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## CONTENTS

### HERMANN OF DALMATIA – AT THE BORDERLINE OF CULTURES

FRANJO ZENKO: Introduction	7–8
FRANJO ŠANJEK: Hermann of Dalmatia in Scientific Literature	9–26
FRANJO ZENKO: Hermann le Dalmate et son traité <i>De essentiis</i>	27–35
ANTUN SLAVKO KALENIĆ: Hermann of Dalmatia and Claudius Ptolemy	37–45
ŽARKO DADIĆ: The Views of Hermann of Dalmatia in Natural Philosophy	47–60
SNJEŽANA PAUŠEK-BAŽDAR: The Natural-philosophical Views of Hermann of Dalmatia on the Harmony of Planets and the Nature of Matter	61–68
IVICA MARTINOVIĆ: The Ontic Order in Descriptions of Hermann of Dalmatia	69–91
STIPE KUTLEŠA: Space, Time and Movement in the Natural Philosophy of Hermann of Dalmatia	93–102
FRANJO ŠANJEK: Bibliography on Hermann of Dalmatia	103–117

### STUDIES


LJERKA SCHIFFLER: From a School of Thought to the Freedom of Thought. A Survey of Past Research in Franc Petrić's Poetics and Esthetics and its Future Tasks	121–144
ERNA BANIĆ-PAJNIĆ: Ontotheologische Voraussetzungen und Implikationen der Konzeption des Unendlichen bei Nikolaus Cusanus, Giordano Bruno und Franc Petrić	145–168
SREČKO KOVAČ: Franjo pl. Marković (On the hundred and fiftieth anniversary of his birth)	169–188

ZLATKO POSAVAC: Đuro Arnold als Ästhetiker im Rahmen der Kontroversen um die kroatische Moderne	189–222
PAVO BARIŠIĆ: Starčević's Political Rhetoric	223–250

## **BOOK REVIEWS**

ERNA BANIĆ-PAJNIĆ, MIHAELA GIRARDI KARŠULIN, MARKO JOSIPOVIĆ: <i>Magnum miraculum – homo</i> (A Great Miracle – Man), Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, Zagreb 1995 (DARIO ŠKARICA)	253–264
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE	265–266
NOTE ON THE CONTRIBUTORS	267–268

*Hermann of Dalmatia – at the  
Borderline of Cultures*





## INTRODUCTION

FRANJO ZENKO

(Zagreb)

In addition to the significance Hermann of Dalmatia has for Croatian philosophy as the first so far identified Croatian philosopher with identified works from the twelfth century, his capital work *De Essentiis* has a reputation of being a »pioneer work of Aristotelianism of the twelfth century« in the history of the European philosophy. (R. Lcmay, *Abu Ma'shar and Latin Aristotelianism in the Twelfth Century – The Recovery of Aristotle's Natural Philosophy through Arabic Astrology*. Beirut, 1962, p. 257).

After having received his education in Chartres in the spirit of Latin scientific, philosophical and theological tradition of Neoplatonic inspiration, Hermann came into contact with Arabic Aristotelianised astrology, particularly with Abu Ma'shar's work *Introductorium maius in astronomiam*, that he himself translated from Arabic into Latin. This contact resulted with Hermann's acquaintance and acceptance of the essential elements of Aristotle's metaphysics and natural philosophy, which was revealed in the mentioned work *De essentiis*. *De essentiis* gained significance indirectly in the twelfth century and afterwards through plagiarizing in Gundisalvinus' work *De processionemundi*.

In the series of works on Hermann of Dalmatia written by Croatian research workers, an insight into gradual revealing of Hermann's work and his significance for the European as well as for Croatian national history of science and history of philosophy is given. With regard to this, the major article of Franjo Šanjek, *Herman Dalmatin u znanstvenoj literaturi* (Hermann of Dalmatia in Scientific Literature) is very instructive, as well as a comprehensive bibliography of Hermann of Dalmatia's works, from which the beginning and the growth of interest for Hermann and his work in European and in world historiography of science, philosophy and theology can be observed. This article is followed by the so far unprinted publication of Franjo Zenko on genesis and development of the reception of Hermann's work in Croatian historiography. The author read it as a paper entitled *Herman le Dalmate et son traité De Essentiis* on the international and interdisciplinary conference »La culture croate au Moyen âge – Racines et ramifications« at Sorbonne in Paris from 6th to 7th December 1985.

One of the important disputable questions in the literature on Hermann is whether he knew Greek and whether he translated Ptolemy's *Almagest* from Greek into Latin. The answer to this question is tried to be given by Antun Slavko Kalenić in his publication *Herman Dalmatin i Klaudije Ptolomej* (Hermann of Dalmatia and Claudius Ptolemy). Antun Slavko Kalenić has reinstated the Latin text, elaborated the Croatian translation and wrote a critical commentary beside the text as well as the remarks for Croatian critical bilingual edition of Hermann's work *De Essentiis* (Herman Dalmatin, *O bitima* I–II, Pula 1990.).

The kind of thematic and problem structure of Hermann's natural philosophy and the part of five essences in it – the cause, the movement, the place, the time and *habitudo* – as well as the kind of the relationship of celestial and terrestrial areas and the mediation role of »medium« is questioned in the publication *Prirodnofilozofski pogledi Hermana Dalmatina* (The Views of Hermann of Dalmatia in Natural Philosophy) of Žarko Dadić. Dadić's article is followed by the article of Snježana Paušek-Baždar entitled *Prirodnoznanstvena gledišta Hermana Dalmatina o suglasju planeta i naravi stvari* (The Natural-philosophical Views of Hermann of Dalmatia on the Harmony of Planets and the Nature of Matter). The author points to Hermann's original alchemic cosmology by which the connection of celestial and terrestrial world is being established on the base of »parental« laws.

Two last contributions refer to ontic-ontologic aspects in Hermann's work *O bitima* (*De essentiis*). In his article *Ontički red u opisima Hermana Dalmatina* (The Ontic Order in Descriptions of Hermann of Dalmatia) Ivica Martinović presents the system of ontic oppositions *gentitrix-creata, conditor-condita, unus-opus eius, auctor-subjectum, creator-creata* and *opifex-opus*, enclosing a thematic survey of the first book *De essentiis*. In his article *Prostor, vrijeme i gibanje u prirodnoj filozofiji Hermana Dalmatina* (Space, Time and Movement in the Natural Philosophy of Hermann of Dalmatia) Stipe Kutleša investigates the position of space, time and movement among the essences, the ontology of the space, time and movement, as well as the universe, time and movement in the thinking of Hermann of Dalmatia.

## HERMANN OF DALMATIA IN SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE

FRANJO ŠANJEK

(Zagreb)

Original Paper  
UDC 19 Hermann of Dalmatia

Hermann of Dalmatia was almost forgotten during the humanism and Renaissance periods, since Classical languages were intensely studied throughout Europe which enabled most of the scholarly people to read the original literary-scientific works of the Greek-Hellenistic epoch, the interest in Latin translations of Arab texts thus being significantly reduced.

Konrad GESNER describes our scientist as a translator of texts discussing Islam: *De generatione Mahumet*, *Chronica Saracenorum* (!) and *Mahometis theologiae*, ascribing the translation of *Planisphaeria* to Hermann's disciple Rudolph from Bruges<sup>1</sup>.

Johann Albert FABER wrote that Hermann of Dalmatia was the »scriptor *Chronicae Saracenorum*«<sup>2</sup>. Christian Friedrich SCHNURRER credits Hermann with a translation of the Koran (with Robert of Ketton) and with introducing Moslem science to the West. He does not identify our translator with Hermann from Nellingen<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> K. GESNER, *Bibliotheca universalis*, Tiguri 1545, fol. 315r; IBID., *Elenchus scriptorum omnium*, Basel 1551, col. 406; IBID., *Epitome*, Tiguri 1555, fol. 74rv. Gesner attributes the translation of *Planisphaeria* to Hermann's disciple Rudolph of Bruges (*Bibliotheca*, fol. 585v). This mistake is often made because the translation centers were not in touch, and because there were several translations from both Arab and Greek, so that neither the origin nor the authors of the respective translations could be pinpointed.

<sup>2</sup> J. A. FABER, *Bibliotheca latina mediae et infimae aetatis*, vol. III, Firenze 1858, p. 222 (first ed. in 1697).

<sup>3</sup> C. F. SCHNURRER, *Bibliotheca arabica*, Halle 1811, pp. 408–409 and 421–423.

*a) A Comprehensive Approach to  
Hermann of Dalmatia's Work*

Although the Paris manuscript of *Planisphaeria* was known to Andreas Gottlieb HOFFMANN<sup>4</sup> as early as 1829, who directly associated Ptolemaeus' work with Hermann of Dalmatia, whose compilation concerning Mohammad's theology – attributed to Hermann from Nellingen – was published by Widmestadt in Nuremberg in 1543, it was Amable JOURDAIN<sup>5</sup>, followed by his son Charles<sup>6</sup>, who was the first in the nineteenth century to point at Hermann as the sole translator of *Planisphaeria* from Arab into Latin. In this way they corrected the Basel editor's mistake who in 1536 attributed the above-mentioned translation to Hermann's disciple Rudolph from Bruges, as well as Gesner's opinion that Ptolemaeus' *Planisphaeria* was translated from the Greek original. The French authors emphasized Hermann's contribution to the emergence of Latin texts considering Islam and our author's fruitful collaboration with Thierry from Chartres, Petrus Venerabilis and Robert from Ketton.

Their work on Hermann was successfully continued by Alexandre Jules CLERVAL<sup>7</sup> who systematically investigated the data on Hermann's life and scientific activity. Abbé Clerval published Hermann's dedication of *Planisphaeria* to magister Thierry<sup>8</sup>. Convinced that our scientist was not an expert in Greek, he believed that he translated from Arab, which is corroborated by the title of the thirteenth-century Paris manuscript »*Planisphaeria Ptolemei translatum de arabico in latinum per Hermannum secundum*«<sup>9</sup>. Clerval was the first to question the authorship issue of the *De utilitatibus astrolabii* and *De mensura astrolabii* treatises, persistently attributed to Hermann Contractus by numerous publishers; the French historian attributed it to our scientist who, unlike the eleventh-century German monk, »was familiar with Arab language, astronomy and Ptolemaeus' scientific theses«. Clerval also pointed at Hermann's reputation among the Chartres school scientists and his influence on the scientific work of his contemporary Bernardus Silvestris, and on his treatise *Experimentarius* in particular.

<sup>4</sup> *Allgemeine Encyclopaedie*, II/6, pp. 258–259.

<sup>5</sup> *Recherches critiques sur les traductions latines d'Aristote*, Paris 1819, p. 105.

<sup>6</sup> A. and Ch. JOURDAIN, *Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote*, Paris 1843, pp. 100–104.

<sup>7</sup> *Hermann le Dalmate*, pp. 5–11; *L'enseignement des arts libéraux à Chartres et à Paris*, Paris 1889; *Les écoles*, pp. 169–239.

<sup>8</sup> A. J. CLERVAL, *Les Ecoles*, p. 190.

<sup>9</sup> The author quotes *Cod. Lat. 7377B* in the Bibliotheque nationale in Paris.

Pierre DUHEM<sup>10</sup> relies on A. Jourdain's, Clerval's and Wustenfeld's conclusions in a short treatise on Hermann's scientific opus. To the Istrian scientist he attributes the translations of Ptolemaeus' *Planisphaeria* (although not quite certain whether Hermann translated the work alone or together with Robert from Ketton and Rudolph from Bruges), Abu Ma'shar's *Introductorium* (stating that the translation was completed in 1140!), the *Astrolabe* attributed to Rudolph from Bruges, a compilation discussing calendar issues (*De computo*) and a translation from Arab that Bernardus Silvestris used in writing his *Experimentarius*.

Charles Homer HASKINS wrote a new chapter of the research into the biography and scientific opus of Hermann of Dalmatia by his *Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science* (1924)<sup>11</sup>. In twenty-four pages, entitled »Hermann of Carinthia« – a name thenceforth used by many science historians, English-writing ones in particular – Haskins collected all the hitherto known informations concerning Hermann's life, the titles of his compilations, translations and his own works, published the introductory treatises and dedications of his works (*De essentiis*, *Introductorium*, *Planisphaeria*) and gave a concise and accurate evaluation of our scientist who was, in his opinion, in the very center of the intellectual activities of the then Europe, crossed by philosophical systems and scientific traditions from East and West, Arab and Christian civilizations and cultures, where Hermann of Dalmatia was a prominent personality among the twelfth-century scientists due to his knowledge of astronomy, mathematics and philosophy<sup>12</sup>.

After a close examination of Hermann's translation of Abu Ma'shar's *Introduction to Astronomy* (1140), Richard LEMAY<sup>13</sup> concluded that our scientist, in spite of a certain shift from the literary meaning, »cleaned« his Latin version of this significant work »from many mistakes, made by the first Latin translator John of Seville (1133), and expounded many unclear and not easily comprehensible passages«<sup>14</sup>. Hermann, according to Lemay, was one of the first Latin authors who introduced Aristotelism to Europe through Abu Ma'shar, which is of particular importance for the research in cosmological and general philosophical problems in the West<sup>15</sup>. Hermann's Aristotelian

<sup>10</sup> *Le systeme*, vol. III, pp. 172–176.

<sup>11</sup> Cambridge 1924, pp. 43–66.

<sup>12</sup> Ch. H. HASKINS, *Studies*, p. 66.

<sup>13</sup> *Abu Ma'shar and Latin Aristotelism in the Twelfth Century*, Beirut 1962, pp. I–XL and 3–468.

<sup>14</sup> R. LEMAY, *Fautes et contresens*, p. 104.

<sup>15</sup> R. LEMAY, *Abu Ma'shar*, pp. XXXV–XXXVII.

concept of natural philosophy was accepted by Bernardus Silvestris and Daniel of Morley. Bernardus Silvestris, according to Lemay, took over a short text from Hermann, probably translated from Arab, and included it into his *Experimentarius*<sup>16</sup>. Bernardus' cosmographic work *De universitate mundi* presents a novel physics, based on Aristotle's and other philosophical systems; these were the ideas that the philosopher from Tours could only learn from Hermann's treatise *De essentiis* and his edition of *Introductorium*<sup>17</sup>. Alain de Lille also uses Hermann's translation of Abu Ma'shar, taking his basic metaphysical principles discussed in *Contra hereticos* from the *Introductorium*<sup>18</sup>.

Lemay does not agree with Alonso's hypothesis that Hermann of Dalmatia translated Ptolemaeus' *Almagest* from Greek in Sicily in 1160, considering the Istrian scientist as not quite competent in astronomy<sup>19</sup>.

Charles S. F. BURNETT<sup>20</sup>, the author of the first critical edition of Hermann's treatise *On Essences* (*De essentiis*), added to his biography the data found in his writings. Through a close analysis of Hermann's works Burnett discovered that he was inspired by natural philosophy taught in the Chartres school (taking over magister Thierry's theses on double creation!), by Boetius' Platonism, Greek and Roman cosmogony concepts (through Macrobius' commentary of Cicero's *Scipio's Dream*), by Oriental traditions and Arab science.

The author examines Hermann's Latin, his originality, his connections with Latin translators (Adelardus of Bath) and Arab scientists on the Iberian peninsula, in some of his texts. Burnett does not accept Alonso's replacement of South French Beziers, where Hermann finished his treatise *On Essences*, with Beterri in the Basque province of Guipuzcoa. He also claims that the scientist was familiar with *Almagest* in the Arab, al-Battani's version and an unknown translator's Latin edition, pointing out that there are no valid arguments against Hermann's authorship of one of the Latin versions of Euclides' *Elements* and suggesting the learned Istrian as a possible editor of the Latin translation of Theodosius' treatise *De sphaeris* etc. In a separate study Burnett presents a critical list of all of Hermann's known and probable works<sup>21</sup>.

In her interesting 1979 PhD thesis at the New York University, Sheila LOW-BEER critically elaborates three of Hermann's scientific texts: *Liber*

<sup>16</sup> *Id.* p. 258.

<sup>17</sup> *Id.* p. 350.

<sup>18</sup> *Id.* p. 135.

<sup>19</sup> *Id.* pp. 18-19.

<sup>20</sup> *Hermann of Carinthia 'De essentiis'* (introduction, Latin original, English translation, commentary and a reliable critical apparatus), Leiden-Koeln 1982, pp. I-X and I-135 and several illustrations.

<sup>21</sup> Ch. BURNETT, *Arabic into Latin*, pp. 100-134.

*imbrium*, *De indagazione cordis* and a freely altered Sahl ibn Bishr's treatise *Fatidica*, also known as *Sextus astronomiae liber*<sup>22</sup>.

The authoress holds that an analysis of Hermann's works would add to the biography of this scientist »from the lands at the east coast of the Adriatic«. Among Hermann's distinguished partners and collaborators in the scientific field S. Low-Beer lists Petrus Venerabilis, Robert of Ketton, Petrus of Toledo and his namesake from Poitiers, magister Thicrry from Chartres, Bernardus Silvestris and Rudolph from Bruges. The authoress states that Hermann of Dalmatia, »the only one of the four Koran translators that Petrus Venerabilis praises as a *very sharp-witted and educated scientist*«<sup>23</sup>, started his scientific career with compilations of astrological treatises, then translated and wrote astrological-astronomical and mathematical texts, and finished his scientific career with his philosophical-cosmological essay *De essentiis*.

### *b) Hermann in the Works of Philosophy and Theology Historians*

Hermann's affiliation with the Chartres school and his advocacy of Plato's world-soul concept in the context of natural philosophy drew the attention of philosophy and theology historians, who credit him with the mediation (through Abu Ma'shar) in the introduction of Aristotelism into the Western thought in the Middle Ages.

Jean de GHELLINCK<sup>24</sup> lists Hermann, Rudolph of Bruges' teacher, among the pioneers of the twelfth-century Western thought revival, considering him to be a »bold translator of astronomical-mathematical texts that required adventurous trips to countries under Moslem rule«<sup>25</sup>.

Manuel ALONSO, who edited the »editio princeps« of Hermann's treatise *De essentiis*<sup>26</sup>, to Haskins' research added the fact that »Dominicus Gundissalvi(nus) in many places in *De processionem mundi* copies the above-mentioned Hermann's treatise word for word«<sup>27</sup>. Alonso places Hermann's scientific activity between 1136 and 1160. Alonso considers the unconfirmed as-

<sup>22</sup> S. LOW-BEER, *Hermann of Carinthia: The 'Liber imbrium', the 'Fatidica' and the 'De indagazione cordis'*, part I–II, New York 1979, pp. 1–415.

<sup>23</sup> *Id.* Part I, p. 17.

<sup>24</sup> *L'essor de la littérature au 12e siècle*, vols. I–II, Bruxelles–Paris 1946.

<sup>25</sup> *Id.* Vol. II, p. 19.

<sup>26</sup> M. ALONSO, *Hermann de Carinthia 'De essentiis'*, Miscelanea Comillas V, Santander 1946, pp. 9–107.

<sup>27</sup> *Id.* pp. 9–10.

sumption that Hermann studied Greek in his childhood (he is alleged to have learned Arab in Spain) and an erroneously understood passage from *De essentiis* to be an irrefutable proof that our scientist translated the Greek original of Ptolemaeus' *Almagest* in Sicily in 1160<sup>28</sup>. The term »scholasticus«, added to Hermann's name by Petrus Venerabilis, Alonso interprets in the sense of the active professorial job<sup>29</sup>. The geographical terms Tolosa (Toulouse) and Bytteri (Béziers) he identifies as the Spanish-Basque localities of Tolosa and Betteri<sup>30</sup>.

Fernand van STEENBERGEN<sup>31</sup> lists Hermann among the more important representatives of the Toledo philosophical school in the twelfth century, while Georges Henri LUQUET<sup>32</sup>, whose primary research is in Hermann Allemanus († 1272), a translator of Aristotle's works, emphasizes that certain translations have been attributed to him although it is known with certainty that they had been made a century earlier. An example he quotes is Abu Ma'shar's *Introductorium*, translated by Hermann of Dalmatia during his sojourn in Spain in 1140<sup>33</sup>. The author notes that Roger Bacon, who often relies on Aristotle's writings translated into Latin by Hermann Allemanus, always puts the name Hermann next to the quotations from Abu Ma'shar's *Introductorium*, but without the designation Allemanus<sup>34</sup>.

Roland de VAUX<sup>35</sup> notes that in *De essentiis* Hermann of Dalmatia does not quote Aristotle's definition of the soul according to the old Greek-Latin version: »Anima... est actus primus corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis«, but according to the Arab edition: »Anima est perfectio corporis agentis et viventis potentia«, quite similar to Avicenna's understanding: »Anima... est perfectio prima corporis naturalis instrumentalis habentis opera vitae«, an additional proof that our scientist was well-versed in Arab philosophy too.

Joseph M. PARENT<sup>36</sup> expresses our scientist's admiration for his teacher Thierry from Chartres, »the second Plato« and »the Father of Latin studies«.

<sup>28</sup> *Id.* pp. 15–16.

<sup>29</sup> *Id.* p. 13.

<sup>30</sup> *Id.* p. 14.

<sup>31</sup> *Philosophie des Mittelalters*. Bibliographische einföhrungen in das Studium der Philosophie 17, Bern 1950, p. 30.

<sup>32</sup> *Hermann l'Allemand († 1272)*, *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, XLIV (1901) 3, pp. 407–422.

<sup>33</sup> *Id.* p. 414.

<sup>34</sup> ROGER BACON, *Opus tertium*, c. 15 (ed. BREWER, p. 49).

<sup>35</sup> *Notes et textes sur l'Avicennisme latin aux confins des 12e–13e siècles*, Paris 1934, p. 67.

<sup>36</sup> *La doctrine de la création dans l'école de Chartres*, Paris–Ottawa 1938, p. 15.



In his works discussing Guillaume of Conches<sup>37</sup> philosophy and Western concepts of nature in the period we have named Late Middle Ages<sup>38</sup> Tullio GREGORY emphasizes the significance of Hermann of Dalmatia, a »typical representative of the Chartres philosophical school, whose treatise *De essentiis* and his translation of the *Introductorium* add to the new conceiving of nature, in which the cause of motion and life, the sky and the planets have become true masters of time and the process of happening, while the harmony of micro- and macro-cosmos causes many correspondences, similarities and actions in the planets – human body parts relation, and this is a new confirmation of the 'legitimum societatis foedus' between heaven and earth and prerequisite for the then practical medicine«<sup>39</sup>.

A similar orientation, Gregory stresses, was advocated by Dominicus Gundissalvi(nus) in the *De processione mundi*; many theses in his work, as well as his ways of thinking, follow Hermann's *De essentiis*<sup>40</sup>. The author also states that the twelfth-century astrological naturalism accepts the horoscope of religions whose meaning in the new concept of the world is such that »Hermann of Dalmatia did not hesitate to adduce it as an additional motive of the argument against the infidels, especially against 'Jewish blindness' that in the 'research into nature during many centuries' was unable to discover the truth predicted by Barbarian astrologists a long time ago«<sup>41</sup>. Somewhat discreetly, Gregory nevertheless acknowledges Hermann's merits in the process of Aristotle's introduction to the West.

The French medievalist Marie-Dominique CHIENU<sup>42</sup> mentions two of Hermann's works: the translation of *Introductorium*, which he supposes was completed around 1140, and the *De essentiis*. In this second one the author discovers a connection between the understanding of nature that Hermann took over from his teachers at Chartres and Plato's concept of the world-soul: »(Naturam) eodem nomine notare possumus, quo Plato significans mundi

<sup>37</sup> T. GREGORY, *Anima mundi. La filosofia di Guglielmo de Conches et la scuola di Chartres*, Firenze 1955.

<sup>38</sup> T. GREGORY, *L'idea di natura nella filosofia medievale prima dell'ingresso della fisica di Aristotele: Il secolo XII*. Atti del Terzo congresso internazionale di filosofia medioevale, Milano 1966, pp. 27–65.

<sup>39</sup> *Id.* pp. 48–49.

<sup>40</sup> *Id.* p. 49.

<sup>41</sup> *Id.* p. 55. The author refers to the *De essentiis*, 9 (after Kalenić): »Unde praesertim Hebraeorum caecitas hic arguitur, cum etiam in naturae speculatione saeculorumque serie vel barbarae nationi veritas Ihesu Christi praenotata fuerit«.

<sup>42</sup> *La théologie au 12e siècle*, Paris 1957; *Nature, Man and Society in the Twelfth Century*, Chicago 1968.

animam vocat<sup>43</sup>. According to Chenu, certain elements present in the *De essentiis* were taken from Hermes Trismegistus' *Liber de sex rerum principijs* and combined with the system of Arab astrology and the naturalism of the Chartres school of philosophy<sup>44</sup>. The author also observes Hermann's consistency regarding Boetius' theses (Sententia Boetii!) that our scientist underlines in the foreword to his translation of Abu Ma'shar<sup>45</sup>.

Richard William SOUTHERN<sup>46</sup>, not agreeing with Clerval's study discussing the Chartres school, nevertheless remembers to emphasize Hermann's intellectual connection with the school and magister Thierry.

In the *Experimentarius* by Bernardus Silvestris from Tours (twelfth century) Brian STOCK<sup>47</sup> finds the antecedents of Hermann of Dalmatia's scientific theses. According to Stock, Hermann, in the foreword to the *Planisphaeria*, states that astronomy is based on empirical knowledge and on the conviction that the celestial bodies are in permanent motion, a thesis also accepted by Bernardus in the *Experimentarius*. The Tours philosopher is more consistent than Hermann in the presentation of Plato's cosmology, while his only connection with Aristotelism is Hermann's translation of Abu Ma'shar. Stock assumes that our scientist translated the *Introductorium* in 1141!

Winthrop WETHERBEE<sup>48</sup> accentuates that Hermann's intellectual maturing was mostly influenced by magister Thierry and Arab science. The author notes that Gundissalvi's treatise *De processione mundi* conceptually follows Hermann's work *De essentiis*.

Peter DRONKE, the publisher of Silvestris' *Cosmography*<sup>49</sup>, proves in his introductory treatise that Bernardus Silvestris and Hermann of Dalmatia, who studied together in Chartres, afterward remained friends and close collaborators. Bernardus' *Cosmography* abounds with philosophical and other scientific terms from Hermann's translation of Abu Ma'shar's *Introductorium* (1140!), although he might have known about the earlier translation by John of Seville (1133).

<sup>43</sup> *De essentiis*, 51; M.-D. CHENU, *La théologie*, p. 32.

<sup>44</sup> M.-D. CHENU, *La théologie*, pp. 134 and 135.

<sup>45</sup> *Id.* p. 32.

<sup>46</sup> *Medieval Humanism and Other Studies*, Oxford 1970, pp. 82–84.

<sup>47</sup> *Myth and Science*, pp. 11–273.

<sup>48</sup> *The 'Cosmographia' of Bernardus Silvestris*, New York–London 1973, p. 11.

<sup>49</sup> P. DRONKE, *New Approaches to the School of Chartres*, Anuario de estudios medievales, 6/1969, pp. 117–140.

### c) Hermann and the Knowledge of Islam in the Christian West

Hermann of Dalmatia is an unavoidable name to the scientists researching Islam and Arab culture.

Ferdinand WUSTENFELD<sup>50</sup>, although knowing about Jourdain's works, wrongly attributes the translation of the *Planisphaeria* to Hermann's student Rudolph of Bruges, crediting him with full cooperation in the translation of the *Koran* and these treatises discussing Islam: *De generatione Mahumet*, *De doctrina Mahumet* and *Chronica Saracenorum*. He points out that the origin of the name Hermann Nellingauensis, printed in Widmestadt's edition (1543, Landshut?), may be traced to a note in Faustus Sabeo's codex. Sabeo was a librarian of the Pope Leo X (1513–1521).

Relying on Jourdain and Clerval, Pierre MANDONNET credits our scientist with the authorship of the Latin version of the Judaeo-Islamic treatises *De generatione Mahumet* and *De doctrina Mahumet*, which were well accepted by the Moslems, and his own compilation known under the title *Chronica mendosa et ridiculosa Saracenorum*<sup>51</sup>. The French historian does not rule out the possibility that Hermann either actually translated the *Koran* or cooperated in the translation, although he attributes it to Robert of Ketton who signed it and sent it to the consignee in Cluny between June 16 and July 15, 1143<sup>52</sup>, that is, at the point in time when our scientist was in Toulouse, completing the translation of Ptolemaeus' *Planisphaeria* from Maslam of Madrid's (al-Majriti) Arab edition<sup>53</sup>.

Albino NAGY<sup>54</sup>, like Clerval, emphasizes that Hermann of Dalmatia was one of the first popularizers of Arab philosophy in the West. Nagy is especially interested in Hermann's anti-Islamic treatises. He knows about Widmestadt's publication of Mohammed's teaching in Hermann's edition, entitled *Theologia dialogo explicata*<sup>55</sup>, but also – less probably – about the *Chronica Saracenorum*.

Ernest Phillip GOLDSCHMIDT<sup>56</sup> suggests that the treatise *Mahometis Abdallae filii*, published by the Bavarian Orientalist Johann Albert Widme-

<sup>50</sup> *Die Übersetzungen arabischer Werke in das Lateinische seit dem 11. Jahrhundert*, Abhandlungen der Historisch-philologischen Classe der Königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, XXII (1877) 1, pp. 44–53 and 130.

<sup>51</sup> P. MANDONNET, *Pierre le Vénérable et son activité littéraire contre l'islam*, *Revue thomiste*, I/1893, pp. 329 and 337–338.

<sup>52</sup> *Id.* pp. 335–336.

<sup>53</sup> *Id.* p. 334.

<sup>54</sup> *Dalmati traduttori nel Medioevo*, *Rivista dalmatica*, I (1899) 2, pp. 79–82.

<sup>55</sup> Ed. J. A. WIDMESTADT, *Mahometis Abdallae etc.*, Nürnberg 1543 (unpaginated).

<sup>56</sup> *Medieval Texts and Their First Appearance in Print*, London–Oxford 1943, pp. 82–83 (he calls Hermann »a Jugoslav, Herman of Carinthia«).

stadt in Nuremberg in 1543 under the name of Hermann of Nellingen, was actually written by Hermann of Dalmatia.

In some of her studies<sup>57</sup>, Marie-Thérèse d'ALVERNY proves that Hermann of Dalmatia was the Latin editor of the writings *De generatione Mahumet* and *Doctrina Mahumet* on the basis of the so-called Cluny collection of Latin codices about Islam (twelfth/thirteenth centuries, especially the manuscript 1162 of the Arsenal library in Paris); she, however, questions his authorship of the *Chronica Saracenorum* and his coauthorship of the *Koran* translation. The untranslated Arab terms in Hermann's texts made the authoress suspect a medieval glossarist's statement that »Hermann Dalmata, scholasticus subtilis et ingeniosus« was actually »peritissimus utriusque lingue, latine scilicet atque arabice«<sup>58</sup>. In his study on Hermann's contemporary Petrus Abelardus (1079–1142) and astrology<sup>59</sup>, d'Alverny alludes to an interesting theological implication from the *De essentiis*<sup>60</sup> where our scientist, by taking over data from Calcidius and Dionysius the Areopagite (over Gregorius Magnus!) »places nine heavenly creatures (ethereum animal!), i.e. nine choirs of angels on ten heavenly spheres (according to the Arab astronomical system from Abu Ma'shar); although careful in ascribing a cosmic role to these 'heavenly spirits', Hermann nevertheless supposes that they help people in trouble«.

José MUNOZ SENDINO<sup>61</sup> states that Hermann of Dalmatia was the author of compilations *De generatione* and *Doctrina Mahumet*, but that he was not responsible for the edition known under the title of *Chronica Saracenorum*, which was – he believes – translated by Robert of Ketton. The author suggests that La Rioja at the Ebro River, Spain, »right below the Pyrenees crossing«, was the spot where Hermann met Petrus Venerabilis.

James KRITZECK<sup>62</sup> investigates Arab-Jewish sources of Hermann's compilations on Mohammed discussing his religious teaching. He points at our scientist's significant contribution to Western knowledge of Islam and his fruitful scientific collaboration with Robert of Ketton, whom he credits with the *Koran* translation.

<sup>57</sup> *Deux traductions du Coran au Moyen âge*, pp. 69–131; *Pierre le Vénéral et la légende de Mahomet*, pp. 161–170; *Quelques manuscrits de la 'collectio Toletana'*, pp. 202–218; *Abelard et l'astrologie*, pp. 611–628.

<sup>58</sup> M.-Th. d'ALVERNY, *Quelques manuscrits*, p. 214.

<sup>59</sup> M.-Th. d'ALVERNY, *Abelard et l'astrologie*, pp. 622–623.

<sup>60</sup> *De essentiis*, 99 (after Kalenić).

<sup>61</sup> *Apologia del cristianismo de al-Kindi*, Miscelanea Comillas XI–XII, Santander 1949, pp. 362–363 and 366.

<sup>62</sup> *Robert of Ketton's Translation of the Qur'an*, *Islamic Quarterly*, II (1955) 4, pp. 309–312; *Peter the Venerable and the Toledan Collection*, *Studia anselmiana* 40, Roma 1956, pp. 176–201; *Peter the Venerable and Islam*, *Princeton Oriental Studies* 23, Princeton (USA) 1964, p. 42 SS.

Charles J. BISHKO<sup>63</sup> revises the chronology of the abbot of Cluny's trip to Spain, emphasizing that Petrus Venerabilis met Hermann in mid-1142 in Santa Maria de Najera, south of Ebro river, where he and Robert of Ketton consented to translate the *Koran*<sup>64</sup>.

Jean-Pierre TORRELL and Denise BOUTHILLIER<sup>65</sup> note Hermann's erudition and skill in translating from Arab into Latin. These authors presume that after the meeting in Najera by the Ebro river Hermann followed Petrus Venerabilis on his trip through Spain and translated two short treatises on Islam on the way. It is known that the abbot of Cluny met the king Alphonse VII in Salamanca before July 29, 1142, and that Hermann of Dalmatia completed his translations entitled *De generatione Mahumet* and *Doctrina Mahumet* the same year in Leon.

Emilio PANELLA<sup>66</sup> proves that the Florentine Riccoldo da Monte di Croce († 1320) in his critique of Islam (*Improbatio Alcorani*) profusely uses Hermann's text *Doctrina Mahumet*, already noted by Ugo Monneret de Villard in 1948.

#### d) Hermann and Sciences in Theory and Practice

Nineteenth- and twentieth-century science historians paid special attention to Hermann's works, particularly to his compilations and translations in the field of science.

Leopold DELISLE<sup>67</sup> was the first to publish a list of Hermann's works according to Fournival's catalog *Biblionomia* (1246), revealing that Hermann of Dalmatia (Hermann Secundus) was the author of the commentary to Euclid's *Geometry, Arithmetics and Stereometry*, wider known as the *Elements*, the writer of the treatises on the usage and value of numbers entitled *Liber de invenienda radice* and the compiler of the treatise discussing astrolabe construction, *De compositione astrolabii*.

Lucien LECLERC<sup>68</sup> mentions Widmestadt's edition of Hermann's compilation on Mohammed's religious teaching *Mahometis... theologia dialogo explicata* (Nürnberg 1543), his contribution to the translation of the *Koran* and

<sup>63</sup> *Peter the Venerable's Journey to Spain*, Studia anselmiana 40, Roma 1956, pp. 163–175.

<sup>64</sup> *Id.* pp. 164–166.

<sup>65</sup> *Pierre le Venerable*, pp. 71–77 and 97–104.

<sup>66</sup> *Ricerche su Riccoldo da Monte di Croce*, Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum, 58/1988, pp. 5–85, especially 51–59 and 63–65.

<sup>67</sup> *Le cabinet des manuscrits*, vol. II, pp. 526–527; vol. III, pp. 67–68.

<sup>68</sup> *Histoire de la médecine arabe*, vol. II, Paris 1876, pp. 354–355 and 382–386.

his scientific writings concerning natural philosophy, mathematics, meteorology, astrology, astronomy, etc. He claims that *De compositione et usu astrolabii* was written by Hermann of Dalmatia, not Hermann the Lame, who does not seem to have known Arab. Leclerc also quotes the two Parisian manuscripts (Lat. 7377-B and Lat. 7399) that show that it was Hermann Secundus, not his disciple Rudolph of Bruges, who translated Ptolemaeus' *Planisphaeria*.

Near the end of the nineteenth century, Moritz STEINSCHNEIDER<sup>69</sup> verified the authorship of the following Hermann's translations and compilations: *Doctrina Machumeti*, *De generatione Machumet*, *Chronica mendosa et ridiculosa Saracenorum de vita Machumetis et successorum eius*, *Planisphaerium Ptolemaei* (after the Arab version by Maslam al-Majriti), *De indagazione cordis*, Abu Ma'shar's *Introductorium maius in astronomiam*, *Fatidica* or *Pronostica* by Sahl ibn Bishr, the *Tables* by al-Khwarizmi and the *Tractatus de mutatione temporis* by an unknown author.

Nikola BUBNOV, in an edition of Gerbert d'Aurillac's – later Pope Silvester II (999–1003) – mathematical treatises<sup>70</sup>, is not quite sure about the attribution of certain Arab-Latin texts about astrolabe to Hermann of Dalmatia or to his namesake from the Reichenau abbey. He knows that our scientist signs his treatises about Islam as 'Hermann Dalmata' and his astronomical compilations as 'Hermann Secundus' and that he was Rudolph of Bruges' teacher.

The Swede Gustav ENESTROM, although with some reservations, attributes the Latin editions of Ptolemaeus' *Planisphaeria* (based on al-Majriti's Arab version) and Abu Ma'shar's *Introductorium* to our Hermann<sup>71</sup>.

The Dane Axel Anthon BJORNBO<sup>72</sup> knows that Hermann was a disciple of Thierry of Chartres', a friend of Robert of Ketton and Rudolph of Bruges' teacher, and that he indebted European science by his Latin translations of the *Planisphaeria* (1143) and Abu Ma'shar's *Introductorium* (1143!?).

<sup>69</sup> *Zur Geschichte der Übersetzungen aus dem Indischen ins Arabische und ihres Einflusses auf die arabische Literatur*, Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 25/1871, pp. 401–404; *Polemische und apologetische Literatur in arabischer Sprache*, Leipzig 1877, pp. 113 and 227–235; *Die hebraischen Übersetzungen des Mittelalters*, Berlin 1893, pp. 534–535 and 567–569; *Die europäischen Übersetzungen aus dem Arabischen bis Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts*, Wien 1905 (reprinted in Graz, 1956), pp. 33–35, 67 and 74; *Die arabische Literatur der Juden*, Hildesheim 1964 (reprinted), p. 25.

<sup>70</sup> N. BUBNOV, *Gerberti postea Silvestri II papae Opera mathematica (972–1003)*, Berlin 1899 (reprint Hildesheim 1963), pp. cvi, 114–115 and 124.

<sup>71</sup> G. ENESTROM, *Hermann Secundus (Dalmata)*, Bibliotheca mathematica, III (1902) 3, pp. 310–411.

<sup>72</sup> *Hermann Dalmata als Übersetzer astronomischer Arbeiten*. Bibliotheca mathematica, III (1903) 4, pp. 130–133.

Belgian Henri BOSMANS<sup>73</sup>, who blames Enestrom and Bjornbo for not having taken into consideration A. and Ch. Jourdain's works and A. J. Clerval's publications, suggests that Hermann of Dalmatia, the teacher, and his disciple Rudolph of Bruges, were the co-authors of the first Latin edition of Ptolemaeus' *Planisphaeria*. He also knows about our scientist's collaboration with Petrus Venerabilis, mistakenly dating it 1141.

Heinrich SUTTER<sup>74</sup> emphasizes the importance of Hermann's version of the *Planisphaeria*, edited according to Maslama al-Majriti's Arab text<sup>75</sup>. The author suggests that the Istrian scientist »very likely translated al-Khwarizmi's *Tables* too, which he also might have read in the Englishman Adelard de Bath's Latin edition«<sup>76</sup>.

Bruno LEFEBVRE<sup>77</sup> stresses Hermann's contribution to the development of astronomy and mathematics in Europe. In spite of the inclination to attribute the Latin version of the *Planisphaeria* to the common efforts of both Hermann and Rudolph of Bruges<sup>78</sup> respectively, he nevertheless credits our scientist with the *Liber de circulis*, *De compositione astrolabii*, *De utilitatibus astrolabii*, with the translations of Abu Ma'shar (*Introductorium*), Sahl ibn Bishr (*Fatidica*) and al-Khwarizmi (*Canons* or astronomical *Tables*), and, inevitably, his collaboration with Petrus Venerabilis<sup>79</sup>.

Polish Aleksandar BIRKENMAJER, publisher of Fournival's *Biblionomy*<sup>80</sup>, knows about the translation of Euclid's *Elements* (manuscript 37 on Richard the Fournival's list, now Lat. 16646 in the Bibliotheque nationale, Paris). There are other Hermann's works in the same collection: *Liber de invenienda radice*, *De opere numeri et operis materia* (45) and the *De compositione astrolabii* (59).

Julius RUSKA<sup>81</sup> knows that it was Robert of Ketton who translated al-Khwarizmi's *Astronomical Tables* (ninth century) in Maslama al-Majriti's edition (1007/08), but adds that they were translated again by Robert's friend Hermann of Dalmatia.

<sup>73</sup> *Histoire des mathematiques et des sciences*, Revue des questions scientifiques, 3e serie, VI/1904, pp. 669–672.

<sup>74</sup> *Die astronomischen Tafeln des Muhammed ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi*, Kobenhaven 1914, pp. ix and xiii.

<sup>75</sup> *Id.* p. ix.

<sup>76</sup> *Id.* p. xiii.

<sup>77</sup> *Notes d'histoire des mathematiques*, Louvain 1920, pp. 128–132 and 144–149.

<sup>78</sup> *Id.* p. 145.

<sup>79</sup> *Id.* pp. 145–149.

<sup>80</sup> A. BIRKENMAJER, *Biblioteka Ryszarda de Fournival*, pp. 6–8, 29, 49–54 and 60–61.

<sup>81</sup> *Isis*, 4/1922, pp. 502–503 (in the review of Suter's work on al-Khwarizmi's *Tables*).

Lynn THORNDIKE, who calls Hermann »of Dalmatia« in his first works, only to choose the version »of Carinthia« under Haskins' influence later on<sup>82</sup>, has tried to accurately define the scientific activity of the Istrian scientist in relationship to the works of his namesakes Hermann the lame (1013–1054) and Hermann the German († 1272), translators of Aristotle's and Averroes' works.

Of Hermann of Dalmatia's works, Thorndike gives special emphasis to the *Introductorium*, *Liber imbrium* or *De pluviis*, *Planisphaeria*, *Liber quadri-fariam partitus* or *De indagazione cordis*, *Elements* (Euclid's *Geometry* etc.), Ibn Bishr's treatise *Pronostica* or *Fatidica*. Thorndike provides no certain evidence for Hermann's *Short Dictionary of Arab Astronomical Terms*<sup>83</sup>. Along with Hermann's collaboration with Robert of Ketton, evident in mutual dedications, the author points at the considerable scientific significance of Hermann's original treatise *De essentiis*. This friendship is also prominent in the collaboration with Petrus Venerabilis.

Georges SARTON<sup>84</sup>, a science historian at the Carnegie Institute in Washington, studied Hermann's major works and his influence on Bernardus Silvestris', William of Conches' and Dominicus Gundissalvi(nus)'s writings. Sarton, who considers our scientist to be a Dalmatian, although familiar with nicknames 'the Slav', 'the Carinthian' and 'Secundus', links Hermann's philosophical-astrological and literary activities with Spain and southern France and the years between 1138 and 1143.

M. A. ŠANGIN questions Steinschneiders' suggestion – that the anonymous astrological text entitled *De indagazione cordis* in Hermann of Dalmatia's interpretation is actually a part of Abu Ma'shar's *Introductorium* translated by the same Hermann – and claims that these two works are different<sup>85</sup>. The same author stresses that the *De indagazione* also occurs under the title *De meditationibus cordis*.

An eminent philosophy historian Maurice de WULF<sup>86</sup>, relying on Haskins, suggests that Hermann of Dalmatia (!) was one of the most famous

<sup>82</sup> L. THORNDIKE, *A History of magic and experimental Science*, vols. II–III, New York 1923; *Id.*, *Alhumasir in Sudan*, *Isis*, 45/1954, pp. 22–32; L. THORNDIKE – P. KIBRE, *A Catalogue of Incipits of Mediaeval scientific Writings in Latin*, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1937, col. 50, 147, 159, 295, 658–662.

<sup>83</sup> L. THORNDIKE, *A History*, vol. II, p. 84, note 4.

<sup>84</sup> *Introduction to the History of Science*, II/1, pp. 173–174.

<sup>85</sup> M. A. ŠANGIN, *Latinska parafraza iz utračenog soćenija Mašallaha 'Sem Ključei'*, *Mémoires du Comité des Orientalistes V*, ed. Akademii nauk SSSR, Leningrad 1930, pp. 235–238.

<sup>86</sup> *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale*, vols. I–II, Louvain–Paris 1934–1936.



disciples of magister Thierry of Chartres, who dedicated the *Planisphaeria* to his teacher, and translated other astronomical works and two short texts on Mohammed<sup>87</sup>. Curiously enough, he does not mention the *De essentiis*, thoroughly studied by Haskins.

Ugo MONNERET DE VILLARD<sup>88</sup> knows that Hermann studied under the tutorship of magister of 'artium' Thierry of Chartres, that he was a friend and a scientific collaborator of the English mathematician and astronomer Robert of Ketton whom he exchanged his works with, and that he was literary active between 1138 and 1143 in Spain (Leon) and at the south of France (Toulouse, Béziers).

Gabriel THERY<sup>89</sup> emphasizes Hermann's merits in translating Arab scientific treatises on astronomy, mathematics and geography, because of which our scientist traveled to Spain. They also points out Hermann's merits in the creation of the so-called Toledo collection of Latin texts on Islam.

Alonso's opponent Theodore SILVERSTEIN<sup>90</sup> holds that the treatise *De essentiis* does not provide enough proof for the conclusion that Hermann of Dalmatia knew Greek and that he was capable of translating the *Almagest*. Silverstein believes that the Istrian scientist was more of a dreamer than a true expert in Greek thought and culture, yet that he was quite an expert in Arab and Latin science<sup>91</sup>. The author especially pursued research into the term 'elementatum' that Hermann of Dalmatia only used as an adjective in the *De essentiis*, *Introductorium* and *Planisphaeria*<sup>92</sup>. Silverstein also points out that Hermann, a philosopher of Chartresian orientation, completed the second Latin edition of Abu Ma'shar's *Introductorium*, used by both his friend Bernardus Silvestris and the English cosmogonist Daniel of Morley, in 1143 (not

<sup>87</sup> *Id.*, vol. I, pp. 76–77 and 182.

<sup>88</sup> *Lo studio dell'Islam in Europa nel XII e nel XIII secolo*, Studi e testi 110, Citta del Vaticano 1944, pp. 10–13; *Il libro della peregrinazione nelle parti d'Oriente di frate Ricoldo da Montecroce*, Roma 1948, p. 108.

<sup>89</sup> *Toledo, grande ville de la renaissance médiévale, point de jonction entre les cultures musulmane et chretienne*, Oran 1944, pp. 6–8 and 11–12.

<sup>90</sup> *The Fabulous Cosmogony of Bernardus Silvestris*, *Modern Philology*, 46/1948, pp. 92–116; *Daniel of Morley, English Cosmogonist and Student of Arabic Science*, *Medieval Studies*, 10/1984, pp. 185–189; *Elementatum*, *id.* pp. 156–162; *Liber Hermetis Mercurii triplicis de VI rerum principijs*, *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du Moyen age*, 30/1955, pp. 226–232; *Hermann of Carinthia and Greek*, pp. 683–699; *Medieval Latin Scientific Writings in the Barberini Collection*, Chicago 1957, pp. 47–48 and 101–102.

<sup>91</sup> Th. SILVERSTEIN, *Hermann of Carinthia and Greek*, p. 699.

<sup>92</sup> Th. SILVERSTEIN, *Elementatum*, pp. 156–162.

in 1140!)<sup>93</sup>. He also points at the similarities of the treatises *De essentiis* and *Liber de sex rerum principiis* by Hermes Trismegistus<sup>94</sup>.

Jose Maria MILLAS VALLICROSA<sup>95</sup> attributes the translation of the *Planisphaeria* to Hermann's disciple from Bruges, who »like his teacher Hermann of Dalmatia worked in Toulouse«<sup>96</sup>. Millas Vallicrosa supposes that our scientist »very probably maintained a connection with the Italian Plato of Tivoli, a renowned representative of the Barcelona school of translating (1134–1145)«.

Marshall CLAGETT<sup>97</sup> – on the basis of the Lat. 16646 manuscript from the National library in Paris, a part of the Fournival collection in 1246 – proves that Hermann of Dalmatia commented on the first twelve books of Euclid's *Elements*.

Emmanuel POULLE<sup>98</sup> points out that our scientist considerably contributed to theoretical knowledge and practical usage of the astrolabe in Europe by his translation of the *Planisphaeria* and other Arab astrological-astronomical treatises, as witnessed by Hermann's disciple Rudolph of Bruges<sup>99</sup>.

Pierre BRUNET suggests that Hermann's activities were restricted to Spain (1138–1142). He knows about the dedication of Ptolemaeus' *Planisphaeria* to Thierry of Chartres, »the leading personality of all the Latin studies«<sup>100</sup>.

René TATON<sup>101</sup> places Hermann, the translator of the *Planisphaeria*, among the bearers of scientific progress that the Chartres school promoted.

In 'Janus' journal, and elsewhere, Hubert L. L. BUSARD<sup>102</sup> published the first twelve books of Euclid's *Elements*. With understandable caution, he suggests that they were translated by Hermann 'of Carinthia', whose scientific activity he puts into the fifth decade of the twelfth century (around 1140–

<sup>93</sup> The author compares Morley's *Liber de naturis* and Hermann's version of the *Introductorium* in the *Daniel of Morley*, p. 186.

<sup>94</sup> Th. SILVERSTEIN, *Liber Hermetis*, pp. 219 and 230.

<sup>95</sup> *Estudios sobre historia de la ciencia española*, Barcelona 1949.

<sup>96</sup> *Id.* p. 262.

<sup>97</sup> *The Medieval Latin Translations from the Arabic of the Elements of Euclid*, *Isis*, 44/1953, pp. 26–27.

<sup>98</sup> *L'astrolabe médiéval*, Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartres, 112/1954, Paris 1955, pp. 83–84; *Le traité de l'astrolabe*, *Studi medievali*, V (1964) 2, pp. 868–871; *Les instruments astronomiques de l'Occident latin aux 11e et 12e siècles*, *Cahiers de civilisation médiévale*, 15/1972, p. 34.

<sup>99</sup> E. POULLE, *L'astrolabe médiéval*, p. 84 (after the Paris codex Lat. 16652).

<sup>100</sup> P. BRUNET, *La science dans l'Antiquité et le Moyen âge*, *Encyclopédie de la Pléiade*, Paris 1957, p. 332.

<sup>101</sup> *La science antique et médiévale*, Paris 1957, pp. 529–536.

<sup>102</sup> *The Translation of the 'Elements' of Euclid from the Arabic into Latin by Hermann of Carinthia (?)*, *Janus*, vols. 53/1966 and 59/1972, Leiden 1968; *The first Latin translation of Euclid's 'Elements' commonly ascribed to Adelard of Bath*, Toronto 1983.

1150). The linguistic peculiarities (e.g. in the declination of the word *diameter*) point at Hermann of Dalmatia as the translator, whose edition is most likely based on al-Hajjaj's ninth-century Arab version. Busard believes that our scientist's authorship is yet to be verified through grammatical and lexical analysis. In the development of the Latin edition of the Elements, our scientist's translation came after Abelard of Bath's attempt (before 1142) and before the integral Latin version by Gerardus of Cremona (after 1145).

Paul KUNITZSCH<sup>103</sup> emphasizes the importance of Hermann's translations of the *Introductorium* and *Planisphaeria* in the creation of Western astronomical terminology.

Ron B. THOMSON<sup>104</sup> corrects the wrong opinion, established during the Middle Ages, that the Latin editor of the Arab al-Majriti's version of the *Planisphaeria* is not Rudolph of Bruges, the author of one of the numerous treatises on the astrolabe, but his teacher Hermann of Dalmatia.

Juan VERNET<sup>105</sup> elaborates upon Hermann of Dalmatia's scientific and translating activities on the Iberian peninsula and in southern France. Vernet, among other things, emphasizes Hermann's interest for the astrolabe, an instrument indispensable for the development of Western medieval seamanship, evaluates his translation of the *Introductorium* (1140) in relation to a similar attempt by John of Seville (1133), suggests that our scientist translated Euclid using al-Hajjaj's Arab edition (9th century) and Adelard of Bath's Latin translation (12th century), recognizes the Istrian scientist's technical skills in translating and his wish to apply scientific knowledge in practice (e.g. – according to Vernet – to manufacture a 'pocket' sundial).

J. VERNET and M. A. CATALA<sup>106</sup> point out that it was Hermann of Dalmatia, not his disciple from Bruges, who translated al-Majriti's Arab version of Ptolemaeus' *Planisphaeria*, which was proved as early as 1914 by H. Suter.

William HARTNER<sup>107</sup> emphasizes that the only Latin edition of the *Planisphaeria* in the Middle Ages the West owes to Hermann of Dalmatia, a scientist from Istria.<sup>108</sup>

TRANSLATED BY SREČKO PREMEC

<sup>103</sup> *Der Almagest. Die Syntaxis Mathematica des Claudius Ptolemaeus in arabisch-lateinischer Überlieferung*, Wiesbaden 1974, pp. 85, 115, 128, 184–191 and 201–203.

<sup>104</sup> *Jordanus de Nemore*, pp. 47–48.

<sup>105</sup> *Ce que la culture doit aux Arabes d'Espagne*, Paris 1985.

<sup>106</sup> *La obras matematicas de Maslama de Madrid*, Al-Andalus, XXX (1965) 1, p. 20.

<sup>107</sup> *Asturlab*, Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol. I, Leiden 1986(2nd ed.), p. 722.

<sup>108</sup> The Croatian version of the text here continues with an analysis of Croatian scientists' research into Hermann of Dalmatia, omitted in the English version since the issue is elaborated by Franjo Zenko in his paper published here, pp. 27–35.

## HERMAN DALMATIN U ZNANSTVENOJ LITERATURI

*Sažetak*

Herman Dalmatin (oko 1110.–posl. 26. II. 1154.) značajno je ime iz povijesti europske znanosti. Njegovim prijevodima, kompilacijama i znanstvenim esejima služe se njegovi suvremenici (Petrus Venerabilis, Bernard Silvestris, Thierry iz Chartresa, Rudolf iz Bruges, Robert of Ketton, Daniel of Morley, Gundisalvi) i poznati srednjovjekovni učenjaci (Alain de Lille, Albert Veliki, Toma Akvinski, Richard de Fournival, Mathew of Paris i dr.)

Humanizam daje prednost znanstvenim djelima na izvornim jezicima, pa Hermanovo ime i imena srednjovjekovnih prevoditelja i učenjaka dolaze u drugi plan. Ali ne zadugo. Značenje Hermanovih radova ističu bibliografi i povjesničari znanosti, počev od Konrada Gesnera (1545).

## HERMANN LE DALMATE ET SON TRAITÉ *DE ESSENTIIS*

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Original Paper  
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Le titre général de ce symposium est *La culture croate au Moyen Age – racines et ramifications*. Notre thème est Hermann le Dalmate et son traité *De essentiis*. La question à répondre serait: quelle relation significative ya-t-il entre ces deux sujets? Nous tâcherons de donner la réponse à cette question dans ce texte en trois parties, consacrées aux trois questions respectives: quand et de quelle manière Hermann le Dalmate, né à la fin du XI<sup>e</sup> ou au commencement du XII<sup>e</sup> siècle en Histria<sup>1</sup>, est devenu l'objet de l'intérêt des chercheurs de la culture croate? Quelle a été la réception du traité *De essentiis*, écrit, ou plus précisément, fini en 1143 à Béziers<sup>2</sup>, chez les historiens des sciences et de la philosophie en Croatie? Dans quelle direction orienter à l'avenir la recherche de cet ouvrage original d'Hermann pour en dégager toute la signification?

### I

Et maintenant, prenons notre première question: quand et de quelle manière Hermann le Dalmate est-il devenu l'objet de l'intérêt des chercheurs de la culture croate? Cette question est légitime et on peut la justifier par le fait tout simple: Il faut nous rappeler ici que la notion même de culture

<sup>1</sup> Voir: Franjo Šanjek, »Herman Dalmatinac, pisac i prevodilac znanstvenih djela iz prve polovice XII. stoljeća«. *Croatica sacra periodica*, god. III, br. 3, Zagreb 1979., str. 108–123. Du même auteur, »Doprinosi Hermana Dalmatinca zbližavanju arapske i evropske znanosti na zapadu u XII. stoljeću«. *Zbornik radova četvrtog simpozija iz povijesti prirodne znanosti i njihove primjene kod Hrvata u srednjem vijeku*, Zagreb 1983. (izdalo Hrvatsko prirodoslovno društvo, Sekcija za povijest znanosti), p. 69–83.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

nationale est un produit relativement récent. Ce n'était qu'avec Voltaire, et plus précisément, avec Herder que le mot 'culture' avait perdu la signification ergologique primaire (la culture conçue comme une action de cultiver) en prenant une signification tout à fait nouvelle, c'est-à-dire sociologique et historique moderne. C'est avec ce changement de signification que la notion de culture est devenue ce qu'elle est aujourd'hui: un instrument adapté à la description de la vie spirituelle et intellectuelle des groupes sociaux intégrés aux nations au sens actuel du mot.

Tout comme les cultures nationales des autres peuples européens, la culture nationale croate s'est également constituée comme telle dans le processus plus au moins compliqué de l'individualisation culturologique européenne moderne. A la lumière de cette rapide théorie de la culture nationale sur un plan plus général, selon laquelle la culture nationale croate doit être comprise comme une réalité historique et dynamique, notre première question pourrait être reformulée et précisée de la manière suivante: à quel moment de la constitution de la culture nationale croate au sens moderne le nom et l'oeuvre d'Hermann ont-ils commencé à fonctionner comme un des symboles de l'identité de la culture croate?

Pour point tournant dans la constitution de la culture croate au sens moderne, on est habitué, à bonne raison d'ailleurs, de prendre le *Hrvatski narodni preporod* du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, c'est-à-dire la *Renaissance nationale croate*, connue sous le nom d'*Ilirski preporod* comme le moment décisif dans la constitution de la culture croate au sens moderne du terme.

Ce fut un événement qui a déclenché le processus, d'ailleurs, accéléré, de l'identification de la culture nationale croate par son intégration spatio-temporelle, celle-ci soutenue par les recherches des historiens inspirés de l'idée de la renaissance croate nationale. Ce fut dans ce contexte culturologique que l'historien croate, Šime Ljubić (1882-1896), qui était aussi un des promoteurs de cette renaissance nationale dans la région de la Dalmatie, écrivit en italien son *Dictionnaire des hommes illustres de Dalmatie* (1856), où nous trouvons également Hermann le Dalmate.<sup>3</sup>

Il faut dire qu'à peu près à la même époque ici, comme en France, par exemple, la redécouverte de l'oeuvre d'Hermann avait eu lieu en Europe. C'est ainsi qu'il était possible pour Ljubić de profiter des travaux de Charles Jourdain qui, en cherchant les premières traductions latines d'Aristote, tomba sur le nom d'Hermann dont la signification pour la vie intellectuelle européenne au XII<sup>e</sup> siècle était évoquée dans son livre *Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote* (1843).

<sup>3</sup> *Dizionario biografico degli illustri uomini della Dalmazia*, Vienne 1856.

Après Šime Ljubić, il faut mentionner encore deux auteurs croates qui ont contribué à ce qu'Hermann et son oeuvre commencent à attirer l'intérêt des chercheurs plus jeunes en Croatie. L'historien de la littérature et de la culture croate, Mirko Breyer (1863-1946) fait connaître au public croate<sup>4</sup> les études de J. A. Clerval, notamment *Herman le Dalmate et les premières traductions latines des traités arabes d'astronomie au Moyen Age (1891)*, *L'enseignement des arts libéraux à Chartres et à Paris dans la première moitié du XII<sup>e</sup> siècle (1889)* et *Les écoles de Chartres au Moyen Age (1895)*.

Dans ces travaux, Hermann est décrit comme un des élèves de Thierry de Chartres, dans lequel notre Hermann avait vu revivre l'âme même de Platon, et d'autre part, Hermann est, depuis cette époque, connu comme traducteur des traités arabes d'astronomie, mais non pas encore comme auteur du traité original *De essentiis*. Après que Charles Hornie Haskins, dans ses *Studies in the History of Medieval Science* (1924), eut prouvé qu'Hermann était le vrai auteur de ce traité révélé au public, et qu'il en donna une analyse poussée, et puis après que P. Manuel Alonso eut préparé l'édition Hermann de Carintia, *De essentiis* (1946), Mirko Dražen Grmek réunit les résultats de toutes ces recherches préalables dans son article sur Hermann, publié dans *Enciklopedija Jugoslavije* (1958 t. 3). N'ayant eu d'autre but que d'établir d'abord les faits biographiques, et puis la bibliographie des ouvrages d'Hermann, ces deux articles, notamment celui de Ljubić et celui de Grmek, ont pu servir de point de départ pour la jeune génération des chercheurs qui apportent une nouvelle qualité à la réflexion sur la personnalité et sur l'oeuvre d'Hermann en Croatie.

Pour donner une idée de ce trait nouveau, il suffit de mentionner ici les communications, consacrées à Herman et à son oeuvre, au symposium *Les sciences naturelles et leur application chez les Croates au Moyen Age* (organisé par la Section pour l'histoire des Sciences de la Société croate des sciences naturelles - Hrvatsko prirodoslovno društvo - à Zagreb 1981).<sup>5</sup> Il devint alors évident qu'il y avait de jeunes historiens qui ne se contentaient plus des recherches des autres mais qu'ils se penchent eux-mêmes sur les anciens textes latins d'Hermann, et ceci en scrutant le contenu théorique sous divers aspects, indiqués par les titres mêmes des communications: «L'apport d'Hermann le Dalmate au rapprochement des sciences arabes et européennes à l'Occident au XII<sup>e</sup> siècle» (F. Šanjek), «Les points de vue d'Hermann le Dalmate sur la structure du monde» (Ž. Dadić), «La cosmologie alchimique

<sup>4</sup> Dans son article O književnom radu Hermana Dalmatina, publié dans la revue croate «Vienac», Zagreb 1896.

<sup>5</sup> Voir le *Zbornik ...* (Recueil), (note n° 1).

d'Hermann le Dalmate» (S. Paušek-Baždar) et «Des fragments musico-théoriques d'Hermann le Dalmate» (S. Tuksar).<sup>6</sup>

Afin d'être complète, cette revue des données plus importantes sur la réception d'Hermann en Croatie devrait être complétée par l'information suivante: un groupe interdisciplinaire de Zagreb est en train de préparer une nouvelle édition critique du traité *De essentiis*, avec en regard une traduction croate. Après les éditions celle d'Alonso<sup>7</sup>, mentionnée précédemment, et qui ne mérite pas d'être désignée comme critique, parce qu'elle n'avait été faite qu'à la base d'un seul des trois manuscrits déjà connus à l'époque, et celle de Charles Burnett<sup>8</sup> qui avait consulté toutes les sources manuscrites connues, mais qui est également insatisfaisante, l'édition critique croate en cours de préparation est un fait significatif qui nous conduit à conclure notre première partie de la façon suivante.

Le nom et l'oeuvre d'Hermann, redécouverts vers la fin de la première moitié du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle par des recherches historiques, et immédiatement reconnus et identifiés par les historiens croates comme un des symboles de la culture nationale croate au Moyen âge, n'ont cessé d'attirer l'intérêt des historiens de la culture autant en Croatie qu'ailleurs. Car il est évident, ainsi que l'écrit Žarko Dadić dans son livre *L'histoire des sciences exactes chez les Croates* (1982), qu'Hermann avait eu un rôle très important dans les sciences et qu'il s'agit d'une personnalité exceptionnelle dans l'histoire des sciences croates, et de plus, il est évident qu'il est le premier savant de notre pays qui ait joué un tel rôle dans le monde des sciences.<sup>9</sup>

Quelle était en fait cette importance d'Hermann, nous le verrons dans la partie suivante qui aurait à répondre à notre deuxième question, posée dans l'introduction: quelle était la réception du traité *De essentiis* d'Hermann chez les historiens des sciences en Croatie?

## II

Alors que la figure d'Hermann avait été redécouverte dans le contexte des études aristotéliennes, reprises vers la fin de la première moitié du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, on peut dire que son traité *De essentiis* était découvert, identifié et

<sup>6</sup> Toutes ces communications sont publiées dans ce *Zbornik* (Recueil).

<sup>7</sup> Herman de Carintia: *De essentiis*, Miscellanea Comillas Universidad pontificia de Comillas, 5, Santander 1946., p. 7-107.

<sup>8</sup> Hermann of Carinthia, *De essentiis*. A Critical Edition with Translation and Commentary. Leiden-Köln, éd. E.J. Brill, 1982.

<sup>9</sup> *Povijest egzaktinih znanosti u Hrvata*, I-II, SNL, Zagreb 1982., p. 22.



étudié au sein d'une discipline historique nouvelle et dynamique, c'est-à-dire par les historiens des sciences.

C'est Charles Hornie Haskins qui a définitivement attribué ce manuscrit à Hermann, qui en a publié des fragments importants et qui en a fait l'analyse détaillée dans son livre *Studies in the History of Medieval Science* (1924).

A la lumière de ces recherches d'Haskins, il était possible, à Manuel Alonso, en étudiant l'œuvre de Gundussalinus *De processione mundi*, d'établir que ce «compilateur éclectique» qui est «à la fois docile à l'aristotélisme et au néoplatonisme arabe» (M. de Wulf), et de citer tout au long le traité *De essentiis*. C'est pourquoi Alonso prépare l'édition du texte intégral de *De essentiis*. Cette *editio princeps* sera la base des études de ce traité d'Hermann en Croatie ainsi bien qu'ailleurs jusqu'à l'édition de Ch. Barnett d'il y a trois années.

S'il nous faut faire maintenant une brève analyse de la réception du traité *De essentiis* dans les travaux des chercheurs croates déjà cités, on devrait indiquer d'abord la perspective sous laquelle le problème fondamental de cet ouvrage avait été compris.

On peut dire que tous les auteurs le comprennent comme un traité «sur les cinq catégories aristotéliennes, *causa, motus, spatium, tempus, habitudo*» (Grmek, Dadić) ou bien comme un traité «de caractère cosmologique» (F. Šanjek, S. Paušck-Baždar). Ce qui concerne les sources d'inspiration, on les voit dans le «platonisme de l'école de Chartres» (Dadić), surtout dans celui de Thierry (Šanjek), et puis dans l'aristotélisme (Šanjek), en particulier dans la physique d'Aristote (Dadić) et dans le néoplatonisme d'Hermes Trismegistus (Dadić). On peut trouver partout cette incertitude très manifeste dans la détermination du caractère de cet ouvrage d'Hermann, dans la littérature.

Quant à l'exégèse et à l'analyse du texte lui-même, il faut dire qu'elles sont encore trop fragmentaires pour nous révéler la pleine signification du traité tout entier au point de vue de son sujet théorique. Il se trouve peu d'analyses concrètes dans les travaux déjà cités et elles sont dirigées par les intérêts des historiens des sciences particulières et c'est pour cette raison qu'elles n'aboutissent pas à une vue globale et synthétique.<sup>10</sup>

Je renonce ici à présenter la réception des théories particulières d'Hermann dans les interprétations des auteurs en Croatie ou ailleurs, car ce n'est pas un symposium consacré particulièrement à l'histoire de la philosophie et

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<sup>10</sup> Ce texte fut l'objet d'une communication faite lors du Symposium sur la culture croate au Moyen âge, tenu à la Sorbonne le 6 décembre 1985. Entre temps ont paru en Croatie de nombreux ouvrages sur Hermann, ce dont témoigne la bibliographie publiée en fin de volume. Il convient notamment de citer les recherches poursuivies par Žarko Dadić qui est l'auteur de la première monographie exhaustive sur Hermann; c'est une approche globale à l'oeuvre de ce dernier. La monographie n'était pas encore publiée en 1985.

des sciences chez les Croates. C'est pourquoi je me borne à signaler quelques problèmes qui se posaient lors de l'étude de ce document de haute valeur sur la pensée médiévale au XII<sup>e</sup> siècle.

Il y a deux présuppositions, à mon avis, qui fonctionnaient comme facteurs limitatifs pour ces recherches: l'une de nature externe, l'autre inhérente à la recherche même.

D'abord, il faut dire qu'il était nécessaire de travailler sur la base d'une édition qui est, au point de vue de la philologie critique, très faible et incomplète. Je n'ai pas besoin de vous expliquer le malaise où se trouve l'interprète – et toute science historique est dans son essence l'art de l'interprétation – quand il sait positivement que le texte disponible n'est pas philologiquement bien préparé. C'est pourquoi il a été décidé de faire une troisième édition, maintenant vraiment critique, car celle de Ch. Barnett, après qu'elle ait été soumise à l'expertise, faite par notre collègue Slavko Kalenić<sup>11</sup> de Zagreb, s'est montrée incertaine et peu fiable<sup>12</sup>.

La deuxième présupposition énoncée jusqu'ici, uniquement par des historiens des sciences est aussi problématique. En partant de l'intérêt de l'histoire des sciences particulières, le traité *De essentiis* fut scruté avec des espérances inappropriées, notamment dans le but d'y trouver (ou de ne pas y trouver!) l'apport cumulatif aux sciences particulières<sup>13</sup>.

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Mais c'est justement ici qu'il faut poser notre dernière question: cette recherche à l'avenir, quelle direction devrait-elle prendre pour satisfaire aux exigences d'une méthodologie plus souple si on veut explorer la pleine signification de ce traité d'Hermann?

Donner une réponse à cette question serait la tâche de la troisième partie qui est en même temps, en quelque sorte, notre conclusion.

<sup>11</sup> Dans son étude *Temeljni problemi uspostave teksta rasprave De essentiis Hermana Dalmatince* (manuscrit de 62 pages, préparé pour la revue *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine* n° 1-2/1986., éditée à Zagreb par l'Odjel za povijest filozofije Centra za povijesne znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu – Section de l'histoire de la philosophie du Centre des sciences historiques de l'Université de Zagreb).

<sup>12</sup> Il faut souligner qu'une traduction en croate de *De essentiis* a paru entre temps en 1990 à Pula, c'est une édition bilingue, *Rasprava o bitima I, II*. Voir la bibliographie en fin de volume.

<sup>13</sup> J'ai procédé à cet endroit du texte à des coupures car il me semble que j'y avais, avec trop de véhémence, souligné la distinction entre une approche philosophique et celle qui procède plus particulièrement du point de vue de l'histoire de la science. Le fait est qu'un texte, tel que *De essentiis*, revêt toute son actualité culturelle dans le cadre d'une réflexion sur l'histoire des sciences.

### III

Le traité *De essentiis* est un ouvrage philosophique et scientifique. C'est un fait, mais il est bien davantage que cela. Et c'est pourquoi nous sommes d'accord avec Charles Burnett quand il dit dans l'introduction de son édition critique: »Moreover, because of its carefully worked out structure, within which there is a precise matching of form to content, (241), I think the *De essentiis* deserves to be called a work of art« (43).

Pour se rendre compte de la véritable nature du traité *De essentiis* et par suite de sa signification, il faut avoir une vue exacte et précise du contexte problématique voire dramatique, dans lequel il avait été écrit. Quelques éléments marquants pour ce contexte culturel des trois dernières décades du XII<sup>e</sup> siècle, se retrouvent dans les faits mêmes du *curriculum vitae* d'Hermann: les études finies quelque part en France, peut-être à Paris ou ailleurs tout près du maître connu en ce temps, Thierry de Chartres, qui écrit dans son ouvrage *De sex dierum operibus*, cette phrase archiplatonicienne, caractéristique d'ailleurs pour le milieu chartrain tout entier: »Divinitas singulis rebus forma essendi est, nam sicut aliquid ex luce lucidum est vel ex calore calidum, ita singulae res esse suum ex Divinitate sortiuntur« (F.-J. Thonnard, *Précis d'histoire de philosophie*, p. 289). Ce fut chez ce platonicien chartrain que Hermann put connaître, non seulement les écrits de Boèce, l'auteur préféré de Thierry, mais aussi, ce qui était encore plus important pour le jeune Hermann, toutes les sources théologiques, philosophiques, mathématiques et scientifiques de la tradition latine. Puis des voyages d'études dans les pays de Proche Orient où Hermann et son ami Robert de Ketton avaient appris la langue arabe, peut-être également la grecque; ensuite la poursuite des études astronomiques et astrologiques dans les milieux des savants musulmans et juifs en Espagne; et enfin, l'engagement dans les centres célèbres de traduction (comme celui de Tolède, p.e.) où l'on réalisait des projets gigantesques, conçus par les esprits supérieurs et clairvoyants de l'Europe de cette époque, qui, tel Gérard de Crémone, Pierre le Vénéral et tant d'autres, voulaient, après la chute du Califat de Cordoue et la reconquête chrétienne, rendre accessibles en latin toutes les sources arabes, musulmanes, juives et grecques de la science profane et sacrée.

Ce ne fut qu'après toutes ces expériences, riches et émouvantes, que Hermann se mit à écrire son traité *De essentiis*, en se retirant dans un lieu secret, n'ayant dit à personne où il allait et quand il reviendrait. Dans cette solitude voulue il se rend compte de ce qui se passe dans le monde où il est obligé de vivre, mais qu'il sent comme un monde profondément déséquilibré au point de vue de la vie intellectuelle et spirituelle: d'une part, on est confronté à l'augustinisme traditionnel affaibli, mais encore respecté comme la

synthèse vivante de sept cents ans de réflexion mais qui maintenant, à la fin de la première moitié du XII<sup>e</sup> siècle, à cause de son platonisme inhérent, n'est plus viable comme principe de la culture européenne posée sur les présuppositions sociales, économiques et politiques profondément changées; d'autre part on voit l'intrusion d'une «science nouvelle» apportée par les savants arabes, musulmans et juifs, c'est-à-dire non chrétiens mais qui attire les esprits chrétiens indépendants et mécontents de la monotonie du platonisme augustinien omniprésent.

Cette «nouvelle science», qui est un mélange oriental d'astronomie et de mathématique, d'astrologie et d'alchimie, se présenta par ses éléments systématiques et scientifiques comme une sorte d'aristotélisme orientalisé, vu et senti par les esprits européens formés dans la tradition chrétienne, marquée par l'augustinisme spiritualiste et platonisant, comme une pensée profondément naturaliste et d'autant plus redoutable.

C'est justement cette situation intellectuelle et spirituelle, déchirée entre ces deux extrêmes, c'est-à-dire le platonisme augustinien spiritualiste et l'aristotélisme orientalisé naturaliste, que Hermann a posé comme véritable problème à son époque et c'est ce qui dirige ses recherches dans *De essentiis*. Au milieu de son traité, en se rendant compte de ce problème initial, qui agita toute son aventure intellectuelle et celle de son ami Robert de Ketton, Hermann dit: « Multa quidem veteris prudentiae studia, mi Roberte, in his, que agimus, consueta, nec ulli ad integritatis evidentiam consecuta videmus. Sic Plato, proposita generatione primaria, tandem ad extremum enisus [est], partem dedit pro toto. Aristotiles vero, totum item amplexus, extremitates demum sine mediorum contextu terminavit. Mihi autem nulla ratione universitatis constructio absoluta videatur, si minus sit quod solum in omni compositione campaginis retinaculum est» (Burnett, 149). Il s'agit donc dans le traité *De essentiis* d'Hermann d'éviter l'extrémisme platonicien idéaliste, ainsi que les extrêmes vides de l'aristotélisme orientalisé (Hermann n'a connu Aristote que par des traductions et des interprétations arabes!), car ni l'un ni l'autre ne nous donnent une synthèse réelle. N'ayant pas compris ce *contextus mediorum*, qui est en effet notre monde réel, ils méconnaissent aussi son essence cachée et sa nature dynamique qui est un tout parfaitement équilibré entre des extrêmes, liés et réconciliés par ce *retinaculum mundi* qui aide tout ce qui est à être ce qui est.

Conclusion: Au milieu du monde médiéval européen du XII<sup>e</sup> siècle, déchiré intellectuellement et spirituellement à cause de l'intrusion d'un élément nouveau, Hermann se sent invité et chargé par la déesse de la sagesse – «desuper adveniens altissima dea verticem meam dextra tetigit... Surge', inquit, 'et sequere me',« dit Hermann dans le Proemium à son traité (Burnett, p.72) – à restituer la balance du monde déséquilibré, ou comme dirait Her-

mann lui-même, du »medium mundi (de)libratum« (ibid., p. 150). C'est justement comme penseur de l'équilibre du *medium mundi semper librandum*, que Hermann pourrait être lu avec intérêt dans la situation actuelle où l'on voit l'esprit européen une fois de plus à la recherche de son équilibre et, par là, de son identité perdue.

TRADUIT PAR L'AUTEUR ET REVU PAR GABRIELA VIDAN

## HERMAN DALMATIN I NJEGOVA RASPRAVA *DE ESSENTIIS*

### *Sažetak*

Ovaj tekst predstavlja do sada neobjavljeni autorov referat što ga je pod naslovom: Hermann le Dalmate et son traité *De essentiis* održao na međunarodnom i interdisciplinarnom simpoziju; »La culture croate au Moyen Age – racines et ramifications« održanom 6–7. prosinca 1985. g. Autor postavlja tri pitanja na koja nastoji i odgovoriti. Prvo, kada je i na koji način Herman Dalmatin postao predmet interesa istraživača hrvatske kulture? Drugo, kakva je bila recepcija rasprave *De essentiis* povjesničara znanosti i filozofije u Hrvatskoj? Treće, kojim smjerom bi trebalo ići buduće istraživanje tog Hermanova glavnog djela kako bi se otkrilo njegovo pravo značenje?



