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EDITORIAL

The Croatian philosophical heritage, starting from the twelfth century up to the present, has been studied at the Zagreb University Institute for the History of Philosophy for the past twenty years. The results of this research into the history of philosophy have been biannually published in Croatian with summaries in one of the world languages in the periodical »Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine« (Contributions to the Exploration of Croatian Philosophical Heritage) since 1975.

The international philosophical audience has not been familiar with the results of this research mainly on account of linguistic barriers. By starting the periodical »Studia historiae philosophiae croaticae« we would like to remove the barrier not only to the diffusion of our works outside Croatia, but also to establishing a dialogue with all those who are interested in the exploration of the Croatian philosophical heritage. The fact is that some Croatian philosophers have been studied also by historians of philosophy outside Croatia. Despite the fact that the same subject has been studied, there was however no exchange of information about the results of historico-philosophical research at the international level, which excluded the possibility of a dialogue.

By starting this periodical we would not only like to establish the possibility of a dialogue about themes of common interest, when dealing with authors who belonged to the »Latin« period of the Croatian philosophical heritage, but would also like to inform about the part of the Croatian philosophical heritage which has been written in Croatian and is mostly linked to the nineteenth and twentieth century, which bears witness to the presence of Croatian philosophical thought in recent intellectual developments.

THE BEGINNINGS OF PHILOSOPHY IN CROATIA*

KRUNO KRSTIĆ †

Original Paper
UDC 1(091)

Rather than being strictly historical, research into the beginnings of philosophy in Croatia can, metaphorically speaking, be termed archeological. While the first preserved philosophical texts, first historically ascertained documents concerning the developed philosophical activity in this country or among this people stem from as late as the age of developed Humanism, i.e. from the first half of the fifteenth century, there is fragmentary evidence together with indications which allow us to place the beginnings of this activity, the scope of which is difficult to determine, into much older periods, perhaps even into the period of the Carolingian Renaissance. The exact historian would perhaps be reluctant to deal with such ancient times because of the lack of signed texts, but we should remember that the troubled political history of this country for the period from the first settlements to the twelfth century had to be reconstructed on the basis of rather scarce written documents which are, with the exception of a few stone tablets and parchment papers, exclusively of a foreign provenance. Difficult fate of this country which had been trodden down by military raids, captured and ransacked, burnt down and destroyed for centuries, has left us few documents of its history. I shall mention only one. While, for instance, the relations with Byzantium and Venice, synods and, especially, papal missives dating from the ninth and tenth centuries, offer evidence of the existence of ample correspondence at

* This short and summary review of the beginnings of Croatian philosophy was written in 1968 and is one of the ground-breaking works which has served as a basis for further explorations of the history of Croatian philosophy. This is the reason why we have decided to publish it here. A few theses expounded in this article have been revised in the meantime, especially with regard to the problems of dating, since »the first historically indisputable documents« can be traced back to the 12th and not to the 14th century, according to our present knowledge. (editor's note)

court chancelleries of Croatian dukes and rulers, this correspondence has been lost without a trace. If Porphyrogenitus had not entered a few informative chapters and examples from the politically relevant Slavic environs into his colorful book of reflections on the art of ruling, if meticulous compilers of Franconian annals had not jotted down a few particulars concerning the events in the South-Eastern Marches of the Empire, if a few chronicles, travel writers, missionaries and diplomats writing mostly in Greek and Latin, had not, though frequently only in passing, touched upon the Adriatic-Balkan peculiarities and troubles, how much would we know today about the history of this country, from the years coinciding with Mohamed's hegiry which are considered to be the years of the Slavic settlement in this territory, to the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries to which we are introduced by the first indigenous writings, namely those by Pop Dukljanin (the Parson Dioclian) and Thomas the Archdeakon, which have been preserved by sheer piece of luck?

Naturally, in foreign historical sources which I have mentioned, in writings which came into being as a result of an almost exclusive interest in political wartime events, we can not expect to find data about the culture of this country, especially not on the possible activities in the area which is so exceptional, and so far from the common interest, as philosophy. Nevertheless, we should not exclude the possibility that further research into the early medieval philosophy could discover, among a vast legacy of anonymous manuscripts which have not been studied so far, and whose attribution is mostly uncertain, some documents which will testify directly to the participation of the Croats in the development of early scholastic philosophy.

In this geographical area, mostly through reports of ecclesiastical and historical character, we can follow the continuing existence of at least some of the forms of classical culture which extended far into the Middle Ages. At the time of the settlement of the Croats in the new country, in the area of the former Roman provinces of Pannonia and Illyria, the classical cultural tradition had not been extinguished, and the commensalism which was established between the newcomers and Roman or Romanized indigenous population included, in addition to the adoption of Latin as the medium of literacy, also the continued existence of educational institutions which cultivated, among other things, also elements of knowledge and theology and philosophy.

As far as I know, textbooks about the history of this country have never notified an event which was of an exceptional importance for the ancient cultural history of this country, namely, the founding of an institution of high learning for Venetum and Illyric at Cividale which was inaugurated by the conclusions of the capitular held in 825 at Corteoloni under Lothair I. The attendance of this high school was not limited to the clergy, so that we have reason to suppose that,

together with members of the clergy, sons of South-Slavic dukes were educated at Cividale as well, in the same way as sons of French and German nobles were educated at analogous institutions in Fulda, Aachen, Sainkt Gall, Corbie, Tours and Liège. It is not impossible that the names of the great Croatian, Pannonian and Bulgarian dukes (Trpimir, Branimir, Braslav, Pribina, Kocel, Boris) written down in the famous evangelistary in the ninth and tenth century, were actually signatures of the former pupils of the Cividale school. The founding of the school was one of the manifestations of the educational efforts of the Carolingian Renaissance, but it was also a step forward in the expansion of the Benedictines as its main promoters towards the European South-East. In the interval of three decades after the founding of the Cividale school, two documents preserved by chance bear witness to the appearance of the Benedictines on the Croatian soil a phenomenon which was extremely important for educational, possibly crucial for ecclesiastic-jurisdictional, and, consequently, also for political orientation of the beginnings of the Croatian sovereignty.

Even before Trpimir's donation (852) decreeing the foundation of the Benedictine monastery at Rižnice, under the dukal court at Klis, a passage from a theological-polemical work links the Croatian duke Trpimir to Gottschalk, a philosopher and theologian. Gottschalk, of Saxon descent, who spent about two years at Trpimir's court, was one of the most famous representatives of the early French scholastic circle. On account of his rigid doctrine of dual predestination which was actually a reformulated thesis on universal determinism of nature, within the framework of audacious theories expounded by his philosophical group, sharp controversies were led for years, and synods were convened which alternately condemned him as a heretic and freed him of the excommunication from the Church. Problems which reminded Gottschalk of Trpimir are linked to some of the aspects of predestination. The point in question, which seems to us to be more parapsychological than philosophical, is: are there auguries in the irrational nature from which future events can be foretold? Gottschalk believed in such auguries: the cheerful trotting of Trpimir's horse, for instance, was the augury that the duke was going to win the Byzantine strategist he was waging war against.

The stay of a distinguished representative of early scholasticism at the court of a Croatian duke is seemingly an insignificant historical detail, but coming from the age about which we have almost no information, it has to be adequately assessed. The coming of Gottschalk and his fellow-brothers, acquaintances and friends, namely Hrabanus Maurus, Ratramnus and Scotus Erigena to Croatia, must have had some influence on the awakening of speculative interests in the educated representatives of this milieu. Before ending this archeological excursion to the time of the first Croatian contacts with the beginnings of European medieval philosophy, I would like to point

out that the early arrival of the Benedictines from Montecassino, France, Ireland and Germany to Croatia, the connecting of representatives of the most important intellectual elite of Europe of the time to the environment which had already accepted to a certain degree the heritage of the late classical tradition, should be explored historically and outlined in greater detail. In order to show that as early as the ninth century a dense network of cultural and political interdependences already existed in the Balkans, I shall only mention in passing that Gottschalk's teacher Ratramnus, twenty years after Gottschalk's stay at the Adriatic, in his *Contra Graecorum opposita* (866) in sharply polemical tones opposed Focius, the famous teacher of the Slavic apostles Cyrill and Methodius, who were staying in the neighbourhood at the time, at the court of the Pannonian duke Kocel. All this occurred at the time when, after Byzantium and the Pope, the Franconian missionaries came to christianize the Bulgarians, and when duke Domagoj was trying to strengthen the politics which opposed Byzantium, and which was pro-western, but not also pro-papal, since we are dealing here with a period when Christianity was represented by three equally powerful antagonistic centres — Rome, Aachen and Constantinople, which tried to use its diffusion for their political aims.

Benedictine abbeys, priories and monasteries, almost a hundred of which had been scattered along the coast from Istria to Boka, together with a few chapter and comunal schools in towns, were the main seed-plots of education and pivots of intellectual work in Croatia for almost half the millenium, up to the time of the appearance of the Franciscans and Dominicans in the thirteenth century. The study at Benedictine schools, as well as at those which in their organization followed their model, among septem artes liberales included also the elements of philosophy under the name of dialectics. Texts used up to the appearance of high scholasticism were mainly Boethius' translations of Aristotle and Porphyry, his comments and disputations on logic, writings by Mario Victorino, Pseudo-Apuleius, Marcian Capella, Cassiodorus and Isidor of Seville. We have no information on the extent of original philosophical work at these schools and Benedictine monasteries; from the thirteenth century onwards the Benedictines lose ground in this country, their monasteries turn to ruins, and their libraries and archives, work of numerous scriptoria, in which a special type of the Beneventan script developed along the coast, with insignificant exceptions, were lost without a trace. When speaking about their decline, it is perhaps not unimportant to point out that ill fate struck much more easily works of the special, i.e. philosophical character, than works of the primary, i.e. religious and legal importance. Hermann of Dalmatia was probably a Benedictine, either from Carinthia or northern Istria. He was a translator of Kur'an and Arabic works on astronomy to Latin, whose philosophical treatise *De essentiis*, written in 1143 in Toulouse and Bezier, dis-

cusses Aristotelian categories of cause, motion, space, time and condition.

I would not like to list here a large number of legal, ecclesiastico-historical, medical, hagiographical, biographical, ritual and devotional texts which, although representing only a tiny remnant of that which had been written through centuries, bear witness to the continuity of cultural literacy and sometimes, directly or indirectly, also to the cultivation of philosophy at schools in Croatia. This continuity should nevertheless be stressed to point out that the expansion of interest in philosophy and the appearance of important works of Croatian Humanism has its roots in a centuries-long tradition and can not be simply reduced to foreign import.

Humanism in this country is not a bare import from abroad, but it would be historically incorrect to claim that it did not receive a powerful impetus also from other countries. In a lively fluctuation of vagrant clerics — Humanist teachers, town chancellors, notaries, mentors of noblemen's sons, physicians, courtly and curial astrologers, bel-esprits and panegyrists in Croatian town, especially those by the sea-side — foreign names are frequently encountered. The fact is undeniable in itself not only on account of lively maritime connections which supported close contacts between the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, but also on account of the cosmopolite orientation and adventure-seeking and wandering affinities of many Humanists. The vicinity of Italy attracted a series of distinguished representatives of Italian Humanism to Croatian towns among whom we should mention the Ravennian, who was for a while a chancellor in Dubrovnik, Johannes Conversini, Lucanac, a teacher of grammar, logic and philosophy, and Philipus de Diversis, who are especially philosophically profiled. As an indication of the early existence of Humanist orientations in Croatia, it is not uninteresting to mention that Conversini, a man of original, non-conformist Stoical views on life, who worked in Dubrovnik in the second half of the fourteenth century, owes his education — as he says in his autobiography — to a man of Zagreb, an unknown master Mihovil. Let us also add that Conversini was a teacher of Petar Paolo Vergeri the Older of Istria, one of the most important representatives of early Humanism, the author of the fundamental work of Humanist pedagogy, namely *De ingenii moribus et liberalibus studiis adolescentiae*.

When speaking of Humanist philosophy in this country, it would be entirely wrong to mention only those names which had been signed on works bearing formal philosophical titles. Humanist (meaning also Renaissance) philosophy is essentially a global mood rather than a system, group or a pile of philosophemes. It is an all-embracing spiritual revolt, a rational expression of the awakened desire for a wide, full human experience, a search for a new optics which will make it possible to perceive in a closely and universally examined

human world its first roots and final truths. It is on account of this that a Humanist is in his historical essence a polyhistor, »uomo universale«, as can be seen from biographies of all great Humanists. A humanist willingly resorts to classical symbols but he also often uses traditional theological metaphors; what is more, sometimes under the pressure of the environment, he lives the whole of his philosophical drama on the theological scene. We must understand this and extend our historical explorations of Humanist philosophy to include especially its manifestations clothed in theological robes. Each philosophy finds its embodiment in paradigmatic images and forms, archetypal articulations of thought of an age. Man of the theological age articulated his existential unrest, the feeling of lostness in life, the tragic feeling of time, his horror in confrontation with nothingness, in visions of the lost paradise, of sinful guilt, of merciless God's justice, of eternal judgement, in the same way as modern man presents them in natural-philosophical concepts of his animal beginnings, merciless physical causality, meaningless birth and death of galaxies, the tyranny of biological laws of heredity of the inevitability of social determination. If we look less for a philosophical text, and more for the authentic philosophical thought, our exploration of the Humanist and Renaissance philosophy will include many names which a rigid criterium of classification would place among theologians, poets, historians or naturalists: Janus Czezmicei, Ludovik Crijević-Tuberon, Matija Vlačić, Andrija Dudić, Juraj Križanić, to mention only a few. Now that we have started a through exploration of the philosophical past of this country, we must start from the assumption that the philosophical thought of Croatian Humanism and Renaissance is hidden, imbued into the whole of creative activity of the period and that its narrower philosophical concentrate should be extracted by a skillful almost destillatory procedure out of a great number of texts which have not been labelled as philosophy.

It is not easy to establish chronologically the beginnings of the Humanist activity in Croatia both with regard to the development of Humanism in this country and to Humanists from this country who worked abroad. Smaller centres of Humanist activity certainly existed as early as the first half of the fifteenth century in almost all Croatian coastal towns, namely, Zadar, Šibenik, Trogir, Split, Hvar, Dubrovnik, as well as in some of the towns in northern Croatia, namely Zagreb and Varaždin. We can find information on students and teachers of philosophy from this country who worked at foreign universities, especially in Rome, Bologna, Vienna, Padua and Paris, in documents dating from the fourteenth century onwards. In as early as the fifteenth and sixteenth century many educated Humanistically-oriented individuals lived abroad as teachers, educators, actuaries, or worked in the diplomatic services of Vatican, various Italian republics, Hungary, Germany and Poland.

Renaissance and Humanist philosophy in this country is not uniform in its ideologico-thematical orientation; it mainly reflects general European moods, currents, groups, models and standards. In order to understand individual directions in this philosophy it is important to understand the general cultural climate of those centres in which their representatives were formed.

The first distinguished Humanist thinkers in this country by the end of the fourteenth and in the first half of the fifteenth century were mainly students of the University of Paris: Ivan Stojković, Juraj Dragišić, Nikola Modruški, Ludovik Crijević, Fran Andreis. At the beginning of the fifteenth century in Paris, torn at the time by Burgundian-English massacres, a climate of rebellion and criticism prevailed, based on the ideas of the expelled Paris chancellor Gerson. They are ideas on the liberation of Church from the papal autocracy, of state from the despotism of its rulers and feudal overbearing, and of the Christian religion from theological squabbles. Rebellious ideas of Gersonism are vividly reflected in the works of all the Croatian Humanists educated in Paris, and they frequently apply them to circumstances in their country. The oldest among them was the Ragusean Ivan Stojković who, as a deputy of the University of Paris gave the request to the pope Martin V to convene a general synod and who opened the first session of the Basel council in 1430. Persisting on the positions of conciliarism, which meant at the time the request for the democratization of the Church administration and independence of secular from ecclesiastical authorities, he entered the conflict with Eugene IV and died as a cardinal in an officially schismatic party. Commentaries of Ludovik Crijević-Tuberon are imbued with anti-Vatican moods, drastic caricatures of the corrupt clergy, especially the Renaissance popes Alexander VI, Julius II and Leo X, with irony over the futility of theological disputes, indignation at the tyrannical and vain folly of rulers, the inhumanity and greed of the feudal class and the poverty of peasants. This Benedictine abbot evidently developed his own views on social relations when, e.g. in a fictive speech, György Dosza addresses rebellious peasants in this way: »Hungarian nobles do not look upon you, peasants, as upon citizens, but they rule over you like slaves . . . Nobles take for themselves in a criminal way all to which you have an equal right; this arrogant lot would not leave you your bare souls if your life did not serve their interests«. Nikola Modruški whose manuscripts *De felicitate*, *De consolatione*, *De humilitate*, written with an obvious affinity to philosophy, have not been studied thoroughly so far, abandoned by Vatican after the conflict with the despotism of Matthias Corvinus, left the bishopry and wandered as an exile through Italian towns. As a bishop of Modruš, he did not hesitate to challenge even the pope's authority in his defense centuries, has no need of missives and bulls«. Juraj Dragišić, a refugee from the Bogumil Bosnia, concerning whom I have been able to of the Glagolitic script: »That which . . . has been used by people for

find out that, as a grandson of the duke Ivaniš Dragušić, he must have been a descendant of the brother of Hrvoje Vukčić Hrvatinić, although trying to mitigate the sharpness of Thomistic-scholastic controversies, defended resolutely all liberal and progressive ideas of his age. He defended Pico della Mirandola who dared to look for the origins of Christianity in Oriental mythologies, sided with Reuchlin and the Jews against the German Dominicans who wanted to burn all the copies of Talmud and other Hebrew writings. On account of his intervention in favour of Savonarola he came into conflict with Alexander VI and had to flee to Dubrovnik. The Dominican library in Dubrovnik contains one of the most complete collections of Savonarola's printed writings; I think (although the scholars in this country dealing with incunabula have not come across this hypothesis) that it is the collection collected by Dragišić in the course of the work on his apologetic treatise *Propheticae solutiones*, which he carried to Dubrovnik when he had to take refuge there. The criticism of lascivious spirit, luxury and aspirations for political power in the highest orders of the church hierarchy is present also in the works of Marko Marulić, the greatest Humanist erudite in this country. It has not been explored so far whether Marulić studied in Paris, but his sympathies for the Gersonian ideal of simple religiosity, free of theological speculation, can be proved by his translation of *De imitatione Christi*, entitled *Od naslidovanja Isukrstova Ivana Gersona kancelara pariškoga* (On the Imitation of Christ by Gerson the Chancellor of Paris).

In contrast to this group, mutually related by a critical attitude towards negative phenomena in the church and the feudal society, a certain number of Croatian Humanists educated in Italy: in the Medicean Florence, at free-thinking universities of Padua, Ferrara, and especially at the Roman Academy of Pomponio Leto, oscillate philosophically, sincerely or decoratively, between Classical-looking Scepticism and Stoicism and reflect vividly the libertinism of Renaissance high society. It is especially true in the case of two distinguished Croatian Latinist poets of liberal epigrams, namely Janus Csezmiczei-Pannonius and Ilija Crijević — Elio Lampadio Cervo whose *Lexicon*, with its series of philosophical terms with explanations, still waits to be edited and studied.

The name of Janus Csezmiczei who, after libertine wanderings through Italy returned to his »barbarous country«, as he calls it himself, brings us to another environment, namely to the Hungarian-Croatian court, where a numerous group of Croatian Humanists used to gather around the beginning of the fifteenth century. The gathering of the Croats around the court which they considered their own, at which they tried to make their careers in the Church or in diplomacy, started with Ivan Vitez of Sredna, educator of Matthias Corvinus, who founded a series of cultural institutions in Hungary: namely, the university and academy at Pozhun, the scriptorium and the library in Budim. Many persons who had already affirmed themselves or were

to affirm themselves in the state administration, clerical, military educational and diplomatic service, lingered there for a longer or shorter time, so that the Hungarian-Croatian court had mainly the role of a relay through which countless national and international relations of the Humanists of this country were established in the course of the century. Among the members of this courtly circle there is a number of those who dealt with theology and philosophy as teachers and writers: namely, Petar Zamanj, Toma Bassegli, Serafin Bunić, Ivan Polikarpo, Severitan Barbula. We shall have to study at least two works of a more specifically philosophical interest: a comment on Seneca and *Totius vitae humanae modus*, Barbula, the mysterious man of Šibenik, who left a few printed works.

By the mid-sixteenth century, at the close of the Humanist-Renaissance period, a group of writers, important for the history of philosophy in this country, appeared, mutually related by an open antagonism towards the papal Rome and a permanent or temporary affinity for the Church reform — namely, Protestantism. Owing to the work of the late Mijo Mirković, we have a rather complete portrait of the most important representative of this group — Matija Vlačić — Flacius, although it has not been philosophically analysed yet. Owing mostly to the efforts of Ivan Supek, the memory of the youngest member of the group, namely Markantun Dominis, has been revived recently. The philosophical importance of other two members, namely the polyhistor and adventurer Andrija Dudić and Pavao Skalić, is still waiting to be explored.

Some late fellow-travellers of Renaissance philosophical developments, representatives of traditional scholasticism, acting as routine commentators of standard texts, writers and editors of school manuals, teachers at theological faculties in this country and abroad: namely, Grgur Natalj Budisaljčić, Augustin Nelješковиć, Klement Ranjina, Petar and Ambrozije Gučetić and many others, could be considered to form a separate group.

Milieus, circles and groups which I have singled out from the whole of the Humanist-Renaissance philosophy of this country without respecting any principium divisionis, are mainly parts of an attempt to outline tentatively some of its meaningful sections and thus offer the initial orientation for further planned exploration of the oldest philosophical past of this country. Several names, two which are mutually related by their closeness to Renaissance Neo-Platonism, have been left out of these sections, although they are extremely important: Franjo Petrišić-Patricius, on whom I have a special paper at this symposium, and Nikola Vitov Gučetić on whom several partial works exist, but no complete study has been written so far.

We could define as the end of the Humanist-Renaissance period of Croatian philosophy the period inaugurated by the Council of Trent, i.e. the last decade of the sixteenth century. This period marked the

beginning of a complete stagnation in philosophical work in this country which ended as late as the eighteenth century with the advent of Rationalism. This period, however, is not the subject of this paper.

(Note: This paper was read at the symposium »Croatian Philosophy in Its Past and Present« organized by The Croatian Philosophical Society on 4th and 5th March 1968 in Zagreb).

