela ta filozofija.

Upravo, naime, u obraćanju filozofijskog mišljenja *konkretnoj situaciji*, u osvješćivanju i uvažavanju onoga »tu« i »sada« *iz kojeg izrasta svako filozofiranje* – a što ga između ostalog čini i pripadnost određenoj naciji – vide glavni predstavnici te filozofijske »struje« (ako tu tendenciju uopće možemo tako označiti, s obzirom na to da se

⁸ Here, we primarily think of the paper by F. Zenko 'O ideji (hrvatske) nacionalne filozofije u Alberta Bazale' ('On the Idea of (Croatian) National Philosophy in Albert Bazala'), in *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, no. 27–28/1988, and the paper by G. Gretić 'A. Bazala – utemeljenje i konstitucija 'Ideje nacionalne filozofije'' ('A. Bazala – Foundation and Constitution of the 'Idea of National Philosophy)'), in *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, no. 31–32/1990.

ne radi ni o kakvoj školi ili pokretu), poput *Glucksmanna*, *Willmsa*, *Finkelkrauta* i drugih, jedan od putova »obnove« zapadnjačke filozofije.

Zahtjev za »renacionaliziranjem filozofiranja« (da upotrijebimo sintagmu suvremenog njemačkog filozofa Bernarda Willmsa) pokreće onda čitavu lavinu pitanja u svezi s odnosom nacije i filozofije, odnosno filozofije i nacije. Iz tog konteksta pokušava se u ovom tekstu sagledati i prikazati sva aktualnost pionirskih pokušaja dvojice značajnih hrvatskih mislilaca prve polovice dvadesetog stoljeća – Franje Markovića i Alberta Bazale, pokušaja naime, da se promisle neka bitna pitanja u svezi s odnosom filozofije i nacionalnog, odnosno da se promisle pretpostavke utemeljenja nacionalne filozofije uopće, pa onda i hrvatske filozofije, kojima bi polazištem bilo pitanje: *koje su uopće pretpostavke govora o »hrvatskoj filozofiji«*.

Te pokušaje vidimo ujedno kao razvijanje *dviju mogućih koncepcija konstituiranja nacionalne filozofije*, pa u tekstu pokušavamo naznačiti njihove bitne odrednice isticanjem dodirnih točaka no prije svega isticanjem razlika što među njima postoje.

ALBERT BAZALA – ESTABLISHING AND STRUCTURING THE »IDEA OF NATIONAL PHILOSOPHY«

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In his early work *Povijest filozofije* (»History of Philosophy«), published between 1906–1913, Bazala stated that his plans include a separate volume that will cover history of the Slavic philosophy, yet this idea was never realized. However, in most of his later philosophical works Bazala focused his attention on the issues of reconstruction and establishment of the Croatian philosophical tradition, and then, within the framework of that line of thinking, he tried to establish the idea of national philosophy.

At this stage we should emphasize that both aspects of this issue, namely the research of the Croatian philosophical tradition, as well as his efforts aiming at establishing the idea of national philosophy, Bazala inherited, one might even say in a form of a task, from his professor Franjo Marković. Franjo Marković was the first secular professor of philosophy (since 1874) at the newly re-established Croatian University, and in 1881, as a new Director of the University he held his famous inaugural speech *Filozofijske struke pisci hrvatskoga roda s onkraj Velebita u stoljećih XV do XVIII*. (»Croatian Philosophers from the Other Side of the Velebit Mountain from the XV to the XVIII Century«)¹. This speech was at the same time a programmatic statement on the mission and task of the Croatian philosophy, as well as the system of philosophical education in Croatia, and at the same time provided an explanation of the role of philosophy in the process of constitution of national identity and national self-awareness. While talking about »two adornments given by the Croatian people to the history of philosophy«, thinking, of course, about Frane Petrić and Ruđer Bošković, he added that our task at

¹ *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, 1–2, Zagreb, 1975.

this point is »to show them our gratitude by taking them away from the darkness of obscurity, and by taking them as foundations on which we should continue developing our new philosophical work.«² Therefore our great and numerous philosophers of the Renaissance provide us with a right and enable us to enter »the elevated temple of the minds of the world – not, however, as masters of the house, but as late newcomer, although with an honorable passport brought from the age of the spiritual renaissance of Europe.«³ In general terms one could say that F. Marković has and argues for a still completely classical, but also visibly Enlightening vision of an all-embracing and all-establishing role of philosophy for the benefit of individuals and community in which they live. He formulated this particular standpoint as follows: »For a man who loves other fellow human beings there is no more comforting or more noble concept than: emergence of a collective spiritual and working identity, emergence of a collective, mentally and operatively united organism which consists of individual persons. And within thus united collective organism, philosophical thoughts, which aim at reaching the understanding of truth, establishing high ideals for artistic work, as well as for ethically-based actions and for reaching religious tranquillity for humanity, these philosophical aspirations have the same function, when it comes to people, as nerves have when it comes to individual persons.«⁴ As a specific summary of such a point of view one may quote Marković's statement that »there is no doubt that only the people that acquired their homeland of thought, indeed have acquired their homeland in true reality.«⁵

Bazala came as a heir to Marković at the Department of Philosophy, and fully embraced thus defined role and task of philosophy, which definitely proved to be one of the sources of inspiration for his efforts to formulate and establish the idea of national philosophy. This particular influence of Franjo Marković's ideas on the task and role of national philosophy, influence on Bazala's own way of thinking could be very precisely defined owing to the fact that Bazala himself openly discussed that influence in his work »*Filozofski portret Franje Markovića*« (»A Philosophical Portrait of Franjo Marković«), published in 1921. This work immediately shows that Bazala fully accepted Marković's argument related to indeed fateful importance of the process of establishing and formulating the self-consciousness of a people, importance for its historical existence – the process that could be achieved and fully realized, as Marković stated, only by philosophy. Bazala thought

² Ibid., p. 258.

³ Ibid., p. 273.

⁴ Ibid., p. 273.

⁵ Ibid., p. 273

that Marković, positioned within his contemporary very precisely defined historical and spiritual framework, was forced to ask himself »what role in educational life of our people should philosophy play, and that not only in the sense of being '*studium sapientiae*' and '*universitas scientiarum*', but also '*in senso cosmico*'«⁶, that is: as a source of a self-conscious culture at the moment when our university had again been established. There is no doubt that Bazala was, similar to Marković, well aware of the immensely important role of universities in the process of shaping the overall cultural consciousness of a people. The best example of such a role was Germany, and it is thus understandable that Bazala often quoted Fichte, who had often wrote precisely about this particular role of universities. Bearing in mind a very specific overall context of that time, Marković had another very tough issue to solve in front of him. Namely, he had to decide which particular philosophy might serve as a leader in the process of bringing the Croatian people into the circle of self-conscious and cultured nations of Europe. According to Bazala, Marković resolved this hard and historically very responsible task in indeed the only possible satisfactory way. Namely, he first decided, in a more general sense, to choose philosophy, as it nurtured critical spirit within its realm. At this point he had a very clear understanding that it is necessary to define and direct, both intellectually and conceptually, an overall cultural life of a people in front of whom lies an endless myriad of undefined and unassessed material from all the various areas of living life. To add to complexity of the situation, the than contemporary culture of the Croatian people included numerous and rather different views of the world and life, belonging to different traditions, and the task was to systematize them methodically and critically, in order to mould this diverse variety into a form of a productive and energetic urge to direct and define the cultural life in general. In other words, at that time it was absolutely necessary to nurture such a scientific and philosophical spirit that would be able to take over this historical task. After that Marković made the second move, and refused to opt for any eclectic philosophical system, which would within itself harmonize and synthesize a variety of philosophical standpoints but, on the contrary, decided to embrace and accept, with certain restrictions, Herbart's critical philosophy, which was later approved by Bazala as well. The Herbart's philosophical system, as Bazala emphasized, was supposed to have the role of »a propedeutics of philosophical spirit among our people«. At this point, however, we should state that as far as this second step is concerned, namely the choice of a concrete, and a foreign, for that matter, philosophical system, Bazala did not fol-

⁶ A. Bazala: *Filozofski portret E. Markovića* (»A Philosophical Portrait of Franjo Marković«), Zagreb, 1921, p. 12.

low his teacher. On this particular issue, as Bazala claimed, one of the central problems of the very concept and the idea of national philosophy becomes clearly visible, and that is the problem of what does it really mean and what might be the consequences of accepting and introducing a foreign philosophical system into the concept of an »autochthonous« national philosophy – the problem we will discuss in detail at a later stage.

Marković managed to find a rather beautiful syntagm for his understanding of philosophy. Namely, philosophy is for him »a central crossing of spiritual streams within a man«, without which we are lost, both as individuals and as a people. Moreover, on philosophy it is based »the spiritual structure, quality and unity of our spirituality, singularity of our thinking and our aspirations, the direction of our will and our work... the consciousness of our own position, the tasks of our cultural life, as well as our role in the overall history of humankind.«⁷ Such an all-embracing definition of philosophy forms the spine of all the life activities in general, with particularly emphasized task of enlightening and educating, in a way which made Bazala to state that Marković gave a parallel between education and cultivation of an individual consciousness and the process of education of a people in general (which indeed had been defined as an unquestionable task of philosophy, especially discussed and founded in Hegel's work *Fenomenologija duha*, »Phenomenology of the Spirit«), a people which thus acquires, step by step, an awareness of itself, of its goals and its tasks. Only in such a way a people becomes able to indeed develop into »a historical factor«, as in the process of living life activities it invests »its soul«, which means that in the process of forming its historical life it indeed realizes »its idea«. Philosophy, understood as »a self-conscious national spirit«, in Marković's works thus has the task »to function as a cultural program of the national being.«⁸ Indeed, only philosophy can have such a role, as it is »a force that shapes, a force that provides a specific, characteristic form to culture of a nation, a culture expressed through objective forms of art and science that are developed within a framework of specific social and political relations. As an expression of national self-consciousness, philosophy represents a principle of self-development, on the basis of which a nation becomes a visible and unavoidable factor among other nations, as well as an active participant in the history of humankind.«⁹ When explaining Marković's view of what philosophy is and what it should be, Bazala quotes from his introductory lecture on Logic (from an unpublished manuscript), where Marković stated: »You will not manage to keep your real

⁷ Ibid., p. 14.

⁸ Ibid., p. 16.

⁹ Ibid., p. 16.

homeland if you have not acquired your spiritual homeland: that one is the only real defender of the other one.«¹⁰

In his explanation of Marković's views, and after the above quotation, Bazala goes back to the question of the relationship between »demands of a national philosophy« and foreign influences, as exactly at this particular point it becomes clearly visible how indeed systematically complex and problematic this demand could become. In this context we have the following framework: the process of education of a national spirit, the process which is, as said above, a defender of its freedom, is being developed on a basis of a foreign, »other-nation« philosophy, that is on a basis of philosophical achievements and philosophical currents of other nations and other spiritual traditions. In other words, this means that at this stage it is necessary to achieve spiritual liberation and independence from foreign influences, which is not only a question of honor and prestige, but before everything else an issue of a national character in a very wide sense of that term, which could thus serve in understanding Bazala's frequent use of a rather vague syntagm »demands of a national philosophy«. When trying to resolve this particular contradiction, Marković uses a metaphor of a nursing-woman. In our case that is the role of a foreign philosophy: although it is not a real mother, it still helps to put a nation on its feet, thus helping it acquire a spiritual independence and liberating it from dependence. Bazala emphasized that Marković was well aware of how dangerous it might be to link this young and still developing national spirit exclusively to one particular spiritual tradition, in our case to the German tradition, repeatedly stating that we have to be especially careful not to allow this »self-grown, authentic seed to die out« because of it. Moreover, in order to avoid such dangers Marković advises to learn as well from English, French, North-Slavic and, before all, Hellenistic sources. According to him, only through such an approach, that is through influence of diverse traditions, would »our own string« eventually become fully developed and formed, enabling in turn that some of the richness of our own spiritual world-view and life will find its expression and manifestation, which should than become fully visible within the framework of concrete life of our people as well. Here we one particular question forced upon us, namely how did it happen that Marković had chosen one very specific system from within the framework of the German spirit, and that was the Herbart's system, to become the basis for philosophical education of our people. Bazala provides a very interesting explanation of this extremely important question: first, Marković himself was often emphasizing how close the Herbart's thinking was to the English philosophy. He tries to find similarities between Herbart's

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

theory of mechanical ideas and the Anglo-Saxon associative psychology. Also, Marković softened Herbart's logical formalism with Mill's views on logic and, finally, he further developed Herbart's views on the basis of Leibnitz and Lotze. According to Bazala, Marković considered the above two philosopher as a sort of representatives of the Slavic philosophy. Namely, he considered Leibnitz only as an alienated representative of a Slavic people, which was indeed true as his parents were born Poles. Furthermore, in Leibnitz's philosophy Marković managed to find disguised »Slavic strings«. From the seemingly same reasons he felt close to Lotze, who was born in Budišće, where at that time there had been inhabitants of Slavic origin. Bazala reports that Marković visibly gave himself up to influence of thinking of these two philosophers. »trusting that by doing this he indeed gives up to the voice of the national being – the Slavic one at that.«¹¹ Of course, Bazala himself did not fully believe that such ideas of Marković were indeed correct and justified. However, for Bazala, even as such they represent in every aspect a valuable and noble attempt to achieve »our characteristic existence« within the cultural framework, namely that Slavic dimension, which Bazala considers to be the primary evidence that Marković truly understood »the problems of our future«, and that is, first of all, a necessity to express our »self-growing« strength and thinking, perfected and ennobled, in all the forms and aspects of life. According to Bazala, this is especially important for small nations, and as an additional evidence of his viewpoint he states that even much bigger and culturally much more developed nations again feel the need to »revive the awareness of their being«. As an additional support of this view, Bazala quotes Nietzsche, who approached all of his fellow Germans who also feel themselves »a corruption of the German spirit«, a corruption that Nietzsche defines as »a cosmopolitan aggregate« and »a form of modern barbarism«, advising them to focus on autochthonous nurturing and education of the German culture. (However, at this point we should emphasize that these are Nietzsche's early views, which at a later stage he considerably changed, and that precisely within the framework of issues related to national culture.) Bazala especially emphasized Nietzsche's understanding that culture should be »of a unified style in all forms of its expression within a culture of a people«¹², and further points out toward the lack of such an unity, an unity which is expressed as a cultural urge that harmonizes various influences, and all that in harmony with the original national being. Without this unifying approach a disorderly state of the view of the world appears, the state that Nietzsche calls »a chaotic mixture of styles«. On the basis of a thus exemplified

¹¹ Ibid., p. 18.

¹² Ibid., p. 19.

task, Bazala concludes that this program, as defined by Franjo Marković, is not a short-term task, but a task of many generations to achieve »the awareness of and invigoration of their own being«, a being that has to be, in specific ways, expressed in all various aspects of life, because there should be no aspect of life where the influence of that being will not be visible. . . Namely, »what is born within a nation, should look, and feel and smell of its native soil«. Within this context Bazala discusses the relationship between various »forms of spiritual culture« and the national being, and concludes that art is the closest to this being, and definitely more close to it in comparison with science, whose basic characteristics is its abstract nature, that is its detachment from concrete life. According to Bazala, philosophy is by its nature closest to art, and philosophy -understood as *ars artium* – through a creative synthesis in fact enables completion and integration of different individual insights of particular sciences into a single unified picture of human relationship toward reality. Finally, by establishing values against life in general, philosophy positions itself above basically scientific function of science. All that in the final instance clearly shows that philosophy is indeed that particular spiritual force and that particular science which is definitely able to understand and adequately further develop the national being.

After claiming that since the time of the Renaissance the major European peoples had begun to develop in »the national direction«, Bazala stated that since that process had begun one could easily follow their attempts, on the one hand to use »cultural efforts« in order to resolve relevant issues of their national being and, on the other hand to form and represent an idea of man and an idea of adequate and worthy human living. Their poets, artists and philosophers have thus been forming and defining the way of thinking and the way of living of these peoples, their place and position in the world, as well as their specific tasks within »the framework of mankind«, and that was the way and the means of how these peoples acquired their self-consciousness. This self-consciousness incorporates themes and content of »folktales and folk-songs, popular daily-life wisdom, social and political mission, taste, and religious feelings.«¹³ Based on heritage of the ancient Greek and Roman culture, as well as on demands of modern life, these elements had continued to develop until they reached a clear form, a profile of the national being, whom Bazala calls »a style of life« through which »the national soul« of that nation found its true expression. At this point Bazala adds that our nation has been directly in contact with all these sources of modern life, indeed taking an active part in many of its aspects, and yet, as »the flow of historical circumstances was not favorable« for us, our nation did not develop in

¹³ Ibid., p. 29.

a way similar to other major European nations. Our historical fate positioned us at the crossroads of great civilizations and religions, Rome and Byzantium, Christianity and Islam, but also at the crossroads of interests of major expansionist nations from the East and the West, from the South and the North. And because of that, for centuries our energies had to be primarily focused on the basic defense that would assure the survival of the people, that is: that people was forced to defend and to try to gather together »the remnants of the remnants of the once famous and great kingdom«. Due to these reasons, in our parts the idea of national unity was developed rather late, and exactly this idea proved crucial for any kind of cultural advancement, as well as for development of an idea of a common literary language and culture. In our parts, therefore, we primarily had to defend our national and territorial integrity. In fact, however, we most of all had to fight for our national identity, which was throughout centuries under attack from aggressive foreign influences, deadly for survival of the national being and the national soul – the process that a philosopher and a poet Marković tried to show in a symbolic form in his poem »*Zla kob*« (»The Ill Fate«), written in 1865.

Bazala concludes that Marković's general views of the relationship between an individual and a people, between history and cultural institutions, are very close to Fichte's ethical idealism. Namely, for both these philosophers culture represents »the nobility of mind within the context of the outside (objective-social) and the inside (subjective-individual) circumstances of life.«¹⁴ Precisely this position on »reaching the awareness of national being« unavoidably lead Marković toward research of the past, because a developed individual and collective self-consciousness enable and result with an ideal integration of the past and the future within the span of the present, from which one should conclude that only »a man of culture (is) a man of history«. Because of that, Bazala, by further explaining Marković, firmly claims that a historical orientation toward a unity of a national life represents a crucial precondition for opening a possibility of developing, that is to say of a new beginning in developing a cultural life. That is the reason why our leading reformists focused so much on history, although they might have done it maybe even without a full awareness of the overall context: Gaj was thus working on bringing tradition back to life, Kukuljević was working on discovering old Croatian writers, and Demeter tried to find bridges and links between his contemporary Illyria and the Roman Illyrism. And although, if one would view their efforts from the point of view of historical truth, one would have to admit that they made a lot of mistakes, these mistakes were indeed not a crucial elements in their efforts. On the contrary, the crucial element was that

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

particular historical connection which, through exactly this approach, that is through various forms of expression and forms of building of a nation, aimed at establishing a historically conscious life of the Croatian nation.

Bazala states that »Marković entered our cultural life at the stage where there was a need to mediate and intervene«¹⁵, namely mediate and intervene in the process of defining cultural continuity of the nation, and that was precisely what he did, while for the process of establishing an original and independent view of the world and life he had neither time nor energy and, therefore, this task was left for future generations. Bazala adds that Marković, after the University was reopened and the Academy was established, searched the past and as a »born aristocrat tried to find in it that passport which will allow his nation to enter the circle of other enlightened nations.«¹⁶ This view of his was most clearly defined in the above quoted inaugural speech, where Marković adds: »In the process of establishing our collective national spiritual identity their own small part will also provide thoughts of our old philosophical writers, as soon as we study them and add their efforts to the overall context of our national life.« After all the above, Bazala summarizes Marković's view of the role of philosophy as follows: »Philosophy is a uniting spirit, a spirit that unites not only thoughts, but also feelings and actions. That is the educational role of philosophy.«¹⁷

At the end of this part of his monograph on Marković, Bazala discovers one additional possibility of for further development and application of his ideas. Bazala, namely, mentions a possibility of development of a sociological idea which »establishes and organizes a society on its conscious potentials«, by which he aims at the following: according to him, social development shows an obvious tendency to regulate life conditions more and more, and that on a basis of internal, and not external factors. This opens up a possibility of developing social and cultural systems based on »a dynamics of conscious forces, on insight into social issues, on social feelings and on social will«, and this would than consequently mean that society is established on »intellectual consciousness«. This very high expectation Bazala proclaims as unrealistic, bearing in mind the than contemporary social and political context, although not entirely imaginary. In addition, such a social construction clearly appeals to him, as it would allow certain traits of the Slavic character to be expressed, for example »that in the context of internal relationships within the overall social life we bring a more devoted attitude, more soul and

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 29.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 30.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 40.

more internal loyalty.«¹⁸ For Bazala, this could be one possible way to use the idea of humanness in order to allow for peaceful transformation of the struggle for survival into a collective endeavor to build in reality that very idea of humanness.

These were the basic outlines, as presented by Bazala, of Marković's ideas on the role and the task of philosophy within the framework of cultural and, more generally, historical life of a nation. Bazala himself generally agrees with these ideas, and even considers himself as a one who follows and further develops Marković's ideas. In his later works related to issues of national philosophy, Bazala took the outline of Marković's idea of national philosophy and tried to further add to it and adjust it in two different ways. First, in a historical-documentary sense, there was a need to supplement and document our philosophical tradition. Second – and definitely necessary to be accomplished – there was a need to provide historical argumentation of development, to establish foundations and to provide necessary argumentation needed for our original philosophical thought, based on insight into and complete understanding of authenticity of our national spirit.

Bearing in mind the than contemporary historical, cultural and spiritual situation of the Croatian people, and especially having in mind influence of Masaryk's overall cultural and social views on Bazala, he indeed was not cut to be just another academic person with academic life in a usual sense of that word. In a similar way in which this was the case with his teacher Franjo Marković, Bazala considered as the true vocation of his life and as a crucial task in front of him, to do everything he could in order to enrich, in various ways, the spirit of his people, and to help bring his nation into the circle of cultured and developed nations of Europe. This task, of course, is primarily a task for philosophy, which represents the basic foundation of spirituality. Philosophy has to form, develop and understand our everyday life, our will and our aspirations, as well as the way of life in general, Bazala's own life represented an impressive evidence of an individual's aspiration to achieve this understanding in reality. One has to note, of course, that these ideas and these tasks were not defined exclusively by Bazala himself. These were also the ideas and »the spirit of the time« that originated with the age of the national Revival, while it was defined in terms of a clear conceptual statement even earlier, by Franjo Rački, the first President of the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences. Rački clearly formulated his insights and his views by defending a standpoint that a nation becomes a nation in historical terms only when it is educated in a sense of specific characteristics of the national spirit. Only after achieving that a nation is able to co-assist in the process of devel-

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 42.

opment of the spirit of the mankind, and its real power is visible only by achieving new scientific and philosophical insights.

Further developing these ideas by Franjo Rački, Bazala as early as in 1907 formulated his initiative for opening a joint, open department of philosophy of the Zagreb university, and in 1912 his idea was realized when an open university extension was established for general public. As is well known, this open university extension, led by Bazala for decades, had a rather significant role in the process of free and open education both in Zagreb and in Croatia in general. Aiming at realization of the above ideas of popular education, Bazala was also one of the most important and active members of two other exceptionally important Croatian cultural institutions. He was a secretary and a president of *Matica hrvatska*, where he also held numerous lectures, and he was also a member and a long-standing president of the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences, where he held numerous and famous speeches at formal meetings of the Academy, while many of his most important works have been published in their official magazine »*Radovi JAZU*« (»Works of the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences«). And finally, he participated in a very concrete way in political life of Croatia and Yugoslavia, defending and advancing reasonable and progressive ideas, arguing for republican, federalist, tolerant and enlightened relations in our country. This is, of course, just a rough outline of rich and diverse activities of Albert Bazala in our overall cultural activities. On the basis of everything that we mentioned, we could clearly and safely state that he was undoubtedly one of the most significant persons of our cultural life between the two world wars, a man of exceptional energy, a person who left a very important mark in our country.

This, one might say cultural and educational activism was, of course, founded in his understanding of philosophy as a non-dogmatic, free act of an individual which, as such, has special obligations and responsibility toward his own community and his own people. Precisely on this particular issue it seems that his was a lucky combination of his classical humanistic foundations, that could be nicely seen in his discussions on the Greek understanding of the relationship of an individual and a community, and concrete existential demands of his own time and place. It is well known that throughout his life Bazala had on his desk a statue of Nietzsche, and that he particularly loved to quote Nietzsche's words from his work »*Volja za moć*« (»Will for Power«): »I do not want to urge anyone to accept a particular philosophy. It is necessary, and maybe even desirable, that every philosopher is always like a very different plant. There is nothing more repulsive than instructive retelling of philosophy...« Reportedly he also often quoted Fichte, a philosopher who was definitely very close to him, especially that part when Fichte stated that every man has and chooses a philosophy that suits him as a person.

Having all this in mind, it is understandable that in his efforts to find a philosophy adequate for his own time, and aiming at realization of his basic cultural and educational beliefs, Bazala took a different road in comparison with his teacher Franjo Marković. What was important for him was an attempt to find ideas, from the overall tradition of philosophy, that might assist in development of cultural life of the nation, as well as to help motivate his own individual creativity. The idea of national characteristics of philosophical systems of major nations, although undoubtedly universal in its nature, in fact originated with one of Bazala's teachers, W. Wundt, who even wrote a work on specific characteristics of philosophical thinking of major European nations. A task for Bazala, therefore, was to find and establish certain specific elements whose origin lie within the framework of overall national creative activities of the spirit of our Croatian people. Of course, on this particular issue his model was Masaryk who was trying to establish and define specific elements of the Czech national spirit. Bazala's philosophical thinking is an expression of his aspiration to comprehend the spirit of his own nation, and he devoted a number of his works to this particular task. This national spirit, according to Bazala, manifests itself through most diverse aspects of specific living experiences. Consequently, philosophy has a task to research the initial original characteristics and distinctive traits of the national being, during which one should be careful to differentiate between this primordial element and those characteristics that were acquired and accepted at a later stage. However, according to Bazala, the very essence of that being is not unconditionally, that is: it is not completely open and transparent. Namely, it avoids a universal conceptual definition. It is founded in and in its foundation is something that Bazala calls a »pra-experience«, through which a life of a people announces and manifests itself. On this »pra-experience, on this living source of creative dreaming, in other words called 'mythos' – from which the following elements are born: the mental thought 'logos' and the enthusiasm for beautiful 'eros', as well as the aspiration for good 'ethos'«¹⁹, on the basis of this pra-experience, an essence of a being becomes pre-defined for philosophy. This particular standpoint at the same time defined his basic criteria for his reception of the contemporary modern philosophy; in other words, for him the entire philosophical tradition was considered as the source from which possibilities for understanding the authenticity of human creativity spring out.

A philosopher searching for specific elements of a national spirit necessarily has to devote special attention to the problem of language, because the

¹⁹ Bazala: *O ideji nacionalne filozofije* (»On the Idea of National Philosophy«), 1938, p. 21.

specificity of spirit is, unavoidably, originally manifested precisely through the medium of language – language that is an authentic, a primordial form of expression of that spirit. That is the reason why Bazala researched rich specific and authentic elements of original popular words, as their etymology unveils precisely this hidden, at first sight elusive polysemy and interrelation between words and things, between experiences and their interpretation. In a same way he interprets the emergence of specific »world views«, where in a form of a rounded entirety of experiences and sensations a rich and specific reality is being formed within human consciousness. A thus formed »world view« differs from an another »world view« precisely by this specificity, both at a level of differences between communities and nations, as well as at a level of differences between individual human beings. Thus understood world-view constitutes »individual« worlds, resulting in reality – which is in fact common to various individuals and nations – transforming into a number of differently experienced worlds. One such especially successful example of Bazala's etymological derivation – that is, of explanation, as defined in a form of a basic philosophical term for a wider »spiritual« meaning and specificity of a particular system – is a term *predmet* (»a physical item«, »a thing«). Bazala analyses it and compares it with the German equivalent *Gegenstand*, stating that the etymology of the German word clearly shows that consciousness is standing opposite to beings, that is to concrete things, thus conveying a static view of the world, while in our word *predmet* we have a rather different viewpoint of a consciousness toward beings. Namely, in our term *predmet* a certain dynamism is visible, that is consciousness, understood as will, in a specific sense and meaning puts something in front of it (*meće*). In other words, world is put, in front of consciousness, conveying a specificity of our individual dynamic grasping and understanding of the world. Bazala, therefore, concludes: »With all these elements in mind, in a form of expression of a particular language there are elements which cannot be simply transferred into another language. For example, it is sufficient to remind ourselves of different and differently balanced overtones in the following words: *kosmos*, *mundus*, *Welt*, for what we call *svijet* (world), or in foreign words *rhema*, *res*, *Ding* for *stvar* (thing), or *moira*, *fatum*, *Schicksal* for *udes* (*fate*), and similar. It is therefore understandable that borrowed words within a new circle do not retain the richness and fullness of their authentic meaning; as an example, we could remind ourselves of a bleak, bear-boned meaning of a word *ideja* (*idea*) in comparison with what one feels that surrounds this particular word within its original Greek language; or we could also think about a completely forgotten element of a creative activity within a word *poezija* (*poetry*).«²⁰ Ba-

²⁰ Ibid., p. 8.

zala, of course, does not confine himself exclusively to discussing specific etymological elements and differences based on them, but he also furthers his insights and comparisons into the realm of structure of spirituality and a thing he calls »specifically complex composition of rational insights and values«. Here we have, therefore, open possibilities of different expressions, and that through different words within a framework of the same language, but covering various aspects of particular empirical contents »put« in front of consciousness. While explaining specifics of distinctiveness of a human being and his consciousness or un-consciousness, Bazala therefore states: »The expression of this possibility is not at every point and in every direction similarly successful and significant, as it could be hindered from »freely« giving itself out and expressing itself, as indeed desire and need urge it to do.«²¹ This is a reason why philosophy has a task to research and find, in all the various manifestations and areas of expression, that particular specificity of our national spirit, a specificity which is, of course, being expressed and is becoming visible in various different aspects. The fundamental characteristic of this, the Slavic spirit, in comparison with other European spirits, Bazala finds in its quality of being a dynamic-willing spirit, which constitutes the basic source of its creativity.

The problem of the process of constituting, and in addition the issue of rich and specific character of national philosophies, within the overall framework of development of the European philosophy, is indeed not a simple problem, although it has rarely been a topic of separate philosophical discussions. There have been definitely many reasons for this, with probably the most important being the fact that philosophers belonging to major European nations simply did not feel the need for such an additional type of legitimacy of their own individual philosophical thinking. As is well known, what we consider and call the Western spiritual tradition, metaphysics or philosophy, has been founded and given as the history of development of Greek thinking. This particular viewpoint was first expressed and conceptually, philosophically and historically systematically discussed and defined, by Hegel. This, the Hegel's concept of development of a spirit, regardless of all individual comments and arguments against it from various points of view and based on different conceptual historical-philosophical motives, still remains the all-embraced and accepted idea of how the spirit of the West has been constituted. We should therefore provide at least an outline of the Hegel's standpoint, which he systematically discussed and defined in the best way in his *History of Philosophy*. His views could be briefly summarized through the following points:

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

1. Philosophy is an objective science on truth, science of the necessity of its being, as well as an insight into concepts and ideas; philosophy is not a way of thinking or a world-view.
2. In contrast with popular beliefs, philosophy is in a very sharp opposition to the abstract; on the contrary, it is the way leading to a concrete.
3. Philosophy begins when and where the universal is being grasped as an all-embracing being, that is: when a being has been grasped in a universal way, that is when the thinking of the thought springs out into visibility. Thinking has to be thinking for itself and it has to reach existence in full freedom. Thus the awareness of freedom has been established. That is why the essential source has to be established in free thought which grasps the idea of an absolute, that is, it is founded in the being that grasps thought as an essence of being, and indeed *is* thought.

However, this universal definition is an abstract definition, that is: at the same time it has to be a historical one, which means that it has to be a concrete form of a nation whose being constitutes that abstract principle. A nation which has this awareness of freedom establishes its existence on this principle, which means that the entire state of being of that nation is founded on this principle. In other words, for philosophy to take its position it is necessary that awareness of freedom exists, which from a practical side means that at this particular point a real, political freedom begins to emerge.

5. Political freedom exists only where an individual human being knows itself as an individual human being, knows itself as that what is universal and essential, as a place where subject gains awareness of its individuality. To think means to define something in a form of that what is universal in its nature, and to think oneself means to know oneself as something that is universal, it means: to define oneself as something universal, or to be able to relate to oneself – and precisely at this point the element of practical freedom is contained.
6. Individual spirit grasps its being as something universal, and that universality expresses itself as a relationship toward oneself. To-be-in-itself established individuality and infinity of Me, and that is the being of the spirit. Therefore, it also is a being of a nation that knows itself to be free, and therefore it also is that universal that is the principle of its overall ethical and all other life. Such a freedom we find first with the Greek people, and that is why philosophy begins with them.

These were, therefore, Hegel's principal theses on preconditions of emergence of philosophy and on the elements that define it as such. Philosophy was, according to that argumentation, born in Greece at one singular and very specific moment of history of that nation. Because of that Bazala

justly gives a title to the first chapter of his history of philosophy as »*Povijest narodne grčke filozofije*« (»History of National Greek Philosophy«). Having in mind our main topic, the following problem emerges at this particular point: a philosophy which emerged as »a national Greek philosophy«, during the 2,500 years-long history of its development became the all-founding basis for the entire Western culture, resulting with a fact that all modern sciences as well as the entire modern scientific-technical civilization emerged from it. However, and regardless of such conceptual and historical process of constitution of philosophy, it is still legitimate to pose a question of role and significance of other »national philosophies« in the process of co-formation and co-constitution of that what we call the Western metaphysics or philosophy. Before we start a discussion and explanation of Bazala's views on the idea of national philosophy, it would be instructive at this point to mention a point of view on this issue of one of the most important philosophers of the Twentieth century who was, after Hegel, the one to most profoundly and deeply discuss the problem of constitution and history of metaphysics. The philosopher in question is Martin Heidegger who, of course, never discussed precisely the issue of »the idea of national philosophy«, although in many of his works he very clearly defined his position regarding the issue of origin and constitution of the Western philosophy. On this issue he is very precise. Namely, according to him, there is no German, French or English philosophy. Moreover, he distinctly states that Nietzsche, whom many people consider to be a German philosopher *par excellence*, is indeed in no way a German philosopher, but the last and the crucial ground-breaking philosopher of the metaphysical tradition, that is of philosophy which has been constituted in a unity and the subsequent development of Platonic-Aristotelian onto-theology.

Bazala wrote very often on issues and problems of national philosophy, first in his early work »*Povijest filozofije*« (»History of Philosophy«), and after that specifically in his following works: »*Filozofijska težnja u duhovnom životu Hrvatske, od pada apsolutizma naovamo*« (»Philosophical Aspirations in the Spiritual Life in Croatia from the Fall of Absolutism Until Today«, Zagreb, 1936); »*O jugoslavenskoj misli*« (»On Yugoslav Thought«, Zagreb, 1935); and in »*O ideji nacionalne filozofije*« (»On the Idea of National Philosophy«, Zagreb 1938). When we take into consideration his other works as well, for example his habilitation work on Marulić, written in 1904, it becomes clear that the problem of the role of philosophy in spiritual and cultural life of a nation represented a continuously recurring theme of his thinking. This, of course, is not surprising. On the one hand, we might repeat that this was an inherited problem, discussed first by his teacher Franjo Marković (1845–1914). In addition, however, during the times of Marković and Bazala this was a topic which simply forced itself upon them, as it was indeed historically and cultur-

ally founded deep within the present historical circumstances and conditions of the than contemporary life of the Croatian people.

In the *»History of Philosophy«*, Bazala's most important work, we see obviously very important problems related to the issue of specific characteristics of national philosophy, which is indeed supposed to be something more than just »a passport«, a fact of an individual, although maybe even significant element of co-formation and co-activity in the process of development of the Western philosophy. Namely, in his history of philosophy Bazala also had to define his position regarding the question of origin of philosophy understood as something that is beyond doubt a specific result of spiritual activity of the West. On this particular point he follows views of E. Zeller (one of the most important followers of Hegel), and supports and defends a thesis that the Greek philosophy is »autochthonous«. Following Zeller, Bazala states that the Eastern peoples provided various encouragements and impulses to the Greeks, yet the Greeks did not simply accept and build as their own any of the systems from the East, but they adjusted all these influences and impulses to their own specific nature, thus establishing their own national Greek philosophy. Following the immanent logic of development of the European spirit, Bazala outlines the process of transformation of the national-Greek horizon into the universalistic Hellenic-Roman, and finally a Mediaeval-Christian horizon, and this entire history fundamentally demonstrates and manifests itself in a ground-braking manner through »the spirit of the West that has its authentic source in the Greek philosophy«. ²² In the Volume III of his *»History of Philosophy«* Bazala discusses, as usually quite common at his time, the German, the French and the English philosophy. However, this conventional division of modern philosophy along the national lines to us still does not seem as an adequate reason to assume that Bazala as early as in this early work of his, indeed argued for and consequently implemented his standpoint on the idea of national philosophy within the framework of the European spiritual tradition.

In his foreword to the Volume III of his *»History of Philosophy«*, Bazala expresses his regrets that within the framework of this work there was no place for history of philosophy of the Slavic nations. The first principled reason for excluding the Slavic philosophers was his initial intention to provide a review only of »philosophical efforts of world importance«. He was afraid that the Slavic philosophers which could possibly be included in such a list, would find themselves in a disadvantageous position, as their undoubtedly great importance for cultural and philosophical life of their nations would seem less important and would become obscured by »the bright shine of

²² Bazala: *Povijest filozofije I*, (*»History of Philosophy I«*), p. 73.

great minds which are coming from the way more enlightened nations«. That is why he proposed that a separate history of philosophy of the Slavic nations should be written, and that each national chapter should be written by a representative of that particular national philosophy. The historical and cultural circumstances have not been favorable for this, undoubtedly honorable idea, and therefore his suggestion from 1912 has not been realized until this day. However, generally speaking we consider that his basic viewpoint was correct, as any general history of philosophy has to be written only and unconditionally from the point of view of »development of the world spirit«. It is, of course, something completely different in what exactly degree the various histories of philosophy fulfilled this rigorous criteria. Definitely not completely. However, we should emphasize that Bazala, while discussing the Renaissance philosophy, nevertheless devoted a few very well written and pregnant pages to philosophical work of Frane Petrić (Fran Petriš), for whom he justly says that »among the most important philosophers from the beginning of the new age, one of our fellow-countrymen distinguished himself«. In addition, in notes devoted to this particular era he mentions activities of other Croatian Renaissance philosophers: Juraj Dubrovčanin, Juraj Dobrotić, Antun Medus, Nikola Gučetić and Benedikt Stay. However, it is surprising that he does not mention Ruder Bošković, although Franjo Marković already wrote a study on him.

Bearing all this in mind, one could conclude that Bazala in his early work »*History of Philosophy*« did not develop in concrete terms, and that on the material incorporating the entire history of philosophy, the ideas of Franjo Marković on national philosophy. Here we have, in a similar way in which Franjo Marković did it as well, a situation in which Bazala mentioned only those Croatian philosophers who contributed to »philosophical efforts of world-wide importance«, but he avoided discussion of a specific national philosophy understood as a constitutive element in the history of the European spirit.

Bazala's work »*Filozofijska težnja u duhovnom životu Hrvatske, od pada apsolutizma naovamo*« (»Philosophical Aspirations in the Spiritual Life in Croatia from the Fall of Absolutism Until Today«, Zagreb, 1936), is the first in line of Bazala's works specifically devoted to the question of constitution of national philosophy. After the introductory explanation of his comprehensive, willing-activist view of philosophy, Bazala states that an overview of a philosophical thought of »a living community« necessarily includes all various aspects of spiritual creation. These are: 1. philosophy of science, i.e. the point of view of a scientific consciousness; 2. philosophy of art or ideational reflections of artistic creation; 3. philosophy of life which that entails analysis of initiating forces of moral, social, political and religious life; 4. philosophy of culture which discusses interrelations between these various spheres of

life, as well as their relationship with theoretical awareness; 5. science of philosophy, which means a scientific systematic deconstruction of existing views of the world and of philosophical consciousness, as well as their critical evaluation. The last point definitely has to include not only »philosophy taught in schools«, but also a view of those issues »which disturb life in its foundations«.

To thoroughly discuss philosophical aspirations of a nation, for Bazala, therefore, means to research and evaluate all aspects of life of the Croatian nation, a nation placed between the German and the Roman circle, which proved to be both a strength and a weakness of its position. This strength demonstrates itself through its openness toward outside influences, through its ability to adopt foreign influences, to allow itself to be enriched by other cultures, while the weakness shows itself in relation to spiritual dependence and addiction, which comes as a result of a peripheral position, finally resulting with potential danger to authenticity and originality of the national being confronted with powerful foreign influences. However, as Bazala emphasizes, this has never happened – on the contrary, precisely through this confrontation and defense a specific national character, with a distinctive own understanding of the world and man's position in that world, has been formed. Bazala lists the following general elements as parts of »the prevailing intellectual, that is philosophical attitude of the Croatian national being«²³:

1. an ideal meaning of freedom;
2. sentimental attitude of the national being;
3. the one which overrules a sense of reality, as well as an insight into rational conditions and possibilities;
4. falling into romantic »evocations«;
5. trying to establish a foothold in some fatal dynamics, hoping that the opposing constellation will prove unsustainable;
6. passive resistance to that which is undesirable and lack of an active-willing grasp of reality and demands which are ideal;
7. the focus of life is positioned within an inner realm of values, with lack of an ability to realistically position itself in the process of advancing its own interests.

These general philosophical points of reference of the national being and the national spirit, according to Bazala, should in addition be supple-

²³ Bazala: *Filozofijska težnja u duhovnom životu Hrvatske – Od pada apsolutizma ovamo* (»Philosophical Aspirations in Spiritual Life of Croatia – From the Fall of Absolutism Until Today«), Zagreb, 1936, p. 6.

mented with the following influences, that is with universal world-view-building elements: first of all, here we talk about a rich and specific synthesis of the Christian education and teaching and humanistic currents of the Enlightenment and individualism, also including the idea of revolution and national liberation.

From such a widely defined and rounded fertile cooperation a humanistic educational system came as a result, with the following basic characteristics: culture is fundamentally defined by the all-human values of the classical world of antiquity, that is by »intellectual, aesthetic and moral sense of the Greek spirit, and the legal and stately wisdom of the Rome«, and that as a part of the Christian world-view forms the fundamental defining characteristics of »the spiritual estate of the Croatian nation«.²⁴ These attributes, however, are more of a historical character, that is: for Bazala these were just the actual potentials of the national spirit, which will become »'politicum' vehicle of the state power in the process of organizing the collective being«.²⁵ However, Bazala was realistic, and he clearly understood historical limitations of »these ideal possibilities for the value and the beauty of education«, as well as the limitation of »trusting the power of ethical justification« in opposition to concrete demands and tasks of economic life and economic development of the nation. In other words, what was missing was »a realistic voluntarism« and »an energetic sense for reality«, which both undoubtedly represent pre-conditions for developing a possibility of development of modern nations. Deficiencies of this kind have, of course, a long tradition in the history of the Croatian people.