## HERMANN OF DALMATIA AND CLAUDIUS PTOLEMY

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(Zadar)

Original Paper  
UDC 19 Hermann of Dalmatia, Claudius Ptolemy

### *Introduction*

First I will outline only the more general details about Hermann of Dalmatia and Claudius Ptolemy, the second century Greek mathematician, astronomer and geographer, and his role in medieval European astronomy. Next, I will cite those passages of Hermann's *On Essences*, completed in Béziers in 1143, which clearly show that Ptolemy's scientific work played a significant role in Hermann's treatise. This is to be followed by an examination of the question, with respect to Ptolemy's *Almagest*, as to whether Hermann of Dalmatia is really the translator of *Almagest* from the Greek into Latin.<sup>1</sup> Finally, I will discuss what I myself have concluded regarding this issue.

### *Hermann of Dalmatia*

Hermann of Dalmatia – we already encounter the *agnomen Dalmata* in Peter the Venerable (Petrus Venerabilis) – called himself by the nickname of *Second* (*Secundus*). With this nickname our writer surely wanted to protect his

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<sup>1</sup> Even though I have discussed this question in the article »Herman Dalmatin i Ptolemejev *Almagest*« in *Filozofska istraživanja*, XIII (1992) 48, pp. 13–17, I am obliged here to correct two mistakes that I made: first, I did not clearly determine the passage in Hermann's text on which the Spaniard Manuel Alonso depends for his argumentation, but spoke altogether generally – the former article was a paper delivered at a conference – about the passages, and hence that Alonso's argumentation in a certain sense copied the passage in *de. ess. c. 31,1*, which I myself actually included as a point of support. The second mistake is that I cited in their entirety the texts of all passages in which Hermann mentions Ptolemy's *Almagest*, thus these superfluous quotations damaged the precision of the approach of my former article.

work from Hermann the Lame (Contractus) of the eleventh century.<sup>2</sup> *Agnomina Sclavus* and *de Carinthia*, which we encounter in Hermann's manuscripts of the thirteenth century, are designed to differentiate Hermann of Dalmatia from both Hermann the Lame and Hermann the German (Alemannus) of the thirteenth century.

This Croatian scholar, philosopher and scientist lived from about 1110 to after February 26, 1154. And we can rightly call him a pioneer in many things. First of all, he is the first Croatian writer whose complete works have been preserved to the present day, and that not only in manuscripts throughout all of Europe, but also in publications: from 1489 when his *Introductorium in astronomiam Albumasaris* was printed in Augsburg, up to our own day with the most recent edition of his original natural philosophical work *De essentiis*, which appeared not long ago in 1990.<sup>3</sup> Hermann of Dalmatia is simultaneously the first Croatian cultural activist who with his contribution, philosophical and natural scientific, played an important role in the history of European and world natural philosophy: having a well versed knowledge of the Arabic language, he also excelled as an interpreter and translator of Arabic works in the fields of astronomy, mathematics and other scientific disciplines of the period. Additionally, he was no doubt among the first spiritual ambassadors who essentially augmented the merging together of twelfth century Arabic and European science. Together with the Englishman Robert of Ketton, Hermann has been noted by world cultural history as the first translator of the *Qu'ran* into a European language, namely Latin. The translation in question was published in Basel in 1543 and 1550 by Theodore Buchmann, known by the humanistic name of Bibliander.

And Hermann himself considered himself a pioneer in many things. His pioneering work he emphasised, with special pride, with what is certainly his most significant original work, *De essentiis*. Namely, he is altogether certain that this work is *magnum nec a primo saeculo de quoquam mortalium auditum*. This great and renowned work, which contains things that had never been heard before by any ordinary mortal of his generation, is precisely a *munus*, that is: a *gift*, but also at the same time a *task* that was given to him by the most exalted goddess – *altissima dea*. But Hermann does not doubt that he will execute this admirably valuable task – *mirandum altissimi numinis munus*, as

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the introductory discussion of Franjo Šanjek's »Herman Dalmatin (oko 1110. – poslije 26. II. 1154) – bio-bibliografski prilozi« in the book: Herman Dalmatin, *Rasprava o bituma* (with Latin text, translation, commentary and notes by Antun Slavko Kalenić), Introductory discussions written by Franjo Šanjek, Antun Slavko Kalenić, Žarko Dadić and Franjo Zenko, Books I–II, Pula, 1990, Book I, p. 14.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. previous footnote.



he calls it himself – precisely in that way that is worthy and dignified. For the task at hand is given by the goddess Minerva herself.

### *Claudius Ptolemy*

Ptolemy – Greek: Πτολεμαῖος, Latin: Claudius Ptolemaeus – in the book entitled *Μεγάλη μαθηματικὴ σύνταξις τῆς ἀστρονομίας* offered a systematic overview of the entire astronomical doctrine up to his period. His work, however, is better known according to its Arabic translation by the title *Almagest* (or *Almajesti*). In it the author favours the geocentric system of the cosmos, which in the Middle Ages had enormous significance in astronomy. Ptolemy's system is based on the presupposition that the sun, planets and other stars rotate around the earth as the immobile centre of the cosmos.

### *Hermann's On Essences and Ptolemy*

Hermann completed his *On Essences – De essentiis* – in 1143, as I already stated. In the introduction to the treatise, he describes how the goddess Minerva woke him from his sleep and gave him a very responsible task. In c. 4,1 he states: »evolat igitur in summum maeistatis suae solium. quo cum in augustissimo receptaculo consedisset, proposita in medio universa substantiae suae materia pariter et huiusmodi instrumentis appositis, primo loco calculis et radio, deinde aequilibri dipondio, postremo lucifera quadam lampade cuncta penetrante, haec, inquit, suscipe! hoc muneris iniungo. nec particulatim. ut hi. qui miseros auditorum animos vario diripientes tantae tibi pietatis causa sunt, datumque larga manu distribue nihil dubitans. Opes enim nostrae largitate crescunt nec indigno animo ullo modo possibles.« That is: »Ascending [i.e. Minerva] thus to the highest thrown of her highness. When she sat on that most honourable and most exalted place, she displayed the universal matter of her essence in the centre, and at the same time these sort of apparatuses: first, counting equipment and a pencil, followed by a scale, and finally some sort of illuminated torch that penetrates through everything. Accept this! she says. I am entrusting you with this task. And that not in pieces, as is done by those who awake so much respect in you, while the miserable souls of listeners foam in various ways, and what I have given you divide with a generous hand and doubt nothing! Our fortune, namely, increases with generosity and is in no way accessible to the unworthy soul.« Minerva's essence and the mentioned apparatuses are offerings that relate to *quadrivium artium liberalium*.

*Artes liberales* were the foundation of a thorough, complete education – precisely as *disciplinarum omnium complexio* or *encyclopaedia*. In the fifth century Marcian Capela named seven – *septem artes liberales*. They were taught in two courses: the lower, *trivium*, grammar, rhetoric and dialectics;

and the higher, *quadrivium*, astronomy, geometry, arithmetics and music theory. Here, astronomy is related to the illuminated torch, geometry to the pencil, arithmetics to the counting equipment, and music theory to the scale. But of these four liberal arts in Hermann's treatise, the most important role is played by astronomy.

Žarko Dadić, in his article *Herman Dalmatin kao znanstvenik*,<sup>4</sup> emphasises the scientific significance of the fact that Hermann of Dalmatia in his *On Essences* accepted the formula of Plato's pupil Heraclites of Pontus, according to whom Mercury and Venus revolve around the sun. According to this system, namely, these planets, moving around the sun, rotate around the earth together with the sun. In spite of the fact that the system of the motion of Mercury and Venus around the sun was not generally supported during the fourteenth century, it was nevertheless known. Given that twelfth century manuscripts, including Hermann's *On Essences*, were copied at the time, the formula of the motion of rotating planets was passed on and the idea, thanks to this, was preserved.

Even though Hermann opted for a different system of the motion of Mercury and Venus – here Johann Kepler is already anticipated – from the one favoured by Ptolemy, his *On Essences* in many passages depends precisely on Ptolemy. But Ptolemy is also discussed in the treatise. Thus, for example, Hermann states in c. 29,6–8: »in causis vero Ptolemaeo contradicit Abumasar tum ipse quidem tum gravissima Hermetis auctoritate. Ptolemaeus namque partem superni ordinis subiectae naturae affinitate, partem remotione huiusmodi differentiis inficit. contra Abumasar cum affinitati hunc effectum tollat, nec remotioni relinquit, ut nihil superis ex subiecta natura accedere verum in hac supernae virtutis officium ipsa dispositionis ratio demonstret.« That is: »Nevertheless, concerning causes Abu Mashar contradicts Ptolemy, and truly even himself, with Hermes' renowned certitude. For Ptolemy paints with these sorts of differences a section of the upper order on the basis of the proximity of the subdued nature, and a section on the basis of its distance. Abu Mashar, on the contrary, takes this effect away from proximity, and it is not even left to distance, thus the very principle of order demonstrates that nothing approaches the upper from the subdued nature, but that in the subdued nature is contained the service of higher virtues.« This relates to Ptolemy's *Quadripartitum* I 4. But in *de ess.* c. 35,9 our writer calls upon the same text, and that I 10. Ptolemy's *Almagest* is nonetheless most frequently cited. *Algam.* VII 2 is cited in *de ess.* c. 33,2, I 3 in c. 34,17, I 7 in c. 34,23, V 16 in c. 40,12, V 11–15 in c. 43,4, V 16 in c. 45,1, II 6 in c. 96,5.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. aforementioned books, Book II, pp. 7–41.

### *Hermann and the Greek Language*

Franjo Šanjek cites the translation of Ptolemy's *Almagest* amongst Hermann's attributions, namely amongst those works that are actually ascribed to Hermann, but it is still a contentious question as to whether they are really his. Šanjek states: »In *De essentiis* (c. 39) our scholar explicitly calls upon *Almagest*: 'quemadmodum in Almagesti probamus', which is also alluded to by Robert of Ketton: 'ad Almagesti quo praecipuum nostrum pateret accessus'« (Ch. H. Haskins, *Studies*, p. 121). He then immediately continues: »Hermann is explicitly mentioned as the translator of *Almagest* by the anonymous glossator of the Louvain manuscript: 'Hermannus iste astrologus fuit... et transtulit alma<estum>'« (E. Reusens, *Eléments de paléographie*, p. 236).<sup>5</sup> And again: »it is not unfounded that Alonso's assumption that Hermann of Dalmatia is also the author of the oldest integral edition of *Almagest*, which he translated from the Greek in Palermo on Sicily during the reign of Roger II (1130–1154).«<sup>6</sup> In the same discussion, however, Šanjek later says the following: »On the basis of the unconfirmed assumption that Hermann, still as a boy [in Istria], learnt Greek (he presumably mastered Arabic in Spain) and an erroneously understood passage from *De essentiis*, Alonso considers it an irrefutable proof that our scholar translated the original Greek text of Ptolemy's *Almagest* in 1160 in Sicily.«<sup>7</sup> Indeed, Manuel Alonso says<sup>8</sup> that four copies of this translation are already known, and that one of them states: »translatus in urbe Panormi tempore regis Roggerii per Hermannum de greco in latinum.« Wanting to identify the mentioned Hermann with Hermann of Dalmatia, Alonso also cites a note of the anonymous Louvain commentator of the thirteenth century: »Hermann iste astrologus fuit natus de Karinthia, non Contractus de Suevia, et transtulit almag<estum>.«

### *Hermann and the Translation of Ptolemy's Almagest*

I nevertheless think that Alonso did not erroneously understand this passage – *de ess. c. 39, 7: quemadmodum in Almagesti probamus*. And not only that. There also exists in Hermann's *On Essences* another passage which Alonso did not take into consideration in his argumentation, which clearly shows that Hermann must have been familiar with *Almagest* before 1143, that

<sup>5</sup> Op. laud., p. 52.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 64.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Herman de Carintia, *De essentiis*, Edition preparada y anotada por el P. Manuel Alonso, Universidad Pontificia Comilla (Santander), 1946, pp. 15–16.

is before he wrote his treatise, and that he knew it precisely in the original Greek. Namely, in this passage (*ibid.*, c. 31,3) Hermann states: »quo facto educit ex eodem centro in utramque partem lineam rectam usque in intrinsicam planitiem sperae acutis hinc inde angulis, ut secundum Eratosthenem Ptolemaeus describit, ad quadrantem ferme recti anguli...« That is: »Given that he did [i.e. the most wise artist = God] this, he derived from the same centre the direction on both sides up to the inner sphere of the surface, with sharp angles on both sides, which Ptolemy describes, according to Eratosthen, almost to a fourth of the right angle...«

Therefore, the statement in c. 39,7 »as we demonstrate in *Almagest*« – the exact passage which Alonso cites – leads us to conclude that Hermann in any case did translate Ptolemy's *Almagest* prior to the writing of *On Essences*, if not completely, then at least part of it. Nonetheless, we can maintain the passage in c. 31,3 »Ptolemy describes, according to Eratosthen« – because it quotes Eratosthen – as the most convincing proof that Hermann was familiar with *Almagest* in the original Greek. This passage, namely, relates to *almag. I 12*, where Ptolemy states: »ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος τῷ τοῦ Ἐρατοσθένους...« Given that no other astronomical work that was accessible to Hermann does not mention Eratosthen in this context,<sup>9</sup> only the Constantinople Greek manuscript of Ptolemy's *Almagest*, according to my view, comes into consideration.

### *Manuel Alonso – Scholarliness, Superficiality and Inspiration*

Scholarliness is visible in Alonso at every step. But it is, unfortunately, quite often superficial. He says, for example, that we already know of four manuscripts of Hermann's translation of *Almagest*, but he does not note exactly what these manuscripts are. He requested of the Naples *Biblioteca Nazionale* that they send him a copy of the twelfth century manuscript of Hermann's *De essentiis*. He received no reply whatsoever from the library – which I myself have personally discovered to be very neglectful in offering its services. This constituted sufficient reason for Alonso to write in his edition of Hermann's treatise that the Naples manuscript has been lost.<sup>10</sup> And as for the number of mistakes he made in copying the 1423 Oxford manuscript of *De essentiis*, I wrote about this issue already in a very thorough manner in the article »De textu Hermannii tractatus qui de essentiis inscribitur«.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Hermann of Carinthia, *De essentiis*, critical edition with translation and commentary by Charles Burnett, E. J. Brill, Leiden/Köln, 1982, p. 269.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *op. supra laud.*, p. 19.

<sup>11</sup> *Živa antika*, XXXIV (Skopje, 1984) 1–2, pp. 139–145.

But in spite of his completely incomprehensible superficiality, Alonso is very often astonishingly inspired in his conclusions. In the next section of this article, I will cite only one example of this, and in that way attempt to give him recompensation for objections voiced against him – although they are completely justified – in my aforementioned article »De textu Hermanni tractatus...« I am sure that the sympathetic reader will allow me such a digression.

### *The Occasion of the Division of Hermann's On Essences into Books and Alonso's Fortunate Mediation*

Three passages of Hermann's *On Essences* cite the first book: c. 49,5, 77,8, 93,1. These mentioned passages, however, contradict what he writes at the end of the treatise: »De essentiis liber Hermanni Secundi explicit anno Domini millesimo centesimo quadragesimo tertio Biternis perfectus.« This, therefore, relates to a book, and not books. As for this: the book is also mentioned by a certain note of the twelfth century, written by another hand, which is found on the upper edge of the 85th page of the Naples manuscript: »proemium In libro essentiarum hermanni philosophi.« But on the other hand, precisely this author of the note on the edge of the 85th page, also wrote at the beginning of the sixth chapter: »primus liber«, and at the edge of the 60th page, at the beginning of the eighteenth chapter – »secundus liber«.

I will now outline what no one else, as far as I know, has ever given consideration to, that is: that the copier of the Oxford manuscript silently or, expressed differently, graphically supported the writer of the aforementioned notes of the Naples manuscript. In the entire text of that manuscript, namely, only in two places are sentences left out, obviously in order to formerly divide three mutually different wholes of the treatise, and that precisely with respect to those passages in the text in which are found the written notes »primus liber« and »secundus liber« in the Naples manuscript. And that there should be such a correspondence between the two manuscripts which belong to altogether different genealogical descendants of the manuscript family, that is: that such a correspondence came about completely by mere chance, of this no one can convince me. It is altogether obvious that both manuscripts unambiguously distinguish between the introduction, the first book and the second book, namely: c. 1–5, 6–17, 18–101.

In his book entitled *Studies in the History of Medieval Science*,<sup>12</sup> following the *petit* printed text of Hermann's treatise c. 11–17, Charles Homer Haskins

<sup>12</sup> Cambridge, 1924, pp. 53–54.

writes the following on page 61: »After this paragraph, evidently a dialogue between Hermann and Robert, there begins what in the Naples manuscript is entitled the second book, although no trace of division into books appears elsewhere.« And thus this sentence by Haskins – if we take into account the text of Hermann’s treatise itself – was for Alonso the only report about the manuscript’s division into books. But given that Alonso’s critical commentary clearly observes that he did not correctly understand Haskins’ criticism, he nevertheless fortunately and, I would say, inspiringly concluded, based on Hermann’s text itself, where the first book ends and the second book commences. Alonso, namely, before c. 49 had printed: »LIBER SECUNDUS«. In the critical commentary, he nonetheless noted the following: »LIBER SECUNDUS, om. C (pero además hallarse en los otros codices como advierte Haskins).« He therefore altogether erroneously understood Haskins’ words, but for that reason he altogether correctly noticed where the second book of the treatise commences.

Charles Burnett, who had access not only to all the preserved manuscripts – the Naples, London and Oxford manuscripts – but also Haskins’ notes and Alonso’s edition, accepts Alonso’s early and very ingenious conjecture, but the beginning of the second book is nowhere designated in any of the manuscripts. In spite of the fact that he remained silent and only wrote in his critical commentary: »Secundus Liber *suppl.*«, for Burnett »*suppl.*« means »publisher’s addition«, that is: it was added by Burnett himself. But this *zelotypia* is not the first nor the last instance among scholars. We should only recall that in the then unknown Long manuscript, that was found in Florence by P. L. Courier, the most interesting passage – preserved only in this manuscript – had by chance (?) ink spilled onto it and, from then onwards, all publishers have depended on this copy. But enough of that.

### Conclusion

In spite of the fact that Hermann in his *On Essences*, interpreting the system of the motion of planets, accepted Heraclites of Pontus’ solution regarding the motion of Mercury and Venus – which later played an important role in astronomy – and not Ptolemy’s, we notice in his treatise that he in many respects depended precisely on Ptolemy for his astronomical interpretations. As for the interpretation of Ptolemy’s *Almagest*, I conclude from the aforementioned passages that Hermann of Dalmatia knew the Greek original and actually translated it into Latin. But in spite of the clear evidence of these passages, I myself did not consider Manuel Alonso’s assumption that the *Vatican Manuscript* of the Sicilian translation of *Almagest* from the Greek into Latin (*Ms. Vat. Pal. 1371*) to be actually Hermann’s translation to be proven.

Charles Homer Haskins, namely, already noticed<sup>13</sup> that it is difficult to believe that Hermann of Dalmatia referred to himself as being ignorant in astronomy. But one never knows. It is altogether possible that during that period when he really translated the work and, so to say, only delved into its content, he can still rightly call himself – »astronomiae imperitus«.

Concerning Hermann of Dalmatia and his *On Essences*. Claudius Ptolemy and his *Almagest*, and the relations among them. I have said what I believe to be sufficient.

TRANSLATED BY DAMION BUTERIN

## HERMAN DALMATIN I KLAUDIJE PTOLEMEJ

### Sažetak

Najprije pisac samo u glavnim crtama izlaže o Hermanu Dalmatinu i Klaudiju Ptolemeju i o njihovoj ulozi u srednjovjekovnoj znanstvenoj javnosti. Zatim piše o Hermanovoj *Raspravi o bitima*. Piše također i o odnosu u kome ova rasprava stoji prema zvezdoznanstvenom nauku, a osobito prema zvezdoznanstvenima Ptolemejevim spisima. Nadalje se također postavlja pitanje i o tome da li je Herman preveo Ptolemejev *Almagest* s grčkoga na latinski. Zaključak se naposljetku nameće sâm po sebi. Premda je Herman prihvatio onaj sustav gibanjâ pokretnicâ što ga je utemeljio Heraklid iz Ponta, – a ta je okolnost bila od velikog značenja za buduća pokoljenja, – ipak se u svojoj raspravi snažno oslanja na Ptolemejeve spise. Sto se pak tiče prevođenja Ptolemejeva *Almagesta*, ako se sudi prema stanovitim mjestima u *Raspravi o bitima* iz 1143. godine, može se zaključiti da je naš pisac poznavao grčki izvornik *Almagesta* i da ga je već prije pisanja spomenute rasprave prevodio barem u nekima njegovim dijelovima. Zato se pisac ovog članka, kad se sve zbroji i oduzme, ne može složiti s onima koji misle da je Manuel Alonso pogrešno shvatio *Raspravu o bitima* u c. 39. Premda ni on sâm ne misli da je dokazano da je *Vatikanski rukopis* prijevođa *Almagesta* s grčkoga na latinski uistinu prijevod Hermana Dalmatina.

<sup>13</sup> Loc. cit.





## THE VIEWS OF HERMANN OF DALMATIA IN NATURAL PHILOSOPHY

ŽARKO DADIĆ

(Zagreb)

Original Paper  
UDC 19 Hermann of Dalmatia

Hermann of Dalmatia presented his system of natural philosophy in his only original work *De Essentis*, which he finished in Beziers in 1143. He drew upon various sources, first of all Aristotle's natural philosophy in Abu Ma'shar's interpretation and Plato's natural philosophy as he studied it during his education in Chartres. He also included a large number of interpretations by various philosophers and scholars whose ideas he accepted or became familiar with in Chartres or through Arabic sources. His system of natural philosophy is sometimes hard to see as a whole or find a logical sequence in which different views are incorporated in it. C. H. Haskins<sup>1</sup> wrote in 1924 that Hermann's work was a strange mixture of Platonism of Chartres, Aristotelian physics and Hermes Trismegistos' Neoplatonism, and that it was a conglomerate of its component parts rather than a compact whole.

The credit for examination and interpretation of Hermann's text should go to two authors who published their studies in 1962 and 1982, respectively. The former, R. Lemay,<sup>2</sup> made an important analysis and drew attention to the dependency of Hermann's Aristotelianism upon Abu Ma'shar's *Introductorium in Astronomiam*. The latter, C. Burnett,<sup>3</sup> made another important step by publishing Hermann's original work in Latin with an English translation. In his commentary, he explained in detail the meaning of certain passages and even sentences and studied the sources of Hermann's views. Without Burnett's work, it would be much more difficult to understand Hermann's treatise correctly.

<sup>1</sup> Charles Homer Haskins, *Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science*, Cambridge, 1924, pp. 57 and 66.

<sup>2</sup> Richard Lemay, *Abu Ma'shar and Latin Aristotelianism in the Twelfth Century*, Beirut 1962.

<sup>3</sup> Charles Burnett, *Hermann of Carinthia, De Essentis*, Leiden – Köln. 1982.

In spite of many difficulties that arise in the reading of Hermann's text, his system of natural philosophy can be perceived as a complete whole, having its own logic, in which it is possible to see why and in what manner particular points were integrated. Hermann successfully combined Aristotelianism with Platonism and there is no doubt as to the manner in which he achieved it. He had his own vision of the integrity this combining would produce, and it did result in an integral system of natural philosophy. Certain explanations of natural phenomena were not easy to fit in and Hermann did it with more or less success. These explanations mostly refer to natural processes in the terrestrial area, and since Hermann sometimes included various explanations of the same natural phenomenon, the resulting effect was a certain departure from the rest of the system, in spite of his efforts.

In his natural philosophy, Hermann did not devote much attention to the concept of *esse* (to be). At the beginning of his first book of *De Essentiis*, he defines it as being of a simple substance and having an immutable nature which does not permit any change. Much more important for Hermann's natural philosophy is the concept of essence, which he also mentions at the beginning of his first book. Essence always has the same nature and does not allow for any alteration of its own and natural sameness. Hermann's definitions of *esse* and *essentia* are under the strong influence of Boethius. According to Hermann, there are many essences, but they can all be reduced to five genera of essences: cause (*causa*), movement (*motus*), place (*locus*), time (*tempus*) and *habitudo*. Beyond these essences, there is nothing, in Hermann's opinion, that could be rightly called by this name.

Before Hermann, other philosophers had also tried to decide about the essences, and whether Hermann was influenced by any of them remains to be speculated on. R. Lemay<sup>4</sup> assumes that Hermann was influenced by al-Kindi's *De Quinque Essentiis* (On the Five Essences), which were matter (*materia*), form (*forma*), movement (*motus*), place (*locus*) and time (*tempus*), and that the number and order of Hermann's essences derived therefrom. C. Burnett<sup>5</sup> points out that there is no firm proof that Hermann was familiar with al-Kindi's treatise, and regards European scholars known to the school of Chartres as a more probable source of influence. The fact is that none of these scholars decided on the same five essences as Hermann. A. S. Kalenić,<sup>6</sup> therefore, supposed that Hermann's choice of the genera of essences was

<sup>4</sup> Richard Lemay, *op. cit.*, pp. 200–203.

<sup>5</sup> Charles Burnett, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

<sup>6</sup> Antun Slavko Kalenić, »Napomene uz tekst« u: Herman Dalmatin, *Rasprava o bitima* («Notes« in: Hermann of Dalmatia, *Treatise on the Essences*), Vol. 2, Pula, 1990, p. 171.

completely original, apart from the fact that Hermann chose five essences according to the tradition. I. Martinović<sup>7</sup> accepted and substantiated this opinion.

Hermann discusses the causes throughout his first book of *De Essentiis*, thus placing the greatest emphasis on the first genus of essences. He first listed Aristotle's causes, i.e. the efficient cause (*causa efficiens*), that from which something comes to be – form (*forma*) and that in which something comes to be – matter (*materia*). Only Aristotle's fourth cause was missing – the final cause (*causa finalis*) but Hermann obviously included it, since he implicitly mentioned it in his work. What are the essences in the five genera and what are their roles in Hermann's system of natural philosophy will be shown further on in the text. The concept of essence is central to Hermann's system of natural philosophy, and he most probably wanted to underline its importance by giving his work the title *On the Essences*, even though he discussed various points of natural philosophy in it. Having expounded his philosophical tenets, he proceeds with a description of the creation of the universe, its coming-to-be, and finally discusses all the phenomena in it.

Hermann holds that God as the primordial cause (*causa primordialis*) creates principles (*principia*) out of nothingness, and these principles are: the efficient cause (*causa efficiens*), matter and form. The efficient cause gives movement to the universe, the material principles are the elemental seeds, while the form is derived from God. From the principles, the whole universe comes into existence and is immediately fully formed, because matter and form appear in the same instant. Hermann calls this coming-to-be of the universe »primary generation« (*primaria generatio*) and the resulting universe »primary *genitura*«. The primary *genitura* is immutable and not subject to death. This immutable universe is called the »body of the universe« (*mundanum corpus*).

The secondary generation follows the primary one. It is generated from the same principles, but in this case God uses the primary *genitura* as his instrument, which is now called the secondary cause. The first *genitura* or God's instrument is nature itself, which stimulates the secondary generation of the new or secondary *genitura*. The first *genitura* appears at once, while the secondary *genitura* extends in time and it is a perpetual and continuous process. In the secondary *genitura*, the changing part of the universe appears which is situated in the lower, terrestrial part of the universe.

<sup>7</sup> Ivica Martinović, »Ontički red u opisima Hermana Dalmatina (Ontic Order in the Descriptions of Hermann of Dalmatia)«, *Contributions to the Study of the Croatian Philosophical Heritage*, Vol. 19, No. 1–2, Zagreb, pp. 9–30 (especially pp. 12–13).

Only essence can appear in the first *genitura*, while substance, which is subject to change, appears in the secondary *genitura*, in the lower universe. The elemental seeds, as material principles, may be contained in essence and substance.

The elemental seeds are the first stage in the composition of the universe. They are divided into male and female seeds and are arranged in an order ensuring harmony. They are: dryness, cold, moisture and heat. Then the male and female seeds are joined and the elements are formed: earth, water, air and fire. These elements take up the whole universe, and not only the terrestrial part as Aristotle thought. However, although the celestial and the terrestrial parts are composed from the same seeds and elements, these two areas differ, since in the celestial part the seeds and the elements are arranged in such a manner that they cannot mix, while in the terrestrial part such mixing is possible. In this way, the essence in the celestial part remains unchanged.

In this respect Hermann criticizes the views of the medieval scientists and philosophers known under the name of *medici*, who claimed that the elements, earth, water, air and fire could be found only in the sublunar area, which was in accordance with Aristotle's original views. Aristotle thought that the four elements could be found only in the sublunar area, and that the celestial area was filled with a »fifth essence«. Hermann prefers the views of the so-called »astrologers« who saw the celestial and the terrestrial area as composed of the same elements. However, for Hermann, these elements are not yet bodies, but principles (*principia*) from which the bodies will be derived in the process of coming-to-be.

The elements in the lower world, in the substance, are arranged in a special way. After the male and female seeds have been joined and the elements have been made, God assigns to each of these »married« pairs a spherical form and places them in such a way that earth in spherical form occupies the central part, water surrounds the earth, and air and fire envelop the first two elements in succession. In this way, the four elements in the lower universe, in the substance, make the four parts of the substance, each of them having the form of a sphere. The lower universe or the substance is, therefore, arranged in four spheres. The essence in the upper, celestial universe is also divided into spheres. There are eight spheres of which seven belong to the planets, while the eighth one consists of three shells: the shell of the equator, the shell of the ecliptic, and the shell in which all visible fixed stars are situated. The seven planetary spheres belong to the Moon, Mercury, Venus, the Sun, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. Since the celestial area is made of the same elemental seeds from which the whole of the universe is made, they are married in the same way as elsewhere in the universe. The sphere of the Moon corresponds to water, the sphere of Mercury to earth, the sphere of Venus to

air, the sphere of the Sun to fire, the sphere of Mars to fire, the sphere of Jupiter to air, the sphere of Saturn to earth and the eighth sphere corresponds to water. However, the structure of the celestial spheres in terms of elements is more complex. The eighth sphere, regarded as a whole, corresponds to the element of water, but one of the shells of the eighth sphere, the one in which all the visible stars are situated and which is called the Zodiac, is divided into twelve parts, each of them corresponding to one element. Since there are only four elements, they are repeated three times within these twelve parts.

To these celestial spheres, God gave movement which belongs to the second genus of essence. This movement is therefore perpetual or, in mechanical terms, it is uniform and is not subject to any change. The eighth sphere as the outermost extreme moves uniformly, while the remaining seven spheres are given two movements of their own: the eccentric and the epicyclic movement. Each of these movements is perpetual and uniform, so that every celestial movement belongs to the second genus of essence.

The eighth and outermost sphere and the substance of the lower area are two extremes of the universe. Between the two extremes there are seven spheres which make the middle part of the universe. This middle part or the medium is of particular importance in Hermann's natural philosophy, being the mediator between the outer extreme and the substance, and the main factor in producing the secondary *genitura* in the lower universe. The eccentric and epicyclic movement of the planets provide a sufficient variety of motion in the upper universe to stimulate all kinds of different movements in the lower universe. Among these planets the Sun is the main mediator in stimulating the lower universe to change, while the Moon has a special position, being situated at the boundary between the upper and the lower universe. The other planets, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn, each have their role in influencing the lower universe.

The universe is, therefore, divided into two essentially different areas: the upper universe with all the essences providing stability and immutability, and the lower universe with the substance in which all changes take place. The upper universe or the area of essence is the active part as it excites the substance in the lower universe into movement and change. The lower part is passive and all the changes taking place in the substance are brought about by the active, upper part. The lower part must, therefore, be still and heavy so as to keep the central place in the universe. The upper part of the universe, or the area of essence, is light and turns around the substance.

Since the essence of the upper part is immutable and the seeds cannot mix, the structure of this area is definite. The situation is completely different in the substance of the lower part. The bodies which appear in this area must undergo different stages in the process of coming-to-be. First, according to a

given law, the elemental seeds are »married« to produce elements in the same way as in the essence of the upper universe. From the elements which are still principles (*principia*), the mixtures (*commixtio*) are produced, being the elements in a mixed state. The mixture is not yet a body, but a kind of »incorporeal body«. From the mixture, the composition (*compositum*) is derived and it is a body. The kinds of things are determined by the matter they have obtained from substance or essence. However, the individuality of things differs as regards external causes and form. Form is more important than matter where the individuality of things is concerned. Form and external causes are provided by the upper universe. God gave to this upper part, which is close to him, the planetary movement and the power to create form. The movement of the planets, which is the external cause or the »moving cause,« and the forms, now become the main factors in the coming-to-be of individual things. The middle part of the universe, the medium, is very important in this respect, and without it there cannot be any change or motion in the lower universe or in the substance.

Having presented two genera of essence, cause and movement, Hermann introduces two other genera, place (*locus*) and time (*tempus*). Place is determined by space, and time by movement. Hermann calls space every interval of the body within its boundaries, and the place of every object is determined by its boundaries. This equally applies to corporeal individual bodies and incorporeal things, both being within the universe. As regards place, every place is a segment of a continuous quantity.

Time is connected by circular movement and this movement distinguishes it from eternity. But, time is not part of eternity in the sense that eternity would be reduced if an interval of time was missing. Hermann's idea of time was based on Plato's *Timaeus*, but he supplemented Plato's views with his knowledge of astrology. Since Hermann considers time and movement to be closely related, it is obvious that he, like Plato, holds that there is no time without movement, which means that time begins with the creation of movement, i.e. the creation of the universe. In addition to that, Hermann, like Plato, regards time intervals as being in correspondence with three movements of the planets and stars, but he makes a distinction between these movements in the manner accepted in the astrological practice, of the Eastern authors in particular. Having established that different time intervals result from different celestial movements, he draws attention to the three different periods of movement of the planets and stars. The first periods, which are very noticeable, are related to the rotation periods of the Sun (year), the Moon (month) and the sky (day). The second periods, which are not so noticeable, are related to the periods of the five other planets. The third periods are related to the »perfect year« or the »great year«, which refers to the revolution of the spring equinox.

For Hermann, the concept of nature has two senses. In the first sense, the role of nature is that of God, the creator of the universe; this is the primordial cause which generates the primary *genitura*. In the second sense, the nature is the secondary cause which brings into being the secondary *genitura*. The process by which the secondary *genitura* is derived from the first *genitura* is governed by the immutable law of nature, called *habitudo*, which is also an essence because of its immutability. The process of reproduction of species also follows the immutable law of nature, and that is why animals produce offspring of the same species. However, the law of nature influences species in different ways, so that each species has its own law or *habitudo*. This means that an animal places a seed into another animal of its own kind, and because of its own *habitudo*, produces an offspring of the same kind.

In Hermann's natural philosophy, the five essences are not equally important. Three of them, cause, movement and *habitudo*, have a role of great importance in the primary and the secondary *genitura*, while time and place are less frequently mentioned in the description of the coming-to-be of the universe. Since he considers cause, movement and *habitudo* to be very important essences, a greater part of his exposition is devoted to them, especially to cause and movement.

Hermann built his system of natural philosophy mostly upon Aristotle's natural philosophy, with which he became acquainted through the work of Abu Ma'shar. He also introduced Platonist views, which he received from the West-European tradition, and many interpretations of the early medieval West-European philosophy. The concept of »marriage« or the joining of the seeds, for example, was taken from this tradition. The emanation of forms from the celestial area which influence the creation of individual things in the terrestrial area is closer to Platonism than Aristotelianism.

Hermann's attempt at reconciliation of certain Platonist concepts, which he adopted during his education, with some Aristotelian concepts, which came to his knowledge through Abu Ma'shar's work, is of great importance. Thus, among others, he often uses Plato's dichotomy of the Same (*Idem*) and the Different in reference to the divine essence and the real world respectively, after Boethius' work *De Institutione Arithmetica*. Immutable essence has the nature of Plato's *Idem*, while substance, being the opposite of essence, is identified with Plato's *Diversum*. What is the Same is active, what is Different is passive. Since in Hermann's system, the upper universe filled with essence is active, while the lower universe filled with substance is passive, Hermann easily established such a correspondence. That is why in his *De Essentiis* he uses the term *Idem* as a synonym for essence, and *Diversum* as a synonym for substance. In the same manner, Hermann uses Plato's terms for the sphere of the equator and the sphere of the ecliptic, calling them *Idem* and *Diversum* respectively.

Both terms, *Idem* for the sphere with the equator as its great circle, and *Diversum* for the sphere with the ecliptic as its great circle, derive from Plato's *Timaeus*. Plato claimed that the movement of the first sphere was simple and therefore had the nature of the Same. The second sphere is, according to Plato, complex and requires multiple division. That sphere is viewed as divided into layers, each of them being a separate planetary sphere, which means that the sphere of the ecliptic is fully related to the movement of the planetary spheres. That is why the second sphere has the nature of the Different. Although Hermann did not need to relate the planetary spheres to the sphere of the ecliptic, he followed Plato in pointing out the reasons why the sphere of the equator had the nature of the Same, while the sphere of the ecliptic had the nature of the Different. Like Plato, Hermann imagined the sphere of the Different to be inside the sphere of the Same, the axis of rotation of the sphere of the Different being tilted towards the axis of rotation of the sphere of the Same. Hermann thought, like Plato, that the movement of the sphere of the Different depended on the movement of the sphere of the Same.

The concept of *quadrivium* including arithmetics, geometry, music and astronomy was adopted by Hermann as part of the West-European tradition. This combination of disciplines was also closely related to the Platonist views existing in Western Europe in the Middle Ages. Hermann had to depend on Boethius in this respect, but he did not discuss the four subjects as a whole, nor did he use this concept as a framework for his exposition. However, in a certain manner, he did express his conviction that these fields were related. Of these fields of knowledge, astronomy was the most important for Hermann's system of natural philosophy and he devoted much attention to the movement of celestial bodies, the planets in particular. The other three subjects, arithmetics, geometry, and music were given less attention in his *De Essentiis*, arithmetics and geometry the least of all. However, some of Hermann's arguments reveal that he did study these three fields, but only in connection with astronomy.

Hermann expressly connects music with the movement of the planets. In a short passage at the end of the first book of *De Essentiis*, he maintains that the movements of celestial bodies constantly produce the music of the spheres, since every movement produces sound. According to Hermann, the celestial harmonies incite corresponding movements in the lower universe. This can be compared to the vibrating of one string which causes another to vibrate, too. The music of heavenly spheres, thus, creates a very strong bond between the celestial and terrestrial areas. As regards Hermann's view on the relation between the movements of the planets and the harmonies of sounds, he mostly drew upon Boethius' *De Institutione Musica*, but he also used other sources.



Hermann did not devote a similar passage to arithmetics or geometry, but he discussed the relation between the celestial movements and mathematics in the introduction to his translation of Ptolemy's *Planisphere*. There, he pointed out that the entire power and reason of planetary movements depended on number, measure and proportion, which are the primordial cause (*causa primordialis*) and also the final cause (*causa finalis*) in a mathematical discipline. He obviously connected arithmetics, geometry, music and astronomy in the way adopted in West-European natural philosophy of the early Middle Ages.

Hermann devoted much attention to the middle part of the universe, the medium, which is situated in the celestial area, between the eighth sphere and the terrestrial area. He placed particular emphasis on the medium, its influence on the terrestrial area and its role as mediator in the earthly phenomena, which has its origin in the astrological views of the Eastern authors and in Aristotle's idea of transmission of influence from the celestial area to the terrestrial area.

Hermann claimed that neither Plato nor Aristotle paid attention to the middle part of the universe. According to Hermann, Plato focused his attention to the primary generation or the origin of the universe, and failed to show any interest in the middle part of the universe. Indeed, Plato did not include the middle part in the process of development of the universe. In Hermann's opinion, Aristotle did not pay sufficient attention to this part of the universe either, because he concentrated exclusively on the final cause, and did not explain how the lower universe came into being through the mediation of its middle part. This is only partly true, since Aristotle claimed that the movements and forces derived from the prime mover and influenced the terrestrial area through the planetary spheres; the terrestrial area would be completely stationary and without any movement if there was no such influence. This shows that Hermann was not familiar with Aristotle's original works, *De Generatione et Corruptione*, physics or perhaps metaphysics. He must have learned about Aristotle's views in physics only through Abu Ma'shar's *Introductorium in Astronomiam*.<sup>8</sup> It is hardly probable that Aristotle's interpretation of the transmission of influence from the prime mover through the planetary spheres to the terrestrial area would have satisfied Hermann, since he wanted to provide a more comprehensive explanation. Aristotle did not use astrology in his interpretations, which certainly was not to Hermann's liking; Hermann found the ideas about correspondence between the movements of planets and the terrestrial phenomena in astrological texts of Eastern authors.

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<sup>8</sup> Richard Lemay, *op. cit.*, p. 215, note 3.

In Hermann's time, astrology was not unknown to Western Europe, but the prevailing astrological views could not provide explanations Hermann needed. Only in the Eastern sources could Hermann find the correspondence between movements of celestial bodies and terrestrial phenomena, and Abu Ma'shar's *Introductorium in Astronomiam* gave him the idea of connecting astrology with Aristotelianism. Astrological correspondences could easily be fitted into Aristotle's system of transmission of influences from the prime mover to the terrestrial area, since they could be interpreted as the influence of the celestial area on the terrestrial area. What this combination still lacked was an explanation of the mechanism of the influence transmission which could be successfully integrated into his system of natural philosophy. In this respect Hermann stressed the importance of the middle part of the universe and devoted much attention to the mechanism of influences. One of the first concerns of Hermann was to explain the role of the middle part in the coming-to-be of the universe and in the secondary *genitura*, especially in the changes of substance in the lower part of the universe. Although, in Hermann's opinion, Aristotle failed to turn his attention to the middle part of the universe, he still depended on Aristotle's belief that there was a transmission of influence from the celestial to the terrestrial area.

The upper or the celestial universe has twice as many spheres as the lower universe. In the celestial area, there are seven spheres of the seven planets and the eighth sphere which is the outermost extreme. But the seven spheres of the planets must be connected in some manner to the two completely different extremes. The middle part is therefore defined as that which is not the same as either of the extremes, nor different from them. Consequently, the medium should be of mixed nature. »Namely, that the bodies are divine, is a mark of celestial nature, and the fact that their movements are so different, shows the need of the lower universe, which being inactive, has to be prompted into action and dragged along into every movement of *genitura*.«<sup>9</sup>

The strongest among all the planets, the Sun, is situated in the middle of the mediator; its heat is of a very subtle nature, its rays penetrate from the centre and illuminate everything uniformly. As regards the position of the Sun, Hermann was influenced by Abu Ma'shar and quoted his arguments in support of this position. That is, if the Sun were nearer, it would burn the terrestrial area, and if it were farther away, it would not have a beneficial influence on the lower universe. In another point, Hermann disagrees with Abu Ma'shar and following the model of Heraclides Ponticus, he imagines that Mercury and Venus turn around the Sun. Hermann's system follows Abu

<sup>9</sup> Herman Dalmatin, *Rasprava o bitima (Treatise on the Essences)*, Pula, 1990, Vol. I, p. 231 (Latin text), Vol. II, pp. 98–99 (Croatian text).

Ma'shar's in assuming that the distance between the Sun and the Earth allows space for other planets, so that the Sun should be in the fourth position from the Earth. Between the Sun and the Moon there should be enough space left for Mercury and Venus to circle around the Sun. Only in this way, Hermann's model of planetary movements could be reconciliated with Abu Ma'shar's views.

The Moon is situated at the very boundary between the lower universe and heaven. The Sun and the Moon have a beneficial influence on the lower universe. The other mediators, or the planets, are arranged in a way that enables them to perform their service to the lower universe. Mars and Saturn are the planets which impede beneficial influences. Their bad influence is neutralized by Jupiter and Venus. The remaining planet Mercury serves everybody. The astrological concept of »bad« and »good« planets fully corresponds to the interpretation given by Sahl ibn Bishr in his astronomical work, the sixth part of which Hermann translated under the title of *Fatidica* in the year 1138.

Astrology was, thus, given an important place in the interpretation of the influence of planetary movements on the lower universe. For Hermann, as well as for Abu Ma'shar, astrology is a valid science which has its origin in the principles of natural philosophy, and relies on experiment, observation and experience. Therefore, it is the highest science on nature.<sup>10</sup> It is important to note that Hermann was among the first, if not the very first, to give such an important role to astrology in Western Europe. From the 12th century onwards, the scientists considered the astrological law to be the fundamental law of the universe.

As it has been mentioned earlier, the changes in the terrestrial area take place as a result of the changes in the substance which are caused by forms derived from the essence and by the movement of the planets. The forms derive from the highest part of heaven, while the matter in which changes take place is in the lowest part of the universe. The middle part of the universe, which is situated between the highest and the lowest part, joins form and matter and brings about the secondary generation.

Metals originate from the combination of two elements, earth and water, with the involvement of form, since the form of individual metals is determined by the planets. Hence the correspondences between metals and planets: gold corresponds to the Sun, silver to the Moon, lead to Saturn, tin to Jupiter, iron to Mars, copper to Venus, and mercury to Mercury. In addition to that, the colours of metals are also related to the planets: black is related

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<sup>10</sup> See Richard Lemay, *op. cit.*

to Saturn, green to Jupiter, red to Mars, yellow or lemon yellow or bluish-grey to the Sun, white to Venus; violet, dark blue or blue are the colours of Mercury, while grey is the colour of the Moon.

Metals are generated inside the earth. Only fire can pull out solid matter from the earth. Since the fire from the upper area is too far away to do it, another fire must be brought into direct contact with this matter. Fire changes the earthy matter into the watery matter, but the exposure to fire must not last longer than necessary, since the earthy matter may turn into air. When the action of fire ceases, the watery or melted matter begins to harden, taking the form of its genus in accordance with the influence of the planet which corresponds to this genus.

However, metals and minerals can also be generated in another way. Some minerals and metals develop from water, which can be inside the earth or on its surface. It is not clear how Hermann conceived this transformation, but it is possible that his explanation was related to Aristotle's. Hermann associates vaporous exhalation introduced by Aristotle, with water, which is an essential component of some minerals. This interpretation could also be related to the traditional view that all metals derive from mercury which is identified with water.<sup>11</sup>

Plants originate from three elements, earth, water and air, with the involvement of forms, which come from the upper part of the universe. Since plants do not contain fire, they are insentient, but animate. Animals are generated by mixing the four elements, earth, water, air and fire, and with the involvement of forms, so that animals are animate and sentient. There is one more difference between the generation of plants and that of animals. A plant is generated when its seed is placed between earth, water and air, while for an animal to come into being, its seed, which mediates in the mixing of the elements, earth, water, air and fire, should be placed inside another animal of the same kind. This means that an animal places its seed only into an animal of the opposite sex. Whether plants or animals are concerned, when the seed is placed, the law of a particular species, *habitudo*, is introduced into the elements, so that an offspring of the same kind could be produced.

Man is also made of four elements, earth, water, air and fire, just like an animal. But, since he is a rational being, he is also made up with some essence. Human beings are, therefore, made up from substance and essence, and are of the Different (*Diversum*) and the Same (*Idem*) nature, so that they are partly subject to change and partly unchanging. The part that is subject to change, the human body, is governed by the corporeal spirit, which is situated

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<sup>11</sup> Charles Burnett, *op. cit.*, pp. 329–330.

in the brain, while the corporeal functions are conditioned by the planets and signs of the Zodiac. Man's incorporeal (rational) soul was instilled into him directly by God. This soul is endowed with free will and reason. Man's body and soul are held together by harmony between the corporeal spirit and the rational soul.<sup>12</sup>

The planets, therefore, influence only the human body, including all the stages of its development. This is consistent with Hermann's view that the movement of the planets can influence only the substance in the terrestrial area. The planets cannot have any effect on the unchanging soul endowed with free will. This interpretation, which follows from Hermann's natural philosophy, is also consistent with the prevailing view on astrology in the Western Europe in the early Middle Ages and in Hermann's time. Namely, Isidore of Seville refused to accept the part of astrology supporting the idea that the planets could have an influence on the soul, and which was used to predict future from the movement of the planets; according to him, only the part of astrology dealing with natural processes was acceptable. There is no doubt that Hermann's view is fully in accordance with this opinion, as he supported astrology within the framework of natural philosophy.

From Hermann's view that man is made from the substance of four elements and some essence, and that one part of him is mutable and failing and the other part of him is constant and unchanging, follows that the man's soul, being made of essence, is not subject to decay. It is immortal, and this is what distinguishes man from animals. This theological assertion also follows from Hermann's natural philosophy.

Hermann combined his natural philosophy with Christianity. God creates the first *genitura* and later on intervenes only in particular cases, for example he instills a soul into man. However, Hermann's interpretation greatly differs from the interpretation given by his master Thierry of Chartres in his work *De Sex Dierum Operibus*. Thierry linked his Platonist philosophy and natural philosophy with the Bible, and placed natural philosophy within the context of the Biblical creation of the universe in six days, and he even stressed this point by the title. Hermann's approach was different. He respected Christianity, but he viewed the functioning of the universe as governed by God's instrument, which is the primary *genitura* or nature itself. The interpretation of natural processes in Hermann's natural philosophy is based on an approach from the point of view of natural science. Therefore, Hermann differs from his master Thierry in the manner he combines Christianity with natural philosophy. They both have Christian beliefs, but Hermann's system of natural

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<sup>12</sup> Charles Burnett, *op. cit.* p. 340.

science and natural philosophy functions in accordance with natural laws and processes and represent an autonomous whole.

TRANSLATED BY BRANKA ŽODAN

## PRIRODNOFILOZOFSKI POGLEDI HERMANA DALMATINA

### *Sažetak*

U radu se prikazuje ustrojstvo Hermanove prirodne filozofije, a osobito kakvu ulogu u njoj imaju njegovih pet esencija: uzrok, gibanje, mjesto, vrijeme i *habitudo*. Ističe se protivnost nebeskog i zemaljskog područja i uloga srednjeg dijela svijeta, tzv. *mediuma*, u prirodnim procesima zemaljskog svijeta. U svezi s tim opisuje se mehanizam postanka i pretvorbe pojedinih dijelova zemaljskog svijeta tumačeći ga u sklopu Hermanovih prirodnofilozofskih gledišta. Posebna se pozornost posvećuje ulozi aristotelizma u Hermanovoj prirodnoj filozofiji, te Aristotelovoj i Platonovoj komponenti u Hermanovu prirodnofilozofskom sustavu. Ukazuje se kako se u Hermanovoj prirodnoj filozofiji povezuju aristotelovski i platonički pojmovi. Konačno se pokazuje kako se astrologija uklapa u Hermanov prirodnofilozofski sustav.

## THE NATURAL-PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS OF HERMANN OF DALMATIA ON THE HARMONY OF PLANETS AND THE NATURE OF MATTER

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### *Introduction*

Under the impact of different schools of philosophy, theories, cultures and religions, Hermann of Dalmatia developed his own system of natural philosophy and his own views on the influence of planets on the earthly, material world. Haskins regards Hermann's major work *On the Essences (De Essentiis)* as a mixture of Platonism (as it was taught at schools in Paris and Chartres in the first half of the 12th century), Aristotle's *Physics*, and Hermes' Neoplatonism (1). Our study shows that Hermann also adopted some tenets of the Hermetic theory, or the so-called sacred art of *chemeia*, particularly those aspects which were closely related to astrology. On several occasions he mentioned Hermes Trismegistos and his *Tabula smaragdina*, and the tenet, »One is all, all follows from it, all is in it.« Hermann became acquainted with Hermetic views through the works of Zosimus and Olympiodorus, and through those of Arab philosophers.

It has been accepted in the field of European history of science that the first reliable reference to Hermes can be found in the work of the German philosopher, theologian and natural scientist Albertus Magnus (1193–1280). The fact is, however, that Hermann of Dalmatia mentioned Hermes as early as 1143 (2).

The sacred art of *chemeia* was developed in the temples of ancient Egypt, as a means of melting metal and extracting plant juices, while a theoretical explanation was supplied by Greek natural philosophy. According to this theory any transformation of matter is possible, since the primordial matter of all natural things is one and the same, and only the properties and qualities are different and they can be changed or »imposed«. The aim of transformation is to improve properties because gold, which is perfect, can also be obtained from base metal.

Progressing from *chemeia* to alchemy, under the influence of Neoplatonist views, the Arabs combined this art with a spiritual state. As a result, it became more nature-oriented on the one hand, while on the other, it became associated with the incorporeal. From this combination of influences a particular cosmological theory emerged, according to which there was a law regulating all the processes in the terrestrial and the celestial worlds. The study of this law included comparison between natural phenomena and divine attributes. In the 3rd century, Zosimus Panopolis, a follower of Hermes, wrote: »Only a man who becomes conscious of God can penetrate into the secrets of nature.« Zosimus greatly contributed to the development of cosmological views on the harmony of metals and planets. At that time only seven metals were known: gold, silver, mercury, copper, iron, tin and lead (the Egyptians and the Greeks were familiar with six of them and the Roman Plinius added mercury as the seventh), and they were matched with the seven known planets: the Sun, the Moon, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn (3).

The idea that there were chemical and alchemical laws by which metals were melted and transformed led to the conclusion that there were also laws governing the motion and the influence of planets; and vice versa, the law by which the planets moved suggested the existence of laws regulating the material and failing universe.

### *Hermann's views*


Like Abu Ma'shar, Hermann thought that Mars and Saturn disturbed beneficial influences, and he believed that they were situated at an approximately equal distance from the Moon and the Sun. In order to neutralize their bad influence, Jupiter was placed in front of Saturn, while Venus was placed in front of Mars, with Jupiter being as far from the Sun as Venus was from the Moon (see Fig. 1).

Hermann explained disharmony between Mars and Venus in the following way: »There is a discord between Mars and Venus concerning copper, because Venus was given brass when lots were drawn. And since brass is part of copper, in the same way as steel is part of iron, we consider this distribution appropriate.« (4, p. 147) Hermann most probably came to this conclusion on the basis of alchemical experience. Alchemists obtained various alloys by melting different metals or their ores, only copper could not be alloyed with iron regardless of their proportions. This experience confirmed the theory of harmony between the seven planets and seven metals known at the time. Since copper was in harmony with Venus, and brass was an alloy of copper and zinc, the same harmony was attributed to brass.

No discord or incompatibility was discovered between other metals. They could be alloyed and mixed by melting. Similarly, no disharmony was perceived



among other planets. Or, as Hermann says: »Therefore, as soon as fire is removed, the melted substance is hardened by the force of earth or water, and returns to its maternal firmness, resorting to the forms of its genus – if indeed gold belongs to the Sun, silver to the Moon, lead to Saturn, tin to Jupiter, iron to Mars, copper to Venus, and mercury to Mercury, mercury being less stable than the rest, as suited to the nature of Mercury.« (4, p. 147) (see Fig. 1).



**Fig. 1.** The idea of harmony between the planets was present in natural philosophy from the 12th until the beginning of the 17th century. Such a sketch has not been found among Hermann's manuscripts, but considering his views, he must have imagined the relations between the planets and metals in the same way.

The planets are situated in the middle part of the universe, the Sun, Mercury and the Moon having the greatest bearing on the relations and the shaping of the terrestrial world. Mercury corresponds to the primordial matter from which everything derives. This is the »body« or essence of all inorganic and organic substance of the terrestrial, failing universe. Hermann calls this primordial matter, *aqua geniture*, and describes it as »warm moving water, which was conceived inside the earth by celestial rays«.

The entire universe, which was conceived from elemental seeds, is divided into two areas: the first is celestial and unchanging, while the second is terrestrial and failing. The former includes seven planets, where the divine active force or supreme power is situated, disposing of the seeds in which the forms and properties of all things on the Earth are contained. Hermann calls the seven mediums (*septem media*), i.e., the seven planets, the mediators between the highest and the lowest extreme, so that the universe is arranged »in nine circles or rather spheres«. Because of different needs, the supreme force is situated within the celestial spheres and is like a plant nursery, a seminary (*seminarium*), for all things, the seeds carrying the forms of their genera: »The primary generation produced the lower universe with as many complete parts as there were elemental seeds. Since it was appropriate that the upper universe should be twice as large as the lower universe, he placed seven mediators between the two extremes, the reason for this being the number which was almost the knot of all things, as Tullius clearly understood when he described the whole order in the following words: »All is connected by nine circles or rather spheres,« and stressed the importance of the ties of this strongest knot perceived as being full of all kinds of musical proportions.« (4, p. 97).

According to Hermann, properties of things are mutable and can be changed under the influence of celestial spheres. Hermann's properties correspond to those of Aristotle, warm, cold, dry and moist, which constitute elements, earth, water, air and fire. Hermann further says: »I do not describe the transfer of form, but the forming of substance. The forming of substance is not about the transfer of form, but rather about the attainment of properties.« (4, p. 80).

What is the difference, according to Hermann, between the animate and the inanimate substances of the terrestrial universe? The corporeal existence of all things derives from *aqua geniture*, which carries the elemental seeds of all things. There are two kinds of seeds, both of them of the generating kind, but the higher sort is the »parental seed«. It forms organic animate substance under the influence of the planets, father Sun and mother Moon. The efficient cause which brings about the union of elemental seeds is the force originating from Venus. The joining or mating of the seeds takes place in *aqua geniture*, which originates from Mercury. That is why Venus is situated between the Sun

on one side, and Mercury and the Moon on the other. This force has a double nature, it is different and adequate, and »it can repulse something, only to join it with something else«. Hermann's *genera* of things (*genera rerum*) mostly correspond to Aristotle's species. Hermann distinguishes kinds of metal, *species metalli*, kinds of germs (and therefore plants), *species germinis*, and kinds of animals, *species animalis*. In his opinion, the material universe was built by stages, and the tiniest particles in plants and animals first appeared in the manner of metal, *more metalli*: »The first kind of movement is obviously related to metal, the second to plants, and the third to animals, although this law is not fully observed in some insignificant particles in plants and animals because they were born in the manner of metal.« (4, p. 142)

According to Hermann, the celestial forces can change properties and transform substance: »To avoid making a wrong impression, that we commit violence while making corporeal substance out of incorporeal nature, it should be kept in mind that this is not a transfer of form, but rather the transformation of substance. In this way, the inanimate becomes the animate, the insentient becomes the sentient, and finally the irrational becomes the rational.« (4, p. 83).

\* \* \*

From the point of view of natural philosophy and alchemy in particular, Hermann's views on the transformation and change of the properties of substance are very interesting. The theory of the origin of metals, formed under the influence of Neoplatonism, was well-established as shown by most of alchemical texts. In his commentary to Plato's *Timaeus*, Proclus wrote: »Gold and silver and every metal grow, as all things do on the Earth, under the influence of heavenly gods and their emanation, gold corresponds to the Sun, silver to the Moon, lead to Saturn and iron to Mars. The origin of these metals is in heaven, but they lie on the Earth, and not in those which radiate this emanation. What is contained in matter will not be allowed into heaven. And although all things derive from all gods, each of them has something specific, one belongs to Saturn, the other to the Sun. People who care about these things, compare them and attribute different forces to them. These things are not, therefore, the gods' private property, but common property. They originate from all of them, but they do not have their seat in them, since the active forces do not need it. Moreover, they will be combined on the Earth through the emanation of gods.« (5)

The origin of metal was compared to the origin of life or to the development of an embryo in an animal's womb. Metals develop just like an embryo. They are born, they grow and develop in the interior of the Earth, and undergo a series of improvements from the imperfect to the perfect state.

Several centuries are required for this transformation and the process goes on continuously.

Departing from the theory of primordial matter from which the four elements were derived, earth, water, air and fire, the alchemists considered every transformation to be possible. They believed that they could achieve, in an artificial way and in a much shorter time, what nature took centuries to produce; they believed they could make gold from a base metal in their laboratories. (6)

According to Hermann, metals are born from nonparental elemental seeds by several stages of genesis. The stages of genesis of metal correspond to the seven genera of metals. The most perfect of them is the seventh genus – gold. Other metals are lower, substitutional forms of this perfect form, and they all attempt to attain it. However, although Hermann speaks about the »life of metals« and different stages of their genesis, he considers them inanimate and without their own movement. Their genesis or progress from an imperfect genus to the perfect genus of gold takes place under the influence of heavenly, cosmic forces.

Considering alchemical beliefs, the most important for us is that Hermann distinguished natural from artificial »births« of metals, and therefore made distinctions between the »genera of metals« that come into existence naturally and those which developed artificially or, as Hermann says, in the secondary generation: »Part of the metal thickened in the first union of elements from harder substances and from a few of the same kind, and since it is nearest to the simple form, it is also the hardest, and it can endure beyond any life span of the failing progeny, and indeed of all that has been born so far, very little of what is generated by the secondary generation falls into this genus, and this is the difference we have already mentioned.« (4, p. 146)

Since metals are base, substitutional forms of gold and attempt to attain it, Hermann believes that artificial transformation is possible, but the result is not stable. Metals can be transformed into other metals as regards their properties, but not as regards their form: »This attribution is easier as regards the properties of form, rather than the nature of substance. There is a multiple inner force in all of them, which cannot be reduced to common nature, and it is hard to determine it by its properties, so that one can easily see that it does not derive from the nature of substance, but from the virtue of form.« (4, p. 146)

A base metal can be transformed into a metal with some properties of gold, but without the »form« of gold. Such artificial or secondary gold is not as stable as the natural, heavenly, cosmic gold. When melted, it returns to the genus of metal to which it belongs according to its celestial form. Thus Hermann says: »Since the whole secondary generation waited for the mixing to begin, and the upper primordial principles did not come down to the lower

ones of their own will, nor could they be brought down by the force of the lower ones, it was necessary to use the composite cause, as a pledge of the upper universe, to pull along the lower universe through the force of a tightening bond.« (4, p. 98)

The first to say that it was impossible to transform base metals into gold was the Persian alchemist and physician Ibn-Sina, better known as Avicenna (d. 1032) in medieval Europe. Independently of him, Hermann of Dalmatia expressed the same opinion. But these two opinions had no bearing on alchemical endeavours in medieval Europe. The idea of artificial transformation of metal prevailed. It was believed that the so-called »universal substance,« the philosophers' stone (*lapis philosophorum*), could change any base metal into gold. Even later on, in more modern times, the famous and meritorious natural scientists and authors of important theories, such as Robert Boyle (1627–1691) and Isaac Newton (1642–1727), believed in the transmutation of metal and tried to make gold in their laboratories. In medieval Europe, under the influence of Paracelsus, the alchemists turned their attention to medicine and tried to obtain a universal substance, believing that it could also heal, rejuvenate and increase longevity.

Of course, their efforts which lasted for many centuries were in vain. Hermann's view on the limitations of man's possibilities could, therefore, be justified. It is possible to change certain properties of metals, but their very nature or form could be changed only under the influence of celestial spheres and their forces. Transmutation is possible, but only natural, cosmic transmutation, involving the celestial spheres and their active forces, and the forces of form deriving from the stars.

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2. R. Taton (ed.), *Histoire Générale des Sciences*, vol. I, *La Science Antiquie et Médiévale*, Paris, 1957, pp. 259–264.
3. A. Reymond, *Histoire des sciences exactes et naturelles dans l'antiquité Gréco-Romaine*, Paris, 1924, pp. 199–208.
4. Herman Dalmatin, *Rasprava o bitima* (Treatise on the Essences), Croatian translation by Antun Slavko Kalenić, Book 2, Pula, 1990.
5. Proclus' view on the origin of metals is quoted according to: E. Ploss, H. Roosen Runge, E. Schipperges and H. Buntz, *Alchimia, Ideologie und Technologie*, Heinz Moos Verlag, München, 1970, p. 16.
6. S. Hutin, *L'Alchimie*, Paris, 1975, pp. 75, 76.

## PRIRODOZNAJSTVENA GLEDIŠTA HERMANA DALMATINA O SUGLASJU PLANETA I NARAVI TVARI

### *Sažetak*

Pokazano je da u svojim pogledima o naravi stvari Herman prihvaća kako platonistička, neoplatonistička i aristotelijanska gledišta, tako i spoznaje arapskih alke-mičara. To mu je omogućilo da razvije izvornu alkemijsku kozmologiju u kojoj je uspostavio svezu između nebeskog i zemaljskog svijeta na temelju osobitih »roditeljskih« zakonitosti. Protumačena je Hermanova odredba sedam nebeskih sfera po kojoj su one »rasadnik« ili »sjemenište« anorganskih i organskih stvari zemaljskog svijeta. Ističući »roditeljski« utjecaj nebeskih sfera Herman je pored arapskog alke-mičara i liječnika Ibn Sine (Avicena) bio jedan od rijetkih srednjovjekovnih autora koji je poricao mogućnost prijetvorbe nesavršenih stvari zemaljskog svijeta, osobito kovina, u savršene. Ta prijetvorba moguća je samo »višnjom silom« nebeskih sfera.

## THE ONTIC ORDER IN DESCRIPTIONS OF HERMANN OF DALMATIA

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Original paper  
UDC 19 Hermann of Dalmatia

### *The hermeneutical circle*

In the introductory chapters of his treatise *De essentiis* Hermann of Dalmatia has made two remarks of methodological character. Firstly, he claimed that the manuscript which he had completed in 1143 in Béziers as precisely stated in the *Explicit* of his manuscript, was not prepared for public circulation or transcribing. Addressing his old friend Robert of Ketton with whom he had spent many an hour from Chartres to Baghdad and back to the banks of Ebro (1131–1143),<sup>1</sup> Hermann wrote: »I at last took it up, and look, here is the work itself! It is unpolished and must be criticized by your own careful judgement before it goes forward into public.«<sup>2</sup> If we look for the

\* This is the enlarged version of the proceeding held at the *Znanstveni skup o Hermanu Dalmatinu u povodu 850. obljetnice djela 'De essentiis'* (*The symposium on Hermann of Dalmatia on the occasion of 850th anniversary of his work 'De essentiis'*). The symposium was diligently organized by the Croatian pan-European union in association with the Institute of History and Philosophy of Science of the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Croatian philosophical society and the Cultural centre of Pazin on 1 October 1993 in Pazin.

<sup>1</sup> See Šanjek's map entitled »Studijsko-znanstveni itinerarij Hermana Dalmatina (o. 1130 – ps. 1143) / The itinerary of Hermann of Dalmatia (c. 1130 – p. 1143)« in Franjo Šanjek, »Herman Dalmatin: Bio-bibliografski prilozi / Hermann of Dalmatia: bio-bibliographical contributions,« in *Herman Dalmatin, Rasprava o bitima*, Vol. I (Pula: Čakavski sabor, 1990), pp. 7–100, on p. 24.

<sup>2</sup> *Hermannus Secundus, De essentiis*, c. 4,1; B 58rH–58vA in: Herman Dalmatin, *Rasprava o bitima*, latinski tekst uspostavio, hrvatski prijevod izradio, kritički komentar i napomene uz tekst napisao Antun Slavko Kalenić / critical edition, Croatian translation and commentary by Antun Slavko Kalenić (Pula: Čakavski sabor, 1990); Latin original in Vol. I on p. 203: »Ecce munus ipsum offero rude quidem ac tuo ipsius, antequam in publicum prodeat, examine castigandum.« – I shall keep to the reference marks introduced by Kalenić who edited the text of Hermann's treatise based on the most complete and legible Oxford manuscript: the first number signifies chapter (*caput*, abbreviated c.), the second number denotes sentence within that chapter. Burnett's reference marks are also enclosed for the readers of Burnett's critical edition.

literal meaning of these words, then it might be concluded that Hermann had the intention of improving the text due to Robert's critical remarks which unfortunately never took place. All the manuscripts preserved to the day prove that the text addressed to Robert was actually the final version of the treatise *De essentiis*. Had he really had the intention of embettering it, difficulties in understanding the text would most certainly have risen, of which two translators of Hermann's treatise are most competent to comment on: Charles Burnett, who translated it into English and Antun Slavko Kalenić into Croatian. If we try to grasp Hermann's address to Robert metaphorically, with every reason since the whole introduction of Hermann's treatise is conceived on a metaphor,<sup>3</sup> thus it might be gathered that he wanted to speak of his project. In relation to the instruction from the preface to Boethius' work *De arithmetica libri duo* serving as the first textbook in the *quadrivium*, Hermann reminded of the importance of examination (*examen*) prior to its forwarding before the public (*ares publicae*), particularly if the research procedure does not astipulate with the learned sentence (*doctae sententiae astipulatio*).<sup>4</sup>

Hermann's second comment pertains to the order of interpretation. Hermann has decided on the circular flow as to start off from whatever essence, »if that point is the origin for everything else« (*si qua est cunctis aliis origo*; c. 7,9; B 58vG) and finally to terminate in the same point »having completed the flow as if in a circle« (*tamquam in girum expleto cursu*; c. 7,9; B 58vG). What are the reasons for Hermann's insistence upon the circular flow? »That which is proposed would be established from the entirety« (*ut ea quae proposita sunt ex integro constituentur*; c. 7,8; B 58vG). Therefore, the method of interpreting a text of Antique rhetoric is in question here, referred to as the *hermeneutical circle* in philosophical hermeneutics. Hermann was primarily concerned with the problem *how* to achieve the circular flow beginning with the first essence and terminating again in that point, and not the very achievement itself. »If« in the presupposition »if an essence is the origin for all other essences« implies that in Hermann's approach to ontology, the method precedes the descriptions of ontic order.

<sup>3</sup> Cfr. Antun Slavko Kalenić, »Funkcija metafore u uvodu u *Biti* Hermana Dalmatina / The function of metaphor in the introduction to *De essentiis* by Hermann of Dalmatia,« *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine* 17 (1991), pp. 107-116.

<sup>4</sup> Boethius, »Praefatio,« in *De arithmetica libri duo*, PL 63, ed. Jacques Paul Migne (Parisiis, 1847), cc. 1079-1168, in c. 1079A14-B1: »Vides igitur ut tam magni laboris effectus, tuum tantum expectet examen, nec in aures prodire publicas, nisi doctae sententiae astipulatione nitatur.« Cfr. Charles Burnett, »Commentary,« in Hermann of Carinthia, *De essentiis*, a critical edition with translation and commentary by Charles Burnett, *Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters* 15 (Leiden-Köln: E. J. Brill, 1982), pp. 237-345, on p. 240.



From this methodological starting-point, the significance of establishing the first essence and the order of all the succeeding ones is of utmost importance. Hermann has classified the essences under five genera in the following order: »cause, movement, place, time, relation« (*causa, motus, locus, tempus, habitudo*; c. 6,7; B 58vC). This sequence demands consideration of the presupposition »if whatever essence is the origin for everything else.« Namely, the cause should be proved that it *is* and, above all, that it is the *origin* of all other essences.

Hermann's selection of essences has been diversely interpreted. Haskins determined no evident relations between Hermann's treatise and al-Kindi's writing *De quinque essentiis* with the different catalogue of essences: matter, form, movement, place, time (*hyle, forma, motus, locus, tempus*). Haskins stressed two essential differences: al-Kindi's catalogue does not coincide with that of Hermann, furthermore, it is closer to Aristotle's catalogue.<sup>5</sup> On the contrary, Lemay persisted in proving Hermann's being under direct influence of al-Kindi's writing. According to Lemay, Hermann started off the treatise with classification of essences which truly differs from al-Kindi's, later to have been changed due to his Christian approach, introducing divine cause as the prime essence and absorbing not only al-Kindi's sequence but his interpretation as well.<sup>6</sup> Burnett criticized Lemay for failing to put forward the proof of Hermann's knowledge of al-Kindi's writing *De quinque essentiis*, having rightly pointed to Hermann's closer sources in Western Europe: Boethius and the commentators of his works at the cathedral school in Chartres, Hermann's teacher Thierry in particular.<sup>7</sup> Boethius' catalogue of essences reads: »qualities, quantities, forms, magnitudes, parvitutes, equalities, relations, acts, dispositions, times, places and whatever else found to be related to body.«<sup>8</sup> Therefore Burnett concluded that Hermann paraphrased here the beginning of Boethius' work *De institutione arithmetica*, although their classifications differ but in three essences: »relations, places, times.«

To my opinion, Kalenić has justly concluded that Hermann's catalogue of five essences »does not correspond to any of the known classifications except

<sup>5</sup> Charles Homer Haskins, »Hermann of Carinthia,« in Haskins, *Studies in the history of mediaeval science* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1924), pp. 43–66, on pp. 56–57.

<sup>6</sup> Richard Lemay, *Abū Ma'šhar and Latin aristotelianism in the twelfth century: The recovery of Aristotle's natural philosophy through Arabic astrology* (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1962), pp. 197–203, referring to the texts in c. 8,7 and c. 16,4–5; B 59rB and B 60rD–E.

<sup>7</sup> Burnett, »Commentary,« pp. 239–240.

<sup>8</sup> Boetius, *De arithmetica libri duo*, l. 1, c. 1, PL 63, c. 1080D1–5: »Haec autem sunt qualitates, quantitates, formae, magnitudines, parvitates, aequalitates, habitudines, actus, dispositiones, loca, tempora, et quicquid adunatum quodammodo corporibus invenitur.«

for being in concordance with the tradition of five.«<sup>9</sup> Hermann's catalogue deviates a great deal from that of al-Kindi and Boethius alike. Discrepancies with regard to the latter draw greater attention as Hermann had undoubtedly pursued Boethius' work in the course of his studies at Chartres and Paris. Whether or not Hermann had been acquainted with al-Kindi's writing is yet to be established. There is a major difference between Hermann's and Boethius' understanding of essence. While Boethius' selection of essences is a mere catalogue in which the properties of the bodies have not been classified according to their importance but remain open for further discussion »in case whatever may be found in relation to bodies,« Hermann's choice rests upon five genera of essences, what is more, sequence of genera, although he cautiously states »that the essences can be included primarily under five genera« (*quinque principaliter generibus comprehendi posse videntur*, c. 6,6; B 58vC). Moreover, the idea that a treatise about the essences should develop circularly from the essence established to be the origin to the terminating essence having thus completed the circle (c. 7,9; B 58vG) testifies of Hermann's sequence of essences being considerably different from other medieval catalogues and classifications prior to his. Hermann's sequence of essences is original particularly in its hermeneutical approach.

The first book of Hermann's treatise deals with the first essence: cause. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, this part of Hermann's treatise involves chapters 6 to 17 of the text edited by Antun Slavko Kalenić in the third edition of *De essentiis*.<sup>10</sup> In Hermann's considerations the cause does not stand for itself but is understood in relation to consequence or effect. That is

<sup>9</sup> Antun Slavko Kalenić, »Napomene uz tekst / Commentary,« in Herman Dalmatin, *Rasprava o bitima*, Vol. II, pp. 167–219, on p. 171.

<sup>10</sup> The corresponding text has so far been published in three editions of Hermann's treatise *De essentiis* as follows: Hermann de Carintia, *De essentiis*, edicion preparada y anotada por el P. Manuel Alonso SI (Comillas: Pontificia Universitas Comillensis, 1946), pp. 25,14–33,31, ff. 91va–93va; Hermann of Carinthia, *De essentiis*, a critical edition and commentary by Charles Burnett (Leiden–Köln: E. J. Brill, 1982), ff. 58vB–60rF, pp. 76–89, the commentary on pp. 241–249; Herman Dalmatin, *Rasprava o bitima*, Latin text in Vol. I on pp. 203–211, Croatian translation in Vol. II on pp. 68–75, the commentary in Vol. II on pp. 171–176. In Alonso's edition the first number denotes the page of the *editio princeps*, the second number is the line reference on that page, whereas the margins bear the manuscript leaf marks of the Bodleian Library (1423). In Burnett's edition, however, the number denotes the leaf, abbreviations *r* or *v* stand for *recto/verso*, capital letters A to H signify eight passages on the page of the manuscript from the 12th century belonging to the Biblioteca Nazionale in Naples. Alonso's and Burnett's marks refer to the external features of the manuscript while those of Kalenić, as I have previously stated in note 2, are guided by the very content of the text which I have therefore decided to follow. Cfr. Antun Slavko Kalenić, »De questionibus quae sunt de oratione scriptoris restituenda veluti principales: Prolegomena,« in Herman Dalmatin, *Rasprava o bitima*, Vol. I, pp. 153–198, particularly on pp. 155–157.

the method by which Hermann described the ontic order. Each description reveals a new level of meaning, new inspiration or fresh points of view. The study of Hermann's descriptions of the ontic order broadens the knowledge concerning cause as the first essence in Hermann's sequence.

### *The first description of the ontic order*


In the first description of the ontic order Hermann begins with the definition of the *esse*: »*Esse* is called that which preserves a simple substance and the same nature without changing, and never suffers anything alien or other« (c. 6,1; B 58vB). Hermann's starting-point coincides with that of Boethius: »*Esse* is that which increases neither intentionally nor decreases by retraction, nor changes through variations, but is preserved by its own force relying upon the aids of its nature.«<sup>11</sup> The coincidence between Hermann's and Boethius' approaches can be observed in the deduction of the concept of essence. Those things »which are always in the same state of their nature« (*quae in eodem semper sunt naturae suae statu*, c. 6,2; B 58vB) are the things »which accept no injury to their proper and natural constancy« (*quae ... nullam tamen propriae et naturalis constantiae suae iniuriam patientia*, c. 6,3; B 58vC), they which are »perfect in their substance and complete by nature« (*in substantia sua perfecta naturaque absoluta*, c. 6,9; B 58vD). Therefore, since these things are, they are properly called essences by Boethius and Hermann. Although they both introduce the concept of essence in the same manner, Boethius and Hermann differ, as I have already explained, regarding the selection of essences and their approach to them.

In the following stage Hermann no longer agrees with Boethius when he describes the ontic order with a presupposition: »being perfect in their substance and complete by nature, the genera of essences lead all genitura into existence, so that without any of these no integrity of genitura would exist, neither, except for these, would any outside assistance be necessary.«<sup>12</sup> This

<sup>11</sup> Boethius, *De arithmetica libri duo*, l. 1, c. 1, PL 63, c. 1080C11–D1: »Esse autem illa dicimus, quae nec intentione crescunt, nec retractione minuuntur, nec variationibus permutantur, sed in propria semper vi, suae se naturae subsidiis nixa custodiunt.«

<sup>12</sup> Hermannus Secundus, *De essentiis*, c. 6,9; B 58vD: »quippe quae [= genera essentiarum] in substantia sua perfecta naturaque absoluta genituram quidem omnem ad esse conducunt, ut nec sine horum [generum] aliquo ulla constet geniturae integritas nec praeter haec [genera] extraneum aliquid necessarium sit adminiculum, ...« See Burnett's English translation of this most significant place as regards the change of punctuation in Hermann de Carinthia, *De essentiis* (1982), p. 77: »for it is these [= genera of essences] that, perfect in their substance, and consummate by nature, lead all genitura into existence, so that without any of these no wholeness of genitura would exist, neither, except for these, would anything outside be a necessary aid.«

argumentation contains Hermann's first description of the ontic order. First, Hermann distinctly analyses the relation *esse-essentia*: essence is not mere existence as it is and is as such, but brings its genitura to the existence (*ad esse*). In the first book of Hermann's *De essentiis* it is the sole place which additionally, apart from the definitions, elaborates the relation *esse-essentia*. Furthermore, Hermann here introduces the third concept *genitura* describing that which is to be generated, brought into being, created (Fig. 1).