TRANSLATED BY LELIJA SOČANAC

POČECI FILOZOFIJE U HRVATSKOJ

Sažetak

Iako prvi pouzdani filozofski tekstovi, prvi povijesno neosporivi dokumenti o razvijenoj filozofskoj djelatnosti na hrvatskom tlu, odnosno u Hrvata, potječu tek iz vremena već razvijenog humanizma s kraja 14. i s početka 15. st., postoje ipak fragmentarna svjedočanstva koja nam dozvoljavaju da tu djelatnost lociramo u ranije doba, možda čak u vrijeme karolinške renesanse. Najčešće se može na temelju crkvenopovijesnih svjedočanstava na geografskom tlu Hrvatske pratiti neprekinuti slijed pojedinih oblika antičkog prosvjetiteljstva duboko u srednji vijek.

U članku su zatim izložene temeljne informacije o najvažnijim hrvatskim filozofima.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PADUA FOR THE EDUCATION OF CROATIAN HUMANISTS (A SKETCH FOR A RESEARCH TASK)

DAMIR BARBARIC
(Zagreb)

Original Paper
UDC 165.742:1(091)

The immense importance of the encounter with the original Greek intellectual heritage for the twelfth century Christian Europe has been observed and repeated everywhere long since, although it has rarely been adequately interpreted in its real essentially historical import and meaning. The rendering of Arabic translations and comments of classical Greek philosophical and scientific works to Latin, as well as the translation of newly discovered Greek texts confronted the surprised West with the hardly surmountable task of the productive adoption and interpretation of Euclid's mathematics, Ptolemy's astronomy, Hippocrates' and Galen's medicine and, above all, of Aristotle's philosophy. The old system of education which had been practised at Benedictine monastery schools scattered throughout Europe for centuries, which encompassed the study of the so-called seven liberal arts: namely, trivium (grammar, rhetoric, logic) and quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy) proved to be inadequate to accept and articulate the newly discovered Aristotle's physics, ethics, metaphysics and most of logic, losing in this way its foundations upon a single common principle and becoming increasingly inadequate to the changed needs of the age¹. (Up to the twelfth century the West was familiar only with the so-called *Logica vetus*: i.e., Boetius' translations of Porphyry's *Isagoges* and Aristotle's *Categories* and *On Interpretation*, as well as the writings on logic by Boetius himself).

The thirteenth century will take upon itself the difficult task of gradually incorporating Aristotle into the edifice of Christian dogmatics, bringing forward a completely new form of the collective spiritual community of teachers and disciples, namely — the university:

¹ See e.g. H. Klinkenberg, *Der Verfall des Quadriviums im frühen Mittelalter*, in: J. Koch (ed.), *Artes liberales*, 1959, p. 1—32.

»In the thirteenth century in Christian Europe, the two great developments for philosophy are the consolidation of great universities and the gradual acceptance of the main works of Aristotle in the curriculum of studies.«²

The first three largest and most influential universities had for a long time been those in Bologna, Paris and Oxford.³ Each consisted of several faculties (the faculty of arts, of law, medicine, theology), but at the universities of Paris and Oxford the faculty of arts (*Facultas artium*) had a dominant role from the very beginning, so that it was there that the contamination of the so-called Christian philosophy with that of Aristotle occurred in the course of the thirteenth and the fourteenth century which will be of a crucial importance for further history, and which will result first in the magnificent *summae* of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, to be followed by the conservation of Christian dogmatics through the harsh condemnation of the orthodox Aristotelianism in the form of Averroism of Siger de Brabant and Boetius of Dacia in 1277 in Paris, and finally by a specific revision of Thomistic scholasticism in the work of Duns Scotus and its critical-nominalistic self-destruction in William of Ockham.

The University of Bologna, however, remained mainly outside of these central developments in scholasticism: at this university, from its very beginnings, absolute primacy was awarded to the study of law, both civil and canon. Even at the Faculty of Arts, Aristotle was taught only on the basis of shorter extracts from his works, while special consideration was given to rhetoric, as well as to mathematical and astronomical sciences.⁴ This specific characteristic of the study at the University of Bologna is of a considerable importance: its relative freedom from scholastic tradition, its early and uninterrupted preference of rhetoric (later of philology as well) to logic and dialectic, and finally its early orientation towards mathematics and astronomy with the progressive elimination of their metaphysical roots and origin (although a specific recollection of these roots, which from the early Pythagoreans to Ptolemy had been fixed under the name of harmony, will be retained as late as in the title of one of Kepler's most important works, namely in *De harmonice mundi* dating from 1619) are the three elements offering perhaps the best explanation of the trends which will attach a crucial importance in the development of European philosophy and history to Italian universities, all of which originated from the University of Bologna. On the one hand, we think here

² Julius R. Weinberg, *A Short History of Medieval Philosophy*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1964, p. 157.

³ H. Denifle, *Die Universitäten des Mittelalters bis 1400*. Berlin, 1885.

⁴ H. Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages I*, London, 1936, p. 234—266.

of the origin of the natural-philosophical speculation and its resulting development of modern scientific method.⁵

The first and the most important university which emerged as a result of the secession of a group of students and professors dissatisfied with the local circumstances from the University of Bologna, was the University of Padua. This »universitas scholarium« came into being in 1222 as a juridical school: its primary core was the legal science which remained the main content of instruction for a long time. In addition to law, medicine, and philosophy, the so-called *artes* were taught as well, and the gradual increase in their importance and scope in 1399 brought about the division of the university (which started in 1360) into two separate universities, namely: »Universitas iuristarum« and »Universitas artistarum«. The latter initially included medicine, philosophy, grammar, dialectic, rhetoric and astrology as the subjects of study. The study of theology was introduced in 1363 which was initially limited to the interpretation of the Bible and comments of Peter Lombard, while in the fifteenth century two more chairs of metaphysics were added, one of which was held »in via S. Thomae« by Dominicans, and the other »in via Scoti« by Franciscans.⁶

By the beginning of the fourteenth century Pietro d'Abano introduced Averroes to Italy⁷ in an attempt to unite speculative philosophy and medicine, and from that time onwards, throughout the fourteenth

⁵ The group of subjects called *humaniora* (grammar, rhetoric, poetics, logic, morality, history) as a characteristic, actually a defining feature of the educational programme of the period we refer to as Humanism, should be understood as a specific re-interpretation of the early-medieval *trivium*. Naturally, it is not an easy task to understand the philosophical meaning of this reinterpretation in the same way as it is not easy, on the other hand, to understand the reduction of *quadrivium* as a whole, mediated through the inclusion of the concept of the actually infinite into the mathematical horizon, to the so-called analytical geometry which is the basis of the modern natural-scientific method as a whole. Comp. P.O. Kristeller, *The Modern System of the Arts, Journal of the History of Ideas*, vol. XII, 1951, no. 4, p. 496—527 and vol. XIII, 1952, No. 1, p. 17—46.

⁶ In order to understand the line of development of the educational system at the University of Padua it seems useful to compare the initial curriculum of studies to that from the time when Galileo was teaching there. At the University of Arts the following subjects were taught in the academic year 1593—94: 1. Ad Theologiam in via Sancti Thomae, 2. Ad Theologiam in via Scoti, 3. Ad Lecturam Sacra Scriptura, 4. Ad Metaphysicam in via Sancti Thomae, 5. Ad Metaphysicam in via Scoti, 6. Ad Theoricam ordinariam Medicina, 7. Ad Practicam ordinariam Medicina, 8. Ad Philosophiam ordinariam, 9. Ad Theoricam extraordinariam Medicina, 10. Ad Practicam extraordinariam Medicina, 11. Ad Philosophiam extraordinariam, 12. Ad Philosophiam Moralem Aristotelis, 13. Ad Chirurgiam et Anathomem, 14. Ad Lecturam tertii libri Avicennae, 15. Ad Lecturam Simplicium, 16. Ad Logicam, 17. Ad Mathematicam, 18. Ad Humanitatem Graecam et Latinam. (*Archivio antico dell' Università di Padova*, ms. 242.)

⁷ E. Renan, *Averroès et l'averroïsme*, Paris, 1866, p. 326. C. Giacon, *Pietro d'Abano e l'averroïsismo padovano*, Rome, 1938.

and fifteenth century Padua remained the centre of Averroism in philosophy, which soon made its university famous in the whole of Europe.⁸ In this way, according to A. H. Douglas, the school of Padua prolonged for a while the basic philosophical preoccupations of the Middle Ages: »And the name of Padua, at this period, stands for the whole of north-eastern Italy. Padua, Bologna, Ferrara, Venice, were at this time in the closest academic literary relationship to one another; they had for two hundred years a common intellectual life, and one bearing a very distinctive stamp.«⁹

In the fifteenth century Nicolaus Copernicus, the cardinal Besarion, Nicholas of Cusa, Pico della Mirandola, were among those who studied in Padua. At the same time a strong humanistic chair was developing (Greek was taught from 1463; in Bologna it was taught as early as 1424), which became a real seed-plot of general European Humanism. Thus, for instance, the Germans: Protasius of Czernahor, the Croats: Ivan Vitez and Ivan Česmički (still erroneously referred to by Italian and Hungarian historians as »gli ungheresi«), as well as Marko Marulić who was well-known and frequently translated in Europe of the time, the Englishmen John Tiptoft, John Free and others, the Poles: Maciej of Miechów and Jan Ursinus, together with a whole series of other important names, became the founders of the mercial prosperity of Venice, followed by an extraordinary progress Humanistic intellectual movement in their respective countries and pioneers in the study of the classical tradition after the return from their studies in Padua.

The sixteenth century was the age of the greatest prosperity of the University of Padua. »In an age of the great political and commercial prosperity of Venice followed by an extraordinary progress of arts and sciences, Padua, became the centre of scientific renaissance: the exchange of students, lecturers, books and ideas with all European countries was vivid and continuous, receiving its vital nourishment from the freedom of thinking over which the protective wing of St. Mark was spread. The Paduan studies, which had been exceeding those at Bologna for a long time, reached European fame.«¹⁰

As to philosophy, Averroism was on the decline, but the main subject of philosophical controversies was still represented by Aristotle's science of the intellect and the differences in Averroistic, Alexandrian and Simplicius' interpretations of its real meaning. Niccolò Leonico Tomeo, who was the first to expound Aristotle on the basis of the original Greek text, Pietro Pomponazzi, Alessandro Achillini, Giacomo Zabarella and Cesare Cremonini had the most prominent roles in these

⁸ E. Troilo, *Aristotelismo e averroismo padovano*, Padua, 1939.

⁹ A. H. Douglas *The Philosophy and Psychology of Pietro Pomponazzi*, Cambridge, 1910, (reprint Hildesheim, 1962), p. 56.

¹⁰ L. Rossetti, *L'Università di Padova. Profilo storico*, Milano, 1972, p. 18.

controversies. These »peripatetic« disputes and controversies, however, had already become anachronous with regard to the changed of the age. The central developments at the University of Padua consisted at the time in the preparation and evolvement of an experimental, empirically oriented scientific method which will reach its culmination in the work of G. Galileo who was lecturing in Padua from 1592 to 1610.¹¹ After his departure natural sciences based on his methodological orientation continued in their development, medicine and biology prospered, while philosophy, in spite of the presence of personalities such as Telesio or Cardano, lost its central and founding role in the life of the university.

The first symptoms of the decline of the University of Padua were manifested in the seventeenth century. The number of foreign students perceptibly decreased, the role and importance of the one of the most influential educational institutions in the history of European universities declined, and its former splendour gradually disappeared. As had earlier been the case with other great universities, the University of Padua increasingly acquired all the typical characteristics of a mere national university.¹²

* * *

This short account of the history of the University of Padua has been given because of the simple historical statement that in the course of the long period from the fourteenth to the nineteenth century this university was one of the educational centres of Europe where the intellectual profile of the greatest number of the most important people from Croatia was formed. What is more, it is very likely that it had not been surpassed by any of the great European universities in this respect.¹³ Even superficial knowledge of biographies of the main exponents of Croatian Humanism is sufficient to understand to what degree Padua had a crucial role in their formation.

¹¹ E. Kessler, *Oblici transformacije aristotelizma u renesansi* (The Forms of Transformation of Aristotelianism in the Renaissance), *Godišnjak za povijest filozofije* (The Yearbook for the History of Philosophy) 5, Zagreb, 1987, p. 5—25.

J. H. Randall, Jr., *The School of Padua and the Emergence of Modern Science*, Padua, 1961. N. W. Gilbert, Galileo and the School of Padua, *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 1, 1963, p. 223—231.

¹² Comp. H. Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages. A New Edition in Three Volumes*, edited by F. M. Powicke and A. B. Emden, vol. II, Oxford, 1964, p. 9—21.

¹³ On the Croats at the University of Bologna see D. Barbarić *Il Collegio Ungaro-Illirico di Bologna nella storia culturale della Croazia*, in: *Collegio Ungaro-Illirico di Bologna 1553—1764. A cura di G. P. Brizzi e M. L. Accorsi con saggi di G. P. Brizzi, D. Barbarić, P. Sakörzy*, Bologna, 1988, p. XXV—XLI.

Here we shall quote only some of the most famous examples: namely, the already mentioned Ivan Vitez of Sredna, Marko Marulić, Janus Pannonius Csezmiczki who was awarded his doctor's degree in canon law in Padua, Juraj Dragišić, Fran Trankvil Andreis, Fridrik Grisogono who was awarded his doctor's degree in medical and philosophical sciences and taught astrology and mathematics from 1499, Franjo Petrić who studied at Padua for seven years, Antun Vrančić who studied theology and law, Ivan Križan who was a lecturer of philosophy by the end of the fifteenth century, Andrija Dudić who studied at the University of Padua from 1558 to 1560, Faust Vrančić, Nikola Andreis who was the rector at the »universitas artistarum« in 1583, Giulio Camillo Delminio, Markantun Dominis who finished his studies in Padua and later taught mathematics, Matija Frkić, who taught theology »in via Scoti«, Juraj Dubrovčanin who was a professor of philosophy, and many others.

The undeniable immense importance of the University of Padua for the history of philosophy and science in general on the one hand, and its evident formidable role in the education of the best Croatian minds on the other, especially in the period from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, confront the systematic exploration of Croatian philosophical heritage with a general task, which is in itself divided into three problems which are partly mutually dependent:

1. To explore, if possible, the complete number, the names, and the titles of all doctoral dissertations of all the Croats who have ever studied or taught at this university.
2. To explore the role of the more important among them in the life and in the intellectual atmosphere of the university.
3. To explore the influence of the Paduan milieu on conceptions and basic theses expounded in the works of the most prominent Croatian humanists.

The stated general task, consisting of the three research problems as its segments, has been outlined before, in the title of a booklet which, however, is not sufficient in itself to fulfill the greatness and extent of its requirement. The point in question is, namely, the study *Hrvati i sveučilište u Padovi* (The Croats and the University of Padua) published by M.D. Grmek in 1957 in Zagreb. In keeping with his prime scientific interest in the history of medical sciences, the author dwells mainly on medical students from Croatia, mentioning now and then a philosopher, a theologian or a law student.¹⁴ Although undeniab-

¹⁴ M. Grmek, *Hrvati i Sveučilište u Padovi* (The Croats and the University of Padua), Zagreb, 1957 (Ljetopis JAZU (Annals of the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts, /vol. 62, p. 334—375), p. 347: »I have not been in Padua long enough to be able to collect systematically all the archival data concerning professors and students from Croatia. I have

ly very valuable and useful, this study, however, merely formulates the extensive research task which we would like to set down more precisely in this contribution, for the realization of which it will certainly remain a fundamental support and a sign-post, especially on account of the richness of the consulted and quoted literature.

Among the three above analysed segmentary problems, the third is certainly the most difficult and at the same time the most important from the point of view of the history of philosophy, so that it should be dealt with only and exclusively by the historian of philosophy. It has been realized to a lesser degree so far in studies and monographs dedicated to individual Croatian philosophers from the past (e.g. Ragusean, Frkić, Delminio, F. Vrančić) which have been written and published as parts of the programme of the Institute for the History of Philosophy.

The first two problems, however, belong actually to historical science in the narrower sense, and the prerequisite for their solution is the possibility of a long-term research into archival documents and related publications, which should be undertaken by experts on history. Once published, the results of this research could be a valuable contribution to the identification and introduction to the main developments in the Croatian intellectual history in general, and they could be of great help in a more powerful constitution of the national cultural self-confidence. We shall have to content ourselves here only by marking some of the indispensable and important sources for such research.

The main sources for the study of the role and importance of Croatian lecturers and rectors in the life of the University of Padua are mainly known already and Grmek quotes them to the full in his work. Among them, Fabris gives an orientation concerning the problems we have been dealing with which is more or less superficial and insufficient in its scope, while the comprehensive chronicles by Facciolati, Riccoboni and Gloria are much more useful.¹⁵ However, we should add to these sources an edition which has been started recently by the Paduan »Centro per la storia dell'Università di Padova« and is exceptionally useful and extremely important for our needs. It is the year-

searched for the documents on some specific personalities, but I have also noted down the information concerning other people from this country I have come across incidentally. When dealing with medieval students and professors I have not taken into consideration their profession, but when dealing with later periods I have concentrated my attention mainly on medicine and natural sciences.«

¹⁵ G. Fabris, *Gli scolari illustri della Università di Padova*, Padova, 1941. J. Facciolati, *Fasti Gymnasii Patavini*, I—III, Patavini, 1756—1757, (ms.) A. Riccoboni, *De Gymnasio Patavino commentariorum libri sex*, Patavii, 1598, (ms.) A. Gloria, *Monumenti della Università di Padova (1318—1405)*, I—II, Padova, 1888.

book *Quaderni per la storia dell'Università di Padova* which had been published in fourteen volumes (1968—1981) up to 1983, when the explorations were undertaken which have served as the basis of this work. Individual numbers contain longer specialistic essays on specific philosophical and scientific themes which were prominent in the history of the university, studies on individual nations and their members, as well as on the activities and published writings of more important personalities who have left a trace and exerted an influence not only on the university itself, but on Italy and Europe as a whole. Besides, each volume contains a very valuable and extraordinarily rich bibliography of all the works, from the oldest to the most recent, concerning Paduan professors and students. We should expect that this important publication will find its place at the National and University Library of Croatia and thus become available for research related to the task we have spoken about.

As to the first task, i.e. to explore, if possible, the complete number, names and titles of dissertations (where they exist) of all the Croatian students in Padua, only the Historical Archives of the University of Padua can be used as a source. The distinguished Hungarian historian A. Veress, who published a valuable collection of data on final papers and exams of Hungarian students in Padua in 1915, included, to be sure, in keeping with the political state of affairs and with views of the time, all the Croats, with the partial exception of the Dalmatians, among »hungares«.¹⁶ Today we should consider this work, which was important at the time, to be inadequate and obsolete, and not only in this respect. Basic corrections and additions should rely on the results of fundamental explorations undertaken on the basis of modern scientific methods.

The guide to the Historical Archives written by Giuseppe Giomo under the title *L'Archivio antico della università di Padova* (Venice, 1893) refers to the so-called Minoto Collection (*Raccolta Minoto*; Giomo, op. cit., p. 76 and farther) as the most adequate for our task. Within the collection, for instance in the manuscript 649, all the professors of philosophy from 1274 to 1509 are listed; the manuscript 661 lists the names of professors of metaphysics from 1469 to 1739, while

¹⁶ *Matricula et acta Hungarorum in universitate Patavina studentium (1264—1864). Collegit et edidit Dr Andreas Veress*, Budapest, 1915, p. VIII.: »Investigatione mea etiam Croatae Sclavoniaeque memini, sed omnino praeterii Dalmatiam, ob solutum et intermixtum cum Hungaria nexum, praesertim vero, quod huius iuvenes ab illa separatim coetum (nationem) effecerant, nihiloque cum Hungaris commune habebant. E Dalmatis solum illos inter nostros numeravi, qui expresse Hungaros se esse fatebantur, ut e. gr. Marinus Ungarus Dalmata anno 1508; sive illos, qui in Hungariam reversi, in illa habitantes nomina sua scriptorum, historiographorumque gloria ornabant, ut Antonus Verancsics, Faustus eius nepos et allii. Ad iuvenes Fluminenses vero post annum 1779-um solum animum intendi, tum enim civitas Hungariae adnexa est.«

in other manuscripts we can find the names of professors of astrology, mathematics, etc. In addition to the documents belonging to the Historical Archives, the most valuable source is certainly the book by F. Dorighella entitled *Elenco dei laureati in Padova esteri e non padovani*, whose two volumes form part of the manuscript no. 43 of the University Library of Padua.

All the mentioned sources, however, present a hardly surmountable difficulty for the realization of the given task. Namely, in addition to their being hardly legible and therefore requiring at numerous points the paleographer's competence and skill, they are difficult to use for another, additional reason, for the understanding of which we should say a few words about a peculiarity of the University of Padua.

From its very foundation its students had been divided and organized according to the criterion of their geographical origin into so-called »nationes« which was customary at all the great early universities except at the Oxford University where as early as 1274 the system of nations disappeared. At the beginning there were only two groups at the University of Padua, namely »i citramontani« i.e. the Italians as the former and »gli oltramontani«, i.e. foreigners, as the latter group. In the sixteenth century, however, the division became much more complex: »The University of Law« consisted of nothing less than twenty-two nations, while »the University of Arts« was made up of students divided into seven nations. The most numerous, influential and best organized of all was the German nation. It was followed in the order of importance by the Polish, British, Galish and other nations.

The difficulty lies in the fact that Dorighella, as well as most of the documents in the Historical Archives of the University, lists the names of the students under their respective »nationes«. Thus we sometimes find the Croats under the heading of »Ungharesi«, and sometimes under the headings of »Dalmati«, or »I Dalmati e gli Istriani«. Often we come across their names outside any definite nation so that we can guess only from the form of the name or, if we are more fortunate, from the denotation of the town of origin (e.g. »da Ragusa« or »da Zara«) that we are dealing with a Croat. Besides, as it is well-known, many people from this country who studied abroad were called by several variants of their Latinized or Italianized names at the time.