Namely, the Croatian people was »forced by historical fate« toward universal ideas of humanism and cosmopolitanism, for example within the framework of the idea of unity of the Christian world, found in Marulić and Gundulić, where the Croatian people was ideally-romantically defined as the first defender of the Christian culture (*antemurale christianitatis*) against the advancing Turkish power. From this, as Bazala states, »synergetic attitude«, one other idea had eventually developed with Križanić, assisted, of course, by a number of additional influences, and that was the idea of Slavism and Pan-Slavism, or »*kéeri Slave*« (»a daughter of Slavs/Glory«), as J. Kollar had stated. On the one hand, this was an expression of emotions within a family, but on the other it was also an expression of the coming cultural affirmation and historical mission of the Slavism. During the further course of the historical development this idea was transformed into the Illyrism, and later into the Yugoslav idea, aiming at defining and achieving a framework of a

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

joint life of the South-Slavic peoples, where this rich specificity of »the primordial-born being« could be powerfully further developed. Therefore, in the course of the modern historical development the decisive turning point in the process of constitution of the national consciousness was reached especially with the constitution of the Academy and with the re-opening of the University, both under the leadership of »the two *dioskura*« of the national movements, Josip Juraj Strossmayer and Franjo Rački. Their activities Bazala defines in the following words: »It was in the spirit of true liberalism, when the political emancipation was linked to the spiritual emancipation, when from the self-determination of a ripe thought followed independence and authenticity of expressions of life.«

Their activities Bazala defines in the following words: »It was in the spirit of true liberalism, when the political emancipation was linked to the spiritual emancipation, when from the self-determination of a ripe thought followed independence and authenticity of expressions of life. The relationship of influence of the intellectual function on practical needs gives to this attitude a meaning of an ideally focused utilitarianism – an utilitarianism that follows the purpose of thinking: to aim at grasping the truth, and as such does not stay exclusively at an abstract theoretical ideal, but brings cognition directly into life in a form of an effective power, and in this new context does not stay focused only on humanistic motives derived from the insight into soul of an individual human being and a specific soul of a nation, but also aims at moving the realistic motives as well, those motives which are derived from knowledge of the material nature as well as from knowledge of conditions of economic life.«²⁶ In this, the most recent historical process Bazala becomes clearly sees a deviation from the above listed »dominant« characteristics of the Croatian national being. Namely, it now seems that »a dreaming romanticism« is being overcome, and what we now need is energetic and rather concrete work in the field of cultural and economic activities, as well as the matters of the state, because »a state comes as a result as awareness of a people, as a product of its self-conscious being, its will and its power – and formulates itself as a task in which historical foundations become important in a degree in which they enter into the current tendencies, borders of state integration stretch as far as national consciousness extends itself, while its content as well as the way it constitutes itself are defined by needs of cultural development.«²⁷ Thus understood construction and constitution of a national community Bazala marks, within philosophical tradition, with the highest possible distinction.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 12.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 13.

Namely, through a system thus defined, a Platonic idea of state is mirrored, a state founded on »the power of rational and moral will«. At this point we should emphasize – especially bearing in mind Bazala's personal fate – his attitude, based on the above mentioned elements, that within thus defined cultural and political horizon the Yugoslav idea was born, primarily in its »moral and cultural meaning« and as something complementary to the Croatian national feeling. In this context Bazala emphasized that the later moves within the Croatian political consciousness away and further from thus ideally defined Yugoslav idea had come exclusively as a result of inadequate and negative political practice, and were in no way linked to formal or substantial weaknesses or inadequacies of the Yugoslav idea in itself.

In 1935 Bazala published a work titled *O jugoslavenskoj misli* (»On Yugoslav Thought«). This was initially the speech he delivered at the ceremonial meeting of the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences held on the Strossmayer's Day, on 4 February. In this work he provided a detailed analysis of the beginnings, as well as the importance and the role of the Yugoslav idea, of course, especially related to contemporary political circumstances. According to Bazala, the Yugoslav idea was just another form of the idea of Illyrism, as changed by or adjusted to contemporary concrete historical circumstances. The idea of Illyrism, on the other hand, had two main sources: according to Gaj, that was »a spark of understanding, a cognition among the people«, which had smoldered in his homeland during the 18th century, while the second source were the ideas of enlightenment and democracy that came as a result of the French Revolution, than the ideas of the German Romanticism and, of course, Herder's historical and philosophical views on historical role of peoples, especially role of the Slavic peoples. During the time of the Illyrism, a consciousness of jointly belonging to the family of Slavic peoples was born as well, under the influence of Kollar, Dombrovsky and Šafarik. On this basis an understanding was developed that there is a need to develop cooperation between these peoples, to care for and foster national rights, national values and tasks within the framework of the international community of nations. The first step in thus defined cooperation was supposed to be unification with the closest ones, that is with the Illyric brothers, the unification »in language, faith and loyalty and every other virtue«²⁸. The ideational foundation of this idea of unification was »the oneness of the language«, which would »come alive through books«, and to realize this goal of national education a unified and common literary language was supposed to be developed. And precisely in Croatia an enormous sacrifice was made along these lines, as we gave up and sacrificed our living and fertile popular languages. And

²⁸ Ibid., p. 2.

that is why Bazala emphasizes that on this particular issue the name is not so important, but the idea itself, so indeed only the name has changed and from the Illyric one we came to the Yugoslav name. The Yugoslav idea, according to Bazala, has three basic characteristics: first, within the geographical and ethnic framework and meaning, second, as a symbol of integration aiming at cultural cooperation and development of a spiritual community, and thirdly and lastly, certain political consequences are coming as a result of the above efforts. Namely, according to Rački, »a union in language and books blazes the trail for the union in community«. The Yugoslav idea thus inherited the heritage of Illyrism and accepted to further develop its spirit, of course in a much more concrete way and based on new rational foundations and again brought around motives. This new community was supposed to guarantee and safeguard overall development and advancement of each and every individual nation, together with unconditional respect for individual and authentic traditions. Through all these elements »an agreeable framework in all the relationships within public life«²⁹ was supposed to be achieved, in order to enable a dignified role and place in »the circle of humankind«. For thus defined Yugoslav idea a spiritual and cultural development within the context of struggle for national existence was of crucial importance, and therefore even Rački during his times had emphasized that the Academy has to stimulate and cherish arts and sciences »for the benefit of the nation and the homeland«. Bazala emphasized that the Yugoslav idea was born within a very specific historical context and that it »represents a concept of being in its full and vigorous form of expression«³⁰. However, this idea is at the same time »a teleological process, that leads to a living practice within a free, genuinely spirited and with a human essence enriched and filled system and organization of culture«³¹. In precisely this way Bazala understands Strossmayer's attitude that the Yugoslav idea represents the future of our nations. Namely, this was the way how he understood it, that is as an idea, as a concept of »a potential reality« which should be brought to reality, and that would bring to the Slavic South an independence to the outside world, while at the same time enabling a powerful and from a point of view of national interest adequate individual development within a framework of a union of nations. Yet, Bazala immediately distances himself from those explanations of the Yugoslav idea that see in it an expression of some kind of a naturalist will for life. On the contrary, the Yugoslav idea, according to him, is first of all »a cultural will developed on natural foundations«, a will understood as a for-

²⁹ Ibid., p. 4.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 5.

³¹ Ibid., p. 5.

mative aspiration and an image of a happy and complete life, established within the spirit of freedom – and as such authentically founded in spirit. Moreover, this idea is »an idea of life« founded on free consciousness and belief of citizens and their willing consent to live together, and as such excludes any form of coercion, because in its essence it is free, progressive and democratic.

In the political sense this idea entails joint responsibility for common interests, while in the cultural sense it represents a vehicle which enables all the social classes to access cultural and educational values. Thus defined, this idea represents itself as the element which builds »a living community of free, equal people connected with each other through natural connections, interests, affinities, solidarity, honesty.«³² For Bazala, therefore, the first and foremost defining element of such »Yugoslav idea« is its foundation in the spirit of freedom which represents an unquestionable value above all other values. He adds here that it is very hard to define freedom. In a negative sense, together with Victor Hugo one might say that there is no freedom *where »je dir oui par peur et vivat par calcul«*, that is, according to Bazala, one could say that »freedom is an honest, an intimate breath of life, in its soul and in its heart – without any interest.«³³ Here, of course, individual limit of freedom is defined by honoring the freedom of the others, while its measure is seen through a secured balance between needs and demands of the union in its entirety. That is the reason why freedom represents a precondition for development of thinking. Within such a framework the freedom of belief and the freedom of forming a union with the others, as well as unlimited right of criticism and search for better possibilities of life, are all just evident manifestations of the idea of freedom, without which one cannot talk about a rational, that is desirable way of constitution of a community.

It is particularly important to emphasize that Bazala came with these statements in the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1935, so when one has in mind the then contemporary, in every single aspect chaotic state of this union of nations about which he speaks, than we could indeed admire tolerance, faith and optimism with which Bazala continued, without any hesitation whatsoever, to defend and argue for thus defined principles of such a union of nations. That union, according to Bazala, had to be established on the foundation of freedom, that is: in ethical terms, it had to be radically directed toward a common goal of achieving well-being of each individual part of the union, as well as of the union in its entirety. This is why Bazala at this

³² Ibid., p. 6.

³³ Ibid., p. 7.

particular point talks honestly and openly, and with firm and unshaken belief in the power of mind, talking about »a multitude of rational sense invested« into survival and development of this union, which cannot survive solely on »reciprocal trust and mutual tolerance.«³⁴

This particular Bazala's work on the Yugoslav idea clearly represents some sort of concretization of his idea of national philosophy. The result, however, shows and clarifies that the idea of national philosophy is in fact the idea of philosophy of a particular people, a philosophy of a particular spiritual and cultural living environment, defined on the basis of a number of historical and culturological points of reference. However, at this point, and based on this particular concept, we are also dealing with a program of constitution and a program of further development of the actual community of the South Slavic peoples.^{34a}

At this point it would be appropriate if we move a little away from the line of our argumentation and discussion of Bazala's ideas, and if we focus for a moment on thematically rather similar work of his colleague from the university and the Academy, a theologian and philosopher Stjepan Zimmerman, titled *Filozofija u Hrvatskoj, zastupana po svećeničkom staležu – kroz tisuću godina* (»Philosophy in Croatia, as Represented by the Social Class of Priests for One Thousand Years«), published in Zagreb in 1929. In this treatise Zimmerman actually moves beyond the horizon of the Croatian philosophy »from the other side of the Velebit mountain from the XV to the XVIII Century«, both in a geographical and a chronological sense, since his research covers entire Croatia and during »one thousand years«. Here we have to bear in mind that Zimmerman wrote this work at the time of great Croatian national anniversaries, namely the 1000th anniversary of the Croatian kingdom and the 100th anniversary of *Matica hrvatska* (»Central Croatian Cultural and Publishing Society«). Moreover, this particular historical and philosophical review was written for the special issue of the Proceedings of *Matica hrvatska*.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 8.

^{34a} On the problem of national philosophy in works of Albert Bazala, Franjo Zenko wrote in his article *O ideji (hrvatske) nacionalne filozofije u Alberta Bazale* (»On the Idea of the (Croatian) National Philosophy in the Works of Albert Bazala«), published in *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, 27–28 (1988), pp. 109–126. The author, however, made a mistake: a work of Stjepan Zimmerman, *Filozofija u Hrvatskoj, zastupana po svećeničkom staležu – kroz tisuću godina* (»Philosophy in Croatia, as Represented by the Social Class of Priests During One Thousand Years«), he by mistake attributed to Albert Bazala. When I collegially alerted him of it, he asked me to mention it in this note and thus advise regular readers of *Prilozi*. At this point I would like to state that due to this mistake the article of my colleague Zenko, taken in its entirety, has not lost its value and neither have its conclusions become questionable.

In the introduction of his treatise Zimmerman explains that »by its essential tendency philosophical thinking is indeed metaphysical«³⁵, from which he deduces that philosophy is genetically linked with religious ideas, as one of the crucial characteristics of religious consciousness is its dissatisfaction with empirical experiences. From this insight into incompleteness and imperfectness of the cosmic and of its own being, the religious consciousness develops its aspiration toward that what is above-experience, where indeed joint elements of philosophy and of religious beliefs are being founded. Together with that, there is one other element specific particularly to Christianity, and that is the overall and regular presence of philosophical questions on God, on human soul, on the goal and the purpose of human life, and all these issues indeed represent the content of that what we call Christian philosophy.

On the basis of thus defined relationship between philosophy and religion Zimmerman first establishes that »philosophical history of the Croatian people begins to develop with its acceptance of Christianity.«³⁶ True, he also adds that philosophical history is indeed older than Christianity, as it was founded on popular religion, yet it is still eminently Christian, since for centuries the Croatian people has been under particular influence of Christianity, yet not only in terms of its content but also in terms of its role and importance for the cultural life in general, as Christianity specifically defined »the spiritual development of the Croatian people«. For this reason, therefore, the history of the Croatian philosophy has been most closely related to activities of the Church in the overall national and cultural life and, of course, especially in the system of education.

This work has five chapters: *I Kršćanstvo i prvi počeci filozofije u Hrvata* (»Christianity and the Very Beginnings of the Philosophy Among Croats«), *II Crkvena školska filozofija* (»Ecclesiastic Philosophy in Church Schools«), *III Filozofski pisci do novijeg razdoblja crkvene filozofije* (»Philosophical Authors Before the Modern Age of the Ecclesiastic Philosophy«), *IV Ruder Josip Bošković i filozofija do osnutka Strossmayerova sveučilišta* (»Ruder Josip Bošković and Philosophy Before Establishment of the Strossmayer's University«), *V Savremeni razvitak katoličke filozofije* (»Modern Development of the Catholic Philosophy«). In the second chapter Zimmerman states the following: when the Croatian people settled in its current homeland, it entered into »the Latin cultural sphere«, and that primarily through schools that were established by the Roman Church authorities. From the IX century the founders of education and a school system in monasteries were the Benedictines,

³⁵ S. Zimmerman: *Historijski razvitak filozofije u Hrvatskoj* (»Historical Development of Philosophy in Croatia«), Zagreb, 1929, p. 1.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

and in their schools we can find the first sources of the school philosophy. Namely, within the framework of *septem artes liberales* dialectics, understood as the art of argumentation and discussion, was also thought in the *trivium*. Church education begun to widely develop especially after being encouraged by the Pope John X during the reign of the Croatian king Tomislav, and its primary goal at that time was to educate new priests. At later time Franciscan and Dominican priests took over this role from the Benedictine order. Within the framework of this historical reconstruction Zimmerman particularly emphasizes that since the IX century these religious schools of ours indeed provided the same theological and philosophical education as all the other Western schools run by priests, and it is therefore indeed fair to say that they begun the 1000-year tradition of spiritual development of our people.

At this point we should also add that this work by Zimmerman represents a pioneering work in historical-documentary sense. He and his associates provided a very comprehensive, thorough and reliable review of development of Church school philosophy in Croatia. Of course, it would be good if it could be further supplemented from the point of view of results of recent researches. We should especially emphasize that Zimmerman devoted the entire Chapter IV of his periodic division of the Croatian philosophy to R. Bošković. By doing this Zimmerman undoubtedly put Bošković at a very special place, stating that the Croatian people should especially respect Bošković as he enabled us »not to be forgotten in the overall competition in educational and scientific work«³⁷. Precisely on this particular issue we can see important difference between Zimmerman's views and Bošković's place in Bazala's *History of Philosophy*.

This work by Zimmerman is important for us in many ways. It clearly shows that during Bazala's time the issue of the Croatian philosophy, its tradition and its role in life of the nation was obviously a very important spiritual and intellectual theme. At the same time it opens a clear view toward another horizon of perception of this particular theme. With both of the above authors we can see the same basic aspiration to grasp the philosophical, the spiritual being of the Croatian people, but they see the crucial characteristics of this being in a somewhat different way, which than results with somewhat different philosophical, world-view and civilizational tasks standing in front of this people. And although Bazala does not openly argue against Zimmerman (at least not on this particular topic – although they often and fiercely argued), he undoubtedly knew about this particular work of Zimmerman, so that even this conspicuous quietness tells us a lot about Bazala's different approach to this complex and controversial theme.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 15.

In his work »*O ideji nacionalne filozofije*« (»On Idea of National Philosophy«), published in 1930, Bazala rounded up his discussions on the issue of relationship between philosophy, nation and social community. At the beginning of his paper Bazala defines that the problem of »national philosophy« is in fact the question of its role within »the genuinely cultural and social circle« labeled as people. The very function of philosophy as such he defines through the questions posed by Kant: what could I know, what should I do, what can I hope for, and from these questions we should be able to get an answer to the question: what is man? Bazala reaches these classical Kantian postulates by tasking philosophy with a comprehensive goal of developing a world-view, namely on the basis of experience as such and experience of life, on the basis of observation and thinking, emotional inspirations and insights, aspirations and hopes, cravings and its material manifestations, and through them reached, achieved successes, or failed plans, with all these elements building and forming a particular picture, a view of how things are formed and how a system of happenings is defined, to finally grasp the place and the task of man. At this point Bazala places special importance on and clearly and precisely emphasizes that the concept of philosophy is not limited either to scientific theoretical exposition of »a spiritual state of humanity« or to conceptual and objective analysis of purely theoretical questions, adding that philosophy should be understood as a historical exposition of development of thinking, of notions of the world, be it moral, social, religious or aesthetic. Moreover, he emphasizes that here we cannot have »interests of philosophical departments«, as Voltaire put it, but we talk about existential issues of man's living, his experience of the world which is constantly changing, realizations of his most different aspirations, cravings and predefined rational and purposeful programs.

The end result of the above exposition is that the concept of national philosophy necessarily entails much more than just a mere sum total of scientific works discussing theoretical and historical questions, that is much more than views and explanations of the world written in a particular national language, by domestic authors of particular, philosophical profession. According to Bazala, the end result of such a »scholarly« interest is that philosophy and its tasks are being reduced to »conceptually developed dispositive outline of philosophical thinking«³⁸, with an addition that this »aspiration for wisdom« has been cultivated in a national language. At this point he adds something of particular interest: namely, for him it is obvious that conceptual thinking represents something that is rationally objective, in other words a

³⁸ Bazala: »*O ideji nacionalne filozofije*« (»On the Idea of National Philosophy«), Zagreb, 1930, p. 7.

generalized content of a spirit that could be expressed in an universal way, which means that this theoretical content could be clearly discussed through »forms of expression belonging to different linguistic areas«³⁹. However, in this, necessarily abstract theoretical language many authentic original elements of a national language and form of expression are lost, although, of course, every language also entails specific individual elements – moreover, »elements that are by their grasp indeed crucial for grasping the worlds.«⁴⁰ These concealed, obscured meanings, the pillars of national language, Bazala calls »ghosts of a native place«. They are exceptionally important for a philosophical language, because they mirror the uniqueness of a living experience grasped at a particular and specific moment. These individualities or »spiritual quintesencies« spring out from that what he calls »a perceptual potential reality«, and which does not express itself only in the process of thinking, but also in general way of behaving in the world, that is equally in feelings and in aspirations, although reflexive thinking has special importance in the process of formation of that what he calls »a rational-purposeful being«. Therefore, a specific and particular concept of world and life comes as a result of manifestations of all aspects of life of an individual living union.

Such a living union is indeed that natural entirety in which an individual and his spirituality are, in which they exist and develop, and for that reason »the natural social framework of an individual life is a national community.«⁴¹ The entire history and culture is originally developed in »a form of a people«, and that means even before a people become aware of its individuality, its power and its rights, and from this, for Bazala's thinking very important definition springs out, namely that »a being of a people is older than a people have awareness of it, and is founded on a specific 'a priori' understood as a primordial ('born') possibility of a kind, and expressed through songs and tales, through thinking and actions, through customs and regulations, through active attitude and creation.«⁴² In this definition of the relationship between consciousness and a people Bazala also based his understanding of philosophy which, through its all-embracing nature is the only activity able to adequately express national being and national consciousness. In this process, we should equally emphasize, it is necessary to defend its originality and authenticity against outside influences. Bearing in mind thus defined meaning of national consciousness, from which general points of reference of concrete human possibilities spring out, a philosophical grasp

³⁹ Ibid., p. 7.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 7.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 9.

⁴² Ibid., p. 10.

and formation of an individual national culture always includes something specific – something concrete. Of course, at the level of simple cultures we still have a uniform entirety, which eventually, and in accordance with the overall development, differentiates within. Only on the basis of this process we can later talk about a picture of world and life in its Indian, Iranian or Semitic aspect, later we can differentiate between an Old Greek, Hellenic or Roman spirit, at an even later time about universalistic Middle Ages, than about Anglo-Saxon, Roman or Germanic prospective, as well as about »Slavic soul« and its various forms of expression, when they developed to a stage of a specifically defined form.

When from this general developmental scheme philosophy has to argument »a creative authenticity of concrete spirituality«, that is of a national consciousness, than, as Bazala emphasizes, we start facing considerable problems. Namely, the most difficult question is how to define this authentic and specific characteristics of »nationality« within a framework of a system so abstract as a philosophical system indeed is, and which, moreover, is never accepted by all the people within a particular »national circle« but, on the contrary, often includes internally opposing characteristics and elements. After listing problems related to definition of this »national element«, Bazala emphasizes that no single philosophical system, regardless of how widely rooted and differentiated in its exposition of situations and life in general, is able to provide »a complete picture of what is happening in a particular region«⁴³, and precisely from this point of view he views as inadequate all those definitions which are attached to different terms of, as he calls it, »scientific philosophy«, for example: rationalism, romantics, realism, idealism, mysticism, individualism, optimism, pessimism, etc. At this point we again have to emphasize that here we again have a clear expression of Bazala's aspiration to define philosophy outside of the traditional academic framework, and in the direction of, one might say, a philosophy of life, as indeed it is a rare philosophy that is able to provide a faithful »picture of happenings in a region«, as this was never really its primary task. Here we could also notice that it is somewhat strange that within the framework of this concept Bazala never tries to use, even in a transformed form, and along the lines of his way of thinking, Hegel's definition of philosophy as an activity that grasps its time, its epoch in thoughts. It seems to us that this was definitely not impossible to achieve, regardless of fundamental differences between Bazala's and Hegel's points of view, and through such an approach his concept would only gain more on its philosophical foundation.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 11.

Moving away from traditional, strictly philosophical approaches which are in fact, according to his way of thinking, only inadequately specified schemes, Bazala turns to representatives of »a science on spirit«, and these were W. Dilthey, K. Jaspers, Th. Erismann, E. Spranger, W. Stern, H. Munsterberger, E. Becker and the others who emphasize the importance of intuition, empathy and synthesis in fantasy as a more adequate way to reach authentic specifics of spiritual phenomena. These methods, according to him, do not lag behind traditional philosophical methods of rational definition of objective meanings in a sense of their generality and the lasting, »for-all-times« valid appropriateness of grasped truths. However, these new methods, as well as in those times particularly well known method of »understanding«, in their aspirations to reach the ideal and the typical, nevertheless failed to become completely sufficient and adequate for understanding of richness and authenticity of individual points of view which are part of the same spiritual circle.

Moreover, for Bazala the history of philosophy represents a precise evidence in favor of his statement. Namely, he thinks that the history of philosophy fails to provide a unified exposition of spiritual being of important individual philosophers, and is equally incapable to define characteristic elements of an era, i.e. of a national type of an individual philosophical system, so at this particular point we always meet only with a partial or a de-contextualized aspect of a particular philosophical existence, era or a national spirit. And what is missing here is something that Bazala calls »a unity of its live appearance«, namely that what is supposed to be the goal of these insights, and that is »a creative authenticity of a concrete spirituality«. This is why Bazala does not want to accept any of the concepts or attempts to interpret or reach an insight into this »concrete spirituality«, which is supposed to be the basis for defining »a specific national being and spirit«.

When discussing weaknesses of traditional methods he first emphasizes inadequacy of the method of »comparing«, that is of analogy, than the trials of congenial approximation, as well as a general problem of inability to grasp individual on the basis of general definitions, bearing in mind that it is not possible to reduce concrete subjectivity to a particular basic definition. He than one by one discusses and rejects various individual psychological explanations which are based on establishing the so-called dominant mental functions or dispositions, for example when the emphasis is placed on ability to observe, on intuition, imagination, on feelings, rationality, willingly acting manifestations or a certain temperament. At this point he refers to Dvorniković's views that melancholy represents a characteristics of »the Yugoslav soul«. In this part of his discussion Bazala mentions, as he says, various combinations of psychological explanations, which use metaphors of suspicious

value, for example when Weininger talks about male and female characters, warm and cold, or firm or soft souls.

He also rejects those psychological explanations, influential during his as well as our own time, that define typologies of introverted and extroverted types, or of static and dynamic types. It is also very indicative that he thoroughly and firmly rejects such national culturological explanations of basic spiritual defining elements, according to which, for example, science and arts are characteristics of the Greek spirit, while the talent for organizing state and developing a legal system (*«regere imperio populos»*) would be characteristics of the Roman spirit, pragmatic behavior and acting would characterize Anglo-Saxon peoples, affinity for refined forms of communication, wit, *esprit*, would be the main characteristic of the French spirit, while the willing subjection to the objective formation of things, rooted in the feeling of duty (defined by Wundt as ethical idealism), would be the characteristics of the German spirit, and finally the Slavic soul would be formed through a subjectivist attitude toward various expressions of life, with this subjectivism being linked with religious enthusiasm, even ecstasy. However, all these attempts, according to Bazala, are inadequate in a sense that they might become formative criteria and the basis for defining »a specific national being and spirit«. Therefore, after completely rejecting the than known attempts to define this authentic national-spiritual element, Bazala first suggests that we should find »an essential relationship« within which we could than define the entire variety of expressions of life. To achieve that, Bazala adds, we should research the following: we should work out and bring out into open all manifestations of life, their positions and arrangement of their positions (Bazala defines this by the German term *Seinsetzungen*), we should than find the areas of life as they are positioned, where its fundamental foundation points (*«fundamentum relationis»*) are becoming visible. That is why we have to research how all these elements are positioned in other areas, how the entire system is fine-tuned (for this Bazala again uses a German term, *«Gefüge»*), and, finally, how this authentic form of being is expressed, that is, how his, as Bazala says, *«So-sein»* is being expressed.

These are, therefore, according to Bazala, the elements which form the essential relationship we are searching for, and he defines it, at a wide theoretical level, as a logical relationship of that what is general and that what is individual. This relationship is than expressed in logical terms as the relationship between idea and concept and has a decisive cognitive theoretical significance. On the ontological level it is expressed as a relationship between phenomena and essence, defining characteristics of being as well as a general sequence of events. From moral and legal point of view this is a relationship of »will and action« with existing norms and laws that formulate obligations,

that is responsibility, and on the social level this relationship is expressed as a way in which an individual interacts with society, and from which, again, a joint survival is being constituted, while on the religious level a result of it is a relationship between relative and absolute truths, from which ideal aspects of beliefs and expectations are then being formulated.

The explicative power of this »essential relationship«, namely that what is individual and that what is general, Bazala briefly displays through essential characteristics of major cultured nations, although on the basis of the same scheme he did not try to define characteristics of »the cultural estate of the Croatian people«⁴⁴. It is definitely worth to examine why Bazala did not do it in this work, published in 1938, in which this was indeed the main and explicit topic; luckily, we do not have to guess on his reasons, as Bazala himself explained this issue. Avoiding further explications of these defining points was not, indeed, the issue of a philosophical problematic character, but an issue of his estimate of the general political situation or »the spirit of the time«, that is of opportunism. If he would decide to start defining this »estate of the Croatian people«, in that case, as he said, he would also necessarily have to define his position in regard to concrete happenings in the real life of his people, and he would also have to define his position toward »historical guidelines«. All that, as Bazala said, would under given circumstances represent a quite »uncomfortable task«.

Bazala felt that the than actual tendencies definitely were not in every aspect an expression of »the essential will« of the Croatian people, but to critically speak about it and to pursue an objective assessment, within a context filled with agitated passions and opposing standpoints, would prove as a task where »every objective word becomes rather unpleasant«.⁴⁵ At this particular point we especially have to emphasize that after such devastating criticism of the »spirit of the time« of than contemporary Yugoslav union, Bazala also adds another courageous attack, firmly stating that all that historically »was or has been born« is not by itself an unquestionable national value, as among these historically born elements there are many different unfinished and incomplete elements of the national consciousness, there are illusions, even »delusions«, and it is indeed a task of philosophy to gain insight into this problem, to differentiate and, moreover, to rectify and correct such a »historical feeling«. For these reasons he decided to avoid judging the actual historical developments, but instead points toward »the role and importance of philosophical 'wondering' for education of the national being«⁴⁶ and for

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 18.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 18.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 18.

development of indeed adequate culture. For the above reasons his discussion aims at and focuses on »the idea of national philosophy«, which means on the role and the tasks of philosophy in its »ideal essence«, that is on the abstract level of formal completeness and purposefulness. At the same time such an approach enables him to leave aside an assessment of realistic achievements of the historical and cultural being of his nation and the achieved level of authentic and philosophical views.

Thus beginning his argumentation, Bazala first established that the line of development of the mankind, that is its history, mostly represents a process of progressive development, although with periods of regression. Therefore, we may say that one of the main characteristics of this process is the element of leaving the »natural state«, that is, here we have a process of reaching the awareness of various possibilities of man along his efforts of rethinking, his reflection upon his own moves or rational actions which entail higher forms of inter-relation, rational-purposeful viewpoints, and that is precisely the element labeled as culture in its subjective spirit. Here we in fact have the »*cultura animi*«, that is nurturing and educating man's natural potentials. Parallel with this, objective expressions of mind are being developed, expressions that take a form of various institutions, while at the same time we have development of the process of institutional advancement of different forms of knowledge and science, and all these elements at the end establish culture in the objective sense. This growth of culture, therefore, signifies the process of moving forward from that what we usually call »the natural state«, and which is also nostalgically called »the paradise lost«, with various implications, for example from the lost initial equality and justice, to the lost »natural« feeling for beautiful, fair and moral. In a certain sense this feeling is shared by Bazala himself, and therefore, precisely because he does not want us to lose this initial and direct relationship with the native soil and the national being, he argues for necessary return to the source, and that is what he calls »the original experience« which entails »the living source of creative dreaming«, and that is »*mythos* from which intellectual awareness springs out, that is *logos*, and after that passion for beautiful, *eros*, and aspiration toward good, that is *ethos*«⁴⁷. This entire process of development resulted with great social stratification and spiritual diversification, and that is what one calls a division of labor which results with various disintegration tendencies, which most seriously endanger natural interrelations and links within the national community. Bazala marks this as a problem of emergence of social asymmetry which, according to him, should be overcome, which means that it is necessary to harmonize different, and even opposing cultural and social

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 20.

sub-systems within a particular community. He emphasizes the necessity of regaining, that is of preservation of the unity of human personality, the fullness of expression of its possibilities, as well as preconditions for rational life in contrast with separateness and limitations forced upon us by highly specialized professions, »expert« education, where that what is called »a unity of life« is being lost.

In order to be able to overcome all the tendencies toward this »asymmetry«, which essentially characterize the modern age, a philosophy is necessary, a philosophy that is, according to Bazala, the only activity able to re-establish the harmonic relationship of an individual with himself and with the community at large, in a regained »natural state«, that is in »the second nature«. This is a necessary process of development and reaching a higher stage of life, and it is developed, or it should be developed, in an »organic order«, and that means also as a form of a continuous »maintaining and renewal of being«⁴⁸ in various different changes and transformations. Yet the basis of these transformations always has to be certain »urge from within«, and this means that an overall development of »the authentic life« should not be forced from the outside, but has to be given only as internal and conscious development of spiritual aspirations aiming at further development of being, and that though individual and authentic values and sense. At this point Bazala again quotes Fichte, who says that »Me« is »an organized natural product« within which individual parts are mutually interdependent, and within this unity thus understood »Me« is expressed as the instinct for survival. And culture, understood as »the other nature« of man, also has its own survival instinct, its own »love for itself«, and that is philosophy. Therefore, culture entails this analogous instinct toward the natural aspiration for development from within itself, that Bazala defines as »persistence in one's own way«, »*conservation sui*«. Namely, culture is a rational-purposeful activity toward imagined and preconditioned outline of man's possibilities and desirable goals. Within this development of culture philosophy has a very special and individual place and, according to Bazala, it is »an instinct, as well as aspiration toward knowledge, moral conduct, social inclusion, artistic creation and religious uplifting«.⁴⁹ However, here he does not identify philosophy with none of these individual and partial expressions of the spirit, but he argues that philosophy exists precisely in the opposition against all these elements, and is indeed something that unifies all these manifestations of the spirit, and directs them toward the final and the ultimate goal of the human life, and that is »reaching perfection in achieving wisdom«.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 23.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 24.

In this definition of philosophy Bazala firmly stands against contemporary Modern-age destruction of the unity of knowledge, which is most clearly visible in natural and technical sciences, but is also equally effective in humanistic and social sciences, including philosophy. This is why he quotes Pythagoras, as cited by Cicero, who *said »artem se scire nullam sed esse philosophum«*, thus arguing for an all-embracing knowledge, or the essential knowledge, which precisely by this virtue of grasping the essence of things and phenomena overcomes the insights of individual sciences, lifting itself to the »rational-purposeful« foundations of that what indeed is, that is represents »the wisdom of spiritual human existence«. ⁵⁰ In this, Bazala's further definition of philosophy it is quite original, especially from the point of view of today's thinking, his emphasis on philosophy understood as an all-embracing instinct, as well as his effort to explain how philosophy reconciles within itself, and include within itself very different definitions of philosophy, and this is enabled by the fact that his understanding of philosophy defines it as something that expresses »vital demands of cultural consciousness«. ⁵¹ Namely, Bazala considers that different historical definitions of philosophy, according to which it provides »principles of knowledge and action« or »basic founding elements of being«, or is understood as »an aspiration toward clarity« or »discussion of ideas«, which is clearly a very wide historical arch of epochal definitions of philosophy, essentially incorporated within his request that an analysis and expression of life should come from »the depth of a soul«, that is, on the other hand, »the essence of the living instinct« and is therefore only at that point able to rise above an intellectual grasp of reality, because, according to Bazala, the entire wisdom of the world and the life is being deduced from »experience«, and this particular phenomenon or concept represents one of the main defining points of his theoretical philosophy, which we will discuss at a later stage. Of course, he does not think about any »experience«, but he aims at the essential ones, calling upon Plato and stating that this is that particular type of »experience« which, by shaking the soul, results with amazement that is the source of philosophy, that is: thus understood »experience« is one of the elements »of the composition of the picture of the world and the life«, as indeed is the title of one of his works.

Reflecting upon different definitions of philosophy, Bazala continuously emphasizes its aspiration and demand to direct, form and grasp the entirety of man's efforts, thus relativizing different philosophical concepts, and that not only in a strict differentiation of philosophical standpoints, but he, on the contrary, talks about »wise ecstasy« and »philosophical enthusiasm« that in-

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 25.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 25.

cludes something much wider than philosophy understood as science in a traditional academic sense. Thus, according to him, philosophy expresses itself as a scientific work based on knowledge of nature and spirituality of man, his artistic creativity, his ethical and social activity, as well as his religious attitude. This all-embracing enthusiasm forms and harmonizes development of cultural consciousness in a way that overcomes old forms and relations and lifts them into higher and organic unities of cultural consciousness. For this reason, philosophy understood as a »school wisdom« for Bazala has limited reach, and that in two ways: philosophy understood as a history of philosophical viewpoints and solutions for him is an interesting and important area of research, but also something that is in itself inadequate and unable to resolve the crucial tasks of a particular historical moment and of future decisions.

On the other hand, philosophy understood as a systematic science, that is understood as theoretical discussion, as conceptual analysis and a process of defining knowledge and being, is equally inadequate in a sense that we could grasp the living, the actual problems of the world and of our life in that world. When listing and mentioning various philosophical-historical viewpoints, Bazala is clearly acknowledging them as unavoidable elements and contributions within the overall effort to grasp the entirety of man and the unity of its world. However, according to him, only in one particular and authentic »personal equation« truthfulness and objective importance of that particular philosophical concept is being established, that is the fundamental importance of the rational element is being clarified, which all becomes clearly visible in various existential situations or, as he says, in »initial tendencies«, that is in borderline situations »of decisions made at crossroads where the entire life is crucified and often even broken into pieces.«⁵²

Bazala thus states that philosophy is something more than just »governing from ideas«, as Schopenhauer thought. Also, it is not just »reflection at a grand scale«, as Cousin stated, but is based on the process of deepening the experience of life, its collected strength, and difficulties in life cannot be resolved by a »rational calculus«, but by something that Bazala calls »'thinking hard', insight of a genius, intuition and prospective-purposeful thinking through«.⁵³ This is why he affirmatively quotes Eucken, who sees in philosophy that immanent inner moving force of reality, that is: to it we should attribute definition of »creative evolution«, as in Bergson, and this means stimulation of rational-purposeful formation. Philosophy is that what forms the being of life and it thus becomes the principle of spiritual survival, which

⁵² Ibid., p. 29.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 29.

means that philosophy has the status of formative force of reality as virtue, aiming at reaching fully achieved humanity. Thus its traditional definition is also being achieved, and that is, according to Bazala: »theology of human aspirations and cravings«, »establishment of human ideal« and »the theory of perfect life«. On the basis of these judgments Bazala provides his own definition of life: »philosophy is... grasping human purpose and striving in wish and in decision to be a man. Philosophy is a ripe and rounded expression – of will to reach humanity«. ⁵⁴ In this definition of philosophy we should especially emphasize two elements: philosophy is an act of decision-making and of will, as through these two elements we are able to clearly grasp Bazala's understanding of philosophy.

Thus reaching his own definition of philosophy, Bazala from it defines the being of man, his nature and his community, culture and civilization in which he lives. Philosophy understood as an »ardent agent« manages the entirety of life taken as »a rationally-purposefully qualified being«. ⁵⁵ Because of that philosophy is an »all-working (general) factor« in development and formation of cultural and civilizational happenings, but is at the same time a persuasion and an instruction to a human being on how to position and define oneself within the context of reality, yet not only in a form of a rational relationship, but also in an emotional-and-willing sense. By this, man achieves a measure of the beginning, that is »the principles and the foundations« from which he springs, as well as the endings (»*finis*, purpose«) to which one should aspire, and in which one may find a stronghold of his life in accordance with human capabilities and realistic needs. Therefore, as Bazala says, here we have a »lesson« on how and in what form to develop and form reality which is fundamentally different from the way nature happens, that is from its causality. This reality, understood as a »second nature« in accordance with biological formations that entail mental processes such as »feelings, visualization, experiencing and instinctive positioning«, but such a reality is first of all expressed through the process of formation of the world based on »human possibility«, that is in processes that relate to »me« and that are labeled as »mine«. According to that, in contrast to purely natural world of physical laws, the reality of the world is founded on subjectivity of the subject, that is: this world is made through willing, rational-purposeful activity. The world is a result of work and realization of »Me«, realization in a particular, individual »aspect«, as its »aspiration« and under the sign of its »need«. On this basis »Me« is being constituted in terms of contents, in terms of emotional and willing sense, and the entirety of the mental spiritual activ-

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 30.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 30.

ity becomes »revenue« and »ownership« of »Me«, that is in this way »Me« becomes and is a subject. This is the road that leads to becoming a subject, the way of establishing its authentic reality. According to Bazala, this process is »dynamic, partly also theological«, but in no way it is a mechanical one – causally conditioned. The characteristics of »Me« as a subject is its continuous aspiration to reach higher and more perfect forms of its own development. The essential characteristics of thus understood being is the continuous working tension in the process of searching for and reaching the predefined goals. Thus understood »Me« is dynamic in its origins, because everything that is reached and appropriated, every single spiritual »estate« has to be continuously regained, that is: »the empire of the spirit is always in pursuit«. ⁵⁶ This ascent into the mental and spiritual spheres therefore does not happen without »burden (*solicitatio*)«, that is without effort, as culture indeed is a troublesome process of nurturing and further developing that what is already reached and achieved.

Within Bazala's thus dynamically defined spiritual world the authentic function of philosophy comes into open, in a sense of »philosophical foundation and at the same time explanation« of how existential acts of conscious activity could be moved, and how after that, the very work of life, understood as »a unique living expression«, could be defined and justified. This particular aspiration of »Me« Bazala defines as »substance« which is indeed the bearer of the spiritual being, that is: the culture that has to be, at every time and any time, again and again built and established until reaching the level of self-sufficient and independent entirety. However, this aspiration is always a concrete and individual aspiration, within a framework of concrete relationships and conditions, and clearly, in terms of time and space, predefined, and the same applies for its orientation and its possibilities. In thus defined Bazala's concept, therefore, we have establishment of a particular existential possibility, which is an act of will, and it has to be »brave and courageous«, founded on insight and foreseeing, which all constitutes »a consciously qualified life« of that »Me« that is always an individual act. Bazala emphasizes that this, always individual acting, definitely can also obtain a more general meaning and recognition beyond time, but it always has to be differentiated from the general quality of activities that happen and last without influence of the subject. For that reason the existential dynamism of »Me« builds and establishes a specific »Me« – a causality that is individual and that aspires to establish a harmonious wholeness. Bazala therefore at this particular point again calls upon Fichte, because here we clearly see how indeed this is an exclusively individual decision of how an individual, a concrete »Me« will posi-

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 33.

tion itself in the process of humanization of the world, that is: in the fight for »honor and dignity of humanity«.

After that Bazala further discussed and developed existential preconditions of development of culture and community, and established the following: an individual »Me« enters the world at a specific, precisely defined point of space and time; it has its place of birth and its native circle from which it starts developing its activities; the past of its predecessors represents an instruction, as well as a direction and responsibility for executing tasks of the future. This, given state of the world understood as a concrete historical structure, is »happiness (*tyche*)«, i.e. that what we meet on our way through life, while that what enables us to reach and realize these tasks is »nature (*physis*)«, that gives a man his »talents« as potential energies that »Me« has to make into reality and »functionally« execute in order to make it a revenue of the conscious life.