**Figure 1.** Description of the ontic order in Hermannus Secundus, *De essentiis* (Béziers, 1143), c. 6,1–9; B 58vB–58vD.

While Burnett uses Latin word *genitura* complaining of the difficulty in finding an English equivalent, Kalenić has decided on the literal Croatian translation with the term *porod*. Finally, that presupposition explicates how five genera of essences lead all *genitura* into existence: by being perfect in their substance and complete by nature. Genera of essences must by all means be such as they, perfect in themselves, lead all the genera into existence characterized by diversity, inequality and dissimilarity, imperfection and inconstancy (c. 6,9; B 58vD). It should be noted that the opposite statement does not hold true: the imperfect does not generate the perfect.

However, due to the conciseness of his style, Hermann has yet to define some of the terms. The terms substance (*substantia*) and nature (*natura*) have already been used, but not defined within his definition of *esse* at the beginning of this description of the ontic order (c. 6,1; B 58vB). He also used them toward the end of argumentation (c. 6,9; B 58vD) assigning them to the genera of essences but failing to clarify them. Furthermore, he made the distinction between genera, implying the unchangeable, and species, implying the changeable, without attempting to justify his choice of terms. It seems that with such a selection of terms his intention was to emphasize the primary and the secondary according with Aristotle's statement in *Categories* (15a4–5):

»Genera are always primary in relation to species.« Despite his failing to clarify the meaning of some of his terms, Hermann of Dalmatia has succeeded in creating his own original description of the ontic order, different from Boethius', and presented at the beginning of the first book of *De essentiis*.

### *The ontic relation causa genitrix – genitum*

The second description of the ontic order in Hermann's treatise *De essentiis* arises from the relation between the generative cause and that which is generated.<sup>13</sup> The primary movement of matter and form, described as »a certain moderate relation of form coming together with matter« (*moderata quaedam formae cum materia coeuntis habitudo*, c. 7,8; B 58vF), Hermann understands as »the generation of all things« (*rerum omnium generatio*; c. 7,7; B 58vF). Interpreted in the cause-consequence relations, it reads: »nothing comes into being without a generative cause« (*nichil genitum sine causa genitrice*; c. 8, 1; B 58vG). In all generation it is necessary to understand a generating author and a moving cause (c. 8,2; B 58vH). This procedure can be repeated again just as everything which is later implies what is earlier. If such a pattern is followed, will it be possible to determine the initial term of the ontic chain and its nature? Therefore, it has to be concluded that »one« (*unum*) is the principle of all things. Hermann describes »one« in the following manner:

»For 'one' is prior to 'two', since unless one comes first there is nothing to make up two. Moreover, when there are two, there must also be one, but the opposite – that if there is one, there will be two – does not hold true.«<sup>14</sup>

Undoubtedly, it is essential here to determine whether the relation between one and two, as elaborated by Hermann, belongs to the mathematical, logical or ontic order. Taking into consideration the fact that Hermann's elaboration is actually a paraphrase of Aristotle's conclusions in *Categories* (14a29–35), as observed by Burnett and Kalenić in their commentaries of the treatise *De essentiis*,<sup>15</sup> it can, therefore, be concluded that Hermann here analyses the second out of five kinds of priorities as, according to Aristotle, it can be said to be prior (πρότερον) in relation to the other. This second sense

<sup>13</sup> See Hermannus Secundus, *De essentiis*, c. 8,1–9; B 58vG–59rB, in Herman Dalmatin, *Rasprava o bitima*, Vol. I, p. 205; Vol. II, pp. 69–70.

<sup>14</sup> Hermannus Secundus, *De essentiis*, c. 8,3–4; 58vH–59rA: »duobus namque prius est unum; nisi enim praecedat unum, nichil est, quod duo constituat. atque ubi duo, et unum est necessario, non vero convertitur, ut, si unum est, et duo fore necesse sit.«

<sup>15</sup> Burnett, »Commentary,« p. 244; Kalenić, »Napomene uz tekst,« p. 173.

of priority determines the meaning of being primary »in succession of being,«<sup>16</sup> implying: A is prior to B when existence of A does not necessarily imply the existence of B, although existence of B necessarily implies existence of A. That A is prior to B according to the second sense of priority is formulated in Latin as: »A is not converted to B in succession of being,«, implying that B is converted to A in succession of being.<sup>17</sup> When Hermann uses the expression »not verily converted« (*non vero convertitur*, c. 8,4), his meaning is guided by the Latin tradition of translating Aristotle's *Categories*: »the opposite implication does not verily hold true« in succession of being.

In Hermann's approach it is not sufficient to point to Aristotle's source only but to study the impact of Boethius' Latin translation and commentary which introduced Hermann to Aristotle's *Categories*. Burnett failed to point out this influence although he found it convenient to cite that very commentary of Boethius in some other occasions as he further included it in the catalogue of sources which Hermann had consulted in writing his *De essentiis*.<sup>18</sup> Here follows Boethius' translation of Aristotle's second sense of priority:

»Secondly, primary does not convert according to the succession of being, as one is prior to two: if there are two, that must imply that one exists, but if there is one, two do not necessarily exist. Therefore, one cannot be converted in succession of

<sup>16</sup> Cfr. recent translations and commentaries of the 12th chapter of Aristotle's *Categories*: John J. Cleary, *Aristotle on the many senses of priority* (Carbondale and Edwardsville: The Journal of the history of philosophy/Southern Illinois UP, 1988), translation with the commentary on pp. 22–32; Aristotel, *Kategorije*, preveo i priredio / translated and edited by Filip Grgić (Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, 1992), Greek text and Croatian translation on pp. 108–111; commentary on pp. 178–180. Both editors are convinced that Aristotle, in order to explain the phrase »τοῦ εἶναι ἀκόλουθῆσις« in Aristotle's original, »to implication of being« in Cleary's translation on p. 22, »prema slijedenju bitka« in Grgić's translation on p. 109, decided on one and two in the number system. Cleary gives an explicite formulation on p. 25: »By way of illustrating this kind of priority, Aristotle cites the relation between one and two in the number system,«, whereas Grgić uses cyphers in his commentary on p. 179. However, in his broad commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, Klaus Oehler simply disregards the meaning of his expression »in bezug auf die Reihenfolge des Seins«; he even fails to include the term into the index of the edition. See Klaus Oehler, »Anmerkungen,« in Aristoteles, *Kategorien* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1986), pp. 183–351, on pp. 338–339.

<sup>17</sup> Cfr. the terms cited in two major translations of Aristotle's *Categories* into Latin, the one of Boethius being most influential throughout the West in the Middle Ages, the other by Giulio Pace published in the late 16th century, influenced contemporary authors: »non convertitur secundum subsistendi consequentiam« in Boethius, *In Categorias Aristotelis libri quatuor*, PL 64, ed. Jacques Paul Migne (Parisiis, 1847), cc. 159–294, in c. 284B11–12; »non reciprocantur secundum existendi consecutionem« in Aristoteles, *Categoriae*, Iulio Pacio interprete, in *Aristotelis opera*, volumen tertium (Berolini: Academia Regia Borussia, 1831), pp. 1–8, on p. 7.

<sup>18</sup> Burnett, »The sources of the *De essentiis*,« in Hermann de Carinthia, *De essentiis* (1982), pp. 370–379, on p. 373.

being, but remains to conclude that the primary is that from which the succession of being is not converted.«<sup>19</sup>

Boethius starts his commentary with a new term: to be primary in the succession of being implies to be primary by nature (*natura*). Determined to explain this intricate concept, Boethius produces two examples, one being from the domain of mathematics, the other from logic.<sup>20</sup> In the first example Boethius expounds the relation between numbers one and two or between cyphres 1 and 2 (*unitas – binarius*). In accord with the Greek knowledge of natural numbers, Boethius has regarded that two can exist if only it consisted of two unities. In that sense, 2 requires 1. From the standpoint of Greek mathematics, the conversion does not hold true. The existence of one does not necessarily imply the existence of two. Or, using Aristotle's terminology, »the succession of being is not converted from one.« Therefore Boethius' conclusion reads: 1 is prior to 2.<sup>21</sup> In his mathematical example Boethius has made a true reproduction of Aristotle's deduction, managing to distinguish clearly Aristotle's reasoning from his own mathematical example, systematically using the pair *unum – duo* in his translation of the corresponding Aristotle's passage whereas in his mathematical example he employed the pair *unitas – binarius*. Boethius made exact distinction between mathematical and ontic order which cannot be said for a number of contemporary commentators of Aristotle's *Categories*.

Boethius has complemented his mathematical example with a logic one, too, depicting the relation *animal – homo* as a relation of two concepts of diverse content. If one starts off with the definition of man as »a rational animal« (*animal rationale*), appearing as early as in Seneca's letters to Lucilius,<sup>22</sup> it is possible, states Boethius, to conclude the following: if I utter man, I have said animal, if I utter animal, nothing is yet said of man. Nevertheless, Boethius failed to conclude: animal is prior to man in the succession of being. He used this example to point out the implication being true only in the order stated.

<sup>19</sup> Boethius, *In Categoria Aristotelis*, c. 284B11–C2: »Secundo autem quod non convertitur secundum subsistendi consequentiam, ut unum duobus prius est: duobus enim existentibus, mox consequens est unum esse, uno autem existente, non est necessarium duo esse. Idcirco non convertitur ab uno consequentia, ut sit reliquum, prius autem videtur illud esse a quo non convertitur essendi consequentia.«

<sup>20</sup> Boethius, *In Categoria Aristotelis*, c. 284C10–D15.

<sup>21</sup> Boethius, *In Categoria Aristotelis*, c. 284D6–8: »... idcirco quod binario non indiget unitas, sicut indiget erat unitate binarius. Quare prior est unitas binario:«

<sup>22</sup> Cfr. L. Annaeus Seneca, *Epistulae morales ad Lucilium*, 41,8: »Rationale enim animal est homo.«; 124,23: »Rationale animal es.«

Hermann of Dalmatia made no use of Boethius' examples, but remained loyal to Aristotle's deduction patterns. If one compares Aristotle's passage in Boethius' translation with Hermann's argumentation relating to the question of why *one* is the principle of everything, it can be noticed that Hermann has added but one sentence, the one containing the verb *constituere*, the key to understanding of Hermann's reasoning: »one is prior to two; for if one is not prior, there is nothing to make up two.« (c. 8,3; B 58vH) The source of Hermann's conclusion is not to be found in Boethius' commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, as he was evidently inspired by the thought of the Baghdad astrologer Abū Ma'shar from the 9th century. In *Introductorium in astronomiam*, translated from Arabic into Latin by Hermann in 1140, Abū Ma'shar reasons: »Being thus, everything generated must have a generator and everything composite must have a compositor which distinguishes the genera and species of all things.«<sup>23</sup> Hermann's assertion at the beginning of his consideration »nothing generated without the generative cause« can, in accord with Abū Ma'shar's conclusion, be extended to the statement »nothing composite without the compositor«. The translator of Abū Ma'shar's astronomical work understood the term *compose* (*constituere*) as part of ontic and not mathematical nor logic order.

In Hermann's concise paraphrase (c. 8,3–4; B 58vH) inspired by Aristotle, aided by Boethius' translation and enriched with Abū Ma'shar's insight, the

<sup>23</sup> Albumasar, *Introductorium in astronomiam*, translated into Latin by Hermann of Dalmatia (Augustae Vindelicorum: Erhardus Ratdolt, 1489), primi libri capitulum tertium »De effectuum qualitate,« f. 16v: »Quae cum ita sint est habere genitorem omne genitum, omneque compositum compositorem discernentem inter genera et species omnium.« I have consulted the copy of the Augsburg edition in the Library of the Dominican monastery in Dubrovnik with shelf mark 35–11–19 adl. 3. See the description of this incunabulum in: Josip Badalić, *Incunabule u Narodnoj Republici Hrvatskoj / The Incunabula in the People's Republic of Croatia* (Zagreb: JAZU, 1952), p. 45, n. 27; Šime Jurić and Franjo Šanjek, »Zbirka incunabula dominikanskih knjižnica u Hrvatskoj / The collection of incunabula in Dominican libraries of Croatia,« *Croatca christiana periodica* 9 (1985), pp. 123–199, on pp. 131–132, n. 5. Kosta Vojnović was the first to catalogue all the incunabula preserved in the Library of the Dominican monastery in Dubrovnik in 1892 but failed to recognize the importance of this very incunabulum. Cfr. Kosta Vojnović, »Prilozi k arhivalnijem pabircima dubrovačkijem / Contributions to the Ragusan archival gleanings,« *Starine* 28 (1896), pp. 1–96, on 34 incunabula in the chapter »Incunabula, koja se nalaze u knjižnici Dominikanaca u Dubrovniku / Incunabula in the Dominican Library in Dubrovnik,« pp. 39–45, with the closing note on p. 45: »Ovaj popis sam izradio s pomoću O. Ambrozija Bačića, dominikanca, prosinca 1892. Ima još *incunabula*, ali sam popisao najznatnije.« (»I have made this catalogue with the assistance of Fr. Ambrozije Bačić, the Dominican, in December 1892. I have catalogued most outstanding ones, but there remain more incunabula.«) The Augsburg edition is the *editio princeps* of Hermann's translation and its colophon on f. 16v reads: »Opus introductorii in astronomiam albumasaris abalachi explicit feliciter erhardi ratdolt mira imprimendi arte: qua nuper venetiis nunc augustae vindelicorum excellit nominatissimus. 7. Idus Februarii. 1489.« On three editions of Hermann's translation in 1489, 1495, and 1506 see Lemay, *Abū Ma'shar and Latin aristotelianism in the twelfth century*, pp. 387–389.



question here surpasses the mere mathematical puzzle of, for instance, number two being able to resolve into ones and that ones can compose number two, as mathematically presented by Boethius. *One*, the origin of everything, does not necessarily take part in the genesis of two, although it is necessary to presuppose the existence of one for the existence of two. *One* can make up two, but it does not necessarily cause the existence of two. Has it not been clear so far, it most certainly will be from this point, that Hermann's explanation is not the description of a mathematical procedure or logical rule, but a description of the ontic order.

In order to prove this, here are some of Hermann's arguments. *One* is a unique principle (c. 8,5; B 59rA). If there are two principles of all things, the prior principle would have to be established. If both principles are struggling to be prior, neither of the two is the principle of all things. No exception is allowed. If a principle is to be the principle of all things, it is also to be the principle of the second principle from the initial presupposition on the existence of two principles of all things.

Lastly, taking into account that this consideration starts with the dispute over the relation between the generative cause and the generated, *one* must be described as cause for movement. Thus, *one* is »the cause for movement of all different things« (*cunctis aliis movendi causa*, c. 8,7; B 59rB) and »the first and efficient cause of all things« (*prima et efficiens causa omnium*; c. 8,9; B 59rB). This implies that the generative cause is expressed in the original Aristotelian term ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως translated into Latin as *causa movendi* and *causa movens*, and in the Latin tradition of translating and interpreting Aristotle's ontology as *causa efficiens*. Besides, with regard to the proposition that which is not moved precedes in antiquity all that is moved (c. 8,8; B 59rB), a new ontological light has been shed on the relation between the generative cause and the generated: the generated succeeds the generative cause as it is moved, and the generative cause is prior to the generated as it is not moved.

Hermann's argumentation of the principle of all things has been paraphrased by Domingo González (Dominicus Gundissalinus), known as Gundisalvi, philosopher and master of the Toledo school of translating. In his work *De processione mundi*, written in 1150 and dealing with natural philosophy,<sup>24</sup> Gundisalvi paraphrased Hermann's description having omitted its least transparent part, the one he might have considered mathematical. For example, he did not use *constituere* (c. 8,3; B 58vH) in the description of the relation

<sup>24</sup> Cfr. Gundisalvi's paraphrase in Hermann de Carintia, *De essentiis*, ed. Alonso (1946), p. 27. It should be pointed out that Manuel Alonso was the first to have noted Gundisalvi's paraphrases incorporated them into the notes of the first edition of Hermann's treatise *De essentiis*. See Manuel Alonso, »Introducción,« pp. 9–19, on pp. 9–10.

between one and two, nor *complere omnium numerum* (c. 8,5; B 59rA) in elaborating the incoherent presupposition of the existence of two principles of all things. But Gundisalvi's conclusion is identical to that of Hermann: »Principle is but one, the efficient cause of everything is one.«<sup>25</sup>

With all his attempted deliberation, the philosopher from Istria was fully aware of having failed to answer what *one* is. He cited the sentence from Plato's *Timaeus*: the first and efficient cause of everything, »as Timaeus says, it is as difficult to discover as it is impossible to define worthily, once discovered.«<sup>26</sup> Hermann finds the first solution in the attempt to describe what *one* is not, so that which remains can be considered what *one* is. Hermann seeks the ultimate solution in the encounter of human intellect and the Divine revelation most distinctly manifested in the Incarnation. Here follows an important turning point in Hermann's treatise: »Since Divine plan is investigated thoroughly in the ample volumes of the Fathers, it is not the purpose of the present treatise to pursue it further.«<sup>27</sup> It should be noted here what the treatise of Hermannus Secundus has no intention of being. Hermann makes no attempt in interpreting revelation and tradition as understood in Christian thought of the 12th century. The treatise *De essentiis* is neither a kerygma nor hermeneutics of the revelation of the Divine plan. According to the author, it is not a theological treatise either. The critical remark of Richard Lemay concerning the major philosophical work of Hermann of Dalmatia has no justification: »while Hermann is a theologian confronted with metaphysical notions of diverse origins and import, ...«.<sup>28</sup>

The generative cause understood as the efficient cause should be incorporated into Hermann's approach to the first causes (c. 7,1–7; B 58vE–58vF). In order to elaborate the causes of the created thing, Hermann points to the following three: »There are three principles of every genitura in the opinion of philosophers.«<sup>29</sup> They are:

<sup>25</sup> Cfr. Kalenić, »Napomene uz tekst,« in Herman Dalmatin, *Rasprava o bitima*, Vol. II, pp. 167–219, on pp. 172–173. The quoted passage from Gundisalvi's *De processione mundi* ought to compare with the somewhat broader passage in Hermann's treatise c. 8,3–9; B 58vI–59rB, and not only to c. 8,3–5; B 58vI–59rA. In that case Gundisalvi's conclusion coincides with that of Hermann and the difference in the argumentation of the two becomes apparent.

<sup>26</sup> Hermannus Secundus, *De essentiis*, c. 8,9; B 59rB: »quam [= primam omnium et efficientem causam], ut Timaeus ait, tam invenire difficile est quam inventam digne profari impossibile.« Cfr. Plato, *Timaeus*, 28 c.

<sup>27</sup> Hermannus Secundus, *De essentiis*, c. 8,13; B 59rD: »quod divinitatis consilium, cum spatiosa patrum scrutentur volumina, praesentis tractatus non est longius insequi.«

<sup>28</sup> Richard Lemay, *Abu Ma' shar and Latin aristotelianism in the twelfth century*, p. 202.

<sup>29</sup> Hermannus Secundus, *De essentiis*, c. 7,1; B 58vE: »Tria sunt enim, ut philosophis placet, omnis geniturae principia:«

(1) »the efficient cause« (*causa efficiens* in Hermann);

(2) »that from which anything is made« or »form« or »event and perfection of the work« (*id ex quo aliquid fit* or *forma* or *operis eventus et perfectio* in Hermann, *causa formalis* in Thomas Aquinas);

(3) »that in which anything is made« or »the matter of things« or »that which sustains« (*id in quo* or *rerum materia* or *sustinens* in Hermann, *causa materialis* in Thomas Aquinas).

Of the causes included in Aristotle's doctrine on four causes, expounded in *Physics* (194b15–195a3) and *Metaphysics* (983a24–988b16 and 1013a24–1014a25), Hermann of Dalmatia has failed to include the final cause (*causa finalis*). After all, Hermann does not cite the Philosopher, but philosophers. Analysing the relation between form and matter, he explicitly quotes Hermes Trismegistus (c. 7,4; B 58vE), actually paraphrasing the statement from the fifth book of Abū Ma'shar's work *Introductorium in astronomiam*: »matter is the necessity of form, form is the ornament of matter« (*estque materia formae necessitas. Forma vero materiae ornatus*).<sup>30</sup> Hermann had translated Abū Ma'shar's *Introductorium* in 1140, three years before he completed his original work *De essentiis*, so that the chapter in which Abū Ma'shar refers to the domiciles owing to the teaching of Hermes, was quite familiar to Hermann.<sup>31</sup> Although the first impression might lead us to believe that Abū Ma'shar's text brings transformed Aristotle's conception, it should be noted that Abū Ma'shar, at the very beginning of his work in the chapter concerned with the quality of influence of stellar movements, introduces four genera of things from the lower world: *forma, materia, compositio, compositum*.<sup>32</sup> When Abū Ma'shar intended to describe Hermes' understanding of the relation between matter and form, he thought it most appropriate to choose the relation between the Sun and the Moon as an example. In this astronomical conception the Moon becomes the matter of the Sun, and the Sun becomes the form of the Moon.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Albumasar, *Introductorium in astronomiam* (Augustae Vindelicorum, 1489), quinti libri »Capitulum quartum [de stellarum domiciliis] iuxta Hermetem post Abidemon,« f. d8r. Lemay was the first to invite the attention to Hermann's paraphrase in search of the influence of Abū Ma'shar's thought upon the treatise *De essentiis* and Burnett has recorded the exact bibliographical item from the Venetian edition of Hermann's translation published in 1506. Cfr. Lemay, *Abū Ma'shar and Latin aristotelianism*, pp. 209–210, 131; Burnett, »Commentary,« p. 243.

<sup>31</sup> Albumasar, *Introductorium in astronomiam*, f. g1r: »Hoc vero nostro tempore id est anno incarnationis Domini 1140. ...« Cfr. Franjo Šanjek, »Herman Dalmatin: Bio-bibliografski prilozi,« p. 45.

<sup>32</sup> Albumasar, *Introductorium in astronomiam*, f. a6v.

<sup>33</sup> Cfr. Albumasar, *Introductorium in astronomiam*, f. d8r: »Sic ergo cum luna quidem tamquam materia solis sit. Sol vero tamquam forma lunae causa erat ut iure luna solis vocaretur, cum virtute sua vim solis consequens, hac itaque de causa tam domicilium lunae contiguum esse.«

The influence of Hermes Trismegistus and Abū Ma'shar upon Hermann is not to be doubted as he realizes that »that which sustains« (*sustinens*) must be prior to »event and perfection of the work« (*operis eventus et perfectio*, c. 7,4; B 58vF). Thus, matter is prior to form. The very choice of the expression »event and perfection of the work« makes one wonder whether Hermann allows an additional cause beyond the formal cause, the one he failed to include in Aristotle's doctrine on first causes: the final cause.

One might also ask oneself about the reasons for disregarding the question »For what cause?« or, putting it less mildly, the reason it was omitted. The most satisfactory answer has been presented in the ontological topics in the first book of Hermann's treatise (See *Appendix* enclosed). The latter leads to the conclusion of the significance of the efficient cause or the principle of movement with Hermann. The first book is concerned with the cause as primary essence, principally the efficient cause.

Having in mind that medieval philosophy, according to traditional interpretation, concentrated on the God-man relation while the Renaissance replaced it with the man-world relation, one must conclude that Hermann, confronted with the triangle God-man-world, intended to research into the third side of that triangle. Hermann's consideration of the relation between God and world becomes a consideration of causes, pertaining to the knowledge of the first causes as introduced by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* (983a24–25), the knowledge tracing directly to the philosophy referred to as late as the second half of the 18th century as *philosophia naturalis*. Hermann's manuscript can, therefore, serve as counterexample of the stereotypes regarding medieval philosophy.

For those pursuing this subject, it is common knowledge that Hermann of Dalmatia owes his scholarship to the Chartres school which encouraged investigations in natural philosophy and natural sciences.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>34</sup> Cfr. on the school in Chartres in relation to the development of astronomy in the 12th century in: Haskins, *Studies in the history of mediaeval science* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1924), on pp. 8–92; Hugo Dingler, *Geschichte der Naturphilosophie* (München: Eidos-Verlag, 1932; reprint Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1967), pp. 63–64; Friedrich Überweg, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, zweiter Teil, hrsg. von Bernhard Geyer, 12. Auflage (Graz: Akademische Verlagsanstalt, 1951), pp. 226–242; on natural philosophy by Guillaume of Conches see Tullio Gregory, *Anima mundi: La filosofia di Guglielmo di Conches e la scuola di Chartres* (Firenze: Sansoni, 1955), on pp. 178–235; on natural philosophies by Guillaume of Conches, Hermann of Dalmatia, Bernardus Silvestris, Thierry of Chartres and Clarenbald of Arras see: Richard Lemay, *Abū Ma'shar and Latin aristotelianism*, pp. 157–298; Tullio Gregory, »L'idea di natura nella filosofia medievale prima dell'ingresso della fisica di Aristotele: Il secolo XII,« in *La filosofia della natura nel medioevo: Atti del terzo Congresso internazionale di filosofia medievale* (Milano: Vita e pensiero, 1966), pp. 27–65.

### *Additional descriptions of the ontic order*

In the first book of the treatise *De essentiis*, Hermann of Dalmatia continues to pursue ontological variations. He first deals with the ontic contrary *conditor – condita* (c. 13,2–5; B 59vE–59vF). What is the difference between the Founder and the founded? Founder is eternal and for this reason »from Himself« (*a se ipso*) and whatever He has in Himself, Hermann here stresses wisdom, goodness and blessedness, is the same: eternal and from Himself. The Founder is defined by the principle: »Whatever He has in Himself, that same thing is Himself.«<sup>35</sup> This principle is well-known in the Latin tradition but can also be found in the work *Lectiones in Boethii librum de Trinitate* ascribed to Hermann's teacher Thierry of Chartres, although the authorship is yet obscure.<sup>36</sup> On the contrary, that which is founded or, as Hermann phrases it, that which is »in the world« (*in mundo*), with Hermann's examples – beauty, roundness, and motion, are in the world as »accidents« (*per accidens*). None of these things »in the world« is the world itself. This implies that the relation between the world and that which is in the world differs greatly from the relation between the Founder and the founded. It makes the distinction between the Founder and the founded clear.

Hermann's next variation involves an important transformation: *unum* is being transformed into *unus* (c. 14,3; B 59vG). Analysing the relation between the generative cause and the generated, Hermann described *one* as the principle of all things, on the other hand his considerations on all things which are generated guided him to the One alone prior to all generation: »Let us then conclude from all this that One alone is first and last, One alone is omnipotent, One alone is the author of the whole universe, One alone, in the wholeness of its essence, is extraneous to all motion – for all Its motion is in Its work.«<sup>37</sup> The distinction between One alone and its work manifested in the role assigned to the motion: motion is effect, motion is of the work alone.

Another ontological opposition, the one between the author and the subject (*auctor – subiectum*) introduced the terms *composition* and *resolution* into Hermann's study (c. 14,3–4; B 59vG–59vH). The virtue in the author (*in auctore*) is always the same, both in composition and resolution (*virtus compo-*

<sup>35</sup> Hermannus Secundus, *De essentiis*, c. 13.3; B 59vF: »quidquid in se habet, idem ipse est.«

<sup>36</sup> Burnett, »Commentary,« p. 248; Edouard Jeaneau, »Thierry von Chartres (Theodoricus Carnotensis),« *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche* 10 (1965), p. 114.

<sup>37</sup> Hermannus Secundus, *De essentiis*, c. 14,3; B 59vG: »licet igitur ex omnibus concludere, quod unus primus et novissimus, unus omnipotens, unus totius universitatis auctor, omnis quidem in essentiae suae integritate motus extraneus; omnis namque motus eius in opere eius, ...«

*nens = virtus resolvens*). On the contrary, in the subject (*in subiecto*) composition and resolution are of different meanings. Therefore composition and resolution do not occur at the same time in the same subject as the virtue causing them does. This distinction seems as ontological presupposition inducing considerations on the composition and resolution in the world, elaborations applicable to the construction of natural philosophy.

The concluding place in Hermann's sequence of ontic pairs has been assigned to the contrary *creator – creata* (c. 14,5; B 59vH). It is expressed by »to exist always«: »The Creator always exists, but created things do not always exist.«<sup>38</sup> In the creator there is always the same »creative will« (*voluntas creatrix*) so that some things are to be created, and some things are not to be created (c. 14,6–7; B 59vH). In his commentary of Hermann's treatise Burnett hastens to compare Hermann's creative will with the Demiurge from Plato's *Timaeus* (29c–30a).<sup>39</sup> Still, the difference in Plato's and Hermann's approach to the genesis of the world must not be overlooked.<sup>40</sup> According to Plato, God is the one who »intends all the good things and none of the bad things« due to his goodness, bringing disorder into order since order is of the better. This means that in Plato's conception the generation of the world is of the will of God, the world being recognized as order, whereas according to Hermann, the Creator always exists and it is upon his creative will whether some things are to be created or are not to be created at all, therefore the created is corruptible, but not eternal. It seems that Hermann intentionally epitomizes his consideration so as his speech on the things created could be regarded meaningful from the ontological point of view. In any case, the philosopher from Istria does not hold necessary to explain the generation of the world using ideas of good and order as with Plato.

In order to produce a more complete description of the creator and the created being opposed to one another, Hermann introduces the concept of *law*, which he, unfortunately, failed to elaborate. He merely stated: »The craftsman naturally imposes the law on his work, but the work does not

<sup>38</sup> Hermannus Secundus, *De essentiis*, c. 14,5; B 59vH: »semper quidem creator, non vero semper creata.«

<sup>39</sup> Burnett, »Commentary,« p. 248.

<sup>40</sup> In order to make a close comparison of Hermann's passage from *De essentiis*, c. 14, 6–7; B 59vH, with Plato's text in the same language, I here quote the passage from Plato's *Timaeus*, 30a translated into Latin by Marsilio Ficino. Cfr. *Timaeus Platonis*, in *Omnia D. Platonis opera translatione Marsilii Ficini, & ad Graecum codicem accurata castigatione* (Venetiis: Apud Hieronymum Scotum, 1570), pp. 403a–422b, on p. 406: »Itaque cum vellet deus bona omnia fore, nihil vero quoad natura pateretur malum, quicquid erat quod in cernendi sensum cadere posset, asumpsit, non tranquillum & quietum, sed temere agitatam et fluitans, idque ex inordinata iactatione redegit in ordinem.«

impose the law on the craftsman.<sup>41</sup> However, the relation *opifex – opus* was additionally resolved by questioning the meaning of the *instrument* in this relation. While translating Abū Maʿshar's *Introductorium in astronomiam*, Hermann came across a conception involving a philosophical comparison between the form and the artist, the matter with his instrument.<sup>42</sup> It was Abū Maʿshar who drew the conclusion: »The artifact is not ascribed to the instruments but the artist.«<sup>43</sup> Moreover, applying this conclusion to the composite (*compositum*) as one of the four species of the lower world, Abū Maʿshar could rightfully decide: »In such a way, then, every composite is not principally imposed by the authority of the matter but by the authority of the form.«<sup>44</sup>

Opposing to Abū Maʿshar's views, Hermann puts forward a valuable distinction regarding Abū Maʿshar's idea of the artist, instrument and artifact (c. 15,1–8; B 59vH–60rC). He first exposes the principle proposition: »Every artifact is rendered by a twin authority: that of the artist and that of the instrument.«<sup>45</sup> The artist and the instrument bear one meaning in creation (*creatio*) yet another in generation (*generatio*). Hermann's term *creation* denotes »creation of principles, at the very beginning, out of nothing« (*creatio a primordio principiorum ex nichilo*, c. 15,2; B 59vH), while his term *generation* signifies »the generation of things from the pre-given principles up to the present day« (*generatio rerum ex antedatis principiis usque nunc*, c. 15,2; B 59vH–60rA). In creation the artist and the instrument are the same for in creation the first cause is not of the matter (*de materia*), but creates things by itself (*a se ipso*). In generation, however, the artist and the instrument are not the same. The instrument (*instrumentum*) is a created principle understood as the secondary cause. Based upon this consideration, Hermann introduces bipartition of the efficient cause by quality: the primary cause is »the most far-sighted artificer and the author of everything – God«, and the secondary cause is His instrument, i.e. the given principle which, among all His deeds, is in the first position of worth (c. 15,6–8; B 60rA–60rC). The analysis of the artifact opposed to the creator, opificer, artist, author, finally called God,

<sup>41</sup> Hermannus Secundus, *De essentiis*, c. 14,7; B 59vII: »legem quippe imponit opifex operi, non opus opifici.«

<sup>42</sup> Albumasar, *Introductorium in astronomiam*, f. a6r: »unde in philosophia forma quidem artificii, materiae vero instrumenti comparatur.«

<sup>43</sup> Albumasar, *Introductorium in astronomiam*, f. a6r: »Opus autem non instrumentis sed artificii ascribitur.«

<sup>44</sup> Albumasar, *Introductorium in astronomiam*, f. a6r: »Ita ergo omne compositum non materiae sed formae auctoritate principaliter ascribitur.«

<sup>45</sup> Hermannus Secundus, *De essentiis*, c. 15,5; B 60rA: »omne vero opus gemina auctoritate constituitur, artificis videlicet et instrumenti;«

concludes the sequence of ontological variations in the first book of the treatise *De essentiis*.

Fundamental concepts from Hermann's descriptions of the ontic order in the first book are to be found in the second book of Hermann's manuscript. It should be noted that Hermann has used them at the very beginning of the second book (c. 18,7–9; B 60rG–60vA). In order to describe generation, Hermann used a metaphor related to smelting. He illustrated the procedure of how different minerals melted together into a mixture run out from a furnace into different channels, being separated into diverse refinements of the filtrate. The lightest refinement floats on top ready for composition and resolution. This upper layer Hermann calls essence (*essentia*). The lower layer, some kind of the sediment, Hermann names substance (*substantia*). However, the terms essence and substance in this metaphor have an utterly different meaning from the one in the first book of Hermann's treatise and can by no means be connected with the description of the ontic order in chapter 6. This conclusion is additionally supported by the bipartition of Hermann's work. Namely, between the chapters 17 and 18 of the Naples manuscript, the syntagm »secundus liber« was added in the left margin at the beginning of the 13th century to the latest, while in the Oxford manuscript from 1423 a line has been omitted, as carefully elaborated by Kalenić in his philological study of the critical edition of the treatise.<sup>46</sup> Had, by any chance, the marginal note between chapter 17 and 18 in the 12th and 15th century transcriptions of Hermann's treatise not been found or the blank space established, the mere difference of the meaning of fundamental ontological concepts would have given a clear sign that with chapter 18 Hermann began a fresh train of thought.

When in the first book of the treatise *De essentiis* Hermann deliberated upon the cause as the first essence in his sequence of essences, his lexical choice included the following terms: »one« (*unum*, c. 8,3; B 58vH), »principle of all things« (*omnium principium*, c. 8,3; B 58vH), »cause of movement« (*movendi causa*, c. 8,7; B 59rB), »first and efficient cause of all things« (*prima et efficiens causa omnium*, c. 8,9; B 59rB), »founder« (*conditor*, c. 13,2–3; B 59vE), »One alone« (*unus*, c. 14,3; B 59vG), »author« (*auctor*, c. 14,3; B 59vG), »creator« (*creator*, c. 14,5; B 59vH), »opificer« (*opifex*, c. 14,7; B 59vH) and »God« (*Deus*, c. 15,8; B 59vC). If any one of Hermann's synonyms denoting for cause ought to be pointed out for the purpose of comparative analysis, *creator* is by far the most outstanding as it occupies the first position in the

<sup>46</sup> See Antun Slavko Kalenić, »Temeljni problemi uspostave teksta,« in Herman Dalmatin, *Rasprava o bitima*, Vol. I (Pula: Čakavski sabor, 1990), pp. 103–151, on pp. 109, 113–115, 128–129; Kalenić, »Napomene uz tekst,« in Herman Dalmatin, *Rasprava o bitima*, Vol. II, p. 176.



Sabaeon catalogue of five essences. Al-Razi also places *creator* at the first place.<sup>47</sup> Among the catalogues of essences preceding Hermann's sequence, only the catalogues of the Sabaeans and al-Razi coincide in the first term with the sequence of essences introduced by Hermann of Dalmatia. Furthermore, the record on the Sabaeans originates from Hermann's contemporary al-Shahrastānī. In his *Book of Religions and Sects* he recounts the philosophical teaching of the Sabaeans in a dialogue form between the Sabaeans, descendants of Hermes' son Sa, and the followers of Abraham.<sup>48</sup> According to this account, Hermes' teacher Agathodaimon declared »that the first principles were five, namely, the Creator, Reason, Soul, Space, and Void, and the composite things came into being thereafter.«<sup>49</sup> The last principle »void« acquired the meaning »time« in some Arabic sources. The question of influence between the two philosophers from the early 12th century remains open to discussion, but one should, nevertheless, note here that Hermann had been acquainted with the hermetic tradition apart from al-Shahrastānī. As he prepared his translation of Abū Ma' shar's *Introductio in astronomiam* Hermann learnt about Ptolemy and other astrologers as he undoubtedly obtained the astrological »image of the world« ascribed to Hermes Trismegistus.<sup>50</sup>

By introducing new terms, Hermann persisted in enriching the concept of cause with new contents. His artifice particularly manifested in opposing the cause to the consequence in a series of ontic contraries. Hermann's great ability is most excellently displayed in the use of phrases pertaining to the concept of cause, as follows: »to be by itself« or »to be by accident«, »movement«, »composition and resolution«, »to exist always«, »law«, »artist and instrument«, »creation and generation«. In Hermann's descriptions of the

<sup>47</sup> Cfr. Burnett, »Commentary«, p. 242. In his list of philosophers who confine themselves to five essences, Burnett, however, mentions Sabaeans and al-Razi, but fails to see the coincidence between their catalogues and Hermann's with regard to the first term, as it might be possible that he did not observe the reasons for Hermann's stressing the first term in his sequence of essences.

<sup>48</sup> Cfr. Walter Scott (ed.), *Hermetica: The ancient Greek and Latin writings which contain religious or philosophic teachings ascribed to Hermes Trismegistus*, vol. 4 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), particularly the chapter »al-Shahrastānī (died A. D. 1153)«, pp. 258-262.

<sup>49</sup> Scott, *Hermetica*, vol. 4, pp. 258-259.

<sup>50</sup> Albumasar, *Introductorium in astronomiam* (Augustae Vindelicorum, 1489), particularly the chapters in the fifth book: »Capitulum quartum [de stellarum domiciliis] iuxta Hermetem post Abidemon,« ff. d7v-d8v, and »[De stellarum principatu] Juxta Hermetem post Abidemon. Capitulum septimum,« ff. e1r-e2v. See also notes 30 and 33. Walter Scott systematically collected Arabic *Testimonia* on hermetic heritage and according to A. S. Ferguson, the editor of the fourth volume of Scott's *Hermetica*, he intentionally omitted the scholastic and medieval testimonies, failing to include the contributions of the Arabic astronomer Abū Ma' shar. This proves that Scott had no knowledge of the translations of Hermann of Dalmatia. Cfr. A. S. Ferguson, »Introduction,« in Scott, *Hermetica*, vol. 4, pp. ix-xlix, on p. xlv. and A. S. Ferguson, »Index locorum,« in Scott, *Hermetica*, vol. 4, pp. 547-569.

ontic order the function of some of these phrases is merely suggested, unlike those which have been thoroughly elaborated resulting in original insights. Discussing Aristotle's statement on what is prior to another as to implication of being, having the choice of Aristotle's proof and Boethius' commentary and examples, Hermann opted for the reconsideration of the former's argument having, thus, enriched his own approach while translating the work of Abū Ma'shar's work *Introductorium in astronomiam*. In his attempt to produce a brief description of the first cause as the creator, then, contrary to Plato's description of the Demiurge in *Timaeus*, he considered it sufficient to use the predicate »to exist always« (*semper esse*) in the description of the creator. Unlike Plato, Hermann failed to call upon the Divine goodness, the cause of goodness and order of creator's work. By making an important distinction between creation and generation, Hermann delicately abandoned Abū Ma'shar's idea of artist, instrument and artifact and introduced bipartition of the efficient cause by quality. In his research into the cause, the generative cause in particular, Hermann confronted with Platonic, Aristotelian and Hermetic doctrines on cause, especially in Boethius' translations and commentaries of Aristotle's works, in Boethius' *De arithmetica libri duo* and in Abū Ma'shar's *Introductorium in astronomiam* as valuable mediators of Classical intellectual heritage in the time of his studies in France and his translating in Spain. Owing to the eclectic approach, Hermann of Dalmatia reasoned out the original answers to the question of cause in the first book of his treatise *De essentiis*.

#### APPENDIX

Ontological topics in the first book of Hermann's treatise *De essentiis* (cc. 6–17; B 58vB–60rF)

6	The description of the ontic order <i>esse-essentia-genitura</i>
6,1–4	Definition of the <i>esse</i>
6,5	<i>Esse</i> and essence
6,6–8	Five genera of essences
6,9	<i>Esse</i> , essence and genitura
7	Three causes: efficient cause, form and matter
7,1	Definitions of the causes
7,2–7	Form and matter
7,8	The moving cause and movement
7,9	The hermeneutical circle in research on the sequence of essences

- 8            The generative cause and the generated
- 8,1–2       Recognition of the cause in all generation
- 8,3–5       One as the principle of everything
- 8,6–8       Bipartition of the efficient cause by quality
- 8,9–11      The first and efficient cause of everything
- 8,12–16     The first theological insert: the divine goodness
- 8,12        The encounter of human intellect and the divine goodness
- 8,13        The divine plan is not the topic of the treatise
- 8,14–16     Arabic views on Christ our Lord
  
- 9            The second theological insert: history of Jesus Christ and astrology
- 9,1         Virgin and the boy – in the account of Persian astrologers
- 9,2         The Wise Men and the celestial message on boy
- 9,3         The truth of Jesus Christ and the Jews
- 9,4–9        Astrologer Abū Ma'shar on the Virgin birth of the child
  
- 10          The third theological insert: the truth of the divine being
- 10,1        The trine God
- 10,2        The first in the order of things and autogeneration
- 10,3        Without beginning and never to end
  
- 11          Movement
- 11,1        Is God the creator of the universe?
- 11,2        Movement of the created
- 11,3        Characteristics of time
- 11,4        Types of movement
- 11,5        Characteristics of place
- 11,6        Characteristics of the sensible thing
- 11,7–8      Alteration
- 11,9        How does the composite exist?
  
- 12          The meaning of the diversity
- 12,1        The proportion between more and less: the order within the same species
- 12,2        Increase and decrease
  
- 13          The founder and the founded
- 13,1        The movement by transference
- 13,2–6      The difference between the founder and the founded: to be by itself and to be by accident

- 14 The creator and the created  
 14,1 What does the authority of the created rest on?  
 14,2 The aim of the work: description of the author's will  
 14,3-4 One and its work: role of the composition and resolution in describing the contrary  
 14,5-6 The creator and the created: role of »to have existed from eternity« in describing the contrary  
 14,7 Artificer and artifact: role of the law in describing the contrary
- 15 Creation and generation  
 15,1 Two genera for movement of the primordial cause: creation and generation  
 15,2-4 Creation of principles and generation of things  
 15,5-6 Metaphor on artist, instrument and artifact  
 15,7-8 Bipartition of the efficient cause by quality: God and his instruments
- 16 Conclusion on the cause  
 16,1 Toward the complete knowledge of essences  
 16,2 Genera of essences and the existence of all things  
 16,3-4 The announcement of the account of the second essence: movement  
 16,5 The principle of instrument
- 17 Robert of Ketton: the praise of Hermann's project  
 17,1 The role assigned by the Divinity  
 17,2 The faith in God – the beginning of all good things

TRANSLATED BY VESNA BAĆE

## ONTIČKI RED U OPISIMA HERMANA DALMATINA

*Sažetak*


U rukopisu *De essentiis* (Béziers, 1143) Herman Dalmatin (*Hermannus Secundus*, prva polovica 12. stoljeća) uveo je i obrazložio svoj izvorni redosljed biti: uzrok, kretanje, mjesto, vrijeme, odnošaj. Od srednjovjekovnih popisa i razvrstavanja biti, koji su mu prethodili, taj se redosljed razlikuje po hermeneutičkom krugu: »da bi se ono što je izloženo utemeljilo iz cjeline«.

Prva je knjiga Hermanova rukopisa u cijelosti posvećena uzroku kao prvoj biti. Ona sadrži temeljni opis ontičkoga reda *esse – essentia – genitura* s kojim se Herman

Dalmatin odvojio od Boetijeva predloška. U daljnjim ontološkim varijacijama Herman je obogaćivao pojam uzroka novim sadržajima. Osobito je bio uspješan kad je u nizu ontičkih opreka suočio uzrok s posljedicom (*causa genitrix – genitum, conditor – condita, unus – opus eius, auctor – subiectum, creator – creata, opifex – opus*).

U Hermanovim opisima ontičkoga reda značenje nekih od spomenutih izričaja tek je natuknuto, ali je zato nekima značenje produbljeno do izvornih uvida. Razglabajući o Aristotelovu iskazu što je prvotno spram ostaloga po redosljedu u bitku, Herman se Dalmatin između Aristotelova dokaza i Boetijevih tumačenja odlučio za promišljanje Aristotelova iskaza, obogativši svoj pristup spoznajom koju je usvojio prevodeći Abū Ma'sharovo djelo *Introductorium in astronomiam*. Kad je pokušao jezgrovito opisati prvi uzrok kao stvoritelja, onda je, protivno Platonovu opisu demi-jurga u *Timeju*, zaključio da je stvoritelja dostatno opisati predikatom »semper esse«, a nije se kao Platon pozivao na Božju dobrotu iz koje slijedi dobrota i uredenost stvoriteljeva djela. Važnim razlikovanjem između stvaranja i radanja tankočutno se odvojio od Abū Ma'sharove predodžbe o umjetniku, priboru i djelu, pa uveo dvodijelu tvornoga uzroka po vrsnoći. U istraživanjima tvornoga uzroka Herman se suočio s platonovskim, aristotelovskim i hermetičkim naukom o uzroku, osobito u Boetijevim prijevodima i tumačenjima Aristotelovih djela, Boetijevu djelu *De aritmetica* i Abū Ma'sharovu djelu *Introductorium in astronomiam* kao dragocjenim posrednicima antičkoga duhovnog naslijeđa za vrijeme svoga školovanja u Francuskoj i u razdoblju prevoditeljskoga rada u Španjolskoj. Zahvaljujući eklektičkom pristupu, Herman Dalmatin u prvoj je knjizi rasprave *De essentiis* dosegnuo izvorne ishode umujući o uzroku.

Članku je pridodan prilog »Ontološke teme u prvoj knjizi Hermanove rasprave *De essentiis*«.



## SPACE, TIME AND MOVEMENT IN THE NATURAL PHILOSOPHY OF HERMANN OF DALMATIA

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Original Paper  
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### *1. The Place of Space, Time and Movement among the Essences*

In his major work entitled *On the Essences (De Essentiis)*, Hermann of Dalmatia wrote that there were many kinds of essences<sup>1</sup> which could all be reduced to five genera. Three of these five genera of essences are place (*locus*), time (*tempus*) and movement (*motus*). The other two genera are cause (*causa*) and intercourse (*habitudo*). Like all the genera of essences, place, time and movement are perfect as regards their substance (*substantia*), complete as regards their nature, and they do not change and are the origin and the beginning of every difference (see Hermann of Dalmatia, *On the Essences*, no. 6.6). The essences are organized in a hierarchy at the top of which there is a cause, for which Hermann uses different terms: *entity* (Ibid., 8.3; 19.7), *one* (Ibid., 14.3), *origin of everything* (Ibid., 8.3), *moving cause* (Ibid., 7.8; 8.2; 16.4; 25.15), *multiplier* (Ibid., 8.2; 15.8; 18.1; 25.3; 30.7; 40.1), *founder* (Ibid., 13.2; 56.12), *maker* (Ibid., 14.7; 15.6; 16.5; 100.14), *creator* (Ibid., 14.5), *God* (Ibid., 15.8; 18.1). This primary cause is the originator of all the essences (Ibid., 7.9). It is whole (Ibid., 8.3–5; 14.3), simple and immobile (Ibid., 8.7), and since it moves everything else, it is the moving cause (Ibid., 8.2; 8.9; 16.4; 25.15) and the efficient cause (Ibid., 8.9), it is eternal (Ibid., 13.3), it is God (Ibid., 15.8). The relation between the cause and everything else is like that between the parent and the offspring (Ibid., 8.1), the originator and the originated (Ibid., 13.2–6), and the creator and the created (Ibid., 14.5).

Besides this primary or primordial cause, there is the secondary cause (Ibid., 15.1), and the other causes (Ibid., 27.6), and the lower ones obey the

<sup>1</sup> Herman Dalmatin, *Rapava o bitima* (Treatise on the Essences), Books 1 and 2, Pula 1990, no. 6.6.

higher ones (Hermann himself does not use the terms higher cause and lower cause). The secondary cause is a helper to the primary cause, the third cause is a helper to the secondary cause, and so on (Ibid., 15.1). On the other hand, Hermann draws upon philosophical tradition in adopting »three principles of every genitura«:<sup>2</sup> the efficient cause (*causa efficiens*), form (tradition refers to it as *causa formalis*), and matter (matter of things – *rerum materia*, or traditionally, *causa materialis*). Although, initially, he cites only three causes (Ibid., 7.1), he also mentions the final cause (*operis eventus et perfectio* – the purpose of the work and perfection (Ibid., 7.4), and *finis omnis intentionis* – the purpose of every intention (Ibid., 52.2)), but he does not call it the fourth cause, as does Aristotle, but the last cause (*postremus eventus*) and the ultimate cause (*ultima causa*) (Ibid.). Hermann's hierarchy of causes is obvious: first, the efficient cause, followed by matter, form (Ibid., 7.4; 25) and purpose. The efficient cause is the primary (or primordial) cause, the secondary cause is »the one through which something is performed, and the third, the fourth and the rest of them are those from which or in which something comes to be, while the final cause is the goal of every intention.«<sup>3</sup> In another passage, where he discusses creation and generation, Hermann distinguishes only between the primary or efficient cause (which is God), and the secondary cause, which he compares to an instrument (Ibid., 15, 4.8).

Hermann included form and matter among the causes (the principles of every *genitura*), and not among the five essences, in contrast to some other scholars, e.g., al-Kindi and Boethius, who classified them among the essences. Hermann's choice of essences is completely original and does not correspond to any other choice of essences of the earlier authors.<sup>4</sup>

While leaving out form and matter, Hermann included intercourse (*habitudō*) among the essences, like Boethius. This is a special kind of movement, i.e. the primordial movement of form and matter in the process which Hermann calls generation (*generatio*) (Ibid., 7.7). Intercourse (*habitudō*) is a necessary bond between form and matter, since there can be no form without matter. Nothing comes to be in matter except through form, and nothing comes to be in form except through matter (Ibid., 25.3). Matter is »in itself shapeless dough (*massa*), and if it did not exist, form would have nowhere to appear.«<sup>5</sup> Matter, as something in which or from which something comes to

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 7.1–3.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 52.2; 53.1.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. A. S. Kalenić, »Napomene uz tekst« u: Herman Dalmatin, *Rusprava o bitima* (»Notes in: Hermann of Dalmatia, *Treatise on the Essences*), Book 2, Pula 1990, p. 171.

<sup>5</sup> Herman Dalmatin, *op. cit.*, 7.5.



be, is by its nature subject or exposed to any movement (Ibid., 7.2). There is no movement in matter, before form appears in it (Ibid., 25.3). The union of matter and form in the continuous process of generation is called intercourse (*habitus*) (Ibid., 51.1).

## 2. The Ontology of Space, Time and Movement

There are several genera of movement. Two genera of movement belong to the primary or primordial cause: the first is creation (*creatio*) and the second is generation (*generatio*) (Ibid., 15.1; 27.2; 49.6;). The other genera of movement belong to the secondary cause and to the successive causes of the lower order. Hermann follows the philosophical tradition in assuming that creation is the origination of principles out of nothingness (*ex nichilo*) (Ibid., 15.2; 22.1; 27.3) according to a sensible law of order, which is guaranteed by the almighty multiplier (*auctor*) of the universe, being beyond any movement (Ibid., 14.3). What is created exists, because it moves (Ibid., 11.2). Thus, a general feature of all that is created (or generated) is its motion.

The second genus of movement of the primordial cause is generation, which is the coming-to-be of all things from existing principles (Ibid., 15.2). Generation is related to creation as the secondary cause is related to the primary cause, or as an artist is related to an instrument (Ibid., 15, 5–8). Generation is of a lower order, second in dignity in relation to creation. There are two kinds of generation: primary and secondary (Ibid., 27, 2.6; 49.6). Primary generation is the origination of first things from the principles; once generated, these first things are not subject to death. Hermann calls them unchanging *genitura* (Ibid., 27.3; 51.2). »The unchanging *genitura* never dies as it is produced by the primary movement from the whole and perfect principles, and is composed from the same principles in their entirety.«<sup>6</sup> Hermann calls the primary movement of the primordial cause, the primary generation (Ibid., 53.1). Although generation comes second in dignity after creation (Ibid., 15.6), he does not allow the primary generation to be considered as coming second in order, time or place (Ibid., 27.4). Hermann seems to show certain inconsistency on this point, since creation should take place before primary generation (Ibid., 15.2).

What is generated in secondary generation is subject to death (Ibid., 27.3). The secondary generation comes temporally after the primary generation (Ibid., 27.5). Hermann calls its product failing offspring or *genitura* (Ibid., 51.2–3). The movement of this offspring is transfer (*translatio*) and change

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 55.1.

(*alteritas*) (Ibid., 54.2). Transfer is understood in relation to substance (*substantia*), while change is regarded in relation to quantity, quality, place, time and order. Both transfer and change have two distinctions: (i) transfer from the primary composition (*compositio*) into the secondary composition, and vice versa, and (ii) change as regards its property (*habitus*) and its inclination (*affectio*). As regards its property, change takes place between the extremes and the medium or, in other words, there is always a change (*permutatio*) into the other of the two. As regards its inclination, change (*alteritas*) occurs between the rise (*augmentum*) and the loss (*detrimendum*), which is always reflected as a change in quality and quantity (Ibid., 11.7; 54.3).

The failing offspring (*occidua genitura*) (Ibid., 5.3) or »the progeny of the universe« (*mundana proles*) (Ibid., 91.1) has a double refuge (*receptaculum*): place and time. If the *genitura* (whether the unchanging or the failing one) is produced by movement, it follows that movement is the condition for the coming-to-be of the universe. This movement, as Hermann maintains, is not possible without the moving cause, which could be internal (*intrinseca*) or external (*extrinseca*) (Ibid., 85.1). The movement of the external cause is perceived as attraction (*tractio*) or repulsion (*propulsio*) (Ibid., 85.2). Having established a firm link between the universe and movement, Hermann emphasizes the importance of movement for the creation of the universe and for its maintenance as well. If movement ceased, the universe would perish.

Since the worldly offspring, as already mentioned, has a double refuge, place and time, what is their role in Hermann's system? Place and time are those in which beings can be. They are modes of existence or, as R. Bošković wrote later on, the real modes of existence (*reales existendi modi*).<sup>7</sup> All that is created is in movement, and the movement has its beginning, since »every movement must have started from somewhere.«<sup>8</sup> The beginning is a property of time. Considering the relation between movement and the created (or the generated), Hermann tried to determine the connection between the universe (or the progeny) and time, and came to the conclusion that »the universe and time are of the same age. Consequently, all the progeny of the universe must be from time.«<sup>9</sup> However, from the ontological point of view, Hermann seems to regard movement as prior to time.<sup>10</sup> This is because creation is one of the genera of movement of the primordial cause, while time is a refuge of the

<sup>7</sup> R. Bošković, *Teorija prirodne filozofije, Dopuna I (Theory of Natural Philosophy, Appendix I)*, no. 4, p. 265.

<sup>8</sup> Hermann, *op. cit.* 11.2.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 91.3–4.

<sup>10</sup> For the relation between time and movement, see Aristotle, *Physics*, 252b 6–8, 218b 17, 218b 20, 218b 21, 219a1, 219a 10, 219a 21, 219b1–2, 220b 15.

failing progeny generated only by the secondary movement of the primordial cause, or the secondary generation. Consequently, time is derived from eternity by movement; therefore, time is not eternal.<sup>11</sup> Hermann defines it as part of eternity, but not in the sense »that the fullness of eternity would be damaged if there was no time.«<sup>12</sup> Time has its beginning and, probably, its end (Ibid., 57.4). Hermann is not definite in terms of the end of time. However, it seems to me that by juxtaposing eternity with time, it is possible to conclude that he viewed time as having an end. What exactly is this juxtaposition? Eternity implies simplicity, indivisibility, sameness and limitlessness (Ibid., 57.3). Time, on the other hand, is in movement which always begins from a certain quantity (Ibid., 11.7; 56.1) and takes place in the joined and the composed (Ibid., 11.8). In contrast to eternity, which is the same and without any difference, time is full of differences; every difference is a difference of time; difference starts with time and ends with time (Ibid., 57.5–7). Since time is in motion, difference and motion are mutually related. If eternity is unlimited, time should be limited. Eternity is, thus, the state which makes time possible, and which »allows division by time, before time and after time, if indeed it ever ends.«<sup>13</sup>

The second refuge and the universal seat of the failing *genitura*, or the limited substance, is place. It is associated with the sentient (*sensibile*), which is always something joined or composed (*compositum*) (Ibid., 11, 5–6). Such is the body. All that has a body must be in a place. Place, as a seat and refuge of the body, has three dimensions: length, width and height. The body extends, it is extensible; it can extend within its boundaries. Hermann calls space any interval within the boundaries of the body. For him, space and body are inseparable: space is defined only in connection with the body, and the body must be in a place. Hermann holds that space and body are related, since all parts of the universe can be limited by place and number.<sup>14</sup> All that exists in the universe, all that is created, is within limited space; this is called circumscribed substance (*substantia circumscriptibilis*). That is why any space in the universe has a local distinction (Ibid., 56.20; 56.23). All that is corporeal is

<sup>11</sup> As regards his ideas about eternity and the beginning of time, Hermann is closer to Plato than to Aristotle, since like Plato he promotes the idea that time was also brought into being. Compare Aristotle's *Physics*, 251b 15–19, 22b 1–7, 223b 29.

<sup>12</sup> Herman Dalmatin, *op. cit.*, 57.2.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 57.4.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 56.7. Hermann's understanding of space is also closer to Plato's than Aristotle's. Cf. Aristotle, *Physics*, 209a 5, 209a 15–16, 209b and especially 209b 12–13, 209b 23–25. There were three major theories of space in antiquity: atomic, Platonic and Aristotelian. For different views on space through history, see e.g. Max Jammer, *Concepts of Space*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1954; Milič Čapčak, *The Concepts of Space and Time*, Dordrecht-Holland/Boston U.S.A., 1976.

within a limited space and the same applies to the incorporeal, from which follows that there is a seat of the rational incorporeal soul. Hermann does not say where this seat is, except that it must be in a limited space. After death, the soul abides in a limited space, either celestial or terrestrial (Ibid., 56, 13–15). However, there is a difference between the corporeal and the incorporeal. Since place is a property of the body, it follows that the incorporeal is not in a place. Hermann wonders where it could be: nowhere or everywhere? It could be everywhere if it is a whole.

Where, then, is the world? For Hermann this question is absurd. It is »neither in one place, nor in every place.«<sup>15</sup> If it were in one place, there could be something else outside this place. If it were in every place, then its individual parts would be divisible (*divisivae*), and not constitutive (*constitutivae*). If the world were in one place or in every place, »it would follow that there was not only one world, but more of them.«<sup>16</sup> The idea of several worlds can also be found in the work of Ruder Bošković,<sup>17</sup> and modern science is very much open to it. Hermann, however, supported the idea of one universe and tried to prove it by showing that there could be parts without division. »The Rhine is in Mainz and the Rhine is in Cologne, not two or more rivers, but the same one in both towns: neither whole, nor in parts, separated by an interval between them.«<sup>18</sup> Parts may exist without division, owing to an interstice (*interstitio*) »which does not divide, but binds.«<sup>19</sup> The question remains as to whether this interstice is an empty space or not. Hermann seems to favour the opinion that space is both: a place where bodies are and empty space (*vacuum*), although he never explicitly mentioned empty space.

Another question is whether space is finite or infinite. Hermann is not consistent in this point. Speaking about the universe being limited by space, he said that if one went through space to the largest parts of the universe, one would proceed into infinity (Ibid., 56.8). Just as there is infinitely large space, there are infinitely small quantities. In another passage, he says that only the multiplier (*solus auctor*), or God, is infinite, not being limited by any boundaries (Ibid., 56,10–11). Everything else created, including space, is finite. Hermann shared the generally accepted opinion about the finiteness of space.

<sup>15</sup> Herman Dalmatin, *op. cit.*, 56.23.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 56.25.

<sup>17</sup> R. Bošković, *Teorija prirodne filozofije (Theory of Natural Philosophy)*, no. 171, pp. 78–79.

<sup>18</sup> Hermann, *op. cit.* 56.26.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 65.27.

### 3. Cosmic Space, Time and Movement

Hermann's ontological views on space, time and movement entail corresponding cosmological concepts. Space is finite because it is encompassed by the highest sphere with the fixed stars. Below it or, more precisely, inside it, there is Saturn's sphere, inside which there is Jupiter's sphere and so on, according to the contemporary knowledge about the number of celestial bodies. In the centre of these concentric spheres is the Earth, which is also spherical in shape. It must be spherical since all the celestial bodies uniformly move in circles (Ibid., 34.18). According to Hermann, what makes the Earth different from all other planets is its immobility. The Earth is also one of the two extremes. The other extreme, the outer sphere, which is the boundary of the universe, turns around a stationary axis. The Earth as one extreme is distinguished from the other extreme in being heavy and passive; heaviness is associated with idleness. The outer sphere is active and mobile; mobility is associated with lightness. These extremes are the constitutive elements of the coming-to-be of the universe. »The universe, the establishment of which was intended for all generations, was primarily imagined as coming into being from the active and the passive part.«<sup>20</sup>

In order to prove that the Earth was in the centre of the universe (Ibid., 34.8–20), Hermann drew upon Ptolemy's *Almagest*. But contrary to the traditional view, that the Earth turned around an axis,<sup>21</sup> as advocated by Plato, Hermann claimed that the Earth, in the centre of the universe, was completely immobile (Ibid., 34.21–24). The Earth is also exceptional in being »the mother and nurse of the whole secondary *genitura*.«<sup>22</sup> Plato also called the Earth a nurse.<sup>23</sup> As an immobile mother and nurse, the Earth »rightly requests a continuous service of the divine movement for each of its needs.«<sup>24</sup>

In order to fulfil these requests, the creator of the universe placed the mediators between the extremes. The middle part (*medium*) has an important role in Hermann's system. Without the medium, the universe would be deficient, as he clearly pointed out: »The composition of the universe would not seem complete to me if this only binding rope of the whole construction were missing.«<sup>25</sup> It was, therefore, important to study medium, which Plato and Aristotle had failed to do.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 34.2.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Plato, *Timaeus*, 40 b. This passage allows different interpretations: does the Earth in the *Timaeus* move around the axis or is it wound around it?

<sup>22</sup> Hermann, *op. cit.* 35.1.

<sup>23</sup> Plato, *Timaeus*, 40 b.

<sup>24</sup> Hermann, *op. cit.* 35.1.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 49.4.

The purpose of the medium is to connect the extremes, and for that reason it should not be the same as the extremes, nor completely different from them; its nature is dual. »Since one of the extremes was of the same nature, and the other was of a different nature, the medium was created having a mixed nature.«<sup>26</sup> The created bodies have characteristics of the upper (celestial) world and the lower (terrestrial) world. The fact that they were created is a mark of celestial nature; that their movements are so different is a terrestrial characteristic. In this respect, Hermann followed the classical division of the universe into the upper (celestial or supralunar) universe and the lower (terrestrial or sublunar) universe. In relation to the lower universe, the upper universe is dual. The four elements (earth, water, air and fire) belong to the lower universe, while the spheres of the planets belong to the upper universe; the Moon is situated at the boundary between the upper and the lower universe (Ibid., 35–37). The seven spheres of the planets and the outer sphere compose the celestial world. Hermann's arrangement of the spheres differs from Plato's and Aristotle's. He accepted the model of Heraclides Ponticus, who maintained that Mercury and Venus circled around the Sun, and the Sun together with them circled around the Earth. This model was later taken over by the Romans and the Latin authors of the early Middle Ages; it was generalized by Johannes Scotus in the 9th century and completely revised by Tycho Brahe in the 16th century.

The movement of the planets is circular because it is the only perfect movement; the movement of the universe as a whole would not be possible if the movement was not perfect, that is, circular (Ibid., 34.5). Although the planets move uniformly in circles, different planets move at a different speed, for which Hermann gives two reasons (Ibid., 41.3; 43.3). The mediators which are higher move more quickly (Ibid., 45.7), and the outermost sphere is the most mobile. The mediators, therefore, resemble the last sphere in that they move, and differ from it in that they move in the opposite direction (Ibid., 47.3–4).

The Sun has a special position among the mediators. It is situated at such a distance from the Earth, that its rays could have an optimal effect on it. The influence of the Sun is considered beneficial. In this respect, Hermann distinguishes between »good« and »bad« planets. The bad influence of Mars and Saturn is neutralized by the arrangement of the planets in space, and the universe is structured in such a way as to balance the influence of good and bad planets. »But astronomy leaves to astrology the admirable mystery of this

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 37.5.

arrangement of stars.«<sup>27</sup> With that comment, Hermann made a distinction between astronomy and astrology.

It has already been said that difference is a property of movement (and time), so that one cannot exist without the other. Differences can be observed in the circling of the celestial bodies and in the circling of the universe as a whole. Hermann divides all these differences into three parts: the first part rests upon people's experience, and Hermann calls it famous (*celebris*); the second part rests upon the unanimity of wise men and he calls it probable (*probabilis*), while the third part is necessary (*necessarius*). Each of these parts is further divided, i.e. the famous part into the yearly, monthly, and daily periods; the probable part into the Saturnian, Jovian, Martial, Venusian and Mercurial periods; and the necessary part into the periods of 360, 3600, 36,000 and 360,000 years (*Ibid.*, 59.1–2). There are also further divisions, which are used by astrologers for calculating the time of various worldly events, and also for explaining the characteristics and customs of various peoples (*Ibid.*, 60–61).

Hermann, therefore, divides time according to the movement of the Sun (year), the Moon and the Sun (month), and the daily rotation of the world (day) (*Ibid.*, 91.5; 91.9). In *De Essentis*, Hermann also wrote about the space of the terrestrial sphere and the space inhabited by people.

Hermann's concept of space, time and movement rests upon the ontological foundations. It also has a cosmological aspect. Although Hermann was educated in the Western Platonist tradition, and studied Aristotelian and Arabic natural philosophy, he differed from Plato, Aristotle and Abu-Ma'shar in a number of points. Among others, he considered the Earth to be immobile, made a different arrangement of the planets and emphasized the importance of the medium. His philosophical system and his understanding of the relations between space and time influenced later European philosophy and scientific thought.

TRANSLATED BY BRANKA ŽODAN

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 38.11.

## PROSTOR, VRIJEME I GIBANJE U PRIRODNOJ FILOZOFIJI HERMANA DALMATINA

### *Sažetak*

U radu se govori o mjestu (locus) <i prostoru (spatium)>, vremenu (tempus) i gibanju (motus) u sustavu pet bití kako ih navodi Herman Dalmatin. Na vrhu ljestvice bití nalazi se uzrok (kojeg Herman imenuje na više načina: počelo svega, množitelj, Bog...) koji putem gibanja izvodi stvaranje (creatio) i rađanje (generatio). Prostor i vrijeme su dvostruko utočište i sjedište propadljivog poroda. Dalje se govori o Hermanovu sustavu svemirskog (kozмолоškog) prostora, vremena i gibanja, koji proizlaze iz prostora, vremena i gibanja ontološki shvaćenih, te se ukazuje na Hermanovo mjesto u sklopu europskog mišljenja.



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# *Studies*



## FROM A SCHOOL OF THOUGHT TO THE FREEDOM OF THOUGHT. A SURVEY OF PAST RESEARCH IN FRANE PETRIĆ'S POETICS AND ESTHETICS AND ITS FUTURE TASKS

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Original Paper  
UDC 19 Franc Petrić

Ma noi per favor divino di questo servaggio fatti liberi, posposta ogni autorità, esaminiamo sopra la proposta, e la costanza della dottrina aristotelica, e o fatti stessi, e la ragion de' fatti, e i fatti della ragione. Per gli quali e per le quali speriamo di meglio, e più al vero, potere queste difficoltà decidere, che per le sole altrui autorità. Le quali chi fa padrone di se stesso, noi tegniamo che tenga dello sciamo, assai più che chi libero ricerca le ragioni conformate a' fatti, e da fatti confermate.<sup>1</sup>

Petrić's entire philosophical work, actually a dialog with European intellectual heritage, is one of the inexhaustible issues investigated by Croatian and other historians of philosophy, especially those concerned with European Renaissance philosophy and the history of Platonism and Aristotelianism; but Petrić's work is also inspiring to modern thought in general. My intention is to point at the results of past research in Petrić's poetics and its future tasks, as well as at the basis of Petrić's esthetical-poetical views expressed in his philosophical and literary works, poetical commentaries, in his 'Nova de universis philosophia' and his major work 'Della poetica', a survey of the ideas and problems in the history of poetry. They all contain basic definitions and particular elements of Petrić's esthetical-poeticological doctrines, his philosophy of art (e.g. poetry, music), his concept of the art of words (stylistics, metrics, melodies), philosophy of language, as well as the relations among poetics, rhetoric, history and theology as expressed in his works. All these elements are necessary in a thorough analysis of Petrić's significance to the

<sup>1</sup> Francesco Patrizi da Cherso, *Della Poetica, La Deca Disputata*, VII (critical edition by Danilo Aguzzi Barbagli, Firenze 1970, vol. II, pp. 131-132).

esthetical reflection, literary criticism and textual hermeneutics during the European Renaissance period, and also to the correspondence between the basic concepts of Petrić's *ars poetica* and Croatian Renaissance and post-Renaissance poetics.

The above-mentioned issues should be examined from within Petrić's (modern) philosophy, his standpoint and relation to philosophical heritage – the context in which the nature and purpose of his Platonism and Aristotelianism may be grasped, as well as the importance of his view in the change of esthetical values that followed. Petrić's opus, the philosophical views formulated in his contribution to the contemporary literary debates discussing Homer (actually, Aristotle's poetics<sup>2</sup>), may be defined as a path from a *school of thought* to the *freedom of thought*.

Petrić's esthetical-poeticological views include a wide personal philosophical and literary experience, a variety of interests and motives, schools and doctrines of the post-Renaissance period, the so-called Second Cinquecento, as well as the already present characteristics of the Seicento poetics.

The foundations of Petrić's esthetical concepts and their speculative content is to be looked for in: 1, The context of Petrić's thought, included in his coherent system of natural philosophy (*Nova de universis philosophia*), in his onto-theological cosmological and gnosological views, therefore in the *original core of Petrić's philosophy*; 2, The *spiritual-historical context* that enables the insight into the fundamental places and paradigms of Petrić's esthetic thought, which articulates some of the common ideas of Renaissance esthetic thought as well as the unique characteristics of Petrić's philosophemes themselves. Whether Petrić's thought – either completely or partly (as well as Renaissance thought in general) – owes to traditional thought is yet to be determined. In spite of all the results achieved by the research in Petrić and the evaluation of the role and significance of his philosophy (syncretism, eclecticism, ingenuity, originality, anti-Aristotelianism, influences of neo-Platonic doctrines, concordism of Hermetic, Orphic, Pythagorean and Platonic doctrines and the teachings of the Fathers of the Church etc.), the other issue remaining to be determined is the extent of its foundations and origins in the traditional European philosophical thought, and whether it transforms and exceeds tradition, clearing the paths for novel philosophy.

Although Petrić is very much present in both Croatian and foreign philosophical historiography, in a wide scope of methodological viewpoints, interpretative levels and evaluations of his philosophical opus, the standpoints combining these two complementary doxographic-methodological routes – also necessary in a systematical research in the esthetical ideas in Petrić's

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, *La Deca Disputata*, II, Se Empedoclo fu poeta minore o maggiore di Omero.

philosophical opus – are very rare indeed. 1. The first way, the way of understanding of the esthetical that starts from the very center of Petrić's philosophical system, from the connections between Petrić's systematic theory of the beautiful, the philosophy of beauty (and its complementary, the philosophy of love) and his natural philosophy concepts, has remained a marginal interest of several scientists, otherwise competent researchers of Petrić's opus. Because of that, only a small number of isolated issues were investigated.

2. The other way is the way of understanding of Petrić's ideas in their historical context, a crisis of ancient values recognized in the Renaissance period, their revision and the search for new ideals, and the birth of a new taste, sensibility and critical thought, enriched by insights in Petrić's contributions to philosophy and art theory.

One of the tasks of my research, not considered so far, is to determine the sources, nature and significance of Petrić's *novel* esthetical-poeticological model and his category apparatus (art theory, poetic act, creator's personality, inspiration, the miraculous, fictional, allegorical, metaphorical, etc.) in a wider comparative context, with parallel emergences of literary, visual arts, and musical traditions, both Croatian and European ones.

This especially refers to the corpus of Croatian literary poetics from the early and late Renaissance and the Mannerism and Baroque poetics, differing from conventional, archetypal normative models.

### I. A Survey of Past Research

There is extensive literature on Petrić's philosophical opus. However, works discussing his esthetical views are far fewer. Influence of various traditions on this part of Petrić's opus are yet to be investigated. The most informative and thorough works elaborating Hermetic tradition, a major influence on Petrić's natural philosophy, are by Cesare Vasoli<sup>3</sup>; E. Jacobs', A. Antonaci's, and Th. Leinkauf's works are a must in the study of the significance of Platonic and neo-Platonic ideas, particularly in Petrić's concept of the beautiful (e. g. Proclo's and Damascius' late neo-Platonism), essential in his criticism of Aristotle<sup>4</sup>. Life and work of this Renaissance philosopher – as one

<sup>3</sup> C. Vasoli, *F. Patrizi e la tradizione ermetica*, Nuova rivista storica, 1980, 64; E. Banić-Pajnić has recently discussed the same issue in Croatia, cf. *Smisao i značenje Hermesove objave*, Zagreb, 1989.

<sup>4</sup> E. Jacobs, *F. Patricio und seine Sammlung griechischer Handschriften in der Bibliothek des Escorial*, Zentralblatt für Bibliothekswesen, 1908, 25; A. Antonaci, *Ricerche sul neoplatonismo del Rinascimento: F. Patrizi da Cherso*, Galatina, 1984; Th. Leinkauf, *Il neoplatonismo di Francesco Patrizi come presupposto della sua critica ad Aristotele*, Firenze, 1990.

of the greatest interpreters of Platonic philosophy in the second part of the sixteenth century – were described by Ch. B. Schmitt<sup>5</sup>. D. P. Walker and Ch. B. Schmitt studied the significance of Petrić's revival of *prisca theologia* in the context of Renaissance thought<sup>6</sup>. The influence of Ficino's ideas – his metaphysics of light – on Petrić's natural philosophy was studied by Maechling, Beierwaltes and Blumenberg<sup>7</sup>, and on Petrić's concepts of the structural beauty of the world, Eros and art<sup>8</sup>. The works considering the esthetical-poeticological problems in Petrić's opus, his attempt to establish poetics as a scientific art, the relations among poetics, history and rhetoric as a general (mathematically structured) science of speech, are far fewer. The historical significance of Petrić's Poetics was analysed in L. Bolzoni's studies<sup>9</sup>.

Scientific interest in Petrić's opus in Croatian historiography started in mid-nineteenth century, after Ljubić's biographical dictionary of famous Dalmatians was published in 1856<sup>10</sup>, a work that Tin Ujević described as an interesting monument in his treatise on Franciscus Patritius<sup>11</sup> that would be of greater help if translated into Croatian, revised and updated. The dictionary has not been translated so far, and the reprint published by A. Forni in 1974 as Volume 59 of the Italian bio-bibliographical series *Italica gens* is not easily obtainable.

The pioneering work in Croatian scientific study in Petrić's philosophy and esthetics was done by Franjo Marković who described Petrić as one of the personalities who had provided a honorable passport (for the Croatian people) in the period of European spiritual revival allowing it to enter the elevated temple of intellectual achievement of the world<sup>12</sup>.

<sup>5</sup> Ch. B. Schmitt, *L'introduction de la philosophie platonicienne dans l'enseignement des universités a la Renaissance*, in: *Platon et Aristote a la Renaissance*, XVI. Colloque international de Tours, Paris, 1976.

<sup>6</sup> D. P. Walker, *The Prisca Theologia in France*, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 1954, 17; Ch. B. Schmitt, *Prisca Theologia e Philosophias perennis: due temi del Rinascimento italiano e la loro fortuna*, in: *Il pensiero italiano del Rinascimento e il tempo nostro*, Atti del V. Convegno internazionale del Centro di Studi Umanistici, Firenze, 1970.

<sup>7</sup> E. E. Maechling, *Light Metaphysics in the Natural Philosophy of F. Patrizi da Cherso*, Univ. London, 1977; *Marsilio Ficino e il ritorno di Platone*, Studi e documenti I, II, Firenze, 1986.

<sup>8</sup> See W. Beierwaltes, *Plotinus Metaphysik des Lichtes in Philosophie des Neoplatonismus*, Darmstadt, 1977, and H. Blumenberg's study *Licht als Metapher der Wahrheit*, Studium Generale, 1957, 10.