A recent edition has eliminated greatly the mentioned difficulties. It is *Acta graduum academicorum Gymnasij Patavini* (1406—1806), which has been published for the past twenty years in Padua as a part of the more comprehensive edition entitled *Fonti per la storia dell'università di Padova*. They have been appositely announced by the publisher in the following way: »Acta incorporate for the first time the documents concerning the awarding of doctor's degrees to students, both Italian and foreign, who have attended the University of Padua in the

course of four centuries. These documents, discovered through lasting research in archives and libraries, do not list only the names of laureates, but of professors, students and witnesses as well. All the nations of Europe, and all the regions of Italy have been included: a multitude of persons, both, famous, less-known, or completely unknown. As the backbone of the school of Padua, *Acta* are a register of the indubitable richness and usefulness for historians of European culture and science.«

Acta have been planned to consist of eight sections, each comprising several volumes. Up to 1983 only the books pertaining to the first and third section have been published completely; within the first section three volumes have been published (1. ab anno 1406 ad annum 1434. Padua 1970², p. XXI + 332; 2. ab anno 1435 ad annum 1450. Padua 1970², p. XII + 355; 3. Index nominum. Padua 1970², p. XII + 117), while within the third, four volumes have appeared (1. ab anno 1501 ad annum 1525. Padua 1969, p. XXII + 448; 2. ab anno 1526 ad annum 1537. Padua 1970, p. VIII + 454; 3. ab anno 1538 ad annum 1550. Padua 1971, p. VIII + 423; Index nominum. Padua 1981, p. XXVIII + 200). The second section, which should contain data for the period from 1451 to 1500 was still in preparation at the time, as well as the other sections, for the period from 1500 to 1806.

Even a cursory view at the volumes which have been published so far points to the importance they might have for our research. Although the indexes of names concluding each section are invaluable since they eliminate greatly the problems which face us in the explorations of documents at the Historical Archives of the University of Padua, or of the Dorighello's list, we shall nevertheless have to read carefully each of the names mentioned on the pages of this valuable publication. It is certain that in this way we shall be able to find a large number of personalities belonging to the Croatian intellectual tradition which have not been recorded so far and determine the degree in which the Croats have participated in this important European centre of science and education.

Once *Acta*... have been completed, it will be the opportunity to reach a fairly complete insight into the importance of the University of Padua for Croatian intellectual tradition through simultaneous exploration of the three questions which have been posed here. Such insight could encourage us to participate in current philosophical and historical tasks of our time with greater self-confidence and resolve. It is in this that historical research would find its true meaning and achieve its realization.

ZNACENJE SVEUČILISTA U PADOVI ZA OBRAZOVANJE HRVATSKIH HUMANISTA

Sažetak

Sveučilište u Padovi, osnovano 1222. godine, jest zajedno s onima u Bolonji, Parizu i Oksfordu, jedno od najstarijih i bez sumnje najznačajnijih. Vrhunac svoje važnosti i utjecaja steklo je ono u 15. i 16. stoljeću, kad predstavlja glavno europsko središte averoističke interpretacije Aristotelove filozofije. Tada je postalo izlazištem humanističkog pokreta u mnogim europskim zemljama, kao što su, s druge strane, upravo na njemu — prvenstveno zaslugom G. Galileia, koji tu predaje od 1592. do 1610. godine — postavljeni temelji novovjekovne metodologijske revolucije unutar prirodnih znanosti.

Zajedno s mnoštvom važnih ličnosti iz Njemačke, Engleske, Poljske, Francuske, Mađarske, Češke, Grčke i ostalih zemalja, mnogo je čuvenih hrvatskih humanista studiralo na sveučilištu u Padovi ili tamo predavalo. Ta činjenica postavlja istraživanju hrvatske filozofske baštine nekoliko bitnih zadataka: ustanoviti točan broj hrvatskih studenata i predavača, zatim njihovu ulogu u povijesti samog sveučilišta, kao i obratno, utjecaj duhovne atmosfere padovanskog sveučilišta na njihove osnovne filozofijske i znanstvene koncepcije.

U ovome su članku nabrojani i u osnovnim crtama karakterizirani glavni izvori za jedno takvo istraživanje.



A CONTRIBUTION TO THE EXPLORATION OF RENAISSANCE THOUGHT: »MAGIA NATURALIS« AS »SAPIENTIA« AND »SCIENTIA NATURALIS«

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»On peut n'avoir qu'un goût
mediocre, aujourd'hui, pour
l'occultisme et la magie. Mais
est-ce bien la question? Il
s'agit de comprendre.«

A. J. Festugière, *La révélation d'Hermès Trismegiste*, I, 362

In discussing the absolutism of any »Presentness« (»der Apsolutismus der jeweiligen Gegenwart«) as a kind of superstition, as well as the thesis that important reversals in human thought and action should never be simply subordinated to the historical self-intelligibility of modernity, Hans Blumenberg, inter alia, points to the enormity of the effort necessary to draw magic and ritual out of the sphere of pure contempt (»Ich erinnere nur daran, welche immense Arbeit geleistet werden musste, um Magie und Ritual aus der Sphäre der puren Verächtlichkeit herauszuholen«).¹

Although we shall not discuss here the main subject dealt with in Blumenberg's treatise in which he mentions magic as an example of a certain type of historical approach to phenomena in the history of human thinking and action, a few remarks which are closely related to the problem discussed by Blumenberg will nevertheless be useful as an introduction to the subject of Renaissance magic.

What is the real meaning of Blumenberg's statement? What »immense effort« has been made with regard to magic?

¹ Hans Blumenberg, *Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1975.

* Occult sciences deal with hidden qualities (virtutes occultae) owing to which the relations of sympathy and antipathy are established in the three kingdoms of the world — animal, vegetable and mineral; it was said in the Middle Ages that these relationships were »secret in nature«. Areas in which these sciences are applied are the so-called »occult arts«.

The rationally founded modern thinking assumed in its very beginning a basically negative attitude towards all the so-called occult arts and pseudo-sciences, including magic. This attitude resulted in the definition of magic according to which it is just a »primitive« form of behavior characteristic of *primitive* civilizations and as such, as a subject of anthropology, sociology, ethnology etc. present within modern views based on scientific principles. Any attempt, however, at the emancipation from the exclusiveness of the way in which we think and relate ourselves to the world today, the attempt which relies primarily on the breakdown of ossified forms of reasoning and consequently on the evaluation of things and phenomena in the world by trying to follow their development back to their very origin, abolishes the certainty (Selbstverständlichkeit) of many attitudes.

By immersing ourselves into the study of the genesis of modern world-view we can reach the fundamental layers, comprising, among other things, our »negative disposition« towards the way of thinking and man's relationship to the world characteristic of the age in which modern thought was born.

To those who have taken part in that attempt at emancipation and who have replaced the attitude of »nostrocentrism« (*Die Nostrozentrik*, Blumenberg, op. cit.) by the attitude of historical relativism, and have looked for the foundations of modern world-view together with the processes which led to the radical change of mentality, as well as for the motives for the negative disposition of modern thought towards different forms of thinking and action constituting the old mentality, another, different view of the importance of these forms for the birth of the modern world-view has been opened.

First of all, a possibility of the exploration of phenomena which had been almost non-existent throughout the centuries of the exploration of the history of human thought has been opened. Many areas of life, formerly defined as »obsolete forms and mere superstition« have been put under the magnifying glass of scholars who have realized that the unambiguous determination of the relationship of modern way of thinking towards these areas depends on the structure of this form of thinking itself, which is at the same time its determination and its limit. Owing to this attitude, the view of a whole richness of forms of Renaissance thought had been obscured with time. Modern thought, despite the fact that it had been rationally grounded in opposition to these forms, nevertheless extracted from them something which had been built into the very foundation of man's modern relationship towards the world.

It has been the result, however, of the »immense Arbeit« of historians of science and philosophy who have understood, in studying, for example, the phenomenon of magic in a new light, the immense importance it had at the time of the »beginnings of modern age« in

which it had the role of the highest form of man's self-affirmation, as the activity in which man could affirm himself as a »deus in terris«, and even as a »deus in universo« (according to Renaissance thinkers themselves).

Once the path for the exploration of phenomena like magic and the so-called occult arts which had formerly been completely neglected, has been opened, the historians of philosophy and science have found themselves confronted with the task to study the reasons and motives for the revival of interest in these areas in the Renaissance period, to examine the fact that even the greatest Renaissance thinkers discussed magic and even referred to themselves as »magi«, to examine which structures of thought were at work in these areas, to establish the kind of relationship towards the new spirit which can be felt in the works of great Renaissance thinkers who, like Galileo and Copernicus, had been striving already towards a new interpretation of the world, to explore that which was »primitive« in Renaissance magic, to determine the origin of the new natural science in it as well as to point towards the processes which represented the transition from one sphere into the other. Their task has been primarily to examine the processes which had brought about the radical change in man's relationship towards a certain form of thinking about the world, a certain form of experiencing the world and its appropriate action, the »magical« being only one of its attributes.

On the basis of these explorations there have been attempts to prove that processes which brought about the transformation of man's attitude to magic were more complete than it can be assumed from the mere stating of the fact that with the advent of modern age the rational attitude of man towards the world prevailed, so that it necessarily assumed an inimical attitude towards all that is related to magic. The complexity of the process has been reflected in a broad scale of views of historians of philosophy and science concerning the relationship between magic and the new natural science, ranging from opinions of those who see in Renaissance magic and in the type of the Renaissance magus predecessors of modern science (e.g. F. A. Yates in her article *The Hermetic Tradition in Renaissance Science*, in *Art, Science and History in the Renaissance Science*, 1967)² to those

² »The Renaissance magus had his roots in the hermetic core of Renaissance Neo-Platonism, and it is the Renaissance magus, I believe, who exemplifies that changed attitude of man to the cosmos which was the necessary preliminary to the rise of science.« »And if, as I believe, the Renaissance magus was the immediate ancestor of the seventeenth-century scientist, then it is true that Neo-Platonism as interpreted by Ficino and Pico was indeed the body of thought which, intervening between the Middle Ages and the seventeenth-century, prepared the way for the emergence of science.« (258 p.)

who think that magic is a phenomenon which has become obsolete long since.

Magic is evidently one of those areas which, owing to the negative attitude of modern thought which assumes a critical posture towards everything that preceded it, has not been sufficiently »objectively« examined so far with regard to its importance for the history of human thought.

It is only in the course of the past few decades that historians of philosophy and science became distinctly aware of the fact that earlier approaches to the exploration of Renaissance philosophy and the Renaissance world-view were functions of the understanding of the development of science and scientific process characteristic of the modern age, which were then put within parentheses in order to attempt, from the positions which tend to overcome the »mentality of the modern age«, a new approach, based primarily on the negation of such an interpretation of scientific progress according to which »there is only a single, unique scientific« tradition and according to which science is not seen as a series of mutually opposed theories and »isms« but as a process in which even the most revolutionary reversals preserve the fundamental core arrived at by previous generations, representing more general theories which incorporate also »old« theories as particular cases« (P. Rossi, *Aspetti della rivoluzione scientifica*, Naples, 1971, p. 37).

A critical attitude towards the historiographic approach which rejected enormous areas of human experience as mere superstition and »dark« remnant of the Middle Ages searching only for the elements of the new in all the manifestations of Renaissance spiritual life and which, viewed from the perspective of a radical break with the old, extracted from all the forms of Renaissance life exclusively those forms of thought which will become characteristic of new science, so that this approach always proved inadequate when trying to resolve a complicated web of directions in Renaissance thought and of the origins of modern natural science, so that this critical attitude towards such approach came as a result of the conviction (based on the insight into Renaissance texts themselves) that a fuller understanding of these very complex processes which led to the Copernican reversal that occurred so fatefully for man at that time, can be reached only if those forms in which the Renaissance spirit was manifested, and in opposition to which, but also as a continuation of which, the modern world-view was formed, are taken to consideration. These are precisely the areas which are usually avoided by historian of philosophy and science in their accounts of the Renaissance as not worthy of their attention. If we apply this to magic, as an area which had been neglected, rejected and considered to be beneath one's dignity, we shall see that one of the results of such efforts of scholars dealing with the Renaissance has been the insight that man inherited the tendency to dominate nature, considered to be a defining characteristic

of natural science understood in its mechanistic sense, from an area which we would hardly ever relate to natural science.³

Cesare Vasoli writes extensively about the historiographical problem related to magic in the introduction to the book *Magia a scienza nellà civiltà umanistica* (Bologna, 1976), a specific anthology of texts concerning the Renaissance magic (comprising works by L. Thorndike, E. Cassirer, E. Garin, P. Rossi, F. A. Yates, D. Walker and other contributors, associates of the Warburg-Institute). In this introduction Vasoli discusses the factors which have been responsible for the neglect of this area in the explorations conducted by historians of philosophy and science, methodological problems encountered by anyone dealing with the subject, and finally the state of the art in scholarship today.

The phenomenon of the magical should therefore be explored in its various aspects ranging from magic, the practice of thaumaturges, inheritors of archaic priests, who were worshipped in Rome, to Neo-Platonic theurgic philosophers who tried to ground magic as a practice on metaphysical systems (their work was directly continued by Renaissance Platonist philosophers, the author's note), from the most vulgar forms of fortune-telling to the highest forms of philosophical reference to the aspiration of the magical to affect the secret course of life . . .

Directing our attention to the importance of a correct historiographic approach, Vasoli points out that one of the greatest obstacles to the adoption of a correct approach to the phenomenon of magic in the Renaissance period has been the conviction of historians of science and philosophy »that magic belongs to an archaic world and represents an »irrational« core of unconscious archetypes and that as such it represents an obstacle to the development of scientific thought«. It is on account of this that an ample body of Renaissance literature had been rejected as an ensemble of absurd, bizarre and silly doctrines of Renaissance magi. Vasoli also points out that, on the other hand, many scholars who have studied the origins of modern science or technology and have understood the importance of this literature, have tended to overemphasize this importance by looking

³ »Um das Herauswachsen des modernen naturwissenschaftlichen Denkens und damit unseres heutigen Wirklichkeitsbegriffs aus der Naturphilosophie der Renaissance voll zu würdigen, muss man sich klarmachen, dass diese Naturphilosophie in die umfassendere Struktur einer der heutigen ganz entgegengesetzten Bewusstseinshaltung eingelagert ist. Aber weit entfernt davon, dass dieses magischastrologische Denken einen Aberglauben, eine »irrationale« oder unkritische Haltung darstellt, ist es vielmehr so, dass vor allem auch der astrologische wie teilweise der magische Gedanke der Träger eines strong naturwissenschaftlichen Ideals, der Typus kausalen, Gesetzmässigkeiten suchenden Wissenschaft ist.« (*Magisches und naturwissenschaftliches Denken in der Renaissance*, Renthe — Fink, Darmstadt, 1933).

in it exclusively for sources of future scientific practice. In judging the role and importance of this discipline in the »pre-critical period«, the author also emphasizes that we should always keep in mind that standard concepts of either science or philosophy can not be used as a starting-point here. In this case the historiographic approach should adopt a course different from the usual standards of understanding appropriate to science and philosophy and be prepared for rigorous and patient research in order to reconstruct the effective dimensions of the phenomenon, the role it had under certain social and cultural circumstances, as well means and forms to which it owed its diffusion, while keeping in mind that this research, with regard to the complexity of the phenomenon, must have insight into all levels of its manifestation (So that, for instance, the study of art, namely the exploration of »symbolic forms«, i.e. of images which are related to the continuity of the oldest myths and to the discovery of archetypes which have been preserved for thousands of years, has recently greatly contributed to the throwing of light on the phenomenon of magic).

Finally, with regard to the state of the art in research today, Vasoli concludes that this expansion of the field of research has contributed to the fact that the historiographical problem of the Renaissance magic has ceased to be a subject which was frequently explored one-sidedly by individual specialists, but has become a meeting-point where different methods of research are confronted and can therefore be compared.

From Vasoli's claims it follows that the basic difficulty in the historical exploration of the phenomenon of magic and the search for meanings which it had in the Renaissance period, lies primarily in the complexity of the phenomenon itself, as well as in the fact that it is manifested on so many different levels. A direct approach to particular problems related to magic presents fewer difficulties than the attempt to outline briefly all the aspects in which it is possible to regard the phenomenon of magic within the framework of Renaissance culture, and give a sufficiently comprehensive insight into all problems related to magic which we encounter in the ample literature which appeared in the period from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century, in order to gain at least an impression of what magic meant for different authors, and outline briefly the most important approaches of historians of philosophy and science who have been dealing with this literature very intensely in the course of past few decades, in the effort to penetrate the essence of the relationship between the magical-astrological and the new natural-scientific concept of the world.

We shall nevertheless attempt to give such an account, especially because of the fact that in this country almost nothing has been written on the subject, which has recently been dealt with very extensively in the field of Renaissance studies.

We shall attempt to give at least a partial insight into the importance of magic in the Renaissance by giving quotations from original works of Renaissance thinkers and at the same time enable the reader to gain an impression, on the basis of such an insight, of the justifiableness or unjustifiableness of attitudes and conclusions of some historians of philosophy and science who have been dealing with the subject, as to the validity or failure of their approach, etc.

We have included among the quotations of original Renaissance texts also the texts of some of Croatian Renaissance philosophers who dealt with the problem of magic. We have considered it the more necessary because their works have not been studied at all with regard to this specific problem.

According to *Pico della Mirandola*, magic is nothing else but »perfecta et summa scientia« (in the work *Conclusiones magicae*)*.

This famous Renaissance thinker, who dedicated many a passage in his philosophical disputes to the problem of magic and the Cabala, insisted on the distinction between the natural magic (»magia naturalis«) which, according to him, is nothing else but »scientia naturalis« and the other, demonic magic, condemned by the Church (which he wrote most extensively about in the already mentioned *Conclusiones* and *Apologia* where he stressed at several points that »natural magic« is just a part of natural science /illa pars scientiae naturalis, quam ego nunc voco magiam naturalem«/). This natural science, which he calls natural magic, can perform miracles »mediantibus virtutibus naturalibus« and is really a »practica scientia naturalis« which would mean an applied natural science, »quae praesupponit exactam (!) et absolutam cognitionem omnium rerum naturalium quasi apicem et fastigium totius philosophiae« so that it is »nihil aliud, quam naturalis philosophiae absoluta consummatio«.

In this »perfect consummation of philosophy« Pythagoras, Empedocles, Democritus, Plato and especially Zoroaster distinguished themselves most.

This is not unusual since it »totius naturae cognitionem complectitur« and, besides, it is not adversary, but complementary to the Christian doctrine (»Nulla est scientia, quae nos magis certificet de divinitate Christi, quam magia et cabala«). Besides, magic, according to him, does not belong to the order of »revealed knowledge« but is the highest within the order of sciences which are »humanitus inventae«. It belongs to the sciences which are »inventae, acquisitae per demonstrationem« in which knowledge is acquired a posteriori »per effectus«. Pico was among the first who tried to rehabilitate magic, emphasizing that this term should not necessarily mean the magic which was forbidden by the church, but may involve the very roots of magic

* All quotations are from *Opera omnia*, ed. E. Garin, Turin 1971.

which the Persian meaning of the word (*sapientia*) refers to. In general, »magiam operari non est aliud quam maritare mundum« (*Apologia*).

Marsilio Ficino, the author who either translated or commented upon the most important works of the Renaissance Platonic and Neo-Platonic tradition, is especially important for the exploration of Renaissance magic. Ficino's case is the more important to any student of Renaissance magic because it reflects the »dual« character of magic to the extent that it is primarily a mode of man's action and of his relationship to the surrounding world, so that it is »an art of performing miracles« (*ars magica*) but by being an art it requires at the same time a system of knowledge (which is, in this case, frequently considered to be »secret, hidden«), so that magic is thought to be a kind of a »more secret philosophy« (*Goelenus' philosophia secretior*) and, what is more, the highest wisdom (*sapientia*) incorporating the system of oldest philosophical and theological traditions (from Zoroaster, through Hermes, Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Empedocles to Plato).

Ficino inherited this philosophical tradition (both Platonic and Neo-Platonic) which incorporated the experience of the world owing to which the existence of the magical was made possible at all (so that von-Renthe-Fink in the work we have mentioned can talk about the »magic idealism« of the Florentine Academy).

This magic idealism is manifested in the »magic ideal« which is characteristic of the new ethical system of Platonically oriented Renaissance philosophers, and it is frequently referred to by Ficino himself in his work *De vita libri tres*, Basel 1532, as well as in his other works. Ficino, on the one hand, presents himself as a Renaissance »magus« giving concrete instructions on how to attract favourable influences of celestial bodies by means of certain objects on earth. On the other hand, his works express a world-view, the exposition of which includes the interpretation of prerequisites for the practice of »magi«. »Magus« is elevated here in the best meaning of the word, as the one who has penetrated the secrets of the world as the greatest of sages, the one who has »caught« the hidden thread of events, understood the secret of creation and thus owing to this insight, acquired the ability to influence the world, realizing in this way the divine in man (»Homo igitur . . . est quidam Deus«). Ficino grounds the possibility of magic on love understood as a cosmological principle (»copula mundi«), as the primary mode of manifestation of the soul of the world and of the essential force of conservation in the universe (»Tota vismagicae in amore consistit«). It is upon this attraction, which exists among things on the basis of congeniality of their essence, that natural magic is founded. The real magic consists in attraction, as the essential force operating between things of this world (» attractio«) so that, accordingly, »nature is magus everywhere« (. . . »ubique igitur natura maga est«). Magus is a sage who is actually »philosophus naturalium rerum astrorumque peritus quem proprie ma-

gum appellare solemus» (*De vita triplici*, 233) and he subordinates the earthly to the celestial, i.e. the lower to the higher («Subjicit magus terrena coelestibus, imo inferiora passim superioribus» . . . *ibid.*, 234). As we have already said, Ficino derives this power of magic from hypotheses on the organization of the universe, since according to him »mundus animal in se magis unum est« and »mundanum corpus est ubique vivum«; i.e. it is filled with soul which is ubiquitous («Tota interim est simul ubique») and the life of the world is in everything («Vita quidem mundi omnibus insita»). This universal life of everything is nevertheless more present in the supraterrrestrial, so that it is from there that the lower, terrestrial world receives influences. Magic, as the application of the concept of relationships in the world is actually a way in which man can »get hold of« favourable influences from higher spheres by means of »natural phenomena which surround him in the lower world« (natural magi are those »Qui naturales materias opportune sauis subjiciunt naturalibus mira quaedam ratione formandas«).

»Simile simili nutriatur« — Ficino thus points out the motto of magi (constantly referring to Plotinus and to those parts of *Enneads* in which he speaks of the universe as a uniform organism which has come from one source and in which one part can influence other parts, or to those where he says that the universe is full of signs and that a sage is the one who, by judging from one part of a sign, is able to recognize the other) and he thinks that, since everything is inter-related, »our soul and body can be adapted to the celestial world and win over celestial influences for themselves« (*De vita triplici*). These influences can be won over not only by means of those qualities of things which are within the reach of the senses, but even more by means of those which are incorporated into things in the celestial world and are hidden to our senses («Neque tamen dicimus spiritum nostrum coelestibus duntaxat, per qualitates rerum notas sensibus praeparari, sed etiam multo magis per proprietates quasdam rebus coelitus insitas et sensibus nostris occultas, rationi vix denique notas. Nam quum proprietates eiusmodi earumque effectus elementari virtute constare non possint, consequens est a vita spirituque mundi per ipsos stellarum radios singulariter proficisci, ideoque per eas spiritum affici quam plurimum atque quam primum coelestibusque influxibus vehementer exponi», *ibid.*, 159).