These statements by Bazala could be defined as an outline of an ontology of human being, and that has clearly and precisely defined authentic existential characteristics; although this qualification »existentialist« one should understand in a wider sense of a point of view, and not as an aspect of the philosophy of existence that precisely during those years was being established in Germany and France. Bazala lists the following essential defining points, one might even say the existentialities or, as he put it, »the down-payments«, »*dispozitio*«; this first »responsible and meritorious work«⁵⁷ of man, namely this individual »Me«, is obliged to use his »talents« in a wise and responsible way and for the greater good of the community. Here we have a presumed possibility, as is rationally formulated in »thoughts«, but also »projected«, that is: it indeed is the basis of a still un-realized work. The very springing into, the entering into reality of »Me« is an original and direct act that is not something a priori given »from a potential newly planted seed (*Anlage*)«, but it is »a product understood as springing of an embryo (*Ansatz*)«⁵⁸, that is: it is a willful, conscious establishment and development of meaning, as well as its formation. This possibility of a subject expresses itself as a »value« of this emerging and than executed act, which in itself always disguises uncertainties of a flow of happenings. However, originality and importance of a concrete individual initiative lies precisely in this lucky grasping and understanding of original and authentic constellation of happenings of the world, that a subject is able to consciously use, or else these constellations are lost beyond hope to be regained at a later time. That is a particular time and space in which »Me« builds its own and authentic world of its personal-

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 38.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 39.

ity, and by this giving to a flow of happenings its personal lasting mark or, in other words, »Me« is individuality understood as »individually developed representation of humanity«. ⁵⁹ Therefore, philosophy is a way of formulating and establishing a self-consciousness, yet not an individual, separate self-consciousness, but it is »a construction of entirety – a formation of being.« ⁶⁰ For this reason the importance of philosophy in the process of education and formation of a self-conscious personality cannot be limited to »being a subject within an individual circle (*suo nomine, agere*)« ⁶¹, but, in contrast to the others, to be a being of the organic and physical world means to be aware of development of the happenings of the world in their historical prospective. It also means to respect past in its future aspect, that is: to accept and »take as its own« the past and the future, or to be »*unum per se*«, and it is for that reason that Bazala again emphasizes that this could happen only within an »independent and self-consciously developed sphere of activity.« ⁶²

By this he at the same time firmly rejects a notion that activities of »Me« should be understood as exclusively happening within a subjective context, because in that case the spiritual world would be defined only as a »group of discrete individual existences«, which self-reliantly and self-sufficiently live within their own individual meaning and sense, so consequently and necessarily they would be forced to live a lonely life. However, »Me«, the subject is not defined only as movement within a framework of consciousness that »enjoys itself«, but is naturally linked with other »Me«s, together with whom it belongs to »a same type of being«.

These individual existences communicate with each other by signs, through speech, thus forming a possibility of rational communication, that is: on this basis they are able to form communities, but specifically human communities; they are different from various forms of joint survival systems in organic world which are based on lower biological, that is on lower mental abilities, such as sensation, imaginings, perceptions and instincts. Differentiation of these two types of communities Bazala bases primarily on the very specificity of subject. He marks and defines them as »friends«, that is: these are those beings which form a society, or: this is a group of existences that mark themselves as »We« and that jointly form »a collective consciousness, a collective will and a collective spirit.« ⁶³ Yet this »togetherness« is not beyond or above a subject, but is only an individual consciousness that is in an energy

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 40.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 41.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 41.

⁶² Ibid., p. 41.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 43.

formed in dynamic unity, and therefore, as such, is able to establish something more than just a mere sum, as thought by Hume and the liberal tradition, and it is therefore why it has nothing in common with results of natural efforts or necessities. This specific unity, therefore, expresses and defines the idea of a community as related to its ability to grasp the past and foresee the future. Moreover, according to Bazala, the world as such is »tying up the past and the future« in a sense that parts define the entirety, and the entirety at the same time permeates and defines individual parts. From this springs a definition that states that social consciousness, understood as »integration« of numerous »Me«s, is something that is being continuously restored and regenerated through activities of numerous »Me«s. However, this social consciousness, on the other hand, is not some firm and constant givenness, but its co-existence depends on intensity of »spiritual work«, that is: its power is being formed in accordance with quality and direction of activity, so it is therefore being developed through convergence and harmonization of diversified »Me«s, or else in a direction of divergence or separation of interests, thinking, feelings and goals. We see here that Bazala develops a specific phenomenology of emerging and structuring of communities. Namely, it becomes clear that this is a way to establish distinct groups within a social consciousness that is within »a social circle«. Those groups can either live parallel to each other, or in relative harmony, or can end up in rivalry that may result with changes of the overall state of things, and even result with community falling apart. However, Bazala thinks that it is possible to assume a different development. Namely if the »social circle« begins to widen and include new members, and based on the appeal of a particular historical circle the community becomes stronger, which means that this community is in harmony with »dynamics of the social core«. In other words, it provides a clear answer to the primal and original interest and aspiration of that particular autochthonous core. Bazala calls this movement »a sociological pattern« whose being is a conscious force and whose basis is that natural quality of »a biological community« that expresses itself through a historical development, and than as »cultural uplifting«, and both of these elements for a continuous line of happenings, connected in time, that link together a similar, constant and stable »community consciousness« understood as »a unity above biology«, and that necessarily through »individuals able to replace each other in a same current«. At this point we again clearly see the full meaning and importance of philosophy, for establishment of both individual and collective consciousness, that is for establishment of a self-reliable, individual and self-conscious personality, that is: »the empire of the spirit is developed and sustained through support and participation of individual personalities.«⁶⁴

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 45.

On the basis of the above argumentation Bazala once again states that »the love for wisdom« »is a fundamental and integral force of life«. Namely, it enables constitution of a human being in a form of a subject, and by this it also positions itself in an essential, active relationship toward spiritual reality, as well as toward »cultural appearance«, that forms its back side. This is the way of developing and educating a personality, »a personal structure« understood as »Me«, but at the same time developing a »friendly«, socially interconnected existences understood as »We«. Into this line of argumentation and into this system, a philosophical thought or, as Bazala says, »concentration« brings into very existence »an aspiration«, that is a spiritualization that results with a self-conscious being labeled as »Me« or »Me – only (*ich selbst*)«. This allows for a subject to be defined from within itself, which again means that he alone decides on his opportunities within given circumstances. In this process he gives those opportunities a specific meaning and sense, while at the same time through that process he gains his own specific authenticity which makes him different from all other beings. Individuality gained in this way entails quality and excellence, that is the elements of development and growth of value, and this, as Bazala says, is »a moment of historical meaning and importance«. Through this process an individual being, gains a place and a name within a historical line of events. He becomes important in »socially widened circle of life«⁶⁵, while thus understood life, on its part and in its entirety, and under the influence of philosophy that founds the spiritual human nature, expresses itself as a specific and authentic analogy of development of individual consciousness, that is of living reality of an individual. In his argumentation of the above standpoint, Bazala calls upon Plato, for whom a social being, a community represents just a man augmented in a specific and authentic way (*makroanthropos*). That is why social being is a specific »systematic form« (*Gefüge*) of individual existences. Their specific spiritualities co-exist and a new quality of common consciousness springs out of it as an expression and a form of co-living of identities of that being. It constitutes itself as an unbreakable unity of the past and the future through the present time. Philosophical thought and »aspiration« sometimes springs out of collective excitement and agitation, or from specific individual initiatives, especially initiatives coming from »great personalities«. Those individuals are able to give, in a specific way, to their community their inner activity, and these activities lead to formation of self-consciousness and to filing up of a community and an individual with purpose and values. Bazala sees a complete social being in its primal and intensive relationship towards »the source of experiencing«. A being moves »from within itself«, grasping and accepting

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 47.

specifics and possibilities of its particular position, and its spiritual development in the direction of individually adequate, appropriate and characteristic spiritual meanings. Those are the various and specific »views, pleasures and goals«, from which than an authentic synthesis of an individual way of life springs out. Therefore, for Bazala this »original experience« represents »the carrier of historical and cultural creative activity«⁶⁶, while social being is not characterized according to individualities and their differentiation, but primarily according to development and building of its own possibilities. Bazala emphasizes that this is valid for all the forms that are developed from a synthesis of individual elements, that is to say they live as one among the many. Completely dependent on the above concept is congruence of different aspirations forming a state of a culture, a meaning and importance of that particular form of living within a precise historical line of events and within a particular historical context. Bazala especially emphasizes independent cultural development of an individual who has to guarantee establishment of a non-conflicting harmonious community, namely a union of »an inner circle«, and which differs, by its interests, needs and insights from other »wider social entities« together with which it forms, during particular historical eras, even more wider communities. These complex communities, however, could transform, their interrelations could radically change or even revolutionize, regardless of whether such changes are isolated or maybe include the entire wider community. At this particular point Bazala obviously thinks about various forms of unions of different nations, regardless of whether on that issue we do or do not have a case of »naturally developed close links and culturally continued integration«⁶⁷, which is another expression used for »an inner circle«, or a popular-national entirety. Such relatively homogenous communities gain their historical and cultural legitimacy only on the basis of willing and conscious expression of »common institutions« within the sphere of »objective spirit«, and this is being mirrored through formative systems of »thinking, imagination and beliefs«, through established and defined social relations, both moral, legal and state ones, and finally through primordial control over nature or, as Bazala says, through overcoming of »the primitive culture«. Such a way of construction of a community is being achieved when »essentially condensed forces« start to develop themselves from their own internal self, and when they start to define possibilities that are given and predefined from within their own »experiential sensation«, thus forming a rational-purposeful reality of their own individuality, its essential idea through which »wisdom of world and life« is becoming visible and is being expressed.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

On the basis of thus defined argumentation Bazala reaches the first defining element of national philosophy, which expresses itself as a sum of spiritual activities self-consciously directed toward personal »education of national life«, as well as a self-conscious expression of in »overall developed system of spiritual aspirations«⁶⁸ in its historical and cultural development. A particular national philosophy, however, has its own individual predefined contextual formative elements: first, we have its definition in terms of geography and nature; within a defined living area we have a nation that is united along a biological basis; here we than have its preconditions in terms of its natural basis, that is a possibility of economic development, as well as a possibility to defend itself against enemy influences, while at the same time the community itself is being complexly stratified on the basis of division of labor. Members of such a community are characterized by fairly similar physical constitution, while various specific bio-genetical factors clearly show their dominant traits and characteristics, regardless of unavoidable mixings and assimilation. Through this an individual becomes prepared and ready for cultural and civilizational accomplishments and achievements, and also through »natural breeding«, and at a later stage, through conscious, purposeful »energetic creation«. Individual consciousness, understood as a »system of mental abilities«, is founded on individual experience, but in a similar way it also forms »a joint consciousness«, which has certain common characteristics: those are the primordial and common forms of being, such as the language of the people, than in myths, that is in mythology of national existence, as well as in a world-view, customs, regulations and artistic creation; each of these individual areas in a very authentic way expresses this individual-common experience of world and life. All these multitudes of expressions should be reduced on principled and essential meanings, and this is precisely a task of national philosophy, which has to harmoniously develop all these elements until they reach a spiritual ideal unity, until they enable a sustainable and effective organization that will than express itself as »a living potential reality of a particular style«.⁶⁹ At this point Bazala again quoted Nietzsche, according to whom culture represents a »unity of artistic style in all the various expressions of life of a particular nation«.⁷⁰ Therefore, it has to be an expression of an autochthonous will of a people, and as such cannot be founded on »borrowed international schemes«. Namely, a culture of a nation, regardless of necessary outside, foreign influences, initially has to develop according to its own »plan«, which means that everything that makes up that culture has

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

to be adjusted to its own individual being. Reaching this goal, however, cannot come as an achievement, as a result of mere philosophical knowledge, but only comes as a result of efforts and activities of all those who produce works of culture and, finally, of the society in general, a society that is being moved, through feelings and through spirituality, toward such »plans«.

According to Bazala, therefore, the basis of development of a national spirit is the actual knowledge of natural and living circle of the nation, as well as knowledge of various theoretical achievements produced within a nation, which at a later stage begin to form »a popular science« and »enlightenment«. Within the constitutive elements of »national spirit« we should necessarily include knowledge of economy, popular anthropology and psychology, as only on the basis of such a comprehensive and complete picture we could define a basis for outlining a direction in which a community should be constituted, as well as for relations with other nations and foreign influences. Bazala, of course, attaches specific importance to aesthetic function, that is to literary and artistic creation which forms and at the same time represents »the native circle« and »the spirit of the land«. Generally speaking, the so-called national creativity or wisdom has to be systematically researched and rationally formulated, in order to be able to define the essence of the popular spiritual unity that is being expressed through such a variety of different expressions. An additional important element at this stage is sociological research of a nation. Such a research of a concrete example of the Croatian people, according to Bazala, shows that peasants form the core of the social being, and it is therefore through this particular social class that the entire social and cultural work is being formed. In this particular theoretical work Bazala only very indirectly, one might even say only through vague allusions, relates to the than actual happenings within his contemporary society and the state, so from that point of view it is even more interesting to analyze his view of peasants, which at that time indeed represented the main and by far the most numerous political factor of the Croatian society. Bazala emphasizes that, regardless of the fact that peasants were indeed, in terms of the actual numbers and in terms of relative class dominance, they definitely cannot be »the only initiator« of historical and cultural happenings, yet it is beyond any doubt an important social factor, on the basis of its »empirical spirituality«, as well as according to its »intentional meaning and importance«, that is by the way and the type of its living existence – by which Bazala primarily aims at its direct living relationship with nature, as well as at the living presence of »consciousness coming from the system of farming cooperatives«, and the resulting feeling of joint interdependence within such a framework – which clearly defines the principal difference in comparison with atomization of individual life in a city. The very way in which agricultural, peasant's economy

is established, emphasizes Bazala, excludes a possibility of unjustified gains, so that this particular type of gaining wealth might be defined as the basic principle on which social and cultural state of things could be established. Also, even peasant's religiosity, be it a purely natural one or not, entails belief in the spirit of the law that rewards work and good deeds, so that could also be an element that should be respected when organizing society in general. These and similar elements, according to Bazala, could form fundamental constitutive elements of »a peasant's democracy«, therefore, of something specifically ours in comparison with, as he says, the English democracy, which is traditional, the French democracy, which is liberal, and the Czech democracy, which is socially-humane. Therefore, national cultural life is being developed through »spiritual enthusiasm« of the entirety of the national being, that is through »natural-biological, empirical-psychological and sociological preconditions«⁷¹ of its survival. By this Bazala reaches another definition of national philosophy, namely it is »spiritually revived activity of the national being«.⁷²

It should be emphasized that Bazala at this point very firmly distances himself from any traces of naturalism in discussing issues of constitution of national philosophy, because it is clear that culture is »a spirit that came from the nature«. However, in no way could culture be understood as just a continuation of nature, since culture is not developed spontaneously, but is being created as in »a form of spiritual qualification«. Pure naturalism, according to Bazala, is non-spiritual and non-philosophical, and the same applies to naturalistic notion of people, which »becomes philosophically exalted being« only on the basis of relationship of rational values, that is only at that point when it transforms its experiential reality into »spiritual meanings«. Also, »empirical spirituality« does not represent a value by itself, but only at a point when it becomes »spiritually developed« it indeed becomes one of the results of cultural activities. Not even the so-called »will of the people« can be understood just as a mere sum of wills of many or the majority, but instead it is »an ideal construction«, which means a rational midpoint of various insights, as well as a midpoint between obedience to authority, that is the principle of a leader and a faceless pressure of the mass. Justification of a call to get closer to nature Bazala understands only as a deterrent against a particular perverted or decadent cultural state, for example when there is a danger of alienation of the national being under foreign influences. Precisely at that particular point, states Bazala, a philosophical aspiration has to emerge in a form of criticism and consciousness, in order to change the course of cultural

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 58.

⁷² Ibid., p. 58.

civilizational happenings back toward their »native tasks«. Only in this particular sense a philosophical aspiration becomes and constitutes »a spiritually revived nature«.

For necessarily correct »constitution of spirit« one other element is equally important, and that is an ideationally correctly directed historical consciousness which has to be able to differentiate between valuable and instructive elements in historical happenings, to be able to use this as a basis for achieving a balanced position between tradition on the one hand and possibilities of new achievements on the other. This is then a basis for an encouragement both to dynamics and to the identical quality of the national being. Of course, such a view of historical consciousness assumes a widely spread aspiration toward spiritual contents with every individual, and that is precisely what Bazala himself tried to achieve in practical terms, namely through development of popular education.

Bazala's understanding is that all-embracing mental and spiritual movement of the national being, permeated with philosophical aspiration, represents in fact a »quest and conquest of a spiritual homeland, of an individually developed view of world and life«. ⁷³

It could be concluded that this last statement by Bazala in fact very clearly represents his way of accepting and further developing Franjo Marković's ideas on national philosophy. In the process of developing and structuring this national consciousness the entire rational aspiration of a nation is built in, that is: this national consciousness entails everything that has been achieved, everything that is desirable, as well as predefined as goals. This is why Bazala calls it, using a very appropriate term, »a spiritual estate«, not something in which one could simply enjoy by himself, and neither could just continuously use it. At the same time it cannot be considered as something that is able to further develop on its own and autonomously, as some sort of an innate idea, as Bazala adds, in a Platonic or an Aristotelian sense, as to argue for a concept like that would mean to argue for a mere and ill-founded, non-historical rationalism.

TRANSLATED BY ZORAN MILOVIĆ

⁷³ Ibid., p. 61.

A. BAZALA – UTEMELJENJE I KONSTITUCIJA »IDEJE NACIONALNE FILOZOFIJE«

Sažetak

Problem nacionalne filozofije za Bazalu je bio naslijeđeni zadatak od njegovog učitelja F. Markovića, prvog profesora filozofije na novoosnovanom Sveučilištu, 1874 god. Bazala je svoje poglede izložio u monografiji o F. Markoviću te posbice u raspravama »Filozofija u Hrvatskoj od pada apsolutizma ovamo«, »Jugoslavenska misao« i »Ideja nacionalne filozofije«. Za Bazalu je filozofija bila temeljna i utemeljujuća znanost u oblikovanju i osmišljavanju nacionalnog identiteta i samosvijesti. Stoga se, strogo gledajući, kod njega ne radi o »ideji nacionalne filozofije«, već o filozofiji nacionalnog, tj. sveobuhvatnom zasnivanju bitnih odrednica »nacionalnog bivstva«, te iz njih izvedenih zadaća i mjesta hrvatskog naroda u »kolu suvremenih evropskih naroda«.



IDEA (IDEAS) OF NATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AND ITS (THEIR) REALIZATION

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Introduction

Talking about Croatian philosophy today is self-explanatory or, at least, it is not as controversial as it is in the case of developing the idea or ideas of national philosophy. However, these two facts are not contradictory, as the principles of these two aspects of understanding one's own tradition are not the same. Almost all research into the history of Croatian philosophy is problem-oriented mostly towards ideas of certain philosophers or, tentatively, periods. Idea of philosophy is the view of the whole regardless of the manner it is being shaped out of particulars and specifics.

What might appear to be contradictory is our own viewpoint – research into tradition is done through separate monographs, anthologies, conferences, articles in magazines, while historical meaning comes into being by connecting such segments into development lines in such a way that the idea of unique history is guaranteed by the very fact that it is possible to talk about uninterrupted awareness of tradition existence.¹ In other words, the extreme point of the whole process, being also the viewpoint, extends itself into the entire historical line, thus as well into connection of all the points into continuity, precisely under the impression of repeated historical recollection.²

¹ I believe it is this kind of continuity that Krstić has in mind when pointing out that philosophy is an extension of literacy in general, and is closely connected with educational work, comp. 'Beginnings of Philosophy in Croatia', *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine* 1–2/1975, Zagreb, p. 14.

² Moreover, Marković is talking about reviving the spirit by conveying our philosophers' thoughts, he is talking about 'us today, starting anew the philosophical work of the Croatian people', concluding that philosophers beyond Velebit 'have not even existed for us so far; we are winning them over', and encouraging us to give 'a new, popular voice' to their works in a foreign lan-

However, we should be cautioned enough by failures of one-sided linear interpretation of history to first try to bring our own viewpoint to consciousness. Although it gives a historical review, it is eventful, really *post festum*, which does not mean that it is illegitimate, as we are a part of the whole process. I point this out because I believe that, for methodical reasons, it is necessary to single out our viewpoint in order to set some limits to our superior historical consciousness.

I believe that the sufficient proof of the contention about *the projection of meaning into a line of separate events* is the very fact that the theoretical endeavors regarding the explanation of the idea of national philosophy, which were followed by studies of it, appeared at moments in history that today we consider to be turning points for our people. Those are the times when different, even contradictory perspectives of past, but also modern events, required focusing on a clear view directed towards one unique whole. This connecting, synoptic view is adjusted according to the strength of actual social and cultural events, which should be especially emphasized. Ideological initiators themselves were aware of that fact.³

Therefore, the idea of national philosophy reflects itself, on one hand, in spiritual continuity of conveyance and mutual permeation of thoughts – this being its narrower sense, and, on the other hand, in terms of time and space continuous line of separate segments of reality – this being its larger sense. Speaking somewhat Platonically – the idea reflects itself, but it also corresponds to something real. As an arranged whole, spiritual history is not a true copy of material history, but this should not be the reason for either of them to lose their importance. In my opinion, but also possible to prove on the very factual level, it is essential to finally realize not only whether our philosophers' scientific postulates, biographical data, living habitus, etc., correspond to our spiritual history, but whether the idea of our philosophical history corresponds to what we reflect by it, because this is the question which we ourselves answer when trying to analogously follow spiritual and material history.

Before we look into the very factual level, it is worth reminding ourselves that, tentatively, there are three predominant ideas of history of philosophy:

guage (F. Marković, 'Croatian philosophical writers beyond Velebit between 15th and 18th C', *Prilozi*... 1-2/1975, Zagreb, 272). He is completely aware that it is our task to revive and relate historical facts.

³ Marković, for example, speaks out at the moment of the renewed restoration of the University, Zimmermann publishes his work to mark the anniversary of the Central Croatian Cultural and Publishing Society, the period of the greatest peril for already insignificant independence and safety of the Croatian people (1929), and Bazala his work explicitly on 'the idea of national philosophy' (1938) after the postulates of the presentation 'On Yugoslav thought' (1936) did not catch on.

Hegel's – the development of idea as self-development of world's spirit up to the point of final self-realization (through dialectical laws); Hartmann's notion of not concluded and impossible to conclude disciplinary traditions at the end of which there are, so called, problem residues; and finally, one derived from Corpus Aristotelicum – a combination of problem and history overviews. I will briefly refer to the latter, because it contains the most useful instructions for national philosophy. Aristotle first cites problems, for example, in *Metaphysics*, book A: *he hule* or *to stoiheions*, then he elaborates on the problem taking esoteric opinions, using the history of Greek philosophy to elucidate and explain his own. It is another thing whether he thinks that his philosophy is the circle of circles, the absolute end reached by overcoming and overtaking previous thoughts.

If we rethink the whole thing, it becomes clear that Aristotle actually takes over the thoughts of his compatriots, using the notions inscribed in the common linguistic fund, thus writing the first history of philosophy, not according to the idea of national philosophy, it is true, but 'world' philosophy. I am pointing out this fact, because it is obvious that he does not even consider necessary explaining the principle and purpose of relating different opinions into a unique whole – namely, it has already been shaped as such in the language, and brought to awareness from the collective memory. I leave open the analogy with Croatian philosophical language or discourse, that is, with the problem of overtaking and interpreting notions with which today we continue the philosophical work of our predecessors.¹

What such unexplained idea of philosophy can refer us to should be explained from Aristotle's practical-philosophical papers: here, the idea of separate and specific thoughts precisely related to a subject is not considered historically, in the sense of their connection and emphasizing the continuity of thought, but he finds linguistically shaped and actually referential solutions to the problems, using them as instructions, suggestions, additional evidence, etc. The focus of the debate here is not the total of related stops in the development of philosophy, but the very spot – *topos* – with its referential and semantic setting. Here, philosophy is topic, esoteric and egoteric – it cannot break the boundaries of the existing political community, determined in terms of time and space, let me not say historically, but perforce it enters the spiritual, in the language shaped whole of events. Raw matter does not enter philosophical consideration (although it is used hermeneutically) be-

¹ P. Vuk-Pavlović may have had the strongest presentiment regarding culture shaping in language, especially in the context of linguistic and reflective ambiguousness: 'Truth is not hidden, even though we cannot reach it sometimes, but words are polysemic and their use is diverse and unequally penetrable. Here comes endeavor regarding understanding insurmountable problems,' *On the Meaning of Philosophy*, Zagreb, 1969, 18.

cause it is not shaped, and neither does philosophy itself shape its continuity, but through inheriting problem residues as subject residues. This is the point where Aristotle comes into the bitterest conflict with Plato, not because it represents the problem residue to him, but because he did not replace the problem residue – namely, blessed life (*bios eudaimon*) is not realized in the political community.⁵ Essays on notions and postulates become views of research into what has been given notion and is established in thinking, namely the reality of political community itself. If I may paraphrase Aristotle, practical philosophy deserves most to be studied because it indicates a way of life in community to a person determined as a political being; today, however, for historically conceived political being, where *politicumom prima facie* is understood to be national, historically confirmed community, precisely history of national philosophy, at the same time philosophy of historical and social reality of a nation, deserves most to be studied. Apart from historiographic aspect, it also has to comprise hermeneutical interpretation, evaluation and directing life in a community. If these two aspects are not related, but remain unspoken suppositions to each other, then all our efforts are drained in the idea of history of philosophy as an instrument for providing proof of historically confirmed political and national particularities (which is today no longer necessary to prove), that is, history of political community evaluated from a divided philosophical and world-view standpoint (which simply ends in its ideologization). The right question to ask in the end is: can we speak of a continuation of consideration of our own historical existence, indeed of modern Croatian society guaranteed by it, but which also guarantees its research, if we bear in mind that precisely *hypolepsis* is the way to reach the explanation of such facts. For something like that it is not enough just to find information, that is, to document historiographically, but it is essential to show how the language of communication and that of science present notions as expressions for subject reality, how it is conveyed and stored in awareness. Is it possible today, when we speak of ‘the good’ of community, to use esoteric information, to clearly define a variety of concepts related to the wanted one, and thus at least delineate the subject we are dealing with – one aspect of Croatian history. Here we have to make use of common or universal points – *topoi* or *loci communes*. For us, there are not just names and their ‘index rerum’, but also a variety of original philosophical concepts the meanings of which should be searched for in the linguistic community.

Let us now go back again to the existing ideas of national philosophy in order to show that they all took into account these facts, using them according to the chosen purposeful direction. If we encompass them in a systematic as-

⁵ This interpretation is referred to, for example, by the first part of G. Bienen's work, *Die Grundlegung der politischen Philosophie bei Aristoteles*, Munich, 1985.

pect, then it is possible to say that there are a few ideas, beside Marković's initial, introductory and programme instruction on a possible direction of consideration. First of all, there is culturally and philosophically based research contained in the works of S. Zimmermann (especially *Thousand years of Croatian Philosophy – Represented Through Clerical Order*). Then there is the contrary, although not completely so, characterological viewpoint of V. Dvorniković (especially in the work *Characterology of the Yugoslavs*), and voluntaristic-activistic viewpoint of A. Bazala, which, to certain extent, opens the possibility of comparing the first ideas (especially in the works *Philosophical Aspiration in the Spiritual life of Croatia – Since the Fall of Absolutism on and On Yugoslav Thought*).

It is interesting that both Zimmermann and Bazala appeal to F. Marković, to his rectorial speech in which he briefly presents lives and works of prominent philosophers. They both continued studying Croatian philosophy according to programme guidelines set by Marković's speech, but they also became aware of the need of the time, focusing themselves later on Croatian culture (Zimmermann),⁶ and Croatian education (Bazala).⁷ Dvorniković also announced the foundation of original, 'our' system of philosophy, but after a long period of break, he transformed the whole project into characterological-typological consideration of national individuality, as it manifests itself in all forms of awareness, not only in philosophy.⁸ Let us follow the chronological line.

Zimmermann's history ('povjesnica') and 'a specific life stream'

Zimmermann wrote a short review of the development of Croatian philosophy for the anniversary of the Central Croatian Cultural and Publishing Society. The booklet was published in 1929. The centre of his interest are the activities of many clerical orders, especially their educational aspect in schools. Zimmermann mostly lists only names and major works of more prominent philosophers. The meaning of his review is stated at the very beginning of the text: 'When it is truly so that philosophical reflection is in its basic tendency metaphysical, then it is easy to understand that it is genetically related to religious elements.'⁹ *Eo ipso* and philosophical thinking in

⁶ It refers to works *Culture Crisis and Meaning of Life*.

⁷ It refers to Bazala's concepts of popular education in the work *On the Idea of Education*.

⁸ B. Despot presents Dvorniković's work in the monograph *Vladimir Dvorniković's Speculation*, Zagreb, 1975.

⁹ Zimmermann, *Philosophy in Croatia, Represented Through Clerical Order*, Zagreb, 1929, 1.

Croatia begin with the moment of their baptism. According to Zimmermann it is obviously consistent with long-term European latinity. It is not debatable for him, he even regards it as otherwise indisputable fact. What is debatable are attempts in that moment of time to present that whole development as mental darkness and illusion, that is, to proclaim the concurrence of the processes of religious and philosophical activities damaging, even denying the latter. Zimmermann is clearly aware that the indisputable historical fact became disputable for the very thing I mentioned at the beginning – because of imposing one's own viewpoint to all separate viewpoints in the development line. Things go so far as belittling Bošković for his religious beliefs, seen as a defect in his thought.¹⁰ Therefore, he considers of equal importance, if not even more important, to talk about contemporaries and evaluate the basic scientific concepts of the time. One should continue the thought, but here, 'in the specific life stream', as Zimmermann often puts it, because it is here that the viewpoint for evaluating past and predicting future events is built.

He does two things: he does not miss a chance for criticism, polemics, review and other forms of confrontation with other people's opinions, but he also considers to what extent their and his own thoughts relate to specific social and historical events of the then Croatia and Europe in general.¹¹ No wonder that his historiographic discussions find support in the philosophy of culture, which is focused on the hermeneutic research into phenomena in Croatian and European society, under the bitter influence of war and its political games.

He realized that all more relevant differences causing confrontation of opinions originate in inexplicable concepts most loudly shouted out in scientific, and most often in ideological or political debates, which is the consequence of their being isolated from the original philosophical context. It is precisely the task of philosophy of culture to individually record subject facts and their expressions, look for their origin and then evaluate them. It 'specifically sheds light upon all details, so that we could inductively establish a point of reference for proper consideration of the whole of life.'¹² Methodical procedure does not involve only historical gathering of individual into general as a whole, but also specific events that always appear as individual subjects and subjects of individuals: 'A critical observer of our time will have to be capable of facing reality with the intention of establishing every detail that

¹⁰ Comp. to his article 'Bošković's philosophical view of the world', *Croatian Review* 5–6/1937, 270 and on.

¹¹ My work *Stjepan Zimmerman's Philosophy*, Zagreb, 1993, speaks about Zimmermann's place in the history of Croatian philosophy.

¹² Zimmermann, *Culture Crisis*, Zagreb, 1943, 106.

can be taken into account for understanding the whole...¹³ In that sense, firstly it is essential to bring back to its original context each concept we use in the language of science and communication, to follow the history of its conveyance and interpretation, so that it could be then embraced in the span of its current use. The prerequisite here is to define the very concept of national culture, namely, the sphere of interpretation and understanding of one's own existence. Only in that case shall we approach properly also those individual viewpoints of historical and cultural heritage that are in the closest relationship with philosophical and educational work.

Considering history ('povjesnica') to be the origin of cultural existence of a nation (as memory is the origin of individual existence), and understood as objectification of spiritual values, Zimmermann is trying to find those values that 'live' in the memory, namely, not those that are proclaimed and unrealized, but precisely those used now in the interpretation and direction of national culture: 'In the light of history (not romance or propaganda) we really can define Croatian being as a border-bearer of Western culture, but in order not to make it a notionsponge, it is also necessary to notice the current ethical potential of this being and not only its capacity for historical recollection.'¹⁴ Indeed, as can be seen from the whole of his cultural and philosophical discussions, Zimmermann points out that only principles are the subject used to appraise, but also that which is appraised, so that the whole historical existence of a community, even though throughout history it had enough grand and honourable names (here he takes pride in Dragišić's humanism, Bošković's erudition, Bauer's educational and political principles), depends on how we shall consider and realize their ideas today. In other words, research into national heritage is only the first, although basic, step in studying one's own culture *hic et nunc*.

Bazala's idea: between aspirations and dreams

Already in his *History of Philosophy* Bazala sadly admits that he failed to write a history of Slavic philosophy which would include the Croatian national thought. Soon he realized that for its research one should first get a clear idea of the very subject and methods to be used. Therefore, in 1938, he published the work *On the Idea of National Philosophy*¹⁵. First, he defines nation as a 'naturally cultural social sphere', which sounds as an oxymoron, if

¹³ The same, 105.

¹⁴ The same, 101.

¹⁵ Different aspects of Bazala's philosophical work and activity are discussed in the works from the conference of the same name. *Comp. Prilozi...* 1-2/1988, Zagreb, 87-179.

we remember that the philosophy of the time, advised by the Neo-Kantian philosophy of culture, considered the concepts of nature and society (culture) to be contradictory. Bazala uses this syntagm to show that all manifestations coming from that circle are not only significant as a historical line of different opinions, beliefs and conceptions (which is the cultural meaning), but firstly as a manifestation of a person's life in their natural circle – national community. It is their rational frame (in language conveyed thought), but also 'experienced reality' (the reality sensibility and experience are oriented to). The former will prevail only because language expresses the contents of national spirituality in a universal way (language areas only its separate parts). So, although a community is realized as spirituality in a dynamic connection of different 'selves', as bearers of willing activity and its superstructure in philosophy as a 'structure of the whole and the formation of Being'¹⁶, only their mutual social signs communication will mark the final development of a national community.

At this point individual 'I' becomes 'we' (here, Bazala's ideas remind me of Buber's), community denoting 'collective consciousness, collective will and collective spirit'¹⁷. To make use of other Bazala's terms: here, the energy of existentially individual 'self', as experiential unity, coming in touch with another 'self' blends into synergic unity (syntagm later used by P. Vuk-Pavlović, as well). Therefore, to conclude, the task of national philosophy is to measure and evaluate the strength of that synergic unity, because it is nothing else but 'spiritually revived activity of the national being'.¹⁸ That is why he demands a more energetic sense of reality in Croatia, indirectly directing us towards 'activity reviving', as a prerequisite for a real relationship (Marković directs us towards that, in any case).

As we can see, Bazala did not start from famous historical names or events, but from the assumption of the strength of national being, which penetrates the surface of plain historical events.

Indeed, as a convinced voluntarist, believing that all rational structures of reality, so history as well, are manifestations of voluntary activity, Bazala first had the idea of following basic tendencies in (more recent) the development of Croatian philosophy, in the process of which he did not interpret them in the form they were written in the works (with the exception of his monograph on Franjo Marković), but he tried to follow the 'manifestation of living community', namely, to show how basic aspirations are manifested in specific historical events.

¹⁶ Bazala, *On the Idea of National Philosophy*, Zagreb, 1938, 59.

¹⁷ The same, 43.

¹⁸ The same, 58.

Bazala also realized, although from a different viewpoint than Zimmermann, the need for relating the two views of national philosophy, as I stated them in the introduction. Underneath all historical currents – the tradition of the written word, oral tradition, educational work, conveyance of ideas, etc. – we find implanted a ‘metalogical root’ of all world events, the source of strength for the very will that determines the current of events at present moment. Consequently, it is impossible to talk about a philosophical position, namely, to give a clear cross-section view of all the mentioned currents, but it is only legitimate to talk about aspiration, that is, an unconcluded process whose manifestations we find and appraise, without a final result, but with a tendency of further development. To be sure, Bazala will state the characteristics of Croatian being’s philosophical statement, but he does not think that it concerns the psychological view of taking a stand as a type of behaviour and thinking, but the concretization of willing efforts, namely, their systematization out of different, even contrary directions of activity, even when the willing activity is insufficient. Here are some of his most interesting insights into the ‘philosophical statement of Croatian being’:

- the ideal meaning of freedom,
- sentimental state of mind, falling into romantic ‘conjunction’ and especially,
- passive resistance to the undesirable and the lack of active-willing embracement of reality and ideal requirements.¹⁹

In his further discussions, Bazala will particularly emphasize the last point, because he realizes well that with transferring the focus of national life on the inner world of values, on intellectual, ethical and esthetical ideal that drained the strength for the willing embracement of reality or abolished the ‘energetic sense of reality’, actually the thought of fatal dynamics, historical faith, imposed itself resulting ultimately in the lack of rationalizations of conditions and possibilities of national existence. Aspirations should be recognized, willingly supported and maintained, but not as Schopenhauer’s blind will driving us in the assigned world, but as means of realization or change of one’s rationally understood conditions of life.

Here, Bazala reaches for the old idea of the Ilirian community of the Southern Slavs, resulting in his work *On Yugoslav Idea* (it is actually a speech he gave in the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts). From the total of his work, it becomes clear that Bazala offers language as sacrifice for what he gives as a characteristic of independence of national community. Southern

¹⁹ Comp. Bazala, *Philosophical Aspiration in the Spiritual Life of Croatia – since the fall of absolutism on*, Zagreb, 1936, 6 and on.

Slavic community was supposed to come true in the common language, meaning blending one's individuality (energy of 'self') during a long-lasting teleological process ending in a 'full manifestation of Being'. If philosophy is, as we have seen, a construction of reality and Being, then it is clear how 'the Southern Slavic philosophy' should express completely the national essence of the Southern Slavs. Bazala thought that the process had only just started, although he found firm support in experiential-cognitive spirituality of nation, believing that in the idea of utilitarianism 'brings cognition into life as effective force... wants to instigate realistic motives, inferred from the knowledge of material nature and conditions of economic life.'²⁰ Within this contradiction it is finally possible to see that historical aspiration also (seen already in Križanić) develops strong guidelines for encompassing national reality, but still either weakens or perforce has to strengthen the quantity of 'invested intellectual sense.'²¹ Voluntaristic philosophy of history of national philosophy as a spiritual view of national history finishes thus by emphasizing the necessity of following all aspirations, but also investing intellectual sense in the abundance of willing-activistic endeavors: if nation as a set of wills is *stunergia*, then intellectual endeavor is definitely *energeia* above all possible 'realities.'

Dvorniković's characterological simplification

At the time when Bazala was writing his treatise, Dvorniković announced, on several occasions, the development of the idea of 'our' philosophy, giving also first indications. Bazala knew of them, indeed, referring to the work *On Psychology of Yugoslav Melancholy*, he refutes them as being too narrow and relying too much on biological and psychological observation of a nation. The remark is partly correct, because in 1917, before the factual existence of the Southern Slavic community, Dvorniković announced: »...therefore it would be of infinite value for our national culture and national future, and in the sense of modern psychological science, to systematically get to know national spiritual habitus, to see and recognize, so to say, our national 'spiritual inventory'«²² However, Dvorniković uses modern psychological science as heuristic means in the typology of modern philosophy, and later very successfully in his characterological discussions, so that in his hands it is not only a methodical tool in studying national culture. In methodological sense, he is an eclectic who adopted many useful procedures and

²⁰ The same, 12.

²¹ Bazala, *On Yugoslav thought*, Zagreb, 1935, 5.

²² Dvorniković, *On Psychology of Yugoslav Melancholy*, Zagreb, 1917, 12.

notions of modern psychology (Wundt), evolutionist sociology (Spencer), intuitionism (Bergson), etc. Therefore, to refute the methodological preparation and the method of scientific discovery in his work is really to realize how much these methods are actually used. Soon enough it becomes clear that from evolutionism Dvorniković adopts belief in the necessity of 'sub-skin' observation of social strata, so that the community would not appear only mechanically connected, but as interwoven tissue on the inside. Here he directly moves to psychological unveiling of what is 'the fundamental, the deepest psychic type, in which life and character of our individual man would be included only as a constituent element and document.'²³ It seems, however, that such a research is not the most successful, because *Characterology of the Yugoslavs* lists a few different types without attributing to anyone the status of the elementary one, and to all the others the documentary one, although it is very clear that the balance is tilted in favour of 'Dinara type' as an intersection of contrary mentalities and temperaments, or even two character constitutions: European-Asian and Western-Southern. They still remain divided, the widest substratum of the 'characterology from beneath, out of wide and deep ethnic base,'²⁴ which somehow suits the typical Dvorniković's dual characterization (for example, rationalism – empiricism, logic – illogic standpoint, etc.)

It is obvious that he is not trying to consider the idea of national culture from immanently cultural-philosophical standpoint, just as he does not approach the manifestations of national art from esthetic standpoints, but always combining psychological-characterological pattern of research. He finds pessimism in works of art by Kranjčević, and Shakespeare, as well as in Schopenhauer's philosophy, reducing them down to one and the same by pointing to the same character feature. This procedure is legitimate as long as we do not raise the question of the meaning of differentiation among various manifestations of spiritual life (Dvorniković, namely, considers art, philosophy, religion, etc. only as different aspects of the same manifestation – life), especially according to usual classification procedures (different language, discourse, nationality, etc.). Is their typifying not only a subsequent rational structure, and not an expression of their deeper, life-elementary, characteristic?

In my opinion, to answer this question, especially in view of earlier sections on Zimmermann and Bazala, it is interesting to analyze the following Dvorniković's statements: 'We still do not have great representative geniuses who would incorporate all those characteristics that we can consider deter-

²³ The same, *Characterology of the Yugoslavs*, Beograd, 1937, 20.

²⁴ The same, 30.

mined ethnic Yugoslav features... None amongst our poets, thinkers or artists, no religious person, no leader, no statesman has completely risen above our indisputable regional type.²⁵ This is where Dvorniković sees the necessity to go under the surface of the manifestation of national spirit and to search through the deepest spiritual inventory. If only we could have a 'representative' (I should really say a 'type') who would carry those traits of Yugoslav spirit that were discovered in the differences of regional types, through typifying as a methodical procedure! It is interesting that this statement is found at the beginning of the paper, when it is not yet clear whether such a 'type of all types' exists, that is, whether such a thing as a Yugoslav ethnic feature exists. Regional type appears to be too simple for such a complex psychological characterization; but on the other hand, it appears to be a simplification of the procedure for processing a huge number of such characters.

Conclusion

I believe my postulate to be confirmed here in the best possible way: if Zimmermann and Bazala (even Marković), in their search for typical national characteristics, either on ethic-axiological level (the first one) or in voluntaristic-activist tendencies (the latter), had pointed to mere existence of 'the leading figures' (in philosophy or religion) in Croatian history due only to their belonging to ethos according to their origin, or due to the fact that they are regarded as points in the development of Croatian national thought, it would really be impossible to maintain the belief in the existence of common traits. It would be hardly possible through Zimmermann's reference to history ('povjesnica') as recollection (exactly because, psychologically taken, it is about the standpoint of the one who recollects), or Bazala's justification regarding the accumulated energy of individual wills (because, psycho-socially taken, material strength is used by the one who releases it). On the contrary, it is only possible from the entirety of the philosophical system, namely, by relating the philosophy of national history to national philosophy: the first one determines common traits historically manifested, while the second one, as a parallel overview of what is in history objectified, checks whether the idea corresponds to the reality, being only another expression for truth verification. They had to show whether points in historical development are only their own historical identity, using them as documents, or we have to at the same time justify our own reality by realizing those values or aspirations through which we acquire that identity.

²⁵ The same.

Finally, there are a few different ideas of national philosophy that are realized, each one in its own way, in some kind of historiographic research. Today, two of them, Zimmermann's and Bazala's, are taken as basis for the research into Croatian philosophy, while Dvorniković's should have brought about the study of the common traits of Croatian culture throughout history and the culture of other Southern Slavs. However, I believe now the need is obvious to cover the first two ideas in their entirety, as they develop from the philosophy of culture, that is, cognitive voluntarism and educational conceptions.

Nowadays, indeed, we are forced to search for new facts of national existence using the whole of philosophical realizations, trying, if not to develop the whole system of realizations, then at least to relate different views of research into the 'idea' of national history that is reflected also in philosophical tradition. This, in turn, prerequisites the awareness of one's own existence as realization or a mere possibility of the realization of ideas we are studying, especially those we refer to in justifying our existence.