<sup>9</sup> L. Bolzoni, *L'universo dei poemi possibili. Studi su Francesco Patrizi da Cherso*, Roma, 1980.

<sup>10</sup> S. Gliubich, *Dizionario biografico degli uomini illustri della Dalmazia*, Vienna Zara, 1856.

<sup>11</sup> T. Ujević, *Franciscus Patritius 1529-1597*, Jadranska Pošta, March 1, 1930, VI, 50, p. 2.

<sup>12</sup> F. Marković, *Filozofijske struke pisci hrvatskoga roda onkray Velebita u stoljećih XV. do XVIII.*, rector's inaugural speech, quoted after the reprinted version, in: *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, 1975, 1-2.

Working on Croatian literary and cultural history, with equal interest for Classical philology, philosophy, esthetics, psychology and ethics, Milivoj Šrepel created the first attempt – his study discussing Petrić's poetics – to describe and scientifically evaluate the literary and historical significance of Petrić's work. Guided by the idea to write a history of Croatian writings in Latin (encouraged by Rudolf Maixner and Franjo Rački<sup>13</sup>), and having collected sources for this project, Šrepel wrote about many personalities from Croatian culture in his works published in *Nastavni vjesnik* in the *Matica hrvatska* editions and in the *Rad JAZU*, creating small literary portraits of authors from the early humanist Latin writings to the eighteenth century, which was, according to him, the peak of our (Croatian) writing in Latin that does credit to the Croatian people, as he wrote in a letter to D. Preradović in 1900<sup>14</sup>. I have to mention some of Šrepel's works, e. g. the one discussing the cynicism of Pannonijs' epigrams, his reading of Marulić in the light of Gerson's and Thomas a Kempis' ideas, his understanding of the significance – in Croatian context as well as in the European spiritual revival – of the ideas and works of Croatian philosophers, authors, scientists, painters and architects, from the humanism and Renaissance periods to the modern times, from Ilija Crijević, Julije Klović, Marko Antun de Dominis, Juraj Šižgorić, Marin Držić, Ivan Gundulić, Junije Restić, Bartol Kašić, Rajmund Kunić, Benedikt Stay, to Marković and others.

In his studies of the phenomenon of the European Renaissance, for example when trying to show the influence of Italian revival on Croatian lands, namely in literature and art<sup>15</sup>, Šrepel focused his scientific interest on two of Petrić's poetic 'decades', the historic and disputative ones, evaluating the characteristics and merits of Petrić's Poetics which he rates above Scaliger's, pointing at their differing concepts, and stressing that Petrić's poetics surpassed Scaliger's, especially since Petrić tried to analyse the being and forms of poetry in a more thorough way, and quite uninfluenced to. Discussing these two parts of Petrić's poetics, Šrepel shows how Petrić, in the second part, took off on his own wings<sup>16</sup>. Šrepel also points at Petrić's criticism of Aristotle's normative poetics: »...He was the *first* (underlined by Šrepel) who... proved that the standpoint of Aristotle's poetics is too narrow«<sup>17</sup> and at the modern qualities of Petrić's work (also noting that Aristotle's rules were

<sup>13</sup> Cf. M. Šrepel's obituary, written by A. Musić, *Ljetopis JAZU*, 1906, Vol. 20, pp. 68–116.

<sup>14</sup> *Ib.*, p. 115.

<sup>15</sup> M. Šrepel, *Preporod u Italiji u XV. i XVI. stoljeću*, Zagreb, 1899, MII, *Slike iz svjetske književnosti*, Vol. 6.

<sup>16</sup> M. Šrepel, *O Patricijevoj poeticsi*, *Rad JAZU*, Vol. 108, Zagreb, 1892, p. 64.

<sup>17</sup> *Op. cit.*, *ib.*

nevertheless accepted for a much longer time, e. g. by Lessing), important in the history of reception of Aristotle's poetic doctrines: »... Modern science... repeated many of Petrić's criticisms three hundred years later, following the inductive method, like Petrić.« Comparing Petrić's poetics with contemporary ones which followed Aristotle (Trissino, Vida, Muzio, Tasso, Minturno, Scaliger, Robortello, Maggi), Šrepel concludes: »Petrić's work is not perfect, and neither it could have been, because not even today may we say that science has perfected poetics«<sup>18</sup>.

The greatest value of Milivoj Šrepel's work on Petrić's poetics is in the motive, on the trail of Marković's inaugural speech as the rector of Zagreb University, aware of the need to study and evaluate Croatian philosophical heritage. Petrić is the first of Croatian philosophical authors on Marković's list, »one of the most prominent interpretators and challengers of Aristotle's work..., one of those who joined the arguments of Italian scientists discussing the relative merits of Tasso's and Ariosto's epics, and the worth of Aristotle's poetical rules in modern times«<sup>19</sup>.

This work on the evaluation of the position, reach and contribution of the representatives of Croatian cultural and philosophical heritage in the European context is important because it proves that ancient philosophical tradition is still present in modern thought, evident as the research in the history of philosophy in Marković, in history of literature in Šrepel.

Several authors studied Petrić's significance in the history of esthetics during the first decades of the twentieth century. On the occasion of the four hundredth anniversary of Petrić's birth, Franjo Jelašić<sup>20</sup> wrote about Petrić's fame throughout Europe, seeing it as Croatian cultural contribution to cultural history in general. From the context of contemporary history of literature, Jelašić notes Petrić's work in linguistics and his contributions to the literary polemics concerning Tasso.

Tin Ujević wrote a number of papers in 1930<sup>21</sup> describing Petrić as »the most important offspring« and »greatest of spirits« of old Dalmatia and the rest of the South, and pointed at the poor knowledge about this philosopher's work in his own country (»Not a single Patritian biography and bibliography

<sup>18</sup> *Ib.*

<sup>19</sup> F. Marković, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

<sup>20</sup> F. Jelašić, *Franjo Petrić, O 400-godišnjici njegova rođenja*, Hrvatsko Kolo, 1929, Vol. X, pp. 274–276.

<sup>21</sup> T. Ujević, *Poslije četiri stoljeća*, Jadranska Pošta, February 13, 1930, VI, 36, p. 2; *Iz književnih ručališta*, *ib.*, February 18, 1930, VI, 40, p. 2; *Franciscus Patritius*, *ib.*, March 1, 1930, VI, 50, p. 2.



has ever been completed at home«<sup>22</sup>). Furthermore, his four-hundredth anniversary was written about »in the Zagreb 'Novosti' only; and that paper was not complete. And in France«, Ujević continues, »Penjon's high-school philosophy textbook mentions Petrić! Giordano Bruno, Kuno Fischer, Harald Hoeffding and Benedetto Croce all knew about him. Francesco Fiorentino, in a study on B. Telesius, compares several Petrić's doctrines with Kantian ones. (...) German authors (among them Ueberweg), along with other ones, wrote about Petrić; Rixner and Suber quote passages from his works in their 'Teachings of Great Physicists' (1820). Any philosopher, willing to undertake this work, would find plenty of materials for his historical-cultural erudition«<sup>23</sup>.

Discussing the Renaissance milieu in general, and arguments about literary genres and poetical rules in particular, Isidor Kamalić wrote about Petrić's poetics and its cultural and historical significance in the third part of his doctoral dissertation<sup>24</sup>, repeating some of Šrepel's views. Along with biographical data, encyclopedic character, variety and characteristic qualities of Petrić's philosophical, critical, historical, scientific and political opus, Kamalić paid special attention to Petrić's works discussing poetics and to his position in contemporary literature of poeticological treatises, as well as to the Petrić – Tasso polemics (Trimerone), and to the value and novel qualities of Petrić's views, opposing Aristotle's normative poetics.

From the times of these pioneering works, many aspects and segments of Petrić's thought had been discussed both home and abroad. Esthetical issues, Renaissance poetics and Petrić's views were discussed in different contexts and from different standpoints, literary-historical and philosophical alike. Petrić's poetics and rhetoric and their respective positions and significance have been evaluated both positively and negatively, especially in the context of renewed discussions about the *general, possible and probable* in poetic speech and artistic truth: From G. Vico's criticisms (Vico described Petrić's theory about the origin of poetry as childish folly) to B. Croce, who – starting from his view of the Baroque as kitsch – formed his opinion about Petrić by reasserting some negative evaluations, e. g. A. Conti's evaluation of Petrić's criticism of the theory of imitation<sup>25</sup>; Although he acknowledges Petrić's intellectual greatness, he criticizes his inability to construe<sup>26</sup> and his sophistry<sup>27</sup>.

<sup>22</sup> T. Ujević, *Iz književnih ručališta*, op. cit.

<sup>23</sup> T. Ujević, *Poslije četiri stoljeća*, op. cit.

<sup>24</sup> Isidoro Kamalić O. F. M., *Francesco Patrizi, 1529–1597, nella cultura e soprattutto nella poetica cinquecentesca*, Split, 1934.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. B. Croce, *Estetika*, Zagreb, 1960, p. 219 (translated by V. Vitezica).

<sup>26</sup> B. Croce, *Storia dell'estetica*, Bari, 1967, p. 46.

<sup>27</sup> B. Croce, *Estetika*, op. cit., p. 176.

Petrić's work discussing individual artistic genres, e. g. rhetoric, and his contribution to the Renaissance theory of oratory, were considered by the authors who wrote at the beginning of the twentieth century, from B. Croce who examined Petrić's rhetoric and his contribution in the context of Renaissance rhetoric<sup>28</sup> to E. Garin<sup>29</sup> and H.-B. Gerl, who compared Petrić's theory of language with traditional humanist theories and basic philosophical orientations of the fifteenth century, analysing his project of a scientifically based rhetoric and the principles that he aimed to build his philosophical rhetoric on, and crediting Petrić with the discovery of the aporias of Classical metaphysics. In spite of all the limitations and shortcomings of Petrić's attempt to discover, for the first time, the formal structural laws of rhetoric, H.-B. Gerl emphasizes its significance<sup>30</sup>.

The analyses of Petrić's contribution to the theory of literary criticism were intensified in the last decades, especially the research in his contribution to the arguments (S. Speroni, G. Scaligero, G. Fracastoro, L. Castelvetro) led in European, and especially Italian, academic circles at the end of the sixteenth century, about Aristotle's poetic theory. These controversies are significant to the histories of literature, language, philosophy, and also to the history of culture in general (Accademia della Crusca, Alterati, etc.)<sup>31</sup>. Petrić joined the discussions about Homer, Dante, Virgil, Classical and contemporary authors that Petrić describes as nobilissimi scrittori. Petrić argues with Calstelvetro, in defense of Dante, considering him to be one of the glorious poets<sup>32</sup>, a poet using new motives<sup>33</sup>, a poet using fantastic elements<sup>34</sup>, quoting him in several parts of his poetics and using elements of his poetic philosophy (the role of genius, the role of the Muses who possess knowledge, of the doctrines about the light and beauty of the universe<sup>35</sup>). This issue has not yet been considered,

<sup>28</sup> B. Croce, *Francesco Patritio e la critica della retorica antica*, in: *Problemi di estetica*, Bari, 1903.

<sup>29</sup> E. Garin. *Note su alcuni aspetti delle retoriche rinascimentali e sulla «Retorica» di Patrizi*, in: *Testi umanistici sulla retorica*, Archivio di Filosofia, 1953, pp. 48–56.

<sup>30</sup> H. B. Gerl, *Humanistička i geometrijska filozofija jezika. Primjena paradigme od Leonarda Brunija do Frane Petrića*, Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine, 1979, 9–10, p. 155.

<sup>31</sup> C. Marconcini, *L'Accademia della Crusca dalle origini alla prima edizione del vocabolario*, Pisa, 1910; B. Weinberg, *Argomenti di discussione letteraria nell'Accademia degli Alterati (1570–1600)*, *Giornale storico della letteratura italiana*, 1954.

<sup>32</sup> In Petrić's Poetics two of Dante's and Petrarch's works are described like i due famosi di nostra lingua, Comedia di Dante a Trionfi del Petrarca in: Francesco Patrizi da Cherso, *Della Poetica* (a c. di D. Aguzzi Barbagli), Vol. I, Firenze, 1969, DDU, Ch. 1, p. 147.

<sup>33</sup> F. Patrizi, op. cit., DDU, Ch. 5, p. 205.

<sup>34</sup> ... fantastici poeti nome devono meritarsi, op. cit., DP, Ch. 5, p. 68.

<sup>35</sup> Op. cit., DDU, Ch. 3, pp. 174, 181.

neither in the analyses of Petrić's esthetics nor of his natural philosophy. An analysis of the similarities of philosophical reflections in Dante's chief poetic work and basic notions of Petrić's philosophy of universe and man (nature, life, eros, physical and spiritual beauty, light, truth), should be undertaken. Controversies about Ariosto and Tasso are actually arguments about *rules, paradigms, models, and freedom of creation*. These arguments are led about numerous problems: *imitatio* and *creatio*, *realistic representation* and *artistic freedom, invention* and *expression*, the role of experience and knowledge of the literary, the poetic, creative act, the phenomenon of poetic characteristics, the source of the miraculous that generates admiration<sup>36</sup>, fictional, the allegorical and enigmatic<sup>37</sup>, the problem of literary genres, the novel, heroic epic, tragedy and comedy, etc.<sup>38</sup> These polemics were led by the followers of Tasso on the one hand, defending stylistic discipline, the ideals of form, the concept of imitation as the essence of art, and the followers of Ariosto on the other hand; These followed the traditions of Platonism and considered invention to be the basis of poetic art. They all focused on the central issue, the idea of art, on the role and aims of art, and on the relations between art and nature, poetry and history, poetry and theology, truth and probability. This new light of increasing contrasts and the inclination toward a harmony of art, philosophy and science, of the worlds of affection, myth and reason, reflects the spirit of the new, pre-Baroque period.

Noticing the importance of Petrić's ideas in the history of Renaissance culture, especially his definition of art, different from the stylistic and rhetoric concepts of the Renaissance period, as demonstrated by R. Scrivano, most authors – from differing viewpoints and analyzing different segments of Petrić's opus – nevertheless agree in their understanding of Petrić's non-construing spirit, Platonically marked, oriented toward criticizing and rejecting authority, Aristotle's rules in the first place, as well as the principles of poetic art (as presented by the members of the Della Crusca academy, Salviati, Pellegrino and others), accepting, however, some obsolescent views (as seen in his polemics with Tasso), and finally failing to complete his project of poetics as a scientific discipline. At the same time, however, Petrić is credited with the expansion of literary genres and categories and his view that poetry defines rules, not vice versa: The only acknowledged rule is the rejection of rules themselves.

These analyses help us grasp and comprehend the significance of Petrić's esthetic doctrines by pointing at the characteristics and innovative qualities of

<sup>36</sup> Op. cit., DA, Ch. 10.

<sup>37</sup> Op. cit., DP, Chs. 2, 5, 7.

<sup>38</sup> See M. Sansone, *Le polemiche antuassese della Crusca*, in: *T. Tasso*, Milano, 1957.

Petrić's poetics, e. g. his theory of inspiration, allegory, etc.<sup>39</sup>, the concepts of Petrić's already manneristic poetics<sup>40</sup>. D. Aguzzi Barbagli points at Petrić's contribution to the Renaissance doctrines about love<sup>41</sup>, representing a contribution to a so far unwritten history of the European philosophical dialog about love, a common theme of many Renaissance treatises; Petrić's novel, original considerations of the phenomenon are discussed in M. Mucillo's works. There are many treatises that discuss the analogies between certain parts of Petrić's philosophy and Ficino's philosophy neo-Platonic concepts, philosophy of love, the mysticism of eros, metaphysics of light, astral doctrines, the concepts of *furor*, the sublime and poetic imagination<sup>42</sup>. Also, there are many works emphasizing the *novum* of Petrić's esthetic-poetic views: The culture historian and esthetician Tibor Klaniczay describes Petrić as a theoretician of Mannerism esthetics in his analyses<sup>43</sup>. Recent musicology research in Croatia (Miho Demović, Stanislav Tuksar)<sup>44</sup> examines one of the hitherto (in Croatia) not thoroughly investigated characteristics of Petrić's philosophical opus, his poetics of music: directly, by analyzing its significance in view of music in practice and the emergence of novel musical forms, and indirectly, through the anticipation of novel ideas of combining forms, e. g. poetic and musical arts, as described by Petrić's contemporary N. V. Gučetić / Gozdc. Outside Croatia, D. Aguzzi Barbagli's research should be mentioned<sup>45</sup>.

<sup>39</sup> G. della Volpe, *Poetica del Cinquecento. La «Poetica» aristotelica nei commenti esenziali degli ultimi umanisti italiani*, Bari, 1954.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. J. E. Spingarn, *A History of Literary Criticism in the Renaissance*, New York, 1899; R. Scrivano, *Il manierismo nella letteratura del Cinquecento*, Verona, 1959; C. Vasoli, *L'estetica dell'Umanesimo e del Rinascimento*, in: *Momenti e problemi di storia dell'estetica*, I, Milano, 1959; B. Weinberg, *A History of Literary Criticism in the Italian Renaissance*, Chicago, 1961; B. Nathaway, *The Age of Criticism: The Late Renaissance in Italy*, New York, 1962.

<sup>41</sup> D. Aguzzi Barbagli, *Un contributo di Francesco Patrizi da Cherso alle dottrine rinascimentali sull'amore*, in: *Yearbook of Italian Studies*, Firenze, 1972, pp. 19–50.

<sup>42</sup> M. Mucillo, *Marsilio Ficino e Francesco Patrizi da Cherso*, in: *Marsilio Ficino e il ritorno di Platone, studie e documenti*, I, II, a c. di G. Garfagnini, Firenze, 1986, Vol. II, pp. 615–679; C. Vasoli, *L'Amorosa filosofia di Francesco Patrizie la dissoluzione del mito platonico dell'amore*, in: *Il dialogo filosofico nel '500 Europeo*, Milano, 1990 (papers presented at an international congress in Milan, Italy, in 1987); C. Vasoli, *Schede Patriziane sul De sublime*, in: *Il Sublime, Contributi per la storia di un'idea*, Studi in onore di Giuseppe Martano, Napoli, 1983, pp. 161–174.

<sup>43</sup> T. Klaniczay, *La theorie esthetique du manierisme*, in: *Litterature de la Renaissance a la lumiere des recherches sovietiques et hongroises*, Budapest, 1978, pp. 327–385.

<sup>44</sup> Miho Demović, *Glazba i glazbenici u Dubrovačkoj Republici od početku 11. do sredine 17. stoljeća*, Zagreb, 1981, and *Glazba i glazbenici u Dubrovačkoj Republici od druge polovine 17. do prvog desetljeća 19. stoljeća*, Zagreb, 1989; S. Tuksar, *Croatian Renaissance Music Theorists*, Zagreb, 1989, pp. 79–105.

<sup>45</sup> D. Aguzzi Barbagli, *Francesco Patrizi e l'Umanesimo musicale del Cinquecento*, in: *L'Umanesimo in Istria*, Firenze, 1983, pp. 63–91.

Petrić's esthetic concepts, in connection with the natural philosophy, cosmological and scientific theories of his time, should also be examined in view of the context of interpretations of beauty and love in numerous poetological works and dialogs written by Italian authors at the end of the sixteenth century (A. Firenzuola, B. Varchi, T. Tasso and others). These works discuss the basic notions of Aristotle's normative poetics, criticized in Petrić's philosophy who used them as the foundation of his novel theory of poetry based on his own rules. Petrić's esthetic concepts should also be considered in the context of his philosophical system, his ontology, cosmology and theory of knowledge.

Systematically investigating Croatian esthetical thought for decades, Zlatko Posavac also wrote about Petrić's philosophical-esthetical thought, holding him to be the first Croat esthetician<sup>46</sup>. In the context of a new philosophical-esthetical approach to the corpus of Croatian literary heritage, in his innovative analyses, Posavac examines Petrić's ideas in view of comparative research in various periods of Croatian cultural history, e. g. Vetranović's poetics<sup>47</sup>, and earlier periods too. Reconstructing and evaluating esthetic views and the medieval theory of art, Posavac – examining the *Lucidarius* from the Petris anthology (1468), a characteristic document from the history of esthetic reflection<sup>48</sup> – noticed the significance of the until then uninvestigated phenomenon of esthetic Utopia the spiritual character of beauty as an entity, its definition (ontological and metaphysical) as well as certain elements that he examined in the context of a wider comprehension, thus finding reflections of medieval esthetic views in the Renaissance period, when they were revived through neo-Platonic tradition (the metaphysics of light)<sup>49</sup>. In his studies of Croatian literary Baroque, Zoran Kravar wrote about some elements of esthetic consciousness and the characteristics of the post-Renaissance spiritual world, considering them to be constantly present in Croatian literature, pointing at certain stylistic similarities of Baroque and modern Mannerism, however, carefully avoiding usage of modern criteria<sup>50</sup>, which may be recommended to the investigators of Croatian philosophical heritage, including Petrić's work.

<sup>46</sup> Z. Posavac, *Estetika u Hrvata do sredine 20. stoljeća*, in: *Hrvatska filozofija u prošlosti i sadašnjosti* (anthology), Zagreb, 1992, p. 105.

<sup>47</sup> Z. Posavac, *Renesansni Orfeo (O Vetranovićevu mitološkom igrokazu)*, anthology *Dam hvarskog kazališta XIV*, Split, 1988, pp. 198-215.

<sup>48</sup> Z. Posavac, *Estetika srednjeg vijeka*, in: *Estetika u Hrvata*, Zagreb, 1986, p. 43.

<sup>49</sup> *Ib.*, p. 45.

<sup>50</sup> Z. Kravar, *Studije o hrvatskom književnom baroku*, Zagreb, 1975.

## I.2. *The Tasks of Research in Petrić's Esthetic-Poetic Views*

The two methodological ways of research in Petrić's literary, esthetic and philosophical views, as described above, enable us to grasp wide, hitherto not discussed issues.

1. This applies to the sources and history of Petrić's esthetic-poetic doctrine, his relation to the European Classical heritage, philosophical-esthetic, literary and artistic, along with medieval heritage (Dante among others), humanism and Renaissance neo-Platonism (one of the tasks is the research into the significance of Plotinus' esthetic doctrines for Petrić, as well as into Leone Ebreco's and Mario Equicola's philosophy of beautiful and love) as well as the theoretical arguments and literary works, especially those from the middle to the end of the sixteenth century; the notions of beautiful and love are their central issues. In spite of all the research progress and innovative analyses, philosophical and literary historiography has never tried to determine the sources, nature and significance of Petrić's *novel* esthetical-poetical model and its categories. By this we mean Petrić's notions of (poetic) creativity, talent, inspiration, his (Platonic, neo-Platonic) idea of poetic enthusiasm, *furor poeticus*, poetic creation and its sources from the Classical period to the Humanist, Renaissance and Baroque poetics (Plato, Aristotle, Horace, Cicero, Petrarch, Boccaccio, Brunetti, Ficino, Bruno, Scaliger), including the tradition of prophetism and the role of Petrić's views in the context of Renaissance theories: His interpretation of the source and nature of poetic creation (within the traditional differentiations between natural origin / talent and divine / holy gift, the prophetic-ecstatic inspiration, poetic madness, the role of the Muses), his definitions of the *essential components of poetic art* that Petrić understands as *creatio*. It was, above all, the notions of *imagination*, *fantasy*, the phenomenon of the miraculous that Petrić used in order to infer the notion of artistic truth, the role of the spiritual in art. In this sense, we have to point at Petrić's view of the relation between imagination and reason in the poetic act (two levels of reality, the probable, real on the one hand, and the improbable, possible on the other), his view of the relation between artistic creation and philosophy and science (the creative imaginative power and its cognitive function, an idea present in Romantic poetics in the understanding of a work of art as the archetype of human creations, Petrić's examination of the phenomenon of erudite poetry etc.). There are other concepts related to the above-mentioned notions of Petrić's poetics: The concepts of *poetic invention*, artistic *creation*, *creatio*, artistic *genius*, *ingenio* and *concetto*, also discussed by European Mannerism and Baroque theoreticians E. Tesauro, M. Pelegrini, B. Gracian, with analogies in literature and painting (Cervantes, Arcimboldo). Another task is to recognize the far-reaching consequences of

this concept, not quite completed as a theory, along with its modern esthetical philosophical dimension. The significance of invention is not exhausted by a mere discovery of the new, unknown, undiscovered realm of reality; Instead, its significance (in Petrić and elsewhere, e. g. in philosophical and theological connotations) is expanded to include *creation* as a result of poet's / human spiritual freedom. Study and evaluation of these key ideas – the concepts of Petrić's poetics, esthetics and rhetoric – is necessary and important because they are the components of poetic heritage, but also of the common European cultural, artistic, architectonic and musical heritage.

We also have to study the reasons for Petrić's critical relation to the inherited philosophical-esthetical doctrines and the construction of his own poetic principles (concerning the origin, nature and function of art, the creative originality and freedom, artistic truth, the unity of poetry and philosophy, the establishment of a poetic science), and to point at the lasting quality of literary and esthetic issues considered in Petrić's poetics, constantly present in the theory and practice of art from the Classical antiquity, the Middle Ages, to the Renaissance and Baroque, to the modern times.

2. The next task is a critical evaluation of Petrić's literary work (the encomiastic epic *L'Eridano*, a poetic praise of the House d'Este), his critical-theoretical work (commentaries to the contemporary Petrarchian sonnet poetry) and finally the determination of his position in the history of literature and in the theory of literary genres.

A specific task is to study Petrarch's significance in Petrić's intellectual formation, his novel intellectual orientation, the idea of a philosophical revival by a return to the study of Plato's, Plotinus' and Hermetic traditions (poetic theology) – in his opposition to the school of thought (Petrić's anti-Aristotelianism), and for its freedom. It is in this context that one should consider Petrić's contribution to the Renaissance commentaries to Petrarch's poetry (the interpretation of the Sonnet VII of the *Rime sparse* and Petrić's significance as the first Croatian who studied Petrarch). Evaluation of Petrić's philosophical dialog as a Renaissance genre and determination of its philosophical models – the Socratic dialog, its relation to Classical dialog structures, humanist rhetorics and Renaissance philology, comparison with Bruno's and Tasso's prose – as well as Petrić's (noetic) use of myth and allegory<sup>51</sup> are the subjects of separate research.

Among other tasks, there is the evaluation of Petrić's contribution to the history of esthetic ideas in a wide comparative context – similarities between Petrić's views and artistic theory and practice. There are evident similarities

<sup>51</sup> *Il dialogo filosofico nel '500 europeo*, Milano, 1990.

between Petrić's views on the one hand with Renaissance and Mannerist-Baroque poetic models on the other. It can be seen in the concept of *mimesis*, understanding of the beautiful, art, the relation among words, poetry and music, unity of forms (e. g. in Nikola V. Gučetić / Gozze, Petrić's contemporary, author of treatises discussing beauty and love<sup>52</sup>), unity of artistic expression in literature, painting, music and architecture, and also the understanding of poetry, poetic talent, the relation between art and nature, between wisdom and knowledge, etc. These concepts were used in esthetic reflection and theory of poetry from Držić's Renaissance poetics (poetics of laughter, 'humorism') to the Baroque poetics of the miraculous, laughter, humor, grotesque and ugly with completely different connotations (Christian moralistic ones, in which ugliness is identified with man's sinful nature).

Petrić's esthetic-poeticological views should also be studied in a wider context of their closeness to European philosophy and Croatian esthetical thought in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries.

## *II. Similarities of Petrić's Esthetic Theories with 16th and 17th Centuries Artistic View of the World*

All the various contexts of methodological approaches, levels and interpretative efforts so far applied complete the picture of Petrić's theoretic, philosophical, particularly esthetic achievements, preparing a thorough, complete study and evaluation of his *ars poetica*, his view of the nature and essence of poetry, the characteristic of the poetic act and the specific characteristics of poetic language, artistic inspiration, originality and freedom, the relation between nature and art, the beautiful in nature and art, the formal and material parts of art, and the intellect. Petrić's views show the limitations of the Aristotelian mimetic theory, and these delineate the two orientations of contemporary philosophy (intellectual spirit of the Renaissance, evident in the efforts to determine a scientific view of art and artistic truth, to affirm the cognitive function of art).

Petrić construes his theory of the intellectual / poetic act as an intellectual, cognitive one, by combining two traditions constantly present in the Renaissance literary poetics that tried to balance the rational dimension («fiero vento di ragione» is the guide of Petrić's natural philosophy views, as well as his early literary interest, his early interpretations of Petrarch, his studies of poetics and rhetorics, the philosophy of language and history, his polemics – e. g. the «Trimerone») with the imaginary, fantastic in artistic vision, a combination of genius, invention and discipline, knowledge and doc-

<sup>52</sup> N. Vito di Gozze, *Dello Stato delle Repubbliche*, Venezia, 1591, pp. 395, 396.



trines. Their source is partly in the Classical theories of genius and inspiration, from Plato and Cicero («De oratore», «De divinatione»), to Horace and Seneca («De tranquillitate animi»), partly in various artists' speculative and practical concepts – painters, poets, architects, from the thirteenth century (Ristori d'Arezzo, Giotto, Leonardo, F. di Giorgio, Brunelleschi, Donatello, Masaccio, Filarete, Petrarch) to the Renaissance theories of art that stress the role of invention, the fantastic and imaginary in the process of creation – »trovare le cose non vedute, dimostrare quello che nonne sia«<sup>53</sup> – and finally to the first 'conceitistic' treatise by C. Pelegrino at the end of the sixteenth century<sup>54</sup> and B. Gracian's definition that places *conceit* into the realm of reason, rational abstraction.

This context enables us to understand the theoretical and philosophical foundation of the basic notions of Petrić's poetics, such as *creative invention*, *the phenomenon of miraculous, fictional, bizarre, hyperbolic, even grotesque* (although Petrić nowhere mentions the grotesque), and *conceit*. The scope and the content of this term must be distinguished from the seventeenth-century 'conceitism', with different contents, styles and genres, and from the idea of the »conceit« as a fantastical-metaphorical drawing, a drawing of the soul. Petrić's esthetical-poeticological terms must also be distinguished from the ways they were used and understood during the Mannerism period, which some historians of literature and art theoreticians regard as a period of decadence dominated by the principle of disorder (although Petrić's esthetics and his theory of the beautiful, dominated by onto-theologically inferred principles of harmony and order, to which Petrić intended to return the lost value and dignity, may also be considered in this context).

The best examples of the similarity between Petrić's theoretical definitions and interpretations of art and the principle of creation (*inventio* and *meraviglioso*, *the miraculous*, as the synonyms of artistic creation, *creatio*) and the artistic view of the world – an expression of the new period of European Mannerism and Baroque – are the unique phenomenon of Arcimboldo and his poetics of painting, his *ars combinatoria* (that owes to the Renaissance principle of *concordia discors*) and F. di Giorgio and his understanding of art, its role and function. In Croatian philosophy and theory of literature there are several representatives of the Renaissance poetic tradition distinguished for their philosophical and humanistic erudition, exceptional personalities and creators of new literary genres, translators and interpreters of European authors' works (from N. V. Gučetić and M. Monaldi to Croatian Mannerism and Baroque poets, as shown by Nikica Kolumbić<sup>55</sup>, from Dinko Ranjina,

<sup>53</sup> L. Cennini, *Libro dell'arte*, ed. P. Thompson, New Haven, 1932.

<sup>54</sup> L. Pellegrino, *Del conceitto poetico*, 1598.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. N. Kolumbić, *Hrvatska književnost od humanizma do manirizma*, Zagreb, 1980, p. 334.

Dinko Zlatarić, to Mavro Vetranić, Antun Sasin, Juraj Baraković and Ivan Gundulić), poets whose works provide plenty of material for a history of Croatian esthetical reflection.

### *II.1. European Examples*

The poetics of painting of G. Arcimboldo – a Mannerist wizard painter and scientist, Petrić's contemporary – contained in the work of this eccentric master of the fantastical, illusionistic and bizarre, can be studied as a certain philosophical-theoretical reflection of the postulations that Petrić systematically developed in his survey of poetic Decades.

In Arcimboldo's theory of perception, as well as in his, painter's way of thinking, observing and interpreting the world and (magic) nature, there are elements similar to Petrić's philosophemes: The work of art emerges as a synthesis of art, philosophy and knowledge, as a construction of artist's experience and artist's contemplation – the artist as a creator of something new. Arcimboldo's portraits, fictional landscapes of human faces, depict some of the basic philosophical, scientific and artistic concepts of the world, man and their relationship, creating analogies between nature and the human body, and, at the same time, both asking and answering questions about artistic issues. Many humanists discussed the scientific form of invention, the concept of the *miraculous*, the similarities and differences between the natural process of creation and the artistic one, the role of erudite artist, in this sense similar to scientists. Boccaccio, for example, in his »Genealogia deorum gentilium« put the emphasis on the ideal of poetic invention, poetic enthusiasm, »fervor... inveniendi« and F. di Giorgio Martini – in his treatises discussing civil and military skills and the role of architecture within the framework of cosmological knowledge – uses an example from architecture to describe the artist's act. The act parallels the work of human mind as a whole, striving for natural philosophy and metaphysics. A well-known example found in Plutarch's and Vitruvius' description of Alexander's life can also be found in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century literature, in L. B. Alberti's »De re aedificatoria«, in F. Villani's treatise concerning Vitruvius, and in F. Colonna's interpretation of the miraculous. It is also cited by F. di Giorgio Martini, a representative of late humanism, a painter, sculptor, architect (at the court of the Duke of Montefeltro in Urbino Martini continued the architectonic work of Lucian Laurana from Zadar), follower of Classical ideals who nevertheless searched for new forms of expression. In his »Trattati de architettura civile e militare«<sup>56</sup> he

<sup>56</sup> Cod. Magl. II, I, 141, fol. 27 v.

interpreted the inspiring story about Dinocrates' project, who wanted to sculpt Mount Athos after human body, »Aton monte a guisa d'uomo« basing his idea on an anthropomorphic comparison (»similitudine della città al corpo umano«). The mountain should have been sculpted as a human statue holding a town in his left hand, and a vessel that all the mountain streams flow into, in the right one. The body, representing earth, is shaped like a town, and the streams represent the veins of the human body. The artist, an architect in this case, works in harmony with the natural system of the universe (Martini writes about plants as nature's home, returning to the sources, Classical and medieval concepts of nature's mind, best expressed by nature's geometry). These views were present in the history of thought from Aristotle, Galen, Philo, to Bacon, Alberti and Giorgio Martini, who used the above example to emphasize artistic invention in architecture. There are analogies like these in literary-poetic and visual forms too.

Analyzing the problem of man, examined during Humanism and Renaissance at different levels (metaphysical, gnoseological, moral-ethical, political) and in new ways, Pico della Mirandola wrote his apology of human dignity. He saw man as a great miracle, a chain of links connecting the micro- and the macro-cosmos. The mystery of man Pico regards as the spot in which miraculous occurs, the place of intertwining of earthly and cosmic, material and spiritual, vegetable (*vita plantarum*), animal (*sensus bestiarum*) and the mind, spiritual, as beings given free will and the capacity to know the mysteries of nature, the earthly and the celestial. M. Ficino's idea of infinity, close to the esthetic category of the beautiful due to its human and cosmic dimensions, has its starting point and its foundations in Ficino's philosophy of *man* and praise of his greatness, from which he inferred the anagogic function of art, his theories of inspiration and fantasy, form, symbol, the theory of love, as well as the understanding of the work of art as the unity of idea and manifestation, which greatly influenced European philosophy and co-determined esthetic reflection and the standpoints of art theory (the conception of its essence and function) in late Renaissance and the oncoming Baroque period (especially the esthetic-poetic views of F. Petrić and N. V. Gučetić / Gozze).

Arcimboldo's discovery of the *new*, the miraculous, is the result of the sixteenth-century understanding of nature as magic. The probable is combined with the improbable, two realities co-exist – materiality and illusion. The artistic vision is the place where new reality occurs, an artistic discourse. The world is an open system of its own meanings: a way of viewing reality. The structure of the universe, an all-encompassing One, a unique pulsating force of the world, is reflected in the still mimetic micro-structure of the human face due to the new ways of viewing. Human face conveys new meanings to the viewer. The artistic vision is similar to Petrić's vitalistic pananimistic concepts

of *Unomnia*, of inner harmony and beauty, homonymous to the One, the Prime, light, life, universal, that feeds and sustains everything. The theory of perception, as developed by this unique artist in his innovative analysis of the correspondence of musical tones and colors, shows influences of Classical philosophy, Pythagorean numeric harmony and Platonic and neo-Platonic model of the world as the cosmic unity, each of its components participating in its beauty, creating inner harmony out of differing realms and grades of the universe. In his sketches and drawings from the Florentine map (representations of the *artes liberales* drawn in 1571) and the paintings of the four elements that interpenetrate and that the world is build of are actually a reflection of the Platonic (*Timaeus*) and Pythagorean models of the world, as well as the neo-Platonic, Ficinian concept of the universe, the unity of man and cosmos (Leonardo da Vinci wrote about the »cosmography of a lesser world« praising the painter's mind, ANC 1 2r. W 19061). It is possible to reconstruct the philosophical background of Arcimboldo's series of portraits of the seasons, apart from their political, sociological and spiritual-historical meaning (it would be interesting to analyse comparative examples in modern, twentieth-century art, for example S. Dali's portraits).

We here consider the role of the categories of *mimesis* – *simulacrum*, *probable*, *illusion*, that became the paradigms of his art, in theoretical-esthetical philosophy and in this important artist's reflection. Arcimboldo's work thus brought some researchers (c. g. R. J. W. Evans and M. Calvesi) to analyse the correspondence between micro- and macro-cosmos, one of the key philosophemes of Renaissance thought, and to analyse the concepts of animate and inanimate matter in Arcimboldo's iconography, with the representation of the elements and the natural-philosophical meaning of its characteristics among the iconographic motives<sup>57</sup>. Painter's expression, generally autonomous in the creation of its own codices, although perhaps not following the general, spiritual and philosophical patterns of its time – in which esthetics, as in Petrić's reflection, focuses on the phenomenon of *form-creating thought* – most certainly records them. Intellect contemplates the world as a *metaphor*, beauty that surrounds the Being, finding the rational principle of beauty in nature, which is also the principle of creation (regardless of its various other foundations, such as supra-individual inspiration, the unconscious, prophetic, heavenly grace, mania, or the Muses).

<sup>57</sup> R. J. W. Evans, *Rudolf II and his World. A Study in Intellectual History 1576-1612*, Oxford, 1973; P. Wesher, *The »Idea« in Giuseppe Arcimboldo's Art*, in: *Magazine of Art*, January 1950; M. Calvesi, *Le fonti dell'Arcimboldi e il verde sogno di Polifilo*, in: J. Baltrušaitis, M. Calvesi, E. Coen, F. Porzio, *Arcimboldi e l'arte delle meraviglie*, Art Dossier, 11, 1987.

The Renaissance concept of art that no longer *imitates*, but rather *expresses* the constitutive *forms* of reality, thus being *above* nature, reflects Plotinus' esthetical doctrines according to which the rational principles of beauty are the basis of both art and nature. The notion of beautiful in Petrić's coherent philosophical system becomes a universal ontological category of the world, a notion explaining the structure of the world and its architecture (Petrić used Pythagorean, Platonic and Ficinian arguments, but also the arguments of Plotinus, Proclo, Longinus, Dante and Augustine, whose concepts influenced Petrić's esthetical views and standpoints).

Elaborating the subject-matter of new science (the »Four Seasons« painted for Ferdinand I in 1563) that he was familiar with, and that had obviously been his inspiration, Arcimboldo's work reflects the spirit and the culture of his time and the artist's socializing with writers and philosophers, scientists, astronomers and astrologers, alchemists, mathematicians and architects. The Prague court of Rudolph II, where Arcimboldo worked, was visited by Tycho Brahe and Kepler, whose teachings Petrić mentions in his »Nova de universis philosophia«. We should mention that in 1581, when Arcimboldo arrived in Prague, Faust Vrančić became Rudolph II's secretary. Arcimboldo's work may be the best to show the change in the esthetical values of the sixteenth century, and the changes in relations among the artistic, philosophical and scientific discourses, as well as the changes in the artist himself. That what is manifested in Arcimboldo's work, which was discussed already in the sixteenth century by Gregorio Comanini, who wrote about the relation of painting, sculpture, poetry and music, or Pietro Lomazzo in his treatises about art, as well as in the discussions about Classical and anti-Classical models, order and disorder is contained in the systematically theoretically and philosophically inferred bases of Petrić's esthetical category apparatus and in his refutation of authority and his search for the intellectually new. In Petrić's coherent philosophical system, as well as in its artistic analogy, Arcimboldo, there are certain central problems of Renaissance thought present in the treatise literature of the period: the relation between poetic creation and its content, scientific content in particular (using Empedocles and Homer as the examples – a discussion that Petrić took part in), the concept of the artist as the creator of novelty, the role of genius and inspiration.

## *II.2. Examples from Croatian Literary Heritage. Renaissance and Mannerist-Baroque Poetics*

The poetics of a new poetic generation, contemporary to Petrić's search for new poetic principles, bears witness to the emergence of a new intellectuality in Croatian literature at the end of the sixteenth century.

In the ideational components of the corpus of Croatian literary heritage, the pre-Renaissance one, preceding Petrić's theoretical considerations, as well as the Renaissance and post-Renaissance, Mannerist and Baroque heritage, especially in the religious allegorical poetry (epic), although the authors did not greatly improve the Croatian Renaissance poetics as N. Kolumbić showed on Vetranović's work, regarding it as a kind of symbolic naturalism<sup>58</sup>, it may be possible to detect some of the basic philosophical esthetic characteristics of new poetics – *creativity*, the phenomenon of the miraculous, imaginary, symbolical, allegorical and metaphorical, the artificial. We have to mention Julije Klović, his »breakthrough from the Classical balance into the Mannerist paradoxes, an artist who looks for 'beautiful things' in a world of ornaments and decorations, who wants to surprise us and astonish us. This is Classics in the form of 'meraviglia'« (Grgo Gamulin)<sup>59</sup>.

Mavro Vetranović's »Pelegrin« and Baraković's poetic play are the best examples of individual expressions in the corpus of Croatian literature that can be compared to European examples of esthetical-poeticological reflection, with the shift in basic esthetical categories (beauty, truth) that occurred throughout Europe. Without interest in Hermetism and strictly philosophical issues, although never far from them, but completely realistic instead, to the level of caricature and grotesque, Croatian writers of the Renaissance and post-Renaissance periods (we mention two of them, Vetranović and Baraković) express uncertainties and dilemmas, the conflicts of their time. Both Vetranović, through his grotesque realism, a combination of the real and the abstract<sup>60</sup> and Baraković, who distinguishes two realities, not to mention Gundulić and Bunić, or even earlier Držić, or Nalješković's Brechtian effects (Darko Gašparović<sup>61</sup>), with their specific thematic, stylistic and genre characteristics (the pastoral-mythological complex, epic, farce, burlesque etc.), regardless of their respective models, influences and reflections, in poetic liberty, gifted with exquisite enthusiasm<sup>62</sup>, create a new, unreal world in which the philosopher's soul is articulated, as Branko Gavella wrote about Marin Držić. Distancing themselves from any generally accepted poetic rules, they blazed the trail to novel Baroque stylistic formation<sup>63</sup>.

<sup>58</sup> N. Kolumbić, op. cit., p. 199.

<sup>59</sup> G. Gamulin, *Predgovor za Klovića*, in: M. Cionini-Visani, *Julije Klović*, Zagreb, 1977, p. 14.

<sup>60</sup> D. Fališevac, *Elementi grotesknog i fantastičnog u Vetranovićevu »Pelegrinu«*, anthology *Danu hvarskog kazališta XIV*, Split, 1988, pp. 215–229.

<sup>61</sup> D. Gašparović, *Nalješkovićeve komedije u svjetlu suvremene dramske teorije i kazališne prakse*, ib., p. 47.

<sup>62</sup> M. Vetranović, *Pisanca u pomoć poetam*.

<sup>63</sup> N. Kolumbić, op. cit., p. 334.

There are two philosophically connotative images in Vetranović's and Baraković's poetics, noticed by literary historians and theoreticians. There are many examples of Baroque literary-painting illusionism and metaphors with philosophical-aesthetic connotations (e. g. Bunić, Palmotić), relevant in view of the shift of esthetic principles, that may be compared to Petrić's category apparatus that his *new* poetics, his novel poetic rules are based on (the relation nature-art, *ars combinatoria*, the notions of the miraculous, metaphor, allegory), whose analogies can be traced in the artistic practices of the sixteenth century and the following one (in the unusual, surprising, astonishing effects in Vetranović, Baraković, Bunić, Palmotić). In this sense, Z. Kravar's studies of the nature and position of art in the intellectual world of the Baroque and its ontological arguments, as well as his studies of the Mannerist and Baroque phenomenon of the anthropomorphic metaphors, are important for literary theory and philosophical reflection<sup>64</sup>.

In the context of our view of the discussed issues, we only quote two examples: a poetic image of the transformation of a human figure, a lovesick satyr turning into a monster from Vetranović's »Piligrin« and Baraković's description of a strange man from his epic »Vila Slovinka« (»The Slav Fairy«)<sup>65</sup>.

Vetranović's poetics of the ugly, as described by the poet, through his mimetic image of the human figure, neither belongs to the realm of dreams nor to the realm of reality as Vetranović himself put it: although borrowing his elements from reality (donkey's ears, owl's eyes, pig's teeth, hump on the back) and arranging them (like Arcimboldo in his combinatory art) in his imaginative mind in a new, fantastic, in reality non-existent way, but possible, even probable in a different, fictional reality, Vetranović articulates the intellectual, philosophical interests as found in many of the works from both European and Croatian Renaissance periods. Petar Zoranić wrote about the

<sup>64</sup> In his study of Mannerism and Croatian literature, Z. Kravar notes a significant position considering the aspiration to project human purposefulness into the natural world, cf. Z. Kravar, op. cit., p. 261.

<sup>65</sup> M. Vetranović, *Pelegrin, Pet stoljeća hrvatske književnosti*, Vol. 5, Zagreb, 1968, p. 239:

»... i svuda kud hodim, svud me je stid i sram,  
zač sam sad prilika, moj dragi blavore,  
ne od lijepa človiaka, ner zvieri od gore.  
Od osla vid uši, na glave ke nosim,  
s kijeh život moj tuži, da u Boga smrt prosim;  
od sove vid oči ter ćeš trud vidjeti,  
na sunce s istoči gdje ne snijem pozrijeti,  
vid zube od prasca, ke nosim u glavi,  
s kijeh mene nebavea slijedi plač krvavi;  
vid grbu vrh pleći, s ke ćutim boljezan,  
ku nije moć izreći ni javi ni u san.«

limits of the knowledge of the self («znam da najteže človek sam sebe iskusi i pozna«, »I know that man has greatest difficulties with his knowledge of himself«<sup>66</sup>), whose poetic and esthetic reflections, models and ideas also partly correspond to Petrić's views (the concepts of bodily and spiritual beauty, virtue and love, truth, artistic invention, fiction, allegory, miracle; his »Mountains« were written while »looking for the figure under the veil«)<sup>67</sup>.

At the boundary between Mannerism and Baroque Baraković built his fantastic images («al' smrtnih telcsi, ali duh, al' si kob, ali jad, ali mir, ali rat, al' srića, al' nesklad«, »you are either a mortal, or a ghost, either destiny, or suffering, either peace, or war, either happiness, or disharmony«<sup>68</sup>) by combining incompatible elements, trying to astonish by ugly discord. Baraković thus announces a new sensibility, new spirituality and theoretical consciousness, a new period in the history of esthetical reflection.

»obuja mene strah, pomislih ča će reć,  
zač mesta i ne znah, ni kuda smrt' uteć...<sup>69</sup>

(...)

Zide tad iz jame čudnovat človek van,  
pamuhne dolame jimaše, ne spasan,  
prem ako s pridnih stran dil mu se bilaše,  
gledat je to za man, jer zadnom hinaše.  
Jazik mu spinaše železna žvala kof,  
pod kim se pinaše kako zmaj pun otrof:  
biše mu črn pokrof popriko obraza,  
a uzdah vazda nof vikofna poraza.  
Kad mi se ukaza, u meni ganu plač,  
biše ga omraza zgledati ružna tač:  
staše mu bridak mač protepen kroz uši,  
mnah se ja na zatač na vojsku nabuši';  
kip se moj usuši, od straha planuh vas,  
hti da se razruši moj život oni čas.«<sup>70</sup>

<sup>66</sup> P. Zoranić, *Planine, Pet stoljeća hrvatske književnosti*, Vol. 8, Zagreb, 1964, p. 168.

<sup>67</sup> P. Zoranić in his salute to the dean of Nin Matelj Matijević, *ib.*, p. 36.

<sup>68</sup> J. Baraković, *Vila Slovinka*, XII, 490, 493, 495, in: *Djela Jurja Barakovića*, SPH, Zagreb, 1889, Vol. XVII.

<sup>69</sup> *Ib.*, XII, 451, 452.

<sup>70</sup> *Ib.*, XII, 461–474.



The liberated spaces of poetic imagination became a new poetical rule, a style. In this sense, J. Baraković's poetics, peculiarity and his original style are paradigmatic in Croatia and throughout Europe. In view of philosophical-esthetical interpretations of the above examples, and many other examples of Baroque symbolics and allegories<sup>71</sup>, we must say that they are not only possible, but that they depend on the seventeenth-century writers' views of the world and man's position in it. These writers created a new way of positing the duality of the physical and spiritual, ugly and beautiful as poetic realities. The image of man created in God's image is contrasted by the image of the beastly nature of man's sexuality (Vetranović's satyr), Baroque pathos fed by the knowledge of man's fall and sinfulness, thus laying the foundations of a new poetics and esthetic reflection.

\* \* \*

The freedom-loving Renaissance philosopher's spirit permeating Petrić's works, particularly those that discuss the issues concerning poetry and the philosophy of art, points at the causes of his direct connections and indirect correspondences (arts in practice) with philosophical ideas of the Renaissance and post-Renaissance periods.

The structure of the miraculous, as the basis of Petrić's »Poetics«, Petrić's apology of artist's creative power – creating a *new* world – and his originality, surpassing the realm of the imitation and standardized norms, the central category of the new, paradoxical, incredible, unexpected, enigmatic, bizarre (*novità, transmutamento dall'usato, paradosso, inaspettato, incredibile, enimma, stupore*), artist's contemplation of the essence of things, and the work, the result of his knowledge, consciousness, imagination, contemplativeness, art as a miracle, were all developed as the *topoi* of esthetic reflection and the poetics of the Baroque and Mannerism periods, and reaffirmed in the Romantic esthetic reflection, remaining a subject of modern esthetic thought to this very day.

TRANSLATED BY SREČKO PREMELC

<sup>71</sup> See: K. L. Schwarz, *Zum ästhetischen Problem des »Programmes« und der Symbolik und Allegorik in der barocken Malerei*, Wiener Jhb. für Kg., 1937, pp. 79–88; E. Wind, *Studies in Allegorical Portraiture*, Warburg I, 1937–38, pp. 138–162; In this context, particularly significant are U. Spirito's analyses of the Baroque and counter-reformation. See: U. Spirito, *Barocco e Controriforma, Medioevo e Rinascimento*, (Misc. in onore di B. Nardi), Firenze, 1955, pp. 701–714.

OD ŠKOLE MIŠLJENJA DO SLOBODE MIŠLJENJA.  
PREGLED DOSADAŠNJIH ISTRAŽIVANJA I BUDUĆI ZADACI  
PROUČAVANJA POETIKE I ESTETIKE F. PETRIĆA

*Sažetak*

Obzirom na rezultate filozofsko estetičke historiografije, kao i na vlastita višegodišnja proučavanja Petrićevih estetičko poetikoloških teorija, autorica u ovoj studiji u dvije tematske cjeline (I Pregled dosadašnjih istraživanja i budući zadaci; II Od škole mišljenja do slobode mišljenja) obrazlaže načela Petrićeve estetičke refleksije, razmatrajući ih kako u njihovu duhovnopovijesnom i filozofskom obzoru, tako i u cjelini Petrićeve filozofije.

Tumačeći središnje pojmove Petrićevog filozofsko-estetičkog rječnika (lijepo, čudesno, alegorijsko, pjesničko stvaranje, pjesnički zanos, invencija, pjesnička univerzalnost, sloboda, *conceito* i dr.), autorica ukazuje na mjesto i ulogu Petrićeve filozofije umjetnosti, na korespondentnosti Petrićeve estetičko-poetičke refleksije i umjetničke zbilje (književnost, slikarstvo) njegova i narednoga stoljeća, te na njenu aktualnost u povijesti europske i hrvatske estetičke misli.

## ONTOTHEOLOGISCHE VORAUSSETZUNGEN UND IMPLIKATIONEN DER KONZEPTION DES UNENDLICHEN BEI NIKOLAUS CUSANUS, GIORDANO BRUNO UND FRANE PETRIĆ

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(Zagreb)

Original Paper

UDC 19 Nikolaus Cusanus, Giordano Bruno, Frane Petrić

In einigen neuen Untersuchungen des Werkes von Frane Petrić wurde auf die möglichen Einflüsse oder wenigstens Ähnlichkeiten seiner Weltdeutung mit jenen von Nikolaus Cusanus und seinem Zeitgenossen Giordano Bruno hingewiesen.<sup>1</sup> So weist schon ein oberflächlicher Vergleich der philosophischen Systeme dieser drei Denker wenigstens auf einen gewissen Parallelismus ihrer Behauptungen hin, auf einen Parallelismus, der unbestreitbar in der neuplatonischen Tradition der Renaissance wurzelt, zu der alle drei Denker zählen und in der schon zur Zeit von Nikolaus Cusanus (Ende des Mittelalters und Beginn der Renaissance beziehungsweise der Neuzeit) Lch-

<sup>1</sup> Vgl. den Text über Petrić von Žarko Dadić in seinem Buch *Hrvati i egzaktne znanosti u osvitu novovjekovlja*, (*Die Kroaten und die exakten Wissenschaften am Anfang der Neuzeit*), Zagreb 1994, und den in der Zeitschrift »Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine« (39–40/1994) veröffentlichten Artikel des Autors *Značenje renesansnog »između« na primjeru Petrićeva tumačenja svijeta* (*Die Bedeutung des Renaissance »Inzwischen« am Beispiel der Petrić's Weltdeutung, Beiträge für die Forschung des Kroatischen philosophischen Erbe*). Die meisten Autoren, die sich mit dem Problem des Endlichen und der Unendlichkeit befassen, von Koyre und Cassirer bis zu Jammer behandeln zwar die Konzeptionen von Cusanus, Petrić und Bruno auf eine komparative Weise, da sie aber die Auffassungen aller drei Denker hinsichtlich der Idee des Unendlichen eigentlich in chronologischer Abfolge darlegen, ist es auch auf Grund dieser kurzen Darstellungen möglich, den Zusammenhang dieser Auffassungen zu erkennen. Bezüglich dieser Darstellungen verschiedener Konzeptionen der Unendlichkeit ist zu betonen, daß es verwundert, wenn beispielsweise D. Mahnke, der die hermetische Tradition relativ gut kennt und diese richtig als Vorlage zur Aktualisierung des Begriffs der Unendlichkeit in der Renaissance erkennt, wobei diese gerade in der Philosophie Petrićs eine wichtige Rolle spielte, Frane Petrić nicht erwähnt. Ähnliches ist auch in Koyres Abhandlung *Von der geschlossenen Welt zum unendlichen Universum* festzustellen, in der er die Konzeption des Raumes von Henry More umfassend darlegt, ohne dabei wahrzunehmen, wie sehr sich dieser in seinen Postulaten auf Petrićs Behauptungen stützt.

ren unterschiedlicher antiken theologisch-philosophischen Traditionen (wie zum Beispiel die hermetische, kabalistische, chaldäische, usw.) assimiliert wurden.

Da es aber noch immer keine vergleichenden Analysen der philosophischen Ansichten dieser Denker gibt, wäre es verfrüht, von Beeinflussungen zu sprechen. Trotzdem ist hervorzuheben, daß komparative Studien der Werke von Cusanus und Bruno schon vorliegen,<sup>2</sup> jedoch wurde Franc Petrić in diesen Analysen bis jetzt außer bei E. Cassirer<sup>3</sup> (der dies in Form kurzer allgemeiner Bemerkungen tut) nicht mitberücksichtigt. Dabei scheint es als eine Einleitung in eine solche komparative Studie angebracht, dasjenige Moment der Weltdeutung zu erörtern, das allen drei Denkern gemeinsam ist.

Und dies ist gerade die Idee der Unendlichkeit, deren Einführung in die Weltdeutung zwecks Umgestaltung des für den Beginn der Neuzeit charakteristischen Weltbildes gewiß von großer Bedeutung war.

Dabei möchten wir, indem wir die Behauptungen von Cusanus, Petrić und Bruno vergleichen, um Ähnlichkeiten und Unterschiede zwischen den philosophischen Systemen und Modellen der Weltdeutung dieser drei Renaissancedenker aufzuspüren zu versuchen, vor allem *die Motive* der Einführung der Idee der Unendlichkeit in ihre Weltdeutung und deren Implikationen untersuchen.

Insofern werden wir zuerst die Motive und die Bedeutung der Einführung der Konzeption der Unendlichkeit in das philosophische System von Nikolaus Cusanus besprechen. Die Idee des Unendlichen steht in seinem System durchaus in der Funktion des Versuchs, die Relation zwischen Gott und Schöpfung beziehungsweise zwischen Gott und Welt zu bestimmen,<sup>4</sup> wobei das Absolute sowohl als Schöpfer (und als absolute Allmacht) als auch als das Größte (Maximum) erscheint, das sich einerseits von der Schöpfung,

<sup>2</sup> Darunter meinen wir vor allem die Studie von F. Clemenso *Giordano Bruno und Nicolaus von Cusa*, Bonn 1847, sowie Blumenbergs komparative Studie *Aspekte der Epochenschwelle: Cusaner und Nolander*, (erweiterte und überarbeitete Neuausgabe von »Die Legitimität der Neuzeit«, 4. Teil 1982).

<sup>3</sup> In seinem Werk *Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit* schreibt Cassirer auf der Seite 312 in Hinblick auf Petrićs Konzeption der Unendlichkeit des Raumes: »In der Begründung und Anführung dieser Lehre tritt wie in der gleichzeitigen Schrift Giordano Brunos »de triplici minimo et mensura« der Einfluß des Nikolaus Cusanus unverkennbar hervor« und weiter auf derselben Seite: »Man wird daher annehmen müssen, daß es sich bei beiden Denkern (d.h. Petrić und Bruno) um eine relativ selbständige Fort- und Umbildung Cusanischer Gedanken handelt«.

<sup>4</sup> Es muß hervorgehoben werden, daß hier, da es sich um eine vergleichende Analyse der Auffassungen dreier Philosophen handelt, die Kenntnis ihrer grundlegenden Thesen und Werke vorausgesetzt wird (in Bezug auf Cusanus *De docta ignorantia*, in Bezug auf Bruno *La cena delle ceneri* und *Della causa, principio e uno* und *De l' infinito universo e modi* in: *Opere italiane*, I, Bari 1925).

von dem Relativen, wo das *Mehr und Weniger* herrscht, wesentlich unterscheidet, andererseits aber zugleich der Sphäre des Relativen immanent ist. Da wir uns hier auf eine gründliche Behandlung der einzelnen Behauptungen aus dem philosophischen System von Nikolaus Cusanus nicht einlassen können, werden wir uns auf jene Behauptungen beschränken, die für das Verständnis seiner Konzeption der Unendlichkeit wesentlich sind. Dabei muß auf die Schlußfolgerung vorgeifend hervorgehoben werden: die Idee der Unendlichkeit dient bei Nikolaus Cusanus primär und in der Tat der Sicherstellung der These über die Welt als Bekundung, Manifestation des Gottes (was dann sowohl durch die Behauptung über das Absolute, über das *Maximum* als *complicatio* – Zusammengezogenheit, Vereinigung der Wesen – als auch über die Welt, über den Bereich des Relativen als *explicatio* – Entwicklung der Wesen – untermauert wird). Dies, daß seine Kosmologie ohne Berücksichtigung der ontotheologischen Voraussetzungen nicht zu verstehen ist, gründet in seiner Behauptung, wonach die Welt eigentlich nur ein Widerschein oder präziser eine Manifestation beziehungsweise die »Entwicklung« (*explicatio*) des Absoluten ist. Wie im zweiten Buch seiner *De docta ignorantia* zu lesen ist, »ist die Welt / das Universum der endliche Gott, ein Widerschein oder ein Bild des Absoluten, des Gottes (*universum similitudo Absoluti*). Das gesamte einheitliche Universum (*unus mundus universalis*) ist eigentlich der sichtbare Gott. Dabei zeigt sich wesentlich als unendlich nur der Gott, der dies auf absolute Weise (oder *negative infinitus*) ist, indem er alles mögliche (*omnia possibilia*) aktuell (*actu*) enthält. Er ist unendlich als »*unitas infinita*« (unendliche Einheit), sofern er auch »*omnium complicatio*« (Zusammengezogenheit, Zusammenfassendheit aller und alles) ist.

Die Welt (*mundus*), der Bereich des Relativen wird gerade als *complicatio* (Zusammengezogenheit, Zusammenfassendheit) der Wesen erst in der zweiten Stufe unendlich sein (*private infinitus*), d.h. sie wird lieber *unbegrenzt* (*inermatus*; in Bezug auf die menschliche Erkenntnis eigentlich *unbestimmt*) als unendlich sein, was als ein Attribut eigentlich nur dem Gott zuzuweisen ist. Im zweiten Buch der *De docta ignorantia* wird Cusanus ausdrücklicher sagen: »Und obwohl die Welt nicht unendlich ist, kann sie trotzdem nicht als endlich begriffen werden, da sie ohne Grenze ist, in die sie geschlossen wäre.«<sup>5</sup> Zugleich hebt Cusanus überall dort, wo über die Welt gesprochen wird, hervor, daß die Welt gerade als unendlich der Widerschein der Unendlichkeit Gottes ist. Die Welt ist nämlich wesentlich ein Werk Gottes, so daß in ihr eigentlich nichts Unvollkommenes vorhanden ist. Jedoch wird die Vollkommenheit Gottes in ihr immer auf eine beschränkte Weise manifestiert.

<sup>5</sup> Vgl. *De docta ignorantia*, II, XI, S. 391, Ausgabe *Philosophisch-theologische Schriften*, ausg. von Leo Gabriel, Herder Verlag, Wien, Erstausgabe 1964, die Zahl der Seiten wird nach der Ausgabe 1982 angeführt.

In Zusammenhang mit den Implikationen aus diesen ontotheologischen Behauptungen von Cusanus, die die Voraussetzungen für seine Kosmologie bilden, ist die Schlußfolgerung zu ziehen: die Grundsätze seiner Kosmologie stellt die Entwicklung, die Explikation jener pseudohermetischer Behauptung dar, wonach »Deus est sphaera infinita, cuius centrum est ubique, circumferentia nusquam«.<sup>6</sup> Der Mittelpunkt der Welt ist überall und der Rand nirgendwo. Diese These entwickelt und interpretiert Cusanus, indem er seine Grundsätze über das Größte und das Kleinste (Maximum und Minimum) befolgt, die sich im Absoluten überlappen (was auch mit seiner Lehre über *coincidentia oppositorum* im Absoluten im Einklang steht), die aber dem Bereich des Relativen (der Wesen) nicht gehören, für den nur *das Mehr oder Weniger* stets bestimmend ist. Und im Einklang mit der Behauptung, daß es in der Sphäre des Relativen, des Geschaffenen nichts Vollkommenes gibt (sogar keinen vollkommenen Kreis, so daß es dementsprechend auch keinen Ort geben kann, der ein absoluter Mittelpunkt sein könnte, da es immer einen noch genaueren und wahrhaftigeren Kreis und Mittelpunkt geben kann), kann weder die Erde der Mittelpunkt der Welt noch die Sphäre der Fixsterne der Rand (die Grenze) der Welt sein.<sup>7</sup> In dem unbegrenzten Universum gibt es nach Cusanus keinen »privilegierten« Punkt, sondern ist alles in einer relativer Bewegung gegenüber allem anderen befangen. Der allgegenwärtige Mittelpunkt (und der nirgends vorhandene Rand) ist eigentlich nur der Gott. Diese These, transponiert in den kosmologischen Horizont (und zwar im Einklang mit der oben besprochenen Voraussetzung, wonach die Welt ein Widerschein Gottes ist), bedeutet, daß sich der Mittelpunkt (der überall ist) und der Rand (der nirgendwo ist) im realem Universum überlappen.<sup>8</sup>

Indem Cusanus eine solche Weltdeutung einführt, ruft er ins Leben eine relativistische Konzeption (alles, was im Universum ist, steht im Verhältnis zu

<sup>6</sup> Die pseudohermetische Behauptung »Deus est sphaera infinita, cuius centrum est ubique, circumferentia nusquam« stammt aus dem Buch *Liber XXIV philosophorum*, die dem legendären Hermes Trismegist zugeschrieben wird. Dieses ziemlich verbreitetes Werk stammt aus dem zwölften Jahrhundert, wobei es von Clemens Baumker in Münster 1928 in: »Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters«, Bd. XXV, veröffentlicht wurde.

<sup>7</sup> Vgl. *De docta ignorantia*, Bd. I, II, XI, angeführte Ausgabe, S. 391: »Da der Mittelpunkt ein Punkt ist, der die gleiche Entfernung vom Rand aufweist, wobei nicht möglich ist, daß eine absolut wahre Kugel (sphaera) oder absolut wahrhaftige Kugel existiert, ohne daß es noch eine wahrhaftigere gibt, ist es klar, daß es keinen Mittelpunkt geben kann, ohne daß noch ein wahrhaftiger und genauer gegeben sein wäre. Völlig gleiche Entfernung zu verschiedenen Punkten ist nur in Gott vorzufinden, da nur er unendliche Gleichheit ist. Er, der selige Gott, der Mittelpunkt der Welt ist, ist auch der Mittelpunkt der Erde und aller Dinge, die in der Welt sind. Und er ist zugleich auch der unendliche Rand der Welt«.

<sup>8</sup> Vgl. *De docta ignorantia*, II, XII, S. 397: »Unde erit machina mundi quasi habens undique centrum et nullibi circumferentiam, quoniam eius circumferentia et centrum est Deus, qui est undique et nullibi«.

allen anderen Gliedern des Systems und wird folglich durch dieses Verhältnis bestimmt). Dadurch wird insbesondere die Rolle des Blickpunktes, des Ortes des Betrachters, von dem aus die Erscheinungen im Universum betrachtet werden, betont. So scheint nach Cusanus dem Beobachter der Erscheinungen im Universum ohne Rücksicht auf den Ort, in dem sich dieser befindet, daß er immer im Mittelpunkt des Universums (die sogenannte »Illusion des Mittelpunkts«) ist.<sup>9</sup> Mit der Einführung dieses Prinzips werden zugleich die Bestimmungen *oben* und *unten* beziehungsweise die Theorie des natürlichen Ortes und der hierarchischen Struktur des Universums und dem zu Folge auch die Möglichkeit irgendeiner Wertrangierung der Orte im Universum aufgehoben. Mit diesem Prinzip steht im Einklang auch die These von der Bewohntheit anderer Himmelskörper. Dank diesem Relativismus verliert die Erde einerseits ihre (bevorzugte?)<sup>10</sup> Mittelstellung und andererseits wird sie nur zu einem Stern unter anderen Sternen – »*stella nobili*«. Daraus folgt, daß sich die Erde, gleichwohl wie alle anderen Himmelskörper, mit denen sie gleichgestellt wird, bewegt (im Universum gibt es nichts, was sich im Zustand des absoluten Stillhaltens befinden würde). Mit der Aufhebung der hierarchischen Struktur der Welt und der Wertrangierung wird zugleich auch die Möglichkeit aufgehoben, daß man die Stelle, die die Erde einnimmt, und damit auch die Erde selbst für den niedrigsten (und schlechtesten) Teil der Welt / des Universums hält.<sup>11</sup>

Es muß aber betont werden, daß Cusanus im streng astronomischen Sinne trotzdem die Voraussetzungen des geozentrischen Modells des Universums gewissermaßen beibehält, wobei die Bewegungen der Sterne im Rahmen des Bestimmungssystems betrachtet werden, das mit der Erde als dem Mittelpunkt in Verbindung steht. Dabei ist von »Geozentrismus« nur bedingt die Rede, da es sich hier eigentlich weder um ein heliozentrisches noch um ein geozentrisches Modell des Universums handelt. Es ist jedoch stets hervorzuheben, daß es unmöglich ist, die astronomischen Theorien von Cusanus

<sup>9</sup> »Wo immer sich jemand befände, würde er glauben, er sei im Mittelpunkt«, vgl. das angeführte Werk, Bd. I, II, XII, S. 397.

<sup>10</sup> Das christlich-aristotelische Weltbild impliziert eigentlich eine zweifache Wertung, eine zweifache Auffassung der Mittelstellung der Erde. Im Christentum kommt nämlich, obwohl es das aristotelische Weltbild mit der Erde im Mittelpunkt übernimmt, der Mittelstellung der Erde als des Ortes der Verkörperung Jesus und des Wohnortes des Menschen eine ganz spezifische Bedeutung zu. In diesem Kontext ist sie der Mittelpunkt eines spezifischen Dramas, eines entscheidenden geschichtlichen Ereignisses. Dies weicht ganz gewiß von ihrer negativen Bewertung ab, die mit dieser Mittelstellung hauptsächlich dank der Amalgamierung des neuplatonischen Schemas – hierarchischen Aufbaus der Wesen, das durch Wertrangierung begleitet wird, mit dem aristotelischen kosmologischen Modell in Verbindung gebracht wird.

<sup>11</sup> Vgl. XII. Buch *De docta ignorantia*.

unabhängig von seinen ontologischen Behauptungen zu betrachten, die deren Voraussetzung bilden. Sofern man diese Tatsache berücksichtigt, sind dann auch die Unklarheiten bei einigen von seinen astronomischen Postulaten zu verstehen, worauf in einigen Darstellungen seiner Philosophie schon hingewiesen wurde. Außerdem betont er selbst, daß der Mensch auch in der Astronomie, und vielleicht gerade dort am meisten, hauptsächlich auf Vermutungen (*conjecturac*) angewiesen ist. Dies ist allgemein dadurch bedingt, daß die Bewegung erst durch das Verhältnis zu bestimmten festen Punkten (Polen oder Mittelpunkten) zu begreifen ist, was beim Messen der Bewegung vorausgesetzt wird. Sofern diese feste Punkte (die für eine sichere Orientierung unentbehrlich sind) nicht vorhanden sind, ist der Mensch in seiner Erkenntnis (der Bewegungen und Ereignisse im Universum) auf Vermutungen notwendigerweise angewiesen. Der zweite Grund für den unbedingt konjekturalen Charakter des menschlichen Wissens (und zwar insbesondere in der Astronomie) liegt darin, daß hinsichtlich des Blickpunktes (wobei dies jeder Punkt im Universum sein kann) unendlich viele Aspekte der Wahrheit (die als absolute Wahrheit – unendlich ist) möglich sind. Jene Sicht der Welt / des Universums, in der die Erde den Blickpunkt bildet, ist nur eine der möglichen Sichten (einer der möglichen Aspekte der Wahrheit). Kein Aspekt und keine Sicht der Wahrheit erreicht die absolute Wahrheit (dies ist nur der Gott), so daß jeder Aspekt und jede Sicht notwendigerweise konjektural ist.

In Zusammenhang mit der Rolle und der Bedeutung, die die Idee der Unendlichkeit im Rahmen der Weltdeutung bei Nikolaus Cusanus einnimmt, kann zusammenfassend folgendes festgestellt werden: diese Idee hat im Rahmen seiner Ontotheologie zweifellos eine primäre Bedeutung; mit Hilfe dieser Idee bestimmt er zuerst den Gott, das Absolute, das *absolute* Maximum, indem er die Allmacht Gottes (*omnipotentia*) eigentlich als Unendlichkeit auslegt, wobei er eine *bestimmte Intention* befolgt. Diese wird ersichtlich in seiner Bestimmung des Verhältnisses zwischen dem Gott, dem Absoluten und der Welt (die zugleich nach Cusanus auch der Universum ist), dem sichtbaren Gott, in dem alles was ist, auf Grund dessen ist, was der Gott darin ist (der Gott ist in allem dasjenige, was dieses ist) und der erst als *unendliches Näherkommen* der Unendlichkeit, der Vollkommenheit Gottes *unendlich* ist. Und gerade dadurch, daß Cusanus als eines der wesentlichen Attribute des Gottes seine Unendlichkeit betont, daß die Allmacht Gottes als Unendlichkeit dargestellt wird, bringt er zum Ausdruck, daß ihm primär gerade eine solche Bestimmung des Verhältnisses zwischen Gott und Welt am Herzen liegt, wonach die Welt eine un-endliche Manifestation des unendlichen Gottes, eigentlich eine *unendliche Möglichkeit* des Manifestierens Gottes, ist. Dabei wird die absolute Priorität des Gottes, dessen Werk mit der Allmacht Gottes, mit dem allmächtigen Willen Gottes nie koinzidiert, gleichwohl nie außer



Acht gelassen. Gott kann nämlich immer mehr (wollen), als dies schon realisiert wurde. Nach Cusanus ist es nicht notwendig, daß Gott in seinem Werk vollständig aufgeht. Das aktuelle Universum erschöpft also die Allmacht Gottes nicht.<sup>12</sup>

Falls wir die Implikationen der Behauptungen von Cusanus über die Unendlichkeit des Gottes und der Welt bis zu Ende durchzudenken versuchen, kommen wir zur folgenden Schlußfolgerung: ohne Rücksicht auf das *Positive*, was durch die Einführung der Idee der Unendlichkeit in seiner Philosophie für die *Welt* errungen wurde, was zur Transformation des Weltbildes, in dem die Welt aus einem geschlossenen System in ein (für alle Möglichkeiten) offenes Universum umgestaltet wird, beigetragen hat (wobei immer die ontotheologischen Voraussetzungen dieser Transformation zu betonen sind), scheint trotzdem die Idee der Unendlichkeit, die primär an die Bestimmung Gottes, der Allmacht Gottes gebunden ist, noch immer die (für den Menschen beziehungsweise für die Möglichkeit der menschlichen Erkenntnis) *negative* Bestimmung beizubehalten, sofern dadurch eigentlich die Unmöglichkeit des Gelangens zur transzendentalen Quelle von Allem – des Gottes (der sich immer wesentlich von der Welt, den Schöpfungen unterscheidet), des Gottes, der primär ein unendlich mächtiger Wille ist, betont wird (so geht der Begriff des Unendlichen eigentlich aus dem »negativen« Resultat der Untersuchung des Verhältnisses zwischen demjenigen, was ist, und dem, wonach das, was ist, ist, hervor, wobei Cusanus dieses Verhältnis als ein Verhältnis zwischen der Schöpfung und dem Schöpfer definiert: dabei darf die Bedeutung und die Rolle der Tradition der negativen Theologie bei Cusanus nicht übersehen werden).

Hinsichtlich der kosmologischen Implikationen der ontotheologischen Behauptungen von Cusanus wurde schon gesagt, daß es sich dabei eigentlich weder um ein geozentrisches noch um ein heliozentrisches Modell des Universums handelt, da die Deutung der Welt / des Universums als Manifestation Gottes durch die Behauptung bedingt wird, wonach »der Gott eine Kugel ist, deren Mittelpunkt überall und deren Rand nirgendwo ist...«. Dies ist eigentlich eine Konzeption, mit der das Prinzip der Ubiquität des Mittelpunktes beziehungsweise eines »dezentralisierten« Universums eingeführt wird. Eine solche kosmologische Konzeption wird am Ende des sechzehnten Jahrhunderts Giordano Bruno, indem er sie radikalisiert, fortsetzen, wobei Bruno die Implikationen der These über die Unendlichkeit des Universums – der Welt weiter als Cusanus durchdenken wird.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> *Ibd.*, III, I, S. 425.

<sup>13</sup> Siehe insbesondere sein Werk *De l'infinito, universo e mondi* in *Opere italiane*.

Wie für die Weltdeutung von Cusanus so gilt auch für diejenige von Bruno die Feststellung, daß die Voraussetzungen des Versuchs, das Verhältnis zwischen Gott und Welt auf eine neue Weise zu bestimmen, auch bei ihm zweifellos die ontotheologischen Voraussetzungen der kosmologischen Konzeption darstellen. Die Feststellung über die Radikalisierung der Konzeption von Cusanus beruht auf folgenden Tatsachen, die im Zusammenhang mit den Postulaten von Giordano Bruno stehen: wie Cusanus, den Bruno in seinen Werken erwähnt und zitiert, so bestreitet auch er, daß das Universum einen Mittelpunkt,<sup>14</sup> einen privilegierten Ort aufweist, so daß ein Modell eines »zerstreuten«, ins Unendliche geöffneten Universums entsteht. Indem Bruno die Implikationen der These von der Unendlichkeit des Universums und der Allgegenwärtigkeit des Mittelpunkts durchdenkt und die Behauptung über die Bewohntheit der Himmelskörper weiter entwickelt, stellt er die These von der unendlichen Zahl der Welten im Universum auf, von denen jede unserem Sonnensystem ähnlich ist,<sup>15</sup> wobei auch diese »andere Welten« (»Erden«, »terrac«) bewohnt sind<sup>16</sup> (dabei ist hervorzuheben, daß Bruno, indem er von der These von der unendlichen Zahl der Welten im Universum ausgeht, als einziger von diesen drei Philosophen die »Welt« vom »Universum« klar unterscheidet). In seinem Modell des »azentrischen« Universums herrscht ein absoluter Relativismus. Was dabei wichtig ist und worin er sich wesentlich von Nikolaus Cusanus unterscheidet, ist die Tatsache, daß er, indem er das Universum zum aktuell unendlichen macht, dieses zugleich als notwendig aufstellt, beziehungsweise daß in seinem Universum, da dieses aktuell unendlich ist, die allmächtige schöpferische Macht Gottes eigentlich erschöpft wird, so daß der Gott auf gewisse Weise tatsächlich zur »natürlichen Ursache« wird (wodurch der Faktor des allmächtigen Willen Gottes beziehungsweise der Willkür als Ursache der Welt beseitigt wird). Gottes Wirken ist dabei notwendig.<sup>17</sup> Das Mögliche wird also mit dem Wirklichen gleichgestellt. Das

<sup>14</sup> Vgl. Bruno, beispielsweise *De l'infinito, universo e mondi*, S. 405, ausg. von G. Gentile, *Opera italiane*, I, 1925, (alle andere Zitate aus diesem Werk stammen aus dieser Ausgabe). »... perche nell' universo non e mezzo ne circonferenza, ma, se vuoi, in tutto e mezzo ed in ogni punto si puo prendere parte di qualche circonferenza a rispetto di qualche altro mezzo o centro«.