Ficino goes on to say that, according to Platonists, it follows that »the machine of the world is made up such a way that in the terrestrial world the celestial is present under terrestrial conditions, and the terrestrial is present in the celestial under celestial conditions« («Confirmatur dictum illud valde *platinum*, hanc mundi machinam ita secum esse connexa, ut et in terris coelestia sint conditione terrena, et in coelo vicissim terrestria dignitate coelesti« . . .) thus abolishing, in a way, the hiatus between the sublunar and the supralunar

world, since both worlds are permeated with the same life, and the same laws of events are valid in the lower as in the higher world.⁴

It is interesting to hear also the opinion of *Frane Petrić* (Franciscus Patritius), on magic which certainly follows the footsteps of the previous two (those of Pico and Ficino) which, if we keep in mind his interest in the hermetic tradition in general, together with the systems of Ficino and Pico, forms an integral complex of knowledge and belief, whose integrity is confirmed especially with regard to hermetic tradition, which is important for their attitude towards Renaissance magic. Frane Petrić (in his work *Zoroaster et eius 320 oracula chaldaica*, Ferrara, 1591) tries to find the sources of the repulsion towards magic, emphasizing that it is in this case understood in only one way. According to him, however, we should distinguish three kinds of related arts: magic, goety and pharmacy. »Plato magiam deorum cultum esse affirmat« (in *Alcibiades*) is the beginning of Petrić's discussion of magic which he continues with a quotation from Porphyry's text *De abstinentia*, on the Persian origin of magic. The magus is actually »Dei cultor et cognitor«. What is more, »theologia et religio« (!) according to him, are »prima magiae pars«, which makes the importance awarded to magic by these Renaissance Platonic philosophers, more or less clear. It is obvious that here Petrić wants to restore magic in its original sense, and we should regard this wish as a constituent part of the effort, especially prominent in the Renaissance, to reach the original, primeval content of cognitive and religious experience which was to manifest itself in the need to »purify« the inherited forms and restore that »prisca theologia« in which magic as »sapientia« is inseparable from the Chaldean-Egyptian and Greek philosophic and religious tradition which is incorporated into the very foundations of European culture.

The part of Petrić's text discussing the second aspect of magic, which is nothing else but natural science, is of a special importance (»Alia magiae pars est cognitio coelestium motuum atque virium exacta. Per quam et influxus coelorum in haec inferiora percipiuntur, et ad humanae usum vitae, in seminationibus, plantationibus et in universum in omni agri colendi ratione fructus capiuntur«). The third part of magic is nothing else but medicine! Petrić concludes his discussion in the following way: »Magiam in universum naturae totius cognitionem complecti. Non eam quidem, quae in usu hodie est apud peripateticos, quae in sola Aristotelis verborum interpretatione versatur tota, nihil pensi habens, si res aliter se habeant, quam ipsi in

⁴ On the importance of magic in the philosophy of M. Ficino comp. P. Walker, *Spiritual and demonic magic from Ficino to Campanella*, London 1958, and W. Beierwaltes, *Neuplatonisches Denken als Substanz der Renaissance*, in *Studia leibnitiana*, Sdhf. 7 (with the theme *Magia naturalis und die Entstehung der modernen Naturwissenschaft*).

duce suo intelligent. Sed eam, quae interspersas, interseminatasque mundo virtutes, quasi de latebris, ac tenebris in lucem evocans, non tam facit miranda, quam operanti naturae famulatur. Et eam, quae universi partibus inest sympathiam, quasi artifex promit et in usum de mundi recessibus, gremioque naturae profert«. (all from op. cit. 5 verso). Magic is nothing else but »Dei veneratio et coelorum atque naturae virium cognitio«.

The elevation of the role of the magus is related here to recollections of a mythical age when creative power of man was manifested most fully, in the performing of miracles, the age when »prisci theologi« were in the possession of all the secrets of the world and knew the primeval power of words upon which the magical power of action is founded (see esp. *Dialogues on Rhetoric*).

In his manuscript *De daemonibus* (see the monograph by Ljerka Sifler-Premec, Zagreb, 1977) *Nikola Vitov Gučetić* (Nicolaus V. Gotius) refers to Pico della Mirandola and distinguishes between the demonic and the natural magic. He also refers to those parts of Plotinus' *Enneads* according to which there are many philosophers who »have found the unity of active and passive qualities (*virtutes*) in natural causes«. Gučetić repeats that natural magic is not forbidden because it does not exceed in any way the limits of nature (Haec magia non prohibetur, quia naturae limites non excedit«).

In distinction from the authors we have discussed so far, *Pavao Skalić* (Paulus Schalichius) belongs to completely different intellectual circles, but nevertheless follows Pico in many of his themes (most obviously in his *Conclusiones*, written in 1553, which were modelled on Pico's 500 conclusions) and adopts his model concerning magic, especially in the second volume of *Miscellanorum* and in the work *Occulta occultorum* (Cologne, 1570), when he says: »Nulla est scientia, quae nos magis certificet de divinitate Christi quam magia et Cabala«, and when he repeats that magic, i.e. »scientia naturalis«, is efficient insofar as it is complemented by Cabala. Skalić also repeats one of the commonplaces in sayings about magic when he claims that the one who deals with magic »potest omnia« insofar as he »cohibitis elementis, victa Natura, superatis coelis, progressus angelos ad ipsum Archetypum usque transcendit«.

Magic is therefore the area in which the dignity of man is realized most fully, insofar as it is here that his power over everything is manifested, enabling him to be *equal* to God.

A part of the text »*Epistolae mathematicae seu de divinatione*« written by *Juraj Dubrovčanin* (Georgius Raguseus) deals very extensively with magic and summarizes, in a way, all that was known about magic in the first half of the seventeenth century. Notwithstanding the fact that Ragusean's approach, is defined from the very beginning by the author himself as »secundum solidam philosophiam catholicamque theologiam«, we shall single out some of Ragusean's statements

concerning magic which we consider to be important (without giving the pages for each individual quotation; the text *De magia* can be found on the pages 372—431 of the above mentioned work).

1) *Magia vox persica est quae sapientiam significat* — whatever we mean by »philosopher« they mean by »magus«; but the word has in the meantime changed its meaning so that it is not used any more to designate pure philosophy, but the term »magus« stands for the man »who performs miracles and their like« (*»mirabilia quaedam et prodigiis similia efficientem«*).

2) *Magia latine accepta, est »ars« seu »facultas«, quae naturae cuiuscunque, hoc est, tam corporeae quam incorporeae viribus, mira quaedam, insolita et communem hominum captum excedentia, efficit.*

3) Regardless of all the other possible divisions of this discipline, the Ragusean divides it into the natural and artificial (*naturalis et artificiosa*), based on whether its factors depend on forces (*vires*) which are incorporated into the nature of things, result from human arts, or from demonic powers (excluding real miracles).

4) *Magia naturalis, platoniorum sententia, nihil est aliud quam exactior quaedam arcanorum naturae cognitio, quae caelorum ac siderum cursu et traiectionibus variis, sympathiis et antipathiis rerum singularium observatis, suo tempore, loco ac modo res rebus applicantur, et mirifica quaedam hoc pacto perficiuntur, quae causarum ignaris praestigiosa vel miraculosa videntur* (italics E.B.P.).

5) Artificial magic incorporates also the performing of miraculous deeds by means of various arts, such as geometry, arithmetic and astronomy (diverse »miraculous« devices, Archimedes' mirror, Boethius' copper serpents etc.).

6) God himself can be considered the author of natural magic as the first to convey its component knowledge to Adam. Solomon, Apollonius of Tyana, Cornelius Agrippa, Paracelsus, Roger Bacon, Geberus, Raimundus Lullus, Arnoldus Villanovus, Cardanus and Ioannes Baptista della Porta were among those who excelled in this art.

7) The demonic magic is related to the Original Sin and to the abuse of man's desire for knowledge (-) and understanding of Good and Evil. From this source (the Biblical story of the expulsion from Heaven is related to this) the art spread to the Chaldeans, Persia, and finally to Egypt, and those who were initiated into this art »*morbos curando, occulta enunciando, futura praedicando autoritatem sibi compararunt*«.

8) Among the Greeks, Pythagoras, Empedocles, Plato, Democritus and other philosophers excelled in this art.

9) The natural magic is »*maxime utilis*« (*»An non naturalium rerum proprietates occultas intelligere humani ingenii vim et separatarum mentium potestatem scrutinari ad solidam philosophiam com-*

parandam maxime conducit?»). An understanding of such magic is even necessary, and it includes chemistry, for instance («Chimici dum res agentes ad patientes applicant, mira procreant, quae naturae vires excedere videntur, cum tamen naturalia sint, aurum etiam purum putum, ut fertur, interdum effecerunt, quod casu fortasse contigit, incidente in affectam et praeparatam materiam vi illa et facultate coelesti, a qua proxime auri forma proficiscitur»).

10) The art of medicine is a part of the natural magic («Medica ars . . . pars est naturalis magiae; An non lapidum, herbarum et animalium quorundam viribus multarumque rerum consensu atque dissensione perspecta morbi innumeri vel curatu difficillimi interdum citissime a medicis personantur?»)

11) The influence of stars is connected to the effects of magic insofar as it is related to the universal force which creates and preserves the lower world (procreatio et conservatio mundi inferioris).

12) The Platonists claim that men are allowed to use the force *separatarum mentium* (theurgy) in those difficult cases in which human art is of no avail.

The text *Magia naturalis* by *Giovanni della Porta* is an important link in the development of Renaissance magic. The work had about thirty editions (it continued to be published up to 1715) and it was an attempt to constitute the natural magic as a system of natural science. The author says in this work that magic is «*sapientia* apud platonicos et perfecta naturalium rerum cognitio» which is based on the attraction of the like to the like, and is nothing else but «*universae naturae contemplatio*» («*Ex coelorum enim motus consideratione, stellarum, elementorum eorumque transmutationibus, sic animalium, plantarum, mineralium eorumque ortus et interitus occulta vestigantur arcana, ut tota scientia ex naturae vultu dependere videatur*» (the mentioned work, p. 3). Finally, he answers the question posed in the introductory part of how it is possible to attract «*virtutes*» of the higher world, in this way: «*Platonici magiam vocabant attractionem unius rei ab altera ex quadam naturae cognatione*» and gives the interpretation that «*all the parts of this world or members of a living being depend on the same author and are mutually related by the link of one nature*» («*Mundi autem huius partes ceu animalis unius membra omnes ab uno auctore pendentes, unius naturale coniunctione invicem copulantur*», p. 22).

In discussing the question about the origin of magic (the text was translated to Latin by M. Ficino under the title *De sacrificio et magia*) believing that the answer could be found there, and says: «*Proclus said in his book that philosophers founded magic (magiam condiderunt)*» when they established the relationship between things in nature, connections of everything to everything and the link of manifested things to hidden ones, and when they understood that the celestial is present

in the earthly and viceversa« (Ioannis Baptistae Portae Neapolitani, *Magiae naturalis libri vigilanti*, Rothomagi, 1650, p. 24).

Also Della Porta distinguishes between two kinds of magic, one being »infamis« and the other »naturalis altera«. According to him, classical philosophers, namely Pythagoras, Empedocles, Democritus and Plato excelled in the latter, and were followed by »Platonic« philosophers (»platonici« meaning Neo-Platonists). These philosophers considered it to be what it actually is, namely »naturalis philosophiae portio« which consists of the »contemplation of universal nature« (»universae naturae contemplatio«). From the observation of motions of stars, from transmutations of elements and from the study of plants, animals and minerals, it »occulta vestigat arcana« and it has its starting-point in the perception of attraction and repulsion as the fundamental form of relationship between things in the world (»Ex proprietatibus quoque occultis, animalibus, vegetabilibus et speciebus omnibus inest compassio quaedam, quam Graeci sympathiean et antipathiean nos tritius consensum dissensumque dicimus«).

It is important to note that Della Porta in most of his statements in the discussion of magic as a natural science refers to views of philosophers whom he calls »platonici«, especially to Iamblichus and his work *De mysteriis** as well as to Proclus and his *De sacrificio et magia*.

With regard to this we should point out the following: it is absolutely certain that it is almost impossible to discuss Renaissance magic without mentioning the importance of magic, i.e. theurgy in Neo-Platonist writing which Renaissance authors refer to, not only because of the fact that magic is discussed in these writings, but primarily because they express a concept of the world which is built upon the kind of understanding of relationships between things and phenomena in the world which enables man to act in the world in the way which can be called magical.

Works of some Neo-Platonist authors (Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus) had an important role in the formation, diffusion and reception of the conception according to which the organization of the world is grounded on magical relationships, i.e. the relationships of attraction and repulsion which depend on »virtutes occultae«, so that its only appropriate mode of action is magic. It results clearly that the phenomenon of magic can be discussed only as a function of a certain type of experience of the world. With this survey of the interpretations of magic in Neo-Platonist writings we have touched upon the question of the source from which the European West derived its knowledge of magic in the fifteenth and the sixteenth century and of the from of the magical which it revived.

* There is ample literature related to the question of whether this work was actually written by Iamblichus or by some of his disciples. See inter alia Th. Hopfner, *Über die Geheimlehre von Iamblichus*, Leipzig, 1922.

Notwithstanding the fact that the majority of Renaissance authors refer to the Persian origin of the term and try to restore the old meaning to the term according to which »magus« is equivalent to »philosophus«, it is evident that all the Renaissance thinkers who dealt with magic resorted to the form of thinking which we encounter in the age of the downfall of polytheism, which was the age of religious upheavals, towards the end of Antiquity, when the »hunger for a direct contact with the divine« came into being (S. Eitrem, *Orakel und Mysterien am Ausgang der Antike*) and when the Greek und Roman followers of old religions tried to breath a new life into the old forms of religious experience by means of mysteries and oracles in which the role of magi, »the ones who are initiated into the highest of mysteries and posses an absolute power over everything« (Eitrem, *ibid.*) is of the greatest importance. When in the first centuries of our era we encounter the type of the man-magus as the central figure of spiritual developments and the symbol of human efforts, it must be seen as a result of the meeting of several directions of thought in a specific form of syncretism⁵ (from the course of development of Greek thought which evolved in the direction of religious philosophy and the attempts to prevail over the rationally founded science of the Aristotelian type, through pseudo-sciences (astrology, magic, alchemy, iatromantis) in keeping with new spiritual needs which were expressed partially as early as the last centuries BC (in the Academy probably immediately after Plato) as the emphasis on the fact that the philosophy of barbarians preceded that of the Greeks, so that the initiators of philosophy were actually Egyptians, Persians, Chaldeans and Indians, while the Greeks were only their disciples, to the diffusion of the influence of Oriental religions in which speculation concerning gods is not separated from the speculation concerning man and the material world, so that a theologian is at the same time a »physicist«.

In this confluence of various directions of thought into a new »spirit of the age« we should look for the root of those philosophical Neo-Platonist theories concerning the world and man that opens up the possibility of magical action, which was taken up by the Renaissance philosophers.

Doctrines about magi as those who »spend their time in the reverence of gods, sacrificial rites and prayers and consider fire, earth and water to be gods. . .« (Diogenes Laerthius), as philosophers who »were in possession of the science of *nature* and the art of reverence of *gods* (Dio Chrysostom), and as divine men who, owing to their understanding of secret relationships between things have power over

⁵»Der Synkretismus aller möglichen Religionen, Kulte, Götternamen, Göttergestalten, heiliger Formeln erreicht in der Magie dieser Zeit den Höhepunkt. Der Magier arbeitet auf seine eigene Weise mit der Gnosis, der höchsten Einsicht in das Rätsel des Göttlichen, nach welcher sich Hermetiker wie Christen sehnten.« (Eitrem, *ibid.*)

all, in conjunction with the cognitive hypothesis (the doctrine of unity of the universe, of an all-relating sympathy, of man as microcosm, etc.) characteristic of those pseudo-sciences which award the primary importance to utility, instead of to theory and which stress primarily the interest in the rare, the unusual and the strange, and interpret things by means of their occult qualities (*virtutes occultae*), were brought together by Neo-Platonism to form one system of interpretation of the world (especially Iamblichus and Proclus /in his work *Peri tēs hijeratikēs iēhnes/*) which is grounded on the theory of successions-chains (*seirai*) which »were not actually discovered by Neo-Platonism (since the idea was expressed as early as *Corpus hermeticum XVI* and *Asclepius*) but were established by it in the aspect which will be retained by the Arabs in the Latin Middle Ages as well as by Renaissance occultists« (A. J. Festugière, *La revelation d'Hermès Trismegiste*, I, 91).

The central place within this system of interpretation is accorded to the one who has been initiated into the hieratic art, therefore into sacred mysteries and relationships which exist between things in heaven and on earth. Such man was to become the Renaissance »magus«.

The fact that Ficino translated the mentioned Proclus' text to Latin and often quoted it ad litteram in his work *De vita triplici* (Proclus' treatise was translated as *De sacrificio et magia*) corroborates the thesis that the Renaissance acquired its knowledge of magic from this source.

Proclus, referred to by Petrić in his *Rhetoric* as »il gran mago Proclo« bases his theory of sympathy and antipathy between things in the world upon the doctrine of chains (*seirai*) of beings, which in a continuous succession of their members connect the divine with the sensory and enable their permanent mutual interaction, as well as upon the doctrine of the gradation of EVERYTHING (to *pān*). The closer an individual phenomenon is to the »power of the paradigm« (tou paradeigmatos *dynamis*) in the divine mind, the law of sympathy is more powerful in its operation. Divine powers are manifested on different levels, from the intelligible to the sensory, so that things on the earth participate in the same way in the »power« (*dynamis*) of their divine idea (»in every chain everything is present in a specific way«). We encounter gradation in the terrestrial as well, namely, while some things participate in the idea only bodily (*somatikōs*) as, for instance, stones, others do it by living, while animals do it on an even higher level. In this way the whole of creation is watched over by »intermediary beings« (*theoi*) to which individuals of a sphere of nature belong, and they are sympathetically related to an appropriate divinity. In a way, the essence of divinity is embodied in them in a certain degree. These beings are at the same time signs of the intelligible principle they emanate from. Man, as a dual being, belonging both to the domain of the body and to the domain of the soul, is related

to the higher world through dual sympathy. Proclus asks (in the Book II of Proclus' commentaries of *Timaeus*, p. 31, transl. by A. J. Festugière): »What is it that produces in things the relationship of sympathy to a certain divine power (*dynamis*) if not the fact that they receive from Nature the »Characters« owing to which some correspond to this and others to that series (*seira*) of gods?«. He goes on to say: »Since nature is »suspended« onto gods themselves and since it is distributed into the orders (*tákseis*) of gods, it bestows upon bodies »signs« of their correspondence to gods: some are awarded the signs of the Sun, others those of the Moon, while still others are given signs of a third god; it is in keeping with this Nature that bodies incline towards gods, some towards this, others towards that one . . .« (p. 31, 32 of the same commentary). One more point: the science of nature is defined here as a part of the science of the divine.

Owing to the magic correspondence which relates one thing in the sensory world to a higher principle, the »external« (visible) qualities of things are not so important as the occult (*occulta*) ones which make them symbols of a certain principle. As we have already seen, Proclus interprets the essential type of relationship between things in the world, namely the effects of sympathy and antipathy as the basis of any magical action, by invisible forces operating in all the regions of the world, through which a demiurge in the act of creation is manifested.⁶

Another contact of Europe with the magico-astrological interpretation of the world occurred in the period of the diffusion of the Arabic influence in Europe.

We should regard also the Middle Ages in the light of this continuity of magic in the West, in the course of which this art, although most frequently qualified by the church as demonic and therefore rejected as such, still perserved owing to an essential characteristic of the mentality of medieval man, namely his obsession with the »miracle« and the »miraculous«. The church itself has never challenged the reality of the magical.

Throughout the Middle Ages the application of some of the results of the exploration of natural phenomena was frequently proclaimed a »miracle« and attributed to magic because it was considered to be the work of demons (the most telling example is that of Roger Bacon who was proclaimed a magician on account of his experiments). Learned men, who studied mostly at Arabic universities, frequently referred to themselves as magi, which meant that they were engaged in the study of the »occult«, in the arcane sciences of natural events

In his *Rhetoric* (p. 5) F. Petrić summarizes Proclus' theses in the following way: »Tutte le cose sono in tutte. L'alte nelle basse, le basse nell' alte. Et tutte priegano e tutte cantano hinni a divini duci de lor ordini: altre in modo inteligibile, altre in naturale, e altre in sensibile.«

(according to A. Lehmann, *Aberglaube und Zauberei*, Stuttgart, 1898, p. 103). As early as the twelfth century the protest of those progressive spirits who opposed the church definition of magic as a demonic art and defended their art as »perfectly natural« (e.g. R. Bacon concerning his instruments; see L. Thorndike, *History of magic and Experimental Science*) grew louder.

The Renaissance emphasis on magic as a natural science still bears traces of these medieval controversies. It can be seen best in Pico's defence of magic and his insistence on the thesis that it is a completely natural science (»Conclusiones«), and especially in Ficino who, aware of how slippery this area is, defends himself (in *De vita triplici*) in the following way: »Nihil omnino tentemus a sancta religione prohibitum«.⁷

Garin, according to whom magic had a capital importance in the Middle Ages, points out that on the eve of the emergence of modern culture it will become characteristic of all great thinkers and scientists who will »purify« it in a way, and proposes the thesis that it is in the difference of attitude towards magic that we can perceive the profundity of the abyss dividing the Renaissance from the Middle Ages. It is in this relationship that the radical change in the vision of man becomes evident, so that he tries to corroborate his thesis with the arguments explaining the medieval vision of nature and man's relationship to it. The rupture is evident not only in the fact that the art which the medieval theology consistently condemned as »a contract with the devil« became accepted as the fundamental human activity (so that a wise man is proudly referred to as »magus«) but also in the emphasis on the positive character of magic (with reference to Neo-Platonic philosophers and the hermetic tradition) which reflects a new understanding of man and his world. What is then the »novum« that distinguishes the Renaissance approach to magic?