TRANSLATED BY IRENA IPSA

IDEJA (IDEJE) NACIONALNE FILOZOFIJE I NJEZINO (NJIHOVO) OZBILJENJE

Sažetak

Krajem prošloga i početkom ovoga stoljeća javlja se u Hrvata nekoliko ideja povijesti nacionalne filozofije. Njihovo ozbiljenje u historijskim istraživanjima dokumentarnog tipa i u povijesnofilozofskim raspravama teče usporedo s procesom političkog i uopće kulturnog samoosvješćivanja Hrvata (povijest nacionalne književnosti, umjetnosti, znanosti itd.), pa je utemeljenje nacionalne filozofije trebalo poslužiti kao jedan od dokaza narodne, povijesno potvrđene, samobitnosti. Raskorak između ideje i njezina ozbiljenja, međusobne sveze moguće oprečnih ideja, odnosno neprekidnost pokušaja da se ona razvije, ostali su do danas nerazjašnjeni, zbog čega, naposljetku, ne postoji jasna slika o ulozi filozofije (i znanosti) u nacionalnoj povijesti. Ovaj rad pruža kratki pregled sistematizirane povijesti filozofije u Hrvata, objašnjajući ujedno metodičke postupke za moguće njezino šire razvijanje.



THE CURRENT STATE OF THE THEORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY OF NATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

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1. Today's assessment of the current state of research of the history of Croatian philosophy is not in any way – or, better to say, is not any more – burdened with the basic questions asked by the very »idea of national philosophy«. The reason for this could be twofold: we could either state that these issues have been adequately discussed before, adding that after Franjo Marković, Bazala, Zimmerman and Filipović we can hardly add anything new, or we could state that the systematic research of the history of the Croatian philosophy, through its naked and visible factuality, produced that critical mass of self-explanatoriness which blocks any principled self-critical questionableness. Therefore, any further insisting on a principled discussion of the »national philosophy« could be considered wether as an act of questioning of such an effort itself, or at least as a certain weakening of an immanent enthusiasm for such an undertaking. Namely, every radical reassessment of our inherited feelings of security could result with a confirmation of validity of the road we had taken, but could also end up with opening our availability for other and different options.

2. However, the past works that discussed the history of the Croatian philosophy have reached that critical mass threshold when new questions, up to now never contemplated, are now being discussed. Although we are still far away from that point when we might begin to think about actually starting to write a history of the Croatian philosophy in the real sense of that word – that is, about one that would not just be an expanded edition of one of the existing so-called historical overviews of the Croatian philosophy (Zimmerman, Krstić, Harapin) – we can already define issues which will definitely have to be discussed in such a history of the Croatian philosophy. One such issue will be that of a chrono-logy of the Croatian philosophy. I differentiate this particular issue from the practical neutral chronological model that we

have been using and that we are still using in initial phases of our historiographic undertaking.

3. The chrono-logical issue, as I want to discuss it here, is briefly touched upon, in different ways, in the above mentioned historical overviews of the Croatian philosophy. In a visibly explicit sense it has already been discussed within some ongoing projects, for example in the anthology of original texts of Croatian philosophers, as well as in the first efforts to synthesize researches of a single philosophical discipline, for example Croatian philosophy of art (Zlatko Posavac), or a synthesis of works from a specific period, for example Croatian Renaissance philosophy. Here, however, I would like to focus only on one principled issue, and that is the issue of springs or – more understandable – the issue of the very beginnings of the Croatian philosophy. This particular issue has been touched upon in the above mentioned historical overviews, although it has not been explicitly raised and discussed. The answer to this question, however, in a way predetermines the chrono-logical understanding of the entirety of the history of the Croatian philosophy.

4. From the typological point of view, there are three possible approaches to this question. The first one is the chronographic approach, which by default positions »the springs«, »the sources«, »the beginnings« of the Croatian philosophy within the framework of a wider European cultural formation. This approach could well be demonstrated by the Marković's speech on the occasion of his inauguration as a Dean of the Zagreb University, where he talks about »workers in the field of philosophy, sons of our homeland during the last four centuries, from the 15th to the 18th century«¹. Thus defined beginning of the Croatian philosophy would be in the 15th century, probably with Benko Benković, or maybe with Nikola Modruški. Thus defined »honorable passport« of the Croatian philosophy would be dated with the age of the European Renaissance or, to put it in Marković's words, »since the time of the spiritual revival of Europe«². Such an approach will be embraced by many scholars since Marković, with Filipović being the most important proponent of this culturological approach to the issue of the source of the Croatian philosophy.

5. The second approach to the problem of the source of the Croatian philosophy is the mythological, that is the religious one. This approach could be illustrated with Zimmerman and his historical overview of the philosophy

¹ Franjo Marković: *Filosofijske struke pisci hrvatskoga roda s onkraj Velebita u stoljećih XV do XVIII*. (»Croatian Philosophers from the Other Side of the Velebit Mountain from the XV-XVIII Century«), Zagreb, 1882, p. 257. Cited according to the reprinted version published in the magazine *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, 1-2/1975.

² *Ibid.*, p. 273.

in Croatia as represented by the social class of priests during the time-frame of one thousand years³. Zimmerman links the beginnings of philosophy in general, and thus the Croatian philosophy in particular, with ethnological findings of developed primitive cultures which had rather developed mythological and religious systems with inner metaphysical core. Although he allows the thesis that the genesis of the Croatian philosophy is »even more ancient, and a general part of human experience as developed from the basis of the original religion«, Zimmerman thinks that »it is completely justified to state that the philosophical history of the Croatian people begins its development at the times when the Croats accepted Christian faith«⁴. Thus understood from the prism of religion, the source of Croatian philosophy also defines the logos of its historical development in time, that is a specific chronologic which is visible from the subtitles which define specific eras in the historical development of the course of the Croatian philosophy: (1) *Kršćanstvo i prvi počeci filozofije u Hrvata*⁵ (»Christianity and the Very Beginnings of the Philosophy Among Croats«); (2) *Crkvena školska filozofija*⁶ (»Ecclesiastic Philosophy in Church Schools«); (3) *Filozofski pisci do novijeg razdoblja crkvene filozofije*⁷ (»Philosophical Authors Before the Modern Age of Ecclesiastic Philosophy«); (4) *Ruder Josip Bošković i filozofija do osnutka Strossmayerova sveučilišta*⁸ (»Ruder Josip Bošković and Philosophy Before Establishment of the Strossmayer's University«); (5) *Savremeni razvitak katoličke filozofije*⁹ (»Modern Development of Catholic Philosophy«).

It is clear that the fifth chapter brings another problem, because the founding of the Strossmayer's University establishes, together with the Catholic philosophy, an another spiritual genus of the Croatian philosophy. Zimmerman himself was aware of this, as at the end of his work he notes that in it »only a partial review of the modern Croatian philosophy could be found«, because he, Zimmerman, focused in his work exclusively on a review of the Croatian philosophy »as represented by the social class of priests«¹⁰. Therefore, only a consistent chronological line of modern Croatian philoso-

³ Stjepan Zimmerman: *Filozofija u Hrvatskoj, zastupana po svećeničkom staležu – kroz tisuću godina* (»Philosophy in Croatia, as Represented by the Social Class of Priests Throughout One Thousand Years«), Zagreb, 1929.

⁴ Ibid., p. 2.

⁵ Ibid., p. 1.

⁶ Ibid., p. 2.

⁷ Ibid., p. 7.

⁸ Ibid., p. 12.

⁹ Ibid., p. 17.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 23.

phy is questionable, because not all of the Croatian philosophy comes from the religious source. One could thus pose a question from which source the other part of modern Croatian philosophy comes, or could come?

6. The third approach to the problem of the source of the Croatian philosophy is the ethnic-national one. An illustrative example of this approach could be found with Kruno Krstić. In his historical overview of the philosophy in Croatia the source of the Croatian philosophy Krstić does not see in a certain age of the overall European culture, and neither in religion, be it the original or the announced one, but in the natural precondition of the Croatian national philosophy, and that is »the linguistic structure of the Croatian national dialects (and especially that particular dialect which was taken as the foundation of the literary language – the Štokavian dialect)« Why? Because »this structure, both through semantic inter-relations of its vocabulary treasure, as well as through organizational patterns of its sentence, it undoubtedly carries within itself the rich characteristics of the Croatian being, that is the natural preconditions of the Croatian national philosophy«¹¹.

Through this syntagm »Croatian national philosophy« Krstić clearly showed whose pupil he was and whose approach to the problem of the source of the Croatian philosophy he follows. Namely, this is the approach of Albert Bazala. Bazala consequently followed this »popular« approach in his *Povijest filozofije* (»History of Philosophy«), where, to use these words, he programmatically showed his attitude in the title of the first book, which is not simply *Povijest grčke filozofije* (»History of the Greek Philosophy«), but *Povijest narodne grčke filozofije*¹² (»History of the National Greek Philosophy«).

7. It is not necessary to explicitly point out all the problems which a written history of the Croatian philosophy would encounter if it would indeed aim at the basic goal of following a chrono-logic of development of the Croatian philosophy from the above mentioned ethnic-national, that is the national-linguistic source of the Croatian philosophy. One should not be surprised with the fact that exactly this approach to the process of constituting the historical self-awareness of the Croatian philosophy was the most challenging one, as the break with the Latin language in other European, and not only European, national philosophies was equally dramatic as it was in the Croatian philosophy, just that we have not been informed about it adequately.

¹¹ Kruno Krstić: *Filozofija u Hrvatskoj* (»Philosophy in Croatia«), printed in *Naša Domovina*, Zagreb, 1943, p. 397.

¹² Albert Bazala: *Povijest filozofije* (»History of Philosophy«), Vol. I, p. 75. Cited according to the second reprinted original edition published in Zagreb in 1988.

8. After a brief review of the problem of the chronology of the history of the Croatian philosophy in the context of the question of source of the Croatian philosophy, one would expect a proposed solution of the problem. At this point I could only say that the resolution of this issue could hardly be expected from the point of view of only one of the above-described approaches to the problem of the source of the Croatian philosophy. Even comparative researches of history of »national« philosophies agree that the »national Greek philosophy« could probably be considered as an exception, and that it is impossible to compare any other national philosophy in the world to this particular exception, not to mention that it could not be imitated. By discussing this particular problem my intention was only to warn that, in the context of reviewing the state of research of the history of the Croatian philosophy, we have not completely liberated our efforts from certain general-level questions posed by the phenomenon of a national, and thus consequently also the Croatian philosophy.

TRANSLATED BY ZORAN MILOVIĆ

STANJE TEORIJE HISTORIOGRAFIJE NACIONALNE FILOZOFIJE

Sažetak

Sa začetkom, razvojem te institucionaliziranom sustavnošću istraživanja povijesti hrvatske filozofije od Franje Markovića preko Bazala i Zimmermanna do istraživačkog tima u Institutu za filozofiju u Zagrebu su tematiziralo se i načelno pitanje nacionalne filozofije.

Jednom prihvaćena, 'ideja nacionalne filozofije' (Albert Bazala) uspješno, tj. plodonosno funkcionira (i) u istraživanju povijesti hrvatske filozofije.

Neka metodološka pitanja historiografije nacionalne, pa onda i hrvatske filozofije, nisu međutim izričito postavljena. Jedno je od takvih i pitanje kronologije nacionalne, odnosno hrvatske filozofije, točnije, njezina iskona. Autor nalazi tri pristupa problemu iskona hrvatske filozofije: kronografski, mitologijski i religijski te etno-nacionalni.



PHILOSOPHY IN CROATIA FROM THE FOUNDING OF THE UNIVERSITY

Methodical outline

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A philosophical gathering of data on *Philosophy in Croatia from the Founding of the University* demands a previous methodical purification. This methodical purification is not already the method itself, too. For the method, it clears the roots and stumps of the path leading to the place, raising to the place where the issue itself can communicate.

Our issue, at first sight, meets us in a self-intelligible, yet astonishing manner within the 'subject matter' of the history of philosophy. Right here questions must be posed – if not adequately, then, at least, they must be noted – as to how the issue of the history of philosophy, and of the historicism of philosophy really stands; further, how the issue of the historical-formation of philosophy stands. What do history and philosophy, even if a so-called philosophical history is at scrutiny, have essentially in common? Within such questions, the question of 'philosophy in Croatia' and 'the history of philosophy' is raised: do they have anything at all, could they have anything at all in common, of course, depending on what is both in the 'history of philosophy' and in the 'philosophy in Croatia' noted beforehand. What is more, the phrase 'from the founding of the University', philosophy and university generally speaking, are neither self-intelligible and are not to be seen at first sight – naturally, if the issue is looked at philosophically, and not merely historically – what could, in fact, be altogether at matter here.

But, on the other hand, not from this 'abstract', indifferent to life, maybe just 'cultural-historically' interesting perspective of a maybe still possible 'history of philosophy', but from the horizon of that completely 'concrete', if we present the issue to ourselves in such a way that we all, here and now, through studying, through continuing and deepening the study as philosophical work-

ers, are those who study philosophy, or are for philosophical activity qualified at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University in Zagreb, then the first question, which we, all of us together, should ask ourselves, is, nevertheless, what this *are* – when we say that we are those who, through studying philosophy, or through continuing that study, today work on the matter of philosophy in Croatia – what this *are*, in fact, is. We simply have to render the accounts to ourselves, make it transparent to ourselves, in that sense to recall to our consciousness, to announce to ourselves what this common being of ours in philosophising, here and now, really is. Of course that the matter is not that of the exterior picture of ‘the factual state’, which would inform us on who works on what, who did what, how many of us there are, what number of works we pride ourselves in, what ‘context’ we work in, what institutions, justifiably or unjustifiably, are founded, what ‘fame’ someone gained in ‘the world’. All this is superficiality. The question is: how the matter in regard of that we *are*, through studying philosophy, through co-operating in philosophy, in fact, truly stands. What is it that we really do if we are thus? What way we are in, what is it that we, in fact, *live* when we live philosophy exactly, and not something else? It is sufficient to remind ourselves that ‘the choice of study’ of philosophy is not a mere choice, but is a *life decision* before all else. One who studies philosophy just nominally, studies it because one wants to acquire a diploma or a degree. A study of philosophy in accord with a life decision requires to completely be at it and with it. Such a decision, namely a decision of life as such, in everyone who has decided for it, amongst other things means a peculiar reduction of life to precisely just that, the one and only, and nothing else. Within the complete plan and program of the educational scheme of a university (from theology, law and medicine, through political science, commerce, natural sciences to computer science and technologies of all orientations), which is completely serviceable to something in life, the study of philosophy does not serve anything ‘in’ life. If only that which is useful and useable is all that is needed, then philosophy is superfluous. A decision to study philosophy correlates to the most inward need of life itself, which, not fearing death, fears the possibility of that which is most horrible – that it fails itself as life and losses itself in the nothingness of fake living. Having in sight the existential quality of this decision, we need to ponder over it, not just what we did by such a decision, but also what we are and what we do, while in this actual horizon, here and now, we live philosophically tied to the University today in Croatia. The answer to that question cannot come from the outside. No one can evaluate and judge what truly happens with philosophy, except who, and only who, truly philosophises. In this sense, the measure of such a ‘historical event’ is in one himself. All the talk ‘about philosophy’ from any of the perspectives of the so-called real world, be it political, theological, scientific, technical, cybernetic and pragmatic, is fully superfluous and meaningless.

Our issue, philosophy in Croatia from the founding of the University, as a 'topic', has two sides: the historical-philosophical and ourselves. Regardless of what historical 'significance' this 'philosophy of ours' could have, the real reason, justification for engaging in this 'topic' could only be that 'we' are the philosophy in Croatia, if we are. Whether we are, and if we are, what we exactly are, should have to be able to be philosophically cleared up.

If one takes the issue at hand, for the moment, purely as a topic, it is immediately seen that nothing in it – 'philosophy', that 'in', 'Croatia', that 'from', 'the founding of' and 'the University' – is transparent. One to the other, all is questionable. What philosophy in fact is, should have to be philosophically already known somehow, in order for something coherent, that is to say something thoughtful-philosophical to be said as to the topic. What, generally speaking, 'being in' is, and how it is possible for philosophy to be-in-something cannot just remain a 'metaphor'. 'Philosophy in Croatia' presupposes that Croatia is not simply a geographic, political or historical determinant, but it rather requires a reply to the question as to what it is that really makes Croatia to be Croatia, and as such can philosophise. That 'from' suggests a specific understanding of time, but is beforehand debatable whether it can be temporally understood in relation to a founding, establishing of anything at all. What the true founding of a university is, could be inquired both from the highest determination of the university itself, and from the need which the university and its founding have to meet. Insofar a university is but a merely historically enduring institution, and is but a, more or less, organised expert production factory, but is rather a life, a community and reality of spirit of a nation, in being the topic of our matter, it needs to be understood what that spiritual life is and is to become, so that it could be recognised as ours.

An attempt of freeing our matter for us, and ourselves for our matter – philosophy in Croatia from the founding of the University – should not be distracted by the problems that the 'topic' carries and get lost in a 'theoretical' analysis of the listed questions, though it should be conscious of the fact that an adequate grasp at the matter must be able to allow answers to those questions. It is, therefore, good at least to remind ourselves what is in some of those questions hidden.

Here, the first question is of philosophy-in-something, philosophy-in-being, i.e. how that can be thought and said at all. This presupposes a general structure of that something, which is able to be in something else. Aristotle, unlike Plato, already thinks that such a structure has its own genuine domicile in that which is as nature ($\phi\acute{o}\sigma\iota\varsigma$). Exposing the question of 'place', in the horizon of *Physics*, in order to just note how things with this $\tau\acute{o}\pi\omicron\varsigma$ stand, in order to find the path leading to such thinking, Aristotle discloses, in the

sense of a thoughtful tracking of the manysidedness of being itself, exactly this structure of being-in-something (*ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ*, *Physics*, Δ, 3, 210^b14, etc.) This being-in through oneself is eightfold. It needs not be specifically pointed out that when Aristotle says that something or even that being itself 'speaks of itself manifold', that that then is not thought of in the nominal meaning of the word – manifold 'is said' or 'is differently denoted', let us agree, as when we use the word cancer for a disease once, and another time for an astrological sign – this is not a matter of mere conventions, but rather Aristotle wants to say that if one speaks thoughtfully, then through thinking and speaking that being discloses itself in its intrinsic systematic manysidedness, insofar as they correspond to that being, i.e. insofar as that being itself thinks itself through thought and speaks itself through speech. What is at issue are not mere manifold meanings of words and phrases, but through that manysidedness of itself, it discloses the manysidedness of that being itself. In this framework, the spiritual and notional being-in is indicated as the derived, it could be said, the depotentialised way of the 'physical' being-in. For our 'topic', Aristotle's profound study would obviously lead to a more profound insight of the very issue. Philosophy-in-something, formally taken would have to signify philosophy-outside-itself. Philosophy not in itself, if one requires, not in the fragment of that which is philosophical, but philosophy outside itself, in another, whatever that other may be. Is it possible at all; if it is, what is it and what does it mean for philosophy; in the end, is it necessary for philosophy to leave its 'purity' and 'of-the-other-sidedness' and enter the 'world', to descend from 'ideal' being into 'reality', to abandon a 'school' and penetrate 'into life', etc. – these are just more popular ways of formulating this, at first sight rather simple question, as to how things stand with philosophy-in-something, with philosophy in Croatia. In other words, which is that 'place' of the possible encounter of Croatia and philosophy? Well, hopefully it will not be the case that philosophy is here 'as in a container' (Ibid., ^a24).

If it accepted that such a place of the encounter with philosophy in some being is fought out – namely, here in Croatia, of which we philosophically know nothing about yet – then the following question, in accord with this more specific relation, is *whence* philosophy in this being, where does philosophy come from to this 'space', and this time. Whence philosophy in Croatia, in Germany, in England, in Greece. In a strange way, one talks, in a certain sense rightly, of 'British Empiricism', 'French Enlightenment', 'German Idealism', yet philosophy is obviously not philosophy because of the above, because then it would be English, French or German. In the same way, though obviously from an outside-philosophical reason, one talks of 'Greek philosophy', but to everyone, who understands the word, it sounds pleonastic, just as beautiful beauty and good goodness do. Still, a question remains:

whence philosophy in a nation? Whence the call for and vocation of philosophy; in which point of a national being is philosophising possible; why, at all, philosophy in a nation; could it be so that a nation which does not philosophise, and thus does not have a philosophy of its own, cannot truly be a nation at all?

The following issue within the matter is the relation between philosophy and a university. It should be inquired into where the origin of the necessary reference of philosophy to a university and vice versa lies. Is it really so that philosophy needs a university, and if it does, what is it that it needs in that which is called a university? Whereas, it is almost unnecessary to ask whether a university needs philosophy. Without philosophy, there would neither be the idea of a university, nor its operationalised derivatives, which today serve as 'conceptions'-criteria in founding, organising and instrumentalising a 'tertiary institution' to a scientific-technical-cybernetic operation of exploiting, destroying and synthetic producing of all that is from Europe, through America to Japan. However, perverting the idea is not our 'topic'. The only question is whether the necessity of a university lies within the nature of philosophy and philosophising, and what the important, intrinsic relation between philosophy, a university and the being of a nation is.

The problems contained in our topic point to the fact that not a thing expressed in the title of the topic is self-intelligible. However, philosophy in Croatia from the founding of the University is not just a topic of ours. It is our matter in a deeper, twofold meaning of that word. Firstly, insofar as we, in a way, are that philosophy in Croatia and at that University, and secondly, insofar as such a philosophy, and ourselves through it, in a way, historically-philosophically is. The topic and the matter are our concern insofar as they are ours. To get to the bottom of the matter would mean that we got to the philosophical 'we' in ourselves and in that which is ours.

A philosophical gathering of data on the matter is, first of all, a freeing of that which is historical. Philosophising is not a historical reflection. A historical event is not a historical fact. Our matter, which we are, and which concerns us, is not the same as the topic, which can be, and need not be put under scrutiny. The chronicle of philosophy is not the history of philosophy. Viewed from a chronicle point of view, philosophy in Croatia from the founding of the University is not a historical topic, but is rather a matter which inquires what our university, Croatian and philosophical being is. In all of the previous 'is not', the request of freeing lives. For example, philosophising *is not* a historical reflection, i.e. when it is truly, in itself, and really philosophising; but it can become a historical reflection, it can loose itself in such reflection and still pretend to be philosophising. In the request of freeing, in that 'is not', at work is, hence, a differentiation between an apparent

and a sincere being of the matter – of the one, of course, which cares to be sincerely.

One of the possible paths to the place of that which is philosophical, and of that which is a chronicle, leads from and through that which is historical, insofar as that which is historical pretends to be a chronicle and philosophical. A freeing, a purification, and in this sense a negation of that which is historical, is, methodically viewed, an act of philosophising negation. Philosophical negation and, more generally speaking, a philosophical No is not a negation as a mere denial of being. A philosophical No is an act of freeing from all that is seemingly philosophical, outside-, non- and anti-philosophical. Through the philosophical No, philosophising itself is constituted as composed, its very own, sincere and right. This methodical act does not allow to be 'defined'. By an act of philosophising, it is always newly stated in action. That is a spiritual settling of accounts with that which interferes with that which is philosophical, even pretending to tread the place of philosophy and philosophising, and to exercise philosophising by its own philosophical illusion. In this sense, the philosophical No is one of the important, intrinsic duties of philosophising as such. Paradigmatically and in its purity, such an act is brought into light and is preserved in a written form in Plato's dialogue 'Sophist'. A sophist is that which a philosopher is not. However, a sophist is not a mere negation of a philosopher. A sophist is an illusion, the lie of a philosopher. Sophism is a philosophy as a false philosophy, i.e. that which wants to be a philosophy, yet a philosophy is not. The problem of sophism is not a historical question (in the sense which it is said in that sophists operated in Athens in the era of 'enlightenment'); the previous is rather an intrinsic possibility of the being of philosophy itself, and this very possibility, as a possible philosophical negation of philosophy which threatens philosophy from the inside, philosophising alone and in itself must be able to overcome, negate, obliterate, in order to truly set itself free from its very own illusion. This crucial duty of philosophy as a general rule, that it alone must be able to set itself free for its very strength, here shows itself, for us, as a duty of freeing from that which is historical-philosophical for that which is chronicle-philosophical. That is why here we say that philosophising is not historical reflection.

It can seem strange that we distance ourselves from that which is historical in the horizon of the 'history of philosophy'. In a way, it seems self-intelligible that that which is historical belongs to this horizon. Well, what else would our 'topic' be then the chronicle of the founding of the University and the history of the founded University and philosophy 'at' it. Naturally, a prior, and by that a crucial question is what it is that we think as that which is historical and how things stand with it.

That which is historical is, in itself, manifold. Directly, it discloses itself as history, in the sense of that which (e.g., 'politically', culturally') happened. That which happened is a possible subject matter of history as a 'historical science' (*Geschichtswissenschaft*). 'Historical science' or historical reflection has as its subject matter that which is historically knowable, which is, in a certain way, 'given' to this science. How this 'given condition' is possible at all, is not a concern of history, though that which is historical must be given so that that same as a science could investigate it, that is to say, could investigate it methodically. Necessary moments of 'the history of the method' are *heuristics* or 'the informing on the sources', *critique* and *interpretation* (still instructive is: Ernst Bernheim, *Lehrbuch der Historischen Methode und der Geschichtsphilosophie*, Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, Leipzig, ⁵ 1908). That which is historical as that which is scientifically knowable must be able to be unveiled in its given condition, to be checked in respect of the 'authenticity' of the sources, and to be 'understood' in the checked correctness. Furthermore, what that which is intelligible in the 'historical understanding' is, is an important question. That at issue are not just networks of causes and effects, reasons and consequences, but are rather deeper and higher questions of 'ideas', 'purposes', 'aims', 'ideals', 'virtues', or, in short, questions of the meaning of historical events, the very understanding itself already knows, when it, in its evolution, differentiates itself as *descriptive* history, which wants to say 'how things were', as *pragmatic*, which wants to say 'why things were', and, finally, as a *genetic* history, which 'points us to' 'how and why it *came into being*' (Ferdo the noble Šišić, *Priručnik izvora hrvatske historije* ('Text-Book of the Sources of Croatian history'), Part I, Kr. zemaljska tiskara, Zagreb, 1914, Introduction, p. 7 and onwards). The question which the 'historical science' necessarily comes up to, if it cares about its very establishing, and which, as a question, surpasses history as a science, preceding it logically, temporally and crucially, history itself and its subject matter, is – what is that which is in action in all that is historical, and that it itself is not what only historically 'comes into being' and passes by, but rather that it is an 'event' as such which enables the above. This is no longer a historical-scientific or historical question, but is a historical-philosophical question of the historical act and its historical-creative factor, without which there would not be 'historical facts', either as historical or as factual.

It is a historical fact that on the 19th October, 1874, the *Royal University of Franjo Josip I. in Zagreb* was ceremoniously opened. It is also a historical fact that, unlike that which is 'opened', the Parliament of the Kingdoms of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia, in 1861 (probably on the 10th September), brought forward a 'Resolution', which is held in the *Official Papers of the Parliament* as 'Article LXXXIV, On the Founding of the Yugoslav University in Zagreb' (*Spisi saborski sabora kraljevinah Dalmacije, Hrvatske i Slavonije od god.*

1861. (*Parliament Official Papers of the Kingdoms of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia from 1861*), edited and published by Bar. Dragojlo Kušlan and Mirko Šuhaj, Ph.D., vol. I-IV, Narodna tiskarnica Ljudevita Gaja, Ph.D., in Zagreb, 1862, I, p. 87). A complete understanding of these 'facts' would require a thorough historical reflection of the 19th century. In order to understand how and why that (the 'Resolution' and the 'opening') happened, it is not sufficient to just point out 'the old Illyrian initiative for a university', to direct our attention to 'the wakening of national consciousness', to consider in detail the fatal and disastrous discussion on the question of 'national language', to keep track of the movements for freedom on all levels up to the acclamation 'by education to freedom', to throw light on the spiritual patrimony and the material support (50 000 florins) of Josip Juraj Strossmayer, to analyse the political movements – primarily around Josip Jelačić, the civil governor of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, to catch sight of the spiritual state of affairs of the then Croatian aristocracy, clergy, early civic society and peasantry. The 'Kingdoms of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia' are not isolated beings, but organically belong to the Monarchy, which, from the inside, in its foundations pierced by the 'ideas' of the French Revolution, is searching for ways to preserve itself as an empire. The abdication of the tsar Ferdinand (1848) and the proclamation of the eighteen-year-old Franjo – who as the monarch takes the name of Franjo Josip I – a tsar, the octroyed constitution, the era of absolutism, the search for a constitution proportionate to 'the spirit of the time', the imperial manifesto of the 20th October, 1860 addressed 'With my people!', as a direct cause of the convocation of the Parliament in 1861, and a many great number of significant, less significant or even – depending on the perspective – not significant at all facts, which are, notwithstanding, the 'historical frame' which our countries live in, are not sufficient for a complete understanding of the facts of 'the founding' and 'the opening' of our University. Even the very year of 1861! This is not a neutral, mathematical, 'natural' or an arbitrary denotation of time. It does not denote either 'Croatian' or 'Austrian' time, but places both in a distinct historical time, which the years are 'the years of the Lord'. That time is neither imperial nor royal, it is not merely European, but is the time of 'the Christian World'. In that time, on the 12th of April, 1861, North-American Civil War broke out, on the 18th of February Viktor Emanuel is proclaimed the King of Italy 'by the mercy of God and by the will of the people', on the 2nd of January Fredrich Wilhelm IV, the Prussian king died, on the 3rd of March 1861 the peasants are freed and autonomy is introduced in Russia, in the same year, postal savings-banks connected to the state life insurance policy in England are founded, Anderson completed the 'fables', Dostoevsky published 'The Humiliated and Wronged', on the 13th of March Wagner's *Tannhäuser* is performed in Paris, and Phillip Reis constructs the first telephone. Keeping all of the above in sight, a true

historical understanding – that which cares to arrive to ‘the bitter end’ – necessarily brings itself, so to speak, to a step aside from itself into historical conception. This conception would like to conceptualise that which is one and the same in action in the American Civil War, in the will of a nation which wants its king, in the freeing of the enslaved physical being, in the securing of the hopelessly endangered physical life, in the scream of the humiliated and insulted freedom, which, up to the present, urges everyone who is aware of oneself as being free, in the metaphysics of music, in the voice which has the power to overcome spatial distance, and, in the end, in the ‘Resolution’ of our Parliament. This is where our question comes from – it is not that the ‘Resolution’ of the Parliament is not a historical fact, but that that resolution or decision is a historical act.

The Article LXXXIV, i.e. the ‘Resolution of the Parliament’ sets forth in the following way:

‘Desiring a parliament of the Triune Kingdom in its exalted duty, by way of which it is to tirelessly strive to strengthen the lawful condition, a more adequate system of its internal affairs and a more fruitful advancement of both the spiritual and the material well being of the people, in all, though primarily in scientific professions, to gratify, and in the latter case to give an opportunity to the youth of the nation, to help to achieve the highest level of education by the lever of the mother tongue, the following ‘Lawful Foundation on the Yugoslav University’ has been established on the basis of the submitted report of the respective Parliament.’

Introduction

So that scientific education, in the Yugoslav countries also, could progress and bear the so desired fruits as it should, a university is founded in Zagreb under the name: Yugoslav University.

§ 1. This University is made up of four departments or faculties: that of theology, that of law, that of medicine and that of philosophy.

All of the faculties are made up of students, – listeners and – enrolled, and the assembly of professors.’

Follows: ‘I *Part.* On students. On the rights and duties of full-time students. On exams. On difficult exams. On part-time students. On the behaviour of full-time and part-time students. On the requests and complaints of students. On the leaving of University. Provisional amendments. II *Part.* On the professors and the University counsel.’

Following this ‘lawful basis’, the University is thirteen years later opened as VNIVERSITAS LITTERARVM CROATICA ... A REGIS NOMINE APPELLATA, and as it stands engraved in the memorial tablet from 1874.

History as a science, methodically pure, consequent, diligent and truth loving, can adequately collect that which happened, how and why it happened in historical time. As a science, it must keep away from constructing the past and from 'telling stories', i.e. it must not become a historical art (historical novel, historical painting, historical film, historical architecture, etc.), which, by transforming past reality into something possible, produces 'mythology', which, at first sight paradoxically, just as 'our history', precedes the history which must yet be 'created', as in politics, so in philosophy, too. A historical conception is neither a search for historical truth, nor a production of historical lies. The conception of that which is of the past would like to conceptualise that which *had* to be, if that which was, was really because it *wanted* to be.

'Desiring ... in its exalted duty ... to gratify ... the Parliament ... established ... a lawful foundation on the University.' The 'desire', the want of the parliament has the measure of the excellence of that which is wanted in that, on the account of which (aim, τέλος) a parliament is a parliament. *The petition of the Parliament of the Triune Kingdom, by way of which to His Majesty the lawful foundation on the Yugoslav University is brought forward in order to be mercifully certified* (*Spisi saborski*, /Parliament Official Papers/, vol. III, no. 301, p. 150), already at the beginning expressly states: 'The Parliament of the Triune Kingdom, striving tirelessly to strengthen the lawful condition and a more adequate system of its internal affairs in all the aspects of public life, paid special attention to the educational institutions, convinced that the spiritual and the material well-being or, shortly, the true prosperity of the people mostly follows from their education.' The spiritual and material well being or, shortly, the true prosperity of the people is the highest decree of the Parliament, or that which predetermines the being and the exalted action of a parliament as such. The true prosperity of a nation is that it can be what it truly is, that it can be itself. This is where the excellence of the duty is to be found.

'Convinced that ... the true prosperity of the people mostly follows from their education', the Parliament knows that the people must be able to educate themselves, for themselves, for their very own being. A nation is not born. A nation qualifies itself for itself through real education. Such an education is not a production of 'experts' ('a special school'). Primarily, it has got to be thorough and versatile and, insofar as it has the need for a nation to be a nation, it necessarily needs a 'device' of 'thorough, versatile education, which, by its very nature, only a university can be' (*Ibid.*). Thoroughness and versatility are the preconditions of 'the highest level of education'. The highest education is the education of 'the youth of the nation' for that which, characteristic to itself, breaks the silence in 'the national language'. To set

free and to educate the self of a nation in 'academic freedom' for its free being, is the aim of a real university, 'and that can take place only when and if a university is raised in Zagreb' (Ibid.).

The petition ends: 'Your majesty! The destiny of the south-eastern Europe must be once and for all resolved; the Turkish Empire is falling apart bit by bit, and, in respect of the given state of affairs, it will not be able to withstand any exterior power: and then the most excellent and most noble duty of Austria will be to apply its educational and ennobled influence to these nations.

These provinces populated by purely Slavonic people will be able to become a part of the rosary of educated nations only by the means of higher educational Slavonic elements, populated in the southern provinces of the great and mighty state of Your Majesty.

The foundation of this Yugoslav University in Zagreb, which the Parliament of the Triune Kingdom in its loyalty here presents, is based, regarding the significance, on those principles, which the universities of central Europe in general, but specifically in the Monarchy of Austria, are constituted on – and therefore, and because of the above mentioned reasons, the Parliament of the Triune Kingdom strongly hopes that Your Majesty shall mercifully validate the foundation. The most obedient and forever loyal aliens of Your Majesty: the Parliament of the Triune Kingdom.' (Ibid., p. 151).

The principles 'that the universities of central Europe in general are constituted on', Kant distinguished in their purity, carried out from the idea of freedom, autonomy of mind and self-sufficiency of the freedom of being, and considered in their last consequences, in the paper *Contest of Faculty* (1798) (see Kant, Schelling, Nietzsche, *The Idea of a University*, translated by B.D., Globus, Zagreb, 1991, preface, p.13 and onward). The deduced idea of a university from the above principles, Karl Wilhelm Freiherr von Humboldt practically reformulated and consciously made serious as the proper founder of the University in Berlin. 'Humboldt's University', thus, became both a theoretical and practical model of universities among 'educated' nations. An educated nation, i.e. a nation which itself can enable itself for discovering its being, and itself can enable itself for living in accord with that being, has at the university a foundation and the exact location of its spiritual being. It is self-intelligible for educated nations that their university is the place where one is educated, and where a true spirit lives. The parliament of a spiritually unawakened nation knows well that the nation can 'become part of the rosary of educated nations' 'only by the means of higher education', or that the nation can rise from historical vegetation to the historical being of 'Europe' and the world, only by the means of the highest education. By bringing forth

a 'lawful foundation' on the founding of a university, a parliament actually sets out the foundation of the possible spiritual being of a nation.

A parliament knows its duty, a parliament wants its duty, a parliament can fulfil its duty. As this knowledge, want and power, a parliament is the consciousness of that duty. In this consciousness, the spirit of the non-existing national being is awoken. This spirit is here as a *need* to be that which is not, that which there is not, but must be, in order to truly be. A necessary, and by that the only true need of a nation is that it be in freedom that which it truly is. A necessary condition of the fulfilment of this need is a university. By bringing forth a decision on the founding of a university, a parliament, working on the fulfilment of the highest need of a nation, performs its task. By way of this, it meets 'its exulted duty', answering to that which as a parliament must be.

What is, thus, a parliament, where does it know of its duty? The duty of setting free a nation, the duty of educating a nation in freedom and for freedom, freedom itself as a duty and holy task, where does it all come from? 'The voice of freedom' does not come either from man or from God, either from nature or from history. 'The voice of freedom' comes from freedom itself, which is not either from anyone or anything, which as freedom is nowhere. The voice of freedom is news from nowhere, which receives the news and announces conscience. Conscience is the place of receiving the voice of freedom. The voice of the conscience inaudibly says that freedom is to be. These inaudible words are more powerful than any thinking and thought through words, they are more piercing than the loudness of any possible voice, its will is unbending. These words speak to everything that would like to be: to be is to be freely. And there is not a being which would not, having a sense for the voice of the conscience, respond to this voice. To have a conscience, to be the con-science of the voice of freedom, to respond to the voice of the conscience, is the same as being by the conscience, trying to be by the con-science.

A parliament is not just the conscience of the need of the being of a nation. A parliament is necessarily and previously the conscience of the national being, so that it could be the conscience of the need of that which is non-existent yet important. Only as the conscience of the being, a parliament can declare the necessity of freedom. Why would a nation, why would any of the nations, why would any being have to be free at all – no one can say. The conscience, on the other hand, says the ultimate: all is to be free. As such, it wakens the consciousness of that which says that one can be, only in freedom, by oneself, in oneself and for oneself, and not from another, in another and for another. To be by oneself, to be oneself, to be a being as that which a being itself is, is the same as truly being. Wakening the conscience of the true being of consciousness wakens the need of the true being, too.

A sincere parliament is both the conscience and the consciousness of the being of a nation. Responding to the voice of the conscience, and responding to the voice of the consciousness of its duty, a parliament acts upon the voice of freedom. A historical act is that act, which produces freedom. Establishing a 'lawful foundation for a university', it sets the foundation of educating for freedom. Educating for freedom is the place where free beings are formed. A historical act of laying the foundation stone is, by the above, historical-creating. In the same way, a nation, living for freedom by the voice of freedom as educated in freedom, is an enabled historical nation by a historical-creating act. All else is but a hollow, passing, though bloody history.

Here, it can finally be said that a parliament, as a conscience and consciousness, insofar as it performs that which is important, as a matter of fact, philosophises. Philosophising is a conscious response of the conscience of freedom, or is a living, creating, spiritual need to truly be for that which is in all. If one holds freedom as that which is holy, indeed, as that which is godly, and if one holds true being as that which is the highest attainable possibility of being in a being, it can be said that to philosophise is to be under the law of that which is godly, as for the highest being of a being. Here, at the same time, some light is shed onto the 'notion' of a nation. A nation is not something which is merely human, and least of all, is an 'object' or a 'subject' (see Vanja Sutlić, *Narod i povijesno mišljenje* ('Nation and Historical Thought'), in *Praksa rada kao znanstvena povijest* ('Work Practise as Scientific History'), Globus, Zagreb, 1987, pp. 199-218). A nation is educated in freedom, and, in that sense, is the self-born being-community of true humanity and of that which is godly in the surroundings of beings suited for freedom. A nation can truly be a nation when it truly philosophises. This is what our matter – philosophy in Croatia from the founding of the University – wants to say.

A parliament, establishing a lawful foundation for a university, in fact, philosophises. Observing the matter historically, the following history could be narrated. The parliament has, philosophising or not, by the article 'on the founding' of the University in Zagreb, introduces philosophy into Croatia, or has, at least, opened a new era of philosophy here. Philosophy here, primarily acts as the Faculty of Philosophy, and on that Faculty as a 'chair' (professorship, Department today) for 'that which is philosophy, theoretical and practical with a history' (*Spisi saborski*, /'Parliament Official Papers'/, vol. I, p. 91). On the 19th of October, 1874, on the day of the opening the University, 'latter-day Croatian philosophy', as opposed to 'the old standing', commenced. Its 'representatives' are mostly professors of philosophy, or, as they lexicographically call themselves, 'philosophical writers'. The number of philosophy students grows progressively, so that, after 1968, there is approximately about three hundred a year in few generations, only in the Department of

Philosophy. That number vacillates, and today, owing to the changed 'circumstances' and the 'competing' institutions, there is approximately the same number in Zagreb. Philosophy here endures in institutes for philosophy and in the Society, in books on philosophy – mostly in translations, while the 'local works' are mostly master's thesis, doctorates and collections of already published articles and discussions – in journals for philosophy, on philosophical symposiums, in preliminary exams, schools. Between the two World Wars, the 'idea of national philosophy' is already appearing, so that, having survived the attempts of 'creating' 'Marxist', and even 'Yugoslav philosophy', again it emerges as the 'Croatia philosophy'. Methodically, all of the possible 'schools' of 'modern' and 'traditional' philosophy are represented, and the 'pluralism' of standpoints and the 'openness' of philosophical thought in a more-and-more intensive co-operation with the 'world' confirms that even 'we' are becoming fully valid members of the international spiritual community, with a prospect of us providing an 'original' contribution to 'universal /?/ philosophy'. Other than that, valorisation and re-valorisation of our own recent and distant pasts are being looked at, monographs are written, but minutely specialised discussions, too, on 'important authors', and first overviews of entire eras are appearing, from *Filosofijske struke pisci hrvatskoga roda s onkraj Velebita u stoljećih XV do XVIII*. ('Writers of the Philosophical Profession of the Croatian Kind from the Other Side of Velebit from the 15th to the 18th Centuries') (1881) by Franjo Marković, through *Filozofija u Hrvatskoj, Poviestni pregled* ('Philosophy in Croatia, A Historical Over-view') (1943) by Kruno Krstić, to *Novija hrvatska filozofija* ('Newer Croatian Philosophy') (1995), edited by Franjo Zenko. History as a historical science ('general' and 'national'), with a specific regard to the history of philosophy, hopefully knows *why* it 'investigates' history.