<sup>15</sup> A. a. O., II. Dialog, S. 320: »A questo si e risposto assai; e diciamo che son terre infinite, son soli infiniti, e etere infinito; o secondo il dir di Democrito ed Epicuro, e pieno e vacuo infinito; l' uno insito ne l' altro. E son diverse specie finite, le une comprese de le atre, e le une ordinate a le atre«.

<sup>16</sup> Vgl. Bruno, V. Dialog des Werkes *De l'infinito, universo e mondi*.

<sup>17</sup> A. a. O., I. Dialog, S. 302. »E non veggo come alcuni intendano quel che dicono della potenza attiva infinita, a cui non corrisponda potenza pasiva infinita, e che quello faccia uno e finito che puo far innumerabili ne l' infinito ed immenso, essendo l' azione sua necessaria, perche procedere da tal volonta quale, per essere immutabilissima, anzi la immutabilita estessa, e ancora la istessa necessita; onde sono a fatto medesima cosa liberta, volonta, necessita, ed oltre il fare col volere, possere ed essere«.

Universum ist nämlich aktuell, durch die Tat, alles das, was sein kann. Die Unendlichkeit der Macht Gottes manifestiert sich als aktuelle Unendlichkeit der Welt.<sup>18</sup> Laut Bruno wäre nämlich eine endliche Welt / ein endliches Universum ein des allmächtigen Gottes unwürdiges Werk. So richtet sich auch Bruno in seiner Ontotheologie, die die Voraussetzung für seine kosmologische Konzeption bildet, nach der pseudohermetischen Behauptung »Deus est sphaera infinita, cuius centrum est ubique, circumferentia nusquam«, wobei natürlich gerade die Form der Kugel fragwürdig ist. Jedoch wird Bruno insbesondere in seinen lateinischen Werken (zum Beispiel im Werk *Lampas triginta statuarum*) ausführlicher erklären, daß dabei die Form der Kugel nur noch als ein Symbol benutzt wird, das zur Erläuterung der Behauptung dient, daß jeder Punkt im Universum ein potentieller Mittelpunkt ist; da die Entfernung von dem nirgends vorhandenen Rand überall dieselbe d.h. unendlich ist. Dennoch geht in dieser ein bißchen »anarchoiden« Darstellung des zerstreuten Universums jede Spur eines Systems verloren. Bruno betrachtet nämlich jede von dieser unendlichen Zahl der Welten als ein unserem Sonnensystem ähnliches System.<sup>19</sup>

Falls wir uns nach einer solchen konzisen Auslegung der Behauptungen von Cusanus und Bruno über die Unendlichkeit mit den grundlegenden Thesen aus der »neuen« Philosophie von Petrić auseinandersetzen, dann sind neben unbestreitbaren Ähnlichkeiten auch wesentliche Unterschiede zu erblicken. Zuerst ist festzustellen, daß auch Petrićs Thesen von der Welt, die in dem Werk *Nova de universis Philosophia*, das mit dem Titel *Pancosmia* versehen ist, erörtert werden, auf den grundlegenden ontotheologischen Postulaten beruhen. Den Ausgangspunkt der Behauptungen über die Unendlichkeit bildet die These, daß die allmächtige Ursache keine endliche, beschränkte Tat, beschränkte Manifestation aufweisen kann (»Ab infinita potentia, infinita provenit actio. Ab infinita actione, infinitum quoque effectum, necesse est prodire«).<sup>20</sup> Und das Erste, worin sich der Gott manifestiert, ist – Raum (»das Erste unter den weltlichen Dingen, sogar auch... vor der Welt«),

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, S 302. »Per venir, dunque, ad inferir quel che vogliamo, dico che, se nel primo efficiente e potenza infinita, e ancora operazioni da la quale depende l' universo di grandezza infinita e mondi di numero infinito«.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.* II. Dialog, S. 361. »Resta, dunque, da sapere ch' e un infinito campo e spacio continente, il qual comprende e penetra il tutto. In quello sono infiniti corpi simili a questo, de quali l' uno non e piu in mezzo de l' universo che l' altro, perche questo e infinito, e pero senza centro e senza margine; benche queste cose convegano a ciascuno di questi mondi, che sono in esso son quel modo ch' altre volte ho detto, e particolarmente quando abbiamo dimostrato essere certi, k determinati e definiti mezzi, quai sono i soli, i fuochi, circa gli quali discorreno tutti gli pianeti, le terre, le acqui, qualmente veggiamo circa questo a noi vicino marciar questi sette erranti...«.

<sup>20</sup> *Nova sveopća filozofija, Pancosmia*, IV, 74.

so daß sich die allmächtige Ursache von Allem vor allem in der Unendlichkeit des Raumes manifestiert. Der Raum ist nämlich die Bedingung dafür, daß überhaupt etwas erscheint und deshalb das erste Geschaffene außerhalb der väterlichen Tiefe. Petrić schreibt nämlich die Unendlichkeit *primär nicht der Welt sondern dem Raum* zu (obwohl er dann im VIII. Buch der *Pancosmia* über den Raum *oder* die Welt spricht, wobei die Endlichkeit und Unendlichkeit des Raumes auch der Welt zugeschrieben wird). Und der Raum ist nach Petrić notwendigerweise unendlich, da er die Bedingung für die Manifestation der unendlichen Macht Gottes liefert. Dabei ist hervorzuheben, daß Petrić zwischen dem endlichen und unendlichen Raum unterscheidet, indem er die Welt, deren Mittelpunkt die Erde (die sich gemäß dem XVII. Buch der *Pancosmia* eigentlich um den Mittelpunkt der Welt dreht) bildet, in den endlichen Raum unterbringt. Unendlich ist in der Tat nur der Raum, der sich von der Welt fortbewegt (*»spacium illud a mundo recedens in infinitum recedere et infinitum esse«*)<sup>21</sup> und dieser Raum ist aktuell unendlich (*»actu infinitum esse concludemus«*). Der endliche Raum weist der Welt (*mundus*) ihren Ort zu. Dabei ist die Fülle (*plenitudo*) aber eine zufällige Eigenschaft (*accidens*) dieses Raumes, dessen wesentliche Bestimmung darin liegt, daß er leer ist (*vacuum esse*; danach würde auch die aktuelle Welt kontingent sein, was Petrić eigentlich auch indirekt behauptet, indem er die Möglichkeit bespricht, daß es die Welt ebenso nicht gäbe). Der Raum der Ins-gesamtheit (*universum spacium*) ist unendlich und ein unkörperlicher Körper (*incorporeum corpus*) und ein körperlicher Unkörper (*non corpus corporeum*).

Bei Petrić ist also keine Rede vom Modell des zerstreuten, »dezentralisierten« Universums. Er vertritt nicht wie Cusanus und Bruno die These von der Ubiquität des Zentrums. Er vertritt die Konzeption des Universums / der Insgesamtheit, in der sich die endliche Welt im Mittelpunkt des unendlichen Raumes befindet. Dabei ist zu betonen, daß Petrić ohne Rücksicht auf diese Unterscheidung zwischen dem endlichen und unendlichen Raum beziehungsweise zwischen der endlichen Welt und dem unendlichen Raum, der sich von der Oberfläche der Welt »nach außen« ausdehnt, stets auf der Einheitlichkeit der Ins-gesamtheit (*uni-versitas*) beharrt, die vor allem auf der Einheitlichkeit der Weltmaterie – des Fluidums – beruht. Dieses Fluidum dehnt sich von seinem größten Teil – der Erde (des irdischen Fluidums) im Mittelpunkt der Welt (und des gesamten Raumes) – bis in die Unendlichkeit aus, wo es ins unsichtbare Licht übergeht, das zuerst den Raum erfüllt und selbst unendlich ist (*»Also, unendliches Licht Gottes unendlich möglich, alles goß sich in die Tat aus und schuf das unendliche Licht«*).<sup>22</sup> Der Raum des Universums ist

<sup>21</sup> *Ibd.*, I, 64.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibd.*, IV, 74.

also wie die Weltmaterie selbst ohne Rücksicht auf die Unterschiede (infolge der unterschiedlichen Dichte des Fluidums, die den Unterschieden hinsichtlich der einzelnen Stellen im Raum entspricht) einheitlich. Dadurch unterscheidet sich die Konzeption von Petrić auch von der stoischen Konzeption, wonach sich außerhalb der Grenzen der Welt der unendliche (leere) Raum befindet. Nach Petrić ist die Welt auch außerhalb des Himmels mit Licht, Wärme und Fluidum erfüllt, so daß sie nicht leer ist. »Die Welt ist also gemäß der mathematischen Notwendigkeit aller dieser Beweise unendlich. Sie ist in seiner Ganzheit eine feste Kugel und bis zum Mittelpunkt mit dem feuerweltlichen Raum, Licht, Wärme und Fluidum gefüllt.«<sup>23</sup> Die Unterschiede, die wir in der Ingesamtheit wahrnehmen, sind dabei auf die Eigenschaften (das Akzidenzielle) zurückzuführen. Die Natur der Ingesamtheit ist nach Petrić wesentlich – eine.

Die Darstellung des endlichen Teils des Raumes, in dem der Welt ihr Ort zugewiesen wird, stellt sozusagen die traditionelle Darstellung der Welt dar, wonach die Erde den Mittelpunkt (als der größte Teil des Fluidums) bildet, wobei sich die Erde nach Petrić (wie dies an einigen Stellen in der *Pancosmia* und insbesondere im XVII. Buch angeführt wird) tatsächlich im Mittelpunkt des Universums befindet und sich in einer Kreisbahn um diesen Mittelpunkt bewegt (wie dies aus dem angeführten Werk »Neue allgemeine...« hervorgeht, s. S. 103: »Und falls sie behaupten, sie befinde sich im Mittelpunkt des Universums und stehe durch ihre Schwere ausgeglichen auf diesem Punkt ganz fest, so ist dies kein Hindernis dafür, daß sie sich im Kreis um sich dreht, so wie sich nach der Meinung der Sternkundigen der Himmel sowohl um denselben Mittelpunkt als auch um seine Angelpunkte dreht« und weiter auf derselben Seite: »Sie kann nämlich im Mittelpunkt sein und sich niemals von ihm entfernen... jedoch hindert sie das nicht, sich um den Mittelpunkt zu drehen«, und zuletzt auf der Seite 104 in demselben Buch der *Pancosmia*: »sondern in die Mitte der Welt gestellt, in den Mittelpunkt, der nicht ihr eigener ist... sondern der Mittelpunkt des Universums, der dadurch auch zu ihrem Mittelpunkt wird, dreht sie (d.h. die Erde) sich vom Westen nach Osten, wie dies auch jene behauptet«, und um sie folgen immer dünnere Teile des Fluidums, die den Elementen der aristotelischen Philosophie bis hin zu der Sphäre der Fixsterne entsprechen). Dasjenige, wodurch Petrić vor allem das traditionelle Weltbild zum Sturz bringt, ist die These vom Nichtvorhandensein der Sphären, an denen die Himmelskörper befestigt sind, als auch die These von der Einheitlichkeit der Weltbewegung (dank der sich auch die Erde bewegt), die auf der allgemeinen (platonischen) Behauptung über die Allbeseeltheit der Ingesamtheit beruht, ferner die These von der ein-

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII, 83 v.

heitlichen Weltmaterie – Fluidum (die in ihren dünnsten Teilen immateriell ist), wodurch das Postulat von dem wesentlichen Unterschied zwischen dem supralunaren und sublunaren Teil der Welt zum Sturz gebracht wird. Obwohl sich nach Petrić auch die Himmelskörper verändern, entstehen und zu Grunde gehen (er neigt sogar dazu, wie Cusanus zu behaupten, daß auch »einzelne Sterne einzelne Welten darstellen, die ihre eigene Luft, ihr eigenes Wasser, ihre eigene Erde haben und in denen Lebewesen, vollkommener und göttlicher als unsere, verweilen«,<sup>24</sup> und im IX. Buch der *Pancosmia* wird auch die unendliche Zahl der Sternen besprochen), und obwohl er der Meinung ist, daß die Erde nur einer der Himmelskörper ist, ein Stern, der »in der Luft hängt«, gibt Petrić die These von dem wesentlichen Unterschied zwischen der Erde und den anderen Himmelskörpern nicht auf. Sie ist nämlich »die Ablagerung der Welt« und »hängt in der Luft«, während jene Körper »im Äther hängen«.

Das Spezifikum des Modells der Ingesamtheit (*universitas*) und der Welt von Petrić widerspiegelt sich auch in der Tatsache, daß er neben der Konzeption der einheitlichen Ingesamtheit, des einheitlichen Raumes der Welt und des Fluidums der Welt (sowohl des körperlichen als auch unkörperlichen) an der Konzeption des hierarchischen Aufbaus der Welt festhält, innerhalb dessen ganz genau festgelegt wurde, was »unten« und was »oben« ist, wobei diese Zuweisung des Ortes in der Welt mit einer Wertordnung einhergeht. Das Interessante an dieser Konzeption der Welt / des Universums ist die *doppelte Bestimmung des Ausgangspunktes* der für die Welt bestimmenden Wirkungen. Gerade darin liegt dann auch der grundlegende Unterschied zwischen seiner Konzeption der Welt und jener von Cusanus und Bruno. Diese haben nämlich die Allgegenwärtigkeit Gottes in die kosmologische Konzeption des zerstreuten Universums umgewandelt, in dem jeder Punkt sowohl Mittelpunkt als auch Rand sein kann, und für den die Zerstretheit der energetischen Punkte charakteristisch ist, sofern Gott in jedem Punkt eines solchen Universums tätig ist. Nach dieser Konzeption ist die vorherrschende Wirkungsform eigentlich die *kreisförmige* (ungeachtet des Widerspruchs in Hinblick auf die Verbundenheit der Unendlichkeit des Universums und der Kugelform im Rahmen dieser Konzeption, da sich sowohl Cusanus als auch Bruno nicht zufällig der Formel »Deus est sphaera infinita...« bedienen; jeder Punkt in einem solchen Universum ist nämlich als ein Mittelpunkt der göttlichen Wirkung, die an Hand einer Kugel umzuschreiben ist, vorzustellen).

Für die Darstellung Petrićs Welt / Ingesamtheit sind aber zwei grundlegende Richtungen des kosmischen Dynamismus bestimmend. Einerseits

<sup>24</sup> *Ibd.*, XXI, 116 v.

befindet sich in Bezug auf die Reihenfolge der Elemente und ihre Wertordnung im Einklang mit dem traditionellen Weltbild die niedrigste Ebene im Mittelpunkt des Universums (und der Welt), während der erhabenste Teil oberhalb des Himmels und der empirischen Welt in der Region des Intelligiblen untergebracht wird. Die Quelle der Schöpfung, der Wirkung Gottes, ist präzise gerade in dieser intelligiblen Sphäre geortet, aus der sich diese Quelle als unendliches geistiges Licht (das Gott selbst ist) über die Teile des unendlichen Raumes ausgießt, indem sie zum körperlichen Licht wird. Nach dieser Konzeption wirkt der Gott nicht aus dem Mittelpunkt sondern aus dem unendlichen Raum außerhalb der Welt. Insofern wird die traditionelle Darstellung der Wirkungsrichtung (der Bewegungsursache im aristotelischen Weltbild und danach auch des Gottes als Schöpfers von Allem im Rahmen der christlichen Interpretation dieses Weltbildes) eigentlich nur geringfügig abgeändert. Interessant ist dabei zu verfolgen, wie die alte (aristotelische) Darstellung der Bewegungsrichtung (die sich vom unbewegten Bewegendem über die Sphäre der Fixsterne bis zu allen niederen Sphären verbreitet) unter Einhaltung der ihr angemessenen Weltstruktur an eine Darstellung der Ingesamtheit angepaßt wird, in der die eigentlich vorherrschende Richtung des Geschehens – »der Weg nach oben« oder besser »der Weg nach draußen«, der Weg »des Fortschreitens« zur intelligiblen Sphäre – als eine Tendenz zur Expansion des Fluidums (durch Verflüssigung) im unendlichen (leeren) Raum dargestellt wird. Im Einklang mit seiner Philosophie des Einen, wonach Alles (Ingesamtheit, universitas) das Eine, das einheitliche Ganze ist, mittels dessen die hierarchische Ordnung der Wesen im Universum eigentlich aufgehoben wird, wobei diese Philosophie danach strebt, indem jedes Einzelne aufgrund eines Prinzips – des Einen, das im Allen ist – das ist, was es ist, alle Wesen in der Ingesamtheit auf gewisse Weise auszugleichen, so daß nach dieser Philosophie ausdrücklich »Deus est ubique« (»Gott überall ist«), nähert sich Petrić zugleich der Konzeption von Cusanus und Bruno, mit der ein Weltbild aufgehoben wird, das in sich die hierarchische Ordnung der Wesen zusammen mit der Möglichkeit einer Wertordnung enthält.<sup>25</sup> Gerade

<sup>25</sup> In Zusammenhang mit Cusanischer kosmologischer Konzeption ist doch noch folgendes zu betonen: er unterscheidet gleichwohl zwischen der oberen und der unteren Welt, so wie man zwischen der Region der Dunkelheit und der Region des Lichtes unterscheidet, obwohl diese zwei Welten miteinander verflochten sind und sich gegenseitig durchdringen wie zwei Pyramiden, an deren sich Enden, Spitzen *supremum coelum* und *infimus mundum* befinden. So behält auch er in gewisser Weise das neuplatonische Schema der Wirklichkeitsstruktur, ein leiterartiges Schema des *Falls und Aufstiegs* (descensus und ascensus, laut Cusanus regressus) bei, das sich von Gott, der außerhalb Allem als absolute Vollkommenheit unerreichbar ist, bis zur Materie, aus der der (menschliche) Geist zur Rückkehr zum Gott strebt, erstreckt. Gleichwohl behält auch Cusanus in seiner Kosmologie im gewissen Maße die Abstufung und Anordnung der Elemente bei, die im Einklang mit der aristotelischen Philosophie ist, wobei die leichteren Elemente aus

in der Aneignung dieser zwei, eigentlich unterschiedlichen Konzeptionen kommt eine gewisse Widersprüchlichkeit der Behauptungen von Petrić zum Vorschein: trotz seiner Bemühung um die Einheitlichkeit rangiert er nämlich die Wesen in Hinblick auf ihre Entfernung vom Prinzip von Allem, das er über die empirische Region, auf »den höchsten Platz« unterbringt, indem er behauptet, daß es sich um ein solches Prinzip (dem Einen) handle, wonach alles sei, ein Prinzip, das für jedes Seiende konstitutiv und demnach »in Allem« (in jedem Einzelnen und in der Ingesamtheit) sei. Im Rahmen dieser Darstellung ist dann die Erde, die sich im Mittelpunkt des Universums befindet, als »Ablagerung der Welt« vom Gott am weitesten entfernt.

Daraus geht hervor, daß für die Kosmologie von Petrić das neuplatonische (ontologische) Modell oder die neuplatonische (ontologische) Darstellung der Wirklichkeit bestimmend ist, die eine Leiter, eine Skala von Wesen, und zwar von der höchsten, transzendentalen bis zu der niedrigsten, der materiellsten Ebene, enthält und die durch zwei Wege – der Weg nach unten (descensus) und der Weg nach oben (ascensus) – bestimmt ist und in der zugleich die Bemühung vorherrscht, dank des Prinzips, wonach alles ist und das in jedem Einzelnen und in Allem ist und das eigentlich das Eine-Alle ist, alle Unterschiede auszugleichen und zu vereinigen. Hier überwiegt also noch immer die *vertikale Kommunikation* zwischen den zwei Polen des kosmischen Geschehens (dem Gott, der »von oben« wirkt und dem Mittelpunkt der Welt – der Erde). Neben der Wirkung des Gottes aus der intelligiblen Sphäre zum Mittelpunkt der Ingesamtheit hin – der Erde, ist in dieser Konzeption auch die Bewegung / der Drang in der entgegengesetzter Richtung vertreten – die Expansion aus dem Mittelpunkt nach draußen, zu der intelligiblen Sphäre (wobei der Prozeß der Verdünnung zugleich als ein Prozeß der Vervollkommnung dargestellt wird). Ungeachtet der Behauptung über die Ubiquität Gottes wirkt der Gott also noch immer auf die Welt »von außen«. Bei Cusanus und Bruno wirkt jedoch der Gott »von innen«, sofern man jeden Punkt im Universum als Mittelpunkt der Wirkung Gottes betrachten kann.

Auf Grund der Einsicht in die grundlegende Behauptungen aller drei Denker kann zuletzt die Schlußfolgerung gezogen werden: das, was ihnen

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dem Mittelpunkt nach »oben« und die schwierigeren zum Mittelpunkt streben, obwohl diese Bestimmungen in seinem Weltbild verloren gehen, sofern den Grundsatz seiner Kosmologie (deren Voraussetzungen seine ontotheologische Behauptungen bilden, wonach Gott allein Mittelpunkt ist, der überall ist und der mit dem Rand, der nirgendwo ist, zusammenfällt) die All-Mittelpunktlichkeit bildet. So könnte man in Zusammenhang mit dem vorherrschenden Schema der Wirklichkeitsdarstellung auch bei Bruno gewisse Abweichung feststellen, d.h. eine Abweichung von der Betonung der Einheit der Ingesamtheit und der Gleichstellung aller ihrer Teile bis hin zur Hervorhebung des Schemas vom Aufstieg und Fall, das mit der Skala der Wesen von dem höchsten bis zum niedrigsten in Korrelation steht und das in seinen moralphilosophischen Abhandlungen vorherrscht.



gemeinsam ist, ist die Tatsache, daß alle drei die Idee der Unendlichkeit in die Weltdeutung einführen, indem sie das Problem des Verhältnisses zwischen Gott und Welt zu lösen versuchen. Insofern kann man über gewisse Übereinstimmung der *Motive* bei der Inanspruchnahme dieser Idee sprechen. Dabei sollte aber in Zusammenhang mit dem Motiven folgendes erklärt werden: auf der Suche nach der Antwort, *warum* überhaupt die Idee der Unendlichkeit in die Weltdeutung eingeführt wurde, scheint es angebracht zu sein, zu erforschen, wie diese aufs neue aktualisiert wurde. Es wird sich nämlich zeigen, daß das Unendliche zuerst als ein Attribut Gottes erscheint, oder präziser, daß die Allmacht Gottes oder der allmächtige Wille Gottes mittels der Kategorie des Unendlichen ausgedrückt wird (nach Petrić ist Gott ausdrücklich unendlich und das heißt unendlich mächtig, *apeirodynamos*). Falls wir ferner die Frage stellen, warum im fünfzehnten und sechzehnten Jahrhundert (gerade bei den Vertretern der neuplatonischen Strömung) gerade auf diesem Attribut Gottes bestanden wird, werden wir einsehen, daß dem so ist, weil es ihnen gerade auf die spezifische Bestimmung des Verhältnisses zwischen Gott und Welt ankommt. Die Welt ist nämlich im Rahmen des Versuches, eine neue Bestimmung dieses Verhältnisses festzulegen, eine Manifestation des Gottes, und als eine Manifestation der Unendlichkeit Gottes wird sie auch unendlich sein. Die Frage, warum gerade diese Bestimmung in diesem Augenblick der geistigen Geschichte so wichtig wird, muß im Lichte der nominalistischen Diskussionen gesehen werden, die am Ende des Mittelalters geführt werden, wobei in einer gesteigerten Form die Frage nach dem Verhältnis zwischen Gott als allmächtigen Willen und (der Kontingenz) der Welt als seiner Schöpfung gestellt wird. Dabei ist die Frage wesentlich, ob sich die Allmacht Gottes in der aktuellen Welt, in der wir leben, erschöpft und falls nicht, warum wollte Gott gerade eine solche Welt und keine andere, was zuletzt auf die Frage nach der Möglichkeit der menschlichen Erkenntnis, die Wahrheit der Welt beziehungsweise Gottes Vorhaben zu ergründen, zurückzuführen ist. Dank der These von der Unendlichkeit oder präziser der Unbegrenztheit der Welt will man die (negative) Auswirkung der These von der Willkürlichkeit als Ursache der Schöpfung dieser (gerade einer solchen und keiner anderen) Welt, wonach wir dann nichts Sicheres über ihre Ursachen wissen können, annullieren. Mit der These von der Unendlichkeit der Welt versucht man dieses Problem so zu lösen, daß entweder Gott mit dem aktuellen unendlichen Universum, in dem es unendlich viele Welten gibt, auf irgendeine Weise gleichgestellt wird, oder daß die Welt für unendlich beziehungsweise un-begrenzt erklärt wird, wobei aber jeder Punkt in dieser Welt potentiell einen Mittelpunkt darstellt (und der tatsächliche Mittelpunkt Gott allein ist, so daß die Welt durch ihre Unendlichkeit eigentlich ein offenes Feld der Manifestation Gottes darstellt), oder ist die Welt, die wir als Werk Gottes

erfahren, endlich, wobei die Möglichkeit der Manifestation des neuen, jenen »außerhalb der Tiefe Vaters noch nicht Vorgebrachten« im unendlichen Raum liegt. Es handelt sich um drei Optionen, die beim Versuch, das oben angeführte Problem zu lösen, bei Cusanus, Bruno und Petrić vorzufinden sind. Eine solche Schlußfolgerung in Bezug auf das Motiv der Einführung der Idee der Unendlichkeit in die Weltdeutung ist bei Petrić nicht so direkt wie im Falle Cusanus und Brunos abzuleiten. Er hält an der Behauptung über die Kontingenz der Welt (die im Mittelpunkt des unendlichen Raumes endlich ist und die es auch nicht geben könnte, was von dem Willen Gottes abhängt, woraus man schließen könnte, daß Gott im unendlichen Raum, nachdem es diese Welt nicht mehr gäbe, eine andere schaffen könnte) fest. Indem er die Frage *unserer* Welt als nur eine der möglichen Welt wie bei Cusanus oder als aktuell unendliches Universum mit unendlich vielen Welten in diesem Universum wie bei Bruno nicht genauer ausarbeitet (obwohl er die Möglichkeit einer unendlichen Zahl der Sterne – der bewohnten Welten im Universum in Erwägung zieht, äußert er sich darüber nicht eindeutig, sondern betont wie bei Cusanus, daß wir in der Kosmologie auf Vermutungen angewiesen sind), bleibt bei ihm die oben angegebene Frage (warum Gott im unendlichen Raum gerade diese und solche Welt schafft) ungelöst. Es ist aber festzustellen, daß Petrić in Hinblick auf die Weise, auf die er die Möglichkeit der Erkenntnis der Welt gewährleistet, in die Fußstapfen Cusanus tritt, indem er hervorhebt, daß die grundlegende Intention Gottes bei der Schaffung darin liegt, sich dem Menschen zu zeigen, so daß ihn dieser in Allem erkennt. Und Gott offenbart sich gerade durch die Welt.

Wie schon hervorgehoben wurde, sind bei diesen drei Denkern neben der Übereinstimmung hinsichtlich der Motive auch wesentliche Unterschiede zu erblicken und zwar insbesondere in Bezug auf die Funktion der Idee der Unendlichkeit innerhalb der Weltdeutung beziehungsweise innerhalb der vorgeschlagenen Modelle der Welt / des Universums. Insofern unterscheidet sich das Modell von Petrić in einigen Kernpunkten von dem Modell, das Cusanus und Bruno vertreten. Von der Konzeption Cusanus unterscheidet es sich vor allem dadurch, daß Petrić neben der These von der Unendlichkeit des Raumes (und der Welt, sofern er darunter eigentlich auch den außerweltlichen Raum beziehungsweise das Universum versteht)<sup>26</sup> gleichwohl an dem

<sup>26</sup> Dabei ist hervorzuheben, daß auch Petrić die Termini »Welt« (mundus), »Universum« (universum), »Insgesamtheit« (universitas) als auch ihre Bestimmung als Unendliches nicht ganz präzise gebraucht. Da er sich sowohl des Terminus »mundus« als auch »universum« bedient, könnte man daraus schließen, daß er die Unterscheidung zwischen der vollen, endlichen (Welt) und dem leeren, unendlichen (Raum) um diese Welt übernimmt, was er als Diogens Lehre anführt. Gemäß dieser Unterscheidung könnte man von der Welt im engeren (endliche Welt) und von der Welt im breiteren Sinne (endliche Welt zusammen mit dem unendlichen Raum um

Modell der endlichen Welt zusammen mit dem hierarchischen Aufbau der Elemente und der diesen Aufbau begleitenden Wertordnung festhält. Dabei ist der Unterschied zum System von Giordano Bruno noch markanter, sofern dieser die Behauptungen Cusanus über die Unendlichkeit des Universums radikalisiert, und sofern er Gott wirklich zur natürlichen Ursache macht, deren notwendige Manifestation das aktuell unendliche Universum eigentlich darstellt.<sup>27</sup>

Der Gott von Petrić (diesbezüglich stehen seine Behauptungen ungefähr in der Mitte zwischen denen von Cusanus und Bruno), dessen Wille ein dominantes Moment in der Deutung der Wirklichkeit darstellt, übertrifft zwar als Allmacht Gottes alle Schöpfungen (worin er mit Nikolaus Cusanus derselben Meinung ist), schafft aber notwendigerweise den unendlichen Raum als Bedingung irgendwelcher Manifestation, Existenz irgendeines Dinges. Er schafft nämlich *aus Notwendigkeit*... Die aktuelle Welt ist als eine geschaffene endlich, wie dies eigentlich jede Schöpfung ist. Es ist möglich, daß es sie auch nicht gäbe, was von dem Willen Gottes abhängt. Es scheint aber nach Petrić unmöglich zu sein, sich vorzustellen, daß es keinen Raum gibt (obwohl auch dieser von Gott geschaffen wurde, so daß auch dieser durch den Willen Gottes bedingt ist),<sup>28</sup> was zu bedeuten hat, daß die Existenz des Raumes auf gewisse Weise für den Gott selbst bindend ist. Hier entsteht noch keine Gleichstellung von Gott und Raum, wie dies beim späteren Anhänger von

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diese Welt) sprechen, was dann dem »Universum« entsprechen würde. Dies ist aber bei Petrić nicht so explizit bestimmt, der sich der Termini »mundus« und »universum« am häufigsten promiscue bedient (er definiert diese so: »mundus seu universum« sind jene »quod omnia continet«). Des Terminus »Insgesamtheit« (universitas) bedient er sich hauptsächlich, wenn er ausdrücklich alle Wesen, alle Ebenen der Wesen von den körperlichen bis zu den intelligiblen, bis zu den Prinzipien meint, und dies als ein einheitliches Ganzes meint. Dies, daß diese Unterscheidung zwischen der Welt und des Universums bei ihm nicht so klar ausgedrückt wird, ist gerade durch seine Konzeption der Welt beziehungsweise des Universums bedingt. Bei ihm gibt es nämlich keine mehreren Welten, die sich in einem einheitlichen Universum befinden würden, sondern nur eine (unsere) endliche Welt, die ein Teil des unendlichen Raumes ist. Falls also sowohl die Welt als auch der Raum nach Petrić alles umfassen, dann sind sie ein und dasselbe, d.h. unendlich. So »mundus igitur hisce omnibus, mathematicis rationum necessitatibus, est infinitus« (Pancos, VIII, 83 v). Dabei ist interessant, daß er sich die Welt obwohl als unendlich zugleich auch als eine feste Kugel vorstellt (»Totus sphaera solida, et usque ad centrum, spacio, lumine, calore, fluore, empyreo, repletus«, ibd.). Ist aber der Raum gleichwohl nur nach außen unendlich und zum Mittelpunkt endlich, so wird auch die Welt sein, also sowohl endlich als auch unendlich.

<sup>27</sup> Vgl. Bruno, *De l' infinito...*, S. 300 u. 302.

<sup>28</sup> *Pancosmia*, I, 65.: »Und falls Gott wiederum einen neuen Himmel und eine neue Erde schafft, was viele weise Leute von heiligen Geist erfüllt vorher sagten, wird es zuvor einen Raum geben, der den neuen Himmel und die neue Erde aufnehmen werden kann. Bevor Gott diese Welt, die wir bewohnen, schuf, gab es den leeren Raum... Der Raum ist also seiner Natur nach vor der Welt und vor allen Dingen in der Welt, vor ihm gab es nichts und alles war nach ihm«.

Petrić, Henry More,<sup>29</sup> der Fall sein wird, jedoch wurde offensichtlich schon hier die notwendige Korrelation zwischen Gott und Raum hergestellt.

Im Unterschied zu Cusanus und Bruno gibt Petrić ungeachtet der These von der Einheitlichkeit der Ingesamtheit und unter Beibehaltung der Konzeption der endlichen Welt die sogenannte »spatielle Hierarchie der Werte«, also, die Wertordnung der Raumteile nicht auf, die bei Cusanus und insbesondere bei Bruno verschwindet. Ungeachtet der These von der einen und derselben Natur des Weltstoffes – Fluidums (innerhalb der die Unterschiede hinsichtlich der Raumteile auf die Unterschiede der Eigenschaften beziehungsweise auf die Unterschiede zwischen den verschiedenen Stufen der Verdünnung und Dichte zurückzuführen sind) besteht er auf der *Abstufung* der Wesen<sup>30</sup> und Prinzipien in der Abfolge der Unkörper und Körper von der intelligiblen Welt über dasjenige, was am meisten körperlich ist (Raum), über Wärme, Fluidum, Äther bis zu der dichtesten Erde, wobei er im XXIII. Buch der *Pancosmia* (S. 122) hervorhebt: »Es ist wiederum eine große Wahrheit, daß sich einige Wesen, je mehr sie sich von ihrem ursprünglichen Platz entfernen, desto notwendiger von der Vollkommenheit und hoher Stellung entrücken. Der Schöpfer selbst ist unkörperlich. Die Dinge, die unter den Körpern den Unkörpern näher sind, sind dem Schöpfer näher. Jene, die dünner sind, sind in größeren Maße Unkörper als Körper.«

Und zum Schluß bleiben folgende Fragen übrig: warum besteht *Petrić* überhaupt auf der Unendlichkeit *aber auch* auf der Endlichkeit des Raumes und der Welt (eigentlich der Welt als einem endlichen Teil des Raumes, folglich, auf der Einheitlichkeit *unserer* Welt und auf dem traditionellen Modell dieser Welt, deren Mittelpunkt die Erde bildet). Und schließlich, was für Implikationen weist ein solcher Standpunkt von *Petrić* auf, beziehungsweise was für eine Bedeutung hat dieser Standpunkt in Hinblick auf die Herausbildung der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft?

Als eines der Momente der Beibehaltung der Konzeption der endlichen Welt im unendlichen Raum seitens *Petrić* könnte man das allgemeine geistige

<sup>29</sup> Henry More, der zu den Platonisten aus Cambridge gehört, übernimmt in vielen seinen Behauptungen, die sich auf den Raum beziehen, *Petrićs* Position, die er gewissermaßen auch radikalisiert (beispielsweise die Gleichstellung von Gott und Raum). Diese seine Behauptungen, mit denen er an *Petrićs* Konzeption anknüpft, erläutert er in seinem Briefwechsel mit Descartes, in dem er entschieden für die Unendlichkeit des leeren Raumes eintritt. Heute gilt bei den Forschern der Geschichte der Wissenschaften und der Philosophie hauptsächlich als unstrittig, daß er durch seine Behauptungen Isaac Newton beeinflusste.

<sup>30</sup> Demgegenüber vgl. bei Bruno, *De l'infinito, universo e mondi*, V. Dialog, S. 404. »... atteso che tali motori non sono, ne possono essere; perche dove e numero infinito, ivi non e grado ne ordine numerale, benché sia in grado ed ordine secondo la ragione e dignità o de diverse specie e geni, o de diverse gradi in medesimo geno e medesima specie.«

Klima seiner Zeit anführen. Dieses Klima charakterisiert vor allem gewisse Angst vor radikalen Änderungen im Weltbild, deren Motive einerseits theologischen und andererseits wissenschaftlichen Ursprungs sind. Es ist völlig klar, welche theologische Implikationen die Verlegung der Erde aus dem Mittelpunkt der Welt hinsichtlich der Bedeutung ihrer Stelle und Rolle in der christlichen Lehre (die Erde als der Schauplatz der Verkörperung Jesus; dabei steht eine bestimmte kosmologische Konzeption, genauer gesagt ein traditionelles geozentrisches Modell, in notwendiger Verbindung mit der theologischen Lehre) haben konnte. Die Beibehaltung dieser Konzeption kann man als Bewahrung der Orthodoxie der christlichen Lehre betrachten. Klar sind auch die theologischen Implikationen der These, wodurch der allmächtige Wille Gottes mit der aktuellen Unendlichkeit seiner Schöpfungen – der Welt – gleichgestellt wird, wobei die Unendlichkeit des aktuellen Universums (zum Beispiel bei Bruno) die Notwendigkeit nach sich zieht, und wobei die Rolle des Willen Gottes eigentlich aufhört, irgendeine Rolle zu spielen. Petrić hält die Welt nur für einen *endlichen* (ausgefüllten) Teil des unendlichen Raumes, dessen Existenz von dem Willen Gottes vollständig abhängt. Er schreibt der Welt die Unendlichkeit nicht ausschließlich zu, sondern mißt diese als ein Attribut nur einem Teil der Welt und des Raumes bei (eigentlich bezieht sich das mehr an die Richtung; Petrić sagt nämlich sowohl für die Welt als auch für den Raum ausdrücklich, daß sie »nach außen« unendlich sind). Und trotzdem griffen die Theologen Petrić an, der die Unendlichkeit der Schöpfungen, nämlich des Raumes, beweist, und zwar in Zusammenhang mit seiner Behauptung, daß der allmächtige Gott (den er in Bezug auf seine unendliche Allmacht »*infiniti potens*« nennt) die unendliche Welt schafft (was sich primär auf den unendlichen Raum bezieht, der *aktuell unendlich* ist, während der endliche Teil – der Raum, in dem der Welt ihr Ort zugewiesen wird, nur ein Teil ist). Der Vorwurf der Theologen ist nach dem VIII. Buch der *Pancosmia* auf der Seite 83 zu lesen (nämlich nach jenem Buch, in dem besprochen wird, »ob die Welt endlich ist« und in der Petrić ausdrücklich behauptet, daß die unendliche Tat notwendigerweise eine ihr selbst entsprechende unendliche Wirkung erzeuge, so daß auch die Welt – Werk und Bild des unendlichen Gottes – unendlich sein wird). Der Vorwurf, den J. de Lugo macht, lautet: »Es ist offensichtlich, daß Gott kein eindeutiger Erzeuger ist. nichts anderes ist mit ihm identisch, so daß sein Ergebnis kleiner als seine Macht ist. Deshalb ist es auch nicht notwendig, daß sich seine Macht das Unendliche erzeugend zeigt; es genügt, die Sache in Einklang mit Gott zu bringen und zwar als ein an ihm Anteil nehmendes Wesen«. <sup>31</sup>

<sup>31</sup> Vgl. Petrić, *Nove de universis... Pancosmia*, 83 v.

In Hinblick auf die wissenschaftliche Motive genügt es, um die oben gestellte Fragen zu beantworten, sich die Tatsache bewußtzumachen, daß gerade jene Wissenschaftler und Philosophen, die den neuen wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen am meisten beigetragen haben, wie beispielsweise Kepler, Tycho Brahe und sogar Galilei, dazu nicht geneigt waren, die These von der aktuellen Unendlichkeit des Universums und insbesondere die These von der unendlichen Zahl der Welten im Universum zu übernehmen. Dabei ist Keplers Reaktion auf Giordano Brunos These von der Unendlichkeit des Universums und der Unendlichkeit der Welten signifikant. In seinem Werk »De stella nova« (1606) äußert er eindeutig seine Befürchtung, »daß man in einem solchen Universum (d.h. wie es Giordano Bruno darstellt) jeden festen Punkt (der dem Menschen als Orientierung bei der Erkenntnis des Universums dienen kann), jede Bestimmtheit des Ortes verlieren wird«. Es ist nämlich die Rede von der Angst vor dem Verlust des Systems und der Ordnung in der Welt,<sup>32</sup> ohne die sich der Mensch »im Unendlichen ohne Grenze und Mittelpunkt« verlieren wird. Gerade Keplers Reaktion, die sich nicht so sehr auf die »Revolution« von Kopernikus wie auf die infinitistische Kosmologie Giordano Brunos und auf ihre theologische und letztendlich anthropologische Implikationen bezieht, weist eben darauf hin, daß sowohl bei der Übernahme als auch bei der Verwerfung der These von der Unendlichkeit gerade metaphysische Motive eine vorherrschende Rolle spielten. Dabei läßt sich Kepler in seinen Überlegungen noch immer von der Frage nach dem »besten Ort« im Universum, nach dem »locus principalis« im Universum, leiten, was wiederum eng mit der Frage nach der Mittelstellung der Erde, der Einzigartigkeit ihrer Lage im Universum verbunden ist (eine These, die der Überzeugung dient, daß Gott alles wirklich wegen des Menschen geschaffen hat, dessen Wohnstätte die Erde ist, die zwar gemäß dem aristotelisch-neuplatonischen Weltbild den niedrigsten und schlechtesten Platz im Universum einnimmt, jedoch im Einklang mit dem christlichen Wertungssystem zugleich eine außerordentliche Position in Hinblick auf den Menschen hat – der als Ebenbild Gottes geschaffen ist). Beim Bestreiten der infinitistischen Konzeption beruft sich Kepler gerade auf die theologische Argumente, indem er die Frage stellt: wenn die Erde keine einzigartige Erscheinung im Universum darstellt (falls also im unendlichen Universum auch andere bewohnte Welten existieren), wie kann dann alles wegen des Menschen geschaffen sein und wie kann der Mensch dann der Herr über alle Werke Gottes sein.<sup>33</sup> Indem Kepler gerade um die Erhaltung der anthropozentrischen Position besorgt ist, ver-

<sup>32</sup> Diesbezüglich s.: Paolo Rossi, *Nobilità dell' uomo e pluralità dei mondi*, in: *Aspetti della rivoluzione scientifica*, Napoli 1971.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, S 242.

sucht er sogar unter Verwendung von wissenschaftlichen Argumenten zu zeigen, daß beispielsweise die Entdeckungen Galileis, die dieser mit Hilfe des Fernrohres gemacht hatte, die infinitistische Konzeption von Giordano Bruno nicht bestätigen.<sup>34</sup>

Jedes der erwähnten Momente enthält etwas, was auch Petrićs Motiv gewesen sein konnte, die Konzeption der Endlichkeit (und der Einheitlichkeit der Welt – des Sonnensystems zusammen mit der Region der Fixsterne) beizubehalten. Demgegenüber scheint das Bestehen auf der Unendlichkeit des Raumes zur Neubestimmung (was, wie schon erwähnt, gerade für die neuplatonische Strömung innerhalb der Renaissancephilosophie charakteristisch ist) des Verhältnisses zwischen Gott und Welt unmittelbar zu dienen. Bei Petrić, bei dem der Faktor des Willens Gottes in der Deutung der Wirklichkeit am ausdrucksvollsten vorhanden ist und bei dem die Kontingenz der endlichen Welt am meisten zum Ausdruck kommt (wobei wir weder die Zeit /der Gegenreformation/ noch die Umstände, in denen er schreibt, nicht außer Acht lassen dürfen), beruht die Garantie der Verständlichkeit der Welt / Ingesamtheit auf der Behauptung, wonach sich Gott dem Menschen durch alles Geschaffene *offenbart* (»Er schuf alles, damit ihn der Mensch durch alles erkenne«).<sup>35</sup> Und ein solcher Gott, der schafft, um sich dem Menschen zu offenbaren (folglich ist der Mensch das Ziel und der Zweck der Schöpfung als auch des kosmischen Geschehens; Petrić verteidigt also in gewisser Weise die Bevorzugung der menschlichen Position im Universum und zwar ohne Rücksicht auf die negative Bewertung der Lage und der Bedeutung der Erde), als »alles, was ist, und alles, was sein kann«, braucht den unendlichen Raum als Bedingung seiner Manifestation, so daß also die Unendlichkeit des Raumes die Bedingung der Verwirklichung, des Erscheinens des Neuen darstellt.

<sup>34</sup> Auch Petrić nimmt an dieser, am Ende des sechzehnten Jahrhundert so aktuellen Diskussion teil, durch die die Voraussetzungen der anthropozentrischen Auffassung in Frage gestellt werden. Im XXI. Buch seiner *Pancosmia* stellt er die Frage: »Und ist es glaubhaft, daß so zahlreiche Sterne über die Stoffwelt so viel Lichter, die kaum zu ihr gelangen, ausgießen, oder daß so viele Sterne nur wegen der Erde geschaffen wurden, zu der ihre Lichter nicht oder kaum gelangen? Und tatsächlich wagt sich der Versand weder zu behaupten noch zu glauben, daß Gott der Schöpfer so riesige Körper, viel größer als die Erde, so unzählige und so schöne, nur wegen eines Körpers, daß so klein und so häßlich wie die Erde ist, geschaffen hat«. Ungeachtet dessen, daß ihm die Lehre der Pythagoreer von der unendlichen Zahl der Sterne – der Welten im Universum (die mit Lebewesen, »vollkommeneren und göttlicheren als unsere« bewohnt sind) glaubhaft erscheint und ungeachtet dessen, daß er behauptet, daß die Sterne durch Licht und Wärme, indem sie das Samen alles Bestehenden verteilen, untereinander einwirken, besteht Petrić trotzdem auf einer so strukturierten Welt, deren niedrigster Teil (eigentlich die Erde) sich im Mittelpunkt befindet und auf die sich über die Sterne, die Sonne und den Mond das Licht aus der Urquelle ausgießt.

<sup>35</sup> *Panarchia*, XXII, 48: »Deshalb schuf er gerade alle Dinge, daß du ihn an ihnen erkennst. Dies ist die Güte des Gottes selbst, und das ist seine Tugend: sich durch alles zu offenbaren«.

Wozu dient also Petrić diese Trennung oder wenigstens Unterscheidung zwischen der endlichen Welt und des unendlichen (leeren) Raumes, wenn über diese überhaupt nicht gesprochen werden kann, da er auch die Welt (offensichtlich in einem breiteren Sinne des Wortes) für endlich und unendlich hält? Vielleicht decken sich seine Motive der Beibehaltung der endlichen Welt zusammen mit ihrem Mittelpunkt – der Erde – mit Keplers Motiven, wenn er die These von der Einheitlichkeit *unserer* Welt vor der infinitistischen Konzeption und vor der These von der unendlichen Zahl der Welten verteidigt. Die These von der Unendlichkeit des Raumes »nach außen« ist ausdrücklich durch ontotheologische Gründe bedingt. Der Raum ist für ihn eigentlich, da ihn Gott ständig schafft, unendlich als eine unendliche Möglichkeit der Realisation des *Neuen*.

Falls wir schließlich unser Augenmerk darauf richten, was für einen Widerhall die Behauptungen dieser drei Denker, die in ihre Systeme der Weltdeutung den Begriff des Unendlichen eingeführt haben, gefunden haben, ist folgendes festzustellen: falls eines der wesentlichen Momente im Rahmen der im sechzehnten und siebzehnten Jahrhundert stattgefundenen Umformung des Weltbildes gerade die Einführung des Begriffs der Unendlichkeit ist, dann haben auch die philosophischen Systeme von Cusanus und Bruno innerhalb dieses Prozesses eine wichtige Rolle gespielt. Jedoch scheinen die Implikationen dieses Prozesses von größerer Bedeutung auf der metaphysischen beziehungsweise anthropologischen Ebene als auf der wissenschaftlichen Ebene gewesen zu sein. Die Einführung des Begriffs der Unendlichkeit in die Weltdeutung und die Eröffnung des Universums (in Hinblick auf das Unbekannte, das Neumögliche) bedeutete vor allem das Überschreiten der Grenzen des menschlichen Geistes, wie dies Bruno in seinem Werk *Das Abendmahl am Aschermittwoch* explizit darstellt.<sup>36</sup>

Hier können wir uns leider mit einer genaueren Analyse der Auswirkungen der Einführung der Idee der Unendlichkeit in die Weltdeutung nicht

<sup>36</sup> Im *Das Abendmahl am Aschermittwoch* schreibt Bruno im ersten Dialog: »Il Nolano, per caggionar effetti al tutto contrari, ha disciolto l' animo umano e la cognizione, che era rinchiusa ne l' artissimo carcere de l' aria turbulento; onde a pena, come per certi buchi, avea facultà de mirar le lontanissime stelle, e gli erano mozze l' ali, a fin che non volasse ad aprir il velame di queste nuvole e veder quello che veramente la su si ritrovasse, e liberarse de le chimere di quei, che, essendo usciti dal fango e caverne de la terra, quasi Mercuri ed Apollini discesi dal cielo, con moltiforme impostura han ripieno il mondo tutto d' infinite pazzie, bestialità e vizii, come di tanete vertu, divinita e discipline, smorzando quel lume, che rendea divini ed eroici gli animi di nostri antichi padri, approvando e confirmando le tenebre caliginose de' sofisti ed asini... Or ecco quello (sc. Nolano), ch' ha varcato l' aria, penetrato il cielo, discorse le stelle, trapassati gli margini del mondo, fatte svanir le fantastiche muraglia, delle prime, ottave, none, decime ed altre, che vi s' avesser potuto aggiungere, sfere, per relazione de vani matematici e cicco veder di filosoffi volgari« ( in *Opere italiane*, I, S. 25. nach der Ausgabe aus 1584.)



eingehend beschäftigen, da es sich um ein sehr komplexes Thema handelt (das außerdem einen interdisziplinären Zugang zu diesem Thema erfordert). Es scheint, daß für die Formulierung der neuen wissenschaftlichen Theorien und für die Grundlegung der neuen Physik, als auch für den weiteren Fortschritt der Wissenschaften überhaupt, Petrićs Konzeption des unendlichen (leeren) Raumes fruchtbarer als die Konzeption der Unendlichkeit der Welt / des Universums selbst (worauf auf Grund der Rezeption seiner Konzeption seitens der späteren Philosophen und Wissenschaftlern von Gassendi bis More zu schließen ist)<sup>37</sup> gewesen ist.<sup>38</sup> Tatsache ist, daß die These von der Unendlichkeit der Welt primär von metaphysischer Bedeutung war, wobei aber ebenso eine Tatsache ist, daß dies eine der Voraussetzungen der Herausbildung der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaften war, für die vor allem die Entwicklung und der Fortschritt bestimmend sind...

Die These von der Unendlichkeit der Welt hat beim Abbau des alten Weltbildes unbestritten eine wichtige Rolle gespielt, wobei die Auflösung der Grenzen der Welt die Voraussetzung für die Aufhebung der Bedeutung der aristotelischen Physik und für die Notwendigkeit der Bildung der neuen Wissenschaft überhaupt lieferte.

ÜBERSETZT VON TIHOMIR ENGLER

<sup>37</sup> Darüber schreibt am ausführlichsten John Henry in »Annals of Science«, 36 (1979), im Artikel *Francesco Petrić's Concept of Space and its Later Influence*. Nach J. Henry ist der Einfluß von Petrićs Konzeption des Raumes auf Gassendi und durch seine Vermittlung mittelbar auch auf Isaac Newton unstrittig. Wie wir dies schon besprochen haben, hat nach Koyré auch Henry More (der seine Auffassung des Raumes unbestritten unter Einfluß von Petrić formulierte) seinerseits Newtons Verständnis des Raumes beeinflußt. Über seinen Einfluß auf More und Newton s. weiter: Max Jammer, *Concepts of space*, Cambridge-Massachusetts, 1954.

<sup>38</sup> Daß Kepler die These von der Unendlichkeit der Welt nicht annahm, hinderte ihn keineswegs daran, seine Gesetze in der Astronomie aufzustellen (wobei wir uns dessen erinnern sollten, daß beispielsweise Mittelstrass seine Bestimmung der Laufbahn der Himmelskörper als Ellipse für ein wichtigeres Ereignis als die Aufstellung der Kopernikanischen heliozentrischen Theorie hält).

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ONTOTEOLGIJSKE PRETPOSTAVKE I IMPLIKACIJE  
KONCEPCIJE BESKONAČNOG U NIKOLE KUZANSKOG,  
GIORDANA BRUNA I FRANE PETRIĆA

*Sažetak*

U nekim je novijim istraživanjima djela Frane Petrića upozoreno na moguće utjecaje ili barem sličnosti što postoje između njegova tumačenja svijeta i onoga Nikole Kuzanskog te potom i njegova suvremenika Giordana Bruna. Doista, već i površna usporedba filozofijskih sustava trojice mislilaca upućuje na izvjesni, u najmanju ruku, paralelizam stavova što svoje korijene imaju neosporno u neoplatoničkoj renesansnoj tradiciji kojoj sva trojica pripadaju.

Spomenuta tvrdnja odnosi se i na pojam beskonačnosti što ga nalazimo u temelju tumačenja svijeta sve trojice renesansnih filozofa. Premda komparativna analiza njihovih najznačajnijih djela s obzirom na ovaj pojam pokazuje uglavnom podudarnost stavova (napose u pogledu ontoteologijskih pretpostavki uvođenja toga pojma u tumačenje svijeta), ipak ona otkriva i neke značajne razlike što se poglavito očituju u modelima svijeta što ih izlažu trojica filozofa.

## FRANJO pl. MARKOVIĆ

On the hundred and fiftieth anniversary of his birth

SREĆKO KOVAČ

(Zagreb)

Original Paper  
UDC 19 Franjo Marković

This year, 1995, is the hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the birth of Franjo pl. Marković, (Križevci, 26 July, 1845 – Zagreb, 15 Sept., 1914). Having held the chair of philosophy at Zagreb University since 1874, the year of the restoration of the University (established 1669), Marković profoundly and far-reachingly marked a large part of Croatian philosophy in the period to come. It particularly manifests in the tradition that directly succeeds (from Gj. Arnold and A. Bazala to V. Filipović), and even in the neomarxism of the second half of the twentieth century (even though it, in fact, in a particular sense breaks with the formerly mentioned tradition). Marković's traces are still difficult to recognize, which is the consequence of the fact that his posthuma remain almost entirely unpublished, and they comprise, among other things, lithographed lectures issued for students for Marković's courses that he led at Zagreb department of philosophy for over thirty years.

However, some important results of Marković's work have not been incorporated in the tradition to follow, but gradually forgotten. In that sense, one should particularly place emphasis upon terminology, that Marković systematically developed for virtually all the philosophical disciplines. The excellence Marković accomplished then, thoroughly in accordance with the lavishness of scientific and technical terminology of the time,<sup>1</sup> has actually never been achieved in Croatian philosophy since. And it is so because the vukian so called »reform« (in fact destruction) of the Croatian language, that took place at the end of the nineteenth century, imposed local speeches of

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<sup>1</sup> It is enough to skim through Šulek's dictionary of scientific terminology or through recently reprinted Parčić's Croatian-Italian dictionary.

rural communities as the standard language, and rejected then up-to-date achievements in the terminology of science and technology; it also shun the affluent linguistic (and lexical) heritage of Croatian literature.<sup>2</sup> Creating new terms, a routine practice in Marković's work, is condemned by this reform.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, due to vukian »phonological« orthography (that is still most widely used) a portion of Marković's terminology automatically turns blurry and awkward.<sup>4</sup>

The present anniversary is an occasion to summarize some to date obtained research results concerning this significant Croatian philosopher,<sup>5</sup> who was, moreover, as significant in his time as a man of letters, and literary and theatre critic. The latter components of his career certainly demand revalorization as well.<sup>6</sup> A definitely important aspect of Marković's philosophy is his programme of renewing philosophy in Croatia, which is also connected with his research programme concerning Croatian philosophical heritage.<sup>7</sup> Within Marković's philosophical system, that is going to be briefly surveyed, a particular attention will be paid to his logic, on which he left, among his posthuma, comprehensive lithographed lectures for students that have, but for two chap-

<sup>2</sup> On the relationship of the Croatian vukians towards the language of Croatian literature cf. an article by P. Guberina entitled »Hrvatski književni jezik i hrvatski jezikoslovci,« printed in 1941 for the first time, and reprinted recently in *Jezik*, 43, 1995, 2–14.

<sup>3</sup> What would it mean, for instance, for the contemporary computer terminology if English would give up the liberty of making new words.

<sup>4</sup> A Croatian himself would probably not be able to guess the correct meaning of the following words, once they have been written »as they are pronounced«: *izjamba, opizba, osjedben, palidžba, raspojan, rastamben, rastrojba, raščezben, razvrzba, sastamben, urezba, uvjedben, zamijemba*. It is different with the morphonological orthography: *izjavyba, opišba, osjetben, paličba, razspojan, razstavben, raztrojba, razčestben, razvrstba, sustavben, uresba, uvjetben, zamjenba*.

<sup>5</sup> For general information on Marković's philosophy cf. A. Bazala, *Filozofijski portret Franje Markovića*, 2nd edition, Zagreb, 1974 (originally published in 1921); V. Filipović, »Franjo Marković – rodoljubni pjesnik i učitelj filozofije.« *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, 15–16, (1982), 7–24; V. Filipović, »Kant na obnovljenom hrvatskom sveučilištu,« *Godišnjak za povijest filozofije*, 2, (1984), 5–12; F. Zenko, »Kant u hrvatskoj filozofiji,« *God. za pov. fil.*, 2, (1984), 173–176 (on Marković).

<sup>6</sup> Mirko Tomasović advocates, anew, on the occasion of this anniversary, a »reaffirmation« of Franjo pl. Marković as a man of letters (cf. *Vjesnik*, Feb 4, 1995, p. 29).

<sup>7</sup> The following articles deal with it: *Filozofijske struke pisci hrvatskoga roda u onkraj Velebita u stoljećih XI. do XVIII.* Zagreb, 1882, reprinted in *Pril. za istr. hrv. fil. b.*, 1–2, (1975), 254–279 (originally published in *Vienac*, 44, (1881), 701–707 without annotation; a German translation in *Synthesis philosophica*, 15, (1993), 11–30). »Filozofijski rad Rugjera Josipa Boškovića,« *Rad JAZU*, 87–88–89, (1887–1888), 543–716. In a way, »Etički sadržaj naših narodnih poslovia,« *Rad JAZU*, 96, (1889), 167–227 also belongs here.

Stipe Kutleša wrote on Marković's interpretation of Bošković: »Boškovićeva filozofija po procjeni Franje Markovića (1887): izvori i uspjesi,« *Filozofska istraživanja*, 32–33, (1989), 1621–1638.

ters, not been published yet.<sup>8</sup> It is very interesting to compare Marković's viewpoint in logic with the one in aesthetics, which is the only philosophical discipline Marković presented in a published book.<sup>9</sup> It should also be mentioned that it still remains to study Marković's history of philosophy, for instance, as well as his epistemology, as unpublished writings on these are to be found among his posthuma.

## 1 THE RENEWAL OF CROATIAN PHILOSOPHY

As the first Professor of Philosophy at the restored University of Zagreb (1874), Marković very intensely faced the problem of how to perform his teaching vocation in a philosophically appropriate way. It is, in fact, apparent from his posthuma that he was at first not aware, or at least not sufficiently aware of the existence of certain Croatian philosophical tradition, that he could rely on, and within which he could find predecessors for his own work.<sup>10</sup> Thereupon, there issued the problem of starting and supporting philosophy in Croatia.

In what way is philosophy as such, and is it at all, in an essential sense associated with the nation within which it arises and develops, in social, political, cultural and other circumstances of its life?

### *The Realization of Philosophy Within a Nation*

Let us first briefly inspect how Marković understands philosophy as such. According to the cited introductory lecture from his *Logic*, Marković sees the origin of philosophy in the man's »striving« for ultimate values, ideals, that

<sup>8</sup> The manuscript and the lithographed lectures are among Marković's posthuma at the Archives of Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, labelled XV 37. We are quoting from the copy 2a. The published parts are: »Logika. Uvod. I. odsjek« in *Pril. za istr. hrv. fil. b.*, 35–36, (1992), 249–258 and »Vrsti sudova po njihovih oblicih« in *Pril. za istr. hrv. fil. b.*, 37–38, (1993), 251–265.

A survey of Marković's logic is given in S. Kovač, »Formalizam i realizam u logici,« *Pril. za istr. hrv. fil. b.*, 35–36, (1992), 141–182.

<sup>9</sup> F. pl. Marković, *Razvoj i sustav obćenite estetike*, Zagreb, 1903 (reprinted: Split, 1981). A text that is also related is »Prilog estetičkoj nauci o baladi i romanci,« *Rad IJAZU*, 138, (1899), 118–205.

Zlatko Posavac deals with Marković's aesthetics in »Estetika u Hrvata (II),« *Kolo*, 1968, 12, 521–525 (on Marković), as well as in the book *Estetika u Hrvata*, Zagreb, 1986., 172–175. On Marković's theatre criticism, cf. D. Tot-Šubajković, »Kazališne kritike Franje pl. Markovića,« *Pril. za istr. hrv. fil. b.*, 19–20, (1984), 83–96.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. F. pl. Marković: »Logika. Uvod. I. odsjek,« *Pril. za istr. hrv. fil. b.*, 35–36, (1992), 249 (footnote 6).

make up the purpose of human life – for the truth, the good and the beauty (together with the sublime.) In that sense Marković talks about »logical, ethical and aesthetical striving,« or, uniting all of them, precisely about »philosophical striving.« The mentioned purposes themselves make up and use up the range, the »horizon,« of what the man's thoughts are directed at, and what they strive after. Therefore, in that sense, it is the »philosophical spirit« and its »force« that unite and connect those thoughts, emotions and activities.

Marković cautions that the laws based upon mentioned ideal values are independent of material, physical as well as of psychic necessity, compulsion (»usilje«) and circumstances. Those laws of value are hence, as Marković emphasizes, self-sufficient, rational, free and »autonomous« (he refers to Kant). Thus, specifically freedom, autonomy, is the fundamental character both of the philosophical striving itself and of the philosophical spirit.

Consistently, for Marković, philosophy has to be, in order to correspond to its essence, »self-born«, »self-constituted«, »self-rising«, »self-substantial« (»samorodna,« »samotvorna,« »samonikla,« »samosvojna.«) In that sense, Marković means in fact the philosophy as long as it arises, occurs and develops within a nation, and especially in the language of that particular nation. Mere »succeeding« of other nations' philosophies does not ensue from an autonomous and free philosophical striving and is not rooted in it, it is not borne by the power of the philosophical spirit itself, but it, quite contrary, obstructs and »enslaves« the original striving for ideals. It is fatal for the striving, and leads but only to the »withering« of the »self-germinating, self-substantial germ.« In other words, the real philosophy always has to be, in a true, genuine sense (not only *via facti*), also a national philosophy – Greek, German, English etc., and finally, if it is to exist in Croatia, Croatian as well.

Considering, however, at first, that he could not rely upon some Croatian own philosophical tradition, it remained to Marković, in the beginning, only to lean on other nations who had already developed their own philosophies. How is it possible, in such a dependence on others, to hatch, cultivate and preserve the »self-born« philosophical striving, which belongs to man as such, in his very essence?

In the above mentioned »Introduction« to his *Logic*, Marković recommends great caution in relying upon foreign philosophies, so that we would not be aimed at and take example by only one nation, for instance, only by German philosophy. In that way we would, as Marković forewarns, lose our own identity, and we would eventually disappear in bare imitation of someone else's philosophy. Therefore, certain balance is needed, one should turn to the philosophies of different nations, that is, as he means, in addition to Greek philosophy, also, especially, apart from German, to English and French phi-

losophy. Besides, he emphasizes the need of »autonomously using works« of other nations, contrary to mere imitating.<sup>11</sup>

»Cosmopolitan,« »international,« »worldwide« character of philosophy is, according to Marković, not in the least less important than its self-substantial national character. The philosophical striving and the philosophical spirit connect and unite different nations and also make possible the »international inheriting« of philosophy. The great and important philosophers do not belong to one nation only, but they are the legacy of the world, as well. But that cosmopolitan character of philosophy is not such that it would contradict the national character of philosophy and eliminate it. On the contrary, it indeed shows the way out of non-autonomous imitation of the philosophy of a specific nation, individualizes every single national spirit in philosophy, and uncovers the view of the philosophical legacy of all the other nations as well. The cosmopolitan character of philosophy, as Marković understands it, not only does not erase the differences among specific nations in the name of the so called »internationalism,« »brotherhood,« etc., but even makes the preservation of the own identity, self-substantiality and being self-born of the philosophy of individual nations.<sup>12</sup>

### *The Croatian Philosophical tradition*

As it is already known, it is just Marković's rector's speech, given in 1881, on philosophical Croatian writers »beyond Velebit« from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century (with a particularly stressed role of Dubrovnik), that initiated the current research in Croatian philosophical history.<sup>13</sup> Having observed the existence of a Croatian own philosophical corpus, Marković starts from the fact that that corpus, that tradition, should be adopted again, that it should be associated with the traditions of other European nations, and that only upon such a foundation Croatian own philosophy could be renewed and built again. In other words, just the recovering itself of Croatian philosophical works from oblivion stimulates a new development of philosophy among Croats; however, not any more within other cultures, building up the philosophies of other nations, as it had often been the case in earlier periods. but on

<sup>11</sup> It is similar in the case of the arts. Cf. *Razvoji i sustav...*, p. 313.

<sup>12</sup> Accordingly, not even Marković's panslavic ideas (or rather, illusions) were for him contradicted to possible Croatian self-substantiality in philosophy – in contrast with, for instance, (pseudo)Jugoslav ideas of neomarxism. Yet, even Marković himself was often compelled by consideration for closest Slav neighbours to use vague expressions, such as »our nation,« »our philosophy,« »our national language« etc. (our italics.)

<sup>13</sup> »Filosofijske struke pisci...« op.cit.

the basis and within Croatian own national spirituality, building up Croatian own philosophy.

The restoration of Zagreb University was just the appropriate institutional frame for such a task of renewing philosophy.<sup>14</sup> In his rector's speech, Marković stresses the need to gather and translate into Croatian that scattered Croatian philosophical legacy (*»dissecta et disjecta membra«*), and to incorporate it, in its new »garments« (not any more in the »somebody else's old garments,«) into psychic national organism, »attach it to the national life.« Using Kant's image, Marković compares old Croatian philosophical writers with extinguished stars, while it only depends on our »good will« (in fact on our morality) whether those stars would shine again with their full glow on the starry sky.

It should be noted that after his rector's speech, Marković particularly dealt with natural philosophy of R.J.Bošković (1887–1889), and the same context embraces his research on the philosophical ethical thought contained in folk morality, folk ethical attitudes (demonstrated in folk-proverbs,) hence even independently of professional philosophical literature (writings from 1889).

### *The Role of Philosophy in National Life*

However, according to Marković, it is not the national identity that is essential for the preservation of philosophy, i.e. of the original philosophical striving and the philosophical spirit in individual cultural and political circumstances, in such a way that there would primarily exist cultured, self-conscious nations, who could thereafter have their own philosophy as well. Marković claims just the opposite. Not a single nation can develop into a self-substantial, culturally and politically independent nation unless that is based upon the philosophical thought, the philosophical striving towards ideal values. Nothing lasting and significant can arise within a nation if thought, emotion and will in that nation are only mechanically conducted by physical and psychological laws, by natural needs and by the needs and impulses of the senses, but only if these are directed towards their ideal goals, which are, precisely, the logical, ethical and aesthetical (hence, philosophical) values (truth, the good, beauty).

Marković gives examples of great nations (the Greeks, the Germans, the English, the French), of their cultural, social and political life, and points out

<sup>14</sup> On Marković's understanding of his own tasks in connection with the University restoration, cf. V. Filipović, »Kant na obnovljenom hrvatskom sveučilištu u Zagrebu,« op. cit.



that it is them in particular, that gave the greatest contributions to philosophy. Even in those nations in which it seems that there was no self-substantial philosophy, for instance, by Romans, one still reveals »ethical and logical force« in their law studies. Marković reminds us that the Arabs also cultivated aristotelian philosophy (it is exactly through them, as it is known, that the greatest part of Aristotle's work was preserved for Europe.) Even in connection with the Turks, another historically important nation, Marković mentions the transcendent principle that they followed (obviously meaning Islam.)

In that sense, in his »Introduction« to *Logic*, Marković says, »We can with certainty claim that nations are kept alive by a live striving for ideals.« In other words, it is just this power of the philosophical striving for ideal values that is the principle of the preservation of a particular nation. He concludes thereupon that an awakening, a renewal of philosophy in the Croatian nation is not only an »intellectual task,« but also, as he puts it, »an ethical national duty.« Such a high rank was also given to philosophy by Marković's successors at Zagreb University (Arnold, Bazala.) Accordingly, Marković does not understand philosophy only as a mere intellectual or cabinet work that would be isolated from reality and from real needs, but he understands it, as we have already pointed out, as an original spiritual force and striving for absolute values, in which the real life, as well as the existence of a nation itself and its incorporation into a world community of nations are yet to be rooted. For that reason, Marković favours quoting J.S. Mill (in the »Introduction« to *Logic*.) saying that only those who have acquired a spiritual homeland, the homeland of thought, can keep and preserve their material, tangible homeland.

## 2 THE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY

Prior to dealing with Marković's logic and comparing it with ethics, we are going to briefly survey his philosophical system.

In developing his philosophical system, Marković proceeds from the above mentioned forms of »philosophical striving« themselves, from our original focusing on, striving for absolute values (logical, ethical and aesthetical.) In the introductory part of his *Aesthetics*, Marković firstly distinguishes the theoretical cognition of truth from practical judging of the good and the beautiful. In accordance with that, he differentiates between theoretical and practical philosophy.

With respect to theoretical cognition, Marković differentiates between that which truly exists and that which exists only apparently: between the

unchanging, constant essence, substance («being,« »biće») and the temporary appearances coming into being. That difference applies to the whole reality; to the material («physical») one, as well as to that of the soul, the spiritual («psychic») one.

While the natural sciences, as Marković points out, deal with the changeable world of the appearances and the laws according to which changes take place in the material, tangible world, philosophy deals with the unchangeable, substantial essence («bićno biće») of that world. That is the metaphysics of the material nature or the philosophy of nature (or rational cosmology.)

Similarly, another part of metaphysics deals with the substantial essence of psychic phenomena; that is the philosophy of mind (or rational psychology). On the other hand, the changeable psychic phenomena and their laws are the subject of empirical psychology.

However, apart from relative, bounded mind, that is to be found in people, we may also talk about the unbounded, absolute mind, about God. God is the subject of the third part of metaphysics, the philosophy of faith. That philosophical cognition of the absolute being is never completely attainable to man as a finite being, except to a very limited degree. Therefore, Marković prefers to speak of the experiment of the rational cognition of the absolute being, rather than of rational theology (which would form an illusion of an attained science of the absolute being.)

The philosophy of nature, the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of faith constitute the metaphysics, which represents only the first part of philosophy: the theoretical philosophy. There are two more parts: ethics, dealing with the principles of judging of the good, which is the philosophical cognition of the good, and aesthetics, dealing with the principles of judging of the beautiful, which is the philosophical cognition of beauty. Ethics and aesthetics constitute practical philosophy.

Besides, metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics are preceded by logic, that studies which forms and rules of thought have to be respected so that thinking would be correct, valid. Those logical conditions must be equally satisfied by metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics; they apply logical forms to their own specific contents and subjects.

In addition to logic, it should also be decided, within philosophy, about the questions of the origin and scope of our cognition. The origin and the scope of human cognition are the subjects of a specific philosophical doctrine, i.e. the rational theory of cognition, which may, however, also be considered to be the introductory part of the philosophy of mind.

### 3 LOGIC<sup>15</sup>

#### *The Criticism of Formalism*

Marković wanted to correct to a certain extent the formalistic conception of logic, that was at the time widely spread in Europe, and that had already dominated Croatian education before Marković (e.g. Pacll's *Logika* from 1868.) In doing that, and in accordance with what we have mentioned above, Marković did not, in his logic, rely exclusively upon German logicians, although their influence had been very significant (Herbart and his followers, Lotze, Wundt.) He also refers to the French (e.g. Janet), and especially to the English (to J.S. Mill in the first place.) It is typical that he also refers to a large number of other, then very influential, logical theories, adding his own commentaries. In the process, also in accordance with what we have already said, he pays particular attention to language, to Croatian terminology, so that his notes on logic issued for students are (as it is, in analogy, the case with his *Eстетика*) a real treasury of Croatian philosophical terminology which can also be very useful nowadays.

With respect to his correction of the formalistic conception of logic, Marković draws our attention to the insufficiency of pure formal logic (e.g. Kant, Hamilton, Herbart and his followers, the algebra of logic,) which only deals with the forms of thinking (concept, judgement, inference, proof etc.) He considers that our knowledge cannot become wider by means of such logical forms, but that they only allow for already acquired knowledge to be analyzed and explained, to be made intelligible. That would proceed exactly from the fact that pure formal logic completely abstracts from the content and subject of thinking, and deals exclusively with the form of thought. Marković thinks that formal logic needs to be expanded to a certain extent, and that it should be done by those forms by means of which we widen our knowledge. Of course, logic does not deal with the actual cognition of things, but it still refers to them and deals with a special kind of generalization and formalization of the inventing procedures in the sciences. In that sense, Marković speaks of and advocates a formal-objective logic (or formal-real one), an intermediary between formalism and realism.

Accordingly, it is inappropriate to simply categorize Marković as a herbartist or as a Herbart's follower. The herbartists themselves, as Marković judges, were compelled to abandon pure logical formalism and introduce real,

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<sup>15</sup> In this section, some parts have been taken from the author's article »Formalizam i realizam u logici,« op. cit.

objectual components into logic (e.g. Drobisch, Lott, Struempell, cf. 2A, 48–49, 60.) In the process, as Marković assumes, that logic approaches the conception of J.S. Mill. Although he also relies upon Drobisch, Marković deems that Drobisch's logic is not grounded deeply enough, so that it can only be appropriate as a textbook for usage in schools. Thus Herman Lotze (whose philosophical position cannot be identified with herbartism) becomes one of Marković's principal mainstays in logic. Marković demonstrates that Lotze's opinions in logic are very much like those of J.S. Mill, whom he amply quotes (especially his theory of induction, but also, for instance, his understanding of logic in general, of syllogism, etc.) Marković takes into account Trendelenburg's objections to formal logic, but he also rejects to accept Trendelenburg's uniting of logic and metaphysics.

Psychology is also important for logic, but more in a sense of an introductory, preliminary consideration – like it is at the time the custom, as Marković points out, of the English, and more and more often of Germans, as well. It should be mentioned that Marković, in accordance with Herbart, thinks that our real thinking cannot be purely general (not purely singular, either,) that in reality it is always combined with singular representations (and conversely, that singular representations are combined with general representations,) so that the »pure concept« remains only a »model« for our real thinking (2A, 134, 137–139.)<sup>16</sup> But, interestingly, that is one of the aspects in accordance with which he criticizes algebraic logic at the end of his *Logic*, assigning psychology, in that way, a more prominent position in logic than a mere introductory one.<sup>17</sup>

Marković, relying upon Wundt, specifies three important features according to which »logical rules« differ from psychological »laws of thinking« (associating and reproducing »representations«: 1 free, volitive, actual (»aperceptive«) and deliberate character of thinking (not forced by the impact of impressions, feelings, etc.); 2 necessity, and thus »guaranteed« and »obvious« truthfulness of logical connecting; 3 a validity of logical thinking for all the subjects and all the objects of thought. Thus, for instance, the logical principle of sufficient reason is also valid for the nature in the form of the »law of causality« (on that, cf. 2A, 148–154.)<sup>18</sup> The first of the above mentioned

<sup>16</sup> Cf. J.F. Herbart, *Lehrbuch zur Psychologie*, 3. Aufl., Hamburg; Leipzig, 1882, pp. 126–127 (59–60.)

<sup>17</sup> It should be remarked that the mentioned psychological considerations are already referred to as the first chapter of logic in Šurmin's notes from Marković's lectures on logic 1887–1888 (in NSBZ. R4013): »We are proceeding to the first chapter of log., the psycholog. facts.« p. 39.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. W. Wundt, *Logik*, Stuttgart, 1880–1883, I, pp. 70–82.

features of logical thinking will be particularly developed by Marković's successor, A. Bazala, in his activistic voluntarism.

Let us now mention some interesting aspects of Marković's system of logic.

### *Words*

Words (and language in general), according to Marković, have a very important role in logic, so that Marković dedicates a whole chapter to that topic in the beginning of the systematic part of *Logic*. Words are prerequisite to logical thinking, because only through them do the representations combine according to equality or similarity, and it is only through them that some »clear and definite general representations« are produced (2A, 157–158.) »Words« also have a certain logical value. Similarly, »statement« (enuntiatio) is the »form« through which the representations »combine« into a judgment, it is the »natural form of a judgment« (2A, 158–159.) Thereby, the natural language is meant, and not the formalized algebraic language (as is the case in Boole and Jevons.) As the algebraic expressions can only be understood if they are interpreted by means of »words,« they are only the »abbreviations of words« (2A, 178–179.) In that sense, Marković interestingly discussed the point with Steintal, opposing the latter's separation of logical thinking and words. Apart from the psychological aspect (as mentioned above), at the end of his study on logic, Marković offers criticism of algebraic logic also with respect to the grammatical aspect itself.