Up to that time, within the closed universe, timeless and immobile, any attempt to gain insight or intervene in the stable order of things was related to the Satanic element in man, and the temptation to change anything, together with man's restlessness driving him towards it, were proclaimed demonic. It was then that astrology and magic, representing empirical systems outside the rational order, which were, consequently, exhausted in phantasms, playing with the powers of darkness, pointed to »a complex mythology of a world bu-

⁷ We should point out that very little has been done in the exploration of the magico-astrological approach to the study of natural phenomena in the Middle Ages (in which, i.e. in the study of natural phenomena, mainly under the Arabic influence, the effects of stars on the »lower« sub-lunar world were considered to be the fundamental regularity of natural events, which was especially prominent in medicine, and all the magic practice was based on the belief in the efficiency of these influences which are manifested as »virtutes« and »qualitates« occultae.

ried against its will«. »It was in this way«, (according to Garin's attempt to define the essential characteristics of the medieval relationship to magic), »the the whole living nature slid towards the dark kingdom of the occult« (Garin, *Medioevo e Rinascimento*, Bari, 1954). Man obsessed with evil, incomprehensible within the Divine universe, is obsessed with Life, equally incomprehensible, which does not fit the reason's dream of a harmonious order, and the »magus listens to the powers moving in the most hidden part of being and hearkens the complex energies dreaming in the depths of the soul«. The Renaissance »novum« consisted in the fact that man, who as a passive observer had quieted his passions for so long, in order to achieve harmony with the world reason (a schematic man in the universe of forms which can be reduced to pure geometry) became an active being, stressing the ideal of man-sage, »who will study the world not in order to shut it into the dungeon of concepts, but to discover the universal creation of life, become one with this creative power, become a creator himself (quoted from G. Bruno cfr. Garin in the mentioned article). All this found its expression in the hermetic ideal of active man.⁸

This understanding of man, closely related to the experience of man as a microcosm, in which, »in a mysterious way« all the parts of the universe are present, was explicitly expressed in the oldest medieval manual of magic, of the Arabic provenance »Picatrix« in which, »in a mysterious way« all the parts of the universe are present. According to this teaching the universe is unique and permeated by the action of an allreviving force, which links all the parts mutually together, and which, owing to the effects of sympathy and antipathy, makes these effects possible in different parts of the universe, provided that we understand the laws of its operation.

The novelty of the Renaissance world-view consists primarily in a new understanding of man and his role in the world exemplified by the motto »Knowledge is power«, which is a reflection of man's aspiration to master the forces of nature. Insofar as this motto is at the same time appropriate to magical action as well, it is possible to speak of the »magical ideal of man« within the new anthropology /von

⁸ The element which can not be avoided in any discussion Renaissance magic is the fact that for the formation of a new experience of man, for the birth of a new anthropology, the revival of the hermetic tradition, especially those parts of *Corpus* which are related to the role and importance of man's position in the world, was of immense importance. We shall mention that the sentence »Magnum miraculum, o Asclepie, est homo!« from *Corpus*, together with »Homo factor deorum«, was the part of these writings which was most frequently quoted in the Renaissance. The conception based on the belief that man can elevate himself to reach the understanding of the secrets of the world, and owing to this knowledge gain power over it, is not identical to the conception of man in Renaissance philosophy, but it had a considerable influence on the new Renaissance anthropology.

Renthe-Fink; »Die Magic ist für diese Philosophie (meaning the Platonic philosophy at the Florentine Academy, the author's note) der adäquate Ausdruck des neuen selbtherrlichen Machtbewusstseins«/.

To stress, however, only this active role of man as the aspect of all »magical action« which influenced Renaissance philosophers in their recourse to magic, would be an oversimplification, so that we could easily overlook that which is of primary interest in everything. The recourse to magic was induced by the adoption of a certain conception of the world (and it is not accidental that within the framework of this world-view nature is felt to be a grade in the manifestations of the divine). We think that the adoption of this conception of world and nature by Renaissance Platonists determined the fate of magic in the Renaissance. As we have already said, up to that time »the magus« moved through »dark« spheres of life, getting hold of hidden forces operating in nature, in an effort to subdue these forces (the result of this effort being in this case the performing of »miracles«). The dark spheres are actually the spheres of the natural. In opposition to former views, man turns his glance away from the transcendental source of all, to concentrate on the visible, corporeal world (with a ray of spirituality, of the universal life-giving force still shining through it). In his recourse to magic, man actually affirms his new interest. Thus, at the same time, he affirms his wish to master the hidden forces. »Philosophus« as »magus« is the embodiment of this wish. It is only through understanding that the ideal of mastery can be realized. The adopted understanding of the world can only be that which the Renaissance magus found in the centuries-long philosophical tradition of »pious philosophy« (*Pia philosophia*) within whose framework magic should be understood as wisdom (*sapientia*).¹⁰

¹⁰ The need to extract, out of all differences, a single, unique system of knowledge, a single complex of knowledge which would answer the highest of man's questions, is manifested in the aspiration to reach the sources of all the traditions of thinking and belief and in the wish to restore the primeval wisdom reduced to a core of revealed knowledge of the secrets of the world. The fact that for the Platonic philosophers this »*sapientia*« is at the same time magic in its original sense should be understood partly from the general tendency to return to the original form of each individual discipline but, what is more important, to that which is common both to the Renaissance magic and to that ancient wisdom (however, the Renaissance thinkers who wished to restore the old meaning of the word »magic« were themselves aware of how much the meaning of the word had changed in the meantime), namely the conviction that a sage is able to elevate himself to the very source of everything — which is not only rational cognition but, what is more, an experience which means transformation, radically changing man's relationship to the world insofar as it is made possible by the »creative« act and the related ability to »perform miracles«. The recourse to this tradition (of magic) is entirely in keeping with the need to prove by arguments the validity of views of the new Renaissance anthropology according to which man is »*Deus in terris*« (Ficino, *Theologia platonica*).

Regarded in this aspect, the recourse of Renaissance thinkers to the interpretation of the world characteristic of the age in which visible world as god's creation was the object of exploration of those who wished to understand the divinity (i.e. the »cosmic« direction in religious philosophy, see Festugière in the work we quoted). They could find this interpretation partly in the hermetic religious philosophy as a meeting-point of several directions of thought, including the one which represented a continuation of Plato's theses in his *Timaeus*, and partly in Neo-Platonist philosophy.

By pointing towards the origin of magic in an effort to restore its »original« meaning within a tradition older than Christianity, they tried to defend magic as an art which belongs to the sphere of the natural and thus oppose the official medieval qualification of magic as a diabolical art. The interest in the natural was thus justified by the inclusion of magic in the sphere of an ancient tradition, presented as a system of revealed knowledge and mystical cognition, including also an understanding of nature and natural phenomena as manifestations of a single, unique life of the universe.¹¹

If we have said in the beginning that it is possible that the aspiration to master the natural forces characteristic of magical action was the element which was inherited by the new natural science, founded on the laws of mechanics, the question of the difference between them immediately imposes itself. Why was natural science (in the Renaissance, up to the fifteenth century) still only »magia naturalis«?

To make the process of the affirmation of magic in Renaissance philosophy and in the formation of the world-view clearer, and to clarify the consequent gradual change in man's experience of the world towards the scientific, we shall single out its more important aspects.

¹¹ This at the same time resolves the relationship: magia naturalis — scientia naturalis — sapientia as the essential aspect of the discussion of the Renaissance magic. The understanding of nature is indivisible from the understanding of the most profound secrets of the world and man, and as such it is a part of ancient wisdom which, from Persian magi, Indian Brahmans, to Chaldeans and Greek orphists introduced the initiated into the »secret knowledge«; i.e. all things, including natural phenomena, possess some elements which have been bestowed upon them by gods from whom everything proceeds (as Proclus would say, according to whom physiology was just a part of theology), sympathy being the link which exists between the object and the divine power, and since Nature is situated in the middle position between the corporeal and the divine, it is in it that sympathy is manifested, so that the understanding of things in nature is at the same time the understanding of profound and hidden links which exist in the world, as well as the cognition of the highest principles. This interconnectedness of systems of secret knowledge, transmitted only to the elect as revealed truth, together with the magico-astrological interpretation of natural phenomena, is most evident in the hermetic literature where texts of a purely theological nature are mixed with texts based on completely experiential understanding of natural phenomena.

The first is the fact that all Platonically-oriented Renaissance philosophers make a distinction between the natural and the demonic magic (as can be seen in Ficino, Pico, Petrić, as well as in all the other authors we have mentioned). This distinction between the two different areas became a »commonplace« of the Renaissance Platonists. First of all, it meant a disassociation from possible accusations of the church because of the Neo-Platonic concept of the world (which included intermediary beings as indispensable members of ontological hierarchy). With regard to this, we should pay attention to another »commonplace« in the works of Renaissance philosophers, namely the affirmation of magic as a discipline which is completely in keeping with Christianity. For all that, Renaissance philosophers mainly refer to passages from the work of Albert the Great (»Ex hac officina magi omnium primi Christum statim natum adoraverunt; Quid igitur expavescit magi nomen, formidolose? nomen Evangelio gratiosum, quod non maleficum et veneficum, sed sapientemsonat et sacerdotem?« Ficino says in his *Apology* and is followed by other authors) and the need to prove this harmony became all the more acute with the growing awareness that magic approaches phenomena with the single goal, for the realization of which the question of the Creator of all is really of minor importance.

An important element in the process was the growing insistence on the distinction between astrological determinism and the activism of man manifested in magic. It was actually a matter of the difference of opinion between individual philosophers who otherwise shared the same view of the world, which is an indication of the intellectual evolution of individual thinkers, representing at the same time stages in their development and stages of the breakdown of a certain world-view.

Regardless of the fact that, when discussing the magicoastrological experience with its appropriate interpretation of the world, we always relate the practice of magic to determinism imposed to the sub-lunar region by the operation of the celestial sphere, magic and astrology nevertheless express two different attitudes of man towards the world. F. A. Yates (*Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition*, 1964) is right to note that astrology is not necessarily magic but that it is »a mathematical science which is founded upon the belief that human fate is irrevocably governed by stars«, while magic is primarily a conviction that man can avoid this determinism (accepted, to be sure, as the validity of certain laws in the world) by means of understanding, based on experience, by observation and experimentation with nature and all that occurs in it, as well as by means of the appropriate action which is founded upon such understanding.

While initially there was a correspondence in attitudes between Ficino and Pico with regard to the approach to the relationship between these two areas (this aspect of the problem of determinism versus freedom was elaborated very well by H. Baron in his *Willensfrei-*

heit und Astrologie bei M. Ficino und Pico della Mirandola, Leipzig, 1927), as early as *Disputationes in astrologiam* Pico expresses a completely negative attitude towards astrology. What is the importance of this in the process of the change of mentality and of the world-picture? Pico refers to the explorations of more »approximate« causes of things. In this study of nature Pico wants to free himself from all the »higher« and more »distant« causes. Pico invites us to approach »things in themselves«. He never rejects, however, the influence of those »higher« causes completely. This can account for the fact that, with all his criticism of astrology, he remained an ardent defender of magic, or of natural magic, to be more precise. Pico's vehement attack on astrology and its determinism was conditioned primarily by the ethical factor, namely the need to affirm man's freedom (according to E. Cassirer). In accepting magic as a natural science, however, he was forced to accept those laws of events operative among things of this world on which the whole of astrology is based.¹²

The third element in the progress from natural magic to natural science was the insistence on the delimitation between the true and the false astronomy, and between the real and the »evil« magic (»... noi assistiamo in tanta parte dell'indagine rinascimentale ad una preoccupata discussione intorno alla vera e alla falsa magia, alla vera e alla falsa astrologia, alla vera e alla falsa alchimia, perchè si intuisce che qui è la via nuova che apprirà all'uomo l'imperio sulla natura«, E. Garin, *Medioevo e Rinascimento*, Bari, 1954). In this process we should observe the importance of Juraj Dubrovčanin who, as a paripatetic, who did not completely dispense with the tenets of the old world-picture, tried to establish such delimitations.

His primary aim was to show that so-called occult arts and knowledge (including the demonic magic) are based on the links between things which are completely arbitrarily assumed and derived. Regardless of the fact that the Ragusean himself (in keeping with what has said above concerning the generally acception magic-astrological causality) allows for the existence of »proprietas occultas« and the influence of »separatum mentium«, as well as for the possibility to produce gold by impressing »vis coelistis« into a prepared substance (as it is done by a chemist) from which »forma auri« immediately arises, as well as for the effects of sympathy and antipathy upon matter, but nevertheless, in keeping with the delimitations which he established in the acceptance of the influence of the »higher« world, as well as by his claim that celestial bodies have only a general power of influence upon the lower world, he confronts the real science which has to prove a

¹² In the sphere of the natural it is owing to astrology that laws of events are discovered, being immanent to natural events, so that, in a way, the framework of the construction which was based on the transcendental source of all, was disrupted.

cause by »modus efficiendi« to all the arts (astrology, superstitious magic, etc.) which »sponte sibi ipsis principia quaedam effigunt« and refer more to their »experimenta« than to »ratio«. He points out that, according to Aristotle, real science »aut a naturalibus causis profiscitur, aut habet per se nota, vel alibi demonstrata principia aut certissimis experimentis comprobata«. What is the real meaning of »sponte effigunt«?

It is actually the same old question which we keep asking, about why we are, while already on the threshold of the new natural science, still in the sphere of the magic experience of the world. The question which imposes itself in the Ragusean's text, arising from his attempt to delimitate the scientific from non-scientific, points to a way we could search for an answer which would open up the aspect of the development of thought from magical to scientific.

As we have seen, even in the works of those Renaissance authors who equate magic with »scientia naturalis« and who, like Pico, do so already in the spirit of the effort to emancipate the exploration of natural phenomena from the »transcendental« and to reduce it exclusively to agencies operating in nature, we are still moving through the world of the mysterious, arising from the experience of wonder, or better to say, through the world based on an understanding of nature which is completely different from that which the new world-view of natural science was to accept. According to this understanding, nature is placed in the middle position between the divine and the sensory, it is life-giving and wise (*vivax et sapiens*) and owing to it, its constituent bodies are intelligent and they participate in the all-permeating life. The universal, life-giving, moving force related to the divine mind through intellectual causes, and the world-soul, is active in nature, and it is by this that we can interpret the miraculous in nature — namely, the miraculous operation of plants, stones, animals (the theses we have mentioned and which are put forward by Ficino¹³ actually summarize views of other authors whom we have discussed). Nature is still felt to be an incarnation of spirit, an objectivisation of God. If we return now to the tendency to master natural forces that we have used as our starting-point in looking for a criterion according to which we could distinguish the areas where this tendency is expressed, we shall also say that, in keeping with the concept of the world which includes magical relationship between things, this tendency in the sphere of magical action is actually knowledge upon which the pos-

¹³ Who follows Proclus' footsteps; Proclus says, in his commentary of *Timaeus*, »that Nature is something between soul and body, containing creative principles of all living beings, which it gives life to and which it endows with life«; it is the border of the incorporeal filled with creative principles; it »leads« the whole of the world and is in itself, in a way, divine, ed. Festugière, Paris (volume I, p. 35)

sibility of action, meant primarily in the sense of identification and unification (by means of which the essence of a thing and therefore power over it is gained) is founded, which is made possible by participation of all the parts of the universe in the same origin of all which is present everywhere. In spite of all his efforts to eliminate the demonic from nature, Pico could not get rid of this animistic view of the world.

It is still the same system of thought which opens the possibility of magical action on the basis of forces of attraction and repulsion (sympathy and antipathy) which abolishes the difference between matter and spirit, physical causality and spiritual efficiency, in the universe which is »unum«, i.e. it is the same web of views which we find as a common denominator in all literature on magic in its continuity, from the early text dating from the tenth century (*Picatrix*), through works of Ficino, Pico, Della Porta and Agrippa, to *Magia naturalis* by Gasparus Scottus which is more a textbook of physics than of magic already, according to which the world is the unique living organism (with all the specific qualities of individual approaches, as for instance in Ficino, Pico and those authors who tried to bring such conception to conformity with Christian doctrines concerning the creation of the world and the Creator) in which man is a being in whom creative powers intersect, in whom different layers of being are intertwined and who unites in himself all there is in the world, so that owing to all this, he has the power to influence all the rest more than any other being. It is, however, possible only to the one who has understood this, therefore to the wise one (and it is actually the magus, since magic is »sapientia« in the original meaning, so that »Aptare vero seipsum ad occultas dotes eius etque mirificas solius sapientis officium« (Ficino, *De vita*, p. 209). Since in the world all is related to all, »everything is full of signs« (as Plotinus had already said). Things are therefore not valid in what they directly mean to us, but in what they refer to, in that »which they stand for as signs. The most efficient among symbols are »figurae et numeris«, in addition to words (Cantus et verbi magnam vim ad beneficium coeleste captandum habere!« Ficino, op. cit.) and in keeping with that which was established by Orphaeus and Pythagoreans, within the framework of the ancient tradition, words and songs can perform »mirabilia«. The mysticism of numbers and the connection of magic with the Cabala (especially in the case of Pico della Mirandola) is closely related to this. Things and phenomena of the world are experienced primarily as a function of links existing between the higher and the lower world (which indicates that the terms of the sublunar and supralunar world coming from the Aristotelian tradition are accepted). Things are defined by their invisible qualities proceeding from the form that is result of the influence of the »higher« world upon matter. The gap between the two spheres, sublunar and supralunar, is abolished by the belief in the universal validity of the laws of action concerning the effects of sympathy and antipathy in things.

In an attempt to summarize the processes leading from the magical to the scientific thinking, we can see that it was actually a »squaring of accounts« between individual thinkers, representatives of the conception of the world which included the magic-astrological understanding of the causality of processes in the world as to some of the assumptions that this conception relied upon (e.g. in the case of Ficino and Pico) as well as the growing criticism of this conception which came from the circles of thinkers who, like Juraj Dubrovčanin, endeavored to establish a distinction between the scientific and non-scientific in the interpretation of the world, and who referred to the new experiential data acquired by the verification of old theses.

How we have finally arrived closer to the answer to the question of why the Renaissance resorted to magic at all. It seems that by the end of the Middle Ages we witness a processe which evolved in the opposite direction from that which took place by the end of Antiquity in philosophy and science, when the rationally founded Greek science and philosophy were increasingly drawn into the sphere of the mystical experience of the world, while the wish for the greatest intelligibility was increasingly overshadowed by the aspiration to achieve, through an understanding of phenomena of this world as well, a direct contact with the »transcendental«, with the »archetype« (according to Skalić). In the same way as the rationally founded Greek philosophy and science were replaced at the time by occult sciences (which can be accounted for, *inter alia*, by the new spiritual needs of the age, new mentality, the formation of which was certainly influenced by the contact with the Oriental thinking), now we witness the aspiration to emancipate human spirit from transcendental ideals, and the direction of interest towards earthly events as the primary object of human endeavors, as a prerequisite for man's successful action in this world. The transitional period on the way towards the complete emancipation and final dominance of the spirit of new science is represented by the religious philosophy of Ficino, Pico, Petrić, Campanella, Bruno and others, containing the tendency to rehabilitate the tradition of pious philosophy (»*pia philosophia*«) which is most closely related to the idea that all that comprises the object of so-called »*physiká*« is related to the mysticomagical experience of the world, including the hermetic ideal of the divine, active man who should create on this earth in imitation of God's creation in the universe.

However, it was on account of this ideal of efficient action in the world that the magico-astrological understanding of causality became too narrow. The idea of links as the general factor to which all the phenomena of the world could be reduced, was not sufficiently precise, since its application could not answer all the questions related to the differences between individuals within a particular species, so that it became useless, because the interpretation of the world it offered did not make possible an adequate degree of efficiency of man's action.

The links in the interpretation of the world which had been accepted up to that time and had been based upon occult characteristics, could not withstand new verification, and the tradition which had preserved a system of doctrines about the world, was not in itself a sufficient reason for their acceptance in the age which relied increasingly on reason, and decreasingly on authorities.

The wish to achieve greater efficiency (*»die Leistungsfähigkeit der Systeme«* — H. Blumenberg) imposed the need for a critical approach to the tradition of consecrated *»truth«*. The assumption characteristic of the old world-picture (i.e. the life-giving quality of the world and the effects of sympathy and antipathy) became too narrow to natural science. The liberation from such assumptions, the liberation from the *»obsession with the occult«* that the new natural science did not know what to make of any more (Newton, I., in Crombie, *Von Augustinus bis Galilei*, 1959, p. 552) and the replacing of animistic conception by the mechanist one, was actually the path leading from *»magia naturalis«* to *»scientia naturalis«*.

Natural science was thus born by the abandonment of the *»miraculous«*, by the oblivion of the mysterious. By means of magic, man could satisfy his need for security, the need to make his existence in the world possible by an acceptable answer to the question about the meaning of everything, by the interpretation of the world which was based on the conviction that the efficient action in the world is possible thanks to the links assumed by the imagination. This interpretation, however, satisfied and justified that conviction up to a point. Starting from the hypothesis that *»man is a microcosm, whereas the world is a large man«* (homo = microcosmos, the world = makranthropos) this interpretation *»breaks down«* when this hypothesis should be confirmed in individual cases by the efficient influence upon phenomena of this world. Although laws governing the magical experience of the world were merely links intuited upon some religious and mythical roots, the human element projected onto the world-picture, they nevertheless offered man the illusion that he was struggling against the darkness within himself and the darkness of the world, representing thus one of the interpretations which man has always used in his efforts to veil the darkness of the Unknown in which he has found himself, in order to survive . . .

It has been our aim to try to understand a model of thinking characteristic of the Renaissance magic which, as we have already said, manifested itself in Renaissance life on various levels so that, on the one hand, it was imbued with superstition in the most varied forms of human endeavor, while on the other it was conceived by the greatest Renaissance thinkers as the highest wisdom which can be attained only by the elect, who have penetrated the most hidden secrets of life. We have tried to discover historical causes of the influence of this phenomenon in society in which the new natural science was born, as well as the attitude it assumed towards this new science. This in-

sight leads us to the conclusion that modern rationality is not a product of purely theoretical reasoning alone, but is an offspring of a tumultuous and lasting process in which man himself was transformed.

In the end the question imposes itself of whether it is possible to give a concise answer to the inquiry into the importance of magic in the Renaissance, which would take into account the essential points which have been reached by the research so far. It seems that the impossibility to give a final and unambiguous answer is a consequence of the awareness that work in this area has only begun and that there is still a lot to be done concerning the texts themselves. Nevertheless, each scholar who has dealt with the subject has contributed with his conclusions to the formation of this answer, by shedding light on a particle of truth.