The parliament (1861), in fact, philosophises. Looking at the matter from a historical-philosophical point of view, we say that philosophy is historical, when philosophising is an act of the conscience of that which is by the voice of freedom. This act is historical-creating, if it corresponds to the need to historically be, and if, on the spiritual plane, it creates the possibility to truly be. A parliament, in fact, philosophises, but a parliament does *not* know that it philosophises. A parliament is aware of its historical act, but does *not* know that philosophy alone as historical-creative is in action. To bring into consciousness this historical act, here the conscience and the consciousness of a parliament as a philosophy corresponds to the historical need for self-awareness, *to educate the self-aware historical-creative notion of philosophy* is the task of 'philosophy in Croatia from the founding of the University'.

The Department of Philosophy of the Faculty of Philosophy at the University in Zagreb functions in this spirit of self-recovering-to-consciousness

of philosophy. The need of philosophy is that without which, there cannot be true philosophising. An attempt to recover to consciousness that need as a 'philosophical aspiration', is preserved in the introductory lecture toward 'Logic', which 'the royal public full-time professor of philosophy' Franjo the noble Marković, Ph.D., held on the 18th of October, 1875. (We present the lecture without its double and possible corrections regarding the manuscript /transcript?/ held in the Archive of our Academy under the number XI 37/2a.)

The lecture carries the title *The peculiarity and the importance of the philosophical aspiration*:

Gentlemen! Logic is, let me say it as a metaphor, the steering wheel on this passenger boat, which the human mind sets sailing on the infinite open sea of thoughts, events and phenomena toward the forever desirously sought for truth, goodness and beauty. Our nation, too, has given in to this aspiration, which humanity longs for as for its very purpose; from the time that man became aware of himself, he cannot leave to rest from this effort, which his very own engagement in spiritual ideals gives him. After more than two thousand years, whence this conscious aspiration can be counted, no one has yet thought to fully take the curtain of the enigmatic statue of Saisa, so that all of the minds could together cry out: 'εὕρηκαμεν', 'we found' the whole truth; yet it did not abate. But what for, then, this infinite aspiration, which has no end? Why go searching for that wonderful scenery of the ideals of truth, goodness and beauty, in the boat of the human thought, when Columbus is not set for discovering? This, in fact, is the very calm human pride that it steadily goes after the *whole* truth, even if it knows that it cannot reach and embrace it *all*. 'An aspiration for the truth, give me, my heavenly Father, the *whole* of truth is just for you', this is how a great cosmopolitan mind Lessing, repeats and somewhat changes the saying, which is to be already found in the writing of St. Augustine, a Church father and primarily a neo-Platonic philosopher; in a dialogue of Augustine's (see Ueberweg, *Poviest filozofije II* /'The History of Philosophy', p. 83) Licencius says: '... just searching for the truth makes us happy, because the wisdom of man, which the happiness of man is based on, is not the complete *knowledge* of the truth, but is a loyal and tireless *search* for the truth.' St Augustine corrects Licencius' thought and teaches that it is not purely a search for the truth, but the consequence of that effort, i.e. the finding of the truth, which is the wisdom and happiness of man. This states the nucleus of humanity. Labour, constant labour for coming to know the truth, continuous steps toward the truth, that is human life; resting, even that which is celestial, is out of the *worldly* reach of the human spirit.

If philosophy and the all of the sciences do not reach the *whole* truth, then the minds would not agree either, though *all* would unanimously want

to say: *'this is true, this is good, this is beautiful'*; still, a lot of the truth has already been discovered, and the real value of goodness and beauty is observable to us in the light, which a human eye can bear. Then again, who would like to blind one's eyes and not use them for that which they catch a glimpse of, regardless that they only see a minute fragment of the world, and not the whole of it? Who would not enjoy the blueness of the sky because it is bounded, and not endless? In the same way, would we not use our mind because it painstakingly shows us just an atom of the truth, and cannot the whole?

Logical truths, aesthetic truths, ethical truths construe the horizon of the human thought, traverse mere matter, contain all that which is valuable and worthy to be and to happen; the horizon is greater and wider than the surroundings of mere physical causality. Thoughts, senses and the will are to behave in accord with the independent laws of the mind, and not in accord with that which is material, not in accord with the constraints of physical laws and causes, not in accord with mechanical necessity. The psychological and physical mechanisms also produce falseness (illusions), ugliness and badness. All of the three is changing, inconsistent, and imprudent. Inconsistent and untrue thinking, ugly squatting, weak or evil inconsistent will: these take root freely and govern the life of the nation, which is not yet inspired by the ideal philosophical aspiration, which is without an authority on logical, aesthetic and ethical truths. These truths are a solemn restrains, though of the mind, and not of the physique; they are not forced, but, on the contrary, because they are of the mind, they are free, in Kant's sense of 'autonomic' restrains. Lawlessness and orderlessness in the sphere of the mind – these are the worst.

Nothing valued comes into existence by human labour without a live logical and ethical aspiration, i.e. philosophical aspiration. Let us consider those nations, such as the ancient Greeks, then the French, the English, the German, which did the most for philosophy, and we shall see a relation between their educational, social and state affairs and the philosophical aspiration. In England, look at Bacon, Locke and Mill, and then their state expanding to all the four corners of the world. In other places, we see that by the lack of philosophical aspiration, a lack of social and state circumstances is to be found. At the same time, such a correlating of philosophical aspiration to the social and the state affairs of a nation could be objected to by that which is already known of the Romans; namely, the Romans did not have, as the Greeks did, original philosophies, yet they still had a powerful worldly state. In fact, the Romans are not a contrary example to our assertion. No, they are not, because in their philosophy, an ethical and logical power was disclosed: this is where their philosophical aspiration, at least logical and ethical, is in

the practical state direction. What of the Arabs, the founders of powerful states? And the Turks? At the time of the flourishing of the former, there was a great liking toward Aristotle's philosophy, and with the latter, there was a rule of complete loyalty to the celestial principle, even if completely misunderstood; so both had, for a long time, a strong state-building and social power. We can certainly state that nations are held in life only by that *live aspiration for ideals*; it is the fireplace of millions of souls. The philosophical spirit is that which unites, not only thoughts, but the senses and acts, too. That is the great educational emblem of philosophy; it is also the emblem of the aspiration of our nation, in order for it to win over philosophy; this aspiration is not purely an intellectual task for our nation, but is also an ethical national duty.

If the philosophical spirit unites the individuals of a nation, it also unites diverse nations, it is the all-national power. However, alongside all the philosophy, even the most enlightened nations still argue and fight; but all the champion philosophers of all the new nations, stipulated by either a direct or an indirect influence of the Christian Annunciation, preach the unity of humanity and the need for harmony, the duty of mutual love of all nations; even if today that is only a wailing voice in the desert, but is a messenger of the future, even if distant future of the humanity. *Philosophy is the all-national spiritual Cosmos* ('world'). It passes from a nation to a nation, and the nations, which were new to its shrine two or three centuries ago, are now indigenous. The same will happen with our nation, if it endures, as it did with others. It also enters its shrine as a newcomer, and if our nation endures for a century, it will also become indigenous, a recognised citizen of that spiritual world, and then, and only then, it will also be a permanent inhabitant of this world, which, filled with gratitude, calls its homeland; one does not keep one's material homeland, if one did not attain a spiritual homeland: this is the only rampart.

As all the lagging behind nations grow on *others'* philosophies, so does ours, too; what is more – this is another apology to the philosophical international inheritance and heritage, – some of the champion philosophers, such as Plato, Aristotle, Bacon, Leibniz, Kant and others – already became cosmopolitan, already belong to all nations.

The cosmopolitan trait of philosophy arranges our circumstance in such a way that we cannot be brought under the subjection of a foreign philosophical school, as for example the German, but that we, in the very cosmopolitan philosophy, find an antidote for the predominance of the German spirit among us. If our education is to rise to the German, we lose on inheritance, and the sprout of originality and selfhood withers. But the again, here we also have the English, the French, the Italian and the northern Slavs, and,

of course, before all of the previous, the ancient Greeks, which we should absorb invigorating drinks from on the course for truth, goodness and beauty. This is exactly the emblem and the value of our attempt around science in our own national language, that by it, the needed international horizon is permitted and opened, that it is necessary to us to regard the Romance nations in our science, also the English, the northern Slavs, whereas a number of Germans very insufficiently takes note of other contemporary nations in the philosophical lectures, and present the matter in such a way that one should even not know of the contemporary French or English philosophers. Let us not care about anything so much, let us not hold anything a livelier question of our scientific progress, than the independent usage of works of those other nations beside the Germans.

That usage is primarily profitable for logic. For it, if for any of the branches of philosophy, the English specifically have produced distinguished papers, which we certainly are to use. In this way, even if we do not have another self-contained national philosophical tradition, we have the all-national, and, on the occasion of different foreign great men advancing, we shall not fall into anyone's shackles or to anyone's one-sidedness, because only in time we shall be able to stand on our feet. Philosophy is the nursing mother, which, even if it is not a natural mother, places on foot a nation, frees it spiritually. And that who adopts to oneself the logic of thought, wins over the logic of acts, too. This is that which encourages us to dive into the questions of philosophy with all our strength, to give ourselves with all our spirit to the long journey on the open sea of thoughts, even if our ship is splashed by the waves of the contemporary political and social predicaments of our entire nation; because we, too, fight the battle for the truth, for the good and for the beautiful.

Franjo the noble Marković knows that self-awareness or the notion of 'the philosophical aspiration' is the precondition of true, responsible and self-aware philosophising as that lives through it. 'The philosophical aspiration' presupposes the need of philosophy, which needs it either has or has not. Insofar as that need spoke out in the historical act of the Parliament, for the 'philosophy in Croatia' all is in that the philosophical conscience and consciousness of the Parliament, which does not know of itself, arrives at its philosophical self-awareness, i.e. that we, who are that need, if we are, proclaim to ourselves what it is that we should philosophically be. Philosophy in Croatia from the founding of the University is not a historical topic, but is a historical task.

This methodical outline would have to serve the possible bringing-into-consciousness of the search for the notion of philosophy with us. That notion

or the historical-creative self-awareness of philosophy would have to be able to respond to the persuasion of freedom, which, as the need of the founding of the University, spoke out through the 'Resolution of the Parliament' (article LXXXIV), in 1861. If we find that notion, then it will no longer provoke an anxiety of words, which disturbed everyone present, when at the banquet, on the occasion of the ceremonial installing of Šokčević to higher court, whose term the Parliament Resolution was brought forward in, Ivan Mažuranić held a speech, which climaxed by the thought: 'The King has given us more freedom than what we can support!' (see Josip Horvat, *Politička povijest Hrvatske*, /'Political History of Croatia'/, Binoza, Zagreb, 1936, p. 244).

TRANSLATED BY ANA JANKOVIĆ

FILOZOFIJA U HRVATSKOJ OD OSNUTKA SVEUČILIŠTA

Sažetak

Filozofijski gledano »filozofija u Hrvatskoj od osnutka Sveučilišta« jest povijesna zadaća osamosvješćivanja povijesno-tvorne naravi filozofije. Uzeta puko historijski ova se »tema« svodi na historijat nastanka Sveučilišta i na – iz najrazličitijih razloga moguću – historiju filozofije u sveučilištem otvorenom vidokrugu. No već i tako uzeto sve se u toj »temi« – filozofija-u, Hrvatska (ne razumljena tek puko geopolitički), ono od osnutka (ne razumljeno tek puko vremenski) i sveučilište samo (s obzirom na svoje najviše određenje) – pokazuje kao problematično. Osnutak Sveučilišta nije puko historijska činjenica, to je povijesni čin Sabora »Kraljevinah Dalmacije, Hrvatske i Slavonije«. Ovaj povijesni čin zapravo je akt sebe-ne-svjesnog filozofiranja. Osamosvješćenje toga čina-akta i njegovo aktualno preuzimanje jest filozofijska zadaća za one koji tu i sada, u Hrvatskoj, hoće odista filozofijski biti.

KRUNO KRSTIĆ AS A RESEARCHER AND HISTORIAN OF CROATIAN PHILOSOPHY*

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Original Paper
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I.

Even though there is not a single history of Croatian philosophy written, the postulate that it can be and must be written is entirely clear today. The urgency of that task is no longer questionable, and the consequences of its postponement are all too plausible for those who know what is at issue, regardless of their relation to such a task – be it positive or negative. In either case, each of the sides knows the weight of the consequences.

Being uninformed – let us not even talk about misinformation! – on the so far attempts and realisations of a few sketches, i. e. drafts as accounts of the integral historical span, so of particular eras, and especially of individual authors of Croatian philosophy, would be impermissible. Here, above all, one cannot overlook the absolutely initiative precedent of the rectorial speech by Franjo the noble Marković (1882), because only decades later a partial account of the philosophical work of the Croatian Franciscans of the 17th and the 18th centuries emerged, written by the friar Juraj Božitković (1925); further, one should esteem the first endeavour of a more complete (yet one-sided) survey by Stjepan Zimmermann, Ph.D., (1929), and in the same year Vanino's announcement on the commencement of the teaching of philosophy at the Jesuit Academy of Zagreb; then, an attempt to interpret the philosophical aspirations in Croatia of the second half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries by Albert Bazala, Ph.D., (1936), Mužinić's information on philosophy amongst Croatians from 1918 to 1938 (from 1939), and after World War II the ideological estimation of Croatian philosophy of

This article is in some places shortened in relation to the original Croatian text. Those places are indicated by /.../.

the first half of the 20th century by Predrag Vranicki with the denotation of the lines of direction of Croatian philosophy after the revolution (1960). Finally, one should specially emphasise the complete surveys that appeared during World War II in the same year: in question are the sketchy surveys of the friar Teofil Harapin and Kruno Krstić, Ph.D., from 1943. From the previously listed works in first perspective are, naturally – if we respect Marković's initial impulse – the surveys by Stjepan Zimmermann, Ph.D., and Albert Bazala, Ph.D., and because of the, relatively speaking, richest fact-oriented survey, Harapin's attempt of a complete survey of Croatian philosophy, too. One should see their relevancy in the methodology of the approach to the addressed topics, in the fundamental concept of the task. However, through their prism, the particularity, the role and the exceptional importance, in fact, the epoch-making significance of the efforts and the results, which the survey *Filozofija u Hrvatskoj* ('Philosophy in Croatia') by Kruno Krstić, Ph.D., from – as it is known and as it is above mentioned – 1943 has, becomes distinctively discerned.¹

¹ Even though at issue here are authors and texts mostly known today, which were hardly known up to recently, it seems advisable to quote the correct bibliographic data. Historically initial is undoubtedly the exposition by Franjo MARKOVIĆ, Ph.D., *Filozofijske struke pisci hrvatskoga roda s onkraj Velebita u stoljećih XI' do XI III* ('Writers of the Philosophical Profession of the Croatian Kind from the Other Side of Velebit from the 15th to the 18th Centuries'), the rectorial speech ... on the occasion of the inauguration on the 19th October 1881, Zagreb, 1882; (previously published in 'Vienac' in 1881, and only later separately and supplemented, p. 23; now available in a re-print in 'Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine', Zagreb, 1975, vol. 1–2; pp. 255–279); the friar Juraj BOŽITKOVIĆ in the column *Kronika* wrote in fact an account of the philosophical work of a few Croatian Franciscans of the 17th and the 18th centuries, entitled *Ljetopisne bilješke* ('Chronicle Records'), Bogoslovska smotra, Zagreb, XIII/1925, pp. 160–173, 365–371 and 501–503 (later particularly extensively wrote on Ribarević); Stjepan ZIMMERMANN, Ph.D., *Historijski razvitak filozofije u Hrvatskoj, Filozofija u Hrvatskoj zastupana po svećeničkom staležu – kroz tisuću godina* ('Historical Development of Philosophy in Croatia, Philosophy in Croatia Represented by the Clergy – through a Thousand Years'), Hrvatska bogoslovska akademija, Department of Philosophy, volume I, Zagreb, 1929, p. 24; Miroslav D. I. VANINO, S. J., Ph.D., *Povijest filozofske nastave u Isusovačkoj Akademiji u Zagrebu 1638–1773* ('History of Philosophical Teaching at the Jesuit Academy in Zagreb'), 'Život' ('Life'), Zagreb, X/1929, vol. 2–4 and a separate; Albert BAZALA, Ph.D., *Filozofijska težnja u duhovnom životu Hrvatske od pada apsolutizma ovamo* ('The Philosophical Aspiration in the Spiritual Life of Croatia from the Fall of Absolutism onwards'), *Obzor*, Spomen-knjiga 1860–1935 ('Memorial Book 1860–1935'), Zagreb, 1935 (in large format pp. 120–123) and a special print in 8^o; Aleksandar MUŽINIĆ, *Filozofija u Hrvata od 1918–1938* ('Philosophy in Croatia from 1918 to 1938'), 'Učitelj' ('Teacher'), Belgrade, 1939, vol. 3–4 and a separate; Josip Teofil HARAPIN, Ph.D., *Razvitak filozofije kod Hrvata* ('Development of Philosophy in Croatia'), Croatia Sacra, Zagreb, XI–XII/1943, vol. 20–21, pp. 153–172; Kruno KRSTIĆ, prof. Ph.D., *Filozofija u Hrvatskoj* ('Philosophy in Croatia'), anthology 'Naša domovina' ('Our Homeland'), vol. I, section XVI, Hrvatska znanost, Zagreb, 1943, the publication of the Main Ustasha-loom; Predrag VRANICKI, *Hrvatska filozofija nakon revolucije* ('Croatian Philosophy after the Revolution'), Spomenica u počast 40-god Saveza komunista Jugoslavije ('Memorial in Honour of the Forty Years of the Union of the Communists of Yugoslavia'), vol. I, pp. 54–58, published by the Yugoslav Academy of Science and Arts (today the Croatian Academy of Science and Arts), Zagreb, 1960.

The first attempt of a gripping into a historical whole is the work by Stjepan Zimmermann, brought forth with the presumption that Croatian philosophy with its important aspects is born and developed in the horizon of the Western-European Christianity and its institutions. Zimmermann does not think that there would not be a secular Croatian philosophy too, but the philosophically formative moments he still generally sees in the religious horizon. Unlike Zimmermann, Albert Bazala, Ph.D., developed a purely secular historical concept of Croatian philosophy based on even theoretically formed theses too. It is held that, more or less – agreeing in the interpretations – Bazala's understanding of the possibilities of whichever national philosophy, so of Croatian philosophy too, lies in that which Bazala himself designates as 'the national thought' or 'the national spirit', which is a more usual notion. Whereas for Harapin's survey, which all keep silent about unreasonably and unjustly in Croatian philosophical investigations, it should be said that, regardless of its fact-oriented indentedness and the introduction of some secular components of philosophy, it represents an survey that basically, tacitly and somewhat maybe in a modified way still leans on Zimmermann's presumption.

Completely different from the above-mentioned conceptions is the effort of shaping a historical survey of Croatian philosophy by Kruno Krstić, Ph.D. One should especially note that it is not accidental that he emerges, so to speak, simultaneously with Harapin's work, witnessing the fact that the historical time, the historical-actual circumstance has definitely ripened to accomplish the necessary task, which Krstić has accomplished paradigmatically ideally and, in respect of the historical moment, in the right time. Namely, if there was not the Independent State of Croatia, the imperative of Krstić's engagement and the possibility of publishing the results would not appear, because it became apparent that, not even half a century later, nothing similar to that pioneer accomplishment could be repeated.² In the methodological point of view, it became apparent, besides the previous, that an approach to the postulated task is necessarily needed not only unambigu-

² After World War II, after the fall of the Independent State of Croatia, in the *Encyclopaedia of Yugoslavia*, Zagreb, 1958, vol. 3, pp. 335–338, an unsigned survey of Croatian philosophy is published under *Philosophy: Croatia*, which has obviously resulted by summing the facts of Krstić and Harapin's surveys, though a series of authors and a few supplements were left out (suppressed) and all this by a Yugoslav-Marxist interpretative impregnation, particularly of the newer eras (which will be discussed more thoroughly in the third chapter of this discussion). After that, over-views of some eras and orientations, a number of studies on individual philosophers or works, particularly on university teaching of philosophy will gradually appear here and there, yet not a single text with the pretension of a complete historical engagement. (The exception is the disciplinary-character attempt of aesthetics.) However, all these works are neither the subject matter of this discussion nor influence the profile making of Krstić's merits.

ously, but in the interpretative possibility of illuminating it from different sides, a request that Krstić met consciously and conscientiously. The simultaneous appearance of the two texts with the same ambition is also testimony of the need and the possibility of a many-sided approach too – Harapin's complete survey, different from Krstić's.

Not in a single moment should it be doubted that Kruno Krstić saw the inspiring sources for Croatian philosophy – particularly for its initial historical moments – in the Western-European Christianity and its institutions (the Benedictines, the Franciscans, the Dominicans, the Augustines, the Paulists, the Jesuits, the cathedral schools, etc.). Yet unlike Zimmermann, for him that is not the fundamental and only inspiring source, but just one of the many, though one of the important constituting components. In the same way, it is not in Kruno Krstić's mind at all to pass by the component that Albert Bazala designates with the syntagm 'the national spirit' and 'the national thought' (religious, juridical and ethical norms, myths, folk songs, people's proverbial sayings, language, etc. as national peculiarities). However, even that skeleton has also the character of not being unimportant at all for Krstić, though represents one or two of the components of the structuring of Croatian philosophy. Thus, even if Krstić was, as a listener at the Faculty of Philosophy in Zagreb, Albert Bazala's 'student', he was not the previous in his philosophical views, and especially was not in his understanding of the approach to the over-view of Croatian philosophy.³ Therefore, it is wrong to hold and designate in this sense Krstić as Bazala's student (even less as his follower!); the misconception, which such a mistaken qualification contains in itself, is neither harmless nor without negative consequences. Their world-views also, though not the less ideological differences (if ideology is not understood only negatively) make it completely impossible to 'proclaim' Krstić as Albert Bazala's student, in view of the concept of the history of Croatian philosophy.

This brief commentary on the conceptions of approaches to Croatian philosophy already points to the fact that Krstić's concept, since it accepts both of the above mentioned approaches, is distinctly diverse and, as to its essence, *complex*. The complexity here, of course, does not mean just a naked eclectic addition of different standpoints, but a multiplied synthetic richness of added moments, which Krstić's peculiar concept of the approach to Croatian philosophy carries with itself, by which thought and philosophising always had for Krstić, as he himself says, the character of *creativity*.

³ Franjo ZENKO delegates the thesis that Krstić is Bazala's 'pupil' and that he 'follows Bazala's approach' to Croatian philosophy in the text *Stanje teorije historiografije hrvatske filozofije* ('The State of Theory of the Historiography of Croatian Philosophy'), *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, Zagreb, 1994, no. 39–40, p. 327.

2.

Krstić's fundamental term of reference of the approach to Croatian philosophy is *historicism*. In this sense, the horizon of his aspiration was from the beginning – and remained: *to understand, comprehend, and then also to present Croatian philosophy as a history of Croatian philosophy*. Of Croatian philosophy, which simultaneously means of the philosophy of the Western-European cultural circle in general, the conviction that at issue is the history of thought through the thought of history is indubitable and irrefutable for Krstić. Hence, philosophy too, is the reflective horizon of a national history. Krstić's survey of Croatian philosophy from 1943 is written by him being aware of the immanence of the history of Croatian philosophy to the Western-European hemisphere, and in this way it is unquestionably articulated and structured correspondingly, i.e. according to the European context, which Croatian philosophy itself co-develops too. This is equivalently related to the significantly epoch-making course of history which is at issue, as much as to the lines of direction, orientations, schools of thought, even the works and points of view of individual thinkers. Of course, for Krstić history does not denote just the mere past, though tradition is that which he in his views justifiably highly appreciates and esteems. Further, for Krstić historicism is not, in any case, situated in the framework of positivistic conceptions, but has its philosophical character. In the sense that is known to us for a long time already – only the West has a history. Thus, as much as we need to appreciate Harapin's rich-with-facts and factually valuable text, it must be said that it is conceived *chronologically*, and Krstić's *historically*.

From the entire text *Philosophy in Croatia*, Krstić's conviction and trust in the precedence of the immanent historicism of philosophy, of the history of philosophy as the history of philosophical thought strictly radiates; a historical survey of philosophy is, in fact, a history of the philosophical thought. The peculiarity, the identity and the autonomous dimension of such a history do not, in any case, involve the exemption from other dimensions, co-terms of reference, components and areas of history, or that is, of the manifestations of historicism, understood both existentially and categorically. This Krstić clearly formulates on the first page (first column, second passage) of his survey: 'The beginnings of the scientific in general, and so of the scientific-philosophical interest amongst Croatians are not self-grown. The reasons of this are partly in the national character itself, and partly in *the historical fate of Croatia*.'⁴ It is most articulately stated that in the considering of

⁴ KRSTIĆ, Kruno, *Filozofija u Hrvatskoj* ('Philosophy in Croatia'), anthology 'Naša domovina' ('Our Homeland'), Zagreb, 1943, vol. 1, p. 397 – Z. P.'s Italics.

the immanent historicism of thought, of the history of philosophical thought, some other outside-philosophical co-terms of reference, decisive for the development and the range, for the possibility of the development and the realization of philosophical thought, need to be appreciated too. Krstić articulates the thesis by the sentence also that we read at the top of the second column on the same page, where he says that ‘besides the mentioned line of the national character, the weighty *political fate of the people* is surely the main reason why *the scientific forms of cultural life* get developed rather late and non-independently.” Here, ‘the political fate of the people’ does not mean anything else but history, national history, which is, Krstić says, ‘reflected in a lively way into the *fate* of the Croatian state life, too’⁶.

From the above it is comprehensible how Krstić sees the history of philosophy in Croatia as the history of (ethnic, national) Croatian philosophy, with the postulate that it be the Croatian history of philosophy. Of course, Krstić does not think all of the above purely (only!) in the framework of the Croatian national culture and history, because it is valid of – if the reality of a nation allows that it can be valid – all the European nations, all the nations from around the world. That is why Krstić can talk of ‘fate’, yet that in his text, in any case, there is no talk of any fatalism, especially not after we get to know how Gjuro Arnold philosophically understood history in Croatia. It should be emphasised the more over that, in the horizon of history, Krstić respects both the present and the future, besides tradition. In the term (not the naked word!) ‘fate’, even though maybe Krstić did not want to or did not do it consciously (and we do not have arguments that he did not), we can and should discern a Heidegger-like meaning of the conception of historicism, formulated in the capital work of the 20th century *Sein und Zeit*. The statement that at the beginnings Croatian philosophy ‘is not self-grown’ (because it will become authentic in its historical maturity), non-self-pleasingly critically contains the ruthless characteristic *of history*, its very own, Croatian, and the history of the West, but the deviation from the inferring of Croatian philosophy from ‘the national character’ and from ‘the national thought’, too. Krstić is not Bazala’s student in the previous, because a philosophy inferable from ‘the national character’ would have to be – even if just at the beginning of its history – self-grown/original. For Krstić, though, ‘the national character’ and ‘the national spirit’ are, it is already said, the constituting co-terms of reference, but not the only, even less the starting or fundamental determinants. Krstić’s concept of the approach to Croatian philosophy is, thus, affirmed as *complex*.

⁵ Ibid., Z. P.’s Italics.

⁶ Ibid., Z. P. put the word ‘fate’ into Italics.

It is also necessary to warn of the cultural aspect of the history of Croatian philosophy immanent to Krstić's account, even though here it cannot be considered in greater detail, since it represents a distinct and rather specific sphere of different problems. However, it is neither difficult to show or to prove that Krstić's account contains presumptions and consequences of the aspect. After all, cultural components are immanent to every philosophy, and so to the national history of Croatian philosophy, too; to its historical reality, and so it should to its historiography, too. Why? Because in the same way – regardless of the differences in the points of view on this topic – both the European and the general histories of philosophy equally are culturally characterised; and their every serious historiography, too. And vice versa: every culture, especially every national culture is simply insufficient without philosophy. Even more insufficient are the historical surveys of culture, especially of a national culture (which, at the same time, implies all the fields in fine arts), if the reflections, that is to say a respect for philosophy is missing.

For Krstić's concept, let us demonstrate the previously expressed statements by a quotation from the text, where he in an interpretative way comments on (and justifies!) the liable-to-criticism philosophical ground of empiricism! So Krstić writes: 'In ... the monstrous duty of setting the world in order, to cut and say what is fundamental and right, what is most important and for the desired purpose – the final ordered state – most decisive, would truly be too daring, and a fruitless endeavour too. To get to 'the bottom of things', to the first and fundamental cluster of information, from which one can always, unambiguously and without residue infer all known existence, solve all the cognitive problems, would be the dream of many thinkers and researchers, possibly of many theoreticians of empiricism, but such a dream is by no means characteristic of empiricism as such, is not identical to the empirical aspiration as a *cultural-historical reality*.⁷ Identically, though more significantly, Krstić declares his conviction on the cultural and cultural-historical character of philosophy a bit further in the same discussion: 'If one understands, as the essence of empiricism, the continuous 'finding a place' for the newly-perceived tasks, for the uninterrupted request that *orbis intellectualis* is to be the assembly of means that are going to enable *success* to precisely those activities which are in sight, *in the centre of cultural interest*, then of empiricism it will be possible to eliminate the dislike, which it is often met with in the philosophical world.⁸ After the previous, should one still have to specifically prove the culturally determined character for Krstić's concept of

⁷ KRSTIĆ, Kruno, *Problem prvih podataka u znanosti* ('The Problem of First Data in Science'), *Nastavni vjesnik*, Zagreb, 1940–1941, no. 2–3; quoted place no. 2, p. 100. Z. P.'s Italics.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 102. The word 'success' in the first copy emphasised by Z. P.

the history of philosophy in general, and by that *eo ipso* of Croatian philosophy too?

The quoted paradigms are intentionally chosen from 'the European context', from the general history of philosophy, since Krstić has *expressis verbis* formulated the co-relativity and reversibility of culture and philosophy for the history of Croatian philosophy on the opening pages of the survey *Philosophy in Croatia*, which we have here quoted as a proof of the thesis that their author does not want to view Croatian philosophy either just chronologically, or just as mere 'heritage', but precisely as a history. By way of this, we cannot do anything for the theoretical, mental and spiritual insufficiency of those who wrongly ascribe to Croatia the thesis that history is – evil (!), which we could denote as unlearned superstition, as 'fear from theory' (and, in fact, as a lack of education in theory) and a lack of any more serious insight into the actual history, even historiography too. The example from the general history of philosophy needed to be quoted, so that a humorous, hackneyed, though harmful understanding could be resisted in advance, an understanding that we often find in the historiographies of Croatian fine arts (literature, painting, music, performance art and even modern media) – namely, an understanding that a number of the phenomena of the Croatian cultural, artistic, economic, social and political history are – non-typical! Because of the previous, even 'provincial'! This, of course, is not true in ninety nine percent of the cases! In the same way, the reversible functional relation between Croatian culture as a whole and Croatian philosophy is not something – 'non-typical'!

One still necessary needs to emphasise the before quoted distinction concerning the cultural understanding of the history of (Croatian) philosophy as an explicit thesis, because of the possible, but before all else, ill-disposed objections. Namely, those that claim that in the cultural version the authenticity of philosophy is lost from sight. Philosophy, and so Croatian philosophy too, is, as a matter of course, part of culture, thus of Croatian culture too, but in itself and by itself it is not simply just an ingredient of culture, it is neither exhausted, nor truly happens as just any 'cultural sector'. In fact, the affirmation, the absenteeism or the repression of some philosophy significantly co-determines the structuring of culture, its type and its level. Hence, when speaking of Croatian philosophy, Kruno Krstić has in sight philosophy as philosophy. For Krstić the history of Croatian philosophy too, as every real philosophy, happens in the e l e m e n t o f t h o u g h t, that is as a thought, and accordingly it is not generated by something that could not be a thought, thus by something that is an outside-philosophical element. A thought in this sense directly constitutes the very history of Croatian philosophy as national, regardless of how much a thought is originally founded on experience in Krstić's personal philosophical standpoint.

An exceptionally pregnant and a particularly important formulation, which declares Krstić's understanding, is a testimony of philosophy as the unique and autonomous, eminent and emanative sphere of thought: 'The first and the cardinal principle is the principle of language purity: *one should think Croatian*.'⁹ Can there be a clearer explication of Hegel's thesis (even if it is doubtful?) that one can truly (begin to) philosophise only in one's mother tongue!?! The correct interpretation of Krstić's thesis is: it is not sufficient just to know (even if very well!) or be acquainted with the Croatian language, but one should (want to, be able to, wish to, know to, etc.) think Croatian! If we paraphrase the above mentioned thesis in the figurative meaning and if we apply it to the field of philosophy, it will be unequivocally shown that for the merit, the insight and the estimation of Croatian philosophy, for the possibility and the ability of the relevant motion, the finding of or the orientation in the history of Croatian philosophy, for Krstić one always 'needs to not just be acquainted with the history of Croatian philosophy (in practice, even this is shown to be done, in general, very poorly partially and superficially – Z. P.'s comment), but should think Croatian too'. Here, of course, the part of the formulation 'it is not sufficient just to know Croatian philosophy' does not mean that knowing Croatian philosophy is something unimportant. On the contrary, that knowing is for Krstić a presumption for all that which can be called 'Croatian thought', and thus both for philosophy inside Croatian culture and for culture itself as such. It is important to emphasise again: Krstić's doubtless standpoint is that exactly the sphere of thoughts, the element of thought is that which is philosophically important.

Both thinking and thought are not thought either in the psychological or in the sociological sense, or in any other positivistic variant at Krstić. Besides philosophy itself and its necessarily logical-rational communicative dimension, another sphere, amongst other things, clearly suggests or determines, as we have already seen, the contours of the philosophical understanding of the element of thought – a sphere that was a subject matter of Krstić's interest: language. It is known that in the renowned 'Differences ...' he says that he has an insight into those differences from a 'feeling for language'.¹⁰ It is nec-

⁹ KRSTIĆ, Kruno, *Hrvatske zamjene za riječ 'kultura'* ('Croatian Substitutions for the Word 'Culture)'), Hrvatski narod, Zagreb, 1942, no. 359, p. 11. Krstić's Italics!

¹⁰ Literally: 'In the choice of words (for a 'differential dictionary' in the same book, Z. P.'s comment) we have relied on the most realistic sigh-post: Croatian language feeling'. At matter is a smaller book by Petar GUBERINA, Ph.D., and Kruno Krstić, Ph.D., *Razlike između hrvatskoga i srpskoga književnog jezika* ('Differences between the Croatian and Serbian Standard Language'), Zagreb, 1940. The application of Krstić's concrete here quoted understanding of the problem is inferable without any difficulty from his other relatively few philosophical discussions, which nevertheless enable a clear discerning of Krstić's philosophical position, which 'decode' his world-view.

essary to warn of the previous, since, unfortunately, it is clear to scarce experts only that Krstić here infers an entire sphere – language! – on the basis of the philosophically understood phenomenon of consciousness as an experience that manifests itself in the form of a certain emotion, feeling too; in the same way that Krstić does in some other texts for the other fields of creativity. Further, it is evident that, regardless of how much Krstić appreciates the acquisitions of modern psychology and sociology, the emotions and feelings cannot here, in any case, be understood either psychologically or sociologically, but they have their philosophical dimension in the same way that thought has it, and in their strict meaning, which is, as we have expressly remarked of Krstić, just as thought, creativity too. With the conviction that it is possible to recognise thought in language. In Krstić it is not a presumption of ours that we read between the lines, but is an indubitable and firm position expressed crystal-clearly: ‘Philosophical thought ... has always aspired to be a thought in the most refined meaning of the word, which strove to break the prejudices and side-tracks conditioned by an outside-logical and anti-logical (‘non-rational’) way of experiencing and cognitive orientation’, because of which it has simultaneously always ‘consciously fought for its own expression in language ...’.¹¹

One of the following important lines of Krstić’s concept of the history of Croatian philosophy, which determines the highest rank and philosophical character to him, is – *c r i t i c a l a p p r o a c h*. Namely, Krstić conceives his brief survey of Croatian philosophy critically. No matter how brief it was, that survey implies *interpretative possibilities*, it implicitly includes *the fact-oriented and doctrine-oriented and theoretical foundation* and it does not retreat from the imperative of *value judgement* which is not laden with prejudices (often wrongly ascribed, thoughtfully suggested and expressed from the position of ‘cosmopolitan’ vanity). The text *Filozofija u Hrvatskoj* (‘Philosophy in Croatia’) has neither ‘the complex of lesser value’ of underestimation, nor the weaknesses of self-pleasing (national) overestimation. Krstić knows very well what role even the shortest doctrine-oriented remarks have by way of the previous, and these we always find in him, and the critical approach that is always present in the previous, which Krstić has never brought into question, has the indisputable character of the, in the Croatian intellectual circles, so much talked about ‘European standard’ or ‘European context’. After all, in respect of the critical co-term of reference, Krstić is explicit and unambiguous: ‘If one of the fields of thought is permeated by the principle of *critical approach*, then it is surely the field of philosophy, and if there is a supreme criterion of self-evaluation of thought, then it is surely the philosophical criteria.’¹² Besides

¹¹ KRSTIĆ, Kruno, *Filozofija i jezik* (‘Philosophy and Language’), Vienac, Zagreb, 1944, year 36, no. 3, p. 50.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 52. Z. P. put the word ‘critical approach’ into Italics.

the principal character of critical approach, this quotation affirms once again Krstić's clouded-by-nothing conviction that philosophy is authentically and autonomously truly philosophy only in the element of thought, and that by way of this he does not (and should not have to) recede from seeing philosophy through the prism of culture and as essentially culture-creating. By way, the critical approach of philosophy and its reflective substantiality obviously affirm themselves by mutual reciprocity.

A special aspect of being-critical and being-philosophical of Krstić's concept of the history of Croatian philosophy is represented by his investigating character, *r e s e a r c h*, an openness to researching. It is self-understood that the research at issue here has a different meaning than the one that Martin Heidegger assigns to modern science in a disqualifying way. For Krstić, research is not a project that always has its anticipated positive or negative, predetermined result. For Krstić, philosophical research, with respect to the history of Croatian philosophy, is the exertion of the insight into historical reality, an insight into the historical reality of thought, an effort to affirm *the truth* of Croatian philosophy, to truly establish that truth and that philosophy, to bring them to life as the spheres of spirit and culture, as the highest plane of 'the fruits of the heart and the mind'.

An openness to researching did not precede only Krstić's brief survey of Croatian philosophy, which is, just as Harapin's, *the first* such complete survey, where we find many of the so far unmentioned Croatian philosophers and the titles of their works, but can be disclosed, because it is explicitly quoted, in Krstić's text *Philosophy in Croatia* itself. Namely, Krstić warns of the fact that many the works of Croatian philosophy lie unstudied in European and local libraries. Moreover, he warns of the fact that in the Croatian archives too, many of the unstudied manuscripts of the known to us, yet more of the unknown works and until then unknown authors are to be found.¹³

A lesser-known *document*, though for the historiography of Croatian philosophy important above all, is the greatest evidence of the same investigating spirit of Krstić's effort in general that is immanent in his text *Philosophy in Croatia*. At issue is the here-and-there just parenthetically mentioned, yet never either explicitly quoted or published Krstić's, in Croatia absolutely the first, *Program* ('Programme') of necessary researching of the entire historical territory of Croatian philosophy. This programme, which up to this day has not penetrated the public, but remained intended for 'internal' us-

¹³ KRSTIĆ, Kruno, *Filozofija u Hrvatskoj* ('Philosophy in Croatia'), 1943; as an example of the 17th, and the 18th century too, p. 399, column II: 'The greatest part of philosophical works, mostly teachers' works of different schools, remains in the archives of various, particularly monastery libraries.'

age, so to speak, is enriched by numerous fact-oriented and thematic innovations in relation to the text from 1943, is supplemented by a series of until then unmentioned works and authors, who until then were unrecognised as philosophers, and a series of complex, epoch-making research tasks too.

Only an experienced researcher and an adequate expert in Croatian philosophy (immediately after World War II, Krstić was not amongst the rare as such, but the only one as such) could put together a Programme of researching the history of Croatian philosophy that is current even today. Only an expert in Croatian philosophy, such as Krstić was, based on his own research and study, and this is necessary to emphasise because of the historical truth, could conceive and then make the final choice of texts for the impressive *Antologija hrvatskih filozofa latinista* ('Anthology of Croatian Philosophers Latinists')! (A greater number of associates worked on this anthology of selected texts, the task of translation was mostly completed in the 70s already, yet the 'Anthology' is not published to this day.) The 'Anthology' is the second, equally significant document of Krstić's investigating spirit that remained hidden from the Croatian and European public.¹⁴

We will have to talk more particularly, more precisely, more specifically and more integrally about the mentioned 'Programme', which exists without the author and the date being stated and which is duplicated on a 'mimeograph' in *two versions* (the second is somewhat extended in either the middle or the end of the 60s), some other time. For now, let us be satisfied by the remark only that it is the initiative document for the researching of the history of Croatian philosophy after World War II. It is tied to the work on the 'Anthology', and, parallel with that, to the needs of the encyclopaedic work of the Lexicographic Institute in Zagreb, and was the basis of a series of publishings of the Yugoslav Academy of Science and Arts.¹⁵ The inspiring author

¹⁴ Work on the conception and realisation as a long-term, not at all easy work has begun before the founding of the Institute of Philosophy in Zagreb, has been partially continued in the short-termed Belgrade branch of the Institute of Human Sciences in Zagreb, so that at the end of the 60s and the beginning of the 70s it has become the legitimate task of the Institute of Philosophy of the University in Zagreb. On some of the aspects of the origination and strange fate of this *Antologija hrvatskih filozofa latinista* ('Anthology of Croatian Philosophers Latinists') that was tried to be completed and prepared for publishing several times, yet was never – from 'unknown' (!?) reasons – published, the author of these lines says more in a largish unpublished so far manuscript (typewriting) intended for the *Preface* of the 'Anthology' publication, which was being prepared during the ethnic war and immediately after it (the mid 90's) – and remained unrealised also. The present two books of the 'Chrestomathy' of Croatian philosophy published by 'Školska knjiga' rest on the idea, and evidently on the results of the work on the mentioned *Anthology*. Today it is possible to resignedly state that a lack of finances was not the only reason why the *Anthology* always remained unpublished.

¹⁵ Franjo ZENKO, Ph.D., mentions the programme in the introduction to the tenth volume of 'Hrestomatija filozofije' ('Chrestomathy of Philosophy') entitled *Novija hrvatska filozofija* ('Newer Croatian Philosophy'), published by 'Školska knjiga', Zagreb, 1995, p. 29.

of the 'Programme' is not Vladimir Filipović, Ph.D., as it is usually held. As regards Vladimir Filipović, Ph.D., he was just the institutional mediator who considered such a task unavoidable by his own conviction, and by his profession and rank he was qualified for it (the Head of Department of Philosophy of the Faculty of Philosophy at the University in Zagreb). In the given historical moment, this positive engagement, as much as his inserting of Croatian philosophy into the 3rd volume of 'Filozofska hrestomatija' ('Philosophical Chrestomathy'; the eras of humanism and renaissance) in 1956, was Filipović's exceptional merit. Namely, in this way, i.e. by inserting Croatian renaissance philosophy into the chrestomathy of European and general philosophy, Filipović's merit lies in the fact that he has maintained the consciousness of the fact that there at all exists something like Croatian philosophy with the dignity of the same rank or level as the European or general, even though Filipović's text in the chrestomathy is, in fact, only with a few known by then innovations, just Marković's retold rectorial speech on Croatian renaissance thinkers plus Bošković (the same illogical conjugation as in Marković).¹⁶

In both of the versions of Krstić's 'Programme', it is important to recognise that they are conceived in the same way as his text 'Philosophy in Croatia' from 1943 too, i.e. that they are intentionally and structurally conceived hermeneutically *historically*. As a task, the subject matters of the research are again the epochs and periods of Croatian philosophy as correspondent to (in the last quarter of the 20th century, one would say 'contextually to!') the European history. It equally applies to some already known, but to a series of until then unknown names too (unknown as philosophers or philosophical writers); to persons, people, particular works ... directions, movements, schools and orientations of thought too.