### *Interrelationship of the Notes in the Concept*

In the introductory criticism of logical formalism, Marković particularly points out the impossibility of understanding the intension of the concept only as a mere sum of notes, because those notes are in reality involved in mutual causality relationships, thus affecting each other and modifying each other (as it is also demonstrated by Trendelenburg, Mill, Bain and Lotze, whose theories Marković presents more extensively in further text.) That »interrelation« of the notes cannot be described by means of mathematical relations (not even by means of multiplication, as suggested by Drobisch.) which is an additional reason of Marković's criticism of Boole's and Jevons's »algebra of logic« (2A, 32–33.) The reason is that notes which constitute a concept do not actually determine each other in an identical way in every single case, while the multiplication procedure (that should be the means of connecting notes into a single concept) is always and in every single case absolutely identical. Similarly, the algebraic combination of notes is not sufficient for the division

of a concept because it does not provide a guarantee against combinations impossible in reality (such as equilateral obtuse-angled triangle) (2A, 34–35). Marković accepts Lotze's understanding in accordance with which notes in a concept are not coordinated, and do not have an equal importance, but some of them are »more primary« than others, and »the mode of connecting notes« is not the same in all the concepts (2A, 190–191.) He also emphasizes that notes which are in a certain concept do not belong to each other if it is only according to psychological simultaneity or succession, but that they must really belong to each other (2A, 184–186.)<sup>19</sup>

### *Insufficiency of Drobisch's Theory of Judgement*

It is important to notify that Marković, after the survey of the classification of judgements that is to be found in M. W. Drobisch, a prominent figure among Herbart's followers, also offers a criticism of it. Drobisch's classification is, although accepted (as Marković points out) by a majority of German logicians (2A, 231), in comparison to Lotze's (and similar Trendelenburg's,) »superficial,« it is not consequent in separating categorical and hypothetical judgements (he does not pursue the classification, according to Marković, far enough in the case of analytical and synthetical judgements). Besides, the disjunctive judgement is a variety (let us add: or it at least takes part in constituting varieties) of both categorical and hypothetical judgements. The disjunctive judgement should not be brought to the same level of comparison as the copulative and remotive judgements, but it is better to append it to the same level of classification with the categorical and the hypothetical judgement, as the third form. An imperfection in Drobisch is, according to Marković, that he does not give a logical deduction of judgements one from the other (a »genetic connection«,) as Lotze does.<sup>20</sup>

### *The Principle of Sufficient Reason*

From Marković's renouncing formalism, there proceeds the importance that he attaches to the principle of sufficient reason. Only that principle, according to Marković, allows for new cognitions to be attained, while the principles of uncontradiction, identity and excluded middle are the foundation only for the formal validity of concepts and judgements (2A, 272). Accordingly, pure formal logic (like Kant's) which, according to Marković, deals

<sup>19</sup> Cf. H. Lotze, op. cit., pp. 46–47.

<sup>20</sup> On all that, cf. 2A, 262–263. In Drobisch, see op. cit., pp. 48–62 and 68–72.

only with analytical judgements and tautological cognitions (which is in fact not correct), needs some broadening which would make it possible to explain both synthetic judgements and the derivation of new cognitions. In the introductory criticism of formalism, Marković states that the inconsistency of formalism is also exposed in the endeavouring to found logic upon the principle of identity and contradiction (»porječnost«) itself, although negation (contained in contradiction,) contrariety, difference and identity cannot be deduced from understanding itself, but only on the basis of »frequent perception.« He also states that only analytical, but not synthetical concepts can be explained by means of those principles, and the latter are also, according to him, possible only by means of observation.

### *Immediate Consequence is Not an Inference*

A sharp differentiating between »immediate consequence« and »inference« is also in agreement with Marković's criticism of formalism. According to him, it is not justified to differentiate between them only as between direct and indirect inferences. »Immediate consequences« are definitely not derived in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason, as »inferences,« however, are. In the first place, as Marković considers, the reason needs to comprise at least two factors, while the derived judgement in a derivation proceeds from only one given judgement. Then, an essential difference lies precisely in the fact that the derived and given judgements differ only with respect to form, while their content is the same.<sup>21</sup> The real inference, by contrast, as we are still to see, according to Marković, makes the content of the cognition larger, and is not restricted to merely changing its form. It is particularly by that, that Marković intends to push back the boundaries of formalism in logic.

In connection with that, Marković also offers a discussion on quantification of predicates, by means of which Hamilton wanted to avoid the indefiniteness in the conversion of judgements (and Boole's and Jevons's reform of logic proceeds from that). But in that way, according to Marković, in order to reveal the meaning of a judgement with the quantified predicate, syllogism and induction should already have been involved. That meaning, therefore,

<sup>21</sup> On that, cf. 2A, 280–281. On separation of immediate consequence and inference (and giving up their common name) cf. in Drobisch, op. cit., p. 73 (ftnt.) Herbart and Lotze attached the theory of immediate consequence to the theory of judgement. Let us also point out that J.S. Mill considers immediate consequences to be only seemingly derivations which, in conclusion, only repeat what is already contained in premises (op. cit., pp. 197–199), but he also considers them to be a useful exercise for students (p. 200.)

does not lie in the logical form of the judgement itself (1A, 315–316), so that the quantification of predicate in the theory of judgement is, according to Marković, untenable.<sup>22</sup>

### *The Supplementation of Syllogism by Means of Induction*

Of course, the theory of inference is a very important part of Marković's logic. After a detailed analysis of four syllogistic »forms« and their »figures,« based primarily upon the extensional relationships of concepts in the inference, Marković deepens the theory of inference by means of Mill's theory of syllogism. Namely, in order to defend syllogism from the objection of tautology, Mill places the sense of syllogism not into the extensional, but into the intensional relationship – the conclusion is not reduced to only repeating the classification of the concepts from the premises. Rejecting thereby »*dictum de omni et nullo*« as the principle of syllogism, he accepts the principle that when a given object has a certain note (»attribute«), the note (»attribute«) of that note also belongs to that object.<sup>23</sup> And to defend syllogism from the objection of *petitio principii* (viz., that the major premise is based upon the conclusion itself as its specific variant without which it cannot be true,) Mill develops a theory in accordance with which the major premise is »inferred« by means of induction from the previously already observed cases. Therefore, it is not major premise that is the real ground of proof of the conclusion, but the real arguments are the previous, observed cases themselves from which one proceeds in induction (syllogism hence really infers from the particular, and not from the universal towards the particular.)<sup>24</sup>

It should be remarked that Marković rejects Thiebergien's objection that only the *a priori* cognitions provide a »guaranteed« foundation of syllogism, while the induction leads only to probable and hypothetical cognitions, which should become more obvious afterwards, within the presentation of Mill's inductive method. Marković also warns that Mill's theory is very much in correlation with Lotze's theory, which he embraces as a foundation for a repeated analysis of »syllogistic forms,« but now with a fundamental respect to the content of concepts. With respect to the inventing value of syllogism, Marković, contrary to Ueberweg, demonstrates that syllogism itself is not sufficient for attaining new knowledge, but that it should be supplemented by

<sup>22</sup> Drobisch, however, did not renounce the quantification of predicate, cf. op. cit., pp. 50–52.

<sup>23</sup> 2A, 354–357. About Mill, cf. op. cit., pp. 220–222 and 225–226.

<sup>24</sup> 2A, 360–368, 373. Cf. also Mill's summary, op. cit., pp. 240–241.



induction and observation. Similarly, mathematical deductions cannot be founded only upon syllogism either (as Ueberweg proposes,) but an intuitive construction is also needed for that (2A, 455.)

Let us add that it has already been conveyed in the introductory part of Marković's *Logic* that pure formal logic cannot sufficiently found the theory of »inferences,« because syllogism is then explicable only as a tautology, in which conclusion does not bring along any new cognition in relation to premises. Besides, neither induction, which would lead to new notes, nor analogy, which derives consequences from causes (causality as a topic does not occur in pure formal logic), can occur.

### *Induction*

Talking about forms by which our cognition becomes larger, Marković primarily accentuates induction itself, inductive inferences and inductive methods. Thereby he, as it is already obvious, very much relied upon Mill himself (to a certain extent upon Baine, as well.)

Inductive inference itself is for Marković not a »perfect induction,« it is not the real inductive inference, because it does not comprise finding out something new, some new general cognition, but is a »mere summation« of already attained truths (2A, 588–589.)<sup>25</sup> The real induction is the one concluding from the known truths towards some till then unknown truth which is valid in a general and certain way. In the process, induction proceeds from a general premise on »the uniformity of nature,« that is, when we speak of »quality succession,« from the »law of causality« (2A, 608–609.) Although he announces to do so afterwards, Marković, in his *Logic*, does not any more return to the objection that in the process one falls into the *circulus vitiosus*. (because the mentioned most general premise itself is a result of induction) (2A, 598–599.)

Five Mill's inductive methods, which Marković presents in detail, examples included, represented a regular part of logic textbooks for grammar schools (from Arnold to Petrović) in Croatia for a whole century. The method of agreement, the method of difference, the joint method of agreement and difference, the method of residues, the method of the concomitant variation<sup>26</sup> (all those methods can be reduced to the first, the second and the fifth methods) are not, however, without faults, so that they should be, alongside their complementary application, supplemented by the deductive method.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. also J.S. Mill, *op.cit.*, pp. 360–361.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. five Mill's rules, *op.cit.*, pp. 487, 489, 495, 497, 502.

That is particularly the case, as Marković points out referring to Mill, when the same consequence can have a number of different causes and when more causes taken together cause a »collective« consequence which is impossible to analyze (and which is not a mere sum of the consequences of specific causes.) That deductive method should be distinguished from the infamous »syllogistic method,« because it includes the inductive procedure, and because, in accordance with the previously presented theory of syllogism, it starts with the inductive inferring of the premise. After that, the syllogism follows (for example with the application of mathematical truths in order to calculate the total result,) the conclusion of which is, again, inductively or observationally confirmed.<sup>27</sup> In that sense, one can talk of deductive-inductive logic, as distinct from purely deductive, or, on the other hand, purely inductive logic. Mill and Lotze, as Marković considers, agree upon such an understanding of logic. Exactly by means of the development of inductive method and of the link between induction and deduction (especially in Mill,) logic has, as Marković considers, »significantly stepped out« of the boundaries of the traditional aristotelian logic.<sup>28</sup>

As Mill (and Bain) do not deal with a logical, syllogistic form of induction, Marković supplements his own chapter on induction (including some objections) by Wundt's theory of »relational inferences,« which find their application in the induction of the causal links. He also gives a criticism of some aspects of Drobisch's theory of logical form of induction. In accordance with Wundt (and with Drobisch as well,) it proceeds that induction does not have some special logical form of its own – the most appropriate are, as it seems, the third and the second figures, which can, of course, be reduced to the first one.<sup>29</sup>

### *The criticism of Algebraic Logic*

Marković completes the objections to Boole's and Jevons's algebraic logic, that he raises in different places, in the final chapter of his *Logic*.

The imperfection of Boole's logic originates, according to Marković, in the fact that he wants to establish logical laws and forms independently from grammatical and psychological conditioning of thinking, representing the forms of thought by means of algebraic symbols, which should be valid for both the quantities and the concepts. For instance, the law of commutativity,

<sup>27</sup> On deductive method, see in Mill, op. cit., pp. 571–582.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. F. pl. Marković, *Razvoj i sustav...*, pp. 293–294.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. M. W. Drobisch, op. cit., pp. 183–185; W. Wundt, op. cit., I, 324 ff., 329 ff.

according to Marković, makes the order of the notes in a concept logically irrelevant. However, that order is neither grammatically, nor psychologically completely arbitrary, but is liable to certain laws. And according to the law of idempotence, the concept is understood as an invariable »ideal« (just like it is by the herbartists), although the concepts as the psychic products change, improve, and are not always the same. Those laws could be valid only for »pure,« »timeless« concepts (in the sense of Plato and Hegel,) thinkable only by a »pure mind,« but not for the »real« concepts, as the human mind thinks of them.

In Jevons, as Marković points out, judgements are reduced to equations, and all the inferences are based upon the substitution of an equal for an equal, wherein, of course, the quantification of the predicate is applied. The inferring, notes Marković, becomes a perplex, mechanical procedure, and understanding is turned into a machine. The principle of the sufficient reason has been omitted, so that such a logic can only relate to analytical, and not to synthetical judgements. There is an intention to reduce induction (which is impossible) to mere formal induction, which abstracts from things, perceptions (in distinction from Mill's »real« induction,) so that it would be completely subordinated to deduction. In Jevons's five forms of indirect inferences by means of an equation, e.g.  $A=B$ , only the extensions of those concepts (notes) are equalled, and not their intensions. The basic Jevons's mistake is just in that, according to Marković, that he takes only extension into account, (»how many individuals a concept means by number,« 2A, 817.) and not the intension of the concepts, so that he reduces logic to a mere quantification (»counting.«) However, just that how different notes can refer to the same object, i.e. how a concordance is possible between different notes, is a logical problem. Marković points out that that problem of the conceptual content is one of the most difficult logical problems in Herbart and Lotze, who try to solve it by means of the principle of reasonability (2A, 817–818.) Instead of following Boole's and Jevons's reform, Marković recommends that the course should be taken which Mill, Herbart and Lotze have set in logic (2A, 818–819.)

Marković's rejection of algebraic logic does definitely not mean that his logic should be uninteresting from the point of view of contemporary, symbolic logic. On the contrary, he himself introduces us, as we can discern, into a number of vivid logical discussions of his time, as are, for instance, just those on the relationship between the extensional and intensional logic, or on the natural and formalized language in logic. Those discussions were certainly a basis for the appearance of Frege's reform of logic – also in opposition to algebraic logic, but adopting the formalization of the language, with mathematics as a pattern.

#### 4 A GLIMPSE AT AESTHETICS

It is interesting, finally, to compare Marković's logic with his aesthetics. Marković himself highlights certain analogy between the two. Just as logic provides rules and forms through which thinking, regardless of any content, becomes valid and correct (Marković's formal, not purely formal, formalistic logic), the aesthetics provides forms and rules through which any phenomenal object becomes beautiful. In that respect, aesthetics is a science of the forms of beauty (together with the sublime.) just as logic is a science dealing with the forms of truth.

In such a formal understanding of aesthetics, Marković agrees with a Vienna herbartist R. Zimmermann, by whom he earlier studied philosophy, although he critically disagrees with him in some essential questions, as we are to see. Just like Zimmermann, Marković considers that it is not matter that is aesthetical, but form. The form has to comply with three conditions: 1 harmony – symmetry and proportion, 2 character, 3 liveliness, completeness, soundness, power (as opposed to dullness, weakness, sluggishness, insufficiency.) But, there should be remembered that the subject of aesthetics is, as it has been mentioned, beauty together with the sublime, which is not in measure and harmony, but, on the contrary, in immensity, and which outshines all our mental powers by means of which we are trying to understand it.

However, just as Marković did not advocate pure formalism in logic, but pursued a formal-objective logic, hence with a certain respect to objectivity, such a departure from formalism is also to be found in his aesthetics.<sup>30</sup>

In other words, Marković shows that a form of beauty can be present, apart from in outer objects, in the feelings of a soul inasmuch as they exhibit a certain harmony of feelings among different subjects – compassion (mercy) and love. Beauty can also be found within will (volition), inasmuch as a will exhibits a harmony with the will of another subject and with ethical principles – benevolence, justness, resolution, firmness of character, goodness (morality.) In that sense Marković remarks that ethics, the subject of which is goodness itself, is, as the aesthetics of will, just a separate branch of aesthetics (in a wider sense.)

However, Marković opposes extreme attitudes that would like to exclude, from the realm of beauty, either the material world of appearance, keeping

<sup>30</sup> Z. Posavac, speaking of a »certain form of herbartistic formalism« in Marković's aesthetics, emphasizes that we are dealing with a critical relationship, and not with a literal reproduction. That is, he refers to the importance that Marković, in aesthetics, attaches to the »ideal ethical content,« as well as to the reflexes of the empirical and experimental psychology (*Estetika u Hrvata*, pp. 174-175.)

only the psychic world (idealism), or the psychic world, keeping only the material world of appearance (naturalism.) Therefore, he determines beauty as a harmony (both emotional and ethical) of a soul within a harmony of an appearance (i.e. presented in a beautiful outer form.)

Opposing Zimmermann, Marković considers that aesthetics, just like logic, cannot be *a priori*, aesthetical forms cannot be derived from concepts, which we would somehow have at our disposal in advance. We cannot *a priori* know what we like, and what we do not like, by means of a »concrete aesthetical feeling.« The basis is the »psychological experience of the enjoyment in liking and of the artistic creation« (psychological basis, reaching as far as physiology.) Similarly, one cannot start from a subject only (as Zimmermann,) but from an object, that is from the experience of the objects that we like. We can deduce general aesthetical forms by means of induction, generalization, abstraction from a concrete, individual experience of what we like. Thereby, Marković refers to Fechner, he finds a subsequent confirmation in Lotze, also refers to Herbart, according to whom not even metaphysics is possible without experience, then to English psychology, and to Wundt.

Similarly, logical forms can also be deduced only by a generalization from the concrete valid thinking and real scientific practice. »Against the apriority of aesthetics, we have an objection similar to that which Trendelenburg developed against aprioristic formal logic. Just as an *a priori* formal logic is not possible, i.e. such a logic that would not at all pay attention to the contents of real thinking, in the same way, aesthetics can only be developed if it is given, as a foundation, the psychological experience of the enjoyment in liking and the artistic creation. General aesthetical forms can be reached only in such a way that abstractions are deduced from experienced concrete facts of the enjoyment in liking and of the artistic creation, by means of understanding...«<sup>31</sup>

In such a way, Marković could incorporate his rich experience of different arts, including the experience of his own practice as a writer, as a starting point, into aesthetics itself; thereby he made his accomplishments in the field of literature and criticism directly philosophically relevant. A completion of his activities could certainly be one of the important reasons that he chose to publish *Aesthetics* among all the other manuscripts he had. But there is still a large part of Marković's philosophical work that remains entirely unexamined. That immense job that is still to be done will allow for a path towards deeper roots of the new Croatian philosophy, probably not without gain for answering some of the questions that are still being posed in philosophy to date.

TRANSLATED BY SMILJANA NARANČIĆ KOVAČ

<sup>31</sup> *Razvoj i sustav...* p. 248.

## FRANJO PL. MARKOVIĆ

*Sažetak*

U povodu stopenedesete obljetnice rođenja Franje pl. Markovića u članku se daje prijesjek nekih bitnih Markovićevih filozofijskih shvaćanja. Tu su ponajprije njegova opća razmatranja o obnovi hrvatske filozofije i o ulozi koju pritom ima hrvatska filozofijska baština, a zatim i njegov filozofijski sustav u sažetu prijegledu. Posebno su obradena Markovićeva karakteristična shvaćanja u logici i, kraće, u estetici. U obje discipline Marković ispravlja formalizam i apriorizam te ih nadopunja sadržajnim i empirijskim pristupom. Velik dio filozofijskih tekstova iz Markovićeve ostavštine još je uvijek neobrađen.

## ĐURO ARNOLD ALS ÄSTHETIKER IM RAHMEN DER KONTROVERSEN UM DIE KROATISCHE MODERNE

ZLATKO POSAVAC

(Zagreb)

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### *Einleitung*

#### *Fin de siècle und Belle Époque*

Falls man zufälligerweise über Arnold (1853–1941) etwas mehr als ein bloßes Stichwort im Lexikon weiß und zwar aufgrund der kroatischen literarischen Historiographie oder aufgrund der allgemeinen kroatischen kulturellen Historiographie, dann ist die Beurteilung seines Schaffens (und zwar immer nur als eines Schriftstellers?) ziemlich fragwürdig: denn er wurde seitens einiger Zeitgenossen gepriesen und wahrscheinlich zu viel gepriesen, während ihn die neuere Historiographie negativ bewertete, mißachtete oder sogar verschwiegen. Kaum jemand würde den Gedanken fassen, ihn aufgrund seiner Bewertung mit der Periode, die man in Kroatien gemäß der Periodisierung gewöhnlich als Kroatische Moderne (1890–1910) bezeichnet, in einen *wesentlich positiveren* Zusammenhang zu bringen. Und trotzdem gerät faktisch der überwiegende Teil der Tätigkeit von Arnold, sofern diese auf die Ästhetik ausgerichtet ist, ihrer Intensität nach und dank der Folgeschwere der Bedeutung seiner meisten veröffentlichten Arbeiten in den Mittelpunkt nicht nur des zeitlichen Intervalls der Moderne sondern auch des Geschehens der Moderne selbst, oder tendiert d. h. gehört diesem grundsätzlich und wesentlich dazu. Und zwar ungeachtet dessen, ob dies gefällt oder mißfällt jenen, die diese einfache Tatsache als auch interessante positive Relevanz und Ernsthaftigkeit der ästhetischen Interventionen von Arnold verschweigen oder nicht einsehen wollen.

Zwar schrieb man bis in die Gegenwart über Arnold als einem Professor, Pädagogen und Philosophen viel, so daß es in Bezug auf den philosophischen Aspekt seiner Arbeit sogar zwei Monographien (Pavao Vuk Pavlović, Branko

Despot)<sup>1</sup> gibt, dennoch ist einiges über seine *Ästhetik* noch nicht genug bekannt; insbesondere nicht die Vielschichtigkeit der Probleme, die er in ihrer geschichtlichen Kontextualität angeht, der Probleme, die durch Arnolds Position zwecks aktueller künstlerisch-theoretisch-ästhetischer Einsichtnahme in jene Epoche in Kroatien, die sich selbst ursprünglich, unmißverständlich als Kroatische Moderne bezeichnet hat, mitbestimmt werden. Deshalb scheint es interessant und sogar wichtig, Arnolds ästhetische Auffassung etwas näher zu erörtern. Um aber Arnolds ästhetische Ansichten ins rechte Licht rücken zu können, sind einige geschichtliche und allgemein mögliche, reale und grundsätzliche determinierende Koordinaten, innerhalb deren Arnold als Ästhetiker auftritt, anzugeben.

Die in ästhetischer Hinsicht relevanteste Periode seiner Tätigkeit liegt, wie schon erwähnt, in der Zeit der Kroatischen Moderne. Daß heißt um die Jahrhundertwende, die in der europäischen und allgemeinen Kulturgeschichte auf unterschiedliche Weisen, mit unterschiedlichen Bezeichnungen und innerhalb unterschiedlicher Periodenabgrenzungen benannt wird. In ihnen allen überwiegt die Überzeugung, daß es sich um eine spezifische, besondere und eigenständige Periode und keinesfalls nur um eine »Übergangsperiode« handelt; man kann sie nämlich weder auf die vorausgehende oder darauffolgende Perioden zurückführen noch in diese Perioden unterordnen. Das Wesentliche aber, was für diese Jahrhundertwende bestimmend ist (und was der Autor mehrmals in verschiedenen Bereichen zu zeigen versuchte), sind nicht jene Phänomene, die das neunzehnte von dem zwanzigsten Jahrhundert trennen, sondern – überraschenderweise! – jene die diese Jahrhunderte verbinden. Das neunzehnte und zwanzigste Jahrhundert bilden im Rahmen der westeuropäischen Welt- beziehungsweise Globalgeschichte eine integrale zeitliche Makroeinheit dessen, was man als modernes Zeitalter bezeichnet, so daß sich diese durch ihre numerische Abgrenzung trotz aller Unterschiede und gewiß auch Veränderungen in ihrer Entwicklung nicht derart differenzieren, daß sie sich gegenseitig entfernen würden, wobei sie ebenso dadurch nicht von ihrem gemeinsamen Grund und der Zusammengehörigkeit getrennt werden. In diesem Sinne ist auch Arnolds Denktätigkeit nicht zwischen zwei wenn auch angrenzenden Sequenzen hin- und hergerissen oder in diese Sequenzen geteilt sondern erfolgt logisch in einer Reihe von artikulierten Etappen, obwohl sich diese Tätigkeit relativ früh, noch im neunzehnten Jahrhundert, entwickelt und gleichwohl relativ rasch im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert beendet – jedoch geschieht dies in beiden Fällen ganz logisch innerhalb derselben geschichtlichen Makroeinheit.

<sup>1</sup> Pavao Vuk-Pavlović, *Stvaralački lik Đure Arnolda*, Zagreb 1934, und Branko Despot, *Filozofija Đure Arnolda*, Zagreb 1970.



Da die erste theoretische Schrift von Arnold 1879 erschienen ist, scheint es angemessen, ihn als einen solchen Menschen zu betrachten, der seine Gestalt unter dem Zeichen des Bestimmungskomplexes, den man sehr oft und zwar nicht ohne Grund als *Fin de siècle* bezeichnet, herausgebildet und dementsprechend auch gewirkt hat. So sehr auch diese Betrachtungsweise anziehend und sogar fruchtbar ist, kann man allgemein betrachtet, was nachher deutlicher werden wird, Arnolds Ansichten nicht einfach für die Ästhetik des *Fin de siècle* halten. Zwar gibt es einige Momente, die die Kroatische Moderne mitbestimmend zugleich zum geistigen Profil des *Fin de siècle* beitragen, beziehungsweise ist der Geist des *Fin de siècle* in die Komponenten der Kroatischen Moderne eingeflochten, so daß diese auch an Arnold nicht vorbeigehen. Die grundlegende negative Instanz, weshalb *Fin de siècle* für Arnolds ästhetische Ansichten keine angebrachte Bezeichnung sein könnte, ist aber scheinbar formaler wenn auch wesentlicher Natur: die Verschlossenheit der Periode, »Abgeschlossenheit« des Jahrhunderts durch das Jahr 1900, also eine ganz numerische, eigentlich mechanische und keineswegs aus der Geschichtlichkeit abgeleitete Grenze. Arnolds Ansichten beziehen sich nicht nur chronologisch sondern auch gedanklich auf das zwanzigste Jahrhundert: obwohl er ein »Traditionalist« war und innerhalb der vereinfachten Pseudogenerationsdichotomie der Kroatischen Moderne zu den »Alten« gehörte, hat er durch die Problematik, die er bearbeitete, die zeitliche Grenze des *Fin de siècle* überschritten.<sup>2</sup>

Einige der ausgeprägten Komponenten des *Fin de siècle* wie beispielsweise Dekadenz und Nihilismus (die sowohl negativ als Verfall, als Bewegung zum Ende hin, als auch positiv als eine auf einen neuen Beginn hinweisende und diesen ankündigende und sogar ermöglichende Abgeschlossenheit akzeptiert wurden, wobei beide Versionen in der Kroatischen Moderne festzustellen sind), sind Arnolds kritischem Interesse nicht entgangen: er behandelt diese, übernimmt sie im Rahmen seiner Betrachtungen, polemisiert dagegen; jedoch stellen diese keine, in seine Ansichten eingefügte Komponenten dar. Demgegenüber könnte man behaupten, daß eine andere Bezeichnung – die im Rahmen der Benennung der Jahrhundertwende vorzufinden ist und die sich sowohl mit der Bezeichnung *Fin de siècle* als auch mit der Kroatischen Moderne deckt – näher an die Möglichkeit der Deutung der Position von Arnold herantritt. Sofern Parallelen und Analogien mit der großen weiten Welt erlaubt sind und zwar unter notwendiger Proportio-

<sup>2</sup> Die Möglichkeit, das Ende des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts als eine besondere geschichtliche und künstlerische Stimmung zu betrachten, wird sehr informativ und mit vielen Argumenten im einleitenden Teil des Buches von Jens Malte Fischer, *Fin de siècle; Kommentar zu einer Epoche*, München 1978, besprochen.

nierung in Bezug auf die bescheideneren Verhältnisse in Kroatien, wurde bei der Bestimmung der Moderne in Kroatien vernachlässigt, eine keineswegs unwichtige Bezeichnung hinzufügen: *Belle Époque*. Es wäre natürlich übertrieben, zu behaupten, daß diese Bezeichnung wegen Arnold einzuführen wäre – er war nicht so sehr ein Mensch von »mondänem« Schlag, daß man diese Bezeichnung mit ihm persönlich verknüpfen würde – jedoch enthält die Bezeichnung »Belle Époque« eine Voraussetzung, die teilweise eine Determinierung der Ästhetik von Arnold darstellt. Im Anschluß an den Realismus und Naturalismus beziehungsweise neben dem Realismus und Naturalismus und ihrerseitiger Negation, Entwertung oder Relativierung der Schönheit ist Belle Époque wie auch *viele andere Ismen innerhalb des Pluralismus der Moderne* nur gemeinsam mit der *Rehabilitierung der Schönheit* beziehungsweise der Rehabilitierung der Schönheit als einer ästhetischen und künstlerischen Kategorie möglich, wobei dasselbe auch für die Kategorie des Lebens gilt. Der Prozeß der Relativierung der Schönheit ist im Zeitalter der Moderne definitiv. Diese wird zwar nicht verworfen, jedoch gilt sie nicht in Allem und für Alles sowohl als grundlegende als auch als höchste ästhetische Kategorie. Neben Kategorien wie beispielsweise Schaffensfreiheit, Seele (oft = Nerven), das Psychische und Psychologie überhaupt, Stimmung, Gefühl, Leben, usf., die die theoretische Grundlage, den Unterbau und den Hintergrund der Moderne (gemeinsam mit den Antithesen) ausmachen, stellt die Schönheit keine bloß neue, sondern gerade eine rehabilitierte Kategorie dar, ohne die die Moderne trotz der im Horizont der Moderne selbst hinsichtlich dieser Kategorie geführten Polemik nicht möglich wäre. So wird diese Kategorie in Hinblick auf einige ihre Momente seitens der Modernisten selbst entweder als Leitidee negiert oder in den Hintergrund gedrängt. Andererseits wird sie von einigen ausdrücklich bejaht. Deshalb ist in Arnolds Ästhetik, die ohne der Idee der Schönheit undenkbar ist, die Schönheit nicht nur als bloßes traditionalistisches Moment zu betrachten, sondern auch als ein Bestreben um die Rehabilitierung der Schönheit; daher als dem geschichtlichen Geschehen der Kroatischen Moderne eminent Anhaftendes und zwar ungeachtet der offenkundigen Tatsache, daß Arnold auch in theoretischer Hinsicht kein Modernist war.

Die Frage, ob die kroatischen Modernisten wirklich die Schönheit bejahten, scheint überflüssig zu sein, weil es dafür unzählige geschriebene Belege als geschichtliche Tatsachen gibt; und ebenso gab es zahlreiche Autoren als auch Ismen, deren Anhänger sie waren: Ästhetizismus (Livadić, Musa Ćazim Ćatić, Begović), Artismus, Symbolismus, Neuromantik, Jugendstil, Impressionismus (alles das bei A. G. Matoš und mancherlei davon bei anderen). Es bleibt aber die grundsätzliche Fragen: ist auf die kroatischen Umstände und das künstlerische Geschehen der Kroatischen Moderne der Begriff der Belle

Époque anwendbar? Die Antwort darauf lautet: dieser Begriff kann und muß mit erforderlichen Abänderungen angewendet werden. Gewiß kann die Bezeichnung Belle Époque in Kroatien den Begriff und die Bezeichnung Moderne sowohl nicht ersetzen als auch die auskristallisierte Periodisierung von ungefähr 1890 bis ungefähr 1910 durcheinanderbringen, ebensowenig wie dieser Begriff durch seine Einseitigkeit keineswegs *die pluralistische Struktur der Moderne* als einer selbständigen gesellschaftlichen Epoche (den Pluralismus der Ismen) ersetzen oder sogar überdecken kann und zwar ohne Rücksicht auf die ziemlich klar formulierte Behauptung von Willy Haas: »Die 'Belle Époque' aber ist im Grunde ein gesellschaftlicher Begriff;«<sup>3</sup> als auch auf die beigefügte Bemerkung, daß es *nicht zu behaupten ist*, »daß die 'Gesellschaft', die diese Epoche formte, eine ungewöhnliche geistvolle Gesellschaft war – wie etwa ein sehr beträchtlicher Teil der Pariser Gesellschaft in der zweiten Hälfte des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts, dem Rokoko...«, wobei aber sowohl die Zeit als auch die Gesellschaft der Belle Époque »zukunfts-trächtig« und diesbezüglich durch ihre Omina – im engeren Sinne des Wortes – »epochal« war.<sup>4</sup>

Was bildet, so zu sagen, die praktische, »gesellschaftliche«, politisch-wirtschaftliche und nicht nur theoretische Grundlage der Möglichkeit, daß in Kroatien eine historische Zeit entsteht, die bis zu einem gewissen, dennoch wahrhaft relevanten Grad in ihrer besonderen »Schönheit, Schein und Wirbel«, wie man dies im Rahmen der konventionellen, traditionell-konservativen Periodisierung der Jahre von 1895 bis 1914 für die französische Belle Époque zu sagen pflegte, zu betrachten ist?<sup>5</sup> Was bildet also die Grundlage der Zeit mit relativierter Periodisierung, die in Kroatien offensichtlich in chronologisch-numerischer Hinsicht und, sit venia verbo, im Lichte der moderneren Methodologie anders zu bestimmen ist. Die Belle Époque deckt sich nämlich in Kroatien größtenteils mit dem kroatischen Fin de siècle und erstreckt sich weiter auf das zweite Jahrzehnt der Moderne. Trotz allen bisherigen negativ-kulturellen und sogar vielen eingewurzelten politisch-historiographischen Einschätzungen war dies, sofern es sich um den Abschnitt des Fin de siècle handelt, was vielleicht viele verwundern wird (wobei der oberflächliche, ideologisch-phrasenhafte, durch Argumente nicht belegte Vorwurf der

<sup>3</sup> Willy Haas, *Die Belle Époque, in Texten, Bildern und Zeugnisse*, München 1967, S. 15.

<sup>4</sup> Willy Haas, a. a. O., S. 16. Mehr über den Pluralismus der Ismen in der Kroatischen Moderne als eine bestimmte Struktur der Epoche vgl. Zlatko Posavac, *Moderna kao interpretativna tema; problem pluralizma izama*, in der Zeitschrift »Republika«, Zagreb XXXVI/1980, Nr. 6., S. 540–556. Auch Zlatko Posavac, *Mali umjetnički Babilon u doba Moderne; o pluralizmu izama očima suvremenika*, in der Zeitschrift »Kaj«, Zagreb XII/1980, Nr. 4, S. 55–66.

<sup>5</sup> S. die Edition *Povijest svjetske književnosti*, Bd. 3, Zagreb 1982, *Francuska književnost, Dvadeseto stoljeće*, (Einleitung von Gabriela Vidan), S. 578.

»Madjarenfreundschaft« jeder Art abzulehnen ist), – der Kroatisch-ungarische Ausgleich aus dem Jahre 1868! In der jüngsten Geschichte Kroatiens war dies einer der reellen und dennoch beinahe *einzig*en Staatsakten, wodurch Kroatien die *nationale, politische und (wenigstens teilweise) staatliche Souveränität* zusammen mit der Autonomie der Gesetzgebung, der inneren Angelegenheiten, des Kultus und des Unterrichts anerkannt wurde. Und obwohl die Finanzen teilweise gemeinsam waren und für Kroatien nicht so sehr günstig ausgefallen sind, wird durch die Revision des Ausgleichs wie selten in der Geschichte der Kroatien auferlegten Staatengemeinschaften öffentlich bestimmt, daß 45% der Staatsgelder Kroatien für seine autonome Angelegenheiten zusteht, daß also Kroatien diese Gelder auch ausgeben kann, während 55% für die »gemeinsamen« Angelegenheiten Ungarns beziehungsweise Österreichungarns bestimmt wurden. (In allen anderen geschichtlichen Kombinationen – wie beispielsweise im ehemaligen Jugoslawien – werden gewöhnlich die Finanzen nicht ausdrücklich und in aller Öffentlichkeit erwähnt, wobei aber der Abgang zahlreicher Güter und Gelder aus Kroatien prozentual gesehen ruinös, eigentlich ziemlich ungünstiger als der »ungünstige« »Kroatisch-ungarische Ausgleich« und die sogenannte »Madjarisierung« war). Durch den Ausgleich wurde schließlich auch zum ersten Mal mit dem Wirrwarr in Hinblick auf die Nationalsprache aufgeräumt: die Sprache heißt *Kroatisch* und nicht »Illyrisch«, »Jugoslawisch«, »Südslawisch«, »Kroato-serbisch«, usf. – also keine der Varianten der »Brüderlichkeit und Einheit«, die den Kroaten »die illyrische Bewegung«, »der Illyrismus«, »Stroßmeierismus«, »Narodnjaštvo«, sogenannte »Volkspartei«, usf. beschert haben. Die kroatische Sprache wird im öffentlichen Verkehr und im Parlament zur Amtssprache, wobei sie sogar im Budapester Parlament und in der dortigen Administration zur gleichberechtigten Sprache wird, so daß die in kroatischer Sprache geschriebenen Schriftstücke aus Kroatien (Anträge, Bittgesuche, Klagen, usf.) grundsätzlich ebenso in kroatischer Sprache zu beantworten gewesen wären.<sup>6</sup> Der »Kroatisch-ungarische Ausgleich« stellt allgemein und

<sup>6</sup> In Zusammenhang damit sind nicht die sektiererischen Deutungen und halb unwahre Informationen sondern der Text des Vergleiches aus dem Jahre 1868 im Buch *Ustavno zakonodjelje, Sbirka ustavnih zakona i propisa valjanih u Kraljevini Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji* (eingesamm., systematisch bearb. und eingeleit. von Milan Smrekar; Edition *Hrvatski zakoni*, Bd. X, Naklada Akademijске knjižare Lav Hartmann (Kugli i Deutsch), Zagreb 1888, Kapitel I, Abschnitt I, *Temeljni zakoni, I Hrvatsko-Ugarska nagodba*, S. 6–28) nachzuschlagen. S. gleichwohl die Prinzipien des Kroatisch-ungarischen Vergleichs (mit dem Stereotyp der negativen Auslegung) im Buch von Lovro Katić, *Pregled povijesti Hrvata*, Zagreb 1938, S. 243–244. In demselben negativen Geiste auch Ferdo Šišić, *Pregled povijesti hrvatskog naroda*, MII, Zagreb 1962 (III. Ausgabe), wobei nur auf dem »Läppchen von Rijeka« bestanden wird. Eine negative Deutung auch im Buch von Dr. Fra Oton Knežević, *Hrvatska povijest*, Bd. II, 1937, Jeronimska knjižnica, Buch 509, S. 309 u. weiter. Dasselbe gilt auch für die jüngeren Historiker.

insbesondere hinsichtlich der Artikel über die Sprache eine gesetzliche Tatsache von erstrangiger politischer und nationaler Bedeutung dar, so daß dieser Vergleich dann auch eine solche Stelle in Hinblick auf die Kunst (Literatur, Theaterwesen) und ihre Theorie (Kritik, Ästhetik und Philosophie) einnimmt.

Die finanziellen Auswirkungen des Kroatisch-ungarischen Ausgleichs waren nicht sofort zu spüren, dennoch konnte man die halbstarren, in den Jahrzehnten des *Fin de siècle* akkumulierten Kräfte des Kapitals nicht nur im wirtschaftlichen Bereich und dem erhöhten Lebensstandard, sondern gerade auch in der Sphäre der Kunst und der Kultur allgemein bemerken. Eine heute noch immer unaustilgbare Spur der Schönheit der Zagreber Unterstadt als eines aus dem neunzehnten Jahrhundert stammenden mitteleuropäischen urbanen Komplexes zwecks Ausgestaltung einer unumstrittenen Metropole stellt das Ergebnis dieses beschränkt positiven und dennoch klar und in aller Öffentlichkeit artikulierten Wirkungsbereiches des Kroatisch-ungarischen Ausgleiches dar. Diese Behauptung ist und kann an Hand der Tatsache des Aufschwungs der eigenartigen Fülle künstlerischer Praxis bewiesen werden, die unmittelbar vom materiellen Wohlstand abhängig war. Dies ist ein Horizont, aus dem auch ein sowohl mittelbarer als auch unmittelbarer Bündel von Impulsen zur Anregung der theoretisch-ästhetischen Tätigkeit beziehungsweise ihres nachträglichen Verständnisses ausgeht.

Die »teuerste« Kunst, die Architektur, als eine Voraussetzung des möglichen Lebens unter der Bezeichnung der Belle Époque ermöglichte im Laufe des *Fin de siècle* direkt die Auswirkung des Ausgleichs: die staatlich-nationale Souveränität und das souveräne Verfügen über wenigstens einen Teil des eigenen Nationaleinkommens. Der intensive Ausbau Zagrebs während des *Fin de siècle* verleiht dieser Stadt ein zu jener Zeit zeitgenössisches, modernes Erscheinungsbild urbaner mitteleuropäischer Prägung, eigentlich die heutige Gestalt Zagrebs, das, was Zagreb als Zagreb ausmacht und zur Metropole Kroatiens macht und was in der Theorie durch die Schriften von Iso Kršnjavi begleitet wurde und zwar nicht nur in Form von Kritiken und Polemiken in Hinblick auf den aktuellen Ausbau und diesbezügliche Pläne sondern auch in seinem theoretisch repräsentativen Werk *Oblici graditeljstva (Formen der Baukunst)*.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Isidor Kršnjavi, *Oblici graditeljstva u starom veku i glavna načela građevne ljepote*; mit einer begleitenden Bemerkung als Untertitel »Im Buch gibt es 111 Illustrationen«, Zagreb 1883; in Bezug auf den ästhetischen Aspekt ist der Schwerpunkt im zweiten Teil des Titels: »glavna načela građevne ljepote« (Grundsätze der Schönheit in der Baukunst) zu erblicken. Für die Ästhetik Kršnjavis vgl. das Buch von Zlatko Posavac, *Novija hrvatska estetika (Neuere kroatische Ästhetik)*, Zagreb 1991. Auch in deutscher Sprache: *Iso Kršnjavi als Ästhetiker und Kunsthistoriker* in *Synthesis Philosophica*, Zagreb 1993, Vol. 8, Fasc. 2, S. 371–407. Resumé und Summary.

Man könnte am Anfang als eine Hervorhebung, durch die die Belle Époque die Periode der Kroatischen Moderne (1890–1910) imprägniert, am Zagreber Zrinjevac (Zriny-Platz) den Ausbau des vornehmen Hotels Palace im Jahre 1891 (das heute zum provinziellen Kitsch vom pseudohöheren Niveau degradiert und wieder an – Österreich! – verkauft wurde) anführen. Es handelt sich dabei um ein Hotel am Zrinjevac, an einem Platz, dem damals gemeinsam mit dem Tomislavplatz schon auf Grund des früher angenommenen Projekts (des sogenannten Lenucius-Hufeisens) der höchste städtebauliche Rang und in ästhetischer Hinsicht präventioser Charakter zugeteilt wurde – von den Palästen, die sich auf der nördlichen Seite befinden, entlang der östlichen und westlichen Nord-Süd-Vertikale bis zum und einschließlich des auch in europäischen Maßstäben ziemlich repräsentativen Hauptbahnhofes, dessen Bau im Jahre 1892 beendet wurde (und der heute leider infolge primitiver »Modernisierungen« verwahrlost und devastiert steht, obwohl die außerordentlich schöne Architektur dieses Gebäudes noch immer im Wesentlichen erhalten ist).

Es ist unmöglich und eigentlich überflüssig, hier eine systematische Inventarisierung und chronologische Aufzählung der städtebaulichen Eingriffe durchzuführen, jedoch sind zwecks Evokation der damaligen Stimmung die unbestreitbar wirkungsvolle Akzente zu erwähnen. So wurde von 1888 bis 1892 das repräsentative Gebäude der Gewerbeschule und des heutigen Kunst- und Gewerbemuseums (also in funktional-ästhetischer Intention) gebaut. Das erste Gebäude der Kroatischen Musikanstalt in der Zagreber Gundulić-Straße stammt aus dem Jahre 1875, wobei der repräsentativere Anbau dieses Gebäudes im Jahre 1895 vollzogen wird, also in demselben Jahr, in dem das neue Kroatische (Landes-) Nationaltheater (das man populär als das Große Theater bezeichnete) gebaut wurde. Zu derselben Zeit wird auf dem Starčević-Platz das sogenannte Starčević-Heim zusammen mit dem sich im Erdgeschoß befindlichen Kaffeehaus »Zrinski« gebaut (heute ist die Innenausstattung dieses Heims völlig verwahrlost, das Kaffeehaus besteht schon lange nicht mehr, und die Außenausstattung des Gebäudes ist ohne seiner ehemaligen Skulpturen geblieben), wie man gleichermaßen später, im Jahre 1906, in Ilica 25 die Kroatisch-slawonische Landeszentralbank mit dem einst prunkvollen Kaffeehaus »Corso« bauen wird (die dann 1907 zu Ende gebaut sein wird), deren Innenräume man devastieren, die Skulpturen an der Fassade aber erhalten wird. Die Erste kroatische Sparkasse bekommt um die Jahrhundertwende ein neues Gebäude in der Ilica mit dem populären »Oktagon«, einem Durchgang (Passage!), das ein so charakteristisches Moment der Architektur des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts der bürgerlichen und kaufmännischen Behaglichkeit war. Ebenso wurde das repräsentative Gebäude der Eisenbahndirektion (in der heutigen Mihanović-Straße) erbaut, und

Kršnjavi baut in Zagreb ein modernes, eines der schönsten und zu jener Zeit in Europa funktionellstes Gymnasiumgebäude (das in den achtziger Jahren des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts in ein Pseudomuseum umgewandelt und dadurch enorm devastiert wurde), währenddessen 1898 in Zagreb auch ein Kunstpavillon aufgestellt wurde und zwar wiederum mit einem Kaffeehaus im Erdgeschoß! Um 1900 wird der repräsentativste Projekt der Inneneinrichtung von Kršnjavi beendet: die Einrichtung des Gebäudes der Abteilung für Theologie und Unterricht (des ehemaligen Kultusministeriums) mit dem sogenannten »Goldenen Saal« in der Opatička-Straße. Es wird auch das Gebäude des »Kroatischen Reigens« (hinter dem Theater) gebaut und danach 1902 das Ethnographische Museum, 1903 das Haus »Rado«, aber auch eines der beispielhaften sezessionistischen Zagreber Gebäude, das Haus »Kalina« (Julio Meinl) in der Masaryk-Straße. Den Schlußakkord der strengeren und authentischeren Abgrenzung der Kroatischen Moderne stellen in symbolischer Hinsicht der 1910 erbaute Palast »Croatia« mit den schönen dekorativen Skulpturen von Frangeš (die Straßenecke der Masaryk- und Preradović-Straße) und das berühmte Haus »Frank« von Kovačić dar, das schon auf eine neue Periode hinweist.

Falls wir in Hinblick auf die Abgrenzung eine ungezwungenere Haltung einnehmen würden, dann ist die Auswirkungen des Kroatisch-ungarischen Vergleiches in Richtung der Belle Époque embryonal in der energisch vollzogener Renovierung (die heute zu bedauern ist) des alten, durch das Erdbeben im Jahre 1880 zerstörten Doms zu erblicken, wobei die heutige neugotische Form dieses Doms entstanden ist, die Form, die heute zum Symbol von Zagreb geworden ist (zusammen mit der Devastation seines dekorativen und heute nicht mehr vorhandenen Daches in den achtziger Jahren des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts); 1883 entstehen die Arkaden auf dem Friedhof »Mirogoj« und von 1882 bis 1883 der Palast »Vranicani« (später Kroatischer Bauernheim, heute teilweise die Moderne Galerie der kroatischen Künste und teilweise Büroräume der Kroatischen Akademie). Falls wir dem Anfangsakkord so ungezwungen herantreten, wie wir dies gegenüber dem Schlußakkord taten, und zwar im Sinne des nachträglichen Wiederhalls der Kroatischen Moderne, aber an Hand der Momente einer neuen geschichtlichen und stilistischen Periode, dann äußert sich dies gewiß in der kroatischen National- und Universitätsbibliothek auf dem Marulić-Platz, die sicher eine der repräsentativsten, prunkvollsten *öffentlichen* Gebäude Kroatiens jener Zeit gewesen ist.

Die Summe der nur flüchtig aufgezählten Beispiele stellt die ästhetische Artikulation des physischen Raumes und des städtischen Lebens zusammen mit den dazugehörenden geistigen, kulturellen und natürlich künstlerischen Eigenständigkeiten dar. Die Stimmung, die dadurch entsteht und die auf Eindruck ausgerichtet ist, leistet ihren Beitrag dazu, daß diese Gebäude die

Stadt in einer Zeit, die zwar mit Kontroversen erfüllt war, ausmachen, in einer Zeit aber, die bewußt, gewollt bestrebt ist, ihren Drang nach Schönheit, ein Kunstwollen, ein ästhetisches und künstlerisches Wollen maximal zu verwirklichen, die zusammen mit ihren Lebensformen nicht nur auf »die alten guten Zeiten« bedacht sondern darauf ausgerichtet ist, in den Augen ihrer Zeitgenossen aber auch der zukünftigen Generationen als Belle Époque zu gelten. Es wäre falsch, wenn man angesichts der kroatischen ästhetischer Praxis und Theorie und noch mehr der (kroatischen) Historiographie dies nicht berücksichtigen würde.

Gibt es etwas ähnliches beispielsweise in der *Malerei*? Im Gegensatz zur konventionellen und durch Argumente nicht belegten Wiederholung der nicht nachgewiesenen Behauptungen über den Beginn der kroatischen modernen Malerei, der erst im Jahre 1898 anzusetzen ist, ist dieser Beginn schon bei Crnčić in seiner Münchener Periode zu erblicken, ausgehend von dem Gemälde Slavonac *runi kukuruz* (1892), *Djevojčica* (1891) und dem verschwundenen Gemälde *Akt* (das im Feuer zu Grunde gegangen ist!), in einer Phase, die zu den Meisterwerken der Kroatischen Moderne führt, zu Crnčićs Gemälde *Bonazza* (1906), wodurch dem kroatischen Bewußtsein durch die bildenden Künste die Schönheit des kroatischen Meeres, indem die Idee der bildnerischen Schönheit sublimiert wird, mit tiefstem Ernst und in sonniger Heiterkeit an Hand des »Freilichtmalerei«-Verfahrens offenbart und präsentiert wird. Außerdem ist der Beginn der Kroatischen Moderne in der bildenden Kunst bei Csikoss in seinem Übergang vom Akademismus zum Symbolismus und Jugendstil zu erblicken, wo ebenso die innovativen Bemühungen an der Idee der Schönheit festhalten.<sup>8</sup> Weiterhin ist die Anwendung des bei Ljubo Babić ansonsten verwendbaren Begriffs (zusammen mit der Korrektur unserer eigenen Auffassungen, die wir seinerzeit unter dem Eindruck von Babić übernommen haben) zu korrigieren, nämlich des Begriffs des »verschönerten Realismus«. Dieser Begriff bezieht sich eigentlich als eine abgeleitete Variante nur bedingt und teilweise auf Crnčić und zwar im neueren Lichte, im Lichte der Kroatischen Moderne, wie dies der Fall auch bei Medović oder Kovačević ist, während man die primäre Applikation dieses Begriffs, der die kroatische Belle Époque vorbereitet (oder sogar eröffnet?), in den Gemälden von Mašić wie *Gušćarica*, *Ljetna idila*, *Na savi*, usf. zu erblicken hat. Ferner stellen die angeblichen Innovationen in der kroatischen Malerei, die man Bukovac (dessen eigentlicher Name Fagione! lautet) zuschreibt, eigentlich eine nachträgliche akademisierte Version – bedingt gesagt – des

<sup>8</sup> Was Crnčić und Csikoss betrifft, ist bei Zlatko Posavac, *Teorijsko-historiografska problematika hrvatske likovne umjetnosti na razmeđu 19. i 20. stoljeća*, Peristil, Zagreb XXXII/1988–89, Nr. 31–32, S. 45–50 (vorgetragen am 5. Kongreß des Bundes der Kunsthistorikervereine der SFRJ) nachzuschlagen.



Impressionismus und dekorativen Divisionismus dar, wodurch er an Hand der Stimmung (zusammen mit der Theatralik seiner großen dekorativen Gemälde) auf eine oberflächliche Weise ununterbrochen die Belle Époque suggeriert; so daß in diesem konformistischen Sinne die Funktion dieses zweifellosen Virtuosen wahrzunehmen ist, über den Lügen verbreiten werden, daß ihn Zagreb nicht unterstützt hat – wofür ein Gegenbeweis nicht ein Haus sondern der Palast von Bukovac ist und zwar zusammen mit einem Atelier, das sich an einem repräsentativen Platz, nämlich auf dem hier schon erwähnten Zrinjevac, befand. (Ein ganz konkreter, materieller Beweis über sein Lebensstandard. Ähnlich wie bei den Münchener »Malerfürsten« Lenbach oder Stuck!).

Im größten Teil der gesamten Malerei der Kroatischen Moderne ist der Geist und der Hauch der Belle Époque zu verspüren, sogar auch im Sinne der reinen bildenden Künste, mit Begeisterung erfüllten, gedanklichen, intellektuellen, ernsthaften neuen Schritten, die seitens des genialen Miroslav Kraljević unternommen werden, um die Belle Époque zu verlassen. Und gerade deshalb ist die kroatische Historiographie der bildenden Künste, indem sie das lebendige Bedürfnis nach Antithetik, aber auch nach Vielschichtigkeit, das Bedürfnis nach höchstem Diapason übersieht, einerseits nicht im Stande, die elitäre Ernsthaftigkeit der Schönheit des Opus von Kraljević entsprechend zu deuten, während sie andererseits unterläßt, den hohen Rang, den die Kroatische Moderne mit der Komponente der Belle Époque in der Sphäre, die man hier bedingt als sogenannte *Triviallkunst* bezeichnen würde, ernsthaft zu erörtern. In Kroatien ist dies für die bürgerliche Version der bildenden Künste das Opus von Robert Auer und für die folkloristisch-nationale das Opus des talentierten Autodidakten Josip Bužan. Dieser hoher Rang der Modalität der Triviallkunst stellt direkt eines der Phänomene der Belle Époque dar, so daß sein Verschweigen beziehungsweise Weglassen das richtige Verständnis der Jahrhundertwende deformiert oder sogar unmöglich macht! Dieses »Verschönern« gehört der unersättlichen Bejahung der Schönheit als *signum temporis* in allen Schichten und Abstufungen der bildenden Künste der Kroatischen Moderne an, von den ernsthaften Bemühungen und Themen bis zur ungefähr gleichen »Ungezwungenheit« der weiblichen Akten von Bukovec und Auer. Sogar in der Exotik von Bužan's *Ciganke* findet die Affirmierung der Schönheit statt. Das deckt sich auf eine für ihn charakteristische Art und Weise mit der Tatsache, daß die kroatischen Modernisten *Makar Čudra* von Gorki übersetzten und veröffentlichten, wofür Starčević's *Slike iz života 1852*, historisch und literarisch von hohem Rang, als gelungene Vorbereitung gelten können. Und inwieweit (und auf welche Weise!?) die kroatische Historienmalerei (nämlich das Genre der sogenannten Historienmalerei) jener Zeit (Medović, Bukovac-Fagione, Iveković u.a.) an den Kontroversen der Kroatischen Moderne und ihres Be-

standteils der Belle Époque teilgenommen haben, ist unerforscht geblieben, in ideologischer und bildnerischer Hinsicht nicht unterschieden worden – und dazu noch verschwiegen.

Ähnliche »Versäumnisse« und Verschweigungen sind auch in der kroatischen musikalischen Historiographie aufzufinden, die so ernst ausgestaltet ist, daß sie so etwas wie leichte Vergnügungs-, Tanzmusik, usf., nicht tolerieren kann, wobei sie insbesondere intolerant ist, wenn es sich um die bürgerliche, kroatische, kroatisch »kleinbürgerliche«, Salon- oder Volks-, kroatisch nationale oder bürgerliche Trivialkunst handelt. Jedoch hat gerade das Zeitalter der Kroatischen Moderne auf eine ungezwungenere Weise, dennoch bemüht, einen meisterhaften Zugang zur Musik aufzubauen. die musikalische Belle Époque bejaht, indem sie dies in der Operette verkörperte, in der Person und dem Opus des kroatischen Bewohners von Slawonien, Srećko Albini, der der Anhänger der musikalischen Kroatischen Moderne und Mitarbeiter in der repräsentativsten Zeitschrift der Kroatischen Moderne, im »Život«, war, wo er auch seinen programmatischen Text unter dem Titel *Za hrvatsku glazbu* (*Für kroatischen Musik*) veröffentlichte.<sup>9</sup>

Es kann keine bessere und im größeren Maße authentische Form der Belle Époque als die Operette geben. Natürlich fällt diese in die Kroatische Moderne nicht vom Himmel, sondern erwächst ihr hoher Rang aus einer ziemlich langen und authentischen einheimischen, kroatischen Tradition. Diese Tradition wird aus mehreren Gründen verschwiegen, wobei die Ursprünge dieser Tradition in dem fernen Jahr 1863 zu erblicken sind, als diese als eine ständige Praxis seitens Antun Schwarz (1823–1891) eingeführt und in den Vordergrund gebracht wurde, der ein ansonsten sehr interessanter Musiker war, den man aber in der Historiographie vernachlässigte und seinen Wert sogar vielleicht herabsetzte, weil er als »Fremder«, »Nichtkroate« (eigentlich als Gegner des Illyrismus), angeblich ein Gegner des richtigen »kroatischen« Musikers und Genies namens Fuchs, daß heißt Lisinski, war. Die Tradition der Operette setzte der »internationale« Stil von Ivan Zajc weiter, eines Maestros, dessen ganzes Opus dem Fachkreis kaum bekannt ist, und das – insbesondere seine Musikwerke, die am meisten kroatisch ausgerichtet sind – in den letzte fünfzig Jahren das kroatische Ohr hauptsächlich nirgendwo und in keiner Gelegenheit vernehmen konnte. Sogar auch nicht in den Haussalons, da diese Form von Musikpflege, die noch in den letzten Lebensjahren von Zajc als eine normale Manifestation des Fin de siècle und der Belle Époque lebendig war, im modernen technischen Zeitalter abgestorben ist, wobei dazu auch die spezifische Primitivierung im Rahmen des ge-

<sup>9</sup> Srećko Albini, *Za hrvatsku glazbu* (*Für kroatische Musik*), Život, Zagreb 1900, Buch I, Bd. I, S. 16–17.

schiechtlichen Unglücks Kroatiens ihren Beitrag geleistet hat. Jedoch übernahm im Bereich der Operette vom hohen Rang (da Zajc die Operetten für die Ausführungen in Wien komponierte) die Staffel von Zajc der vorhin erwähnte Albini, indem er ein Werk von außerordentlicher, sehr großer Popularität schuf: mit dem Werk *Baron Trenk* hat er sowohl in Kroatien als auch in Europa einen großen Erfolg erzielt, was leider aus der Stelle, die ihm die kroatische Musikgeschichte zuweist, nicht ersichtlich ist. Diese Stelle war nämlich bis jetzt aufgrund der praktizierten interpretativen historiographischen Methoden, die in der kroatischen Musikgeschichte um (wahre!) Innovationen flehen, sogar nicht zu bestimmen.<sup>10</sup>

Zum Teil wegen des modernen technischen Zeitalters, aber noch mehr wegen der musikalisch-»sachkundigen«, »ästhetischen« Vorurteile und gewiß aufgrund der ideologischen Implikationen blieb dieser ganze Komplex der kroatischen bürgerlichen – und warum auch nicht kleinbürgerlichen!? – *Salonmusik*, die von Motiven der authentischen kroatischen Volksmusik programmatisch bewußt, theoretisch und sogar kritisch berechtigt durchtränkt war, buchstäblich ignoriert und wurde – man könnte ebenso behaupten – verboten. Disqualifiziert als ein disqualifizierender Maßstab! Falls aber zur Zeit des *Fin de siècle* nicht nur Komponenten der sogenannten Kammermusik sondern gerade auch der instrumentalen und vokalen Salonmusik (und sogar der Tanzmusik) zum Vorschein kommen, dann ist das alles, diese Salonkomponente, als eine legitime Manifestation dessen zu sehen, was mit recht als *Belle Époque* bezeichnet wird. Unbefangene, unbekümmerte Heiterkeit, neuromantische Gefühle zusammen mit der Schönheit des Erlebnisses, einer Schönheit, die bis zum Kitsch reichen kann, dürfen nicht negativ betrachtet und keineswegs verschwiegen oder sogar, verheimlicht werden. Wie der literarische Naturalismus aus ästhetischen Gründen die Verheimlichung des Häßlichen nicht zugelassen hat, so darf für die *Belle Époque* jene

<sup>10</sup> So hatte beispielsweise Andreis in seinem Überblick *Razvoj muzičke umjetnosti u Hrvatskoj* völlig unbegründet, fast nebulös, Albini historiographisch in das Zeitalter »zwischen den zwei Weltkriegen« eingestuft; s. *Historijski razvoj muzičke kulture u Jugoslaviji*, Zagreb 1962. In der Historiographie der kroatischen Musik ist die Reformierung der Methodologie mehr als dringend erforderlich, wie dies auch in anderen Bereichen der kroatischen Kunst der Fall ist. Jedoch werden in dieser Hinsicht nirgends keine systematischen komplexeren Forderungen gestellt. Deshalb sei es mir gestattet, auf eine neuere, meine eigene, meiner Meinung nach positive Anstrengung unbescheiden hinzuweisen: Befürwortung der Forschungsmethodologie, innerhalb der man die Auffassung berücksichtigt, daß geistige, kulturelle und sogar künstlerische Phänomene weder mechanisch erfolgreich »zu verpflanzen« noch diese aus den bloßen »Einflüssen« zu deuten sind, ohne dabei in die geschichtliche *Voraussetzungen der Möglichkeit des Entstehens und der Weiterentwicklung* dieser Phänomene Einsicht zu nehmen. S. die Studie (die sich in ihrer Thematik mit der Darstellung der Ästhetik von Arnold teilweise deckt) Zlatko Posavac, *Ususret psihologizmu Moderne*, Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine, Zagreb XV/1989, Nr. 29–30.

Schönheit, die vielleicht nicht streng ästhetisch ist, verschwiegen werden. Denn die »klassische Schönheit« ist im Falle der Belle Époque wirklich zu streng. Wissenschaftliche, aber auch viele andere Interessen dürften deshalb nicht zu kurz kommen. Und während in den modernen Massenmedien die trivialste und ähnlich geartete andere »neukomponierte« »Musik« (bis etwa 1990 z.B.) der schlechtesten und niedrigsten Art lawinenartig das Ohr des kroatischen Publikums betäubt, so daß es sich dagegen überhaupt nicht mehr wehren kann, wobei darunter besonders die Zeit der letzten Dekaden des ehemaligen Jugoslawiens gemeint ist, ist die kroatische Salontradition und patriotische Tradition des ganzen neunzehnten Jahrhunderts und insbesondere des Fin de siècle und der Belle Époque einfach unbekannt, daß heißt verschwiegen und negiert. Disqualifiziert!

Ist dies mit Argumenten zu belegen? Eigentlich bis jetzt nur an Hand von Vermutungen. Ein Beispiel: A. Stöhr. So wissen wir nicht, was für eine Musik die »Salonmusik« von Ante Stöhr (1849–1923) war, da wir das nicht wissen können, weil wir Jahrzehnte lang – und heute leider noch immer – diese Musik nicht hören konnten, wobei wir von ihrer Existenz in ein paar knappen Zeilen aus der *Musikenzyklopädie* dank Božidar Širola und Josip Andreis erfahren. In diesen kärglichen Informationen ist unter der wiederholten Bezeichnung »Salonmusik« ein für die kroatische sowohl ästhetische als auch künstlerische Historiographie wichtiger und noch unerforschter Komplex zu erahnen, ein musikalischer Komplex nämlich, der vielleicht an sich wertvoll (wobei wir daran glauben, daß er dies auf seine Weise auch ist) und geschichtlich interessant und sogar relevant sein könnte, da er erst jetzt überhaupt entdeckt werden konnte und zwar im Lichte der Imprägnation des Fin de siècle und der Kroatischen Moderne durch die Bezeichnung der Belle Époque.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Was Stöhr betrifft, s.: Božidar Širola, *Pregled povijesti hrvatske muzike*, Zagreb 1922. Andreis schreibt über Stöhr in seinem Überblick *Razvoj muzičke kulture u Hrvatskoj*: »er komponierte meistens für Klavier im unprätentiösen Salongeist (Kursive von ZP). In seinen Klavierstücken bearbeitete er oft Volksmelodien (sic! – op. ZP), aber auch Vokalkompositionen und Opernausschnitte anderer kroatischen Komponisten, und veröffentlichte diese in Sammlungen-Albumen, die seinerzeit sehr populär (Kursive von ZP) waren«; das Zitat stammt aus dem Buch *Razvoj muzičke kulture u Jugoslaviji*, Zagreb 1962, S. 180. Und schließlich ist in der *Muzička enciklopedija* des Verlags Jugoslavenski leksikografski zavod (I. Ausgabe, Zagreb 1963, Bd. II, S. 645) zu lesen (Autor dieses Teils ist Krešimir Kovačević): »Stöhrs melodische Invention ist nicht originell. Seine Werke hat er auf der kroatischen und slowenischen *Folklore* (sic! – Kursive von ZP) aufgebaut, wobei er auch süßliche sentimentale städtische Lieder im veralteten Salonstil (Kursive von ZP) bearbeitete«. – Falls man in diesen Zitaten beim Lesen imaginär die »ästhetischen« und »elitären« Vorurteile und den negativen ideologischen Ballast beseitigt, ist in diesen Urteilen als der Zeitgeist gerade die Belle Époque zu erblicken!! Zwar kommt die kritische Beurteilung dieser Musik erst dann in Betracht, wenn wir sie irgendeinmal hören als auch eine freie Auswahl ohne irgendwelcher Arbitrage treffen werden können, so daß diese Bewertung wirklich als eine offene Frage hinzustellen ist; dennoch ist wahrscheinlich den Bestimmungen »Salonstil« und »sehr populär« als Tatsachen Glauben zu schenken?!

Da von der *Literatur sub speciae aestheticis* noch die Rede sein wird, da diese auch den Mittelpunkt des Interesses und Engagements von Arnolds bildet, ist hier, nachdem die Voraussetzungen für die in Kroatien bisher ungebrauchliche Einführung des Begriffs Belle Époque mit Argumenten aus der geschichtlichen Wirklichkeit anderer Kunstformen faktisch belegt wurden, möglich, was die Literatur betrifft, sich nur auf das Moment ihres Bedürfnisses nach einer Rehabilitierung der Schönheit als künstlerischer und ästhetischer, als praktischer und theoretischer Kategorie zu beschränken. Dieses Bedürfnis kam schon im Rahmen des kroatischen Realismus – Naturalismus zum Vorschein, jedoch nicht, wie mancher dies im ersten Augenblick denken könnte, seitens des literaturkritischen und ästhetischen Idealismus sondern gerade seitens des Realismus. Insofern macht schon Janko Ibler (Desiderius), indem er seine *Literarna pisma (Literarische Briefe)* 1881 in der Zeitschrift »Sloboda« in Sušak veröffentlicht und sich für den Realismus von Kumičić und seine Erzählung *Jelkin bosiljak (Jelkas Basilikum)* einsetzt, darauf aufmerksam, daß der Autor »offensichtlich talentiert ist... (und) ... fähig ist, schön und poetisch zu schildern«, wobei er zugleich hervorhebt, daß »das 'Schöne' und das 'Realistische' keineswegs kontradiktorische Begriffe sind.«<sup>12</sup>

Im Rahmen der Auseinandersetzungen zwischen den »Alten« und den »Jungen« um die »Sezession«, anlässlich der Erscheinung der Kroatischen Moderne und der modernen Bemühungen, kam es in Zusammenhang mit der Kategorie der Schönheit zu einer Konfrontation. Der vorhergehende Realismus – Naturalismus negierte die Schönheit als eine künstlerische Aufgabe, wobei diese Negation teilweise auch einige Modernisten übernommen haben, indem sie die Schönheit für keine entscheidende oder wichtige ästhetische Kategorie hielten (z.B. Marjanović). Da die »Alten« deshalb, aber auch aus vielen anderen Gründen, die »Jungen« angegriffen haben, meldete sich als *Verteidiger* der »Jungen« 1898 zum Wort der Rechtsanwalt Josip Frank, der ansonsten der Anführer der Rechtspartei von Starčević war, mit seiner Schrift *U obranu hrvatskih umjetnika (Zur Verteidigung der kroatischen Künstler)*, wobei er aber die These vertrat, daß die Schönheit gleichwohl für die »Jungen« in ihrer Kunst ein wesentliches Merkmal ist.<sup>13</sup> Die Intervention Franks haben die Geschichtsschreiber der kroatischen Kunst und insbesondere der Literatur unbesonnen verworfen, da diese einen »anwältlichen« Charakter aufweist und zwar ohne irgendeinen theoretischen Wert. Der historiographis-

<sup>12</sup> Janko Ibler (Pseudonym Desiderius), *Literarna pisma, piše jih nekoj gospodi Desiderius*, Sloboda, Sušak 1881; heute in der Edition »Polemike u hrvatskoj književnosti«, Zagreb 1982, Bd. 4, S. 791.

<sup>13</sup> Josip Frank, *U obranu hrvatskih umjetnika*, Antwort auf die Epistel von Fra Š. Kuhač »Anarkija u hrvatskoj književnosti i umjetnosti«, Zagreb 1898; heute in der Edition »Polemike u hrvatskoj književnosti«, Zagreb 1983, Bd. 7, S. 535–566.

che Irrtum und Fehlgriff ist aber offensichtlich: Franks Schrift stellt gerade durch seinen *anwältlichen* Charakter einen autochthonen Ausdruck jener Zeit, jenes Schaffens und jener Epoche dar: es handelte sich dabei nicht so sehr um eine Einführung oder eine Entdeckung der Schönheit sondern um eine *Rehabilitierung*, also *Verteidigung* dessen, was angegriffen, negiert und entwertet wurde, und dessen Recht und Würde folglich wiederherzustellen ist. Aus diesem Grund stellt Franks Schrift den Zeitgeist dar; signum temporis, als es in Kroatien galt, die Schönheit für die Kroaten sowohl mit politischen als auch anwältlichen Mitteln zu verteidigen.

Die unmittelbare Bejahung der Schönheit vertrat, wiederholen wir das, nicht vom Standpunkt der »Alten« sondern im Namen der »Jungen« und der »Modernisten« Branimir Weisner-Livadić; und zwar nicht zufällig, nicht nur in einem Augenblick, sondern kontinuierlich, als ein Prinzip. Demzufolge zur Zeit und nach der »Szession«, und sogar nach seiner Mitarbeit in der Zeitschrift »Život«. Deshalb wäre interessant, einen späteren, weniger bekannten oder beinah unbekanntem Text anzuführen, der nach Arnolds Auftreten und der Polemik zwischen Livadić und Arnold erschienen ist; ein Text von Livadić, der wegen einiger anderen Momente auch relevant ist, in dem er (was hier wichtig ist), über den Roman *Dva svijeta (Zwei Welten)* von Vjenceslav Novak schreibend, hervorhebt, daß für ihn (d.h. Livadić) die Schönheit eine kritisch-interpretativ-wert-ästhetische Funktion hat: »Hier überträgt Novak sein *Empfinden der Schönheit* in die Welt der Stimmen, tief davon überzeugt, daß die Musik Gefühle ausdrückt«. <sup>14</sup> Im Gegensatz zu Marjanović, der sich vom Primat der ästhetischen Kategorie der Schönheit distanzierte, indem er Franks Verteidigung der Schönheit bei den Jungen mißachtete und sich primär für die Psychologie einsetzte, bejaht Livadić, deren Ausgangspunkt die Psychologie ist, wobei er das Gefühl als die zentrale ästhetische Kategorie aufstellt, die Psychologie zusammen mit der Kategorie der Schönheit, indem er sie beide als für die Kroatische Moderne in gleichem Maße wesentlich und konstitutiv versteht und sie als solche auch ausbaut.

Daß dabei die Kategorie der Schönheit nicht einfach ein Ball war, den sich gegenseitig die »Alten« und die »Jungen« zuwarfen (und vorwarfen!), bezeugt ihr lebendiger Widerhall nach Ablauf der Kroatischen Moderne, so daß man in einigen Interpretationen aus der späteren Perspektive sogar im Ästhetizismus und Artismus eine allgemeine (so der junge Haler z.B. negative) Charakteristik der Kroatischen Moderne sah. Die unantastbare, permanente und schließlich definitive Einführung der Schönheit gelang dem modernsten aller Modernisten, dem luziden Talent von Antun Gustav Matoš,

<sup>14</sup> Branimir Livadić, *Vjenceslav Novak*, *Savremenik*, Zagreb I/1906, Nummer 1, S. 29. Vgl. auch: Zlatko Posavac, *O esteticizmu Moderne*, *Odjek*, Sarajevo XXXVII/1986, Nr. 2.

der weder den Jungen noch den Alten angehörte. Er wird nach Ablauf der Kroatischen Moderne, im Jahre 1911, indem er sich des Essays unter dem Titel *Teofil Gautier* bedient, innerhalb einer geschichtlichen Perspektive ausharrend und wie oft früher zusammenfassend den Begriff der Schönheit in Rahmen einer wichtigen und bis jetzt übersehenen, oftmals nicht berücksichtigten und wiederum offensichtlich verschwiegenen Formulierung bejahen: »Weil die *Schönheit*, ewig und warm wie eine *Fackel des modernen Zeitalters*, die Schönheit des Perikles, Venedigs und V. Hugos, als *Verwirklichung des potenzierten Lebens* all jene *Energie* besitzt, die uns der *Gedanke* oft *entzieht* und in der Art eines Hamlets wegnimmt. Flaubert und Gautier sind Nihilisten, Verächter und Verzweifelte, dennoch gab der Glaube an die Schönheit und die Schönheit selbst ihrem Leben einen Sinn, eine Richtung, einen höheren Wert und ein Leben überhaupt.«<sup>15</sup> Matoš bejaht und definiert also die Schönheit als »Verwirklichung des *potenzierten Lebens*!« Das ist eine These, die von großer Wichtigkeit für den geschichtlichen Kontext ist, für die Interpretation und Bestimmung der Jahrhundertwende; für das Verständnis des Begreifens der Schönheit im vergangenen neunzehnten Jahrhundert, als auch für ein richtiges Verständnis der ästhetischen Konzeptionen des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts. Jeder Kenner erkennt nämlich auf Anhieb, was für Komponenten, Assoziationen und in Hinblick auf Kroatien gleichwohl geschichtliche Konsequenzen in diesem Zitat zum Vorschein kommen. Die klassische Schönheit ist das nicht mehr, und gerade diese Einsicht ist notwendig, um die Epoche, in der Arnold wirkt, zu verstehen.

Als Einführung in die Möglichkeit des richtigen Verständnisses der ästhetischen Auffassungen von Arnold, ihrer Gründe, ihrer historischen Rolle und seines geschichtlichen Stellenwertes im geschichtlichen Kontext überhaupt, daß heißt sowohl innerhalb der kroatischen inländischen, lokalen mitteleuropäischen Stimmung (einiger relevanten Aspekte der kroatischen künstlerischen Produktion, die wir flüchtig skizziert haben), als auch innerhalb der europäischen und weltweiten Kontextualität in Hinblick auf den Charakter der Philosophie und Ästhetik von Arnold im Sinne der philosophischen, theoretischen Tätigkeit, also als eine Einleitung in eine entsprechende interpretative Auseinandersetzung – ist noch etwas erforderlich. Man muß nämlich zu diesem Zweck in aller Kürze die zeitgenössische Lage der Theorie beziehungsweise der *Philosophie* um die Jahrhundertwende in ihrem geschichtlich-zeitgenössischen Horizont schildern. Und zwar mit den Augen der Zeitgenossen. Was die Ästhetik selbst betrifft, wurden seitens des Autors dieses Artikels die Elemente einer solchen Kontextualität in einigen vorher-

<sup>15</sup> Antun Gustav Matoš, *Teofil Gautier*, *Obzor*, LH/1911; heute in SD 1973, Bd. IX, S. 141–145; die angeführte Stelle ist auf S. 145. Kursive im Zitat von ZP.

gehenden Untersuchungen präsentiert,<sup>16</sup> wobei als eine Illustration der zeitgenössischen Lage der Philosophie das Werk von Oswald Külpe aus dem Jahre 1902 unter dem Titel *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Deutschland* (5. Aufl., Leipzig 1911) gute Dienste leisten wird. Dem ist aber eine Bemerkung vorzuschicken: da der Einfluß der deutschen Philosophie um die Jahrhundertwende in Kroatien relativ am stärksten zu spüren war, wird man nachträglich nur einige Ergänzungen zufügen müssen, die es erlauben werden, Külpes Darstellung als ein Dokument der Zeitgenossen der Kroatischen Moderne bei der Klärung der geistig-theoretischen Situation, die in Kroatien um die Jahrhundertwende unter Anwendung erforderlicher Proportionierung vorzufinden ist, restlos zu benutzen.<sup>17</sup>

Der Inhalt des Buches von Külpe ist in fünf Abschnitte mit indikativen Titeln aufgeteilt. Neben dem ersten, allgemeinen einleitenden Abschnitt am Anfang wird im zweiten Abschnitt der *Positivismus* behandelt, in dem als herausragende Namen Ernst Mach und Eugen Dühring vorkommen. Der Positivismus spielte in Kroatien zur Zeit der Kroatischen Moderne eine wichtige Rolle, so daß der Darstellung von Külpe natürlich auch noch der Einfluß des französischen und englischen Positivismus zuzufügen ist, wobei in Hinblick auf die Ästhetik die Tatsache wichtig ist, daß gerade in den neunziger Jahren des neunzehnten Jahrhundert in Zagreb die Übersetzung des Werkes *Filozofija umjetnosti (Philosophie der Kunst)* von Hippolyte Taine veröffentlicht wurde, und daß einen großen Einfluß auch Spencers Evolutionismus (beispielsweise bei Ljudevit Dvorniković) hatte. Im dritten Abschnitt des Buches von Külpe wird der Materialismus behandelt, in dem der Name von Ernst Hæckel hervorgehoben wird, während der vierte Abschnitt den Titel Naturalismus (der gewiß philosophisch und nicht literaturgeschichtlich gedacht ist) aufweist, in dem die Ansichten von Ludwig Feuerbach und Friedrich Nietzsche dargestellt werden. In einer solchen kurzen Inhaltsangabe könnte die Rolle des Gedankengutes von Nietzsche neben anderen Namen leicht verschwinden, obwohl gerade Nietzsche in ganz Europa und in Kroatien zur Zeit der Moderne von außerordentlicher Bedeutung war. Deshalb wird hier von Nietzsche mehrmals noch die Rede sein. Im fünften Abschnitt

<sup>16</sup> S. Kapitel *Hrvatska estetika u doba Moderne* im Buch von Zlatko Posavac, *Estetika u Hrvata*, Zagreb 1986; was den europäischen Kontext betrifft, s. die Studie desselben Autors *Estetika Alberta Bazala u doba hrvatske Moderne*, in der einige wichtigere europäische Ästhetiker als Zeitgenossen von Bazala und der Moderne apostrophiert werden: Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine, Zagreb XIV/1988, Nr. 27–28. Jetzt im Buch von Zlatko Posavac, *Novija hrvatska estetika* (Neuere kroatische Ästhetik), Zagreb 1991.