Starting from the conviction that it is the problem of the relation of this phenomenon towards the new natural science that is in the centre of the historico-philosophical interest with regard to the importance of magic in the Renaissance, we should conclude that the question of whether magic was actually a forerunner of the »new spirit« and of the natural science which it gave birth to, or whether the latter was born only and exclusively in opposition to it, lies somewhere in the middle, which means that the new natural science emancipated itself only gradually, as we have endeavored to demonstrate, from a way of understanding of relationships and laws characteristic of the magico-astrological conception insofar as it liberated itself, as an essentially different understanding of relations between things and phenomena in each individual area of knowledge and action, from the world-picture adapted to the wish to act efficiently (»*Magie calme provisoirement l'inquiétude d'une intelligence dont la forme dépasse la matière*« Henri Bergson, *Les deux sources de la morale et religion*, Paris, 1969).

This is evidently exemplified by thinkers like Francis Bacon¹⁴ who, while condemning magic in his efforts to reform knowledge and eliminate all that is arbitrary, accidental, mysterious and particular in the approach to natural phenomena, still retains remnants of medieval and Renaissance magic (i.e. the acceptance of the force of attraction and repulsion as a universal link between things, a dynamically-vitalistic conception of reality, the acceptance of the presence of spiritus in all bodies, etc.). He laid down the same motto as a starting-point

¹⁴ See the article by P. Rossi, *Francesco Bacone e l'eredità della magia*, in *Magia e scienza . . .*, p. 269—287. It is on the example of this philosopher that E. Bloch shows that the ideal of the transformation of objects »so that they could serve us« arises from the Renaissance magic liberated from any superstition; according to Bloch »magic understood as a way to affect nature is the oldest form of technology, »en intention . . .« (E. Bloch, *The Philosophy of the Renaissance*, translated to French by P. Kamnitzer, Paris s.a.)

of the new science, namely »to master nature by means of knowledge« which Agrippa von Nettesheim had mentioned as the starting-point in the action of magi (in *De oculta philosophia*).

The effort to master nature, borne by the faith in the omnipotence of man's creative power, which was expressed in the motto of magi »Knowledge is power« represented an important stimulus in the affirmation of the new approach to the world. New science, however, will develop the system of the interpretation of the world which will corroborate this conviction in the possibility of action, the optimism of man, on a basically different theoretical basis.

As to the problem of the study of magic itself, we shall join those historians of philosophy and science who, in concentrating their attention to »marginal« themes of Renaissance thinking, have followed the way to which they were directed by the awareness that, without understanding the complexity of processes which brought about the change in the experience of the world and man, it is not possible to understand completely the structures of thought characteristic either of our experience of the world, or the world we live in itself. This complexity requires an approach which should include a minute analysis of individual themes dealt with by authors who participated in these processes, and a detailed study of each individual argument. In the case of the Renaissance, it necessarily leads us to the conclusion that it is difficult to label any direction of thought or mode of action as »progressive« or »reactionary«, because it has been proved that even in the works of the greatest thinkers »superstition« and »reason« exist side by side.

Together with Garin, we shall say once again that anyone »who might think that it is possible to define strictly the border between »reason« and »superstition« has missed not only an important aspect of the historical reality of the age, but also the essential components of scientific and philosophical thinking as well.

TRANSLATED BY LELIJA SOCANAC

PRILOG ISTRAŽIVANJU RENESANSNOG MISLJENJA:
»MAGIA NATURALIS« KAO »SAPIENTIA« I »SCIENTIA NATURALIS«

Sažetak

U posljednja dva desetljeća intenziviran je interes za tzv. marginalne teme renesansnog mišljenja, što je prije svega rezultat konfrontiranja dvaju historiografskih pristupa izučavanju intelektualnog života renesanse, u kojem pobjedu odnosi onaj, što svoju metodu (»pluralistička« obrada manifestacija renesansnog života) i sadržinu primjerava spoznaji, da je nemoguće »istinu« renesanse sagledati samo na taj način, da se procesi što je čine i njena dostignuća promatraju tek kao »primitivni« oblici u pre-

vladavanju kojih se »novum« novovjekovlja uobličava, a sve što je vrijedno procjenjuje takvim, ukoliko je anticipacija tog »novuma«.

Primijenjen na sferu magijskog taj drukčiji pristup znači zapravo pokušaj revaloriziranja uloge magijskog, pri čemu se u zagradi stavlja dotadašnji pristup, po kojem se magija smatra tek nekim zaostatkom primitivnih oblika doživljavanja i prakse, čime biva isključena iz svakog »ozbiljnog« istraživanja renesanse.

U članku se, uz pozivanje na mišljenja onih povjesničara filozofije, koji su nastojali rehabilitirati interes za »zaboravljene« sfere renesansnog života poput C. Vasolija, E. Cassirera, E. Garina, F. A. Yates, P. Rossija, D. P. Walkera, tematizira pitanje dvojakog značaja i značenja magije u renesansi, s obzirom na različite izvore i tradicije, zahvaljujući kojima biva posredovana renesansnom pokretu na Zapadu, tj. njeno značenje »sapientiae« (čemu je pretpostavkom oživljavanje kaldejsko-hermetičke tradicije te neoplatoničke filozofije) te »scientiae naturalis« (u kojoj se dadu zamijetiti zameci temeljnih značajki novovjekovne znanosti). Pritom se konstatira da su racionalno utemeljeno novovjekovno mišljenje i nova prirodna znanost, što se doista rađaju i kroz prevladavanje temeljnih postavki jednog tumačenja svijeta, što su pretpostavkom i magijsko-astrološkijskog poimanja kauzalnosti i načina djelovanja, svoju temeljnu nastrojenost u doživljavanju uloge znanja i djelovanja izrazili upravo sloganom renesansnog maga, po kojem je znanje—moć.

CASSIRERS INTERPRETATION DER RENAISSANCE-ASTROLOGIE, F. GRISOGONO UND F. PETRIĆ

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MEN. Καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζητήσεις, ὁ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο ὃ μὴ οἶσθα τὸ παράπαν ὃ τί ἐστίν; (...) ΣΩ. (...) Οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ὃ γε οἶδεν ζητοῖ: οἶδεν γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ τῷ γε τοιοῦτω ζητήσεως: οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδεν: οὐδὲ γὰρ οἶδεν ὃ τι ζητήσει.

Platon: Menon 80d5—e5

Jedes Fragen ist ein Suchen. Jedes Suchen hat seine vorgängige Direktion aus dem Gesuchten her. Fragen ist erkennendes Suchen des Seienden in seinem Daß- und Sosein. Das erkennende Suchen kann zum »Untersuchen« werden als dem freilegenden Bestimmen dessen, wonach die Frage steht. Das Fragen hat als Fragen nach ... sein *Gefragtes*. Alles Fragen nach... ist in irgendeiner Weise Anfragen bei... Zum Fragen gehört außer dem Gefragten ein *Befragtes*. In der untersuchenden, d. h. spezifisch theoretischen Frage soll das Gefragte bestimmt und zu Begriff gebracht werden. Im Gefragten liegt dann als das eigentlich Intendierte das *Erfragte*, das, wobei das Fragen ins Ziel kommt.

M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*.
Tübingen, 1963¹⁶, S. 5

Eine von wenigen unbestrittenen und, wie es scheint, unbestreitbaren Thesen über die Renaissancephilosophie ist die Meinung, daß sich die Renaissancephilosophie an der Grenzscheide der Epochen befindet. Am Wendepunkt zwischen dem Mittelalter und der Neuzeit bleibt sie angesichts ihrer Thematik an das Alte gebunden, obwohl sie

in einigen Aspekten schon das Neue anzeigt.¹ Der Maßstab mit dem man sowohl den Grad der Gebundenheit an das Mittelalterliche, als auch die Annäherung an das Neue mißt, ist die neuzeitliche Naturwissenschaft. Nach den Begriffen der Kausalität, der Erfahrung, des Experiments, der Mathematik bestimmt man den Grad der Annäherung der Renaissancephilosophie an die neuzeitliche Philosophie. In diesem Sinne wird auch die Renaissanceastrologie interpretiert und bewertet. Aus diesem Horizont heraus weist die Renaissanceastrologie durch ihren theoretischen Aspekt, d.h. mit ihrer Idee einer durchgängigen Naturkausalität, auf das Neue hin — auf die neuzeitliche Naturwissenschaft, während sie durch ihren praktischen Aspekt, d.h. durch die Vorhersage und Prophezeiung an das Alte, das Mittelalterliche gebunden bleibt.

Wir möchten am Beispiel eines kroatischen Renaissance-Arztes, -Philosophen und -Astrologen das Phänomen der Astrologie von neuem und aus einer anderen Perspektive thematisieren. Dabei bleiben wir bei dem erwähnten Maßstab — bei der Naturwissenschaft. Die neuzeitliche Naturwissenschaft ist in der Tat ein epochales geistesgeschichtliches Ereignis, nach welchem nichts geblieben ist, wie es vorher war. Nach Galilei und Newton hat die Philosophie mit der Tatsache der Naturwissenschaft ein aufgegebenes Problem: den Begriff der mathematischen, exakten, verifizierbaren und machtermöglichenden Wissenschaft, den man weder Leugen noch bestreiten kann, den man aber hinsichtlich seiner Möglichkeit, Stellung und Reichweite interpretieren muß. Die Philosophie (und in ihrem Rahmen auch die Astrologie) bis Galilei aber (so auch die Renaissancephilosophie und -Astrologie) orientiert sich generell nach dem klassisch-mittelalterlichen Begriff der Wissenschaft — so ist auch ein eventuelles Erahnen oder eine approximative Annäherung an den neuzeitlichen Begriff der Wissenschaft in der Tat als das Neue zu deuten. Dabei müssen wir aber sehr vorsichtig sein. Das heißt, daß man auch den Horizont der Begriffe, die aus der naturwissenschaftlichen Praxis oder aus der unmittelbaren Reflexion auf diese Praxis hervorgegangen sind beachten muß. Die naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffe der Kausalität, der Erfahrung, des Experiments, u.s.w. haben bestimmte sprachliche, wortgetreue oder auch nur assoziative Korrelate in der mittelalterlichen und Renaissancephilosophie. Und doch meinen sie in der mittelalterlichen- und Renaissancephilosophie etwas ganz anderes. Auf Grund einer unvorsichtigen Angleichung dieser naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffe an ihre, auf den ersten Blick vielleicht Assoziationen erweckenden, sonst aber sinn disparaten und nichtspezifischen Korrelate, bringen wir gewaltsam und willkürlich einen fremden Sinn in die Renaissance-texte hinein. Dabei entgehen uns einige Wesenszüge, die oberflächlich

¹ V. dazu: H—B. Gerl, *Einführung in die Philosophie der Renaissance*, Darmstadt 1989.

zur traditionellen, durch die Wissenschaft aufgehobenen Thematik gehören — die aber faktisch zur Entmachtung des traditionellen Begriffs der Wissenschaftlichkeit geführt haben. Damit haben sie zwar nicht positiv und direkt an der Konstitution der Naturwissenschaft gewirkt, sie haben doch auf eine bestimmte Weise das Bedürfnis nach ihr geweckt, und damit ermöglicht, daß die neue Naturwissenschaft in greifbare Nähe treten konnte. Mit anderen Worten: wir wollen die Renaissanceastrologie nicht nach wissenschaftlichen Begriffen beurteilen, nach Begriffen in denen die Wissenschaft ihre eigene Erfahrung synthetisiert — wir möchten das Phänomen der Astrologie dem Phänomen der Naturwissenschaft gegenüberstellen, um auf diese Weise die Stellung des astrologischen Wissenschaftsbegriffs zwischen dem klassisch-mittelalterlichen und neuzeitlichen Begriff der Wissenschaft und der Wissenschaftlichkeit interpretieren zu können.

*

Cassirer hat über Astrologie relativ wenig geschrieben, Grisogono war ein Arzt und Astrologe am Übergang aus dem 15. ins 16. Jahrhundert und Petric's Meinung über Astrologie führen wir hier nur in Klammern an (er meinte die Astrologie sei *vanitas* und alles das wäre nur eines Lächelns würdig — *ridenda*). Wir müssen also zu Beginn erklären, warum im Titel dieses Referats verbunden mit dem Phänomen der Astrologie die Namen Cassirers, Grisogonos und Petric's genannt sind. Cassirers Interpretation der Renaissanceastrologie scheint uns grundlegend und bestimmend zu sein für die meisten der zeitgenössischen Interpretationen der Relation zwischen der Renaissanceastrologie und der künftigen Naturwissenschaft. In Grisogonos Werk glauben wir Elemente zu finden, mit denen wir Cassirers Auffassung problematisieren wollen, und mit Petric möchten wir eine andere Relation zwischen Renaissancedenken (Wissenschaft) und der neuzeitlichen Naturwissenschaft darzulegen versuchen.

Cassirer schreibt über Astrologie in seinem Buch: *Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance* im zweiten Abschnitt des dritten Kapitels: »Freiheit und Notwendigkeit in der Philosophie der Renaissance«. Dieser Kontext ist wohl auch entscheidend für seine Interpretation der Astrologie. Nach Cassirers Meinung überwindet der Renaissancekampf gegen christlich-mittelalterliche Tradition und Dogmatik der »Widerstände die das Mittelalter dem System der Astrologie entgegengesetzt hat«. Der direkte Weg zur klassischen Epoche der griechischen Philosophie ist der Renaissance zunächst verschlossen, die Renaissance recipiert die griechische Philosophie durch die helenistische geistige Tradition. Astrologie lebt zwar auch im Mittelalter, aber der christliche Glaube bietet ein ständiges Korrektiv; Astrologie ist der Macht der göttlichen Vorsehung untergeordnet. Das Vordringen des

weltlichen Geistes und der weltlichen Bildung verstärkt den Einfluß der Astrologie. Wie auf einer Seite das »regnum gratiae« seine Bedeutung einbüßt, so verstärkt sich auf der anderen Seite die Bedeutung des »regnum naturae«, d.h. die Bedeutung der naturalistischen magisch-astrologischen Kausalität. Die Natur *iuxta propria principia* zu erklären bedeutete die Natur aus ihren eingeborenen Kräften zu erklären. Astrologie und Magie in der Renaissance stehen nicht im Widerstreit zu dem neuzeitlichen Begriff der Natur, sie ebnen ihm den Weg. Astrologie und die empirische Naturwissenschaft sind in der Renaissance verbunden, und doch ist die Trennung der Naturwissenschaft von der Astrologie nicht nur der Sieg der Erfahrung, des Messens und Rechnes über die Spekulation. Zwischen der Astrologie und der neuzeitlichen Naturwissenschaft steht ein grundlegender *Wandel der Denkart*, eine *neue Logik des Naturbegriffens*. Als wichtigste Aufgabe der Erforschung der Renaissancephilosophie bestimmt Cassirer gerade die Aufgabe, *dem Werden dieser Logik nachzugehen*. Der Weg, auf dem sich in der Renaissance die Naturwissenschaft konstituiert hat, ist das Wesentliche und das Wichtige und nicht nur das bloße Resultat als solches. Was zu erforschen ist, ist die Dynamik des geistigen Prozesses in dem es zur Trennung und »Auseinandersetzung« zwischen Astrologie und Naturwissenschaft gekommen ist. Zwischen der Astrologie und der neuzeitlichen Naturwissenschaft gibt es keinen kontinuierten Fortschritt in gerader Linie. Das Alte und das Neue ist vermischt und erscheint zusammen. Die Renaissanceastrologie weist in die Richtung der neuzeitlichen Naturwissenschaft, weil sie sich mit ihrem Glauben an die feste astrologische Kausalität, an die Gesetzlichkeit des Geschehens, den Willkürlichkeiten des Wunderglaubens, der Magie, des Traumdeutens usw. widersetzt. So ist die astrologische Kausalität »die Bedingung der Begreiflichkeit der Natur«, weil erst durch sie die Willkür, die Kontingenz, der bloße Glaube aufgehoben und der Primat der wissenschaftlichen Vernunft aufrechterhalten wird. Das ist der eine Aspekt der Astrologie, Cassirer will aber mit Warburg zwei Aspekte unterscheiden »Als Theorie sucht sie (d.h. Astrologie) die ewigen Gesetze des Weltalls in nüchterner und klarer Linienführung vor uns hinstellen, während ihre Praxis im Zeichen der Dämonenfurcht, der »primitivsten Form religiöser Verursachung« steht.«² Die Bedeutung der Renaissanceastrologie (Pomponazzi) sieht Cassirer gerade darin, daß sie ganz bewußt diese zwei Aspekte unterscheidet. So lehnt sie jenes dämonische Element des Glaubens ab und übernimmt nur den Gedanken von der unverbrüchlichen Kausalität des Geschehens, die keine Kontingenz und Willkür erlaubt. Das ist zwar noch immer keine Naturwissenschaft im neuzeitlichen Sinne, sondern Astrologie, aber diese Astrologie Pomponazzis hilft in rein methodischer Hinsicht, den Weg zu neuem exakt-

² E. Cassirer, *Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance*, Darmstadt 1977 (1. Aufl.: Leipzig-Berlin 1927), S. 111.

-wissenschaftlichem Grundverstehen des Naturgeschehens zu bereiten. Die Kehrseite dieser Idee der astrologischen Kausalität ist aber der Gedanke einer allumfassenden Determiniertheit von allem, nicht nur natürlichen Geschehen, sondern auch geistigen Leben und der Geschichte. Dieser Aspekt der Astrologie, nämlich der Aspekt der Deutung, der Vorhersage und Prophezeiung dessen, was in den Sternen geschrieben ist, was notwendigerweise geschehen muß, wird allgemein als Aberglaube verstanden. In Picos Kritik dieses Aspektes der Astrologie sieht Cassirer auch einen Weg, der in die Neuzeit und neuzeitliche Naturwissenschaft führt. In diesem Sinne weist Cassirer darauf hin, daß Kepler die Astrologiekritik Picos übernommen und weitergeführt hat. Was aber die totale astrologische Determiniertheit betrifft, so gibt es, nach Cassirer, auch innerhalb der Astrologie selbst Tendenzen der Subjektivität auch im Rahmen des astrologischen Weltbildes einen neuen Platz einzuräumen. Angesichts der Polarität, die in den Sternen walte (also der Möglichkeit, daß der Einfluß der Sterne zum Guten oder auch zum Schlechten angewendet wird), ist die Freiheit des menschlichen Entschlusses auch innerhalb des astrologischen Weltbildes möglich. Es hängt vom freien menschlichen Entschluß ab, welchem Gesetz und welcher Ordnung — der *providentia*, dem *fatum*, oder der *natura* — der Mensch sich unterstellen will.³

Aus dieser kurzen Darstellung von Cassirers Interpretation der Renaissanceastrologie möchten wir drei Thesen hervorheben:

1) Die Astrologie, von ihrem theoretischen Gesichtspunkt gesehen, steht im Gegensatz zu den magischen Willkürlichkeiten, hebt die immanente Naturkausalität hervor und wird dadurch »Bedingung der Begreiflichkeit der Natur«; damit bereitet sie den Weg der neuen exakt-wissenschaftlichen Grundauffassung des Naturgeschehens. Dem müssen wir auch zufügen, daß die astrologische Kausalität eine mathematisch deskribierte (nicht aber mathematisch abgeleitete oder »bewiesene«) Gesetzmäßigkeit des Geschehens ist — so arbeitet wohl Astrologie am neuzeitlichen Begriff der Wissenschaft auch mit ihrer Mathematik, mit der Idee einer geometrisch-exakt vorgestellten Notwendigkeit des Naturgeschehens.

2) Die Kehrseite der Idee der astrologischen Kausalität ist die Idee totaler, vollständiger Determination; sie geht aus magischen Vorstellungen hervor — ist also Aberglaube. In diesem Sinne ist die Idee der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft auch der *Kritik* der Astrologie verpflichtet.

3) Innerhalb der Astrologie gibt es aber auch Tendenzen, der Subjektivität auch in der vollständigen Determiniertheit die Möglichkeit der freien Wahl zu sichern. Das ist aber möglich auf Grund der Pola-

³ Diese kurze Darstellung von Cassirers Interpretation der Renaissanceastrologie referiert über die wichtigsten Thesen aus: E. Cassirer, *Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance*, Darmstadt 1977, S. 103–129.

rität, die in dem Einfluß der Sterne vorgestellt wird. Die Sterne lassen die Möglichkeit offen, daß die Menschen deren Einfluß zum Guten oder zum Bösen wenden können.

Es scheint, daß Cassirer in seiner Interpretation der Renaissanceastrologie alle wesentlichen Elemente, die auch später in den Diskussionen über Renaissanceastrologie zu Wort kommen, angezeigt hat. Sicher werden einzelne Aspekte auch verschieden akzentuiert und dadurch auch verschieden bewertet. Cassirer wollte, so scheint es mir, auf eine komplexe Weise einem komplexe Phänomen angemessen bleiben, um so der Falle des einseitigen Zugangs auszuweichen. Seine Deutung der Renaissanceastrologie gründet Cassirer nicht auf einzelnen aus dem Kontext herausgenommenen Thesen, sondern auf der inneren Logik und in dem Horizont des Denkens, in dem sich die Astrologie bewegt. In diesem Sinne scheint mir die These Cassirers besonders wichtig, daß Wesentliche am Übergang von der Astrologie (Renaissance) zur mathematischen Naturwissenschaft (Neuzeit) der Wandel der Denkart ist, und daß die Hauptaufgabe der Erforschung der Renaissancephilosophie gerade darin besteht, dem Werden der neuen Logik des Naturbegriffens nachzugehen. Diese Aufgabe möchte ich zu meiner eigenen machen und am Paradigma zweier Schriften von Frederik Grisogono diesen Wandel des denkenden Zugangs zur Natur von der Renaissanceastrologie zur neuzeitlichen Naturwissenschaft darzulegen versuchen.