In comparing those two Krstić's *Programmes* to the text from 1943 that is at issue here, one cannot but notice *how many innovations*, new names,

Namely, the quote is incorrect. Zenko says: 'When in 1967 the Institute of Philosophy was founded, which Filipović led as both manager and head for fifteen years, within the framework of the Institute he has mostly engaged in the research of the 'Croatian philosophical heritage' having gathered a team of young researchers and quite a number of associates led by Kruno Krstić, who in 1969 worked out the first Programme on the history of Croatian philosophy.' As it has been mentioned, Kruno Krstić has already put the *Programme* together earlier, before 1969, and it has surely been used, if nowhere else than in preparing the *Anthology of Croatian Philosophers Latmists*, so that at the founding of the Institute after the discussions at the meetings of the Croatian Philosophical Society (which the author of this study also participates in personally) it was here and there extended and supplemented. Thus, according to the previous it is the *second* text of the *Programme*, whose author was again Krstić.

¹⁶ FILIPOVIĆ, Vladimir, Ph.D., *Filozofija renesanse* ('Philosophy of the Renaissance') (and philosopher's selected texts); Philosophical Chrestomathy, vol. III, first edition, Zagreb, 1956; chapter XIV entitled *Hrvatski renesansni mislioci u sklopu svjetske filozofske misli* ('Croatian Renaissance Thinkers within the Framework of the General Philosophical Thought'), pp. 115–128. Filipović does not cite F. Marković.

authors, works and new epoch-making enlightenments, illuminations of particular epochs, periods and historical streamings those Programmes contain, and these are not or are just rather briefly touched on in the text *Philosophy in Croatia*. That is why two things must not be overlooked. The text from 1943 already – alongside Harapin's – as *the first complete survey of the history of Croatian philosophy*, contained the results of Krstić's independent discoveries, while the *Programmes* are progressive testimony of not just the usual results of further research endeavours, but also present real *discoveries* in a number of particularities, but in greatly complex engagements and new authors' works too. This discovering moment of Krstić's research, by which the *Programmes* are documentary evidence, was simply passed over in silence up until now in a rather unpleasant and incorrect manner. It was held as self-evident, so to speak, yet it was never stated that Krstić's *Programmes* contain a number of until then unknown authors and a number of until then unknown, i.e. for the history of Croatian philosophy non-respected works; as if they appear all by themselves. Namely, the *Programme* served as a starting point to a number of 'academic' and learned discussions, and it is only that their authors 'never remembered' to quote Krstić, without whom the respective wise academics would know neither the author nor the work that they occupy themselves with on 'the high European level'. The circumstance that we do find some authors and some works in the *Enciklopedija Jugoslavije* ('Encyclopaedia of Yugoslavia') cannot justify the passing over in silence of the research and discovery merits and the personal (non-institutionalised) self-sacrificial persevering work of Kruno Krstić precisely in the field of the history of Croatian philosophy! Amongst other things, in the field of encyclopaedic work too. After *Jugoslavika* ('Yugoslavia') and both of the *Programmes*, while speaking of his work on the Croatian philosophical heritage in 1971, Krstić stated strongly convinced that 'the discovering of the unknown ... /is/ ... in progress'. Stated verbatim: 'I believe that there is going to be many discovering surprises not only in manuscripts, but in published works too.'¹⁷

If we finally now take into consideration all of the above statements *on Krstić's concept*, on his understanding of the approach to the studying of Croatian philosophy, then it should be concluded that it is developed as an independent, original, for the historiography of Croatian philosophy crucial

¹⁷ KRSTIĆ, Kruno, *Bit će još mnogo otkrivačkih iznenađenja* ('There is still to be many discovery surprises'); see the interview *Razgovori s istraživačima, 2. O filozofskoj baštini Hrvata razgovaramo s dr. Krunom Krstićem* ('Conversation with Researchers, 2. On the Philosophical Heritage of the Croats We Converse with Kruno Krstić, Ph.D.'), interviewed by Zlatko Posavac, *Hrvatski tjednik*, Zagreb, 1/1971, no. 3, p.16.

and ground-breaking modus of research, understanding, presentation or interpretation. Krstić, of course, does not overlook and knows very well what had been done before him. He accepts the previously established standpoints and their results, and as a true admirer of tradition he works on tradition, but he was not in any case simply Bazala's student, as some wanted to suggest, as we have seen! Or Bazala's follower! The essence of Krstić's approach to Croatian philosophy is made up of (1) *the dimension of history*, the moment of historicism made a topic in the element of (2) *thought*, as interpretation and value-estimation equally in the fact-oriented and doctrine-oriented way, him always made a topic (3) *culturally* or cultural-historically, but also unavoidably (4) *critically*, him always being open to (5) *research*, thus to new perspectives in all cases, and so to (6) *discoveries* too. In his work, Krstić has borne witness to all of the above by both a spoken word and in texts written in that field, yet scattered around in various publications and numerous encyclopaedic volumes.

Therefore, as the conclusion we could say the following without hesitation: if the initial precedence of recognising the reflective and spiritual need for stimulating the research of the (history of) Croatian philosophical heritage belongs to Franjo the noble Marković by the paradigm of renaissance philosophy (plus Bošković), then we can and must take Krunoslav Krstić, Ph.D., to be the first, and in many things so far the only one who realised that task, and hence *the founder of the history of Croatian philosophy*, i.e. the one who formulated and carried out its concept or, in other words, *the founder of the real philosophical historiography of Croatian philosophy*. Namely, Krstić did not consider his work on the study and presentation of Croatian philosophy solely as registering the heritage and eventually establishing a chronological order in it, but in that heritage he saw and respected *the history of philosophy* as the history of *Croatian* philosophy. And Croatian philosophy is not – unlike what some think and forcefully, yet completely uncritically suggest – less interesting, is neither something else nor different, and in many of its successful moments it is not less diligent than both the European and general. For the Croats, their culture and their national continuance it is irreplaceable, needed and significant. That is why we can only lament over the fact that the sixth volume of *Hrvatska enciklopedija* ('Croatian Encyclopaedia') never got published, where Kruno Krstić would probably write the text on Croatian philosophy under the term *Philosophy*, and where, completely surely, the statements proven here would be revealed more prominently. Thus, the shameful, disgraceful, even ill hearted and frightening passing over in silence of Kruno Krstić's merits for the philosophical historiographic establishing of the *h i s t o r y* of Croatian philosophy would simply not be possible.

3.

An attentive reader at the end of the 20th century, who carefully read Krstić's survey *Philosophy in Croatia* and who, by not giving up, continues reading this discussion on Krstić's respective text, can pose the following question with all reason: considering all, is not the epoch-making grade expressed here on the character of Krstić's historical survey of Croatian philosophy a particular exaggeration, an overstatement of merits, is it not simply disproportional and way too high? The more so, as today it is not hard to observe deficiencies in Krstić's truly brief and concise exposition. Concerning these deficiencies, already in his time – maybe? – one could ask why is it that some not really insignificant and not really unknown authors and some not really unimportant titles have not been mentioned? Is not the precedence unjustifiably attributed to Krstić in comparison to Harapin's text that cites some truly not unimportant for Croatian philosophy works and authors, which Krstić does not register because he probably still did not know of them? Moreover, a decade and a half after Krstić and Harapin's surveys, a relatively more extensive, 'the most complete', relatively speaking, chronology of Croatian philosophy will be published, which is more extensive than both Harapin and Krstić's and with innovations (!); thus, the so far most extensive, relatively speaking, text on that topic and of such a character, which even today, at the end of the 20th century, we can usefully consult in the 'Encyclopaedia of Yugoslavia' under the entry of *Philosophy* and in the section of *Croatia*.¹⁸ Finally, it seems that giving Krstić the preference over Harapin is not the only thing questionable, when both represent the same historical moment of the ripening of the open problem of Croatian philosophy. The lack of explicit explanation of the methods and principles of the historiography of Croatian philosophy is beginning to be suggested as questionable, since obviously there already exists a tendency to bring into question the very possibility of giving Krstić and Harapin the preference over Bazala. Namely, neither one of the former two ever pointed the problem in the direction of theoretical, even suspicious discussions *O ideji nacionalne filozofije* ('On the Idea of National Philosophy'), as Bazala did before them.

The question can not and must not remain unanswered. The statement is very simple: Harapin cites some titles and authors, which are not in Krstić. In parity, it applies vice versa too: we can hopelessly search for a series of names

¹⁸ See the Encyclopaedia of Yugoslavia (first edition!), Zagreb, 1958, vol. 3, pp. 335–338. It can be presumed by all certainty that the bulk of the text was written by Krstić, particularly regarding the historical articulation and registering of the main works and authors, then all the significant innovative supplementation and the fact-oriented enrichment in relation to his own survey from 1943. No puzzle hides in the circumstance that the article is not signed.

and titles in Harapin, which Krstić cites. Therefore, the reply to the objection does not lie in such a 'rivalry', because obviously one must pay attention to the degree of the researching of 'the Croatian philosophical heritage' at the time when both of the authors attempted to sum up their then available knowledge. This is a moment that especially must be taken into consideration, since both of the texts are equally pioneering, and knowing the matter too depended not only on the invested effort but also on the factual accessibility of materials. It is very characteristic that Harapin's text is richer with the earlier centuries, hence the older history, while Krstić's text is preferential towards the newer, especially the 19th and the 20th centuries. But besides the accessibility, the principles of approach were obviously important, which differentially intensified and directed the research efforts, conditioning the priorities and the diversity of research inquisitiveness.

However, it cannot be overlooked that both Krstić and Harapin do not mention some today very distinguished, exceptionally important names and works. For example: Herman Dalmatin, Pavao Skalić, Matija Vlačić Ilirik (Flacius), etc. Thus, while in 1943 Harapin mentions Rogačić and his work, and so his text *Euthymia sive de tranquillitate animi* (1690) too, but, in fact, not saying much more than Franjo Marković, there is no say of Rogačić in Krstić in 1943. Krstić will accept these names later – including Rogačić and a series of other left out names and works – in the first possibility of presenting his supplemented knowledge of Croatian philosophy. This is something that Harapin did not do (or could not do), because we do not know of his later published works. However, does this instructing to the time after 1943 mean that, for example, the historiographic survey of Croatian philosophy published in the 'Encyclopaedia of Yugoslavia' in 1958 is more relevant, because it contains all the names and titles, which neither Krstić nor Harapin have, individually or both together? Plus some other names of philosophers and philosophical aspirations, which are also not present in either Krstić or Harapin; or at least, not like those emphasised in the Encyclopaedia?

Regarding the text in the Encyclopaedia of Yugoslavia from 1958, it should primarily be emphasised that it is signed by the letter R (= redakcija = editorial staff). Thus, it has no authorization by the author, even though it will not remain hidden from every expert who is acquainted with the matter at issue that the skeleton, i.e. the base of the encyclopaedic text is surely Krstić's, yet he both could not and did not want to sign it. A more rigorous exegesis would show a series of rather interesting, bewildering particularities. However, for our needs the statement is sufficient that the text is a sum and a contamination of both Krstić and Harapin's original surveys, to which Krstić has surely added the insights of his later research, but, in the end, an Anonymous One (in fact, a few always-on-duty censors, whose names should not be

a puzzle) has abstracted the text and has added all that, which Krstić both could not and did not want to sign any longer, as we have already stated.

Regardless of how informatively useful, even today, the text in the Encyclopaedia of Yugoslavia is, even though it does not have a usual bibliography cited at the end, the dimension of historicism, the dimension of critical approach – which we consider as significant – are abstracted from it, and, as much as it was possible, the dimension of the national character of Croatian philosophy was also abstracted from it. Namely, regardless of the fact that not a single philosophical text is without a particular ideological charge, and so are both Krstić and Harapin's texts too, in the allegedly indifferent 'non-polemical' encyclopaedic (!) text they overstep all due limits by the formulations that speak of 'the philosophical clericalism'¹⁹ or by the statement that 'the reactionary circles (!? – Z. P.'s comment) strive to support their shaken positions by a temporary leaning on idealist doctrines, from Kant's, through Lotze and Herbart's to Wundt's'.²⁰ The closing sentence of the encyclopaedic article openly points to where the ideological 'editorial' 'correction' of the text was directed to. That was an undertaking that definitely disqualifies the article together with all those 'researchers of the Croatian philosophical heritage', who as their source and starting point take (cite!) this encyclopaedic text, because by that at the same time, tacitly or explicitly, accept the 'encyclopaedic' positions, yet persistently passing over in silence Krstić and Harapin's pioneer work, as much as all of Krstić's subsequent effort. This closing formulation in the Encyclopaedia of Yugoslavia from 1958 (vol. 3, p. 338) runs as follows: 'The philosophical work in Croatia assumes a Yugoslav character more and more...'

It is evident that by way of such determinations the encyclopaedic text comes to be not just different from, but contrary to Krstić and Harapin's significant, exactly fundamental intentions. On the other hand, that which was the meaning of the fundamental principle of Krstić's approach – *historicism*, thus an understanding of the *Croatian* philosophical heritage as *the history of Croatian philosophy* – is completely eliminated from the encyclopaedic article, even though its principle of realisation, as of the entire Encyclopaedia too (!), should have been 'scientific', i.e. the principle of 'dialectic and historical materialism'. Historical? That *historicism* in the encyclopaedic article on Croatian philosophy dropped even under the level of chronological and fact-oriented correctness! After all, mostly the same happened, as in all the publications of the Yugoslav Lexicographic Institute in Zagreb, always and whenever the 'rebus croaticarum' should strictly have been at issue. Let us

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 337. The fact that the text is unsigned should always be in one's mind.

²⁰ Ibid.

not even talk about the Independent State of Croatia as a topic! That is way in Krstić we find his contemporaries, talented philosophers, such as Ivan Oršanić and Julije Makaneč, introduced into the historical survey, who the Encyclopaedia of Yugoslavia does not even mention, just as the exceptional intensification of Croatian philosophy exactly in the period of the Independent State of Croatia, thus undoubtedly, in the unfavourable circumstances of World War II. Another analogy shows the insufficiency concerning the dimension of historicism, i.e. the complete eliminating of the Croatian national-historical dimension from the encyclopaedic article in 1958. In 1943, Krstić writes: "The papers of great national heroes also have an important cultural-philosophical significance in the middle of the second half of the 19th century, such as: Ante Starčević (1823–1896), Eugen Kvaternik (1825–1871) and Mihovil Pavlinović (1831–1887). Even though their work is gathered around the centre of the idea of national liberation, in their work one can find a developed world-view, and particularly as regards the issue of society, nation and state."²¹ The circumstance that Starčević is not mentioned in the encyclopaedic article is abundantly symbolic. Primarily, one should be warned of the fact that not all censorship editing in the encyclopaedic publications of the Yugoslav Lexicographic Institute is to be 'assigned' to Krleža's account, which is obvious to all those who are acquainted with Krleža's positive, affirmative relation towards Starčević. The verses of the poem 'Planetarijom' ('Planetarium') from *Balade Petrice Kerempuha* ('The Ballads of Petrica Kerempuh') and the *Preface* to 'Podravski motivi Krste Hegedušića' ('The Drava valley motifs of Krsto Hegedušić') are evidence of the previous.²² At the end of the second millennium and in sight of the third, half a century after Krstić's careful, yet firm insertion of Starčević into the epoch-making structures of the Croatian history of philosophy, as a conclusion it is definitely evident that there cannot be any credible history of Croatian philosophy if Starčević's work is eliminated, suppressed from it, or passed over in silence. The more over that Starčević himself has built his world-view, besides on the natural and historical law founded on the idea of freedom, on the idea of historicism, which, for Croatian philosophy, signified the establishing of the fundamental idea of the philosophy of history!²³

²¹ KRSTIĆ, Kruno, *Filozofija u Hrvatskoj* ('Philosophy in Croatia'), anthology 'Naša domovina' ('Our Homeland'), Zagreb, 1943, p. 401.

²² KRLEŽA, Miroslav, *Balade Petrice Kerempuha* ('The Ballads of Petrica Kerempuh'), firstly the Slovenian publication in Ljubljana, 1936 and then the first Croatian publication, Zagreb, 1946. *Planetarijom* ('Planetarium') also in 'Pet stoljeća hrvatske književnosti' ('Five Centuries of Croatian Literature'), Krleža I, Zagreb, 1973; book 91. *Preface* to 'Podravski motivi Krste Hegedušića' ('The Drava Valley Motifs of Krsto Hegedušić'), Zagreb, 1933 and later a reprint in Zagreb, 1971.

²³ See Josip HORVAI, *Ante Starčević, kulturno-povijesna slika* ('Ante Starčević, Cultural-Historical Picture'), Zagreb, 1940; Zlatko POSAVAC, *Interferencija tradicije i moderniteta: o ste-*

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We have seen how Krstić comprehends history, which, in applying it to Croatian philosophy, essentially distinguishes him from Bazala. It is not possible to say that the problem of the philosophy of history was unknown to Bazala, but his concept of history as 'progress' is diametrically opposed to Krstić's concept. Also, Bazala's understanding is essentially positivistic, which is the least sustainable in modern philosophy, and that is why it is not present in Krstić.

Thus, the difference between Krstić and Bazala's approaches to Croatian philosophy is substantial, as it is pointed out as anticipated at the beginning of this discussion. For Bazala, history is an additional moment in the complex of the sum of the determinants of (Croatian) national philosophy, so Bazala descriptively interpolates it to another determinant of that complex, manifest in life forms or in the ways of experience, such as culture, economy, geographical position, common conceptions of goodness and evilness (ethical, juridical and religious norms), myths (mythology), etc., which he then generates, as the sum, 'the national spirit', 'the national mentality' and ultimately national philosophy. Whereas, in Krstić history is the fundamental principle of the approach to Croatian philosophy with subordinated determinative components. We have emphasised that for Krstić national, folk culture and art are just aspects of the possible complex of determinations of the generation of and understanding (Croatian) national philosophy, which is principally, historiographically and also primarily truly possible only as a manifestation of history in the element of thought.

For example, Bazala, as many other philosophers or philosophical writers after all, can take a *myth* to be the centre of 'the national spirit' and *eo ipso* the source of national philosophy. For Krstić, a *myth* can eventually be an aspect, which is reflected in true philosophy, which acts on the spirit of the nation and its thought, yet a myth is not the source of Croatian philosophy, it is not even crucially determinative. Krstić himself did not set forth an explicit

klisnoj' estetici Ante Starčevića ('Interference of Tradition and Modernity: On the 'Steklish' Aesthetics of Ante Starčević'), firstly in 'Forum', Zagreb, 1985 and now in the book *Novija hrvatska estetika* ('Newer Croatian Aesthetics'), Zagreb, 1995, pp. 45–90; also *Starčević kao književnik* ('Starčević as a Writer'), Glasnik HDZ, Zagreb, on the 7th and 14th December, 1990, no. 32 and 33. Apart from the above: Zlatko POSAVAC, *Arnoldova estetika i hrvatska filozofija povijesti u 19. stoljeću* ('Arnold's Aesthetics and Croatian Philosophy of History in the 19th Century'), Filozofska istraživanja, Zagreb, 1995, no. 59. Pavo BARIŠIĆ several times discusses Starčević's ethics as a science of life, philosophy of state, etc.; see the first volume of the new publication Ante STARČEVIĆ, *Sabrana djela* ('Collected Texts'), Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, Zagreb, 1995; preface by Franjo TUDMAN, Ph.D. See also the just published book by Pavo BARIŠIĆ, *Filozofija prava Ante Starčevića* ('Ante Starčević's Philosophy of Law'), Library 'Filozofska istraživanja', vol. 73, Zagreb, 1996.

deduction, but if we draw the consequences from his way of thought and look for their point of support in reality, then Croatian philosophy is not even either derivable from myth, or originally co-determined by *myth* or anything mythical, regardless of how much (post)modern philosophy aimed at making the category of myth philosophical, even topical and life-efficacious. On the other hand, only a *legend* can be the source of Croatian philosophy, and not a myth, myths, which Croats, in fact, do not have in their tradition. (Some even tried to subsequently establish them, yet hopelessly.) For example, we could see 'the archaeology' of (Croatian) philosophy *in the legend* of St. Jerome, who is considered to be the creator of the Croatian letter, the father of Croatian literacy, the nurse of language and speech, literature in general, and whence the other 'fine arts' too. In this quote, the term 'archaeology' is authentically Krstić's terminological-methodological metaphor, while to the found history, as a possible aspect of the source, we have added the paradigm from our side because of a more strict demarcation.

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In order to plausibly see the difference of Krstić's concept from Bazala's, it is sufficient to quote those thoughts of theirs where the 'teacher' and the 'student' talk about the same problem, the same historical reality, the same author – Ante Starčević, a doctor of philosophy and a lawyer. What Krstić wrote has already been quoted earlier in this discussion (see the quote belonging to footnote 21), and now Bazala's interpretation of and 'deliberation' on the same matter, from his mostly-always-cited with-praises discussion *Filozofijska težnja u duhovnom životu Hrvatske od pada apsolutizma ovamo* ('The Philosophical Aspiration in the Spiritual Life of Croatia from the Fall of Absolutism /in the 19th century – Z. P.'s comment/ Onwards'), should be compared to it. Of course, Bazala has only praises for Strossmayer and the populists (whom he declares as liberals!), at great length working out in detail the statement that their 'party ...in the advancement of the spiritual life of the nation had ... its particular cultural-philosophical significance'. He further adds: 'A stronger emphasis on the historical moment, tradition and historical law provides character to another current of spiritual life, which is concentrating around A. Starčević. The political idea comprises the national and cultural ideas. The state becomes the main expression of the nation: it encircles the matter of life, predetermines all of its functions and marks the nation by its name. As much as it itself had to be the highest reality of the nation, that much it tied and determined the nation by its organisation: a national state is corresponded by state nation. From the inside this has led to, it is true, a stimulus for the request and expression of Croatian individuality, but at the same time from a certain point of view, towards the outside *it has confined the national being to a political frame and has set the boundaries to the cultural and humane aspirations – not without a dogmatic stiffness and conser-*

vatism, which, as the state interest, measured off all of the other aspirations.²⁴

Bazala does not see, does not recognise (does not acknowledge!?) a philosopher in Starčević. In Starčević Bazala only sees a politician, ideologist, and at best a theoretician on politics and the state. It is not just that Bazala wrongly interprets Starčević (out of a misunderstanding or deliberately, as a member of the opposing current!? – Z. P.'s comment), but, what is the worst, he proclaims Starčević, Starčevićism and 'rightism'* (he does not even mention Kvaternik) as positions that, we would say today, grants permission to the anti-cultural and anti-humane activity, thus to the guiding ideas, which are by their character 'dogmatically stiff and conservative'. It looks incredible, though it is true that Bazala himself has formulated this harsh theoretical discrimination against Starčević and the disqualification of 'rightism'. Thus, as diametrically opposed to Krstić, such a statement is represented by the very same Bazala, who has in the years of Croatian Moderna, defended Croatianism in the conflict between 'the old' and 'the young' from the position of 'the old', and after the establishment of the dictatorship of January-the-sixth he represented Yugoslavism. From the previous it becomes clear why Bazala 'had to' disqualify Starčević, since even in variations it is no longer debatable that the 'Croatian' Illyrian Rebirth and 'Strossmayerism' were from the beginning (and remained) carried by the idea of Yugoslavism, 'not without a dogmatic stiffness and conservatism'.

/.../

But, let us return to philosophy in the 'scholarly' meaning of the word, so that we could also necessarily apply its universality, its cosmopolitanism to the Croatian historical reality too and when the latter is fragmented, to the epoch-making sections of the context. Thus, so that, in such a general historical context, we could say of every Croatian existential fate (of which Ivo Kozarčanin says 'my dear Croatian sadness, my dear mother' (*Utljeha*, /'Solace'/, 1936) exactly in the horizon of existential fate) that they are equally, nevertheless, universal, as much as they are individualised. Consequently, so that, from a usually possible, in this case Krstić's conception of philosophy, we could see how 'unscholarly' wide and extensively applicable it is, how 'unscholarly' applicable it is in both the historical and problematic aspects, and how, in this unscholarly applicability, its universalism truly appears in the forms of existentials – thus Croatian too.

²⁴ BAZALA, Albert, Ph.D., *Filozofijska težnja u duhovnom životu Hrvatske od pada apsolutizma ovamo* ('The Philosophical Aspiration in the Spiritual Life of Croatia from the Fall of Absolutism onwards'), *Obzor*, Spomen-knjiga 1860–1935 ('Memorial-Book 1860–1935'), Zagreb, 1935. First quote from p. 122, column 2; second quote from p. 123, column 1. Italics in second quote by Z. P.

* From Cro., *pravaštvo*, a political movement stemming from Starčević's Party of Right.

Krstić's thought is truly impressive – when by stating some of the significant moments of philosophy, he guesses the reality of the world, whose 'validity' and 'value' of the espied relativisation of those banal 'reasoners' on today-yesterday-tomorrow he does not lessen! Krstić is clear: 'When philosophy is at matter, at issue is a historical duration of a special kind. Even though the title 'philosophia perennis' was usurped for a religiously inspired philosophical current, the denotation 'perennis' belongs to philosophy in general. It is an illusion that the progress of science or the reformation of society divests philosophy of justification, because philosophy neither enquires at all about that which the sciences search for and find, nor coincides in any way with that which the social transformations change and stabilise. In its origin, philosophy is a particular form of man's self-coming-to-consciousness, in which the eternal motifs of hope and anxiety (and despair and resignation), transformed into questions, fly above the temporality of human existence. Maybe exactly the fact that the same questions, sprung from the same existential anxiousness, some time before searched for their peace of mind in different visions and illusions of the mind, gives the studying of the philosophical history a special charm.'²⁵

It is as if Kruno Krstić here modestly talks of the *charm*, which personally stimulates him to engage in philosophy, while, in fact, he expresses the truth valid of the powerful *magic* of philosophy in general, which, of course, regards Croatian philosophy too, that is to say, the Croatian history of philosophy too. Moreover, regardless of the fact that the interview took place in 1971, Krstić knew that he had to speak cautiously, and he implicitly suggests that the research should be centred on those historical passages and those philosophies and philosophers, in which 'the same questions sprung from the same existential anxiousness' that we find ourselves facing today equally in the historical fate, and so in the Croatian national fate, the fate of man's individual existence, the fate of that which is universally human, yet historically individualised, *hic et nunc*. This is a guidance on the needed gathering of not the indifferently equal historical moments, but those that are existentially relevant, as in the individual, personal fate, so in the historical fate of the collective national personality, thus the Croatian national history of culture and philosophy. Therefore, in this perspective, not just the 'greatness' of some names or doctrines will forever be crucial, but also the terms of reference of the place and time, in which we recognise 'the questions, sprung from the same existential anxiousness', and also the same 'motifs of hope and anxiety'

²⁵ KRSTIĆ, Kruno, *Bit će još mnogo otkrivačkih iznenađenja* ('There is still to be many discovery surprises'), subtitle *O filozofskoj baštini Hrvata razgovaramo s dr. Krunom Krstićem* ('On the Philosophical Heritage of the Croats We Converse with Kruno Krstić, Ph.D.'), interviewed by Zlatko Posavac, *Hrvatski tjednik*, Zagreb, I/1971, 30th April, no. 3, p.16.

– thus, that which is existentially significant, as the existential affirmation and negation. We recognise the given and valid-for-philosophy-in-general explanation exactly by the existential moment, as the same reference for the approach to the history of Croatian philosophy.

When it is shown that from the concept of general comprehension of philosophy, such as Krstić's is, a deduction of an application to the Croatian philosophy is possible, always in the dimension of historicism, then naturally it must be clear that, in that history, it is necessary to see that which is significant, important, essential and the most crucial. If then general history and philosophy should be viewed as previously explained, as we find them exposed in a number of accepted (and acceptable!) standard works, then that which is crucial in the Croatian history, and so in the Croatian history of Croatian philosophy too, should also be seen. That which is not always possible to find already arranged in textbooks, but that which is still to be found!

Krstić himself had the very virtue of finding that which is essential. He left it as immanent, deductively inferable message, so important for the studying of the Croatian history of philosophy. All the data is valuable, but it needs to be seen in the interpretative way through the prism of the need of finding the key places, which correspond to the European context, but which are not always and simply its subordinated identical other. One should endure in finding the key works and authors, those that problematically, valuably and in the doctrine-oriented way 'fill up' the Croatian history, and which are not always and simply just of the European 'respective greatness' or 'universally known' and acknowledged names, since methodologically it is impermissible to merely equate the valuable 'levelling'. One will only then, out of these inversions and reversibility, be able to discern that which is truly significant for 'both gauges', which belong to the same culture and philosophical sphere, to discern the greatness and value by viewing the matter from both sides.

So that all of it would be possible, research persistence, real interest is needed, but above all, a direction to the very matter for the very matter – engagements that are irreplaceable and that have adorned Krstić's self-sacrificial diligence. Naturally, love for work, a real desire is needed too, a specific professional training is also necessary for different fields, but personal culture, personal refinement, nurtured sensibility and 'orientation' in a wide range of topics on culture (in the field of both universal and Croatian art) is particularly needed and, of course, *talent* too – all that which Krstić had and which one needs to recognise and then acknowledge of his modesty. Namely, all these qualifications cannot be replaced by anything else, not by any ambitions, not by any 'engagement in great things', not by any pompous effects, vanities, carriers, titles. That is why Croats and Croatia should consider

Krstić and those few personalities alike or akin to him as remarkable, and their share in the Croatian history of objective spirituality as momentous.

Only through the prism of the concept of philosophy and historicism such as Krstić has postulated, and together with all that which is deduced from that concept and all that which is immanently understood in the unavoidable methodology along with diligence and persistence, it is possible to be a permanently successful researcher of Croatian philosophy as Krstić himself was, constantly progressing in the widening of horizons and in the discoveries, which have little been known and talked about, if at all, in the second half of the 20th century. His very own culture, education and diligence enabled Krstić to subsequently successfully fill in those places, which can today easily be seen as insufficient in his first survey, which was the first for him personally and amongst the first for the Croatian history of philosophy in general. Finally, one should know that in 1943 Krstić was only thirty-eight years of age!

/.../

However, besides all of Krstić's merits and virtues, one should not pass by his failures. Namely, one can presume that Krstić would, in later years, probably even publicly and based on new conceptions correct, for example, his completely absurd, incorrect and failed statement: 'Out of this lethargy ('the transition of the 18th into the 19th century and the first decades of the 19th century') Croatian philosophy is beginning to rise only in the second half of the 19th century, when, within the framework of the general national rebirth, a philosophical book written in the national language is slowly beginning to appear.'²⁶ Krstić's statement is correct if one thinks of the texts written in the national language in the second half of the 19th century, but in fact, this intensification is not in an immediate causal relation with the so-called 'rebirth', and it is the least to be found within 'the framework of the general national rebirth', insofar as 'the Illyrian Movement' is understood by the previous denotation (this can be seen further in the text). Instead of attributing the initiative impulses of the change in the middle of the 19th century to Starčević, Krstić placed Starčević's significance not earlier than the middle of the second half of the 19th century. The signs of a later different standpoint towards the transition of the 18th into the 19th century and particularly towards the Illyrian Movement are discernible, but for these corrective reinterpretations Krstić obviously had no longer a publishing opportunity.²⁷

²⁶ KRSTIĆ, Kruno, *Filozofija u Hrvatskoj* ('Philosophy in Croatia'), anthology 'Naša domovina' ('Our Homeland'), Zagreb, 1943, p. 400, column 2.

²⁷ Proven on the esthetical plane, research shows that the impulses of the intensifying of and change in Croatian cultural life with the same indications in the spiritual sphere in general

If in 1943 the spirit of Mark Twain (Krstić's pseudonym as Krleža's severe critic and attacker) was still excessively lively in Krstić, who maybe could not agree with the poem *Planetarium* in the *Balads*, even if just with the bitter sarcasm regarding the Illyrian Movement, surely later he agreed with Krleža's estimation of the same on the occasion of celebrating the 'Illyrian' jubilee after World War II. Krstić would undoubtedly then completely explicitly disagree with Bazala. (If Krstić, appreciating all conceptions, still would not desist from some of his failures from 1943, we would have to consider that as his fallacy, regardless of all of our appreciation and sympathy. Yet we can indeed find indications for the correction in two discussions already from 1943, where he clearly shows that the Illyrian Movement is Yugoslavism and, surprisingly, he does not abstain from just a positive grade of 'Slavism'.)

A possible objection that the example of the Illyrian Movement remains in the sphere of guessing the 'speculative inference', factually and textually unconfirmed, needs to be rejected. Let us cite, therefore, another example from older history – Rogačić. Harapin mentions him with his works, while Krstić does not. Even the Encyclopaedia of Yugoslavia (first edition) does not mention him. However, we find Rogačić noted already in Franjo the noble Marković, which Harapin appreciates, while it remains unclear as to why Krstić does not at least nominally take him over from Marković. But it is not hard to demonstrate how Krstić later accepts all of Marković and Harapin's relevant quotes, which were questionable or unknown for him in 1943. Such is the case with Rogačić too, who Krstić later on insists upon, obviously having familiarised himself with Rogačić's work in a degree, which the Croatian philosophical historiography is neither familiar with nor treats his work even today in. Let a note (footnote) published during Krstić's life (and that is why it should be considered credible) be evidence of the previous. Already in 1968, Krstić has warned the author of these lines to pay attention to Benedikt Rogačić's (1646–1719) esthetical points of view, adding that, besides in *Euthymia seu de tranquillitate animae*, there are elements of the same in Rogačić's manuscript (!) *Sylva phrasium* too, which at the end of the 20th century

also, so in the development of Croatian philosophy too, must be recognised exactly in the middle of the 19th century in Starčević. Hence, in the so-called post-Illyrian and post-re-birth phase. See on this Zlatko POSAVAC, *Interferencija tradicije i moderniteta* ('Interference of Tradition and Modernity'), subtitle *O "stekliškoj" estetici Ante Starčevića* ('On the 'Steklish' Aesthetics of Ante Starčević') in the book *Novija hrvatska estetika* ('Newer Croatian Aesthetics'), Zagreb, 1991. For a different and not 'only' interpretation, for exactly the very factual state see the recent study by Zlatko POSAVAC, *Ivo Bizzaro (Bizarić), njegova estetika i problem "romantičnog" klasicizma* ('Ivo Bizzaro (Bizarić), His Aesthetics and the Problem of 'Romantic' Classicism'), *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, Zagreb, XXI/1995, no. 41–42, pp. 221–263.

still remained unstudied.²⁸ In fact, only at the end of the 20th century first texts in the Croatian language that more extensively deal with Rogačić's theses begin to appear. Thus, after Krstić's death.²⁹

Or, in 1943 Harapin cites Matija Ferkić considering him as one of the 'early fighters of Scotism', while Krstić does not have him. But, Krstić, personally having studied him, represents him in the Encyclopaedia of Yugoslavia (volume 3, p. 393, Zagreb, 1958), under Frčec, citing that regardless of the fact that Ferkić teaches the philosophy of Duns Scot, he 'does not consider himself a Scotist, but a Bonaventurist, i.e. a follower of the Augustine mystical philosophy of Bonaventura Fidanza.'

By his persistent work on the history of Croatian philosophy, Krstić has continually deepened and widened the area of the subject matter of his interest, so changing the general view of Croatian philosophy in the positive sense. By way of these permanent enrichments he has not disturbed, but has confirmed his concept and methodology of approach. Krstić has been doing all of the above regardless of the restrictions and without a real affirmation of his work until the end of his life, so to speak. And exactly because of his passionate expertly engagement the results surpassed by far the need of encyclopaedic work, the only place where after World War II he could at least to a certain extent, of course, on a restricted scale and as 'censored', 'promote' only his most significant research results, and sometimes not even them.

Since the *Anthology of Croatian Philosophers Latinists* never got either completed or published, even today one does not know how voluminous was Krstić's share – in fact, the greatest and the most significant. That is why to the question on the possibility of preparing the abundance of the research fruits 'in the form of a book, one or more' for the Croatian public (in 1971 optimism for the feasibility of such an intention began to appear), he sceptically replied: 'The material that I have been gathering, while writing certain

²⁸ See Zlatko POSAVAC, *Estetika u Hrvata od prvih početaka do sredine 20. stoljeća* ('Aesthetics in Croatia from the Beginnings to the Middle of the 20th Century'), Kolo, Zagreb, VIII (CXXVIII) 1968, no. 10, p. 337; also in the book entitled *Hrvatska filozofija u prošlosti i sadašnjosti* ('Croatian Philosophy in the Past and Present'), Proceedings of the Symposium of 1968, Zagreb, 1993, p. 112.

²⁹ P. KNEZOVIĆ in *Poezija Benedikta Rogačića* ('Benedikt Rogačić's Poetry') spoke on Rogačić at the scientific meeting 'Dani hvarskog kazališta' ('Days of Hvar Theatre'); the exposition is published in the anthology 'Dani hvarskog kazališta' ('Days of Hvar Theatre'), vol. XX, Split, 1994. On Rogačić's points of view on fine arts and the tasks of poetry see Zlatko POSAVAC, *Hrvatska estetika u 17. Stoljeću* ('Croatian Aesthetics in the 17th century'), Filozofska istraživanja, Zagreb, year XIV, 1994, vol. 55, pp. 858–859. On the work *Euthymia* in more detail see Mijo KORADE, *Duševni mir i prava sreća – etičke teme u poučnom spjevju Benedikta Rogačića* ('Spiritual Peace and Real Fortune – Ethical Themes in Benedikt Rogačić's Didactical Poetry'), Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine, Zagreb, 1995, no. 41–42, pp. 109–122.

articles on our humanists for the encyclopaedia, is of course more extensive than the encyclopaedic texts, but my working duties in the Lexicographic Institute are such that I doubt that will ever have enough time to put that material into a greater work.³⁰ The doubt has unfortunately become true! Yet, this statement, as much as Krstić's participating, after all, in the preparing of the *Anthology*, is still evidence of the fact that after 1943 Krstić permanently and under restrained circumstances continually research-wise widens the earlier presented situation. Krstić so confirms his own prognosis on the research discoveries, yet always and again, his own concept of the approach to the study of the history of Croatian philosophy too. We find the evidence, even if only partial and fragmented, of the accuracy and fruitfulness too in the short published texts, restrained by the encyclopaedic standard, yet enriched by condensation. Amongst other things the quoted statement confirms the existence of an interesting and obviously not a minute manuscript legacy, even if it is only in the form of notes, which can once again make Krstić's successful work, as much as the success of his approach to Croatian philosophy in general be heard. Of course, not only regarding Krstić's engagement with the Latinists. Unlike Krstić, who after 1943 persistently and in unfavourable circumstances widens or deepens the knowledge of philosophy in Croatia, Bazala after 1935 and Harapin after 1943 do not publish, as we know, anything else from the field of the researching of the history of Croatian philosophy. In the same way we do not know whether anything relevant from that field remained in Bazala and Harapin's manuscript legacies. Thus, retrospectively, in relation to them and in respect of the additional later extension of results Krstić is once again in advantage, even though *that which is the most important* in Krstić from the very beginning rests in his approach, *in his concept of the approach to Croatian philosophy*.

4.

If the immediate analytics of Krstić's survey *Philosophy in Croatia* is widened, as it has been done in this discussion, then it becomes more and more irrefutably and indubitably evident all through to the end that Krstić's approach-concept gets always and again new and new additional exclamatory confirmations, that it continually gains on the strength of the argumentation and (the needed) sharpness of profiling. A thesis is being established – the thesis of the advantage, of the precedence that Krstić has by way of his survey

³⁰ KRSTIĆ, Kruno, *Bit će još mnogo otkrivačkih iznenađenja* ('There is still to be many Discovery Surprises'), subtitle *O filozofskoj baštini Hrvata razgovaramo s dr. Krunom Krstićem* ('On the Philosophical Heritage of the Croats We Converse with Kruno Krstić, Ph.D.'). interviewed by Zlatko Posavac. Hrvatski tjednik, Zagreb, 1/1971, 30th April, no. 3, p. 16.

and in relation to Bazala and Harapin, and of course, in relation to just a few other attempts (Zimmermann, *Encyclopaedia of Yugoslavia*) and their methodologies. Krstić's concept is fruitful.

The essence and the significance of Krstić's approach-concept makes and once and for all remains as the *reached level*, obligatory for everyone – *historicism*; an obligatory-for-everyone understanding of Croatian philosophy as *the history of Croatian philosophy*. And when in a concurrence of events Krstić as a researcher is compelled to approach Croatian philosophy as a 'heritage', he still really sees it as the history of Croatian philosophy. The difference is not insignificant – as a 'heritage' philosophy can way too easily attain the character of a cultural décor or even be reduced to the sphere of that which is ethnological, to the sphere of ethnography. This statement does not signify a hierarchical degradation of either culture or ethnology, but is a warning of the circumstances in which philosophy loses or can easily lose its fundamental existential essence – its very own authenticity, by which it impinges upon existential relevancy, a relevancy for a person individually, but for man in general too; for an actual person in a community, for a nation; and in an abstract way ... for humankind. 'To force' something or someone out from history in the universal, and this-worldly dimensions is nothing but to deny existence. Is it that hard to notice how many Croatian individuals are simply eliminated from their own history? In such a way they become non-existent together with their engagements and works. Is it hard to notice that both Europe and the world exert themselves, strive long and hard in many different ways to eliminate the Croats and Croatia from the European and cosmopolitan history? Well, when that is unsuccessful, then together with a number of 'chosen' and 'consecrated' individuals, they all together wholeheartedly struggle to 'over-stylise' Croatian history, to definitely and without a right of appeal condemn that which is and which is not (historical) truth. By that and in that history is truly a question of survival.