<sup>17</sup> Oswald Külpe, *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Deutschland: Eine Charakteristik ihrer Hauptrichtungen nach Vortragen gehalten im Ferienkurs für Lehrer 1901 zu Würzburg; fünfte, verbesserte Auflage*, Leipzig 1911 (1. Auflage 1902).



wird der ziemlich breit angelegter *Idealismus* bearbeitet, wobei neben Hermann Lotze, Eduard von Hartman und Wilhelm Wundt die Spitzenstellung Gustav Th. Fechner (der sonst als Begründer der positivistisch konzipierten experimentellen psychologischen Ästhetik bekannt ist) einnimmt. Hier ist sofort ruhigen Gewissens hinzuzufügen, daß H. Lotze in Kroatien am Vorabend der Moderne (bei Arnold in der Abhandlung *Zadnja bića (Letzte Wesen)* aus dem Jahre 1888) einen großen Widerhall fand, wobei dann um die Jahrhundertwende Wundt auf verschiedene Weisen aktualisiert wurde: vor allem durch seinen Psychologismus (in Kroatien gab es pro und contra Stimmen), dann durch den Voluntarismus und insbesondere noch durch sein Werk *Völkerpsychologie*; dieses Werk spielte eine große Rolle innerhalb der Problematik des Verhältnisses zwischen der Nation und der Kunst, die eine der konstitutiven Themen der Kroatischen Moderne war, und die durch die Antithetik und Heftigkeit der ausdrucksvollen Auseinandersetzungen geprägt wurde, wobei diese ein wichtiger thematischer Bestandteil der ästhetischen Ansichten von Arnold war.

Külpes Überblick übermittelt natürlich kein Bild der philosophischen Verhältnisse in Kroatien, dennoch stellt er größtenteils das Schema des philosophisch-theoretischen Widerhalls und eine analoge Profilierung des geistigen Klimas in Kroatien um die Jahrhundertwende dar. Falls man diesem Überblick den spezifisch starken Herbartismus und den energisch aktivierten Neuhomismus hinzufügt, dann stellt die Übereinstimmung mit dem Überblick von Külpe einen annehmbaren Ausgangspunkt dar, der sich mit dem *Fin de siècle* deckt. Natürlich daß sich das Bild der philosophischen Strömungen um die Jahrhundertwende aus einem größeren zeitlichen Abstand und unter einer breiter angelegten Berücksichtigung sowohl des deutschen als auch insbesondere des nichtdeutschen Anteils sofort einigermaßen ändert und zwar nicht nur bei der Aufzählung der Namen sondern auch in der Interpretation, was beispielsweise an Hand des Abschnitts *Die Philosophie des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts* aus der kurzen Taschenausgabe Vorländers *Geschichte der Philosophie* aus dem Jahre 1932 bestens zu illustrieren ist, wodurch die elementare *Skizze* des notwendigen geschichtlichen Kontextes als vorläufig und vorübergehend genug ergänzt zu betrachten ist.<sup>18</sup>

Zwecks Profilierung der Ästhetik in Kroatien sind gewiß am Anfang noch die relativ unbedeutenden, dennoch wahrnehmbaren französischen Einflüsse Bergsons (dessen Bedeutung erst in der Zeit zwischen den Weltkriegen in den Vordergrund rücken wird) zuzufügen, als auch gleich der zu Beginn des

<sup>18</sup> Karl Vorländer, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, Berlin 1932. Auf Grund der 7. Auflage der Originalausgabe von Karl Vorländers 'Geschichte der Philosophie' in 3 Bände, Verlag Felix Meiner in Leipzig 1927, mit Kurzungen herausgegeben von Dr. Johannes Hoffmeister.

zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts ziemlich sichtbarer, aber auch relevanter, moderner Einfluß Benedetto Croces aus Italien.

Falls man noch die potentielle Reflexe des gesamten neunzehnten Jahrhunderts in Betracht zieht, dann gilt unter Berücksichtigung des französischen Positivismus für das Gebiet Österreichs (beziehungsweise der Österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie, deren Bestandteil damals Kroatien noch immer war) eine charakteristische Feststellung, die Jens Malte Fischer im Buch *Fin de siècle; Kommentar zu einer Epoche* macht: »Weder Hegel, noch Schopenhauer prägten das geistige Klima, sondern Bolzano und Herbart.«<sup>19</sup> Und solche Zustände im neunzehnten Jahrhundert haben sich natürlich in der Artikulation der Kroatischen Moderne widerspiegelt, obwohl schon zu dieser Zeit die frühere absolute Dominanz des Herbartismus nachzulassen begann: zuerst ganz allmählich und dann rasch immer mehr und mehr.

Eine der besonders betonten, geistig stark wirkenden Komponenten, einen der ausdrucksvollsten Komplexe, Thesen und zugleich auch Antithesen in ganz Europa um die Jahrhundertwende bilden dennoch die Auffassungen und Ansichten eines besonders gefeierten und umstrittenen Autors, den die angeführten Überblicke und insbesondere auch andere Übersichten zwar erwähnen, aber dessen weitreichende Einflußnahme auf die Zeit der Kroatischen Moderne gerade in Hinblick auf den Bereich der Ästhetik aus diesen Übersichten nicht immer ersichtlich ist. Es ist die Rede von den philosophischen und mit diesen unzertrennlich verbundenen ästhetischen Auffassungen von Friedrich Nietzsche. Im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert wurde das Opus Nietzsches trotz allen Kontroversen als ein bedeutender Gedankengut der Geschichte der Philosophie akzeptiert, trotzdem wird seine Popularität und Einflußnahme um die Jahrhundertwende noch heute nicht als eine Selbstverständlichkeit angesehen. In diesem Sinne stellen »die unzähligen Einflüsse Nietzsches ab 1890«, deren Vorhandensein Karl Löwith mit recht feststellt, eine wirklich beinahe überraschende geschichtliche Wirklichkeit dar. Daß dabei gerade das Jahr 1890 erwähnt wird, ist kein Zufall sondern ein Beweis dafür, daß gerade mit diesem Jahr die Periode der Moderne beginnt.<sup>20</sup> Für

<sup>19</sup> Jens Malte Fischer, *Fin de siècle; Kommentar zu einer Epoche*, München 1978, S. 15. Dennoch erfuhr Schopenhauer, um die Wahrheit zu sagen, in der zweiten Hälfte und am Ende des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts als auch zu Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts in Kroatien gewissen stärkeren Widerhall. S. auch Zlatko Posavac, *Runa recepcija Croceove estetike u Hrvat-skaj*, Filozofska istraživanja, Zagreb XIII/1993, Nr. 50. S. 675–684.

<sup>20</sup> Karl Löwith, *Von Hegel zu Nietzsche, Der Revolutionäre Bruch im Denken des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*, nach der 8. Auflage, Hamburg 1981; Vorwort zur ersten Auflage (1939), S. 7; in der Übersetzung *Od Hegela do Nietzschea*, Sarajevo 1988, ebenso S. 7. Auch Gotthart Wunberg, *Die Wiener Moderne; Literatur, Kunst und Musik zwischen 1890 und 1910*. Reclam Taschenbuchverlag, Stuttgart 1994.

Karl Löwith ist Nietzsche nämlich (was insbesondere zu berücksichtigen aber auch kritisch zu interpretieren ist) ein »überzeugter Entdecker der 'Modernität'«,<sup>21</sup>

Wie auch immer der Widerhall der Werke von Nietzsche unterschiedlich war, von oberflächlicher bis zur tieferen Verständnis, besserem oder schlechterem Begreifen, bis sogar zum völligen Mißverständnis und manchmal sehr geschmackloser Buchstäblichkeit, ist es ohne Bewußtmachung der Tatsache der Einflußnahme Nietzsches (wenn auch fragmentarisch, partiell, ausdrucksvoller oder blasser) nicht möglich, die geistigen Strömungen, Thesen und Antithesen der Moderne nicht nur auf der streng philosophischen sondern gerade, wie schon erwähnt, sowohl auf der ästhetischen und insofern praktisch auch auf der künstlerisch-schaffenden Ebene zu verstehen.

Die Anmerkung über Nietzsche gilt im vollen Umfang mit einigen Besonderheiten auch für Kroatien, obwohl Nietzsche zur Zeit der Moderne *keine deklarierte Anhänger* hatte. Jedoch hatte von der katholischen Seite Cherubin Šegvić schon ziemlich früh die Anwesenheit Nietzsches in der kroatischen Literatur festgestellt, wobei dies in der Ästhetik polemisch Bazala aber auch Arnold feststellen wird, und über Nietzsche werden Matoš und Marjanović schreiben, wobei dann am Ende der Moderne infolge der verständlichen Idiosynkrasie der katholischen Seite gegenüber Nietzsche Katinov 1910 im achten Jahrbuch der ersten kroatischen philosophischen (eigentlich theologisch-philosophischen) Zeitschrift »Hrvatska straža« wiederum die Durchträngung der Kroatischen Moderne durch den starken Widerhall der Ideen Nietzsches, wenn auch in »popularisierten«, vulgarisierten Versionen, bestätigen wird und zwar auf eine polemische Weise: »Das Nietzscheum ist mit unserem Zeitalter zusammengewachsen, es ist ein Abbild des Geistes und Denkens unserer Zeit. Mit seinem Geist ist nicht nur der philosophische Gedanke sondern auch der literarische und künstlerische Geschmack durchdrungen«.<sup>22</sup>

Grundsätzlich und methodologisch, historiographisch wurde die folgende Frage gestellt, wobei diese Frage im Falle Kroatiens noch potenziierter zu stellen ist: Woher und auf welche Weise ist ein so überraschender Einfluß Nietzsches zustande gekommen, da es bekannt ist, daß der Autor für die niedrige Auflage der letzten Bänder von *Zarathustra* nicht wußte, was er damit machen sollte!? Die Historiographie bietet aber eine interessante Lösung dieses Rätsels an: »Verantwortlich für die eruptionsartige Verbreitung Nietzsches seit 1890 war vor allem, wie schon die Zeitgenossen erkannten, der

<sup>21</sup> A. a. O., S. 194.

<sup>22</sup> Katinov, *Nietzsche i Nietzschejština kod nas*, Hrvatska straža, VIII/1910, S. 162.

dänische Kritiker George Brandes. 1889 hatte er zuerst über Nietzsche Vorträge in Kopenhagen gehalten, 1890 ihn in Deutschen Rundschau propagiert...«, schreibt der hier schon erwähnte Jens Malte Fischer.<sup>23</sup> Da Brandes aber schon ziemlich bekannt war, dessen Einfluß man auch in Kroatien zu verspüren mochte, ist es verständlich, daß auch auf diese Weise, direkt oder indirekt, Nietzsches Einfluß auch in den Strömungen der Kroatischen Moderne eine Spur hinterlassen hat.

Indem man die summarische Serie der Momenten in Betracht zieht, die hier als Einheit auf eine neue Weise zwecks Klärung und Verständnisses sowohl der kroatischen Kunst, der »künstlerischen Praxis« als auch der Kunsttheorie beziehungsweise der kroatischen Ästhetik um die Jahrhundertwende eingesetzt werden, wird dadurch – neben der sonst schon festgestellten pluralistischen Struktur dieser Epoche – die methodologisch notwendige *zusätzliche Vorbereitung* für die Explikation der ästhetischen Ansichten Arnolds geschaffen, die im Rahmen dieser Epoche, der Kroatischen Moderne also, um die Jahrhundertwende zum Vorschein kommen. Dadurch wird zugleich die Optik zwecks genauerer und extensiver Interpretation *aller* ästhetischen Texte von Arnold verbessert, wobei diese reliefartiger, ohne Vorurteile und nicht mehr einseitig gestaltet wird. Da es mehrmals dazu kam, daß man über Arnold negativ sprach oder einfach schwieg, ist hier in Bezug auf den ästhetischen Aspekt und insbesondere im geschichtlichen Rahmen der Kroatischen Moderne das methodologische Postulat – *audiatur et altera pars* – anzuwenden.

Da Arnold mit seiner theoretischen Tätigkeit schon vor der Kroatischen Moderne begann und da er ästhetische Themen auch in nicht speziell ästhetischen Schriften vorbringt, wird die Darstellung unter Berücksichtigung der biographisch-geschichtlichen Reihenfolge erfolgen, indem man alle, für die Ästhetik relevante Thesen enthaltenden Texte in Betracht ziehen wird. Die Erörterung wird hier ungeachtet der verständlichen, insbesondere späteren »Deckung« im Einklang mit den folgenden Phasen und thematischen Einheiten beziehungsweise Problemkreisen im Sinne sowohl der persönlichen, biographisch chronologisierten Interessen von Arnold als auch der Artikulation der geschichtlichen Aktualität erfolgen: 1. ästhetische Fragmente in der Abhandlung *Etika i poviest (Ethik und Geschichte)* (1879); 2. Ästhetik und Psychologie (das Problem des ästhetischen Gefühls und der Bestimmung der Schönheit in zahlreichen Ausgaben des Lehrhandbuches

<sup>23</sup> Jens Malte Fischer, *Fin de siècle; Kommentar zu einer Epoche*, Winkler Verlag, München 1978, S. 39. Hinsichtlich dieser Studie ist auch die Bemerkung wertvoll, daß zwecks Feststellung »der Ursachen für den Rückgang der Rezeption von Nietzsche in Österreich eine besondere Untersuchung erforderlich wäre« (S. 39). - Über Brandes Nietzsche-Propagierung unterrichtete sehr informativ und schnell in einer (stellenweise problematischen) Studie unter dem Titel *Georg Brandes* Milan Marjanović 1903 in der Zeitschrift »Hrvatska misao«; nachträglich veröffentlicht im Buch *Književne studije*, Split 1911 (Nietzsche s. S. 65–68).

*Psihologija (Psychologie)*, das die ganze Periode der Kroatischen Moderne durchdringt; Erstausgabe 1893); 3. das Problem der Verhältnisses zwischen der Nation und der Kunst im Rahmen der Tätigkeit Arnolds als Vorsitzenden des Vereins Matica Hrvatska (die erste Rede erfolgte 1903); und schließlich 4. das moderne Problem des Verhältnisses zwischen der Wissenschaft und der Kunst (1906) als auch 5. das Verhältnis zwischen dem Glauben und der Kunst (1908) in den reifen, letzten Schriften von Arnold.

### 1. *Ästhetische Prämissen in der Abhandlung »Etika i poviest« (Ethik und Geschichte)*

Im Rahmen der Interpretation und sogar der doxographischen Darstellung der ästhetischen Ansichten von Arnold, insbesondere aber im Rahmen ihrer Bewertung und Bestimmung ihrer geschichtlichen Rolle und des Stellenwertes im kulturgeschichtlichen und philosophischen Kontext, wie auch im Rahmen der Bestimmung des Kontextes selbst (wie wir schon hinsichtlich einiger Dinge dies sehen konnten) wird es erforderlich sein – vielleicht ist es nützlich, im Voraus darauf hinzuweisen –, sich den bisherigen Standardzugängen zu den Darstellungen überhaupt und insbesondere zu den Zugängen zur Bedeutung des Opus von Arnold zu widersetzen. Und zwar den meisten von ihnen und nicht allen und allem, was in ihnen vorgebracht wird! Dabei hat dies nicht nur wegen bloßer Widersetzung der gebräuchlichen, obwohl unzulässig inerten und beschränkten, engherzigen und meistens unrichtigen, voreingenommenen und nur teilweise intellektuellen »Rezeption« der kroatischen kulturellen, künstlerischen, philosophischen und sogar ästhetischen Tradition, so auch des Beitrags von Arnold, zu erfolgen. Der Sinn liegt nicht in bloßer Entgegensetzung sondern geht aus einem anderen, neuen und freieren methodologischen Zugang hervor, nämlich eine im größeren Maße wahrheitsgetreue und authentische Erkenntnis des Werkes und der Zeit zu gewinnen und zwar gleichzeitig mit der Erkenntnis der Relevanz, der offenen Probleme und ihrer Konsequenzen. Dabei handelt es sich um Probleme, die durch Arnold Arbeit aufgeworfen, bewußt gemacht und erleuchtet wurden.

Im Gegensatz zum herkömmlichen Verfahren, wonach Arnolds ästhetische Tätigkeit nur im Lichte der Auseinandersetzungen zwischen den »Alten« und den »Jungen« am Anfang des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts gesehen wird, ist hervorzuheben, daß Arnold viele seine ästhetische Thesen schon vor dem Ausbruch der erwähnten Auseinandersetzungen formulierte, wobei er die ästhetische Probleme in theoretischer Hinsicht zum ersten Mal viel, viel früher behandelte. Diese sind ganz knapp, haltbar und mit vielen wesentlichen, grundlegenden Implikationen in der ersten, 1879 veröffentlichten

theoretischen Schrift Arnolds unter dem Titel *Etika i poviest*, die mit einem explikativen, für den Charakter der Schrift und ihre Entstehungszeit indikativen Untertitel: *Abhandlung, die vom Beauftragten für die strengen Prüfungen an der Philosophischen Fakultät bewilligt wurde* versehen ist, formuliert. Eine Angabe, die in den bisherigen Darstellungen oder Anführungen von Arnolds ästhetischen Ansichten überhaupt nicht erwähnt wird, geschweige denn, daß diese Angabe in interpretativer Absicht in Betracht gezogen wäre.

Tatsache ist, daß sich Arnold mit den ästhetischen und direkten künstlerischen Phänomenen am meisten und am umfassendsten zur Zeit der, man könnte dies so beschreiben, zweiten Welle des Konflikts der »Alten« und der »Jungen« in der Kroatischen Moderne beschäftigt; es wäre aber falsch, daraus die Schlußfolgerung zu ziehen, daß seine ästhetischen Ansichten erst dann und ad hoc formuliert wurden. Im Gegenteil, die philosophische Grundlage zu seinen Ansichten wurde schon in der erwähnten Abhandlung aus dem Jahre 1879 geschaffen. Ebenso würde es falsch sein, in dieser Tatsache nur noch eine weitere Bestätigung dessen zu erblicken, daß Arnold angeblich an der Polemik mit den »Jungen« und ihren »neuen Ideen« mit einer »Verspätung«, mit »veralteten«, kalendarisch sogar zwei Jahrzehnte »alten« Themen und Problemen teilgenommen hat. Im Gegensatz dazu hat Arnold gleich am Anfang sowohl den Rang und die Thematik, die für die Jahrhundertwende beziehungsweise Kroatische Moderne als antizipierend zu betrachten sind, erreicht, wobei aber auch offensichtlich ist, daß Arnold später die ästhetische Problematik entwickelt, erweitert und vertieft hat, so daß diese für die zeitgenössischen aktuellen Probleme jederzeit souverän ansprechbar war. Dies wird aufgrund der genaueren, thematisch-problematisch entfalteren und vollständigeren Darstellung sichtbar sein.

Daß bei Arnold die ästhetische Thematik ganz am Anfang in der Schrift unter dem Titel *Etika i poviest* aufzufinden ist, könnte ungewöhnlich erscheinen, und falls man die Sache nicht genau kennt, könnte man daraus falsche Schlußfolgerungen ziehen. Jedoch ist diese Verbindung mit dem Titel indikativ und symbolisch, wenn man Arnolds spätere ästhetische Ansichten in Betracht zieht. Dies aber nur als ein bloßes Anzeichen. Die ästhetische Problematik stellt nur den Ausgangspunkt der Schlußfolgerungen hinsichtlich des Titelthemas dar, das Arnold im Geiste der Philosophie Herbarts behandelt, so daß allen Kennern der Lehre von Herbart der deduktive Ausgangspunkt bekannt sein wird, in dem Arnold seine Betrachtungen des Verhältnisses zwischen der Ethik und der Geschichte begründet: »Ethik ist ein Teil der Ästhetik – die Ästhetik des Willens«.<sup>24</sup> Folglich muß Arnold, um das

<sup>24</sup> Duro Arnold, *Etika i poviest*, Zagreb 1879, S. 2.

Problem der Ethik und ihre Beziehung zur Geschichte zu erörtern, den ästhetischen Ausgangspunkt skizzieren.

Gleich zu Beginn sollte man sagen, daß Arnold nicht der erste ist, der die These derselben Richtung in Kroatien vertritt, da diese in den 1868 von Iso Kršnjavi veröffentlichten *Listovi o praktičnoj filozofiji, mladoj prijateljici na zabavu i pouku napisani (Briefe über die praktische Philosophie, an eine junge Freundin zwecks Unterhaltung und Belehrung geschrieben)* enthalten ist. Neben einer Reihe von Autoren, bei denen eine klare Spur des ästhetischen Herbartismus (Kržan, Basariček, u.a.) zu entdecken ist, ist hervorzuheben, daß Arnold außerdem weder ein wortführender noch einer der konsequentesten Anhänger des ästhetischen Formalismus von Herbart war – da dies in Kroatien (unter direktem Einfluß von Robert Zimmermann) Franjo von Marković gewesen ist. Dennoch bildet den Anfang, den Ausgangspunkt und die Grundlage Arnolds ästhetischer Betrachtungen gerade Herbarts ästhetische Auffassung; und zwar mit einigen im Rahmen der ästhetischen Konfrontationen der Kroatischen Moderne ziemlich wichtigen Akzenten.

Arnold geht in seinen Folgerungen von der Unterscheidung aus, daß die Erkenntnis zweierartig sein kann, *theoretisch* und *praktisch*: »die Untersuchung erster Art bezieht sich auf dasjenige, was hier *ist*, während sich die Untersuchung zweiter Art auf dasjenige bezieht, was hier *sein sollte*«. »und was es hier nicht gibt.«<sup>25</sup> Zur praktischen Erkenntnis oder sozusagen in die praktische Philosophie gehören daher die Ästhetik und die Ethik. Dabei ist es aber wichtig, ein wesentliches Moment hervorzuheben, das hinsichtlich der späteren ästhetischen Einstellung Arnolds nicht zu vergessen ist, da dieses Moment den theoretischen Ausgangspunkt und folglich auch seine Grundlage bildet. Da »es Dinge gibt, bei denen die Erfragung ihrer theoretischen Natur, dessen, was sie sind, nicht genug ist, sondern ist es obendrein noch erforderlich, zu untersuchen, ob diese auch so bleiben sollen, wie sie sind, oder sollte man sie sogar umgestalten«, erscheint diese »praktische Erfragung notwendigerweise dort, wo auf *die Gestaltung der Dinge die Freiheit einwirkte*, infolge deren sie auch anders sein könnten, als sie sind.«<sup>26</sup> Es ist offensichtlich, daß hier Arnold *den Begriff der Freiheit* (im Unterschied zur logischen oder naturwissenschaftlichen Notwendigkeit) wegen der Würde der ethischen Sphäre und der moralischen Tat bedarf, indem er eine Mittelstellung zwischen dem Indeterminismus und Determinismus vertritt; da aber die Sphäre des »Praktischen« auch den ästhetischen Bereich umfaßt, ist deshalb die *Freiheit auch für ästhetische Schöpfungen fundamental*. Als auch antizipierend für das ganze Geschehen der Kroatischen Moderne und der modernen Kunst überhaupt.

<sup>25</sup> A. a. O., S. 1.

<sup>26</sup> A. a. O., S. 1–2; Kursive im zweiten Teil des Zitats (S. 2) von ZP.

Ferner, da in der Sphäre des »Praktischen« nicht die Rede von Dingen ist, wie sie sind, sondern davon, wie sie sein könnten oder sollten, ist offensichtlich das Gemeinsame der Ästhetik und der Ethik *die Abgabe von Werturteilen*: Billigung oder Mißbilligung. Die ästhetische Form ist dabei in logischer Hinsicht primärer und an Hand ihres Bereiches umfassender. »Falls die Dinge, die durch *freie Schöpfung* entstanden sind, beim Forscher das *Gefühl* der Behaglichkeit, des Gefallens, des Beifalls hervorrufen – dann sollen sie so bleiben, wie sie sind; falls sie aber umgekehrt das Gefühl der Unbehaglichkeit, des Nichtgefallens, des Mißfallens hervorrufen – sind sie umzugestalten. In jenem Fall bezeichnen wir sie als *schön*, unbedingt wertvoll; in diesem als *häßlich*, unbedingt wertlos.«<sup>27</sup> Der Gegenstand »des ästhetischen Urteils muß aber zusammengesetzt sein; da das Gefühl des Gefallens keineswegs einfache Elemente sondern erst ihre Verhältnisse hervorrufen können.«<sup>28</sup> Der Charakter und das Moment der Relation, d.h. des »Verhältnisses«, bildet zugleich den Unterschied zwischen den ästhetischen und ethischen Urteilen. »Das Subjekt des ästhetischen Urteils ist das harmonische Verhältnis der Farben, der Stimmen... und des ethischen jedoch das Verhältnis des Willens.«<sup>29</sup>

Die angeführte Skizze bildet das Gerüst dessen, was in diesem Augenblick Arnold über die Ästhetik schreibt, indem er im Rahmen des Herbart'schen Formalismus bleibt, dem er aber nicht bis zu Ende treu bleiben wird. Trotzdem war das Resultat dieser formal strukturierten Grundlage die Konsequenz, der er bis zu Ende treu bleiben wird und die schon infolge des im Rahmen des Positivismus entwickelten Relativismus des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts strittig war, wobei diese Konsequenz zuletzt zur Zeit der Moderne zum Stein des Anstoßes und zum Streitgegenstand geworden ist; nur das Arnolds Konsequenz keinen formalen Grund aufwies.

Die Gegenstände der sowohl ästhetischen als auch ethischen praktischen Beurteilung sind entweder »unbedingt wertvoll« oder »unbedingt wertlos«, was zu bedeuten hat, »daß die ästhetischen als auch ethischen Urteile absolut und allgemein sind; und die Begriffe des Schönen und Häßlichen, des Guten und Bösen die einzigen, mit deren Hilfe man den absoluten, allgemeine Wert eines bestimmten Gegenstandes und eines bestimmten Willens ausdrücken kann.«<sup>30</sup> Oder, sofern die Rede von ästhetischem Einklang ist, von der Harmonie der Teile, dann muß dasjenige, was schön ist, »notwendigerweise gefallen«,<sup>31</sup> so daß »das Urteil über diesen Einklang nicht subjektiv, relativ, sondern nur objektiv, absolut sein kann«; woraus zu folgen hat, daß »die Ästhetik

<sup>27</sup> A. a. O., S. 2; alle Kursive im Zitat von ZP.

<sup>28</sup> A. a. O., S. 6.

<sup>29</sup> A. a. O., S. 6.

<sup>30</sup> A. a. O., S. 5.

<sup>31</sup> A. a. O., S. 4.



unwiderlegbare und allgemeine Maßstäbe für die Beurteilung des Schönen und Häßlichen aufstellt.<sup>32</sup> Deshalb kann weder das Schöne noch das Häßliche in Zusammenhang mit den »Begriffen der Nützlichkeit, der Begehrenswertigkeit und der Annehmlichkeit« gebracht werden, da wir dadurch »den relativen Wert dieser Objekte ausdrücken«,<sup>33</sup> wie dies im ästhetischen Horizont wörtlich zu lesen ist: »Der absolute Wert eines schönen Objekts kann nicht in der Nützlichkeit, Begehrenswertigkeit, Annehmlichkeit sondern im ständigen, uneigennütigen Gefallen liegen, das sich im ästhetischen Urteil klar ausdrücken läßt.«<sup>34</sup>

Damit wäre hauptsächlich alles expliziert, was Arnold unmittelbar über die ästhetische Probleme in seiner Schrift *Etika i poviest* schreibt. Dabei ist interessant, daß er sowohl die Probleme der Kunstgeschichte beziehungsweise der Geschichtlichkeit des Ästhetischen als auch den »geschichtlichen Relativismus« des Schönen und der Kunst nicht anspricht, obwohl er gegen den allgemeinen geschichtlichen Relativismus und Positivismus polemisiert. Der ästhetische Relativismus erscheint lautstark in der zweiten Hälfte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts und zwar vielerorts und in unterschiedlichen Varianten. Von reiner Oberflächlichkeit bis zu ernstzunehmenden Betrachtungen. Arnold meinte den Relativismus beseitigt zu haben, indem er ihn grundsätzlich ablehnte. Man sollte aber nicht die Auffassung vertreten, daß Arnold, auch bevor er persönlich wegen einiger seiner Behauptungen angegriffen wurde, die theoretische Dimension des Problems der Geschichtlichkeit des Ästhetischen beziehungsweise des Künstlerischen nicht zum Bewußtsein brachte. Man darf ihm ebenso die eventuelle »Unkenntnis« Hegels und der weitreichenden, aus Hegelscher Geschichtsverständnis resultierenden Thesen nicht zum Vorwurf machen, da es sich bei Arnold einfach um eine anfängliche Option zu Gunsten des Herbartismus handelt. Die Kenntnis Hegels (geschweige denn des Positivismus) demonstrierte Arnold in seiner Rektoratsrede im Jahre 1900, wo er unter anderem nicht versäumt, den ästhetischen Aspekt zu betonen: »Die Philosophie sprach niemals mit mehr Stolz als aus dem Munde Hegels... Anlässlich seines Gedankens und teilweise infolge der Lehre seiner Vorläufer veränderte sich die Historiographie und die *Geschichte der Kunst*, Recht und die Staatswissenschaft, Philologie und Naturwissenschaften. In demselben *schönen Buch* hinterließ die absolute Philosophie ihre große Spuren.«<sup>35</sup> Aus allem ist ersichtlich, daß Arnold großen

<sup>32</sup> A. a. O., I c.

<sup>33</sup> A. a. O., S. 5.

<sup>34</sup> A. a. O., S. 6.

<sup>35</sup> Duro Arnold, *Filozofija, prirodne nauke i socijologija; riječ u prilog metafizici (Philosophie, Naturwissenschaften und Soziologie als Beitrag zu Gunsten der Metaphysik)*, in »Govori izrečeni dne 19. listopada 1900. kod instalacije rektora za školsku godinu 1900./1901. u kraljevskom hrvatskom sveučilištu Franje Josipa I.«, Zagreb 1900. S. 25. Kursive im Zitat von ZP.

Wert auf das philosophische Niveau des Problems zu legen pflegte, während er erst später dazu gezwungen sein wird, auf die modifizierten ästhetischen Implikationen der Geschichte eine Antwort zu geben.

In Arnolds Schrift *Etika i poviest* stellt die ästhetische Problematik den primären Gegenstand seiner Interessen einfach nicht dar, und insofern wird sie beschränkt dargestellt. In diesem Sinne schneidet Arnold neben der extensiv theoretischen, philosophischen Thematisierung der Geschichte die Kunst und die ästhetischen Probleme explizite nicht an. Jedoch ist gleichwohl unter dem ästhetischen Gesichtspunkt nicht zu vergessen, daß Arnold in Kroatien zusammen mit Starčević gerade auf die geschichtliche Aktualisierung der Philosophie der Geschichte grundsätzlich eine Antwort gab. Sowohl Arnolds Jugendschrift als auch andere seine Abhandlungen sollte man nämlich nicht nur nach dieser oder jener Lösung bewerten, sondern auf Grund der Problematik, die er eröffnet, indem er ihr die theoretische beziehungsweise philosophische Würde und einen dementsprechenden Horizont verleiht. Und was die Lösungen selbst betrifft, als auch die Verknüpfung des Geschichtlichen und des Ästhetischen, müssen in den später erfolgten Kontroversen auch trotz Arnolds eventuellen nachträglichen Modifikationen die gerade bei Arnold schon früher grundsätzlich gelösten Probleme in Betracht gezogen und in theoretischen Hinsicht respektiert werden, von denen seine Gegner entweder überhaupt nichts wußten oder diese einfach vernachlässigt, verschwiegen haben; in den meisten Fällen waren diese Gegner nicht nur Arnolds Orientierung sondern gerade seinem theoretischen Niveau, dem Horizont seiner Betrachtungen nicht gewachsen. Neben vielen anderen Momenten ist hier auch das Problem der Geschichte zuzuzählen.

Deshalb ist die Antwort auf die Frage: Wie verstand Arnold die Geschichte konkret? nicht zu übergehen, sondern sollte man hier eine zusammenfassende Explikation dessen anbieten. Arnold beantwortet dieser Frage kurzum und ohne Umschweife: »Was ist also Geschichte? Geschichte ist Wille«. <sup>36</sup> Die Antwort Arnolds ist ganz lapidar, so daß diese in der definitiven Fassung bis zur Definition ausgebaut wurde, wonach die Geschichte »der freie Wille der Menschheit« beziehungsweise »Willenschöpfung der Menschheit ist«. <sup>37</sup> Bei den Kennern der Philosophie des neunzehnten Jahrhundert muß der Assoziationskreis, den der philosophisch thematisierte Begriff des Willens hervorruft, nicht im besonderen erweckt werden, obwohl bei Arnold der Horizont der Psychologie und des Herbartismus zu beachten ist: »der Wille ist derjenige Punkt, in dem sich die Geschichte und die Ethik berühren«.

<sup>36</sup> Đuro Arnold, *Etika i poviest*, Zagreb 1879, S. 18.

<sup>37</sup> A. a. O., S. 63f. 67.

woraus zu folgen hat: »Ethik ist die Kritik des Willens überhaupt und deshalb auch die Kritik der Geschichte.«<sup>38</sup> Hinsichtlich der Freiheit und des Willens als einer wesentlichen Bestimmung »hat die Menschheit bis heute nichts mehr getan – als sie es wollte. Dementsprechend ist jedes Zeitalter und jedes Volk zu bewerten.«<sup>39</sup> Arnold vertritt nämlich den Standpunkt: »Die Historiographie hält die Bewertung des Wertes der geschichtlichen Ereignisse für ihr Prinzip«,<sup>40</sup> so daß daher Arnold fordern kann, daß »der Historiker die vollständige Entwicklung des Volkes darzustellen hat: also weder nur dasjenige, was in verschiedenen Zeiten passierte, noch den pragmatischen Bund darzustellen, sondern hat er zu zeigen, welches Volk und welches Jahrhundert seine Lebensaufgabe tüchtig gelöst hat und welches dies nicht tat.«<sup>41</sup> Damit ist Arnolds These mit Hegels Konzeption als auch mit einer eigenartigen Verbindung der ästhetischen Thematik mit der geschichtlichen sehr verwandt. Dabei steht der Mensch als Einzelner in Relation zum eigenen und den anderen Völkern, wie dies auch der Fall unter den Völkern selbst ist. Daher die Norm: »Wir sollten alles, was bei anderen (Völkern) wertvoll und edel ist, lieben – und über all dem hinaus ist das Unsere liebzuhaben.«<sup>42</sup> Und trotz der Tatsache, daß der Ausgangspunkt und der Gedanke der Geschichte in die menschliche Individualität gesetzt ist, in die Bedeutung der Person, bildet die Ideale der Menschheit nicht die Summe der Individuen, sondern »können die Völker erst« durch ein harmonisches Verhältnis untereinander »zur Menschheit werden – zu einem ethischen Kosmos«, wobei bei Arnold der Eindruck erweckt wird, als ob bei ihm ein Widerhall von Schiller und der Beethovens Neunte zu verspüren ist, wenn er die Schlußfolgerung zieht: »Im Weltall wird man keinen faszinierenderen Einklang hören als in dem Augenblick, in dem sich alle Völker wie Brüder umarmen werden.«<sup>43</sup>

In dieser Schlußfolgerung wird das Konzept der Geschichtsauffassung von Arnold profiliert, wie es in der Abhandlung *Etika i poviest* theoretisch und philosophisch konsequent dargestellt ist. Es wäre aber hier nicht angebracht, das Geschichtskonzept von Arnold der Kritik zu unterziehen, indem man ihn abmißt und in die zahlreiche Fülle der Doktrinen des neunzehnten und zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts einordnet, da die Wichtigkeit und Bedeutsamkeit der Philosophie der Geschichte zu jener Zeit immer größer wurde, um dann

<sup>38</sup> A. a. O., S. 19, aber auch 69.

<sup>39</sup> A. a. O., S. 19.

<sup>40</sup> A. a. O., S. 68.

<sup>41</sup> A. a. O., S. 64.

<sup>42</sup> A. a. O., S. 52.

<sup>43</sup> A. a. O., S. 79.

sogar im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert schicksalhaft zu werden.<sup>44</sup> Es ist aber auf die Tatsache hinzuweisen, daß die ästhetische Ausgangsprämisse der Geschichtsdeduktion an Hand der Ethik im Rahmen der Ansichten von Arnold den direkten Zusammenhang des Ästhetischen und des Geschichtlichen notwendigerweise aktualisiert und über die Geschichte der Menschheit als Geschichte der Völker zugleich die Problematik des Verhältnisses zwischen dem Ästhetischen und Nationalen, dem Volk und der Kunst, eröffnet, was später dann auch wirklich zu einem besonderen Thema auswachsen wird. (Im Rahmen der vorliegenden Darstellung erfolgt dies als ein besonderer Abschnitt.) Aus diesem Horizont ist gleich noch auf die *Breite* der Ansichten von Arnold hinzuweisen, genau umgekehrt zu den zahlreichen bis zum heutigen Tag nicht beseitigten Auffassungen der Gegner, die Arnold *Enge* vorgeworfen haben, indem sie ihm den nationalen Isolationismus übelnahmen – was einfach nicht wahr ist. Das ist ein Moment, das aus diesen früheren Jahren auf die späteren Auseinandersetzungen der Kroatischen Moderne zu projizieren ist, wobei dieses Moment in den Polemiken sowohl im ethischen als auch ästhetischen Horizont faktisch nicht berücksichtigt wurde. Ein Beispiel: die schon erwähnte Vorwegnahme der Idee der Freiheit in der ästhetischen Sphäre, die für das Zeitalter der Kroatischen Moderne so wichtig war, hat die Kroatische Moderne bei Arnold »vergessen«! Dennoch ist der Umstand sehr charakteristisch, daß keine Polemik gegen Arnold um die sogenannte »Freiheit des Schaffens« geführt wurde.

Ferner wollte man in Hinblick auf Arnolds ethische und ästhetische Ansichten, da man sie partiell und nicht in der Fülle ihrer theoretischen Möglichkeiten betrachtete (ausgenommen einige Ausnahmefälle!), den Eindruck erwecken, als ob diese Ansichten zum Arsenal des historisch unproduktiven Gedankenguts gehören. Zwar übte Arnold außerhalb des kroatischen vaterländischen kulturellen Kreises keinen Einfluß aus, jedoch gewannen einige Problemkomplexe hinsichtlich der Relevanz ihrer Aufstellung und des Niveaus (und nicht nur der Orientierung) der Lösungen als auch der Art ihres Durchdenkens, die bei Arnold vorzufinden ist, an Bedeutung, indem sie im großen Maße gedanklich produktiv wurden. Und zwar gerade im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert: von der These, daß der Positivismus und die Naturwissenschaften »zu kurz« sind, und daß sie keinen entsprechenden Zugang zu dem

<sup>44</sup> Eine kritische Information und Übersicht der wichtigsten Doktrinen der Philosophie der Geschichte des neunzehnten und zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts s. Robin G. Collingwood, *The idea of History*, London-Oxford-New York 1946, Teil III u. IV. – Die Übersetzung in der Ausgabe Sarajevo-Zagreb 1986. Mehr über die Philosophie der Geschichte in Kroatien des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts s. Zlatko Posavac, *Arnoldova estetika i hrvatska filozofija povijesti u 19. stoljeću*, *Filozofska istraživanja*, Zagreb XV/1995, Nr. 59, S. 901–917.

Phänomen der Geschichte darstellen, bis zur Auffassung hin, daß die Geschichte nicht nur eine Summe der bloßen Tatsachen ist, sondern daß sie auch eine Wertung impliziert. Darin bleibt Arnold weder abseits von einigen berühmten wesentlichen gedanklichen Tendenzen noch umgeht er sie. So wurde beispielsweise die Einführung des Werturteils als »materielles« und nicht nur als formelles Prinzip hinsichtlich der Thematik der Ethik und dann auch der Geschichte, das bei Arnold skizziert vorzufinden ist, bei Max Scheller für das zwanzigste Jahrhundert beispielhaft behandelt, bei dem die ganze Sache sogar so sehr radikalisiert wird, daß der Werthorizont beziehungsweise »Ethos den Ausbau des metaphysischen Systems bedingt«. <sup>45</sup>

Viele Thesen von Arnold fanden einen Widerhall in Kroatien, wurden gelegentlich nicht auf richtigem Niveau akzeptiert; Arnolds Ideen fanden auch ihre Anhänger und Fortsetzer, jedoch waren diese nicht immer von seinem Format und durch seine Systemhaftigkeit geprägt. Leider erzielte aber Arnolds philosophische Behandlung der Geschichte in Kroatien keine ausreichend intensive Kontinuität, wodurch dieses wichtige Thema in den theoretischen Brennpunkt dauerhaft gerückt sein würde. Und doch kann neben dem unmittelbaren Einfluß der großen Denker und der modernen Philosophie des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts in Bezug auf die Belebung dieser Problematik in Kroatien Arnold wenigstens die Rolle der Vorbereitung nicht abgestritten werden. Das ist nämlich aus der Orientierung einiger kroatischen Denker des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts ersichtlich. So sind in den Thesen von Julije Makanac, der wegen seiner antimarxistischen und antikommunistischen Ansichten jahrzehntelang nicht erwähnt wurden, aus dem Jahre 1938 klare Behauptungen aufzufinden, die ohne Erinnerung an Arnolds einstige Anfänge unverständlich sind. »Bei der Erforschung der Kultur ist keine adäquate Methode diejenige der Naturwissenschaften sondern die Methode der Geschichte«, <sup>46</sup> wobei »die geschichtliche Untersuchung ohne das Kriterium, wonach man das historisch Wesentliche von dem historisch Unwesentlichen unterscheidet, nicht möglich ist«, als auch ohne gewisse Werturteile, so daß »die Geschichte als eine Lehre ohne objektive Geltung der Werturteile nicht bestehen kann...« <sup>47</sup> Mit der Behandlung der Geschichte unter dem ästhetischen Aspekt beschäftigte sich direkt auch Pavao Vuk Pavlović, einer der

<sup>45</sup> Was Max Scheler betrifft, s. die nützliche Monographie von Milan Galović, *Bitak i ljubav: Max Scheler – od fenomenologije do filozofske antropologije*, Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo, Zagreb 1989, z.B. S. 88, 168f, 178 u.a.

<sup>46</sup> Julije Makanec, *Marxistička filozofija prirode*, Mala knjižnica Maticе Hrvatske, Kolo III, Zagreb 1938, S. 41. Über das Thema *marxistische Philosophie der Geschichte* schrieb in Kroatien vor Zweitem Weltkrieg Vilko Rieger.

<sup>47</sup> A. a. O., S. 42.

Vercherer Arnolds und teilweise einer seiner Nachfolger, und zwar in seinem reifen Alter in der Abhandlung *Umjetnost i muzejska estetika* (*Kunst und die museale Ästhetik*) aus dem Jahre 1963.<sup>48</sup>

Außerdem fehlt es Arnold in der Abhandlung *Zadnja bića* (1888), in der die ästhetische Thematik nicht behandelt wird und in der Arnold seinen Grundsatz des spiritualistischen Pluralismus darlegt, die aber der ersten Phase der Explikation seiner ästhetischen Ansichten angehört, nicht an Sensibilität für die geschichtliche Dimension, wenn es sich um den ihr zugehörenden ästhetischen Aspekt handelt. Arnold leitet nämlich seine grundlegende rein philosophische These aus der summarischen kritischen Darlegung und Kommentierung der Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie ab, indem er sie als Ausgangspunkt für den gespannten geschichtlichen Bogen bis zu den neueren Auffassungen hin aufstellt, wobei er gerade aus dem geschichtlichen Horizont ebenso die ästhetische Determination der Geburt der Philosophie der alten Griechen entdeckt: »Ihre Aufmerksamkeit erregten die konkrete Natur und die *Schönheit* ihrer Erscheinungsformen. Deshalb ist zum ersten Gegenstand der philosophischen Betrachtungen die *harmonische Ganzheit* der Natur und ihr klares *geordnetes* Äußeres geworden...«<sup>49</sup> Und in der letztendlichen Bewertung seiner eigenen Einstellung (des spiritualistischen Pluralismus) auf der Linie Leibnitz – Herbart – Lotze wird Arnold in derselben Abhandlung die »monadologische« Wechselbeziehung und die mögliche Harmonie der »letzten (d.h. grundlegenden, ontologisch zugänglichen) Wesen«, von denen eines auf das andere beinahe orphisch einwirkt, mit einem Ausruf versehen: »Die Geschichte über Orpheus bezeugt die Tiefe des griechischen Geistes; sie ist keine bloße Geschichte sondern eine metaphorische Wahrheit«.<sup>50</sup> Für Arnold implizieren Orpheus und die Geschichte über Orpheus neben dem philosophischen sowohl den ästhetischen Aspekt des Problems, so daß Arnold gerade mit dem Bild des Orpheus in Bezug auf die Geschichte des kroatischen ästhetischen Bewußtseins einen der vielen Anknüpfungspunkte der ästhetischen Behandlung im Rahmen desselben gro-

<sup>48</sup> Pavao Vuk-Pavlović, *Umjetnost i muzejska estetika*, zum ersten Mal veröffentlicht in »Godišen zbornik na filozofski fakultet na univerzitetu vo Skopje«, Buch 15, Skopje 1963; heute ein Kapitel im Buch *Dušečnost i umjetnost*, Zagreb, 1976. Über diese Abhandlung, ohne diese mit Arnold aber mit dem Problem der Geschichtlichkeit des Ästhetischen als ein zentrales Problem in Zusammenhang zu bringen, s. Zlatko Posavac, *Muzeji, umjetnost i povijest, Überlegungen zur Abhandlung von Pavao Vuk-Pavlović Umjetnost i muzejska estetika, Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, Zagreb XIII/1987, Nr. 25–26, S. 135–161.

<sup>49</sup> Dr. Đuro Arnold, *Zadnja bića. metafizična razprava*, vorgetragen an der Sitzung der Philosophisch-juristischen Abteilung der JAZU am 17. November 1886. Rad JAZU, Buch 93, Zagreb 1888, S. 110. Kursive im Zitat von ZP.

<sup>50</sup> A. a. O., S. 132.

Ben Horizontes des geschichtlichen Nexus, der vom Orpheus von Vetranović bis zum modernen Zeitalter reicht, herstellt.

Mit den Fragmenten der besprochenen Schriften von Arnold ist die erste Phase der ästhetischen Überlegungen Arnolds vollständig behandelt. Diese Phase umfaßt die Zeit, in der Arnolds philosophischer, aber auch ästhetischer Ausgangspunkt entsteht. Dabei imprägniert diese Phase die Behandlung der Geschichte, die zwar den geschichtlichen Aspekt des Ästhetischen in sich nicht direkt einbezieht, dennoch bleibt das Thema selbst und die theoretische Aufstellung des Problems, wie dies schon angedeutet wurde, infolge seiner großen Relevanz nicht ohne Wiederhall in der ästhetischen Sphäre. Diese Sphäre wird sich als unmittelbare Konsequenz einer speziellen expliziten Behandlung nicht manifestieren, weder als die nächste noch als eine selbständige Etappe, und dennoch wird sie aus ihrer eigenen Immanenz innerhalb Arnolds späterer Erweiterung und Vertiefung der ästhetischen Problematik zum Vorschein kommen.

ÜBERSETZT VON TIHOMIR ENGLER

## GJURO ARNOLD KAO ESTETIČAR U KONTEKSTU KONTROVERZA MODERNE

### *Sažetak*

O Gjuri Arnoldu (1853–1941) napisan je priličan broj članaka koji su posvećeni njegovoj djelatnosti kao sveučilišnog profesora i pedagoga, no također i kao književnika, dok su o Arnoldu kao filozofu napisane i dvije manje sustavne monografije. O Arnoldu kao estetičaru nema međutim opširnijih specijalnih studija. Budući da se Arnold, ne svagda baš uspješno i u svemu sretno, javljao i kao pjesnik, a u konfliktima se umjetničkih struja odnosno programa na razmeđu 19. i 20. stoljeća nasuprot mladima našao na čelu tzv. starih, s očitim se nesporazumima uobičajilo nekritičke ocjene (ranije jednim dijelom pozitivne, kasnije pretežno negativne) iz povijesti književnosti vrlo neselektivno i gotovo paušalno prenositi na Arnoldova estetička teorijska shvaćanja u cjelini. Ovaj rad nastoji dati ekstenzivni prikaz i kritičku interpretaciju cjeline Arnoldovih estetičko-filozofijskih nazora ukazujući na njihovu relevantnost u okvirima razdoblja Moderne i otvaranju nekih važnih aspekata estetičke problematike 20. stoljeća, trudeći se oko metodološkog inoviranja pristupa zadanom predmetu istraživanja, te točnije, istinitije, što će reći adekvatnije prosudbe i ocjene Arnoldovog estetičkog rada.

Zamišljen kao monografska studija ovdje objavljen tekst sadrži samo uvod i prvo poglavlje. Uvodni dio nastoji u konkretnoj građi povijesti hrvatske umjetnosti fin de siècle, te razmeđa 19. i 20. stoljeća, naći elemente uporišta za razumijevanje Arnoldovih estetičkih nazora pokušavši u pluralizmu »izama« Moderne iz kvalifikacije la

belle époque izvesti povijesno aktualiziranu činjenicu za reafirmaciju prethodnim razdobljem književnog realizma-naturalizma negirane ljepote kao estetički relevantne kategorije, koja je za Arnoldova shvaćanja konstitutivna u svom tradicionalnom značenju. U slijedećem (zapravo prvom) poglavlju razmotreno je fragmentarno početno zauzimanje polaznih stavova estetičkog herbartizma u mladenačkoj Arnoldovoj raspravi *Etika i povijest iz 1879*, što su dosad previdali ili propustili registrirati komentatori Arnoldovih nazora.



## STARČEVIĆ'S POLITICAL RHETORIC

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Original Paper  
UDC: 19 Anic Starčević

In interpreting Starčević's work, one usually begins with his political rhetoric as a specific form of political activity. The syntagma *political rhetoric* in the title, nevertheless, here seeks to highlight the fact that, in Starčević's work, rhetoric is not developed only in its determination as the political praxis of speaking before parliament, but also relates to a particular reflection on the rules and history of rhetoric, which indubitably highlights both the elements of the construction and application of a specific rhetoric in its significance as a skill, doctrine, science or even as a theory. This is evident in a twofold sense. On the one hand, it is possible to read this from Starčević's explicit quotations and views on antique rhetoric, or even on the role of modern rhetoric in parliamentary life and the shaping of public opinion. On the other hand, this is clearly visible through a consideration of Starčević's political speeches that show, organised and logically-dialectically expounded, a specific rhetorical grounding.

It is worthwhile to bear in mind that during the nineteenth century, a high culture of parliamentary rhetoric was nurtured by the Croatian *Sabor* (i.e. parliament), the so-called 'wild Sabor of Zvonimir's crown' as it was called by the Viennese press, which was supported by a centuries-old rhetorical tradition in Croatian lands. In this context, I will mention the most significant names who have again partly become the subject of discussion, but who are partly completely ignored. To be emphasised are the names of the teacher of rhetoric Ivan Lukarević (1521–1609), orators Antun Vramac (1538–1587) who published two books of written speeches in Varaždin, followed by the orators Matija Divković (1575–1643), Juraj Habdelić (1609–1679) and others. If, for example, one skims over parliamentary journals containing stenographic notes of delivered speeches and political debates from 1861 to 1892, i.e. the period when Starčević first entered the Croatian Sabor up to his final

speech, one can notice that many important Croatian cultural and public activists such as Ivan Mažuranić, Josip Juraj Strossmayer, Ivan Kukuljević, Franjo Rački, Eugen Kvaternik, Franjo Marković, Fran Folnegović, David Starčević, Hinko Hinković and others expressed themselves in that political theatre as expert and well versed orators. But Ante Starčević certainly has a unique position in this group as a political orator and thinker of rhetoric.

As a political orator, Starčević left an irrefutable and certainly fascinating influence not only on his adherents and those of like mind, but also on his political competitors and adversaries, such as Strossmayer or even his regular opponent *Ban* (i.e. Viceroy) Khuen Héderváry himself. Ingrained in the people is the representation of Starčević as an orator, as a particular popular tribune, who received this image because, above all, in his speeches he always acted as a defender of the common man, and what is evident in his speeches is that he genuinely felt the needs of the people and always spoke from that common perspective.

It is interesting, in this context, to mention the fact that it was precisely Strossmayer who submitted Starčević's first speech in the Sabor for publication, and that he obviously had a very positive opinion of his rhetoric. The reaction which this renowned speech by Starčević received is testified to by Julije Makanec, for instance, in his article »Starčević i Strossmayer na Saboru 1861.«, stressing as characteristic elements of his rhetoric »the correlation of arguments, unique sagacious juristic reasoning linked with a deep pathos of heart« which, having a strong influence on the audience, »shook (...) the souls of all representatives irrespective of whether they agreed with Starčević or not. Strossmayer himself, Starčević's political adversary, was so moved and entranced by this speech that he had it printed and made accessible to the people at his own cost.«<sup>1</sup>

It is also worthwhile recalling the special characteristic relation that Ban Khuen Héderváry had toward Starčević's speeches, which the Ban himself most often had replicated in the Sabor. Among other replicas of Starčević's speeches, singled out is the one on the state prosecution delivered on December 22, 1891, in which are shown respect for his rhetoric and political philosophy, in spite of disagreement. Here, the Ban states: »I share the views of my preceding speakers in judging the speech of the representative, for I always listen to his speeches with great interest, which present an interesting picture before my eyes of how a man, on the basis of

<sup>1</sup> Julije Makanec, »Starčević i Strossmayer na Saboru 1861.«, *Hrvatska Revija* VIII, 9, 1935, p. 451.

historical elements accompanied by strange aphorism, can develop a philosophy which demonstrates that everything that happened and everything that takes place today is of no value, and does not offer the smallest prospect that it can ever be better.«<sup>2</sup>

As a third example of the reaction to Starčević's political rhetoric in public life, I will cite the 1867 Austro-Hungarian *Lexikon* – in which, interestingly enough, basic biographical details are left out – where it is interpreted that Starčević, precisely with reference to his fierce speeches in the Croatian Sabor, as the Croatian Demosthenes or Cicero brought upon himself the attention not only of Croatia, but the whole Austro-Hungarian monarchy: »Zuerst richtete sich die öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit nich bloß Croatiens sondern der ganzen Monarchie im Jahre 1866 auf ihn, als er anlässlich der Zrinhi-Feier, welche im November g. J. sowohl an mehreren kleinen Orten Croatiens als zuletzt in Agram und daselbst mit großem Aufwande nationale Begeisterung begangen wurde, in croatischen Landtage gegen diese nationale Feier sich erhob...«<sup>3</sup> In this context, the comment alludes to Starčević's speech of January 27, 1867, citing that it was published in the press, and it mentions the full title in the Croatian language.

Furthermore, the aforesaid article especially emphasises and describes Starčević's peculiar influence on the wide circle of adherents, particular young intellectuals and lawyers – *hrvatska akademjska mladež* (i.e. Croatian Aca-

<sup>2</sup> This quote is taken from Starčević's *Djela* (edited by the Club Committee of the Party of Rights), Book I, Zagreb, 1893, p. 422. In another passage, for example, Hédevráry makes an irony of the *classical nature* of the thesis in Starčević's political speeches, but he nonetheless in essence highlights the philosophical grounding of views on the principles of the Party of Rights concerning the creation of a community of people and the state: »Those principles became concentratngly clear to me not long ago, when I read a book which I obtained from a certain library in Zagreb – it is called 'Schlarafia politica', the name of the writer is not given, but it is a good book – and found out how, namely, people in the distant past had already tried to create a concept on the establishment of a community of peoples and states, that those people can live in an ideal position, and here I saw that dr. Ante Starčević only adheres to the greatest scholars when he stated his thesis. Here are Homer, Herodot, Plato and Xenophon, here are all those individuals who exerted themselves in creating an ideal state.

»Present here are the same theses, which I often had the honour of hearing from the mouth of dr. Ante Starčević, the representative for Delnice, when he represented the Party of Rights from the seat in which sits dr. Amruš who, surely being familiar with the theses of dr. Ante Starčević, that most eloquent representative, found himself provoked to join the ranks of the Party of Rights as soon as he found out that many scholarly individuals of international fame, such as Homer, Plato, Xenophon, etc. already shared the principles of dr. Ante Starčević, and thus he himself decided at that moment to at least come closer to the Party of Rights.« Cited according to: *Govor s 97. sjednice Hrvatskoga sabora od 22. prosinca 1894., Stenografički zapisnici 1892.–1897., sv. III, pp. 1924–1925, Zagreb, 1895.*

<sup>3</sup> *Biographisches Lexikon des Kaiserthums Österreich*, Bd. 51, S. 153, Vienna, 1885.

demic Youth), who followed this *Croatian Diogenes*, shouting *ovations*<sup>4</sup> in the town square and organising public parades.

### 1. *Classical Rhetoric as a Model*

Rhetoric as a discipline, according to Starčević's interpretation, belongs to the skill of the statesman, and is akin to politics and ethics in the classical Aristotelian sense. These disciplines, above all, have a mutual field of interest, given that all three have as their subject of consideration human activity, moral acts, virtue and values. Ethics and politics commences from man's life in the community, happy or blessed living and virtues, while rhetoric, along with this, also deals with various types of passions and feelings. The basic task of rhetoric as a part of politics<sup>5</sup> Starčević adopts precisely from Aristotle's determination of rhetoric as the education of common citizens and statesmen.

Almost all interpreters of Starčević's speeches accentuate his model in the classical rhetorical tradition. First, it is worthwhile citing Kerubin Šegvić who, highlighting the sources of principles in ancient Roman rhetoric, states regarding Starčević's 1861 speech that, on account of its *classical nature*, it is possible to establish a doctrine of parliamentary rhetoric upon it, adding: »This speech is an exalted one from both the real and formal perspective. The old man no doubt prepared himself for this speech, for in it is visible a clear disposition, a symmetry in the division of arguments. He upheld the principles of great Roman orators so as to give a classical shape to his arguments, to lull and subjugate the minds of listeners with the force of his demonstrations. It is possible to establish a doctrine of parliamentary rhetoric on it.«<sup>6</sup>

In this sense, Stanislav Šimić especially stressed, referring to Starčević's style, the classical nature of his expressions and the spirit of great Roman classics. Fascinated above all by the aphoristic nature and thought out strength of Starčević's sentences, Šimić dares to offer the following estimation: »The abundance of his thoughts of general common, living sense is to

<sup>4</sup> Starčević is here already called the *Croatian Diogenes*: »Als im Frühling 1867 die Pozoristen dem Andenken des Banus *Jelačić* vor dessen Monumente eine Serecade brachten, wollten die Anhänger des 'croatischen Diogenes' demselben als Gegner dieser dem Standbilde des Banus dargebrachten Ovation ein Zeichen ihres Vertrauens und der anerkennenden Würdigung geben, und beschlossen, ihm einen glänzenden Fackelzug zu bringen, überreichten ihm aber, da ihnen zu dem Fackelzuge die behördliche Bewilligung verweigert worden, eine von seinen Anhängern unterzeichnete Vertrauensadresse.« (ibid.)

<sup>5</sup> Concerning the influence of Aristotle's concept of politics on Starčević's philosophy of state, cf. my article »Filozofija države Ante Starčevića«, in: *Filozofska istraživanja* 45 (1–1992), Zagreb, pp. 367 ff.

<sup>6</sup> Kerubin Šegvić, *Ante Starčević, njegov život i njegova djela*, Zagreb, 1911, p. 113.

this day the highest achievement which any writer has imparted in the Croatian language.«<sup>7</sup> Šimić outlined, precisely in a condensed and reflective manner of expression, the characteristics of classical prose in Starčević's style, stressing examples of the application of metaphors, antheses, satire, irony and other mediums of persuasion not only in his speeches, but also in other literary forms.

No doubt Tomislav Ladan, considering concrete examples of Starčević's rhetorical and literary expression, pointed out best particular influential elements of the Latin rhetorical tradition. Here, Ladan arrived at an interesting conclusion which states, namely, that it is possible to »continue to show layer by layer, sentence by sentence, just how much Latin grammar and rhetoric there is in his speeches, at the technical and reflective level.« Ladan, in this context, does not only limit himself to Starčević's rhetoric, but also extends his argumentation to other forms of written expression, claiming that Starčević's entire work is penetrated with elements of traditional rhetoric: »Writing on any topic, as a man of a solid classical education, he uses the achievements of the heritage of rhetoric, but also grammar, and more importantly – a specific poetics.«<sup>8</sup> Beginning with Starčević's rhetoric, Ladan demonstrated that it belongs to one of the *most independent* Croatian 'artists of the word', who inbuilt the rules of classical rhetoric into his literary expression. Ladan, under this perspective, has also examined Starčević's political rhetoric as a type of literary expression.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Šimić's article entitled »Starčevićev stil« in the anthology: *Dr. Ante Starčević*, Zagreb, 1936, p. 72 (second edition: Laus, Split, 1992, p. 150). In this article, Šimić cites one of Starčević's characteristic rhetorical periods, claiming the following: »Classical sentences! not only in the length of their breadth, which shows that the writer is a distinguished student of great Roman classics; it also this in spirit, the studious and integrating strength of meaning in expression, in which every form of knowledge is enhanced by another observation with a new comment – thus its meaning is filled, and the rhythm gives it a higher momentum which, contrary to his knowledge, antithetically continues, ending in a conclusion; it is classical according to the complete expression of thought, and according to the simultaneous representation of the reality from which it emerges, and the feelings that this reality awakens.« (ibid. pp. 72–73). Concerning Starčević's specific »stekliš« (i.e. inflamed) aesthetics«, cf. the article bearing the same title by Zlatko Posavac, in his book *Novija hrvatska estetika*, Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo, Zagreb, 1991, pp. 45 ff.

<sup>8</sup> Tomislav Ladan, »Predgovor«, in: *Ante Starčević. Politički spisi*, Znanje, Zagreb, 1971, p. 66. Ladan mentions here, apart from the classical rhetorical tradition, that it is also worthwhile to bear in mind the influence of modern political rhetoric, above all classical French rhetoric: »Given that Starčević as a tireless reader was deeply immersed in the rhetorical tradition, it is difficult to ascertain what his rhetoric received from antique rhetoric, from medieval sermons, and what it received from modern political oration. The width of his personal literariness would permit the presupposition that ancient and new, antique and classical French rhetoric, were equal influences. Judging by this, together with the aforesaid Aristotle and Quintilianus, influences would also include Roman orators and historians: Cicero, Tacitus, Cato, Suetonius...«

The classical names of antique rhetoric and philosophy that Ladan notes in his discussions, which also cite other interpreters, beginning from Aristotle to Cato and Cicero, Quintilianus, Tacitus or Suetonius, are not only deduced mediately from a similar approach or through a comparison of style and figure, but the above names also appear explicitly in Starčević's works as sources. It is worthwhile mentioning above all his *pet favourite* among the classics – Cicero. From Starčević's earliest perspective, Cicero's views and his Stoic argumentation, especially concerning legal and ethical issues, are often cited as the backdrop for his own thought. Emphasised, among other passages, is his quotation in *Poslanica pobratimu D. M. u. B.*, in which he makes an irony of the natural law of his cherished thinker: »And what the people have to agree upon is the law, says Cicero. Really, now this man – previously my pet favourite Roman philosopher – comes to mind; – throw him into an oven, and never think of him again! – He said, that the law which can and must make man happy, must be the same in Rome and in Athens and everywhere – always. How passionately that man cut himself up in this thought!«<sup>9</sup> Starčević adopted from his *pet favourite* not only reflections on natural law, but also rhetoric, even though he did not completely agree with him in style and method. His disagreement with Cicero is particularly expressed in the criticism that Cicero contaminated the original Roman customary world with 'Greekism', and this relates not only to Greek custom, language and philosophy, but also scholarly rhetoric. Among other works by Cicero, Starčević cites and invokes the following titles: *De Fato, Pro Flaco, Pro Archia, Quest. Tuscul.* and others. As for Tacitus, Starčević states that he had read him a great deal as a youth: »I read this man a great deal in youth, but I do not have the writer at my disposal, and I refer to Michelet (bible de l' hum. 460).«<sup>10</sup> The citation of examples, figures and passages from the works of other classical writers and orators shows that he mainly utilised them as primary literature.

If one desires a basic outline of the influence of classical literature, then it is above all worthwhile stressing the moral backdrop of Starčević's speeches and texts, his clear critique of immorality and vice, and his reverence for virtue, truth and justice. According to an ancient Roman custom, he upheld the principle of considering himself a true orator – *vir bonus*. The following particularity of his style is Latin clarity and brevity, conciseness, without superfluous spices in adjectives inasmuch as they are unimportant, which Šimić had already interpreted through the personal characteristics of the

<sup>9</sup> Cited according to the Blaž Jurišić edition, *Ante Starčević. Izabrani spisi*, Zagreb, 1943, p. 327. Concerning Starčević's conception of ethics, cf. my article »Etika kao znanost života«, in: *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine* 37–38 (1993), pp. 169–191.

<sup>10</sup> *Djela* III, p. 155.

author, who rejects everything that is non-essential, all excessive chatter and ornateness. Finally, especially stressed is the classical division of his speeches, in which are clearly accentuated an introduction, a narration, an argumentation and a summary, as well as the application of tested rhetorical tools of persuasion.

## 2. *Rhetoric and the Decadency of Rome*

It is interesting that Starčević, similarly as in his approach to other social and historical phenomena, does not simply regard rhetoric from a positive point of view. Thus, for example, in the first chapter of his treatise *Pasmina slavoserbska po Hervatskoj*, which was inspired by Montesquieu's philosophy of history, he describes the contrasts between the Greek and Roman spirits and singles out precisely *rhetoric* as one of the major sources of the decadence of specific Roman custom. Attempting to briefly outline the basic characteristics of the civilisation of a people on which Croatian civilisation leans, Starčević in this introductory work describes as a predecessor of the Croatian spirit that civilisation from whom Croats inherited cities, roads, bridges, water-works and all those other things they adopted into their material and spiritual world. Situating in the foundation of his presentation the extreme, sharp antagonism between Greek and Roman spirituality, Starčević is one of those rare thinkers who fiercely opposes Greco-centralism in European history and extols the significance of original Roman culture and ancient custom, uncontaminated by the controversial influence of Greekism and orientalism. This type of approach by Starčević is a unique and original philosophico-historical interpretation of the determinants of Western European civilisation, which may at first glance appear unfounded from a historiographical philosophical position, and it is not without confirmations in other interpreters of world history. One should mention here, among others, that Eurocentric thinker who, in his presentation of the history of philosophy, orders everything else in subjugation to Greek metaphysics, and that to such an extent that he even rarely mentions Roman or medieval thought – G. W. F. Hegel. But when one considers Hegel's conception of the movement of Objective Spirit, customs, rights, morality and the state through world history more attentively – on which Starčević himself concentrates – it is possible to see that the depiction of the Greek world also points to characteristics of immaturity and even a lack of political freedom, which is conditioned by many natural links with the Asian orient, while the Roman Empire is the product of the unpolished work of the »mature period of history.«<sup>11</sup> Only in this mature phase of the

<sup>11</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über der Philosophie der Geschichte*, in: *Werke*, 12, Frankfurt a.M. 1970, p. 138.

development of European history, which Starčević also extols in like fashion, is the abstract state created as a moral achievement based on a legal foundation in which the individual has his share. However, given that these aspects of Starčević's philosophico-historical argumentation stand outside the framework of this discussion, I will limit myself only to the problem of the appearance of rhetoric, which Starčević links with the infiltration of diseased oriental seeds into the mature body of the Roman political community.

Contrary to the dominant understanding of the symbiosis of Greek spirituality and the Roman world, according to which the defeated Greeks conquered Rome with their superior culture – testified to best by Horatius' renowned statement: *Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit et artes intulit agresti Latio* – Starčević with his sharp contradictions between these two constituents of European civilisation expressed his own open sympathy for the simplicity and maturity of the Romans and their customs, as well as an aversion for the speculative significance and shaky morality of the Greek spirit which, especially after the age of Alexander, adopted characteristics of Asiatic orientalism. At the same time, Starčević also highlighted the darker side of the glorified cultural symbiosis as one of the causes of the deterioration and fall of the original Roman character, their significance and customs. Like old Cato, Starčević accuses Cicero and other Romans for allowing themselves to be seduced by Greek gods. He also accuses them of being negatively influenced, on the one hand, by Greek philosophy, namely what Starčević calls 'intellectualism', which was already in the phase of collapse after Aristotle, and the rhetoric of Asian lawyers, on the other hand, ironically calling it chatty and entangled. Thus he accuses the Romans for leaving their position as teachers of the people empty and becoming scholars, allowing themselves to be possessed by the foreign spirit of licentious Greekism which, after its metaphysical zenith, was in the stage of all-encompassing deterioration. This historical event for Starčević was fatal for European history, mainly because the ancient Romans drifted from their ancient customs and habits, their personal, familial and state virtues and values.

In the description of the evils that Rome encountered with orientally impregnated Greek culture and custom, Starčević especially extols manifestations that are associated with the penetration of dialectical reflection – rhetoric. Even though the appearance of this trend of beautiful chatter was inevitable when the Romans began to admire the Greek skill, thereby accepting their scribbling, conjecture, carving of stones, musical instruments and other arts, as Starčević ironically calls them, in the beginning they nonetheless resisted the influence of beautifully worded orators, who argued in favour and against anything, and several times banished Greek rhetoricians, namely philosophers, from Rome. In this context, Starčević draws particular attention to



the renowned Senate conclusion of 161 BC in which rhetoricians were denied residence in Rome, describing the event in the following way: »Chatter and entanglement could not be ignored. Around the Roman year 592, the praetorian inquired of the senate about philosophers and rhetoricians. The senate answers: let the praetorian be cautious and act according to his honour, so that these people should not exist in Rome.«<sup>12</sup> In explaining this conclusion by the senate, Starčević does not offer the usual reasons, which highlight the political danger that originated in rhetorical schools, but first cites the argumentation later expounded by the censor Lucius Licinius Crassus, namely that these rhetorical schools with their new creations are contrary to the Roman customs of their forefathers. Stressing that this sort of rhetoric destroys the moral traits of the Roman citizen, given that the youth waste the whole day engaging themselves in empty chatter for and against, developing a longing for eloquent and long-winded speaking, thereby abandoning the traditional Roman ideal of good production, works and cultivation of the land, Starčević adopts the censor's explanation in the longish quotation from Suetonius' work *On Orators*:

»Soon the censors themselves determine: 'we are informed that there are people, who introduced a new type of teaching (discipline), who call themselves by the name of Latin orator, and that the youth go to them and waste their time the whole day. Our elders determine both the teaching and schools of their children. This new trend which is contrary to the custom and morality of our fathers we do not like, nor do we consider it to be in order. We direct this condemnation to those teachers and those students. Gradually, this school also appeared both useful and respectful, and many have enrolled in it because of defence and glory. Cicero, prior to be a praetorian, gave speeches in Greek. Cicero himself confesses that in his childhood he studied Latin rhetoric, and that he did not pay attention to it, adhering mainly to scholarly men who claim that it is better to feed the mind with Greek exercises.' (Suetonius, *de rhetorib.* 1,2)«<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> *Djela* III, p. 146.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.* What is especially controversial for Starčević is that Cicero and the Romans accepted the influence of Greek rhetoric, which had received an oriental character, particularly with an *Asiatic* orientation. In the third part of his introduction to Cicero's *Izabrani govori*, prepared for publication by Matica hrvatska in 1866, entitled »Razvoj rimskog govorničtva«, Starčević's contemporary Adolfo Veber writes the following: »Even in this, Roman orators are still under the influence of their Greek models. When Alexander the Great gained the East, defeating Greece, he introduced Greek education into Asia. Thus not only did Asia become Greekish, adopting the Greek language and customs, but the Greek language also adopted something of the Asian, eastern, especially in rhetoric. That manner of speaking, whose signs were exuberance and abundance, was called Asiatic. In this way, the Greek language and speech: 1) lost that purity by which it was shaped prior to expanding outside Greek lands; 2) became more conceited than natural, full of trope and figures, through which precisely orientalism is emphasised; 3) had its

The commentary that Starčević adds to this description by Suetonius of the conflict of original Roman significance and morals with foreign, newly imported unreliable beautiful words states that a just punishment will fall on those who subject their culture to clever sophistry. For him, this sin calls into question Roman freedom and glory: »There is no bigger scandal than that the Romans, after seven centuries of freedom and glory, from the time they ruled the earth, began studying rhetoric.«<sup>14</sup> The razor of Starčević's criticism is directed most of all against his pet favourite among the Roman classics – Cicero. He is responsible for not only accepting and propagating foreign books and a foreign language among the Latins, but also for adopting and developing Greek rhetoric in Latin. And not only any rhetoric, but the decorated and ornate rhetoric of an oriental nature. Guided by the presupposition that history is always constituted of merited rewards for achievements, Starčević explains the immanent fall of Roman civilisation in relation to Cicero and his inoculation of a foreign, inapplicable spirit: »Cicero says, acknowledged by his listeners, that Greek books are read among all peoples, and that Latin ones are pressed into narrow borders. (Cicero, pro Archia) This was the case at that time when the Roman was master of every known people. But together with Cicero and Cicero's followers, it could not be different. The Latin language, Latin books lost their value, their teachers and their students, so that Cicero knew no one who could even copy Latin books without errors. (Id. ad. Q. Fratrem III, 5).«<sup>15</sup>

When one engages in an examination of Starčević's explication of this scandal that lies in the appearance of rhetoric, what becomes visible is above all the danger of rhetoric for its own sake, which happened, for example, with sophist dialectical tricks and contradictory entanglements. Moreover, Starčević sees Greek philosophy and intellectualisation itself, above all in relation

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own specificity which the Romans called: *celeritas, volubilitas, cursus, flumen orationis*, that is a certain haste of speech: 4) was more cut up in speeches, rather than correlated in periods. Cicero distinguishes between two types of Asiatic speech: that which, together with an exuberance of words, aimed at subtlety of thought, and that which revolved only around an exuberance of words. At the head of the Asiatic school was the renowned Hegesias of Magnesia in Asia Minor. But on Rhodes the other type of oration was dominant, similar to the attic, such as in Demosthenes, which was introduced by the exiled Athenian orator Aeschines.« (pp. XXXI ff.)

<sup>14</sup> *Djela III*, p. 146.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.* It is interesting the way Starčević spoke of his pet favourite Cicero in another context, not overlooking his great patriotism, stating that he, precisely with his 'ornate' rhetoric, ignoring the justice of the things he spoke in favour of, contributed to the collapse of his homeland. In the philosophical essay entitled »Uputa«, Starčević states: »Cicero helped in bringing about the downfall of his homeland, destroying the freedom that he otherwise warmly loved, when he accepted bribes to defend the greatest injustice, and the worst crimes in the state, etc.« The article was published in *Hervastki kalendar za prostu godinu 1858*, Zagreb, 1858, p. 22.

to the period of its separation into orientations and branches such as Epicureanism, Stoicism, academism or the peripatetic school, more as theoretical chatter about essences and Being for its own sake, and not for the sake of practical life. Contrary to the mature and sober Romans, who were concerned with the cultivation of the land, stock-breeding and trade, which Starčević especially values, and who on this basis founded a spirit of simplicity, respect for tradition and the traditions of other peoples, scepticism entered their beliefs, morality and customs through rhetoric and ornate speech, which had a detrimental influence on their personal and public lives, putrefying the binding elements of their political community. In contrast to this type of Greek philosophy and rhetoric which is distinguished by its speculation and exuberance, which Starčević criticises as metaphysical dreams and sophistic cleverness, Roman spirituality is less metaphysical, and more practical and adaptive to the needs of life. Thus for Starčević this type of philosophy and rhetoric for its own sake, accompanied by doubts in justice, truth and goodness, represents an unambiguous sign of the collapse in which the Romans found themselves perplexed and weakened. The spirit of oriental Greekism, entangled in metaphysical dreams and far removed from everyday life, is for Starčević sharply opposed to Roman simplicity and rationality, which should conceive both philosophy and rhetoric as practical wisdom, namely as a medium for enhancing moral significance, as the sharpening of thought and drawing conclusions that will teach man about the purpose and meaning of living, and about his duties. This is the disparity between two determinations of spirituality which certainly not only forms the point of departure for interpreting Croatian civilisation in Starčević's sense, but also the key for understanding Western European culture is to be found in this disparity.

In concluding this short account on the appearance of rhetoric as one of the sources of the collapse of the Roman spiritual world, it is worthwhile stressing the following elements with respect to Starčević's understanding of rhetoric. On the one hand, in resisting ornate rhetoric, he opposes artistic rhetoric for its own sake. On the other hand, this type of sharp criticism is discernable as a basic characteristic which determines his own rhetoric. Just as he rejects rhetorical ornateness for the sake of style, so too Starčević opposes the sophistic purpose of rhetoric, namely to achieve any unjustified decision arrived at through artificial means of persuasion – the separation of rhetoric from ethics, in which it became pure illusion and deception which clouds the path to truth.

### *3. Political Rhetoric and Democracy*

That Starčević, in spite of the above cited references to rhetoric as an omen of the collapse of specific Roman culture, is nevertheless not opposed

to rhetoric as a practical science is highlighted not only by his own usage of this form of political skill, but is also seen in his explicit statements about rhetoric. Thus, for example, we should single out his analysis of the difficulties of rhetoric in Croatia when Croatian rhetoricians Mažuranić and Strossmayer entered public life, as described in the autobiographical work *Nekolike uspomene*. From the basic presuppositions of this examination, it is possible to deduce his indisputable positive attitude about the rhetorical skill and freedom of speech and thought as one of the major assumptions for constructing modern democracies and public opinion.