Federik Grisogono (Federicus Grisogonus 1472—1538)^{3a}, der kroatische Arzt, Astrologe und Philosoph lebte am Übergang aus dem 15. ins 16. Jahrhundert. Von ihm sind uns zwei Schriften bekannt: 1) *Speculum astronomicum terminans intellectum humanum in omni scientia*, gedruckt in Venedig 1507 und 2) *De modo collegiandi, pronosticandi et curandi febres, necnon de humana felicitate, ac denique de fluxu et refluxu maris*, gedruckt in Venedig 1528. Diese zweite Schrift faßt in sich mehrere Untersuchungen verschiedenen Inhalts zusammen, von denen uns für unser Thema hier nur die Untersuchung: »de humana felicitate« mit dem vollständigen Titel vor dem Textanfang: »de felicitate et humana perfectione. De summa felicitate et suprema perfectione humana«, interessiert. Die erste Schrift *Speculum* ist einheitlich im

^{3a} Der kroatische Renaissancearzt, -Astrologe und -Philosoph ist bei uns kein unbekannter Autor. 1972 wurde an der Philosophischen Fakultät in Zadar ein Symposium über das Leben und Werk von F. Grisogono gehalten. Die Referate, die bei dieser Gelegenheit vorgetragen wurden, sind in der Sammelschrift: *Zbornik radova o Frederiku Grisogonu*, Zadar 1974, veröffentlicht und sie sind verschiedenen Problemen der Biographie und der Interpretation des Werkes von Grisogono gewidmet. (Autoren sind: D. Foretić, I. Petricioli, S. Antoljak, M. D. Grmek, E. Stipančić, Ž. Dadić, B. Belicza, V. Dugački M. Brida, V. Bajsić und I. Supićić) Von anderen Arbeiten über Grisogono sei noch erwähnt die philosophische Interpretation von E. Banić-Pajnić: *Federicus Grisogono; de divinis mathematicis, Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, Zagreb 1985 (1—2/21—22) S. 83—95.

Inhalt — in ihr werden einige Probleme der Mathematik, besonders einzelne Fragen der *Elemente* Euklids erörtert.

Wir beginnen mit einem etwas modifiziertem Cassirerschen Problem. Wie geschieht der Wandel der Denkart innerhalb der Renaissance (in der Renaissanceastrologie) in bezug auf das vorangegangene Denken der Antike und des Mittelalters und in Richtung der neuzeitlichen Naturwissenschaft. Grisogonos Schrift *de humana felicitate* scheint auf den ersten Blick zur Problematik der praktischen Philosophie, zur Ethik, zu gehören. Es geht hier aber überhaupt nicht um die Thematik der praktischen Philosophie. Diese Schrift Grisogonos kann man zur umfangreichen protreptischen Literatur rechnen. Am Anfang stellt Grisogono fest, daß nur die Erkenntnis den Menschen glücklich machen kann, dann analysiert er die Bedeutung und die Tragweite einzelner Disziplinen und Wissenschaften, um sicherzustellen, welche von ihnen die Erkenntnis im höchsten Grade erreicht und auf diese Weise den Menschen am meisten glücklich macht.

Um aber Grisogonos Abstand vom klassischen und mittelalterlichen Ideal der Wissenschaft und der Wissenschaftlichkeit darzulegen, müssen wir vorerst einige Sätze aus dem Vorbild aller protreptischen Literatur, aus dem *Protreptikos* von Aristoteles anführen. Mit allen Modifikationen und Begrenzungen gilt das Ideal der theoretischen Wissenschaft, wie es im *Protreptikos* expliziert ist, durch das ganze Mittelalter und im großen und ganzen auch in der Renaissance. Wir können uns freilich hier nicht auf eine tiefgreifende Analyse des Aristotelischen Textes einlassen, wir möchten nur jene Thesen in bezug auf welche es bei Grisogono zu einem wesentlichen Wandel der Denkart kommt, hervorheben. Auch im Aristotelischen *Protreptikos* beginnt die Untersuchung mit der Frage, was das Glück für den Menschen ist. Das Glück besteht nicht im Erwerben der Güter, das Glück ist ein (guter, richtiger) Zustand der Seele ($\pi\omega\varsigma \tau\eta\nu \psi\upsilon\chi\eta\nu \delta\iota\alpha\chi\epsilon\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$)⁴ Der richtige Zustand wird als $\varphi\rho\acute{o}\nu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ bestimmt und er ist nur auf Grund der Erkenntnis, auf Grund der Philosophie möglich.⁵ Die höchste Erkenntnis aber ist die Erkenntnis dessen, was durch sich selbst, um seiner selbst Willen erstrebenswert ist ($\delta\iota' \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$) und nicht erst durch etwas anderes oder wegen etwas anderen ($\delta\iota' \xi\lambda\lambda\alpha\varsigma, \delta\iota' \xi\lambda\lambda\omicron$) als erstrebenswert bestimmt werden kann.⁶ Das, was an sich und wegen sich selbst erstrebenswert ist, wird als das zweckfreie Denken bestimmt, als das Denken, das man wegen der bloßen Betrachtung ($\tau\acute{o} \theta\epsilon\omega\rho\epsilon\iota\nu$) wählt. Das Gute und das Glück ist nicht im Nützlichen und Vorteilhaften, sondern in bloßer Betrachtung ($\tau\acute{o} \theta\epsilon\omega\rho\epsilon\iota\nu$). Die theoretische Erkenntnis, oder

⁴ *Der Protreptikos des Aristoteles*, Einleitung, Text Übersetzung und Kommentar von Ingemar Düring, Frankfurt am Main, 1969. Klostermann Texte: Philosophie) S. 24 (B.2)

⁵ op. cit. S. 26 (B 5)

⁶ op. cit. S. 38 (B. 25)

die theoretische Wissenschaft erweist sich in zwei Hinsichten als die höchste und als das höchste Glück bringende. Sie ist die höchste Erkenntnis, weil sie zweckfrei und um ihrer selbst willen besteht, und sie ist die höchste, weil auch ihr Gegenstand um seiner selbst willen besteht und alles andere ist nur um seiner willen.⁷ Eine Erkenntnis aber, durch die ein Vorteil für den Menschen (nicht das Glück) denkbar ist, ist in zwei Hinsichten eine niedrigere, unwürdigere Erkenntnis: Als Erkenntnis ist sie nicht um ihrer selbst willen, sondern wegen eines Vorteils für den Menschen, und die Gegenstände auf die sie gerichtet ist, sind nicht wegen sich selbst, sind keine Prinzipien und Ursachen (*αἰτίαι, στοιχεῖα*), sind nicht unveränderlich und ewig,⁸ sondern etwas, das wegen eines anderen ist (wegen eines Vorteils), das also veränderlich und manipulierbar ist.

Angesichts dieses Ideals der theoretischen Erkenntnis und des Ideals des Gegenstandes der theoretischen Erkenntnis kommt es bei Grisogono zu einem wesentlichen Wandel. Obwohl auch Grisogono mit der Frage beginnt, was das Glück für den Menschen ist, und obwohl er wie Aristoteles das Glück in der Seele und nicht im Erwerben der Güter sehen will,⁹ kommt es zum wesentlichen Wandel in der Auffassung, was die Vorzüglichkeit einer Erkenntnis ist und was eine vorzügliche Erkenntnis bedeutet. Die Vorzüglichkeit einer Erkenntnis wird nicht nach Kategorien »um seiner selbst willen« und »um eines anderen willen« bestimmt. Grisogono geht von der Frage nach dem Ursprung und Entstehensgrund einer Erkenntnis aus und antwortet auf platonische Weise: Das Glück entsteht aus der Erfüllung eines Strebens und dieses Streben gründet sich auf einen Mangel.¹⁰ Die höchste Erkenntnis ist aber die, die dem Menschen das höchste Glück in dem nur ihm eigenen Streben bringt, in dem sich der Mensch von allen anderen Lebewesen unterscheidet.¹¹ In der Suche nach der vorzüglichsten Erkenntnis (*cognitio ceteris praestantior*)^{11a} unterscheidet Grisogono, im Ein-

⁷ op. cit. S. 38 (B. 27)

⁸ op. cit. S. 44 (B. 35)

⁹ Federici Chrisogoni (= Federik Grisogono) (...) necnon de humana felicitate (...), Venetiis, S. 22a — »Quandoquidem si in bona corporis validudine perfecta esset rationalium felicitas aut sensuum facultate, brutorum profecto plurima nobis esse beatiora, quilibet perspiciat.«

¹⁰ Federici Chrisogoni, (= Federik Grisogono), op. cit. S. 22a — »Beatus equidem ille dicitur, qui habet quicquid appetit secundum rationem. Infirmi enim summpere sanitatem per omnibus concupiscunt, pauperes autem divitias (...)«

¹¹ Federici Chrisogoni, (= Federik Grisogono), op. cit. S. 22a — »Non est ergo quaesita felicitas illa, quae nobis et beluis communis est, sed ea magis, qua animantia queque superamus et bene vivimus.«

^{11a} Federici Chrisogoni, (= Federik Grisogono) op. cit. S. 22ab — »Maioribus ergo quam corporis aut fortunae bonis constituendam beatitudinem scrutari, abiectis prorsus imbecilibus Aristippi et Epicuri opinionibus, per omnigenas rationis humanae disciplinas et artes, sive liberales et theore-

klang mit der christlichen Tradition, die Erkenntnis, die auf Grund des natürlichen menschlichen Verstandes möglich ist und die Erkenntnis, die von Gott geschenkt wird.¹² Zuerst untersucht er die Möglichkeiten und die Tragweite der durch den natürlichen Verstand erworbenen Wissenschaften und schließt mit einem Lob an die Theologie.¹³ In seiner Beurteilung der Wissenschaften orientiert sich Grisogono zuerst nach einem aristotelischen Kriterium — nach der Dignität des wissenschaftlichen Gegenstandes. So können die Grammatik, die Dialektik und die Arithmetik (sowohl auch die Musik und die Perspektive) keine vorzüglichsten Wissenschaften sein (oder was dasselbe bedeutet: den Menschen nicht im größten Maße glücklich machen), weil ihr Gegenstand als *animi operationes, opus intellectus* und nicht als *essentiae* oder *cause primae* bestimmt wird.¹⁴ Im Gegensatz zu diesem aristotelischen Kriterium wird aber die Rechtswissenschaft positiv bewertet, zwar nicht als die höchste Wissenschaft, aber doch, als die Vorbedingung des Glücks.¹⁵

Uns interessiert besonders Grisogonos Meinung über die Naturphilosophie, die Physik und seine Stellungnahme zur Metaphysik. Es geht hier natürlich um die Aristotelische Distinktion und Aristotelische Wissenschaften. Die Physik ist im Grisogonos Sinne viel vollkommener als die vorher genannten Disziplinen. Sie trachtet durch die Erkenntnis der Bewegung und der sinnlichen Dinge nach einer Erkenntnis der Bewegung und der sinnlichen Dinge nach einer Erkenntnis der Wesentlichen, der *quidditates*. Die Erkenntnis des Wesentlichen, der *quidditates*, entgeht aber der Physik, weil sie auf die Erkenntnis der Sinne, die nie zur Substanz vordringen können, angewiesen ist. Das Nicht-zur-Substanz-vordringen-können, d.h. die Kontingenz der Erkenntnis des menschlichen Verstandes (*intellectus*), geht aus der notwendigen Angewiesenheit des Intellekts an die Sinne hervor.¹⁶ Aus demselben Grund

ticas sive mechanicas et practicas, opere precium discurrere arbitramur, quoniam sit illa cognitio ceteris praestantior, quae nos efficacius ad metam beatitudinis conducat.«

¹² Federici Chrisogoni, (= Federik Grisogono), op. cit. S. 22b — »Pro cuius investigatione clariori duplicem sane modum eruditionis fore permittemus, alterum quidem humanitus ex naturali rationis indagine provenientem, alterum vero divinitus, ad cuius assecutionem se habet humanus intellectus ut mere patiens absque ulla intellectus agentis activitate, sed supernaturali inspiratione et ex creditis principis robor assumit assensus.«

¹³ Federici Chrisogoni, (= Federik Grisogono), op. cit. S. 23d — »(...) ad solam profecto illam orthodoxae fidei theologiam pro capessenda felicitate suprema recurrendum est, quae supra omnes humanitus inventas disciplinas et cabalistarum peritiam nos in clarum deitatis intuitum deducit pluraque exequens, quam polliceatur.«

¹⁴ Federici Chrisogoni, (= Federik Grisogono), op. cit. S. 22b

¹⁵ Federici Chrisogoni, (= Federik Grisogono), op. cit. S. 22c

¹⁶ Federici Chrisogoni, (= Federik Grisogono), op. cit. S. 22cm — »(...) ipsa (sc. naturalis philosophia) tamen nequaquam beatos reddet citius assensu, quoniam circa sensibilibus et materialibus sive corruptibilibus motus

de erlangt die Metaphysik nicht das größte Glück (d.h. sie ist nicht die vorzüglichste Erkenntnis), obwohl sie als ihren Gegenstand die abstrakten Substanzen intendiert. Auch sie ist an die Erkenntnis der Sinne angewiesen, also kann sie ihren angestrebten Gegenstand nie im positiven Sinne erreichen. Ihre Erkenntnis ist vielmehr negativ. Die Metaphysik verspricht mehr, als sie erfüllen kann.¹⁷

Diesen Wissenschaften gegenüber hebt Grisogono als die höchste und vorzüglichste Wissenschaft die Astronomie (d.h. die Astrologie) hervor. Auch nach aristotelischem Kriterium ist die Astrologie die höchste Wissenschaft, weil ihr Gegenstand ehrwürdig und über alles Irdische und alles Sinnliche erhoben ist. Ohne Rücksicht auf dieses aristotelische Kriterium lobt Grisogono auch andere Vorteile der Astrologie: die astrologische Erkenntnis verfügt über die Zeit und über die Wirkungen in der Zeit, weil sie das Gegenwärtige, das Vergangene und das Künftige aus ihren Ursachen erkennt. Das betrifft nicht nur die natürlichen Dinge, sondern auch die menschliche Geschichte. Damit verschafft diese Erkenntnis einen großen Vorteil (*plurimum confert*). Sie sieht das Künftige vorher und macht es dem Menschen möglich, sich vor dem, was auf ihn zugeht, zu schützen. (Von solchem Nutzen sind z.B. die Ratschläge der astrologischen Medizin, oder die Anweisungen zur Saat oder Ernte.) Die Astrologen genossen deswegen immer ein großes Ansehen und wurden als Seher, Götter oder Gottgesandte geehrt. Am Ende wiederholt Grisogono seine These, daß der Gegenstand der Astrologie über alle anderen Erkenntnisgegenstände erhoben ist und begründet die astrologische Kausalität in dem Willen Gottes, der die himmlischen Körper als zweite Ursachen geschaffen hat. Die Untersuchung beendet Grisogono damit, daß er die höchste und vollzüglichste Erkenntnis, die auf Grund des natürlichen Verstandes möglich ist — die Astrologie — ganz im Einklang mit dem christlichen Glauben der übernatürlichen Erkenntnis unterordnet.¹⁸

Mit seinem Lob an die Astrologie, bzw. mit der Bestimmung der Astrologie als der vorzüglichsten, höchsten Wissenschaft, die nicht nur den verschiedenen *artes*, sondern auch den dreien theoretischen Wissenschaften: der Physik, der Mathematik und der Metaphysik überge-

et mutationes versatur atque per accidentia novem praedicamentorum quidditates rerum cognoscere laborat. Philosophus autem, quando pro cognoscenda substantia sensus omnes est expertus, ab intento fine frustratus existit diminutamque rerum cognitionem, substantiarum praesentium, posteris dereliquit humanusque intellectus parum quiescit, immo semper haesitare videtur. Neque id absque ratione evenit, quoniam intellectus indiget sensuum famulatu, qui ad substantiam minime se profundant (. . .).«

¹⁷ Federici Chrisogoni, (= Federik Grisogono), op. cit. S. 22d — »Non igitur beatum quempiam efficiet metaphysica, quae longe plura promittit professoribus, quam possit attendere.«

¹⁸ Federici Chrisogoni, (= Federik Grisogono), op. cit. S. 23abc

ordnet ist, stellt Grisogono das traditionelle aristotelische, klassisch-mittelalterliche Ideal der theoretischen Wissenschaftlichkeit in Frage. So konzipiert er *in nuce* ein neues Ideal der Wissenschaftlichkeit: eine Wissenschaft, die auf Grund des Verfügens über die Zeitdimensionen der Gegenwart, der Vergangenheit und der Zukunft, durch die Erkenntnis und das Vorhersehen, die Macht über die Geschehnisse gewinnt.

Diese These scheint aber, zugleich banal und logisch, dem Phänomen der Astrologie nicht angemessen zu sein. Daß sich die Astrologie um das Vorhersehen und die Prophezeiung des Künftigen bemüht, war zu jeder Zeit bekannt. Ihr Vorhersehen ist aber die Prophezeiung, d.h. ihr Vorhersehen ist in der irrationalen Vorstellung von magischen Einflüssen und okkulten Qualitäten gegründet. Das ist bestimmt richtig und kann nicht in Frage gestellt werden. Astrologie als Wissenschaft, als eine Erkenntnis und ein Vorhersehen aus Prinzipien verstanden und in der Annahme der astrologischen Kausalität gegründet, ist ein Aberglaube.

Man kann aber die Frage auch anders stellen. Funktioniert die Astrologie wirklich als ein Wissenschaft-Aberglaube oder auf eine andere Weise? Daß die Astrologie nach ihrem Selbstverständnis eine Wissenschaft ist (ein Wissen aus Prinzipien und dazu ein mathematisch dargelegtes) und konsequent zu diesem Selbstverständnis (und aus dem Horizont der neuzeitlichen Naturwissenschaft) ein Aberglaube ist, wird heute niemand ernsthaft in Frage stellen. Unabhängig aber von der Frage über das Wesen des Phänomens Astrologie (die auch ihr Selbstverständnis in die Frage hineinbezieht) ist die Frage über das faktische Funktionieren der Astrologie und die Frage über die Anregungen, die sich möglicherweise daraus ergeben haben.

Darüber nur einige wenige Gedanken: astrologische Berechnungen sind exakt, d.h. sie gelten unabhängig von der geozentrischen, heliozentrischen, wissenschaftlichen oder okkulten Annahme. Das, was die naturwissenschaftliche Astronomie der Astrologie vorwirft, ist nicht in erster Linie die Exaktheit der Rechnungen, sondern ihr Sinn. Die astrologischen Berechnungen sind nicht unexakt, oder falsch, sie sind sinnlos. Und — das ist mein Standpunkt und meine These — astrologische Voraussagen sind nicht in den astrologischen Berechnungen gegründet, oder, m.a.W. Astrologie funktioniert nicht als ein Wissen aus Prinzipien, als eine Wissenschaft, sondern auf eine andere Weise. Astrologische Berechnungen sind eindeutig und exakt, die Deutungen aber und die auf ihnen gegründete Voraussage sind von jeder Eindeutigkeit weit entfernt. Eine Deutung (z.B. eine Computerdeutung), die alle Konstellationen und Rechnungen in Betracht ziehen möchte, wäre total sinnlos, d.h. ohne jegliches eindeutiges Urteil, ohne eine Empfehlung, ohne einen klaren Ratschlag. Der Astrologe trifft eine Auswahl dessen, was für eine bestimmte Frage oder ein bestimmtes Problem relevant ist, und was man als für das Problem unwichtig ausklammern muß.

Das bezeugt die astrologische Literatur deutlich — so auch Grisogono.¹⁹ Außerdem verwenden die Astrologen mit großer Selbstverständlichkeit und ganz unreflektiert die Begriffe: Liebe, Haß, Zuneigung, Macht, Freunde, Feinde, Dürre, Überschwemung s.s.w., die als wirkliche Motivationen oder Ursachen im Bereich des persönlichen, des gesellschaftlichen und des ökonomischen Lebens zu akzeptieren sind. Schließlich gibt der Astrologe (wie auch Cassirer es trefflich bemerkt hat) eine Polarität in den Sternen zu, d.h. die Möglichkeit, daß derselbe Stern und dieselbe Konstellation der Sterne zu verschiedenen Effekten führt — relativ zu dem Charakter, den Fähigkeiten und Dispositionen des Rezipienten dieser Einflüsse, relativ zu dem Menschen. Das heißt, daß die Astrologie auch nach ihrem Selbstverständnis ein Wissen ist, mit dem man disponieren kann, ein Wissen, das in bestimmter Weise die Macht über die künftigen Geschehnisse ermöglicht.

Auf Grund dieser Überlegungen möchte ich die These vorlegen, daß die Astrologie, im Gegensatz zu ihrem Selbstverständnis, nicht als ein Wissen aus Prinzipien, nicht als Wissenschaft (und deswegen auch nicht als Aberglaube) funktioniert, sondern als eine »Lebensweisheit« oder Weltklugheit in natürlicher Einstellung, als empirisches Wissen darüber, was in den Grenzen der persönlichen, gesellschaftlichen oder natürlichen Sphäre wirklich als Motivation oder Ursache gilt. Damit ist dieses Wissen, als ein Wissen in der natürlichen Einstellung, ein »Arbeitswissen«, d.h. ein Wissen um jene Momente im Leben, die prinzipiell manipulierbar sind.

Aus dieser Blickrichtung können wir in Grisogonos Kritik bzw. in der astrologischen Kritik des traditionellen klassisch-mittelalterlichen Begriffes der Wissenschaftlichkeit einen neuen Aspekt entdecken. Der traditionellen Wissenschaft, d.h. der Wissenschaft von der Substanz und dem Wesen, von dem, was unverändert in den Veränderungen beharrt, das man nur mit Ehrfurcht betrachten kann, wird nicht das Vorurteil des Glaubens an die okkulten Mächte entgegengesetzt, sondern die »natürliche Einstellung«, die ursprünglich tätige Orientierung des Menschen in der Welt. Damit aber zeigt sich, im Gegensatz zur Cassirerschen Deutung, daß die Astrologie an dem Begriff der neuzeitlichen Naturwissenschaft nicht durch ihren theoretischen Aspekt, mit der Idee der immanenten Naturkausalität arbeitet, sondern durch ihren praktischen Aspekt, gerade als Aberglaube, bzw. als tätiges Orientierungswis-

¹⁹ Grisogono war in praktizierender Arzt-Astrologe. In der früher zitierten Schrift *Grisogonos* stellt er auch das Horoskop eines Kranken auf, auf dessen Beispiel er dann die Frage erörtert, welche Aspekte man für die richtige Prognose der Krankheit in Betracht ziehen muß, welche aber als für die Prognose unwichtige auszuklammern sind. V.: F. Chrisogoni, op. cit. S. 12d: *Et si quis fuerit occupatus in aliis, quae viam naturalem non sequuntur, a veritate declinabit: sicut illi, qui ponunt solem et alias planetas esse obervandos in qualibet aegritudine cronica, ad motum quorum fiunt dies cretici: quae omnia falsa sunt, praeter haec, quae diximus.*

sen — durch ihre Forderung einer Wissenschaft, die auf einen Vorteil für den Menschen gerichtet sein soll und die die Macht über persönliche, gesellschaftliche und natürliche Geschehnisse ermöglicht.