Without a history of philosophy, thus without the history of Croatian philosophy, there is no philosophy as philosophy. Hence, without the history of Croatian philosophy there is no – Croatian philosophy. There is no philosophy in Croatia. In this way, as a 'heritage' though non-historical philosophy loses its dignity and authenticity, is eliminated and neutralised as philosophy. Because everything can be 'heritage'! Legacy! *Das Erbe*. A heritage is an estate, a house, a meadow, money, books, cutlery, animals, gold jewellery, debts, an abandoned castle or just a photograph album. Even a disease. Prejudices and cultural goods, not just material, can be inherited. It is Krstić's virtue that in approaching Croatian philosophy he sees the need for establishing *the history of Croatian philosophy*. Within this need he understands it with all good reason 'in the European context', in the structure of the history of the Western European world, but at the same time he exerts

himself around its understanding within both the individualised Croatian history and a philosophical understanding of the history of Croatian philosophers. It becomes perceivable that this is not just an ideal postulate, but that it is possible and needed insofar as we at least as examples mention these concepts within the range from Arnold to Krstić's contemporaries Ivan Oršanić and Julije Makanec. According to Arnold 'in history nothing took place that humankind did not want to', thus not without the will of the people. From the previous we can deduce the following: if Croats do not want their *history* of philosophy, then they really do not have (their) *philosophy as such*. It is exactly astonishing that at issue is not just one or two Croatian philosopher, who relates to the very idea of the history of Croatian philosophy negatively (let us not even talk about reality, about realisation). 'They should acquire an affirmative standpoint, already because their philosophies' 'wisdom' and 'great thoughts' they cannot place anywhere but into the history of *Croatian philosophy*. ('Filip', as we used to call Vladimir Filipović, Ph.D., in the philosophic circles, ingeniously set in motion a library of professors-teachers (!) of philosophy at the re-established University of Zagreb so that in the historical sequence there remained an empty place for a monograph on him. He only did not publish a monograph on Haler, who surprisingly neither Krstić mentions in his survey, though we do not know why. He did not publish a monograph on Makanec either.) But those philosophers (who were far away from Filip's wittiness and ingeniousness too) see themselves only, of course, in the orbit of European and general philosophy (as if Croatian philosophy is not within the same orbit!?), not rarely showing evident signs of thought that in the best case the very history of Croatian philosophy starts off with them in fact. In this absurd negative standpoint it is more than perceivable that history means survival and by his affirming of Croatian philosophy through the history of Croatian philosophy Kruno Krstić has definitely absorbed the absurd standpoint of negation.

By introducing critical approach alongside the concept of history Krstić has affirmatively introduced *the principle of evaluation* to the historiographic considerations of Croatian philosophy, obligating by that all the fields of Croatian historiography in general; a principle, which has been so vigorously and clearly crystallised in Croatian philosophy of the new era, yet which all, both in the local plan and 'in the European context', have strove to push aside, it is not hard to see why, by all available means in the name of 'impartial', 'objective' and 'non-ideologised' 'science', as if science does not express value judgements. However, at the end of the 19th century in the dissertation *Etika i povijest* ('Ethics and History') the young Arnold already has been resolute in the statement that history includes value judgement by replying to the question whether or not a period fulfilled its (historical) task. This is a thesis that Julije Makanec will exhaustively work out in detail in a

polemic with Marxist (materialistic) philosophy in the middle of the 20th century, substantiating his own standpoint by the thesis on the complexity of the value-determinants of history that cannot be reduced only to economic (material) goods, while not appreciating the fields (and by that both the judgement and originating standards) of the ideals of European tradition – truth, goodness and beauty.³¹ By leaving aside here the discussions of Arnold and Makanec's theses, it must be pointed out that Krstić is, on the one hand, on the line of tradition of Croatian philosophy itself, and on the other, on the line of the current development of the European axiological thought of the first half of the 20th century. Krstić has so 'found' himself on the methodological trace of the classical critical approach, and by affirming the value moment of judgement – which through the prism of critical approach does not pass by history – he has also definitely eliminated the 'a priori' standpoints on the *worthlessness* of Croatian philosophy. The primary postulate of the insight into history, thus the affirmation of the existence of the history of Croatian philosophy enables that which is sought for – value judgement. Real history and a critical approach go together.

By introducing the value dimension made current by the ideals that are unable to slip away from the experience sphere, is not Croatian philosophy too, nevertheless, just one such value postulate projected as a romantic ideal? Was maybe Bazala's estimation correct? 'Planting the gravity centre into the inner world of values, *with a certain distancing from the realistic orientation* concerning the widening of interests beyond the egoistic taking advantage of circumstances, beyond the aspiration for power and establishing – beatitude on the idealised past on the one hand and almost a pious pointing at 'God's justice' as an expression of the final victory of meaning on the other hand – these are all, it seems, the reflective dominant, that is, of the philosophical standpoint of a Croatian being.³² One must have an ear for Bazala's statement and understand its warning. Bazala marks the feeling for the value of ideals and often the 'planting the gravity centre into the inner world of values' because the true Croatian spirit and Croatian culture are, in fact, unthinkable without ideals, without the affirmation of values, without the searching for and the affirming of meaning. Yet pointing to the 'weakness of this frame

³¹ We implicitly include the tractates: Gjuro ARNOLD, *Etika i povijest* ('Ethics and History'), Zagreb, 1879; Julije MAKANEC, *Marksistička filozofija prirode* ('Marxist Philosophy of Nature'), Mala knjižnica Matica Hrvatske, Zagreb, 1938; also Julije MAKANEC, *Uvod u filozofiju povijesti* ('Introduction to Philosophy of History'), (posthumously), Zagreb, 1993.

³² BAZALA, Albert, Ph.D., *Filozofjska težnja u duhovnom životu Hrvatske od pada apsolutizma ovamo* ('The Philosophical Aspiration in the Spiritual Life of Croatia from the Fall of Absolutism onwards'), Obzor, Spomen-knjiga 1860–1935 ('Memorial-Book 1860–1935'), Zagreb, 1935, p. 120.

of mind' that manifests itself – Bazala is only partially right in this, though is nevertheless right (!) – as 'the romantic note over and above the sense for reality' 'with a certain distancing from the realistic orientation' is not without foundation.

By his survey *Philosophy in Croatia* Krstić has shown, insofar as one thinks of philosophy, and then Croatian philosophy in general together with the history of philosophy, that just a 'beatitude on the idealised past' is not what is at work here. Krstić's survey of Croatian philosophy, regardless of how short it is and that in 1943 it was still lacking in a list of things, proves *the contrary to Bazala's statement*, yet without polemics with Bazala, that the history of Croatian philosophy can not and must not be seen just as an 'idealised picture of the past'. Krstić's survey is evidence of the reality of Croatian philosophy as *the history* of Croatian philosophy, because history is not just a mere past – all the same whether 'idealised' or not. On the other hand, Bazala's statement that 'the national idea with its moral and political values has transported itself into an idealised picture of the past' is, in fact, his 'Strossmayer-like' polemics against Starčević, whom Bazala either did not want to or could not correctly philosophically understand. Krstić has eliminated even that Bazala's insufficiency too (insinuation!), considering it necessary that one sees Starčević as a protagonist of not just Croatian politics, but particularly of Croatian philosophy too. And of the Croatian both spiritual and cultural life! In a philosophical point of view Krstić has – and again maybe not wanting to polemize with Bazala – *eliminated* the-justified-in-many-things objection to the Croatian lack of 'a sense for reality' (that was maybe Bazala's criticism of not just Starčević, but of Gjuro Arnold too), citing the contemporary-to-himself Bazala's very own activist-regarding-intentions and impregnated by voluntarism philosophy, then Ivo Pelar's thought's sobriety and particularly Ivan Oršanić and Julije Makanec's philosophical activism. It is a context, in which one should particularly emphasise Ivan Oršanić's realistically conceptualised philosophy of politics, as founded on ideals with the postulate of freedom and Julije Makanec's philosophy of history, as through the prism of traditional values structured axiologically and in the activist way. This was a passed-over-in-silence Croatian philosophy of existential (individual and national) practise that appeared a whole quarter of a century – two decades at least – before the media-politically favoured praxis-philosophy in Croatia. Krstić's approach to Croatian philosophy as the critical history of Croatian philosophy is definitely a rejection of the objection (and the possible errors too) that in it one can only see an 'idealised picture of the past' (by some – demonised!), in which Bazala is only a forerunner of those innumerable insults of Croatian culture, those intentional and unintentional fallacies on Croatian history according to which (Croatian) his-

tory, insofar as it is not an incarnation of evil, represents the Croatian phantasmagoric 'fight for a better – past'.

Krstić's research and critical establishment of the history of Croatian philosophy gains him a specially prominent and deserved place at the end of the 20th century, thus in the time of the already progressing research of Croatian philosophy with rich research results. Even though Krstić has not (at least not as we know according to the so far published texts), especially not like Bazala, particularly discussed the problem of national philosophy and its history, that still does not mean that such a foundation was not present in Krstić and that he did not develop it with all consciousness. Krstić's short text *Philosophy in Croatia* gets an *epoch-making significance* for the Croatian philosophical historiography exactly by the philosophical establishing in *history*. In Krstić the concept of history, as it has been problematically activated in both European and cosmopolitan philosophy of both the 19th and the 20th centuries, is not simply installed according to some (imported) model, but should be view in light of (and this was gradually becoming more evident) Krstić's very own philosophical points of view; in light of his world-view that one can, as we have said, identify on the basis of a relatively small number of Krstić's philosophical texts. That is why, we should warn exactly here, Krstić should not be viewed only through the prism of his exceptional philological, psychological, cultural, encyclopaedic, etc., merits, but should also be viewed as a philosophically exceptionally educated, authentic and original thinker. Well, as Krstić was passed over in silence or – at least shoved aside as a researcher, as an expert and historiographer of Croatian philosophy, so he remained almost unmentioned and unappreciated as a philosopher. A philosopher by vocation ... As a philosopher (this is still to be acknowledged), Krstić's place is in the history of Croatian philosophy that he has alone established by his own lucidity. And the concept of history in the approach to Croatian philosophy logically follows from (and here we need to understand him as such) Krstić's world-view, from his very own philosophy.

By conceptualising the approach to Croatian philosophy as *the history* of Croatian philosophy, Krstić is the irrefutable *founder of the real Croatian philosophical historiography* – this is no longer only an analytic statement, but a reasoned statement that should be considered as evidence. It does not lessen the contribution of other researchers and chronographers, but the here nominated and elaborated exceptional place belongs to Krstić only. The more over that in the function of the founder of the history of Croatian philosophy – not just by his research *Programmes* – he has become the director and pointer of the paths of further research. He has become the previous by the activating of the concept of history, by a historical approach. Namely, the previous surpasses a mere *research of heritage*, which as an identification of

'heritage' in the sense of inheritance always remains necessary to every present, because without having taken over the identified heritage, neither fullness nor richness of any present is possible. Only in history *heritage* becomes historically transformed into *tradition*, affirmatively establishing its very self, surpassing itself by the transformation as something more than just mere traditionalism and passive 'inheriting'. Namely, there is always a danger of a closed turning to just history. Or of a stupid drugging by futurism. Only history opens all the three dimensions: the reciprocity of the past, the present and the future. After Krstić's establishing of the Croatian philosophical historiography – since it is recognised as existentially fatal – the postulate of the unavoidable realisation of writing and publishing the real history of Croatian philosophy becomes ardently fatal from the above.

TRANSLATED BY ANA JANKOVIĆ

KRUNO KRSTIĆ KAO ISTRAŽIVAČ I POVJESNIK HRVATSKE FILOZOFIJE

Sažetak

Iako nije napisana nijedna povijest hrvatske filozofije u formi ekstenzivnijeg pregleda ili knjige ipak je stupanj njene istraženosti toliki da se o njoj raspravlja sve češće, a potreba da ju se napiše postaje sve očitija i veća. Budući da ipak postoji nekoliko hrvatskih skicoznih pokušaja informativnog enciklopedijskog karaktera nužno je ocijeniti njihov karakter i vrijednost. Autor ove studije smatra kako među tim pokušajima posebno i najvažnije mjesto ima kratki pregled *Filozofija u Hrvatskoj* Krune Krstića iz 1943. godine promatran kroz prizmu načela Krstićeva pristupa i na temelju sveukupnog ostalog do sada poznatog Krstićeva rada. Krstićev se kratki pregled bitno razlikuje od ostalih kratkih prikaza i mnogih već, a često i vrlo ekstenzivnih monografskih prikaza pojedinih autora, problema ili kraćih razdoblja i povijesnih segmenata hrvatske filozofije u tome što Krstić hrvatsku filozofiju tematizira kao povijest a ne naprosto kao veću ili manju baštinu. Bit Krstićeva pristupa hrvatskoj filozofiji čini: (1) *dimenzija povijesti*, moment povijesnosti tematiziran u elementu (2) *mišljenja* (dakle filozofiji kao filozofiji), faktografski i doksoografski, te interpretativno i vrijednosno, no svagda tematiziran i (3) *kulturološki* odnosno kulturnopovijesno, ali neizostavno i (4) *kritički*, uvijek otvoren (5) *daljnjim istraživanjima*, dakle novim perspektivama, interpretacijama i (6) *otkrćima*. Zato autor ove studije smatra Krstića *utemeljiteljem povijesti hrvatske filozofije*, tj. utemeljiteljem *prave filozofijske historiografije hrvatske filozofije*.

U trećem i četvrtom poglavlju studije kritički se analiziraju moguće usporedbe sa sličnim pokušajima drugih autora zajedno s različitim interpretacijama pa i kontroverzama u prosudbama mogućnosti metodološke i koncepcijske poredbe pristupa hrvatskoj filozofiji, uključujući tu i glasove njene gole, puke negacije.

Book Reviews

Ljerka Schiffler, Frane Petrić/Franciscus Patricius. Od škole mišljenja do slobode mišljenja (»Frane Petrić/Franciscus Patricius. From a School of Thought to the Freedom of Thought«), Institut za filozofiju/Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, 1997, pp. 340

On the 400th Anniversary of death of Frane Petrić (1529–1597), the Sixth Days of Frane Petrić, organised annually in Cres, were devoted to this, maybe the most important Croatian philosopher. At the same time, although not linked directly to the anniversary, a book by Ljerka Schiffler was published, titled *Frane Petrić/Franciscus Patricius. Od škole mišljenja do slobode mišljenja (»Frane Petrić/Franciscus Patricius. From a School of Thought to the Freedom of Thought«)*. Bearing in mind the author's continuous research of the Croatian philosophical heritage of the age of Humanism and Renaissance in Europe and in Croatia, and thus her rather regular encounters with Petrić, in her scientific as well as in her literary work (in her play *Licem suprot zvijezda*, »With Face Opposite to the Stars«), one could say that this book represents just a continuation of what Ms. Schiffler just sketched or developed in full detail in her previous works. However, one could also say that this particular work in general represents the best and the most thorough work on Petrić yet. One confirmation of such a statement is visible, before all, in the sheer scope and comprehensiveness of this work, which covers all the aspects of Petrić's philosophy, and the other, equally important, could be seen in the fact that in many aspects this book surpasses Petrić and his work and becomes a statement on philosophy today and on us as we are, here and now. The following elements are important in this context. Although one cannot claim that Petrić's philosophy has not been researched and discussed enough, both in Croatia and abroad, this book brings two important new elements. The first becomes clear when we take a look at the comprehensive bibliography of the works on Petrić, which shows that there have been many indeed excellent longer or shorter studies, but just a few of them tried to cover the entirety of Petrić's work. This book, on the other hand, first develops an analysis and then a synthesis of Petrić's philosophy, and provides us exactly with a systematic review which covers the rich variety of Petrić's huge opus, covering all the elements which are common for all of its parts. The other new element is the fact that Ms. Schiffler takes all this variety of works and breadth of vision and comes to conclusions which are relevant not only for an analysis of Petrić, his concrete works and the overall context in which they were written, but are also relevant for an analysis our own age and our own situation today. The deepest, the most important values of Petrić's philosophy – first of all his philosophical attitude – are indeed actualized in

this book. Through Petrić the author speaks about what we today can learn from him, but she also speaks about philosophy in general.

The book consists of twelve chapters, divided further into sub-chapters, but we could provide a concise review by dividing the work into three separate larger parts.

1. At the beginning, in the chapter titled »Pristup« (»The Approach«), before starting with an analysis of Petrić's philosophy, the author provides us with an introductory, yet also a programmatic explanation of her own approach to Petrić and his thinking. Petrić, »a thinker in opposition«, primarily in opposition to the tradition – yet, of which (the tradition) he was, of course, also a continuation – cannot be interpreted unambiguously and unequivocally, he cannot be considered only and exclusively just as another, more or less important part of the philosophical heritage of Croatia and the world. In the chapter titled »Govor o Petriću u vremenu« (»Discussing Petrić in Time«). Ms. Schiffler justly revives his philosophical thought: »When going together with Petrić, it is indeed possible to *surpass* Petrić as well, to go toward what I call a destiny of philosophy and a destiny of a thinker, a destiny understood as *a courage of thinking*... Discussing Petrić thus ceases to be just another discussion of a philosopher as a part of a philosophical heritage, and becomes a discussion on thinking itself, and than a discussion of what we see in Petrić as a part of that heritage, what is in general and everywhere possible to think about heritage, thus becoming a discussion on *us as we are*« (p. 12). Therefore, the work of Petrić, marked with understanding of »a philosophy as a destiny«, should also be discussed in the context of destiny of philosophy today. The approach of Ms. Schiffler, as being, one could also say, a rather personal one, thus moves away from a mere historiographic or a strictly problematic approach to Petrić, yet still continues to encompass and discuss all of the most important elements of Petrić's philosophy and in the final instance ends up being no less scientific than it is supposed to be. This approach to Petrić, outlined in the introductory chapter, is extended to interpretation of Petrić's philosophy in general as well as his individual works, and permeates Ms. Schiffler's entire reading of Petrić, which has not been superficial in any of its aspects, and thus indeed become a »Petrić-like« in its nature, as the author surpassed Petrić in a similar way in which Petrić himself in his open discussion of tradition (being »a thinker in opposition«) had managed to surpass the intellectual heritage which had inspired and had defined him.

2. The second part includes »Životopis« (»Life«) of Frane Petrić, as well as the chapter titled »Petrićevo učenje« (»The Teachings of Petrić«), in which Ms. Schiffler through a number of points provides a review of basic elements of Petrić's philosophical model and a review of the crucial elements of that model.

Taking relevant information from Petrić himself, but also from an envying number of consulted works of other authors, the author in the chapter »Životopis« outlines the context in which Petrić should be discussed, including issues ranging from contradictions on the Croatian, Italian and Latin forms of his name, to a chronological overview of Petrić's life and his works.

In the chapter titled »Petrićevo učenje« (»The Teachings of Petrić«), Ms. Schiffler emphasizes that she will discuss Petrić's philosophy both along its horizontal and along

its vertical axis – which has not been a common approach in previous historiographic studies of Petrić. First, the various elements of Petrić's philosophy are not mutually independent, but represent individual parts arranged around a unified speculative model («the model of the rebirth of philosophy»). This unity reflects itself at various levels so that, for example, poetics is not in opposition to his scientific line of thinking, and both are just parts of a unified philosophical model which, on the other hand, could be understood only on the basis of clear understanding of the spirit of his age. Exactly due to this fact we have the second, vertical approach, which discusses Petrić's philosophy in its spiritual and historical context, most of all in his relationship with Plato and Aristotle, that is the Platonism and Aristotelianism of his time. This relationship, which indeed defines the entire line of thinking of Petrić's philosophy, started with destruction and revision of the heritage and resulted with *an alternative* and an original model of thinking, so that we could say that Petrić alone »took the road of a thinker who, through the method of Socrates, by doubting the existing knowledge and trusting wonder and astonishment – that very spring from which philosophy comes pouring – continues to ask questions« (p. 42).

To this part we could also add the *Addendum* at the end of the book, where we have a list of Petrić's published works, a list of his manuscripts and translations into Croatian, as well as a list of secondary literature on Petrić.

3. The third part, and at the same time the central part of the book, consists of those chapters which discuss Petrić's philosophical works, but also those of his works which are not philosophical in the strict sense of that word. These works have been discussed separately, although Ms. Schiffler together with some of the most important works discusses some which are less important but which relate directly to specific themes.

In this part of the book a prominent place is reserved for a chapter titled »Estetičko-poetički pogledi« («Views on Aesthetics and Poetics»). Ms. Schiffler provides an extensive overview of Petrić's poeticological model, of the philosophical-aesthetical horizon of Petrić's understanding of beauty, art and all other related problems, and in addition further positions Petrić in relation to poetical and aesthetic theories dominant in Europe and in Croatia at his time, to end with an overview of works of those who have discussed this particular aspect of Petrić's work, with an addition of an outline of further tasks left to be tackled by future researchers of Petrić's views on aesthetics and poetics. From the way this particular subject is treated it is clear that Ms. Schiffler feels especially close to this aspect of Petrić's thinking. One should add, however, that this focus does not mean that a reader has been deprived from a serious overview of all other elements important for the opus of Petrić.

On the contrary, here we encounter chapters that deal with each of the more important works of Petrić (*Sretan grad*, »Happy City«, *Deset dijaloga o retorici*, »Ten dialogues on Rhetorics«, *Deset dijaloga o povijesti*, »Ten Dialogues on History«, *Peripatetičke rasprave*, »Peripatetic Discussions«), yet they are again discussed in the context of an unavoidable relationship between a part and a whole, between text and context. The same approach is used for overview of Petrić's commentaries, his literary-dia-

logical and his polemical works. Here we should especially emphasize a chapter devoted to Petrić's most important work *Nova sveopća filozofija* («A New universal Philosophy»), which ends with a short yet useful *Rječnik ključnih pojmova Petrićeve prirodne filozofije* («Glossary of the Most Important Concepts and Terms of the Natural Philosophy of Petrić»).

«The other Petrić» is presented in the chapter titled «Tehnička djela. Epistolografija» («Technical Works. Epistolography»), which again clearly shows, through analysis of his shorter technical papers and his rich correspondence, how diversified his work indeed was, yet at the same time how firmly unified around a single focus, a single demand.

The final chapter, titled «Petrićeva povijesna sudbina. Europski odjeci» («Petrić's Historical Destiny. European Echoes»), presents maybe the best possible conclusion of the entire book, as it includes an overview of reception of Petrić from his time until the present, a discussion of the so-called history of his influence, of the echoes of his works which have reverberated throughout the European history of philosophy, and which most clearly show his importance and value, regardless of the fact whether great names of the European philosophy made their comments on him through their positive or negative statements.

The above mentioned chapters could not be called mere descriptions, and neither the rest of the book or the book in general could be called just a textbook. Although it is both instructive and useful for those who will meet with Petrić for the first time, it also gets much deeper into Petrić's written and not-written philosophy, into his works and everything that permeates them or surpasses them.

To conclude, Ljerka Schiffler in her new book clearly presents Petrić's questions, provides answers on questions about Petrić, but she also – we have to emphasize – provides an answer to another question: *What Petrić means to us today?* By summarizing the previous researches of Petrić and by thoroughly discussing Petrić's philosophy, the author in fact undertook a Hermeneutic reading of Petrić, in which Petrić did not remain just as an object of a scientific discussion of a particular thinker from the history of (the Croatian) philosophy. Ljerka Schiffler approached Petrić in an adequate and probably the only correct way: by deliberating-about, deliberating-together-with and deliberating-beyond, where one discusses tradition and its problems with an open mind which opens up a possibility of true evaluation, but which also modernizes. Because of that, if we accept the essence of Petrić's teachings, than the freedom of thought, as Petrić understood it and realized it, could not be just a mere historical-philosophical term, but also a modern concept of thinking that will inspire our continuous being in the tense space between modernity and tradition, it can be developed into our own discussion of tradition, into our independent, free philosophical thinking.

REVIEW BY HRVOJE JURIĆ

TRANSLATED BY ZORAN MILOVIĆ

Franjo Zenko (Ed.), Starija hrvatska filozofija (»Early Croatian Philosophy«), Hrestomatija filozofije (»Chrestomathy of Philosophy«), Vol. 9, Školska knjiga, Zagreb, 1997, 572 pages

The Volume 9 of the *Chrestomathy of Philosophy*, in general edited by Damir Barbarić, is devoted to early Croatian philosophy and includes, together with the introductory study written by Franjo Zenko, six more studies on renowned Croatian philosophers of the Old Ages (Herman Dalmatin, Juraj Dragišić, Franc Petrić, Nikola Vitov Gučetić, Josip Ruder Bošković, Šimun Čučić), with an additional selection from their original works. Each of the six studies includes, among other things, a biography of the discussed philosopher and each of the studies, with the exception of the one on Franc Petrić, in addition has a bibliography, which both includes data on more important editions of primary works of these philosophers and a list of more important books, anthologies or separate articles on their life or work. Every translation from the opus of the above mentioned philosophers is accompanied by a Latin-Croatian glossary of more significant terms. The editor of this volume is Franjo Zenko, while the authors include Erna Banić-Pajnić, Mihaela Girardi Karšulin, Srećko Kovač, Ljerka Schiffler and Franjo Zenko. Translators are Stjepan Hosu, Antun Slavko Kalenić, Tomislav Ladan, Ivan Macan, Augustin Pavlović and Josip Talanga.

In his introductory study, titled *Starija hrvatska filozofija (»Early Croatian Philosophy«)*, Franjo Zenko begins with presenting the overall idea and aim of the last two volumes of the *Chrestomathy of Philosophy*, devoted to the early and the modern Croatian philosophy respectively, and continues with his short introduction of all the philosophers included in this, next to the final volume of the entire edition. The aim, therefore, of these two volumes is »to introduce not only a more narrow, expert philosophical professional public, but also a wider intellectual public to the most renowned Croatian philosophers and their characteristic philosophical texts« (see p. 7). In its wider context the so-called early Croatian philosophy includes all the periods before the Era of the Croatian Popular Enlightenment, when we have the first Croatian philosophers who started writing their texts in the Croatian language. The early Croatian philosophy, therefore, is written for the most part in Latin, and in a lesser degree in some other foreign languages, most notably in Italian. Zenko at this point emphasizes that this fact, i.e. that the early Croatian philosophy is written primarily in the Latin language, »does not mean that all these philosophers were under the intellectual influence of the Scholasticism« (see p. 9). On the contrary, »if we base our conclusions on the most prominent names of the early Croatian philosophy – Herman Dalmatin, Franc Petrić and Ruder Bošković – it might even be said that it indeed developed out-

side of the context of the Scholastic-Aristotelian philosophical orientation, with a good deal of it developed in direct opposition to it« (see p. 9). The beginnings of the early Croatian philosophy, and thus the beginnings of the Croatian philosophy in general, Franjo Zenko links with the introduction of the Croatian people into the European cultural and civilizational framework. At this point he discusses the three different approaches to the issue of the source of the Croatian philosophy. According to Franjo Marković and Vladimir Filipović, the source of the Croatian philosophy is linked with humanism of the European Renaissance (see pp. 12–13). According to Stjepan Zimmerman, the beginnings of philosophy in general should be linked to the developed mythological and religious systems, and thus the beginnings of philosophy amongst Croats should be linked to their acceptance of Christianity. It would thus be possible to explain the entire history of development of the Croatian philosophy as analogous to development of »the Christian philosophy«, until the later-age emergence of »the secular philosophy« (see p. 13). According to the ethnic-national approach of Kruno Krstić, the source of the Croatian philosophy should be searched for within the framework of the basic natural precondition of the Croatian popular philosophy, where he primarily aims at »the linguistic material of the Croatian national dialects, which hide within themselves such lexical-semantic relationships and structural organizational patterns of sentence, that clearly show rich characteristics of the Croatian being, characteristics which by themselves represent natural preconditions of the Croatian national philosophy« (see p. 13). In the context of these three approaches to the problem of the source of the Croatian philosophy Zenko points out, first, that »none of the European nations, including of course the Croatian people, did not base their philosophy on any original and exclusive pre-Christian, popular-mythical and/or popular-religious heritage, and neither on some national popular (pre)language, as was the singular case with the old Greeks« (see p. 14). Second, none of the European nations established their philosophy by linking it directly to the philosophical tradition of the old Greece – at every place and at every time this heritage was interposed in one way or another by the Christian Patristic and Scholastic theological-philosophical »editorial retouch« of the old Greek philosophical heritage (see p. 14).

In his study of Herman Dalmatin Franjo Zenko discusses life and work of this, as recent researches showed, the oldest Croatian philosopher. He further defines Herman's thinking as »a rich synthesis of metaphysics of the old Greek philosophy, the Christian beliefs and the Arabic natural philosophy and science based on astrology« (see, p. 94). He considers that the primary research goal of Herman's philosophy is perfection of the *quadrivium*, that should be achieved through introduction of the Western Latin-Christian tradition to the old Greek and Arabian mathematics, astronomy and astrology, to the so-called »new« science (see p. 83, and also pp. 23–24). In this context Zenko briefly comments on Herman's translations of astronomical and mathematical works (on geometry) from the Arabic and the Greek (Sahl ibn Bisher: *Sextus astronomiae liber*, Abu Ma'shar: *Introductorium in astronomiam*, Euklid: *Elementa*, Ptolemaeus: *Planisphaera*). Further and in detail, he explains the teachings expounded in Herman's most significant work *De essentiis*, first the science of causes (on the first and the second cause, on birth and creation, etc.), than the science of move-

ment (on the generation and being, on mixing the elements, that is the semen, on coming together and coming apart, on essentially higher world of stars and a substantial lower world, etc.), and, finally, the science of place and time. Herman's basic theological-astrological founding point Zenko briefly summarizes as follows: »God, as the primary cause (*causa primaria*) of everything that exists, had built for himself a higher world of stars (*mundus superior*), as a vehicle (*instrumentum*) through which, as the secondary cause (*causa secundaria*), he produced and brought to life everything that exists in the lower world (*mundus inferior*), based on laws immanent to the second cause, which had been established by the first cause« (p. 102). In the context of the history of the Croatian philosophy Zenko points out two characteristics of Herman's philosophical system: first, Herman is the originator of »that tradition of positive evaluation of the old out-of-Biblical astrological-philosophical and astrological-theological hermetic tradition which, within the framework of the Croatian philosophy, has been especially strengthened by Frane Petrić« (see p. 83). Second, Herman »introduced into the Croatian philosophy the dynamistic element, which became one of the characteristics of the mainstream of the Croatian philosophy: from Krizogon, Petrić and Bošković to Bazala« (see p. 95).

Zenko's study on Herman Dalmatin is followed by a selection from Herman's most significant philosophical work *De essentiis*, translated and with notes prepared by Antun Slavko Kalenić, who also put together a glossary of more significant terms.

In her study on Juraj Dragišić, Erna Banić-Pajnić first provides information on life of this Croatian philosopher, later focusing primarily on two of his most important works, *Propheticae solutiones* and *Fridericus, de animae regni principe*. She also briefly mentions two other works, *De natura angelica* and *Defensio praestantissimi viri Joannis Reuchlin*, as well as his works on logic. Dragišić's *Propheticae solutiones* is in fact a theological-philosophical defense of authenticity of Savonarola's prophecies. From a theological point of view Dragišić defends a possibility of making predictions even after Saint John's *Revelation*, even more so because he considers Savonarola's prophecies to be a prediction of a revival of Christianity, as announced in the *Revelation* itself (Chapter 18). From a philosophical point of view Dragišić defends argumentation which states that knowledge of future actions does not contradict with man's free will, as these actions have indeed been caused by it. He also discusses the problem of certainty of knowledge of things that will happen in the future, and concludes that God's knowledge of future happenings is reliable, while man's knowledge (for example, in astrology) is not reliable, with one addition: namely, that exactly in prophecies man's *praescientia* becomes reliable through the grace of God, and thus is, therefore, indeed divine in its nature. Finally, what is important for a prophecy to be an authentic one, states Dragišić, is not only to see, but also to correctly interpret what has been seen. Banić-Pajnić emphasizes that in *Propheticae solutiones* Juraj Dragišić, »with his attitude and the way he provides and exemplifies his argumentation, he mostly stays confined within the framework of a Scholastic type of discussion, firmly holding to arguments of his teachers, primarily Duns Scotus, whose arguments... he tries to reconcile with arguments of Thomas Aquinas« (p. 157). The later tendency, namely the one of reconciling arguments of Scotus and Thomas, Banić-Pajnić considers as characteristic

for other works by Dragišić as well, for example for *Fridericus, de animae regni principe* (see p. 159), or for *De natura angelica* (see p. 160). However, in his paper *Fridericus, de animae regni principe* Banić-Pajnić recognizes certain philosophical motives through which Dragišić gets closer to the Renaissance philosophical spirit and comes, so to say, to the threshold of the Modern Age: »Although in his discussions Dragišić follows the tradition developed from the Middle Ages' line of arguments (between the followers of Scotus and those who followed Thomas Aquinas) on the pre-eminence of will, that is of mind, in them we can still notice traces of a Renaissance-type of approach to man, which is visible primarily in Dragišić's emphasis on free will« (see p. 159). Namely, Dragišić »demonstrates the pre-eminence of will *ratione libertatis*. that is exactly by its freedom«, because »the will is neither defined nor put to action by anything else«. Moreover, the will »freely chooses object of thinking, of understanding« – therefore, the will is »that primary element in man and in all the world«, and we should consider as the first cause of things exactly the free will of God, and not his knowledge (see pp. 158–159).

The selection of Dragišić's works includes parts of his *Propheticae solutiones*, translated by Stjepan Hosu. Editing of the translation was done by Josip Talanga, who also made notes for the text.

In her study on Franc Petrić Mihaela Girardi Karšulin first exposes his life, and then starts with discussion of humanistic themes present in Petrić's early works, then continues with Petrić's anti-Aristotelianism (especially in his work *Discussionum peripateticarum T. IV* – »Peripathetic Discussions«), and after that discusses his work *Nova de universis philosophia* (»New Universal Philosophy«). Girardi Karšulin ends her study with discussion of the history of influence of Petrić's philosophy, as well as the state of research of Petrić's philosophy among the later Croatian philosophers. She provides brief summaries of themes and problems discussed by Petrić, as well as an overview of the current state of research of his particular works, occasionally bringing to our attention the basic recurrent themes of his works in general – for example, his typical Renaissance-style syncretism, or his passionate anti-Aristotelianism. On the other hand, she particularly emphasizes Petrić's powerful Platonic aspiration toward a systematic universal science. In his early works of humanistic nature Petrić did not successfully reach this aspiration. His »wish to define a scientific or a philosophical basis of human relationships in a form of an ideal union thus remains a mere *desideratum* – Petrić (in his work *La città felice* – »Fortunate City«) did not succeed in establishing an ideal human union based on a single principle« (see p. 208). In his later work titled *Della historia diece dialoghi* (»Ten Dialogues on History«) Petrić also tried but again did not succeed in his trials to conceptualize »a strict« science of history, and instead of it just proposed »a set of instructions that should enable a more objective approach« (see p. 210). Finally, in his *Della rhetorica dieci dialoghi* (»Ten dialogues on Rhetorics«), Petrić understands Rhetorics also »as ignorance, as no-knowledge or an insecure knowledge, which gains an illusion of knowledge because it is regulated by certain rules of experience« (see p. 211). In his work *Della poetica* (»Poetics«), on the other hand, Petrić does not even discuss a possibility of »scientification« of poetics, as

he considers that the very basis of poetry is something completely opposite to knowledge, that is: ecstasy, fiction, amazing and incredible (see p. 213). Petrić fulfills his powerful aspiration for developing a system of universal knowledge only in his most significant work *Nova de universis philosophia*, but he does that through establishment of science which »encompasses indeed all beings, except man himself (and human phenomena), that is through establishment of a new-Platonic system of knowledge in which, however, man is being reduced to an abstract (rational) soul, to – so to speak – a mere viewer of the system« (see p. 221).

The selection of Petrić's work includes parts of his *Discussiones Peripateticae*, translated by Augustin Pavlović, as well as parts of *Nova de universis philosophia*, translated by Tomislav Ladan. Notes for *Discussiones Peripateticae* were prepared by Mihaela Girardi Karšulin and Augustin Pavlović. The choice and the expert editing of texts was done by Mihaela Girardi Karšulin, who also prepared a glossary of more significant terms.

In her study on Nikola Vitov Gučetić Ljerka Schiffler especially emphasizes the variety of Gučetić's opus, which encompasses studies on philosophy of nature, ethics, aesthetics, theology, economy, pedagogy, politics etc. His theological works Gučetić wrote »in the spirit of a pro-Vatican polemics with Protestants«, discussing »the problem of repentance, predetermination, temptation, faith and salvation« etc., openly showing his »enmity against Luther, Calvin and Melanchton« (see p. 297). In this context he based his arguments on »Platonic-Aristotelian philosophical tradition, on teachings of ecclesiastical fathers and Biblical texts« (ibid.). In his *Commentaria in sermonem Averrois de substantia orbis et in propositiones de causis*, as well as in *Quaestio de immortalitate intellectus possibilis contra Alexandrum Aphrodisaeum*, Gučetić discussed »some of the crucial themes of the Renaissance natural philosophy, metaphysics and theology – teachings on soul, the problem of the unity of mind, substance of the world, eternity, the first mover, the question of cognition, organic and inorganic nature, the nature of heaven and motion, the nature of soul and its immortality, etc.« (see p. 298), and in the process he presented and discussed »different theses of followers of various philosophical schools, trying to reconcile their arguments within the framework of his own approach rooted in Christianity« (see p. 297). Gučetić's Rhetorics represented »a move away from the traditional Aristotelian and Ciceronian Rhetorics, thus anticipating the Rhetorics of the Baroque« (see p. 299). In his works on aesthetics and poetics (*Dialogo della Belleza* and *Dialogo d'Amore*), Gučetić's »thinking is in many ways under direct influence of the neo-Platonic aesthetic vision of the universe«. Gučetić tried to read the neo-Platonic ontological-esthetical categories »into the doctrine of Aristotle, and to expand them into a specific synthesis of various currents of thought and interpretation« (see p. 302). The result of these efforts, however, was that Gučetić's thoughts on aesthetics did not result »with a comprehensive theoretical system«, but remained mostly »fragmented and unfinished« (see p. 302). In the final part of her study Schiffler briefly expounds Gučetić's works dealing with economy (*O lihvarstvu – »On Usuriousness«*), pedagogy (*Governo della famiglia*), and politics (*Dello Stato delle Repubbliche*).

The selection of Gučetić's works includes his *Commentaria In propositiones auctoris de causis*, as well as *Quaestio de immortalitate intellectus possibilis, Contra Alexandrum Aphrodisaeum*, translated and with notes prepared by Ivan Macan, who also prepared a glossary of more significant terms.

In his study on Ruder Josip Bošković Franjo Zenko devotes most of his attention to Bošković's concept of force, pointing out that his idea of force (*vis*) should be understood as »the first and the only, ontologically the strongest principle« (see pp. 412–413). This should be understood not in the sense of the Aristotelian-Scholastic difference between possibility and reality (*dynamis-energeia, possibilitas-realitas*), but in a sense in which Aristotle himself (in *Metaphysics* 1047a 24–26), gives preference to force, and not to reality, resulting with »*energeia* being only a manifestation of *dynamis*, while that what is indeed a reality from the very beginning is exactly the force, as well as what brings that force into being, *dynamis* and *dynaton*« (see p. 411). Because of this basic foundation of Bošković's philosophy, Zenko labels his philosophical system as *absolute dynamism* (see p. 413), further emphasizing the following three founding elements: first, understanding that individual particles and points of matter are endowed with certain forces; second, understanding that these forces are either attractive or repulsive, and that they behave in accord with certain laws; and, third, understanding that these forces never function on the basis of an impulse or physical touch – on the contrary, bodies (as well as their particles and the very points of matter) never touch each other (see p. 413 and also p. 416). In general, Zenko considers Bošković's philosophy to be »a result of fundamentally-philosophical review of ontological presuppositions of the Modern age (Galileian and Newtonian) science« (see p. 396). Zenko also states that the above mentioned approach of Bošković is exactly what makes him different and provides him with a better starting position in comparison with Galilei and Newton, adding that »apart from taking over the spirit of mathematics-inclined modern Galileian-Newtonian scientific approach, Bošković also discussed and very strictly, precisely and fully developed metaphysical-dynamic preconditions of the Modern-age physics on the one hand, and the instrumental, organogenic nature of the modern scientific approach on the other hand. Neither Galilei nor Newton discussed either of these issues« (see p. 402).

Zenko's study on Ruder Bošković is accompanied with the text of Bošković's treatise *De viribus vivis*, translated and with notes prepared by Josip Talanga, who also prepared a glossary of more significant terms.

In his study on Šimun Čučić, within the context of modernization of the Scholastic philosophy in the Monarchy (and thus in Croatia as well) in the second half of the XVIII century, Srećko Kovač discusses Čučić's most important philosophical work, a systematic review of philosophy in ten small volumes entitled *Philosophia critica elaborata*. He emphasizes a number of important elements: separation of physics from the system of philosophical education, rising the importance of ethics (which after 1773 is not just another subject for students of metaphysics, but an independent philosophical discipline), the division of metaphysics into ontology and natural theology, cosmology and psychology, and, finally, independence of empirical psychology (which resulted

with psychology of mind staying within the realm of metaphysics, while the empirical psychology became an introductory course at the first year of study, usually together with a short review of the history of philosophy and logic). Such division of philosophical disciplines is visible in Čučić's *Philosophia critice elaborata*. Kovač presents all disciplines covered in Čučić's work: empirical psychology, logic (dianology and alethology), metaphysics (ontology, cosmology, psychology of mind and natural theology) and, finally, ethics (praxeology, anthropology and ascetics). In this context he especially emphasizes Čučić's rather negative attitude toward the Scholasticism of the Middle Ages (which »resulted only with chaotic exchange of arguments and fights, often over completely unimportant issues, and which, more often than not, engaged in empty quarrels over words and not in serious arguments over the substance of the issues discussed«, see p. 488). On the other hand, Kovač points out Čučić's rather tolerant attitude toward Kant (in this context, Kovač compares Čučić with Ivan Krstitelj Horvath and his *Declaratio infirmitatis fundamentorum operis Kantiani* »Kritik der reinen Vernunft«). Such an attitude of Čučić toward Kant is visible not only in his logic, but also in his ontology and his ethics. Although his attitude toward Kant is critical and regardless of the fact that he discards many of Kant's statements, it is still true that Čučić »takes over some of the most important principles and postulates of Kant's philosophy« (see p. 489), and introduces certain arguments of Kant into the realm of the scholasticism. Through such an approach of Čučić, concludes Kovač, »a road was defined which will in the second half of the XIX century result with strong affirmation of 'secular philosophy', that will continue to develop alongside the now renewed scolasticism and neoscholasticism« (p. 506).

Kovač's study on Šimun Čučić is accompanied by selected parts of his *Philosophia critice elaborata*, translated by Augustin Pavlović.