Leaning on the determination of rhetoric as a branch of state affairs or politics, Starčević in his interpretation commences from the fact that precisely the teachings of the laws of rhetoric in the widest sense is an essential presupposition for the development of freedom and democracy in modern civil states. The explication of this thesis is to found in forms of the creation of the civil public through the organisation of societies, meetings and the press in which issues essential for the survival of the political community are publicly presented. Also created and affirmed is the freedom of the people through the formation of public opinion, in such manner that the laws of rhetoric are taught and practiced, and through them questions about the general good are evaluated. Determining precisely as the purpose of modern political life the development of laws of rhetoric in order to propose public decisions through the »observation, listening and reading« of the orator and speech, Starčević begins with the significance of the concept of *le public* in seventeenth century France, which entails both courtly and public readers, observers, listeners (lecteurs, spectateurs, auditeurs) as addressors, consumers and critics of art and literature, but also political publications: »With other, free nations, how many opportunities people have to learn about state affairs and its individual branches, to learn about the laws of rhetoric, and to listen, read, observe in their own languages orators, speeches, in societies, in meetings, in parliaments, in newspapers, in books!«<sup>16</sup>

What is essential for Starčević about the rhetorical refinement of public opinion is the ability to state and publicly announce, through the aid of rhetorical rules of questioning, general interests in an appropriate fashion. Here, he also mentions in passing his rhetorical ideal as the »clear and ordered« presentation and expoundation of public issues. The presupposition for this is not only the construction of the laws of rhetoric in the strict sense,

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<sup>16</sup> Djela III, p. 351. Concerning the concept of the public sphere, cf. E. Auerbach, *Das französische Publikum des 17. Jahrhunderts*, München, 1933, pp. 5 ff., and J. Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft*, Neuwied am Rhein und Berlin, 1956.

but also a culture of speaking in the widest sense, which also entails the shaping of language: »Therefore, how easy it is to know a certain issue elsewhere, and to state and develop it as something clear and ordered: how easy it is to become an orator there!«<sup>17</sup> Here, the orator is understood in the widest sense as the creator of public opinion who expounds his views before a listening or reading public.

Contrary to the description of the rhetorical situation among educated civil societies such as France or England, for example, where there exists established public and secret societies, clubs and saloons, journalism and a market for books, which was formed gradually through endeavours in the literary and political public, in Croatia it demonstrated that the construction of these rhetorical aids is inadequate: »And as for the situation with us, where there is not a single means? Indeed, little is said when it is stated: To prepare one's own speech, the Croatian needs at least five times the amount of days, as the Englishman or Frenchman needs hours. And how many Croats are there who see this, how many enjoy learning, reflection, work? Even so, the time has come for Mr. I. Mažuranić and Bishop Strossmayer to speak. What sought of orators will they be?«<sup>18</sup> If one begins with this so described deficient presuppositions for the development of rhetoric in Croatia, then it is completely obvious that Starčević's judgements of the aforesaid two orators, as well as his judgement of the establishment of institutions of public opinion, could not the least have been positive. But he was in favour of complete freedom of press, claiming explicitly in the cited speech that no one but God can forbid a man to think, just as no one can prohibit him to write or publish. As for the question whether one can write or publish anything, he replies: *I say that one can say whatever in the world one wants to.*

Indeed, Starčević does not utilise rhetoric in order to attain literary fame or to found a rhetorical science, but is primarily concerned with the political effectiveness of his speeches. This deals with political rhetoric which, according to classical rhetorical determinations, is primarily related to something that will take place in the future and through which the audience – traditionally called the *national assembly* – is persuaded or dissuaded. As is well known, according to the division of classical rhetoric into three basic types of speeches with respect to Aristotle's differentiation, whereby listeners only observe the speech and enjoy or judge it, apart from political rhetoric (*genus deliberativum*) there also exists legal rhetoric (*genus iudiciale*) and the epideictic form of speech (*genus demonstrativum*). The characteristic of political rhetoric

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<sup>17</sup> *Djela* III, p. 351.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

(suasoria),<sup>19</sup> in which are discussed certain affairs of state, with respect to the explication and judgement about the usefulness or harm (utile vel inutile) of something, the orator persuades (suadere) or dissuades (disuadere) the audience about a specific decision or act.

According to the classical Aristotelian outline of rhetoric, from which this short illustration of Starčević's political speeches begins, three basic segments defined traditional philosophical discussion on rhetoric. First, the rhetorical sources of persuasion from which the methods of persuasion are deduced. One should also mention that the allotment of methods of persuasion with respect to three sources is ascribed to Aristotle, beginning with the presupposition that there are those that judge about something in which they are convinced because they themselves have experienced something similar, because they begin from a testimony that emerges from certain moral qualities of the orator, and finally because they are convinced that the act is proven.<sup>20</sup> Next, the second segment of rhetoric which appears is the manner of delivering a speech (diction, style, construction and execution). Finally, the third segment of rhetoric deals with the division and order of the parts of the speech.

#### 4. *The Principle of Instruction and Emotionally Moving*

At the beginning of his renowned speech at the public assembly in Bakar on June 1, 1879, on the freedom of the press, Starčević explicitly draws upon one of the classical principles of rhetoric, summarised in the assumption that the basic aim of rhetoric is to instruct and move the audience. It is well known that the first teachers of rhetoric – the Sophists – gave special attention to rhetorical tools in their performances and theories, beginning with the ques-

<sup>19</sup> In the second part of the aforesaid introduction, entitled »Što je govor?«, Adolfo Veber states the following: »The Romans constructed three types of speech: *legal* (genus *judiciale*), *advisory* (g. *deliberativum*) and *commendable* (g. *demonstrativum*). The *legal* is used in all court cases, especially the major ones, who executed something according to their constitution, some before the public, some before the greats in the senate. For minor cases they do not forge special speeches before judges... *Advisory* speeches are used, sometimes before the public, sometimes before the senate, with respect to important state affairs, whether that be the acceptance and sending of ambassadors, war and peace, the naming of dukes, taxes, etc. In one words, when advise was needed what to do in similar jobs, that is when there was a need for either persuading in favour of something or dissuading against something... *Commendable* speeches are given when someone or something has to be honoured or censured. These types of speeches are usually given before a minor audience than a larger one, before learned people...« (pp. XIII ff.) Cf. also Julije Golik, *Izbor iz retoričkih i filozofijskih djela M. Tullija Cicerona*, Zagreb, 1909 and Stjepan Senc, *Pramjeni iz grčke i rimske književnosti u hrvatskom prijevodu*, Zagreb, <sup>3</sup>1920.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Retorika*, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1990, p. 165.

tion of how to awaken within the audience, through knowledge and influence, their sympathy and hence influence their decision. Gorgias, for example, in his definition of the rhetorical skill in Plato's dialogue of the same name (452c – 453a) stressed, above all, emotionally moving listeners with words, awakening in them the desired persuasion, citing judges in court, statements in national assemblies and civil councils. On this basis, the Romans entrusted their rhetoricians with the major rhetorical maxims of teaching (*docere*), moving (*movere*) and amusing (*delectare*).

It is clear that Starčević with his classicist approach gives less significance to the third tool of rhetorical persuasion, even though it is not altogether abandoned in his speeches, above all the provocation of laughter and sharp satire, and the question can be raised about his attitude on the first two maxims. In the first moment, when one observes his explicit statements, it seems that he also rejects the first two maxims and even openly distances himself from them. However, if one further follows the way in which he expounds this, it is nonetheless evident that it is not completely like this. The difference, above all, is that he distances himself from sophistic goals, namely he rejects the skill of speaking for the sake of the technique of persuasion or decorated chatter. In this sense, for understanding Starčević's claim that he is not interested in moving or instructing listeners, it is worthwhile to bear in mind that differentiation which is drawn between rhetoric with a political aim, on the one hand, and long-windedness and beautiful words, on the other hand. That type of rhetoric that is above all centred on exploiting human weakness and unreliable feelings as its aim is altogether foreign to him. We should mention in this context, for instance, Plato's demonstration of the possibility of sophistic rhetoric aimed at making the great small or to unjustly make themselves just through the use of deceptive words and claims. For that reason, Starčević believes that the orator need not attempt to move nor instruct his listener: »It is said that the orator must instruct and move his listeners. I do not hold to this principle, for I am convinced that one man cannot instruct nor move another, but rather can offer him an opportunity and motive to willingly instruct and move himself.«<sup>21</sup>

<sup>21</sup> *Djela* I, p. 431. It is well known that precisely Cicero, when lacking proof, tried to influence judges by 'moving' them, according to which this style is called *Ciceronian*: »Cicero, seeing that neither the Asiatic nor Attic orientation, if executed through the whole speech, can attain the purpose, maps out a middle path, taking something from one, something from the other, depending on the aim of the speech. The speech should, according to his opinion, instruct, soften and move the listener. Thus the three established types of speech: *subtle*, *medium* and *grand* (*genus subtile, medium et grande*). The subtle should be used when the orator wants to clarify or prove something; the medium is used to emphasise imagery and trope, but without exaltation, when he wants to soften the listener; the grand, which employs tropes, figures, periods and a quick

Indeed, what is not claimed is that emotionally moving – *pathos* in Aristotle's sense<sup>22</sup> – is unnecessary or undesired, but Starčević does not want to construct the purpose of his speeches on that, so as not to lead his listeners to a wrong conclusion or unjustified decision through deception. For that reason, as an orator he seeks of his listeners an equal position of being strict judges who can maturely evaluate the issue at hand, and not be entranced in the affects of the senses which are inconstant and can quickly change. The judge who should impartially offer judgement about a certain issue must above all testify to the truthfulness of the claims of the person who presents the case.

But with emotionally moving or the *pathos* of the listener in rhetoric, the issue is, naturally, much more complicated than with the other tools of persuasion. For the final purpose of political rhetoric is nonetheless the persuading of listeners and obtaining a particular solution for an issue or dissuading them from something. Indeed, in this respect neither are Starčević's speeches devoid of this rhetorical affect. But he nevertheless distances himself from the rhetorical affects of moving, which is attained through entrancement or loudness, ornateness or beautiful wording. These sorts of affects are deceptive, which is not admissible in his concept of rhetoric, and he expounds this in the following way: »Whatever burns briskly, burns out quickly; and whosoever learns quickly, that person also quickly forgets, while time respects only those works and those foundations that are constructed with time and effort. I therefore hold that one person can give another only an opportunity for being instructed and moved for what is good. Therefore, if you will reflect upon and cross-examine my words, which you shall hear today, from so many possible vantage points, and if you find that they are good, I am sure that you yourselves will be instructed, and that in which you yourselves are convinced, you are certain to endeavour to attain with your whole might. (Continued shouts of 'Long live!')«<sup>23</sup>

Consistent to the mannerism of the attic rhetorical model of simplicity, clarity and conciseness, Starčević, addressing the entire auditorium, con-

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paced speech, especially where there are no verifiable proofs, is used to move the judge, thus this is a type of Asiatic style. With this method, which can be called Ciceronian, Cicero was most often and constantly admired by the Roman public, which did not care much for thinly reasoned demonstration, as it did for the fullness of expression and well phrased language.« Adolfo Veber. o. c. p. XXXIII.

<sup>22</sup> In the division of the technical methods of persuasion which are applied in rhetoric on the three fundamentals that are produced by the significance (ethos) of the orator, the disposition (*pathos*) of the listener and the value of the speech itself for the *pathos* of the listener, Aristotle says: »Persuasiveness is attained through the disposition of the listener when the giver of the speech awakens emotions, for man does not make the same decisions in a state of satisfaction or non-satisfaction, love and hate.« *Retorika* 1356a, p. 7.

<sup>23</sup> *Djela* I, pp. 431–432.



structs his explication, in the form of syllogisms, on premises that are simple and general, similar to common sayings or proverbs. The first two statements expressed in the spirit of the people: »Whatever burns briskly, burns out quickly; and whosoever learns quickly, that person also quickly forgets« have synonymous meanings, whereas the third points to the durability of what is well constructed and with effort: »time respects only those works and those foundations that are constructed with time and effort,« from which emerges the conclusion expressed in the first person tense: »I therefore hold that one person can give another only an opportunity for being instructed and moved for what is good,« followed by yet another conclusion which, by way of analogy, relates to the rhetorical means of persuasion: »Therefore, if you will reflect upon and cross-examine my words, which you shall hear today, from so many possible vantage points, and if you find that they are good, I am sure that you yourselves will be instructed, and that in which you yourselves are convinced, you are certain to endeavour to attain with your whole might.«

Even though Starčević claims at the beginning and end of this speech that he does not want to move his listeners, what this speech aims at is to precisely lead the listener into a particular mental state that will positively evaluate his propositions. But he does this, naturally, in a subtle manner so as not to be detected, explicitly at the beginning and later, in some places implicitly. Namely, he utilises the first technical method recommended by Aristotle, and that is to represent himself as a man of firm nature or significance. Hence Starčević describes himself as an orator who is primarily interested in truth and justice, and they are characteristics that should receive the listener's reverence and trust. It is well known that precisely for Greek orators, and even in Plato's criticism of rhetoric, who especially insisted on an association with the ethical, and particularly in Roman rhetoricians, for example Cicero or Quintillianus, the classical maxim is applicable – *vir bonus dicendi peritus*.

In order to better understand what Starčević claims when he rejects the affect of moving, and he cites that the listeners themselves will accept his statements when they test them, one should begin with his differentiation between the effort to win over, convince and incline the listeners about (conciare) the proofs of the truthfulness of what is defended (probare) and the effort to only awaken feelings, namely emotion (movere). Given that he does not consider the latter an applicable rhetorical tool, as was the case, for example, with his pet favourite among the classics Cicero, who in his speeches abundantly utilised the awakening of strong emotions in his listeners, including tears, in both the court and in the assembly (collacrimatione), Starčević to this extent begins more with the verifiability of the truth of what he speaks and the reasons upon which it is founded. When one carefully examines his speeches, it is clearly shown that he tries to present at every opportunity

something of his moral philosophy with which, in the long run, he wants to instruct the audience.

Even though he possessed an indisputable innate rhetorical gift of persuasion – *orator nascitur*, which is testified to by many interpreters, Starčević was not content with simply this, but thoroughly prepared himself for his political speeches. Here, his model is Aristotle's and Cicero's type of orator who carefully prepares and studies everything in the field of science and life he discusses. From an overview of the themes of his speeches, one can see that he gave original contributions to all five major fields of political rhetoric, as outlined by Aristotle in his *Rhetoric*: revenue and expenses, war and peace, defence of the country, import and export of goods, and legislation. Even though his most renowned speeches are situated in the period between 1861 and 1878, when it is believed that he »said everything he had to say,« Horvat affirms that after this period he followed political developments to the end of his life, studied state law, economics, social life and history, as well as further offering his component judgement on them before the national assembly:

»Starčević's parliamentary work from 1878 until his death was filled with speeches accompanied with interpellations. Precisely these interpellated speeches reveal the extent of Starčević's knowledge, constantly following the everyday life of the people, their needs and their longings. These speeches... are also full of clairvoyant observations and material facts from all fields of national life. There is almost no object of debate about which Starčević would not speak about, from measures taken to curb the spread of the cattle plague to state legal discussions on issues concerning Rijeka.«<sup>24</sup>

Starčević possessed the presuppositions of a good and versatile political orator, not only on account of his temperament and rhetorical passion, but also due to other rhetorical tools and thoroughly prepared speeches, which were equally good both in the written and oral form. In his vehement speeches, Starčević's argumentation was not only complimented by the strength of his voice, but above all by the rich construction of demonstrative materials. Apart from knowing foreign languages – French, German and Hungarian, as well as classical Latin and Greek – and constantly following the foreign press, above all the liberal *Independence Belge*, Starčević had a wide education and was well versed in philosophy and history, especially Croatian national history, from which he often took examples from earlier and more modern periods as witnesses or employed them in order to construct his rhetorical syllogism. Among other things, he applied several times as a candidate for the chair of philosophy and history at the Academy of Law in Zagreb. With his first

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<sup>24</sup> Josip Horvat, *Ante Starčević*, NZMII, Zagreb, 1990, p. 377.

attempt in 1848, he was not accepted even though he satisfied all prerequisites, and the second time when he asked Strossmayer in 1858–59, as is testified to by F. Iveković,<sup>25</sup> to support him in attaining the professorial position for Austrian history at the Academy of Law, the Bishop distanced himself in one of his letters, mentioning that his dealings with the government would be of little help, even though he admitted that Starčević would »be fully competent« for the professorship. Starčević also had a keen interest in linguistics, he prepared his dictionary, polemicised about linguistic and literary issues, he wrote poetry, drama and prose, and as a publicist he wrote about political, economic and legal questions. Apart from classical and historical books, in his library were found mainly French books, from encyclopaedists to modern writers in the disciplines of politics and history. According to Quintilianus' list of presuppositions of the model orator, he was familiar with civil rights and, working for many years in an advocate's clerk office, was in direct contact with legal foundations. In particular, Starčević thoroughly studied national customs and the religious rituals of the state and people in which he himself publicly participated. From this wide corpus he offered in his speeches his own literary creations, whose purpose, in the long run, was to *instruct* the listener.

### 5. *The Ethos of the Orator*

If we more carefully examine Starčević's distancing himself from the *pathos* of political rhetoric, which is seen in his renowned election speech in Krapinske Toplice in 1871, what becomes evident is that he cannot accept what is 'pathetic' in rhetoric primarily because arguments *pathetica* overpower the will of those who should pass judgement impartially. Moreover, he addresses the auditorium with the explicit request that they do not allow themselves to be carried away by feeling that are provoked by pathetic words, soberly warning against ornate rhetoric: »But here one should criticise voters

<sup>25</sup> Cf. F. Iveković, *Dr. Ante Starčević. Značajne crte o njemu*, Zagreb, 1905, p. 18. Contrary to Strossmayer's humble opinion about his insignificant influence on the decisions of the government in Vienna, Horvat states, for example, that in 1860–61 Strossmayer was the most important political 'factor' in Croatia: »Finally Strossmayer, who was certainly the decisive factor concerning the filling of all political positions as the real leader of Croatian politics, liked to gather around him talented people, offer them assistance, gradually binding them through the debt of gratitude, especially people who studied at the same department as he did himself.« From this Horvat arrived at the interesting conclusion that precisely Strossmayer helped Starčević in the clerical election for the Rijeka county, which also contradicts Iveković's interpretation as well as Starčević's later version of the event, which Horvat himself mentions, that Mažuranić and Strossmayer allegedly »endeavoured to obstruct his entrance into the Sabor in 1861.« Cf. J. Horvat, pp. 200 ff., 220.

if they, who are many, completely swayed by all those weaknesses of the representative, allow themselves to be deluded by his words.«<sup>26</sup>

The reasons with which Starčević augments his view can be reduced, in the final analysis, to what Aristotle defined as the 'most effective tool of persuasion' – the orator's character (*ethos*). The moral strength and honour of the orator indisputably remained the most trustworthy criteria for judging the verifiability of what is spoken. Hence Starčević harshly warns voters not to judge only the orator's *pathos*, namely to concentrate »not only on the words of the representative, but also on whether he has the strength to do what he says, and whether circumstances allow, hoping for success from his words and work.« Presenting himself as an honourable orator, Starčević precisely emphasises the responsibility of the judges-listeners, that they do not display preference for he who is not good. For even if the orator is unworthy of trust, he falls victim only to shame, while those who display preference to such an orator falls victim to both shame and harm: »Therefore, you and I should observe attentively, that such a disgrace should not appear among us. Shame falls upon me only if I let you down; upon you fall both shame and harm if you glorify me, unworthy as your representative.«<sup>27</sup> The conclusion is unambiguous: the listeners in judging the truth must be prudent above all concerning the orator's moral personality, given that whether the orator is good and the correctness of what he represents depends on this.

Thus in his reflections on speeches and political orators from Aeschines and Cicero to Mažuranić and Strossmayer, for example, Starčević does not overlook that Platonic and Stoic, which is close to him, association between rhetoric and ethics, examining in particular the morality of the orator himself and the verifiability of his words. It is well known, namely, that the Stoics, in rejecting the ethical neutrality of rhetoric, established a determination of rhetoric as the knowledge of a good speech in the moral sense. Along these lines, beginning precisely with the model of ancient Roman rhetoric and opponent of the Greek culture that entered Rome in his day – *Marcus Portius Cato Censorius*, and that Latin thinker that Starčević cites in his works – *Marcus Fabius Quintillianus*, rhetoric was signified by the phrase *scientia recte dicendi*, the major task of rhetoric being the persuasion of the people about what is right:

»The orator as I conceive him should be the sort outlined by Marcus Cato: an honourable man who understands the art of speaking. He must above all be decorated in the qualities that Cato depicts in the first place, and they are by

<sup>26</sup> *Govor u Krapinskih Toplicah*, May 20, 1871, in: *Djela* 1, p. 75.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

nature the highest and most important, i.e. he must above all be a good man. This is important not only because nothing would prove to be more dangerous than rhetoric for both state and private things when it places its weapons in the service of vice, but also because I, who have endeavoured to contribute to the courses of rhetoric with all my strength, would perform a very bad service to mankind if I were to forge the weapons not for a soldier, but for a bandit.«<sup>28</sup>

The above cited statement by Quintillianus can be taken as the point of departure not only for understanding Starčević's political rhetoric, but also as the key to his political creed. For him, not only is the moral *habitus* of the orator an essential factor of his power of persuasion, but also in the *ethos* of the orator is contained his political value. For that reason, when one objects that Starčević is sometimes overzealous in the moral qualification of his political opponents, it is worthwhile to grasp, say, his life and political motto that is contained in Cato's renowned phrase – *vir bonus dicendi peritus*.<sup>29</sup> Given that Starčević consistently applied Cato's rhetorical principle not only to his opponents, but also retained it in his speeches and acts, he was rightly called during his own lifetime – *the Croatian Cato*.<sup>30</sup> Starčević's position in Croatian politics and spiritual history is reminiscent of Cato's role in Rome, not only because both were good political orators and their analysis of the penetration of rhetoric and Hellenism as a danger for original Roman spirituality, but above all because what is similar in Starčević to Cato is that he is a Croatian of an 'ancient character', defending old Croatian national customs from negative foreign influences and money as the evil of contemporary civilisation, which ruins original morality and custom.

<sup>28</sup> Marcus Fabius Quintillianus, *Obrazovanje govornika* (Institutionis orationae III, 1, 1), translated by Petar Pejčinović, V. Masleša, Sarajevo, <sup>2</sup>1985, p. 490. Concerning the mentioned definition of rhetoric, cf. *Inst. orat.* II, 15, 34–36, *ibid.*, p. 136.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Seneca: *Contr.* I, praef. 9. The aforesaid Cato's rhetorical principle, which Starčević adhered to in normal life, emerges above all from his political testimony founded on strict morality: »The first (orator) of that period was *Cato Censorius* (520–605 = 234–149), named such because he was very strict as a censor. Given that he was in spirit and body a true patriot, he opposed with all his might the importance and fame of everything foreign, especially Graecomania, that is the behaviour of Greeks, and that not only in social life, but also in literature; due to this he learned the Greek language only in old age. On the other hand, he preserved and defended with all his power ancient Roman customs, moderation and respect.« Adolfo Veber, o. c. pp. XXIX ff. Cf. also Veber's Croatian translation of Cicero's work *Katon Stariji ili o starosti*, Zagreb, 1860 (<sup>2</sup>1911).

<sup>30</sup> Tomislav Ladan, »Predgovor«, in: Ante Starčević, *Politički spisi*, Znanje, Zagreb, 1971, p. 9. Cf. also Dubravko Jelčić »Predgovor« in the edition *Pet stoljeća hrvatske književnost*. Josip Horvat emphasises precisely Starčević's similarity to Cato in his fervour for historical Croatian rights: »During the period of the sitting of the assembly of the Rijeka county, Starčević's Catonism in his conception of Croatian rights certainly has something daemonic-fascinating, he receives something from the Old Testament prophetic calling, in an ambient that even yesterday was alive in the world of cheap Epicureanism.« o. c. p. 214.

That Starčević not only rhetorically called to mind the importance of the orator's moral personality, but also that this Stoic point of departure was deeply entrenched in his political philosophy, can be demonstrated with many examples in his speeches. By selecting from this framework several of the most significant passages where he expounds classical rhetorical examples, one is able to see just how much Starčević was opposed, regarding this issue, to the liberal principle that for the political community and the concept of the general good it is altogether irrelevant how citizens live in the moral sense. In his evaluation of people who perform political and public duties, what becomes particularly evident is the classical approach to morally founded politics, sharpened by the thesis of the unacceptability of the position which claims that care for the general good of the political community lies in the authority of state institutions, and not as an issue effecting every citizen. Opposing the modern understanding contained in the statement »However one attends to his affairs and lives, that is his problem, so long as he does not touch me,« Starčević cites as a counter-argument that immoral living and acting influences others precisely because it damages the general good, hinting at Aeschines: »We know that Aeschines' best speech is the one in which he accused Timarch of licentious living. Such a man did not have a word in public, for it was known he worked for the general good, just as he worked for his own. Timarch is condemned.«<sup>31</sup>

In the same context, in substantiating his position, Starčević also cites Cicero's speeches which show that it is not unimportant for the political community how citizens trade, live and administer themselves. »We have Cicero's defence of Flaco, accused of evil administration in his region, and the case against Verresus, also accused of evil administration. Today we would say: it's none of my concern how an official administers and works, so long as he is not against me, but in that way the Romans possessed the entire known world.«<sup>32</sup> Therefore, the good community is the one in which all citizens should keep vigil over the good and evil administration of public officials, for the fate of the 'general good' depends on this.

Precisely due to this strict morality and almost fanatical consistency in evaluating political events and people, Starčević received from his opponents the fame of an indisputable rhetorical and moral authority. Not even Grof Khuen Héderváry, who was named the Croatian Ban in order to tame the wild Sabor of Zvonimir's crown and to especially delve into the firmly rooted secrets of the rhetoric of the committed *stekliš* (i.e. inflamed individual) Starčević, dared to dispute how Starčević, during the course of thirty one years

<sup>31</sup> *Djela* 1, p. 417.

<sup>32</sup> *Djela* 1, p. 418.

of actively participating in the work of the Croatian Sabor, succeeded in imprinting into the people with his speeches an image of his rhetorical significance as a man of principle and consistency. Moreover, in one of his comments about Starčević's political rhetoric, the Ban strongly emphasised his moral character, proclaiming him to be the 'most consequential' orator in the Sabor, but of course, in making an irony of these classical rhetorical values, he wants to challenge, or at least call into question, the verifiability of Starčević's political views. Namely, this relates to Starčević's final speech in the Croatian Sabor on August 17, 1892, in which he strongly condemns, in his specific style, the proposed legal address, and concludes with a statement about the holiness of truth and the duty of the orator to state it: »Gentlemen, I know that you will refute and deny me so that not a single word of mine will remain; but I am not vain and ignorant. Everyone who knows me believes this. That is why I congratulate you in advance, and I repeat, I am against your address, as well as everything else that you have done thus far.«<sup>33</sup> Replicating Starčević's objections, Khuen Héderváry commences with an ironical emphasis of Starčević's love for truth:

»According to parliamentary custom, I will first concentrate on the speech of the speaker directly before me, the representative for Delnice, about whom I must state immediately, and with joy comment, that he is the most consequential member of this esteemed Sabor – but I must add, that I do not know whether that is flattery for the representative in question. I know the judgement of the great authority, who I myself nonetheless do not hold to be an absolute authority, who has very strange opinions about people who are always consequential. That is, Prince Bismark. I think that the representative well remembered the words that Bismark spoke; that he who is consequential is that person who does not think too much about things, or who does not have the sufficient ability to do so. (Laughter from the right). I myself believe that it is very good to have such people – whether that is flattery or not is another question; but it is good to have such pillars in the country, who represent an idea consequentially. That is very good, for in the changes of time in various circumstances and relationships, everyone can pass judgement according to that pillar what is good and what is badly done, that point serves as a starting-point, according to which everyone can measure his position.«<sup>34</sup>

Just as every irony contains a little truth, so too this passage certainly presents an image of Starčević which he, in his quality as an orator and politician, received from the Croatian people, as a constant and honourable, moral and political staff or *pillar* according to which one can distinguish what

<sup>33</sup> *Stenografički zapisnici 1892.–1897.*, sv. 1, Zagreb, 1892, p. 59.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 60.

is good and what is wrong in political life. Here, it is completely clear to the infamous Croatian Ban that Starčević is not only deeply rooted and consequential, but also thinks well about things and has the sufficient ability to do so. Indeed, neither Bismark's authority can be of any assistance to deny this and bring it into question.

### 6. *The Good and Bad Political Orator*

From this ethical position and approach to rhetoric and politics, it is worthwhile to also understand Starčević's evaluation of the moral significance of individual political orators. For him, these represent two correlating components according to which a political orator can be judged as either good or bad. Leaning on classical rhetorical maxims, as especially developed by Quintilianus, namely that the rhetorical gift should not be utilised as an accessory to crime in the concealment of truth, nor should it be associated with a wicked life, Starčević particularly attacked the loud orator Strossmayer. Taking Quintilianus' renowned assumption that »an evil man and a good orator can never be found in the same person«<sup>35</sup> as his point of departure, Starčević especially harshly judges, among other personal traits, the wide opinion that Bishop Strossmayer is a good statesman and a good orator. The point of view from which Starčević judges Strossmayer's rhetoric and value as a statesman begins with the question of virtue and steadfastness in working for the general good. Thus, he explicitly cites the importance of public trust which is based on the moral significance of the orator, about which he states the following: »Everywhere else a man, in order to receive trust in state matters, must demonstrate his permanently entrusted program, from events or at least from reason and the people, he must demonstrate his work over many years, or must at least be recommended by men who know him and who enjoy the trust of the people.«<sup>36</sup> The significance of this moral steadfastness of the statesman and

<sup>35</sup> *Obrazovanje govornika* III, 1, 9, o. c., p. 492.

<sup>36</sup> *Nekolike uspomene*, in: *Djela* III, p. 350. Starčević's rhetorical steadfastness not to alter from his program in the face of danger attained full expression in the renowned court speech of June 8, 1863, in which he defended himself against an accusation about his words in a speech delivered on June 4, 1862. Not only did Starčević not soften his words, but admitted them and strengthened them even more with new arguments, exposing himself to the danger of an even worse accusation. But his principle was expressed in that court defence, that he »does not seek trouble, but when the right of his homeland and the honour of the Croatian people is in question, he knows nothing about any danger« and ends his speech with an epilogue as a steadfast adherent of classical rhetoric: »Those are my three sins, with which I am accused. I sincerely acknowledge them here. I will take pride in them until death before God, before respectful people. In these sort of circumstances, I will always sin, and I am convinced that the time will come when those who accuse me will repent, they will grieve that my proposal was not accepted.« *Segvić* pictorially



orator, which must be reflected in the program affirmed by historical reality and reason, is above all contained in the fact that the political orator, with this moral steadfastness, gives orientation to politics of the assembly or the people.

Contrary to this type of ideal of the orator as championed by Starčević, we have Strossmayer lacking the virtue and quality that could awaken the trust of the people. Given that he did not develop his program, that would be consistent and steadfast, Strossmayer lacks all those essential presuppositions of a good political orator. Indeed, Starčević emphasises that his exertions in rhetoric are simply the source of mockery: »And Bishop Strossmayer, without any of that, indeed having everything contrary, so humiliated, crushed and ridiculed, cannot behave in this fashion in his speeches and rhetoric without a program, orientation and constancy in the Sabor; this Bishop Strossmayer, who gave 100,000 forints to mischievous people so that they could shame and denumb Croats, betrays himself as the most leading statesman, the most leading orator, the most leading patriot.«<sup>37</sup> Starčević's derisive sneer is provoked by that person who shows himself to be a great orator, but lacks the virtue that would make him worthy of that fame, for according to the basic determination, an inconstant and unjust man cannot speak about dignified matters.

Apart from this ethical dimension of the orator's significance, Starčević also engages in an evaluation of other 'peculiarities' of rhetoric, applying them to the aforesaid author. From a succinct and concise enumeration of virtues that typify the good orator, it is possible to discern his conception of rhetoric. Even though he is critical of Mažuranić, similar to the way he is critical of Strossmayer from a political perspective, Starčević nonetheless does not deny that he possesses the personal traits of a good orator. Thus in his outline of Mažuranić's rhetorical presuppositions, the following aspects of a good orator are emphasised. First, his countenance and oratorical appearance is mentioned, as well as his vocal abilities. Next, what is not less important for the development of the rhetorical gift is an orderly and measured life, as well as a good memory and fervour for study. In relation to the technical aspect of the rhetorical skill, especially highlighted is the division of a speech, as well as

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describes the effect that the speech had on the audience in the court, stressing the power of the court orator who defends himself with his ethical principles over the judge and state prosecutor: »Who carefully reads the stenographic report of that fatal discussion will see a man conscious of his innocence, proud that he can sit in the defendant's chair for justice and truth. You see a man who courageously looks into the faces of his accusers, but these do not dare encounter his gaze. Both judge and state prosecutor stand destroyed under the impression of Starčević's speech. They do not engage him in discussion about guilt. To the public, they look like the real guilty party.« Kerubin Šegvić, *Dr. Ante Starčević, njegov život i njegova djela*, pp. 158 ff.

<sup>37</sup> *Djela* III, p. 350.

the manner of presentation, diction and style. These are scholastic presuppositions of true rhetoric which Mažuranić satisfies, but in the end there appears an ironical shift in this description with the note that Mažuranić actually did not utilise his rhetoric talent because he mainly remains *silent*:

»Mr. I. Mažuranić possesses those peculiarities without which an orator could not be an orator: he has a mature stature, a correct countenance and a clear voice, even though unrefined. A once cerebral and good pupil, together with his ordered way of life, it is hard to believe that he forgot everything. As for himself, he knows from his school days that a true speech must have a head and a tale, and in between them a proportionate body; he knows that an orator must know the thing about which he wants to speak and think, and to arrange his thoughts in words: he knows what is and what is not a speech; he could, if he exerted himself, make a speech, even though it is hard for him not to threaten, or not to defend himself, or not to attack his opponent. But he does not care for this, he prefers to remain silent.«<sup>38</sup>

According to the above cited rhetorical presuppositions, it is evident that Strossmayer does not satisfy even this second aspect of the rhetorical skill. Therefore, not only because he lacks the steadfast virtues and significance of a statesman, but also because his speeches do not have a correct organisation, nor do they have an appropriate demonstrative argumentation. His speeches lack an appropriate division and they are insufficiently supported by a logical instrumentum, for it is obvious that the orator does not bother himself too much when he writes nor does he sufficiently measure his words, as is testified to by the admirer and adherent of the great Strossmayer, Jovan Subotić. Expounding his argumentation to its extreme, Starčević concludes with the harshest qualification of Strossmayer's rhetorical skill, proclaiming him to be an orator not for those who need a state direction, but for 'persecutors' – *Slavo-Serbs*: »But Bishop Strossmayer does not have in that measure neither one of those traits, and did not show any other trait of an orator; judging from his speeches, he knows nothing about rhetoric to that extent to which a pupil of the fifth grade knew. He speaks as though he were not himself, as though a torrent carries and orders his words, whatever falls onto his tongue, he seeks strength in bellowing, with his speech he would scare a choir: he is an orator only for Slavo-Serbs.«<sup>39</sup>

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., pp. 351 ff.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 352. According to one of Starčević's many definitions, Slavo-Serbs are »giddy-brained and bought people, vowed traitors of Croatia, stupid people, blinded by the most impure passions, that type of people who sell themselves to anyone who wants them, and they give every buyer Croatia as collateral, that type of people who, if nothing else is offered, can be bought for a bowl of potatoes.« *Djela* III, p. 304.

For Starčević, *sclaviservi* are the worst sort of people of a captive race, widespread among every nation, among the Russians and the French and the Germans, but what disturbs him the most is Strossmayer as their spiritual leader among Croats. Citing examples for this stern judgement, Starčević demonstrates that it is grounded above all in Strossmayer's vacillating nature as a statesman and his problematic moral significance. Namely, the argumentation is reduced to the accusation that Strossmayer aims at subjecting Croatia, with his rhetoric, to Austria and Hungary. Concentrating on individual principles from Strossmayer's speeches, Starčević endeavours to show their disharmony with those actions that the orator himself made in his political activity.

Not entering here into an evaluation of the thoroughness of these judgements, nor into the exaggerated nature of Starčević's harsh satire which arises from such qualifications – among other things, neither were his opponents, and especially Strossmayer, any less mild toward Starčević in labelling him with the most drastic names, calling him, say, an *outer and inner monster* – it is nevertheless worthwhile, in the end, to confirm that Starčević in his bitter invectives or reprovals did not alter in the slightest from his principles. Just as with his opponents, in whom he noticed a separation of actions from words of empty promise or a tendency toward material profit, namely defining the general good to one's own benefit, he criticised with a merciless satirical whip, so too he remained consistent in his argumentation. Starčević himself was not familiar with compromise, concession or opportunism, nor did he tolerate them in others, for that was for him betrayal. For that reason he criticises St. Peter in wanting to give concession to the Jews in interpreting the Christian message and glorifies St. Paul who was strict in maintaining written principles. For a consistent *stekliš* orator holds to the rhetorical doctrine that *man must forget his stomach when principles, conviction, the good of the people and the homeland, and the right of freedom, are in question*.

\* \* \*

In concluding this discussion of the characteristics of Starčević's political rhetoric, I will cite the indicative evaluation of Franjo Iveković. Even though he is critical of Starčević in many things and endeavours to diminish his significance in both the theoretical and political sense, he nevertheless had to acknowledge his good rhetorical skill. Indeed, the ironical Iveković did not say this literally, but called Starčević a *good Sophist*: »In his speeches, which he delivered in the Sabor in 1861 and during the preceding years, deducing conclusions from whatever premises, he showed himself to be a good Sophist.«<sup>40</sup>

<sup>40</sup> F. Iveković, o. c., p. 19.

We noticed, of course, in considering Starčević's views on rhetoric that they are least of all subject to critical observations about the negative qualities of sophistry. Neither did he receive a wage for his instructions nor did he exploit dialectical tricks and contradictory entanglements so as to reach an unjust decision. But, along with this, it is certainly worthwhile also remembering in passing the fact that precisely these Greek enlighteners – the Sophists – were simultaneously the first teachers of that skill that was an integral part of state life, and which from Aristotle onwards relates to ethics, as well as dialectics – *rhetoric*. The strength of Starčević's political truth, indeed, was greatly founded on refined, and in that sense 'sophisticated', dialectical argumentation and was permeated with various types of premises and conclusions, which is also testified to by his constant examination and consideration of the classical rhetorical tradition and historical examples. His rhetoric, however, appears in its true light when it is evaluated from the aspect from which he himself judges other political orators – from the position of a moral and political program dedicated to *events, reason and the people*.

TRANSLATED BY DAMION BUTERIN


## STARČEVIĆEVA POLITIČKA RETORIKA

### *Sažetak*

Retorika kao disciplina u Starčevićevu tumačenju pripada sklopu državničkih umijeća te se u klasičnom smislu razmatra u bliskoj povezanosti s etikom i politikom. Zajednički je predmet razmatranja tih tzv. praktičnih filozofijskih disciplina ljudsko djelovanje, ćudoredne činidbe, krjeposti i vrijednosti. U tom sklopu retorika kao praktična disciplina polazi od odrednica čovjekova opstanka i življenja u zajednici, dakle sretna življenja i vrlina, uzimajući u razmatranje također i razne vrste strasti i osjećanja koje utječu na govorničku uvjerljivost. Starčević je osnovnu zadaću govorničtva preuzeo iz Aristotelova određenja retorike kao naobrazbe i odgoja običnih građana i državnika. Gotovo svi interpreti Starčevićeva političkoga govorničtva ukazuju na njegove uzore u klasičnoj retoričkoj tradiciji. Međutim, u svojem antitetičkom pristupu pojavama Starčević, s jedne strane, govorničtvo promatra kao znak dekadencije osebujne rimske običajnosti, primjerice, a s druge strane, ukazuje na političko govorničtvo u modernim državama kao jednu od osnovnih pretpostavaka razvoja slobode naroda i demokracije.

U ovom se članku ogledaju iskazi i pojedini primjeri iz Starčevićevih političkih govora s obzirom na načela klasične retoričke baštine. Posebice je riječ o izvorima i metodama njegova govorničkoga uvjeravanja, načelu poduke i ganuća, pathosu slušatelja te ethosu govornika.

## *Book Reviews*



*Erna Bajić-Pajnić / Mihaela Girardi Karšulin / Marko Josipović*  
*Magnum miraculum – homo (A Great Miracle – Man)*  
*Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, Zagreb, 1995.*

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*Magnum miraculum – homo (A Great Miracle – Man)* is a collection of works on several Croatian philosophers from the humanism and Renaissance periods (Andrija Dudić, Marko Marulić, Nikola Modruški, Fran Trankvil Andreis, Juraj Dubrovčanin, Federik Grisogono, Frane Petrić, Pavao Skalić), with their supplemented texts. The title of the collection was taken from Hermes Trismegistes' *Asclepius*: »magnum miraculum est homo, animal adorandum atque honorandum. Hoc enim in naturam Dei transit, quasi ipse deus; hoc daemonum genus novit, utpote qui isdem se ortum esse cognoscat« (*Asc.*, 1, 6). That is, the above-named Croatian philosophers' selected texts in the *Magnum miraculum – homo (A Great Miracle – Man)* are discussed particularly from an antropological point of view, namely, concerning the issue of man and his relation to the world – regardless of to what extent this problem is considered as the central issue of entire humanistic and Renaissance philosophy.

The first part of the collection – entitled »Magnum miraculum – homo (A Great Miracle – Man)« – consists of the following texts: Erna Banić-Pajnić, »Veliko čudo – čovjek. Problem čovjeka u djelima hrvatskih humanističko-renesansnih filozofa«; Erna Banić-Pajnić, »Andrija Dudić. Rasprava o čovjeku – rasprava o kometima«; Erna Banić-Pajnić, »Marko Marulić i njegove pouke za čestit i blažen život«; Erna Banić-Pajnić, »Modruški o ljudskoj sreći kao sreći smrtnika«; Erna Banić-Pajnić, »Trankvil Andreis o filozofiji i ljudskoj sreći«; Marko Josipović, »Krepostan život – sretan život. Prema Juraju Dubrovčaninu (Georgius Raguseus)«; Erna Banić-Pajnić, »Matematika i ljudska sreća (prema Federiku Grisogonu)«.

The second part of the collection – entitled »Man and the Concept of Science« – lists the following texts: Mihaela Girardi Karšulin, »Renesansno određenje čovjeka između ideala teorijskog života i projekta novovjekovne znanosti«; Mihaela Girardi Karšulin, »Frane Petrić. Od 'antropološkog' problema do novoplatoničkog sustava«; Mihaela Girardi Karšulin, »Pavao Skalić. Eulogus ili o odvojenoj duši«; Mihaela Girardi Karšulin, »Pavao Skalić. Čovjek na razmeđu znanosti«.

The third part of the collection consists of Croatian humanism and Renaissance philosophers' selected texts in Latin originals as well as Croatian translations: Andrija Dudić, »*De cometarum significatione commentariolus / O značenju kometu raspravica*« (translated by Veljko Gortan and Daniel Nečas Hraste, the text is somewhat abridg-

cd); Marko Marulić, *De institutione bene vivendi per exempla sanctorum* / *Pouke za čestit život s primjerima* (excerpts, translated by Branimir Glavičić); Nikola Modruški, *Dialogus de felicitate humana* / *Dijalog o ljudskoj sreći* (translated by Serafin Hrkač, the text is somewhat abridged); Trankvil Andreis, *Philosophandumne sit* / *Treba li filozofirati* (translated by Šimun Selak, the text is somewhat abridged); Juraj Dubročanin, *Moralium epistolarum liber primus* / *Moralna pisma. Knjiga prva* (excerpts, translated by Marko Josipović); Federik Grisogono, *De felicitate et humana perfectione* / *O sreći i ljudskom savršenstvu* (from: *De modo Collegiandi, Pronosticandi et Curandi Febres; Necnon de humana Felicitate, ac denique de Fluxu et Refluxu Maris*, Venice, 1928, translated by Jakov Stipišić); Frane Petrić, *Solutio eorum quae Aristoteles in activa philosophia Platoni obiecit* / *Razrješenje onoga što je Aristotel u aktivnoj filozofiji prigovorio Platonu* (from: *Discussionum peripateticorum*, Tomi III. liber VII., Basel, 1581, translated by Daniel Nečas Hraste); Pavao Skalić, *Eulogus seu de anima separata eiusque passione* / *Eulog ili o odvojenoj duši i njezinoj trpnji* (from: *Encyclopediae seu orbis disciplinarum, tam sacrarum quam prophanarum, Epistemon, Eulogus, seu de anima separata...*, Basel, 1559, translated by Ina Rogošić-Blagojević). All the Latin texts were edited by Pavle Knezović.

Andrija Dudić<sup>1</sup> (1533–1589), a philosopher, poet, philologist, theologian, scientist, diplomat, went to school in Verona, Pavia, Venice, Wrocław, Padua; he was an active participant of the Council of Trent (his *Orationes*, held on several occasions at the Council of Trent, kept being published until the mid-eighteenth century); he conducted correspondence with Paulus Manutius, Joachim Camerarius, Thomas Erasmus, Justus Lipsius, and Petrus Ramus; he was known among the reformists in Germany and Switzerland, among the Socinians in Wrocław, and in the crypto-Calvinist circle in Silesia; his central interest was philological-bibliophilistic (he collected ancient codexes, copied texts, translated from Greek into Latin – for example, Ptolemaeus' *Tetrabiblos*, Proclus' paraphrase of Ptolemaeus' *Tetrabiblos*, Longinus, Apian's history of Hannibal, etc.)<sup>2</sup>

Dudić's treatise *De cometarum significatione commentariolus* was first published in Basel in 1579, and reprinted several times afterward. The central topic of the treatise is the comet as the herald of forthcoming wars and misfortunes. Dudić quotes various opinions on the comet's quiddity – his contemporaries' opinions first, and then the opinions of ancient philosophers. Is the comet composed of fumes rising from the bowels of the Earth, self-igniting and burning? Is it a star like any other, only not always visible? Is it a heavenly sphere lit by the Sun? Dudić concludes that the comet's quiddity remains unknown to us. In spite of that, we can ascertain that the comet is

<sup>1</sup> Andreas Dudithius, Dudithus, Dudith, Sbardallatus de Orchowitza (Horchowitza).

<sup>2</sup> For more information on Andrija Dudić cf.: A. Costil, *Andre Dudith, humaniste hongrois, Sa vie, son oeuvre et ses manuscrits grecs*, Paris, 1935; J. Faludi, *Andre Dudith et les humanistes francais*, Szeged, 1927; E. Lutteri, *Della vita di Andrea Dudizio Sbardellato*, Revereto, 1988; V. Bazala, *Dudić Andrija (1533–1589)*, Zagreb, 1951; C. Vasoli, »Andreas Dudith-Sbardellati e la disputa sulle comete«, in the book *I miti e gli astri*, Naples, 1977; Ž. Dadić, *Povijest egzaktih znanosti u Hrvata*, SNL, Zagreb, 1982, vol. I, pp. 94–97 (»Prva protivljenja Aristotelovoj prirodnoj filozofiji u Hrvata. Andrija Dudić«).



not a herald of future wars and misfortunes. How many wars were there, yet unannounced by comets? How many pestilences ravaged Europe, without any omen from heavens? The idea that comets herald forthcoming evils Dudić refutes by experience itself. The reasons for starting a war should be looked for in the real motives of a country's ruler – possibly his greed or vanity, vindictiveness, etc. In the same manner, other great evils on earth (plague, earthquakes, volcano eruptions, etc.) are not to be explained by a comet in the sky; they should rather be examined so their true causes may be found. In short, any interpretation of great misfortunes and wars that is based on comets should be – according to Dudić – considered nothing but superstition, caused by the rarity of the phenomenon, which (unlike other phenomena in the sky) causes amazement.<sup>3</sup>

In her interpretation of Dudić's text Banić-Pajnić particularly emphasizes the anthropological aspect of the topic: the relationship between the phenomenon in the sky and the events in man's world. In Dudić's claim that comets have no effect on rulers' decisions Banić-Pajnić sees a step toward the emancipation of man's realm (*regnum hominis*) from the realm of nature (*regnum naturae*), or – eventually – from the 'prime mover', that is, from the realm of God (*regnum Dei*).

Marko Marulić<sup>4</sup> (1450–1524) went to school at first in his native town of Split, and later in Italy (probably Padua). After school he returned to Split and stayed there all his life. Marulić was a humanist and the most important Croat representative of the *devotio moderna*, quite influential in Europe, as witnessed by many editions of his works published in various European languages throughout the continent. Marulić's *Evangelistar* was first published in Venice in 1516, and saw seven more editions (in Venice, Basel, Cologne, Paris and Antwerpen), translated into French, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian and German. The *Quinquaginta parabolae* were also first published in Venice around 1516, twice more in Venice and once in Cologne.

Marulić's first work was also his most popular one: *The Institution (De institutione bene vivendi per exempla sanctorum)*<sup>5</sup>, first published in Venice in 1506, and some fifty more times by 1697 – in Latin: once again in Venice, in 1509, then in Basel in 1513, 1518 and 1555, in Cologne in 1530, 1531, 1536, 1609 and 1686; in Solingen in 1540, in Paris in 1585 and 1586, in Antwerpen in 1577, 1584, 1593 and 1601. The work was also published in Italian (twelve editions), German (seven editions), French (five editions), Portuguese (two editions), Czech (one edition), and probably in Spanish. *The Institution* is also Marulić's most extensive work (six books comprising seventy-one chapters), a moral-theological collection of a great many examples taken not only from the Holy Scriptures but from Christian tradition too (St. Basil the Great, St. Jerome, St. Ber-

<sup>3</sup> More on Dudić's treatise *De cometarum significatione commentariolus* cf. in: C. Vasoli, *op. cit.*; also in: Ž. Dadić, *op. cit.*

<sup>4</sup> Marcus Marulus (Spalatensis).

<sup>5</sup> Later versions of the title are: *De institutione bene beateque vivendi per exempla sanctorum*, Koeln, 1530; *Bene vivendi instituta*, Basel, 1513; *Opus de religiose vivendi institutione*, Koeln, 1931; *Dictiorum factorumque memorabilium libri...*, Antwerpen, 1577; *Palaestra Christianarum virtutum...*, Koeln, 1686.

nard of Clairvaux, St. Thomas of Aquinas, etc.). Marulić's treatment of philosophy (non-Christian one as well as Scholasticism) was in principle negative. His intention was not to discuss particular virtues, but to give vivid examples instead, that would move the reader to lead a moral Christian life. Encouraging his reader by numerous examples of Christian virtue, Marulić – like to the movement he represented – hoped to renew Christian spirit in Europe.<sup>6</sup>

This element is the very starting point of the interpretation offered by Banić-Pajnić, according to which it is an experience of crisis of the basic moral and world-view principles of the Middle Ages that should above all be recognized in the background of this hope and endeavor to renew Christianity. This crisis produced the attempts at a new evaluation of man's place and role in the world, in the way that emphasized the antropological elements in humanism and in the Renaissance. In this context, Banić-Pajnić compares Marulić's view of man with Pico's one: they both emphasized man's special position among God's creatures, and they both based it on man's freedom to choose between the two ways of living (the way of good and the way of evil). Pico, however, stresses man's uncertainty facing the decision, while Marulić emphasizes the clear demarcation between the two ways.

Nikola Modruški<sup>7</sup> (before 1427–1480), the Bishop of Senj and, later, of Modruš, was educated in Venice. At the time, Modruški was considered an eminent rhetorician (his *Oratio in funere reverendissimi domini d. Petri Cardinalis sancti Sixti* held in 1474 was famous, and it was published and in a relatively short time reprinted seven times in Rome, Padua and Rostock). The winter of 1463–1464 Modruški spent at the court of the humanist and patron Ivan Vitez of Sredna, the Varadin Bishop, where he and other learned men discussed, among other things, whether it was within human power to attain knowledge of his purpose and to obtain his happiness – direct and clear vision of God in his own shape. This treatise survived as a manuscript entitled *Dialogus de Mortalium felicitate*, written by Nikola Modruški himself after his return to Italy and sent to Pope Pius II. A copy of the treatise, sent by Nikola Modruški to Bishop Ivan

<sup>6</sup> More on Marulić's *Institution*, cf.: Drago Šimundža, »Glavna obilježja i kulturno-povijesno značenje Marulićeve *Institucije*« in: Marko Marulić, *Institucija*, Književni krug, Split, 1986, vol. I, pp. 11–51; Darko Novaković, »Generički kontekst Marulićeve *Institucije*«, in: Marko Marulić, *Institucija*, Književni krug, Split, 1987, pp. 9–31; Mirko Tomasović, »Evropska recepcija *Institucije*«, in: Marko Marulić, *Institucija*, Književni krug, Split, 1987, vol. III, pp. 9–20. On philosophical aspects of Marulić's work, cf. Albert Bazala, *Marulićev filozofski rad*, Zagreb, 1904; Vladimir Filipović, »Osnovi etičko-filozofske orijentacije Marka Marulića«, *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, year IX, No. 1–2, Zagreb, 1983, pp. 3–22; Vladimir Filipović, »Filozofska misao Marka Marulića«, in: Marko Marulić, *Pouke za čestit život s primjerima*, Globus, Zagreb, 1986, pp. XI–XVII; Ljerka Schiffler, »Marko Marulić i filozofija u svjetlu enciklopedizma«, in: *Dani hvarskog kazališta*, Splitski književni krug, Split, 1989; Zlatko Posavac, »Marulićev *Dialogus de laudibus Herculis*«, in: *Dani hvarskog kazališta*, Splitski književni krug, Split, 1989; Ljerka Schiffler, *Ideja enciklopedizma i filozofsko mišljenje*, Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo, collection Filozofska istraživanja, book 23, Zagreb, 1989, pp. 90–106 (»Marko Marulić – filozof i enciklopedist«); Josip Talanga, »Marulić i Kant o problemu laži«, *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, year XVI, No. 1–2, Zagreb, 1990, pp. 181–196.

<sup>7</sup> Modrus(s)iensis, Catharensis, Segundinus or Secundinus, Machinensis, Mikula.

Vitez in Varadin two years later, in 1465, was also preserved. The manuscript and the copy were compared and published as an *editio critica* (*editio princeps* too) by Father Serafin Hrkač in 1975.<sup>8</sup>

Modruški believes that man can attain his purpose – direct and clear vision of God Himself – in a natural way (that is, not exclusively through revelation but also by the natural light of the mind). He also considers speculative knowledge of God to be inadequate – it is in our nature to long for perfect knowledge of God, that is, not just for knowledge of God's essence, but also of God Himself. We therefore cannot be happy with a general, abstract knowledge of God, offered by speculation; we only feel our purpose fulfilled in the intuitive observation of God Himself in His own quality and form. Nature would have created our inclination toward such a purpose in vain (nature that *per definitionem* does nothing in vain), but for its capability to attain this purpose without revelation. However, as we can only see in light, but not in darkness, we can only fulfill the purpose of our being with God's help; that is, as we can see without God's revelation, but not without light, we can indeed know and fulfill our purpose without revelation, but not without the grace of God. In short, our purpose and our greatest happiness – vision of God as He is – awaits us after the end of this life, as the reward granted by God for a pious life on Earth; we can, however, be granted the award by our nature, and we can know the award as our ultimate purpose and happiness by the natural light of the mind, not through revelation only.

Banić-Pajnić recognizes this fundamental thesis of this dialog as an attempt at a reconciliation of Classical thought with Christianity, that is, of philosophy with theology: on the one hand, man with his natural tendencies and capabilities, on the other hand man's ultimate purpose and complete happiness as the gift from God. If man's nature already enables him to accept this God's gift, it then means that man is not liable to sin by his own nature and unworthy of salvation, God's grace, but that man himself takes part in this salvation – namely, by this very inclination and capability to see God as He is. Modruški thus in this dialog emphasizes man's role in God's act of salvation, or, more precisely, the role to which God calls man to perform on this act, not just through revelation but by the way of man's nature itself. This act of salvation is therefore immanent, not alien to human nature. This emphasis on the role of man's nature in the act of salvation, or the emphasis on the immanence of the act to man's nature itself, Banić-Pajnić recognizes as an advance sign of modern anthropocentrism, that is, a sign of man's world (*regnum hominis*) emancipation from the realm of God's grace (*regnum Gratiae*).

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Nicolaus Modrusiensis, »De mortalium felicitate dialogus«, *Dobri pastir*, year XXV, vols. I–IV, Sarajevo, 1975, pp. 156–200. More on Nikola Modruški's philosophical work cf. Seraphinus Hrkač, »Nicolai Modrusiensis *De mortalium felicitate dialogus*«, *Dobri pastir*, year XXV, vols. I–IV, Sarajevo, 1975, pp. 141–155; Serafin Hrkač, »Nikola Modruški«, *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, year II, No. 1–2, Zagreb, 1976, pp. 145–156; Ljerka Schiffler, *Humanizam bez granica*, collection Filozofska istraživanja, book 58, Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo, Zagreb, 1992, pp. 95–105 (»Filozofski Dijalog o sreći smrtnika Nikole Modruškoga«).

Fran Trankvil Andreis<sup>9</sup> (1490–1571), a humanist, diplomat and poet, went to school in Trogir, Dubrovnik, Padua, Perugia, Siena, Bologna, Vienna, Ingolstadt and Leipzig (where he also taught Cicero and Quintilian). He collaborated and maintained contact with many humanists (Joachim Vadian of St. Gallen, Erasmus Desiderius von Rotterdam, Willibald Pir(c)kheimer, Eobanus Hessus, Juan Luis Vives). Due to increasingly straitened circumstances he took a job in diplomacy in 1525. In late 1549 he returned to his native Trogir, where he remained until his death in 1571.

*Dialogus philosophandumne sit* was written during Andreis' stay in Poznan in 1544, and was published in Krakow in 1545. In the dialog Andreis stresses that sciences and arts are not natural gifts, given at our birth, but that we attain them through efforts and hard work. It may be said that nature merely encourages us to attain them. However, both nature and toil are on their own insufficient to provide us with sciences and arts. We may only achieve that within the society we belong to and within the tradition that teaches us how to attain these knowledges and how to master these arts. Equally so when peaceful life is in question – although we may be inclined to lead a peaceful life by nature itself, it is not given to us by nature itself; it is rather achieved within the society and the tradition we follow, restraining our passions and impulses by our own labor and efforts. For the toils invested in peaceful life, learning and mastering arts, we are awarded the bliss of vision of God's essence and presence by God Himself. Therefore, we should engage in philosophy – life devoted to philosophy is a preparation for man's utmost good: *contemplatio divinae mentis*.

In her interpretation of Andreis' dialog Banić-Pajnić puts particular emphasis on Andreis' anthropological approach to the issue. The main foundation of man's becoming man (through attainment of virtue, knowledge, arts and peaceful life) is his very society – nature only provides capability and encouragement, God the award, and realization itself is the result of man's life in human society. Regardless of nature's (*regnum naturae*) encouragement to peaceful life, virtue, science and arts, regardless of God's own encouragement through the grace of His award (*regnum Dei, regnum Gratiae*), a heavy share of the very act, virtues and peaceful life, sciences and arts, is the result of man's actions in the society he lives in. In this element Banić-Pajnić recognizes the separation of man's world (*regnum hominis*) from the realm of nature (*regnum naturae*) and from the realm of God's grace (*regnum Gratiae*).<sup>10</sup>

Juraj Dubrovčanin<sup>11</sup> (second part of the sixteenth century–1622) studied 'litterae humaniores' (in Venice), philosophy and theology, mathematics, astronomy and medicine in Padua, Siena, Pisa, Florence, Rome and Naples. From 1601 (until his death in 1622) he taught philosophy at the Paduan university as the successor to Cesare Cremonini, whom he polemized with about the forms of Aristotle's four elements. His polemics with Fortuni Liceti, concerning the nature of comets, is also well-known. Juraj Dubrovčanin's following works were published: *Astronomico et filosofico discorso*

<sup>9</sup> Andrijević, Tranquillus Andronicus Parthenius, Tranquillus Andronicus Dalmata, Fran Andronik.

<sup>10</sup> On the same dialog by Andreis cf. Erna Banić-Pajnić, »Trebalo li filozofirati?«, *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, year XV, No. 1–2, Zagreb, 1989, pp. 127–148.

<sup>11</sup> Georgius Raguseus.

(...) *sopra l'anno M.D.XC. calculato al Meridiano dell'inclita Citta di Venetia*, Venice, 1590; *Tractatus De formis elementorum*, Padua, 1605; *Peripateticae disputationes...*, Padua, 1613. *Epistolarum Mathematicarum seu De divinatione*, including a short treatise entitled *De Puero, et Puella, qui ad D. Antonii Confessoris altare delati, revixisse putantur*, was published posthumously, in Paris in 1623. Some of Juraj Dubrovčanin's manuscripts were lost, but the following ones have survived: *Epistolae morales, dialecticae et mathematicae* (in the British library, London), the *Expositio (...) super Artem brevem Raymundi Lulli, Quaesita VII* and the *Expositio (...) super spheram Ioannis de Sacro Bosco* (in the Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Milan).<sup>12</sup>

The central topic of the letter entitled *De humana felicitate* (the first one from the *Epistolae morales*) is the earthly happiness of man as a man, not as any particular individual, with some particular preferences, and also not regarding man's supernatural purpose. Dubrovčanin examines the doctrines of the Stoics, the Peripatetics and the Epicureans, siding with the Stoic view that happiness consists of virtue alone (neither of mere action in accordance to virtue, as the Peripatetics claimed, nor of pleasure derived from virtue, according to the Epicureans). In the sixth letter of the *Epistolae morales* (*Stoicorum de affectibus doctrinam nec Christiannae religioni nec Sanctis Patribus adversari*) Dubrovčanin proves that the Stoic doctrines on senses is neither contrary to Christian religion nor to the Fathers of the Church, while in the ninth letter (*De Amicitia*) he discusses and defines friendship.

Josipović interprets Dubrovčanin's ethical discourses in the context of Paduan school naturalistic and logistic Aristotelian views, emphasizing in particular Dubrovčanin's choice of Stoic doctrines concerning the senses, not only happiness (as opposed to Peripatetic and Epicurean doctrines).

Federik Grisogono<sup>13</sup> (1472 or 1473–1538) was at first educated in his native Zadar, and continued his studies in Padua. He was an astrology (astronomy) and

<sup>12</sup> More on Juraj Dubrovčanin's philosophical work cf. Marko Josipović, *Il pensiero filosofico di Giorgio Raguseo nell'ambito del tardo aristotelismo padovano*, Massimo, Milano, 1985, Croatian translation: Marko Josipović, *Filozofijska misao Georgiusa Raguseiusa*, Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo, collection Filozofska istraživanja, book 65, Zagreb, 1993; Marija Brida, »Problemi djela *Peripateticae disputationes* Jurja Dubrovčanina«, *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, year I, vol. 1–2, Zagreb, 1975, pp. 151–184; Marija Brida, »Juraj Dubrovčanin o Aristotelovu tumačenju pokretača prvog kruga«, *ibid.*, year II, vol. 1–2, Zagreb, 1976, pp. 135–144; Marija Brida, »Juraj Dubrovčanin o peripatetičkom tumačenju unutarnjih pokretačkih principa«, *ibid.*, year III, vol. 1–2, Zagreb, 1977, pp. 133–158; Marija Brida, »Spor Jurja Dubrovčanina i Cesara Cremoninija o formama elemenata«, *ibid.*, year IV, vol. 1–2, Zagreb, 1978, pp. 39–83; Marija Brida, »Juraj Dubrovčanin o principu individuacije«, *ibid.*, year VI, vol. 1–2, Zagreb, 1980, pp. 7–49; Banić-Pajnić, O spisu Jurja Dubrovčanina *Epistolae mathematicae seu de divinatione*, *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, year VI, vol. 1–2, Zagreb, 1980, pp. 83–102; Žarko Dadić, *Povijest egzaktnih znanosti u Hrvata*, ŠNL, Zagreb, 1982, vol. 1, pp. 210–214; Marko Josipović, »Iz rukopisne ostavštine Georgiusa Raguseiusa. Narav logike – Ars lulliana – Paedia«, *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, year XIII, vol. 1–2, Zagreb, 1987, pp. 71–84; Marko Josipović, »Iz rukopisne ostavštine Georgiusa Raguseiusa: neki vidici problema o univerzalnom«, *ibid.*, year XVI, vol. 1–2, Zagreb, 1990, pp. 197–208.

<sup>13</sup> Chrysoconi Iadertinus, Crisogoni Iadertinus; De Bartholatiis is sometimes added.

mathematics professor at the Paduan archlyceum from 1507 to 1509 when the University suspended work. From 1509 on he lived in Zadar. Grisogono's major work, *De modo Collegiandi, Pronosticandi et Curandi Febres; Necnon de humana Felicitate, ac denique de Fluxu et Refluxu Maris*, was published in Venice in 1528.<sup>14</sup>

In the treatise *De summa felicitate et suprema perfectione humana* (from the quoted work) Grisogono searches for the knowledge that makes us blessed. Among the sciences of the natural mind, this knowledge may be found in none of the following ones: grammar, rhetoric, dialectic, arithmetics, geometry, music, perspective, law, natural philosophy, metaphysics, medicine. It may be found in – astronomy, which examines heavens, lifting us thus above any dirt of the sublunar world and making us like the higher intelligences; it also shows us how to connect the future with the present and the past, and which – finally – determines the causes of all the past, present and future occurrences in the sublunar world. And among the divine sciences it is not the cabalistic one that makes us blessed; it is orthodox theology.

Comparing Grisogono's concept of happiness with the same concepts in Marulić, Modruški and Andreis, Banić-Pajnić particularly emphasizes Grisogono's reason for choosing astrology as the ultimate science among the sciences of the natural mind: astrology foretells future events on Earth, its contribution to human happiness consists of its practical usage – not theoretical speculations – in, concretely, treating diseases and in preventing wars, schisms etc. In these reasons Banić-Pajnić recognizes an advance sign of modern orientation to the earthly (*regnum hominis*) but also – and in connection with that – to the applied, not theoretical science.

All together, it should be pointed out that in her interpretations of Croatian Renaissance philosophers Erna Banić-Pajnić starts from the following theses: first, Renaissance philosophy is oriented prevalingly anthropologically, bearing in mind the variety of aspects of anthropological issues in the Renaissance (e.g. the problem of man's happiness, man's knowledge, etc., or the astrological aspect of the problem of man's happiness, the ethical aspect of the problem of man's knowledge, etc.); and second, Renaissance was a period of transition, related to – on the one hand – the crisis of the medieval system of interpretation of reality and the experienced uncertainty due to the system failure, and on the other hand related to modern times, the shift of the central and starting points in the interpretation of world and reality from God to man – and the related increasing anthropocentrism, the growing autonomy of the *regnum hominis* with reference to *regnum naturae* and *regnum Dei* (*regnum Gratiae*). These two

<sup>14</sup> More about the life and work of Federiko Grisogono cf. Mirko Dražen Grmek, Prinosi za poznavanje života i rada zadarskog renesansnog liječnika, kozmografa i astrologa Federika Grisogona *Radovi instituta Jugoslavenske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti u Zadru*, vol. XV, Zadar, 1968, pp. 61–90; *Zbornik radova o Federiku Grisogonu – zadarskom učenjaku (1472–1538)*, Zadar, 1974; Žarko Dadić, *Povijest egzaktih znanosti u Hrvata*, SNL, Zagreb, 1982, vol. 1, pp. 61–73 (»Prirodna filozofija i znanstveni doprinos Federika Grisogona«); Erna Banić-Pajnić, »Federicus Grisogono: De divinis mathematicis«, *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, year XI, vol. 1–2, Zagreb, 1985, pp. 83–95; Mihaela Girardi Karšulin, »Cassirerova interpretacija renesansne astrologije, F. Grisogono i F. Petrić«, *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, year XVI, vol. 1–2, Zagreb, 1990, pp. 147–166.

theses form a clear and determined concept of Renaissance philosophy. In other words, Banić-Pajnić bases her interpretations of individual Renaissance philosophical texts on an interpretation of Renaissance philosophy as a whole.

Frane Petrić<sup>15</sup> (1529–1597) was educated in Venice (1542–1544), Ingolstadt (1545–1546), Padua (where he studied medicine at first, 1547–1551, and then philosophy, 1551–1554). From 1577 to 1592 he taught Plato's philosophy at the university of Ferrara, and in 1592 – invited by the Pope Gregory XIV and Cardinal Aldobrandini – he went to Rome where a Department of Plato's philosophy was formed for him. Petrić's major works are the following: *La città felice*, Venice, 1553; *Della historia diece dialoghi...*, Venice, 1560; *Della retorica diece dialoghi...*, Venice, 1562; *Discussionum peripateticarum*, Tomi primi, Libri XIII, Venice, 1571; *Discussionum peripateticarum*, Tomi IV, Basel, 1581; *Apologia contra calumnias Theodori Angelutii eiusque novae sententiae quod Metaphysica eadem sint quae physica...*, Ferrara, 1584; *Della poetica (...)* *La Deca Disputata (...)* *Il Trimerone (...)*, Ferrara, 1586; *Della poetica (...)* *La Deca Istoriale*, Ferrara, 1586; *Nova de universis Philosophia libris quinquaginta comprehensa (...)*, Ferrara, 1591.<sup>16</sup>

In the text entitled *Solutio eorum quae Aristoteles in activa philosophia Platoni obiecit* Petrić cites Aristotle's objections to Plato's political philosophy and ethics, trying to make Aristotle look like an unwarrantable critic of Plato, as well as a false witness not just in the matter of Plato's doctrines but also in the case of other philosophers.

In the text *Frane Petrić. Od 'antropološkog' problema do novoplatoničkog sustava* Girardi Karšulin examines Petrić's complete opus, following the gradual elimination of the problem of man from his works – from *La città felice* to *Nova de universis Philosophia*. While Petrić's early treatises (*La città felice*, *Della historia diece dialoghi*, *Della retorica dieci dialoghi*) are mainly concerned with anthropological problems, although guided by a Neoplatonic enthusiasm for a scientific basis of research into the phenomena, that is, an enthusiasm striving for their common deduction from a single principle, in *Nova de universis Philosophia* – despondent over the possibility of a systematic scientific elaboration of anthropological problems – Petrić offered a scientific system of all the beings, deduced, indeed, from a single principle, but a system in which there was no room for either man or anthropological topics. In this sense, Petrić may be regarded as an 'anticipator of the consequences' of the idea of modern mathematical science.

It must be said that Girardi Karšulin's approach to Petrić is strongly marked by her recognizing Platonic and Aristotelian elements in his work (e.g. in *La città felice* there is the Aristotelian – and also Christian – element of soul-body dichot-

<sup>15</sup> Patritius, Patricius, Patritio, Patrizio, Patrici, Patrizzi, Petriš (Patričić, Petricić, Petrišević, Patricij), Petris.

<sup>16</sup> Literature on Petrić's life and work is enormous. We therefore point at the bibliography of works on Frane Petrić published in the *Studia historiae philosophiae Croatiae*, vol. 2, No. 2, Zagreb, 1993, pp. 201–225, compiled by Vladimir Premec, Franjo Zenko, Mihaela Girardi Karšulin and Ljerka Schiffler.

omy; or, in general, the Platonic element of mathematics and geometry as scientific paradigms; etc.).

Pavao Skalić<sup>17</sup> (1534–1575) went to school in Zagreb, Vienna (where he won the BA degree in 1549 and his MA in 1551 – for his work on *septem artes liberales*), in Bologna (where he studied theology and finished his doctorate in 1553). During his studies in Italy Skalić paid special attention to Giovanni Pico della Mirandola's works. On finishing his studies, he returned to Vienna in 1553, where he soon begun teaching at the theological faculty. Later on he taught in Prussia, at the University of Koenigsberg. In Urach, with Petar Pavao Vergerije, Primož Trubar, Stipan Konzul and Antun Dalmata, he joined in the work at Ungnad's 'Biblical institute'. In Basel in 1559 he published his *Encyclopaediae, seu orbis disciplinarum, tam sacrarum, quam profanarum, Epistemon*; in Koeln, in 1570, the *Miscellaneorum de rerum causis et succesibus et de secretoriore quadam Methodo (...) Libri septem*, and in 1571, also in Koeln, the *Miscellaneorum tomus secundus, sive catholici Epistemonis, contra quondam corruptam ac depravatam Encyclopaediam libri XV*.<sup>18</sup>

In his text *Eulogus, seu de anima separata, eiusque passione* Skalić examines the imperishable part of man, the soul. Before the original sin, man – like the universe – was imperishable, and after the sin he was divided into the perishable and the imperishable parts. The imperishable part, soul, can be separated from the perishable one, body, because of their contrary natures. This, however, does not mean that man's soul cannot suffer. Soul is not possible without the object it gains knowledge about. It is free indeed in the matter of free choice of the objects of its thought and knowledge, but not in the matter of its own intentionality, so that it is not capable of not intending an object. The soul therefore does not suffer because it is touched – like the body – but because it is, in its intentionality, determined by the quiddity and limitation of its very object.

In her two treatises on Skalić, Girardi Karšulin examines in detail Skalić's understanding of science, comparing it with Petrić's. Having determined soul's qualities as passivity and finality, Skalić does not – like Petrić – tend toward a general science systematically inferred from a single principle, but toward a certain collection, an encyclopedia of various ultimate knowledges that need not either be entirely certain or all be deduced from a single principle. Besides that, Girardi Karšulin emphasizes

<sup>17</sup> Paulus Scalichius de Lika, Paulus de la Scala, Paulus Scaliger, von der Leiter, etc.

<sup>18</sup> More on the life and work of Pavao Skalić cf. Gerta Krabbel, *Aus Paul Skalichs Leben*, Muenster, 1914; Gerta Krabbel, *Paul Skalich. Ein Lebensbild aus dem 16. Jahrhundert*, Geschichtliche Darstellungen und Quellen, Heft 1, 1915; Erna Banić-Pajnić, »Pavao Skalić i tradicija 'aeterna sapientia'«, *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, year IX, vol. 1–2, Zagreb, 1983, pp. 111–122; Erna Banić-Pajnić, *Smisao i značenje Hermesove objave*, Globus & Institut za povijesne znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu – Odjel za povijest filozofije, Zagreb, 1989, pp. 144–156; Ljerka Schiffler, *Ideja enciklopedizma i filozofsko mišljenje*, Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo, collection Filozofska istraživanja, book 23, Zagreb, 1989, pp. 82–90 (Enciklopedija P. Skalića; Alojz Jembrih, *Tragom Pavla Skalića Gordogan*, No. 29–30, Zagreb, 1990; Mihaela Girardi Karšulin, »Pavao Skalić. Filozofija između sinkretizma i paradoksa«, *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, year XX, vol. 1–2, Zagreb, 1994, pp. 117–130.



Skalić's opposition to Aristotle's evaluation of science, or, more precisely, to the Aristotelian criterion of the evaluation. That is, Skalić believes that each science has a certain use, and that it does not exist for its own purpose (knowledge as such). In this sense, metaphysics really is the ultimate science, not for its own purpose, but rather for some extratemporal, supernatural benefit that man can derive from it. From the anthropological aspect, it means that man, even as a subject of metaphysical knowledge (not just as a subject of e.g. natural philosophy, ethical, etc., knowledge), is not a mere observer: man is rather a being that needs a certain good (the good provided by metaphysics itself). In short, Skalić's concept of science is an idea of encyclopedic knowledges useful for man.

We should stress that the central issue in Girardi Karšulin's works is the Renaissance (Neo)platonism, investigated in particular in its scientific aspect. On the one hand, Girardi Karšulin emphasizes Platonic as well as Aristotelian elements in Petrić's and Skalić's (Neo)platonism (e.g. the Platonic element of omnidependence upon the One, the motive of integration of knowledge, syncretism, or e.g. the Aristotelian method in Petrić's *Panaugia*, that starts from that which is 'first for us' tending toward the knowledge of that which is 'first by itself', etc.); on the other hand, Girardi Karšulin places special emphasis on Petrić's and Skalić's concepts of science, comparing Petrić's universal science, systematically inferred from one principle, with Skalić's cumulative encyclopedic program of various knowledges usable to man.

As for the anthropological aspect, it is accentuated in Girardi Karšulin's works mainly in connection with Petrić's and Skalić's concepts of science, so that man may not even be considered within the scope of Petrić's universal science, while Skalić's man, as the subject of knowledge, becomes an ultimate being, needy of the benefits derived from a particular science.

Finally, it must be mentioned that Girardi Karšulin understands Renaissance in the first place as the destruction of the traditional medieval system of world and values (especially in relation to the traditional ideal of theoretical life, replaced by useful science). Anticipations of modern sciences are not to be looked for in the Renaissance. As the destruction of the medieval scientific system, the Renaissance merely created the possibility of the emergence of modern science.

As the final conclusion, it should be noted that the book *Magnum miraculum – homo* (*A Great Miracle – Man*) is marked by the three authors' – Josipović, Banić-Pajnić, Girardi Karšulin – different approaches to the texts from Croatian humanist and Renaissance philosophical heritage.

The viewpoints of Marko Josipović and Erna Banić-Pajnić seem to be most markedly different. While Banić-Pajnić always interprets certain philosophers and philosophical texts in view of the entire Renaissance philosophy, the 'ultimate context' for Josipović is the Paduan school. Josipović does not say a word about Renaissance philosophy as a whole. Apart from that, Josipović's approach is only as comparative as the author discussed (Juraj Dubrovčanin) compares his views with those of other philosophers and philosophical schools (e.g. the Stoics, Peripatetics and the Epicureans). Banić-Pajnić, however, compares quite often – for example, Pico's and Marulić's concept of man, Grisogono's concept of human happiness with the concept of happi-

ness in Marulić, Modruški, Andreis, etc. The same comparative approach is typical of Girardi Karšulin, who e.g. compares Petrić's and Skalić's concepts of science, Pico's and Skalić's visions of man, etc. In addition to that, Girardi Karšulin also presents her views of entire Renaissance philosophy, yet bases her interpretations of Petrić's and Skalić's works on the search for Platonic and Aristotelian elements in their texts to a far greater extent, which makes her approach closer to Josipović's.

In short, *Magnum miraculum – homo (A Great Miracle – Man)* is a book that differs not only in the themes of the humanism and Renaissance Croatian philosophers' selected texts, but also in the treatment of these texts – from the search for particular Aristotelian, Platonic, Stoic, etc. elements, to the theses and conclusions about entire Renaissance philosophy.

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