We should also mention that, as far as the translations are concerned, this volume of the *Chrestomathy of Philosophy*, together with some previously published translations of works of early Croatian philosophers, such as Herman Dalmatin's *De essentiis* (»On Substances«) and Frane Petrić's *Nova de universis philosophia* (»New universal Philosophy«), brings new, previously unpublished translations, for example Hosu's translation of Dragišić's *Propheticæ solutiones* (»Prophetic solutions«), Macan's translation of Gučetić's *Commentaria In propositiones authoris de causis* (»Comments on Author's Ideas on Causes«) and Talanga's translation of Bošković's discussion *De viribus vivis* (»On Living Forces«). As far as the studies are concerned, we should first emphasize that they are conceptually uniform in terms of assessment and review of past researches on these philosophers, defining influence and position of certain works of the discussed philosophers not only within the framework of the history of the Croatian philosophy, but also within the context of the history of the European philosophy in general, in which they were written. For example, Zenko thus emphasizes the role of Herman Dalmatin in the process of informing the Western Latin-Christian tradition with the old Greek and Arabic mathematics, astronomy and astrology, as well as the place of Bošković's philosophical system especially within the context of the Modern-age Gallilei-Newtonian science. Banić-Pajnić, on the other hand, emphasizes

not only Dragišić's position toward the two principal philosophical schools of the Middle Ages (the one of Thomas Aquinas and the other of Duns Scotus), but also points out certain elements of the age of the Renaissance in his work, while Girardi-Karšulin points out Petrić's markedly Renaissance philosophical syncretism, as well as his fierce anti-Aristotelianism. While Schiffler indicates the spirit of anti-Reformation in theological-philosophical works of Gučetić, as well as the anticipating Baroque style of his rhetorics, together with neo-Platonic elements of his aesthetics, Kovač discusses Čučić's philosophical opus in the context of changes of the curriculum of philosophy at universities throughout the Monarchy during the second half of the XVIII and the first half of the XIX century, giving special attention to Čučić's attitude toward Kant. Another important element is that these studies, in discussing particular works of more prominent early Croatian philosophers, clearly show not only that the early Croatian philosophy is essentially incorporated into the history (in schools, movements, debates) of European philosophy of the Middle Ages, Renaissance and Modernity, but also that this relation is heterogeneous in its disciplinarity and school orientations, as during the history of the European philosophy different Croatian philosophers took part in various metaphysical and ontological, theological, aesthetical and poetical, rhetorical and logical, as well as epistemological, natural-philosophical, ethical and political exchanges of arguments and currents, defending in this process positions of rather different philosophical schools and traditions (Aristotelian, Platonic and neo-Platonic, Thomistic and Scotistic, Hermetical, Syncretic, Gallileian-Newtonian, etc.). In short, *Starija hrvatska filozofija* in general, although it includes discussions of only six selected Croatian philosophers (and thus definitely does not pretend to be a complete history of the Early Croatian philosophy in any way), it still provides a good introduction into the main characteristics of the Croatian philosophy until the beginning of the XIX century, it provides adequate introduction into its European identity, as well as into variety and diversity of its disciplines and its traditions.

REVIEW BY DARIO ŠKARICA
TRANSLATED BY ZORAN MILOVIĆ

Franjo Zenko (ed.), Novija hrvatska filozofija (»Modern Croatian Philosophy«), Hrestomatija filozofije, sv. 10, (»Chrestomathy of Philosophy«, Vol. 10), Školska knjiga, Zagreb, 1995, pp. 535

I

Within the framework of the new *Chrestomathy of Philosophy*, edited by Damir Barbarić and published by *Školska knjiga* from Zagreb, a new volume has been published under the title *Novija hrvatska filozofija* (»Modern Croatian Philosophy«). The editor of this volume is Franjo Zenko, assisted by Ivan Čehok and Damir Barbarić. Together with the previous, the Volume 9 of the *Chrestomathy*, titled *Starija hrvatska filozofija*¹ (»Early Croatian Philosophy«), this new volume, which chronologically continues where the previous book has stopped, represent something rather new in the field of publishing of philosophical works in Croatia. Even more so because the previous *Chrestomathy of Philosophy*, edited by Vladimir Filipović, did not cover modern Croatian philosophy, probably due to specific reasons, while the early Croatian philosophy, although mentioned in the volume titled *Filozofija renesanse* (»Philosophy of the Renaissance«)², was not covered in a sufficiently comprehensive manner. Of course, this does not mean that the issues discussed in this particular book have not been discussed before at all – indeed, both the early and the modern Croatian philosophical heritage has been systematically researched for a long time now, with numerous more or less comprehensive studies, covering a wide variety of topics, written and published. It just means – and this is exactly the novelty brought by these two volumes of the *Chrestomathy of Philosophy* – that until now we did not have a single comprehensive review of Croatian philosophy that could be compared to these two books. Within such a frame-

¹ Franjo Zenko (ed.): *Starija hrvatska filozofija* (»Early Croatian Philosophy«), *Hrestomatija filozofije*, sv. 9, (»Chrestomathy of Philosophy«, Vol. 9), Školska knjiga, Zagreb, 1995.

² See Vladimir Filipović: *Filozofija renesanse* (»Philosophy of Renaissance«), *Filozofska hrestomatija*, sv. 3, (»Chrestomathy of Philosophy«, Vol. 3), Nakladni zavod Matice Hrvatske, Zagreb, first edition, 1983, chapter »Hrvatski renesansni mislioci u sklopu svjetske filozofske misli« (»Croatian Renaissance Thinkers in the Context of the World Philosophy«), with the following philosophers included: J. Dragišić, B. Benković, F. Petrić, N. Gučetić, G. Budisaljčić, J. Dubrovčanin, A. Medo, M. Marulić, M. Vlačić and R. Bošković. Also included was a selection from Bošković's work *Teorija prirodne filozofije* (»Theory of Natural Philosophy«).

work these two volumes function not only at the level of *informing us* with the most important Croatian thinkers, but also at the level of *systematizing* at least part of the results of longtime studies, as well as *outlining guidelines for future* of such researches. Of course, a comprehensive overall review of the Croatian philosophy – what we call by that name, what we think that comes under this title, as well as what it indeed shows to be – could be given only by a systematic history of the Croatian philosophy³. Such a work, however, has not yet been written, and this *Chrestomathy*, in particular this volume, as Franjo Zenko stated at the very beginning of his Introduction, »is not a history of the Croatian philosophy, and neither could replace such a history«⁴. Regardless of that, at this point we should commend this, indeed the first attempt of an easy-to-survey systematization of rich and comprehensive years-long research of the Croatian philosophical heritage. We should also especially emphasize one additional strength of this systematization, and that is the fact that it includes a selection of basic original texts, or parts of major philosophical works, that enable us to get direct information on the most important names from our philosophical heritage, at least in a sense in which the author states that »such an edition (that is, this chrestomathy of the Croatian philosophy, H.J.) has to provide a minimum of historical philosophical information on the modern Croatian philosophy«⁵. We should also add that each study with its selection of original works is followed by very useful bibliographical additions, including a list of original works of every author, as well as a list of works on them.

II

The introductory study, written by Franjo Zenko, provides an introduction to the book in three different ways. First of all, most of the introduction is devoted to *the is-*

³ In this context we could add one additional remark. Namely, *Novija hrvatska filozofija* (»Modern Croatian Philosophy«), generally speaking, opens discussions at two levels. 1. The first issue is the very *idea of chrestomathy*, as one possible way of presenting, summarizing, as well as evaluating tradition (in our case, a philosophical tradition), with publicly or informally stated opinions ranging from those who think that chrestomathies are generally made obsolete (since »informative« histories of philosophy should be good enough to cover our needs, accompanied with translations of more important philosophical works), to those who have more moderate opinions and whose arguments therefore deserve more attention and discussion. 2. The second possible issue would be the very topic of this (as well as the previous) volume of the *Chrestomathy*. Here we could question the very *idea of the Croatian philosophy*, where we could question not only whether the term »Croatian philosophy« is appropriate, but also what it indeed is and what makes it what it is. We could also discuss a number of additional topics, such as the past researches and discussions of the Croatian philosophy, as well as potential or indeed necessary future studies of the Croatian philosophy, that is of the Croatian philosophical heritage. However, due to the fact that all these questions are rather demanding (as they are too wide in their scope and it is indeed not possible to provide easy one-sided *answers* on them), we shall therefore leave them at the current stage of just rough outlines. It should also be noted that the editor of this volume of the *Chrestomathy* partly mentioned some of them in his introductory text.

⁴ Franjo Zenko: »Novija hrvatska filozofija« (»Modern Croatian Philosophy«), in: *Novija hrvatska filozofija* (»Modern Croatian Philosophy«), p. 7.

⁵ *Ibid.*

sue of the modern Croatian philosophy, which means the issue of its definition in terms of its time-frame and the themes it discussed, the authors who could be considered to be a part of it, its so-called »historical foundations«, as well as the overall historical context of its »inception«. Here we have a comprehensive historical review of the modern Croatian philosophy that also covers those individual authors that have not been separately discussed in the chrestomathy. Here we also have a very important initial remark crucial for understanding specific characteristics of the modern in comparison with the early Croatian philosophy: »An essential element of a genuine, and not just historiographically recorded national philosophy is its living continuity. That means that there are certain elements, for example professors of philosophy and their pupils, who follow or oppose their professors, thus forming something that could be called a philosophical life, a philosophical atmosphere, with philosophical currents, and even with philosophical schools, all within a national philosophy.«⁶ Second, Zenko's introduction at the same time offers an overview of researches of the Croatian philosophical heritage, from Franjo Marković until today, which is – presented in a comprehensive form and in one text – definitely very valuable. The third important characteristics of this introduction lies in Zenko's explanation of his own approach as the editor of this chrestomathy, the approach that has been defined at various points, but could be summarized through the following quote: »Therefore this attempt of reconstruction of the spiritual-historical and the more narrow Croatian, as well as the wider European historical philosophical context and continuity, from which the hereby presented philosophers have developed, will be based both on my personal discussions with the late Croatian philosophers Vladimir Filipović, Kruno Krstić, Marija Brida and Pavao Vuk-Pavlović, as well as on the usual academic literature, yet without allowing for much of my personal experiences and testimonies on our philosophers and professors of philosophy.«⁷

Finally, we should say a few words on the choice of philosophers and their texts presented in the *Modern Croatian Philosophy*. In this our review we will follow the sequence in which the individual, probably the most important modern Croatian philosophers have been introduced in this volume through an overview of their work and a selection of their original texts.

III

The first in line of the presented authors is Franjo Marković (1845–1914). Marković, a distinguished poet, philosopher and even a politician, is additionally important due to the fact that he was the first Head of the Department of Philosophy at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Zagreb University, which was re-established in 1874. This particular position of Franjo Marković, however, was not just a sign of his formal status but indeed a position of great influence. As stated by Ivan Čehok, who wrote the

⁶ Ibid., p. 9.

⁷ Ibid., p. 10.

study on Marković in this volume, on the basis of his activities »the Croatian philosophy started to develop away from studies and interpretations written in the spirit of the Scholastic tradition, and moved toward discussions of, agreement with or critical analysis of all the modern currents present in then-contemporary philosophical and scientific thought.«⁸

Marković's philosophical work is presented in this volume by a selection from his crucial work *Razvoj i sustav obćenite estetike* (»The Development and the System of General Aesthetics«), as well as by the text of his inaugural speech that he held as a newly elected President of the Zagreb University, a speech exceptionally important for the history of the Croatian philosophy, titled *Filosofijske struke pisci hrvatskoga roda s onkraj Velebita u stoljećih XV do XVIII*. (»Croatian Philosophers from the Other Side of the Velebit Mountain from the XV to the XVIII Century«). At this point we should particularly welcome the fact that among the selected original works by Marković we have a chance to read selected parts from his previously unpublished manuscript titled *Pedagogika* (»Pedagogics«), especially because all previous discussions on Marković focused almost exclusively on his main work, thus avoiding his manuscripts which clearly show, as noted by Čehok, »development of his thought, and its focus that shifted toward research fields close to philosophy (such as pedagogy), as well as, finally, the methodical rigor and systematic approach in his understanding and exposition of a system of philosophy.«⁹ This is indeed true for the *Pedagogics*, that is of major importance in our attempts to understand Marković's ideas on ethics (in a part titled »Sustav općenite pedagogike« – »System of General Pedagogics«, from the chapter »Etički osnov pedagogije« – »Ethical Foundations of Pedagogics«), where he clearly followed Herbart, whose ideas Marković accepted through his teacher Robert Zimmermann.

The given selection of Marković's original texts, based on different focal points of his philosophical work, Čehok justifies as follows: »From the previous explanation it is clear that there are two or three crucial focal points in the entire Marković's opus. The first of them is, of course, his aesthetics, which is so comprehensive that it is almost impossible to take out only a single briefly expounded part of his overall systematic exposition, so we have thus decided to present only the introductory chapter, which is, in addition, crucial for understanding his entire system of thought, as I have tried to present it here. Indeed aiming at providing a reader with a more comprehensive basis for getting to know Marković closer, we decided to include a previously unpublished, and almost completely unknown article found among his manuscript of the *Pedagogics*, titled »Etički osnov pedagogije« (»Ethical Foundations of Pedagogy«). This chapter is the only systematic overview of Marković's ethics, as his short work *Etički sadržaj naših narodnih poslovice* (»Ethical Content of our Popular Proverbs«) is primarily based on discussions of individual ethical concepts. As far as the third text (Marković's inaugu-

⁸ Ivan Čehok: »Franjo Marković«, in: *Novija hrvatska filozofija* (»Modern Croatian Philosophy«), p. 31.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

ral speech as a new Director of the University) is concerned, we have to say that even today this text represents a powerful encouragement for research of the Croatian philosophical (and scientific) thought.«¹⁰ Indeed, and founding our argument on this last element, we could add that Marković definitely represents that particular turning point in the history of development of philosophy among Croats with which we can begin our review of the modern Croatian philosophy. Because: Marković does not only stand at the (new) beginning of the institutional history of philosophy in Croatia, which started with the re-opening of the Zagreb University and the establishment of the Department of Philosophy, and he is not only at »the beginning of the continuity« of the Croatian philosophy, since when we can indeed in a full sense of that word talk about the Croatian philosophy/the philosophy among Croats, but he also stands at the beginning of »the outer« and »the inner« development of the Croatian philosophy – a philosophy that became aware of its own tradition and the foundations from which it had developed, a philosophy that turned toward a precisely defined and a clear program of research of its own philosophical heritage on one hand, and toward formulation of an idea of a national philosophy on the other, including development of its connections with the European and the overall philosophical trends in the world, as well as toward its task of building a cultural identity of the people. In this respect it is significant in what way Marković used J. S. Mill in his inaugural speech: »The one who acquired the logic of thinking, that one will acquire the logic of acting as well; and there is no doubt that only the people that had acquired for itself the homeland of thought, managed to firmly acquire for itself its concrete homeland as well.«¹¹

IV

The overview of life and works of Gjuro Arnold (1853-1941) was written by Damir Barbarič. Gjuro Arnold was the first doctor of philosophy who obtained his degree from the Zagreb University (in 1880), and was a student of Franjo Marković, thus substantiating the previously mentioned argument of Franjo Zenko on »the living continuity« of the national (Croatian) philosophy, a continuity which is established only when within a national philosophy the relationship between students and professors starts playing an important role, when »a professor finds his student«, not necessarily in a sense of someone who continues where his teacher stopped, but even if it is a relationship of an opposition against. After finishing his studies in Zagreb, and owing to Marković's assistance, Arnold continued his studies abroad (at Gottingen, Berlin, Paris), where he met, among others, Lotze, who will continue to have major influence on Arnold, influence visible in all of his works. Similar to Marković, Arnold was also a poet, and was similarly active both at the University and at other cultural institutions,

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 44.

¹¹ Franjo Marković: *Filosofijske struke pisci hrvatskoga roda s onkraj Velebita u stoljećih XV: do XI III*, (»Croatian Philosophers from the other side of the Velebit Mountain from the XV to the XVIII Century«), in: *Novija hrvatska filozofija* (»Modern Croatian Philosophy«), p. 106.

primarily the two most important, *Matica hrvatska* and *JAZU* (Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences).

Barbarić's review is based primarily on discussions of Arnold's texts presented in the *Chrestomathy* (*Filosofija, prirodne nauke i socijologija. Riječ u prilog metafizici*, »Philosophy, Natural Sciences and Sociology. An Argument on Behalf of Metaphysics«, and *Zadnja bića. Metafizička rasprava*, »The Ultimate Beings. A Metaphysical Treatise«), although we are provided with adequate information on other works by Arnold that are relevant for complete understanding of his philosophical ideas. After providing us with basic biographical data on Arnold, Barbarić starts his discussion of Arnold's philosophy with a statement which unveils his predominant idea and his self-proclaimed task, that could be followed throughout his entire opus: »The essential characteristics of Arnold's thinking, the spiritual basis from which all his positive statements arise, the defining atmosphere from which the basic elements of his philosophical convictions spring, is a fierce and uncompromising opposition to the spirit of positivism, naturalism, materialism and atheism, the spirit which slowly gained momentum during the 19th century, to announce its final domination at the end of it.«¹² After providing argumentation for this statement with a quotation from Arnold's work *O psihologiji bez duše* (»On Psychology Without Soul«), Barbarić immediately continues with discussion of Arnold's inaugural speech when he was elected Director of the University, titled *Filosofija, prirodne nauke i socijologija. Riječ u prilog metafizici* (»Philosophy, Natural Sciences and Sociology. An Argument on Behalf of Metaphysics«), from which one could indeed clearly understand Arnold's basic standpoint on what philosophy, by itself and in relation to the overall context of science, is and what it should be – and that not only in his own time but in general. This basic attitude is at the same time important in understanding his other works, which deal with psychology, logic, art, ethics and religion. Arnold's deliberate escalation of tensions between philosophy and (natural) science, as well as his positioning on the side of philosophy understood as »the Queen of science«, was first and most visible in the field of psychology, where Arnold was a person of influence not only because of his position as a professor who taught a number of courses related to psychology, but also because of his significant study *O psihologiji bez duše* (»On Psychology Without Soul«), as well as his most important philosophical work *Zadnja bića. Metafizička rasprava* (»The Ultimate Beings. A Metaphysical Treatise«). The reverberations of this basic philosophical attitude, which argues »on behalf of metaphysics«, are also visible in Arnold's ethics (in his doctoral thesis *Etika i poviest*, »Ethics and History«), as well as in his treatise on art which was, according to Arnold, and in a similar manner in which it happened to science, left without any metaphysical content. Arnold's ideas on aesthetics are interesting to us also from a point of view of our cultural history, since they met with fierce reactions from Arnold's contemporaries, followers of modernism, first of all because Arnold stated that »the folk art« is the only form of art which has any significance, which was,

¹² Damir Barbarić: »Gjuro Arnold«, in: *Novija hrvatska filozofija* (»Modern Croatian Philosophy«), p. 130.

in fact, his way of arguing for »a pure« »popular/national culture«, as opposed to a culture of a people that would be open to, and a subject to foreign influences. After discussing Arnold's understanding of a triad of the highest human ideals (truth, beauty and goodness, including the relationship between them), as well as the element that stands above them or, better to say, in their very foundations, namely: faith and God, Barbarić states that »the central source of Arnold's philosophy, that basic principle upon which all his philosophical insights and beliefs stand and from which they all spring out«, is first of all »negation of change and statement of something permanent and invariable.«¹³ Barbarić's overview ends with a statement by Pavao Vuk-Pavlović, Arnold's student, which maybe provide the best picture of this important Croatian philosopher, who at the turn of the century defended philosophy as »*condition sine qua non* of any science (...) that views everything *sub specie aeternitatis*, and for which in addition to that a world of ideals exists as well«¹⁴, »a living thinker« who did not succumb to »false questions«: »And whatever one may think of Arnold's work, and regardless of what might be one's attitude toward the problems he discussed and the solutions he offered, one could nevertheless not deny that from his every sentence that passionate zeal bursts out, clearly being an evidence of true and truthful interest for issues, and that not only within a framework and in a context of a cold intellectual approach, but even more in a context of a full and warm life.«¹⁵

V

Following the overview of life and work of Gjuro Arnold, and a selection from his works, Franjo Zenko presents his chapter on Albert Bazala (1887-1947), followed by Bazala's study *Meta-logical Source of Philosophy* (»Meta-logical Source of Philosophy«). Although Bazala owes his popularity primarily to his three-volume work *Povijest filozofije* (»History of Philosophy«), published in 1906, 1909 and 1912 respectively, Zenko goal of presenting Bazala's own basic philosophical views justifies the choice of the *Meta-logical Source of Philosophy*. This study, written in 1924, Zenko calls Bazala's »most characteristic and philosophically most relevant text.«¹⁶ In this particular work, in other words, we could most clearly see an expression of Bazala's philosophical approach, which could be most precisely labeled, to use his own words, as *voluntaristic activism*. This crucial philosophical thought of Bazala, which does not fall within a framework of just another theme from »a classroom manner philosophy« or only within a particular philosophical system, but aims at achieving »an activist view of

¹³ Ibid., p. 142.

¹⁴ Gjuro Arnold: *Filozofija, prirodne nauke i socijologija* (»Philosophy, Natural Sciences and Sociology«), in: *Novija hrvatska filozofija* (»Modern Croatian Philosophy«), p. 162.

¹⁵ Cited according to Damir Barbarić: »Gjuro Arnold«, in: *Novija hrvatska filozofija* (»Modern Croatian Philosophy«), p. 143.

¹⁶ Franjo Zenko: »Albert Bazala«, in: *Novija hrvatska filozofija* (»Modern Croatian Philosophy«), p. 201.

world and life in general« – that thought has been formulated through doubt in a purely logical essence and nature of philosophy. In Zenko's review this thought has been discussed primarily within the context of the above mentioned study, although the author provides us with explanation of its further development or its reverberations in other works by Bazala. In his *History of Philosophy*, as Zenko states, Bazala provides »a critical revision of great philosophers and philosophical systems and discovers in them meta-logical and activist currents, not only in order to justify legitimacy of his own historical-philosophical ideas, but also to show the historical truth on the essence and the nature of philosophy«¹⁷. The same is also true for Bazala's thoughts on the idea of national philosophy, developed under the influence of his professor Franjo Marković, which were in addition substantiated by concrete historical-philosophical researches. Having in mind Bazala's scientific work as well as his work as a professor of philosophy, but also his lively activities in the field of culture, Zenko ends his overview with words of Kruno Krstić, who saw Bazala's importance in the fact that he was »the first to introduce the Croatian secular philosophy to essential themes of the modern European philosophy, while at the same time (...) spreading the application of philosophical approach to a wide variety of aspects of cultural life (arts, education, upbringing, social aspects etc.)«¹⁸.

V7

One of the most important chapters of the modern Croatian philosophy, which should definitely not be avoided when one speaks of modern philosophy in our country, is the Neo-scholastic philosophy. Stjepan Zimmerman (1884–1963) has been chosen as the most important representative of this philosophical approach, and Ivan Čehok wrote an overview of his philosophy. By discussing Stjepan Zimmerman, one might say, we at the same time discuss various currents within the Twentieth century Neo-scholastic philosophy in Croatia, as well as its relationship, its exchange of arguments and discussions with the so-called »secular« philosophy. This has also been acknowledged by Čehok in the biographical part of his text, when he stated that Zimmerman's own fate »in a way mirrors fate of other scientists and philosophers of Christian beliefs and creed in our parts.«¹⁹ At this point we should especially emphasize that Zimmerman is represented through a comprehensive selection from his works, which should not come as a surprise if we take a look at his indeed rich opus as an author. Čehok follows Zimmerman's main works and points out the most important elements of his philosophical system that had been developed over many years of his studies. First of all, Čehok discusses Zimmerman's work *Opća noetika* (»General Noetics«), which deserves attention not only because it was his first work, published in 1918, but also if

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 203.

¹⁸ Cited according to *ibid.*, p. 211.

¹⁹ Ivan Čehok: »Stjepan Zimmerman«, in: *Novija hrvatska filozofija* (»Modern Croatian Philosophy«), p. 289.

we have in mind the importance of the cognitive theory, that is its »objectivist noetics«, within the overall framework of the Zimmerman's philosophical system and his understanding of the system of philosophy in general. Within thus defined context we cannot avoid discussing Zimmerman's attitude toward Kant, to which Čehok also devotes necessary space in his study. Other major elements of the Zimmerman's system are explained through examples and justified by citations from the following works: *Filozofija i religija* (»Philosophy and Religion«) – chapter »Kako se znanstveno izgrađuje filozofija religije?« (»How a Scientific Philosophy of Religion is Developed?«); *Filozofija života* (»Philosophy of Life«) – chapter »Filozofija i kršćanstvo« (»Philosophy and Christianity«), and *Kriza kulture* (»Crisis of Culture«) – chapter »Uvodno razmatranje« (»Introductory Study«). Having in mind Zimmerman's indeed very rich opus, as well as diversity of his interests (covering philosophy, theology, psychology, but also the Croatian philosophical heritage), we can conclude that this overview offers a successful summary and a cross-section of philosophical and intellectual activities of, in Čehok's words, »scientifically and socially the most engaged Croatian philosopher of the Twentieth century, who finally achieved practical realization of the basic elements of his philosophy of life in his own personal life.«²⁰

VII

The fifth overview in the *Modern Croatian Philosophy*, written by Franjo Zenko, is devoted to Pavao Vuk-Pavlović (1894–1976). The introductory study on Vuk-Pavlović is, as Zenko stated, directly adjusted to the selection of his original works that accompanies it. This is in addition explained at the end of the study, where Zenko wrote: »The aspects of Vuk-Pavlović's cognitive philosophy analyzed in this study, the aspects of his philosophy of culture, his philosophy of tradition, as well as his spiritual-philosophical world in general, should be of primary use for those readers who will focus on original works presented in this particular chrestomathy. They should be read and considered not as a summary of the overall opus of Vuk-Pavlović, but more as a very specific introduction to his rich and complex, and for the Croatian philosophy above all very enriching spiritual-philosophical world.«²¹ It is, therefore, clear that Zenko's overview does not aim either at presenting Vuk-Pavlović's philosophy in general, or at dissecting in detail the rich and specific multi-layered »Vuk-Pavlović's spiritual-philosophical world«²². On the other hand, the presented selection from Vuk-Pavlović's original works, regardless of their individual value and importance, should also not be considered as if indicating the most transparent examples of his philosophical thinking, on which – and only on which – one should exclusively focus if wanting to acquire complete and comprehensive understanding of this, exceptionally

²⁰ Ibid., p. 302.

²¹ Franjo Zenko: »Pavao Vuk-Pavlović«, in: *Novija hrvatska filozofija* (»Modern Croatian Philosophy«), p. 403.

²² Ibid., p. 393.

interesting and to this date still fresh and alive philosophical thought. In this respect Zenko is careful not to emphasize any »central« theme which had preoccupied Vuk-Pavlović, and he also tries not to define any »central« work of his, which should than by definition come to an exclusive focus of our interest. Zenko, therefore, decides to provide an overview that will primarily discuss the selected original works by Vuk-Pavlović, which will than function as an encouragement and as an instruction for a more comprehensive reading of Vuk-Pavlović's works. The selection of original works includes three works. The first of them is »Istina i očitostni doživljaj« (»Truth and Experience of Evidence«), the final chapter from probably the most important book by Vuk-Pavlović titled *Spoznaja i spoznajna teorija* (»Cognition and Cognitive Theory«), published in 1926. Zenko devoted most of his introductory study to this particular work, as the problem of cognition, that is the cognitive theory, remained one of the most important and constant interests of Vuk-Pavlović throughout his entire life. In this particular field Vuk-Pavlović gave his most important contributions to philosophy, and one might even state that he – in opposition, for example, to skepticism, idealism or pragmatism – showed certain originality in his approach. The importance given by Zenko to this particular segment of Vuk-Pavlović's philosophical thinking is, therefore, fully justified. However, we should not forget that his philosophy in general should not be reduced only to this single aspect of his work. The variety of Vuk-Pavlović's interests, and the consequent activities he undertook (and here, together with different philosophical themes, we find his poetry as well as his translations of literary works, first of all of Tagore's), also include his cultural-historical studies, edited and published together in his 1964 book titled *O značenju povijesnih smjerenja* (»On Importance of Historical Tendencies«). Two studies from this book have been chosen for the selection of the original works by Vuk-Pavlović: »Pogled na kulturnopovijesna smjerenja« (»A View of Cultural-Historical Tendencies«), and »Značenje povijesne predaje« (»Importance of Historical Tradition«). In »A View of Cultural-Historical Tendencies«, Vuk-Pavlović analyzed the current state of the European culture, discussing »the historical fate of trials to live a life based on values, understood as a form of an authentically human way of survival«²³, while in the »Importance of Historical Tradition« he discusses »a way of salvation from the tradition of the one-sided system of cultural-historical values, founded on calculating mind, which is by itself and from itself unable to secure a balance of life.«²⁴ The selected texts, introduced by instructive and relatively brief overview, and followed by a comprehensive bio-bibliography, provide, all things considered, an indeed very good introduction into the »spiritual-philosophical world« of Pavao Vuk-Pavlović, whom Zenko at one point calls »one of the 'most universal' and the most spiritual of the Croatian philosophers.«²⁵

²³ Ibid., p. 399.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 401.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 403.

VIII

The last part of this book, again written by Franjo Zenko, is devoted to Vladimir Filipović (1906–1984). This part justifiably stands as a conclusion to the *Modern Croatian Philosophy*, because Filipović was not only a philosopher whose work in a very important way marked the entire age of the modern Croatian philosophy, but his scientific, pedagogic and cultural efforts and activities proved to be – one might even dare to say – a decisive impulse for recent research of the Croatian philosophical heritage, with one of its results being this very book itself. Here we primarily think about Filipović's initiative crucial for establishment of the Institute of Philosophy, that devoted much of its resources primarily to research of the Croatian philosophical heritage, the establishment of a philosophical magazine *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine* (»Contributions to Research of the Croatian Philosophical Heritage«), as well as his efforts related to publishing works by the most important Croatian philosophers. Of course, in this context we should not forget a number of his other initiatives, his influential work as a professor of philosophy, as well as his own scientific work. It is, therefore, necessary to view Filipović's work in its entirety, recognizing the common thread characteristic for all the various aspects of his activities. Franjo Zenko used exactly this approach in his study, starting his discussion with Filipović's doctoral thesis *Problem vrijednosti – Historijska i kritičko-sistematska aksiološka rasprava* (»Problem of Values – a Historical and Critical-Systematic Axiological Discussion«), which clearly presents Filipović's basic philosophical ideas, which were later discussed in full in his other works. Zenko's comprehensive review of Filipović's views on axiology is endorsed by selected parts from Filipović's work *Problem vrijednosti* (»Problem of Values«), which are here published for the first time. However, what deserves special recognition is Zenko's attempt to link together these basic topics of Filipović's philosophy and his previously mentioned engagement on promotion of the national culture in general, and the Croatian philosophy in particular. Reading primarily through the above mentioned Filipović's work, in which he tried to provide »a satisfactory definition of the ontological status of the phenomenon of value«²⁶, Zenko states: »One should therefore especially emphasize that particular form of the axiological-thematic expansion by which Filipović, following Franjo Marković and Albert Bazala, tried to define the Croatian philosophical heritage as an integral part of the Croatian national objective spirit.«²⁷ In Filipović, therefore, as noted by Zenko, »it is clearly recognizable the use of axiology on the system of spiritual goods as represented by national cultural tradition, and within it national philosophical tradition.«²⁸ This particular effort made by Filipović, and visible both in his own work as well as in the work of his students, assistants and younger researchers of the Croatian philosophical heritage is

²⁶ See Franjo Zenko: »Vladimir Filipović«, in: *Novija hrvatska filozofija* (»Modern Croatian Philosophy«), p. 468.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 474.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 475.

therefore – and this should be emphasized once again – just the right chapter for an end of a review of the modern Croatian philosophy, as it on the one hand closes a continuing list of Croatian philosophers (from Marković until, one could say, this day), those who approached the issue of philosophical education with passion, while on the other hand still provides plenty of information on recent attempts to research and evaluate our rich philosophical tradition.

IX

If at the end we leave aside the issue of whether a chrestomathy as such is indeed needed at all, or if we decide not to raise the issue of choice of the selected philosophers (a choice which could, of course, and as always on such occasions, be argued against), and while still waiting for a systematic history of the Croatian philosophy to be written (a task for which we – as shown on this book *as well* – do not lack adequate experts), we could conclude that *the Modern Croatian Philosophy* is a book that should be recommended, both because of its instructive value for those who are just starting to learn about the Croatian philosophical heritage, as well as because of the following two reasons: because of the importance which this particular period of the Croatian philosophy had in the history of the Croatian philosophy in general, and also its importance for defining the Croatian philosophy, for its research and evaluation²⁹; and because this book represents an important contribution to research of the Croatian philosophical tradition as well as that specific philosophical dimension within us.

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²⁹ Franjo Zenko in his introduction states that »the general spiritual-historical context of the modern Croatian philosophy (...) is characterized by the process of constituting, theoretically developing and definitively strengthening the national spiritual-historical and, more narrowly, historical-philosophical self-consciousness of the Croatian philosophy.« – Franjo Zenko: »Novija hrvatska filozofija« (»Modern Croatian Philosophy«), in: *Novija hrvatska filozofija* (»Modern Croatian philosophy«), p. 7.

Juraj Križanić, Politika («Politics»), (Translated by Mate Mlinar and Radomir Venturin. Introductory study by Ante Pažanin) Publishing line *Povijest hrvatskih političkih ideja* («History of Croatian Political Ideas»), Golden Marketing/Narodne novine, Zagreb, 1997, pp. 432

Among our scientists Juraj Križanić has been an object of considerable interest since long time ago, yet one might add that this interest has not been proportionate to the number of Križanić's works translated into Croatian. Owing primarily to Ivan Golub, our renowned expert in Križanić, a *Križanićologist*, one might say, Križanić is today warmly accommodated in his Croatia after centuries of wandering around – that is, after centuries of his more or sometimes much less visible international prominence. One should also admit that he has been brought back to light from scientific obscurity only by occasional and rather rare Croatian writers, but much more often by Russian authors, as Križanić left his clearly unavoidable mark in their own, Russian culture. Although one has to admit that, together with the Russian as well as considerable international bibliography of works on Križanić, the bibliography of works by Croatian authors is also rather long and important. However, the truth remains that until now we did not have a *comprehensive* translation of Križanić's most important work, *Politika* («Politics»). When I say «comprehensive» I mean that the 1947 edition of this work, published by *Matica Hrvatska* under the title *Politika ili Razgovori o vladalaštvu* («Politics, or Discussions on Governing»), translated by Mate Mlinar and edited by Josip Badalić, was not complete. That first, incomplete edition provided the basis for this new, critical (which in our country usually also means a deluxe) edition of *Politika*. Parts missing in the previous edition were translated by Radomir Venturin, who also edited and compared with the original the old version of the translation. Together with the translation itself, this edition, published jointly by *Golden Marketing* and *Narodne novine*, brings the usual additional necessary set of critical instruments in a form of a rather comprehensive and considerably long introduction written by Ante Pažanin, together with Bibliography of Križanić's published works, as well as the works on Križanić, and ending with the additional commentaries prepared by a Russian expert «Križanićologist» A. L. Goldberg, whose original text in Russian was for this edition translated and edited also by Radomir Venturin.

Juraj Križanić was born in 1617 or 1618 in Obrh near Ozalj, and was killed in Kahlenberg near Vienna in 1683. His entire life and his entire work – which covered a wide variety of interests and topics: theology, politics, history, linguistics, economy,

music and philosophy – were, in spite of their scope and their variety, marked by his self-assigned task, his »Moscow project«. During his studies Križanić came into contact with a book by Antonio Possevin titled *Komentari o moskovskim stvarima* (»Commentaries on the Moscow Issues«), in which he for the first time learned that, in his own words, »a great number of our peoples (*gentium*) are poisoned with internal split« (cited according to A. Pažanin: »Uvod u Križanićevu *Politiku*«, »Introduction to Križanić's *Politics*«, p. 11). When he realized in what degree the Slavs – and for him the Slavs were: the Russians, the Poles, the Czechs, the Bulgarians, the Serbs and the Croats – had been divided and without any mutual interdependence, Križanić put all his ideas and all his trials to realize them behind the basic idea of bringing the Slavs closer together and making them more strong. The first and the most important step on this road was supposed to be overcoming the church division between the Russian Orthodox Church, as the church representing the most numerous and the most powerful of all the Slavic peoples, and the Rome, that is the Catholic Church. The Russia, thus connected with Rome, would form a union with the Western Christian rulers and would liberate other Slavic peoples who were under the Turkish rule. Parallel to this »big task«, Križanić envisaged an another, equally important process, that of cultural development and enlightenment of the Russia, the task he had formulated as his own personal one, and the one that would eventually bring the Russian Emperor closer to accept Križanić's crucial political concept. The final result of all these efforts, as Križanić defined them, was first to focus on working with the Russia, but to finally bring better future and prosperity to all the Slavic peoples.

With this in mind the *Politics* was written, namely, aiming at rationally advising the Russian Emperor on various issues of state politics, which would enable the geographically huge, yet insufficiently strong Russia to overcome its backwardness, backwardness that was at that time, for various reasons, characteristic of all the Slavic peoples. The manuscript of the *Politics* – an anthology of texts originally titled *Razgowor ob wladatelistwu* (»Discussions on Governing«) – was written between 1663 and 1666 in Tobolsk, at probably the most difficult period of Križanić's life, during his fifteen years of exile in Siberia, where he landed for reasons which have not been clarified until this day. However, even these hardships did not result with Križanić either losing his strength of will or compromising his basic ideas and intentions. *Politics* was supposed to have the above mentioned advisory function within the overall context of Križanić's mission, yet, during his own time, and under very specific circumstances, the book did not have any impact. In Russia it was published for the first time only in 1859. Since then, however, it has stirred a lot of interest and until this day has had a long and rich history of influence.

Politics is divided into three parts. Before starting his discussion of the basic themes of his work, Križanić in the Introduction lists the reasons for writing the book, explains the way the book has been divided, and provides basic remarks on individual parts. Here he cites the prophet Jeremiah, who »states the three essential things through which the world is being celebrated and through which the world reaches its blissfulness, namely: the wealth, the power and the wisdom« (p. 96). These three ele-

ments »are empty and perilous for a soul« if God is being forgotten. If the contrary is true, states Križanić, these »gifts from God«, the wealth, the power and the wisdom (which invigorate the body, if justly and moderately enjoyed), together with the divine worship (which invigorates the soul), represent the founding pillars of a state. Križanić therefore states that »this work will be divided into three parts, and will start discussion on the wealth, the power and the wisdom of a ruler« (p. 96). In the first part of *Politics*, titled »O blagu« (»On Wealth«), Križanić discusses trade, crafts, farming and mining in a manner that he uses throughout his work, that is: by exchanging, from sentence to sentence, from paragraph to paragraph, general analysis and synthetic conclusions on the overall topic of the state wealth, that is the treasures, with concrete examples and advice (for example, at one point he discusses the process of tanning leather). To this Križanić also adds the following: »Wealth of a ruler does not consist only of a treasury full of silver and gold, but first of all of the number of people under his rule. A king is not richer if he has more gold, but if he has more people« (p. 97). In the second part of *Politics*, titled »O sili« (»On Power«), and devoted to the power of a ruler and a state, Križanić primarily discusses »the physical«, that is »the usual or the common« strongholds of a kingdom, such are fortified places, rivers, weapons, military structures etc., yet at the very beginning he also lists »spiritual« strongholds, such are the king's divine worship, good behavior, happiness of the people, struggle against lust for other people's goods as well as keeping useful alliances. These other strongholds Križanić considers as »more important«, since »the power of a state lays neither only in its largeness, nor in fortifications of its cities, but much more in its good system of laws« (p. 97).

The third and the most important part of *Politics* is titled »O mudrosti« (»On Wisdom«). At the very beginning of this part Križanić discusses three elements important for further explanation of his ideas, all three under the joint name of wisdom. These three elements are: *wisdom* understood as »knowing the greatest and the highest of all things«, *knowledge* understood as »knowing things by their causes«, and *philosophy* understood as »care for and will to acquire the wisdom« (p. 173). In a chapter titled »Izlaganje o mudrosti, o znanju i o filozofiji« (»Presentation on Wisdom, Knowledge and Philosophy«), Križanić defines a scheme for division of knowledge and crafts, a theme well deserving to become a separate topic of a thorough future analysis of an expert on Križanić. The crucial part of his exposition on wisdom can be found in the chapter titled »O političkoj mudrosti« (»On Political Wisdom«), that seems to be a transition from general discussions on wisdom, knowledge and philosophy (and which could be finally considered only as an introduction), to discussions of concrete problems formulated through Križanić's precise analyses and instructions founded on historical and theological argumentation and commentaries. For Križanić, the Politics, or the royal wisdom, is »among all the secular sciences the most noble (...) and a partner to all of them« (p. 177). The entire political reasoning could be condensed into two »sayings or natural commands«, which are its »bottom and its foundation«, and these are: first, »Know Thyself« and, second, »Do not Trust Foreigners«. By positioning and defining these two sayings as principles, Križanić establishes the vertical line of his argumentation, but also provides two basic rules of political behavior, followed by other

peoples (for example, Germans), in contrast to Slavic peoples, for whom this indeed represents the crucial cause of all Slavic misfortunes. After so openly pointing toward the Slavic carelessness toward knowledge and crafts, as well as their willingness to lose their minds in their craving for things not belonging to them, stating in addition that all these things are characteristic for the Slavic peoples, Križanić continues with his discussions – always followed by relevant examples and argumentation – of state issues, issues of Emperors, popular issues, the Russian, the Slavic, the foreign and other issues, that reach their climax in the dialogue between Boris and Hrvoje.

Križanić's *Politics* thus finally becomes »a patriotic deliberation« (p. 173), as he himself defines his work at one point. After one finishes reading this book, and bearing in mind his controversial life and work, one could conclude that the basic aim of the book was to serve to a clearly defined goal: to the Russian Emperor and to the Russia, and in fact to all the Slavic peoples and the Slavism in general. Everything else, everything that we find in his work in addition to the basic skeleton – and which is definitely not irrelevant – represents, however, only a means, an instrument, although this instrument is not unrefined, but is clearly defined and polished.

Exactly this essence of Križanić's »project« – his passionate engagement on enlightening the Slavs and bringing closer their churches and their peoples – is what makes his work so interesting today and what enables a dialogue with it, a dialogue that aims to pose questions, across centuries, questions on Slavic peoples and the ways to achieve a possible Slavic unity. In this exact sense Križanić represents an intriguing signpost within a framework of such a discussion, even more so because he should be considered more as a visionary person than as a dry analytical mind discussing »the social and political situation« of his own time. However, if we decide to accept him as a interlocutor, we should above all approach directly him and his work, and not certain interpretations (and we could even say manipulations!), which aim at instrumentalizing his essential thoughts. Within such a context Ante Pažanin in his *Introduction to Politics* justly notes that »Križanić's thoughts on Slavism should in principle be differentiated from the later-day passions for all things Slavic and for the Pan Slavism« (A. Pažanin, »Uvod u Križanićevu Politiku«, »Introduction to Križanić's *Politics*«, p. 58).

Križanić's work in general – and this is also true for this particular edition of his *Politics* – is useful in three different ways. Above all, we now have a complete translation of Križanić's most important work, a critical edition that includes a long and comprehensive introduction, as well as a bibliography and commentaries, which opens up possibilities of a wider and a more thorough research of Križanić's ideas even outside the context of a narrow circle of experts. Second, Križanić's ideas and his activities, and thus the *Politics* as their crucial element, represent a very valuable and important contribution to the history of an idea (some would say: a misconception), an idea of Slavism. Within the context of such discussions in Croatia, from now on this particular book will also have to be acknowledged as an important mark. Finally, Križanić's work is of value in our researches of political thought among Croats, that is of the history of Croatian political ideas (which is also the title of the publishing line in which the book has been published!). The above explanation of this threefold usefulness is in fact a

warm recommendation to all those who will take this book into their hands not to avoid it but to read it. We would like to strengthen this suggestion with a few words from Križanić himself: »And that is the reason why among the living people there are so few good advisors but, as someone said, dead advisors are also the best and the most loyal friends – namely, the books. Even more, books will not be seduced by greed, and neither by hatred nor love, and they will not flatter, and they will not fear to say the truth« (p. 169).

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