Die Kehrseite der Astrologie als einer »Lebensweisheit« oder eines empirischen Wissens für die praktische Orientierung in der Welt ist die mathematisch dargelegte »immanente Kausalität der Natur«. So herrschte in der Renaissanceastrologie und im Rahmen der platonisch-neuplatonischen Tradition eine große Begeisterung für die Mathematik die als einzige ein sicheres Wissen ermöglicht. Diese Begeisterung finden wir auch bei Grisogono.

Im Kontext der Renaissanceastrologie spricht Cassirer zwar nicht von der Mathematik, er hat aber die Renaissancemathematik (und die ist sehr stark neuplatonisch geprägt) für sehr wichtig gehalten. Nachdem er von der Da Vincis Begeisterung für die Mathematik gesprochen hat, schließt er mit den Worten: »Galilei geht diesen Weg der Betrachtung zu Ende«. ²⁰ Freilich bestimmt Cassirer die Rolle der Mathematik in der Astrologie (aber nicht nur Renaissanceastrologie) als »außerst paradox«. Auf der einen Seite steht die »Exaktheit des mathematischen Denkens«, auf der anderen »fantastische und abstruse Mystik«. ²¹ Den Unterschied zwischen der astrologischen Mathematik und der Mathematik der Naturwissenschaft bestimmt Cassirer als den Unterschied zwischen Ding-Zahl und Funktionszahl in der Analysis des Unendlichen. ²² Diese Distinktion trifft bestimmt das Wesen der Sache. Aber, nach Cassirer, die Renaissanceastrologie weist in Richtung der neuzeitlichen Naturwissenschaft mit ihrer Idee der »immanenten Kausalität der Natur«, und diese ist gerade in der Form des »exakten mathematischen Denkens« ausgedrückt, das in der Astrologie der »abstrusen Mystik« gegenübersteht. So wirkt auch Ding-Zahl im Sinne Cassirers auf eine (nicht näher bestimmte) Weise am Entstehen der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft mit. Wir möchten auch die Bedeutung betonen, die Cassirer dem Platonismus am Entstehen der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft zuschreibt. So meint Cassirer, z.B. daß Kepler sich von der astrologischen Denkart befreit hat durch Platonismus, nach welchem die Zahl nicht aus den sinnlichen Dingen abstrahiert wird, sondern als das Platonische gilt, als »eingeborene Idee«. ²³ Nun ist aber diese Auffassung der Zahl und einer mathematischen Entität überhaupt gerade die Auffassung, die auch innerhalb der astrologischen Mathematik gilt.

²⁰ E. Cassirer, *Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance*, Darmstadt 1977, S. 58.

²¹ E. Cassirer, *Die Begriffsform im mythischen Denken*, Leipzig, Berlin 1922, S. 46.

²² A. a. O.

²³ E. Cassirer, op. cit. S. 49.

Damit kommen wir aber zu der anderen Schrift Grisogonos: *Speculum astronomicum terminans intellectum humanum in omni scientia. Venetiis 1507*. Im Unterschied zur früher erwähnten Schrift hat diese Schrift Grisogonos ein durchgehendes Thema: die Mathematik. Sie enthält einen Brief des venezianischen Adligen Marcus Antonius Contrarrenus in dem dieser die Gelehrtheit Grisogonos lobt, dann eine Rede, die Grisogono an der Paduaner Akademie gehalten hat und schließlich den Hauptteil mit dem Titel: »Praefatio, in librum Elementorum Euclidis«. Dieser Hauptteil gliedert sich in zwei Teile: im ersten Teil erörtert Grisogono mathematisch-metaphysische Grenzprobleme (causa efficiens, finalis, materialis, formalis), den Begriff und die Bedeutung der Arithmetik und besonders die Wissenschaften, die mathematisch aufgebaut sind, also angewandte mathematische Wissenschaften: die Musik und die Astrologie. Im zweiten Teil legt er einige Sätze Euklids aus, kritisiert sie und schlägt seine Lösungen vor. Hier können wir nicht im einzelnen auf den Inhalt oder, was viel wichtiger wäre, auf das Verfahren des *Speculum* eingehen. Darüber wurde schon bei uns geschrieben — vom mathematischen Aspekt aus hat das Ernest Stipančić,^{23a} von philosophischen Erna Banić Pajnić^{23b} getan. Als Ansatz nehmen wir hier das Problem und das Phänomen der Renaissanceastrologie und wir möchten die Frage auf folgende Weise stellen: Wenn die Renaissanceastrologie als Praxis, d.h. als die Idee einer Wissenschaft (von der Natur), die den Anspruch hat, die künftigen Geschehnisse vorauszusehen und sie dadurch manipulierbar zu machen, am Entstehen des neuzeitlichen Begriffs der Wissenschaftlichkeit mitwirkt, wie steht es dann mit der Astrologie als einer Theorie, d.h. einer Idee der »immanenten Kausalität der Natur« (Cassirer), die eine Gesetzmäßigkeit, bzw. eine Notwendigkeit des Geschehens gerade deswegen ist, weil sie mathematisch formuliert ist?

Nach ihrem Selbstverständnis ist die Renaissanceastrologie die höchste Wissenschaft, weil sie eine demonstrative Wissenschaft (und eine Wissenschaft von den höchsten dem natürlichen menschlichen Verstand erreichbaren Ursachen) ist. Demonstrative Wissenschaft heißt aber für die Astrologie: mathematische Wissenschaft. Astrologie ist die höchste Wissenschaft, weil sie eine mathematische Wissenschaft über die höchsten Ding-Ursachen ist.²⁴ Als mathematische Wissenschaft

^{23a} Ernest Stipančić, *Matematički pogledi Federika Grisogona*, *Zbornik radova o Federiku Grisogonu*, Zadar 1974, S. 71—94.

^{23b} Erna Banić-Pajnić, *Federicus Grisogono: de divinis mathematicis, Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, 1—2(21—22), Zagreb, 1985, S. 83—95.

²⁴ Federici Chryzogoni, (= Federik Grisogono), *Speculum...* (Diii): »Proportio cuius (sc. astrologiae) ad alias scientias est, velut perfectum ad imperfectum, quia haec cognoscit causas rerum omnium. Aliae vero non cognoscunt causas ultimas. Ideo etiam cognitio huius (sc. astrologiae) est nobilior, quam tota cognitio naturalis, etiam demonstrative habita.«

ist die Astrologie eine Wissenschaft, die zugleich das Vergangene, das Zukünftige und das Gegenwärtige erkennt, d.h. sie kann die künftigen, die gegenwärtigen und die vergangenen Stellungen und Konstellationen der Sterne bestimmen, auf Grund deren sie imstande ist, Prognosen in allen Bereichen des Lebens zu machen.²⁵ Diese Prognosen sind solcher Art, daß sie ein sinnvolles Handeln ermöglichen, d.h. der Mensch kann in bestimmten Grenzen auf Grund dieser Voraussagen über seine Zukunft verfügen.²⁶ Der Mensch kann aber über die Konstellationen der Sterne, d.h. über die immanente Gesetzmäßigkeit der Natur, die sich als eine notwendige Gesetzmäßigkeit mathematisch beschreiben läßt, nicht verfügen. In diesem Sinne ist die Astrologie eine notwendige, demonstrative Wissenschaft, im gewissen Einklang mit dem platonisch-aristotelischen Ideal der Wissenschaftlichkeit, weil sie Mathematik ist.

Nun aber, wie funktioniert die Mathematik in der Astrologie, oder wie versteht die Mathematik sich selbst innerhalb der Astrologie? Nach Grisogonos Auffassung ist der Mensch nur auf Grund der Mathematik Gott ähnlich, nämlich so, daß ihm das Gewesene und das Künftige präsent, d.h. erkannt ist.²⁷ Die Zahl (Arithmetik) ist das Maß (mensura) auch aller himmlischen Geschehnisse.²⁸ Die Kehrseite der These, daß der Mensch durch die Mathematik Gott ähnlich ist, ist die These, daß auch Gott selbst der Zahl unterstellt ist (ipse numero subiacere

²⁵ Federici Chrysogoni (= Federik Grisogono), *Speculum . . .* (Diii): Haec (sc. astrologiae) est illa scientia, qua praeterita, et futura praesentia facimus: Qua cognoscimus fatales dispositiones hominum ad mores et vitia.«

²⁶ Federici Chrysogoni, (= Federik Grisogono) *Speculum . . .* (Diii): »Ex quo clare liquere potest (secundum astrologos philosophos et multo clarius secundum veritatem catholicam) astra non necessitare, maxime in animam intellectivam, a qua fluit nostra libera actio. Primo secundum astrologos patet, quia frustra essent tot libri ab eis de electionibus editi, si eligere nobis esset negatum. Sed essent omnia sub necessitate. Frustra etiam imagines summa arte fabricandae, ad sapientiam, ad bonam, ad malam fortunam, ad amorem, ad odium. Ad nocendum inimicis, ad iuvandum sibi et amicis (...).«

²⁷ Federici Chrysogoni, (= Federik Grisogono), *Speculum . . .* (Aiiii): »Sed unica ratione vollo esse contentus, excellentes, scilicet mathematicas, sua nobilitate omnes scientias humanitas acquisitas excedere: quia per eas solas Deo optimo maximo similes esse possumus: cum ipsi (Deo benedicto) et praeterita et futura sint praesentia. At sola mathematica inter omnes alias scientias humanitas acquisitas praeterita et futura praesentia facit (quamvis imperfectiori modo).«

²⁸ Federici Chrysogoni, (= Federik Grisogono), *Speculum . . .* (Aiiii): »At sola mathematica inter omnes alias scientias humanitas acquisitas praeterita et futura praesentia facit (quamvis imperfectiori modo) (...) qua (sc. mathematica) ignorata, geometriae qualis cognitio erit? (...) Non astrologiae, cum nihil aliud sit, quam diversae observationes motus planetarum, vices temporum, annuae conversiones, diversi labores solis etque lunae: quae omnia solo numero mensurantur.« Vergleiche auch: op. cit. (Diii): »Naturales omnes sunt cum necessitate.«

videatur), nämlich so, daß er als erste Ursache des Seienden, das als Vielheit begriffen wird (*multitudo*), als *einer* bestimmt werden muß.²⁹ Deswegen ist die Mathematik schlechthin, d.h. hinsichtlich ihres Gegenstandes (*simpliciter*), als auch hinsichtlich ihres Verfahrens (*ordine procedendi*) das, was zugleich für uns und der Natur der Sache nach früher ist.³⁰ Auf Grund dieser Vereinigung der Aristotelischen Bestimmungen: »das, was früher oder das Erste für uns« und »das, was früher oder das Erste der Natur der Sache nach ist« in der Mathematik, kann Grisogono behaupten, daß Gott mathematisch erkennt und schafft.³¹ Die mathematische Wissenschaft von der Natur, d.h. die Astrologie, hat diesen Vorzug vor der Aristotelischen Physik, der prinzipiell nur das zugänglich ist, was auch den Sinnen zugänglich ist,³² daß sie als Wissenschaft von dem, was der Natur der Sache nach früher ist, ausgeht und auf diese Weise die Erkenntnis Gottes und sein Schaffen nachahmt. Die immanente Kausalität der Natur erkennt der Mensch in der Astrologie auf dieselbe Weise, wie auch Gott sie erkennt und schafft.

Können wir diese Sätze als Antizipation des Galileischen Gedankens, daß der Mensch reine mathematische Erkenntnisse auf dieselbe Weise erkennt, wie sie auch Gott selbst erkennt, verstehen?³³ Keineswegs. Hier geht es um ein suggestives, aber nicht adäquates Korrelat der Naturwissenschaft, das ich am Anfang angedeutet habe. Das will aber in der Renaissance etwas ganz anderes ausdrücken, als in der Neuzeit. Wie hoch der Platonismus-Neuplatonismus die Mathematik auch schätzt und wie groß auch sein Bemühen sei, die Wissenschaft mathematisch auszudrücken (oder gerade deswegen), bleibt er doch immer der platonischen *exemplar-imago* Struktur verpflichtet. Die Konsequenz dieses Grundsatzes ist nicht nur die Einsicht in die Defizienz, die Approximität des Bildes gegenüber dem Worbild, in die Defizienz der menschlichen Zahl gegenüber der Göttlichen Zahl, son-

²⁹ Federici Chrysogoni, (= Federik Grisogono), *Speculum...* (Aiiii) (...), cum et ipse (sc. deus) numero subiacere videatur, quatenus est unum principium actu existens, a quo omnis multitudo (...)

³⁰ Federici Chrysogoni, (= Federik Grisogono), *Speculum...* (Ciii): »(...) sed mathematica tam simpliciter, quam ordine procedendi est de prius notis nobis et naturae.«

³¹ Federici Chrysogoni, (= Federik Grisogono), *Speculum...* (Ciii): »Ex quo patet, quod per applicationem est ratio cognoscendi in omni scientia (sc. mathematica), non solum nostra, verum etiam ratio cognoscendi ipsius intellectus divini (...), quia ea ratione, qua intelligit, eadem etiam et producit (...), sed ratione mathematica intelligit, ergo et producit.«

³² Federici Chrysogoni, (= Federik Grisogono), *Speculum...* (Ciii): »Naturalis (sc. scientia) autem ordine procedendi est de obiecto prius noto nobis, quam naturae.«

³³ G. Galilei, Dialog über die Weltsysteme (Galileo Galilei, *Sidereus Nuncius* — *Nachricht von neuen Sterne*, herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Hans Blumenberg, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1980, S. 157.

dern auch eine spezifische Vorstellung von der Beziehung zwischen dem Gegenstand und der Methode einer Wissenschaft.

So unterscheidet auch Grisogono die Zahlen im Geiste Gottes (numerus in mente divina), die Substanzen, Ideen und Vorbilder sind und die Zahlen, die dem Menschen zur Verfügung stehen, die aber Akzidentien sind und nur Ähnlichkeiten den Göttlichen Zahlen gegenüber.³⁴ Die Folge dieser *exemplar-imago*-Struktur ist, daß die Wissenschaft von Göttlichen Zahlen die höchste Wissenschaft ist, die Göttliche Arithmetik. Sie ist aber dem Menschen unzugänglich.³⁵ Auf der anderen Seite ist die Wissenschaft von den dem Mensch verfügbaren Zahlen möglich, aber sie ist eine abgeleitete Wissenschaft. Die Zahl, die den Menschen zur Verfügung steht, ist auf Grund der Teilung einer kontinuierlichen Quantität entstanden (causatus ad divisionem quantitatis continuatae).³⁶ Die menschliche Zahl ist also keine direkte Konsequenz und kein unmittelbares Bild der Göttlichen Zahl, sondern ist das Bild eines Bildes. Daraus folgt, daß die Arithmetik als die Wissenschaft von der menschlichen Zahl nicht die erste Wissenschaft ist, weil sie nicht die Wissenschaft vom ersten Bild des Vorbildes ist; die erste Wissenschaft ist die Geometrie, als die Wissenschaft von der kontinuierlichen Quantität als dem unmittelbaren Bild Göttlichen exemplar-Zahl.³⁷ Aus diesem Grunde ist aber die Geometrie nicht die Erkenntnis der abstrakten, idealmöglichen Raumrelationen, sondern der Raum ist

³⁴ Federici Chrysogoni, (= Federik Grisogono), *Speculum...* (Ciiii): »Sed hic esta multa equivocatio, quia ille numerus, ut est in mente divina exemplar et ratio, vel obiectum sui intellectus. Certe sunt substantiae de mente divi Platonis quia tam secundum philosophos, quam secundum veritatem catholicam: non cadit accidens in deo. ... Numeri vero ad nostrum usum redacti sunt similitudines illorum in mente divina existentium.

³⁵ Federici Chrysogoni, (= Federik Grisogono), *Speculum...* (Aiiii): »Unde non sine forti ratione divini Platonici atque Pythagorici totam philosophiam naturalem atque divinam solo numero speculati sunt. Est enim tantae excellentiae et ambitus, quod eminenter transcendit omnem cogitationem nostram: totam potentiam et lumen intellectus nostri. Quem numerum species vel ideas, id est rationes in opifice manentes, specificos numeros vocaverunt.« Vergleichs auch: op. cit. (Ciiii): »Quare illo modo /sc. als exemplar und ratio/ accipiendo numerum, bene est prior, non solum ista quantitate continua et discreta (quae sunt accidentia), verum etiam ipsis intelligentiis secundis tempore et natura (secundum veritatem catholicam), quamvis secundum peripateticos non sit prioritas temporis in substantiis abstractis, quia in aeternis non prius tempore est unum quam alterum, quamvis in illis sit ordo perfectionis. Tamen de tali numero difficilis est scientia.

³⁶ Federici Chrysogoni, (= Federik Grisogono), *Speculum...* (Ciii): »Sed iste numerus de quo quaerimus modo scientiam est accidens. Quia causatus ad divisionem quantitatis continuatae.«

³⁷ Federici Chrysogoni, (= Federik Grisogono), *Speculum...* (Ciii): »Vide enim quod quantitas continua multo maiore ambitum, latitudinem et potentiam habet, quam ipsa arithmetica, quia est parens reliquarum partium mathematicae, ex consequenti aliarum scientiarum.«

das Bild des Göttlichen geometrischen Paradigmas und die menschliche Geometrie ist die Erkenntnis des Wesens dieses Bildes. In diesem Sinne müssen wir den Satz Grisogonos verstehen: »*Mathematicus enim abstrahit a materia sensibili secundum diffinitionem tamen, quia non secundum esse*«. ³⁸ Geometrie ist nicht nur intellektuelle Einstellung, die Erkenntnisweise — Geometrie ist der wissenschaftliche, existente Gegenstand. So kritisiert Grisogono im folgenden Abschnitt die Nominalisten und Petrus von Mantua, den Satz nämlich, daß die Oberfläche und der Körper *realiter* dasselbe sind, während sie sich nur im Begriff (*ratione*) unterscheiden. Wenn dem so wäre, meint Grisogono, wäre die Geometrie als Wissenschaft (*modus considerandi per abstractionem*) nicht möglich; möglich wäre nur die Physik als die Wissenschaft vom sinnlichen Gegenstand. ³⁹ Angewendet an die Astrologie heißt das, daß die Astrologie nicht nur die geometrische (exakte) Erkenntnis der »immanenten Naturkausalität« oder der regelmäßigen Bewegungen der Sterne (die auch anschaulich regelmäßig sind) ist, sondern auch die Bewegungen der Sterne selbst, als ein Bild des mathematischen, geometrischen Vorbildes, sind aus geometrischen Formen zusammengesetzt: aus Dreiecken, Sextilen, Oppositionen u.s.w. Geometrische Regelmäßigkeiten sind keine abstrakten Relationen, sondern das Wesen dieser Bewegungen, in die sie sich als in ihre Bestandteile zerlegen. Geometrie und Astrologie sind keine bloßen Abstraktionen oder eine Idealisationsweise, sie sind ein in der Natur existenter Gegenstand, das Abbild der Göttlichen Geometrie. Und das ist bestimmt nicht die Richtung, in der die astrologische »immanente Naturkausalität« einen Einfluß auf das Entstehen des neuzeitlichen Begriffs der Wissenschaft ausüben konnte.

Das astrologische Bild des Himmels besteht aus geometrischen Gebilden als seinen Bestandteilen, während Galileis Buch der Natur in der mathematischen *Sprache geschrieben* ist. Galileis mathematische Sprache des Buches der Natur ist kein Bestandteil des Buches (weil das Buch nicht aus der Sprache als eines seiner Bestandteile besteht). Sie ist nicht evident und ist keine Antizipation, keine Vorwegnahme der Regelmäßigkeiten, sondern ein Mittel der Entdeckung und des Mitteilens dessen, was nicht unmittelbar und anschaulich evident ist. Die Sprache des Buches der Natur ist eine Frage, die ihren Sinn aus der Antwort erhält und nicht auf Grund ihrer methaphysischen Dignität. Sie ist eine menschliche, operative Frage deren Rechtfertigung

³⁸ Federici Chrysogoni, (= Federik Grisogono) *Spectulum . . .* (Eiini)

³⁹ Federici Chrysogoni, (= Federik Grisogono), *Spectulum . . .* (F): »(.) quia dicit ipse, si considero aliquod corpus per longum, erit tamen longitudo, si per longum et latum, erit superficies, si vero per profundum, erit corpus, tamen in rei veritate linea, superficies et corpus sunt idem realiter et sola ratione differunt. Quae quidem opinio domini (ut videtis) destruit modum considerandi per abstractionem, destruit omnes scientias et non daretur cognitio nisi quae sensu percipimus.«

in der inneren Konsistenz und in der Möglichkeit liegt, eine Antwort hervorzurufen, die sie mit Notwendigkeit vorausgesehen hat.

Die Renaissance-Geometrie und mit ihr die Renaissance-Astrologie weist weder als Bild der Göttlichen Erkenntnis noch als Bild des Göttlichen Schaffens, und auch nicht auf Grund ihrer Fähigkeit, vergangene und künftige Stellungen und Beziehungen der Sterne richtig zu errechnen, in diesen Bereich der mathematischen Befragung der Natur hin, weil sie den mathematischen Gegenstand als eine physisch-metaphysische Entität versteht. Mathematik fungiert in der Astrologie nicht als »Erklärung der Naturgesetze« oder als »mathematische Formen«, sondern in erster Linie gegenständlich: als die Körper, deren Wesen darin liegt, daß sie eine mathematische Form haben, auf Grund derer sie prinzipiell errechnbar sind. Diese Interpretation der Mathematik und der »mathematischen Naturwissenschaft« ist auch grundsätzlich aus dem Platonischen *Timaios* ableitbar. Aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach war *Timaios* auf gerade diese Weise in der Renaissance-Philosophie und -Astrologie verstanden (obwohl sich die zeitgenössische Naturwissenschaft in einem ganz anderen Sinne auf Plato und *Timaios* beruft — Heisenberg und von Weizsäcker z.B.).

In einer anderen Tradition (in der Renaissance), der aristotelischen, erkennen wir eine andere Interpretation der Mathematik, die, wie es mir scheint, auf eine viel relevantere Weise auf die Funktion und den faktischen Status hinweist, den die Mathematik im Rahmen der neuzeitlichen Naturwissenschaft erhalten hat.

Damit kommen wir zu Petrić. Der kroatische Philosoph Frane Petrić (Franciscus Patricus — 1529-1597) war ein Neuplatoniker, nach dem eigenen Selbstverständnis ein Platoniker. Einen großen Teil seines philosophischen Opus widmete er der Aristotelischen Philosophie, d.h. der Kritik der Aristotelischen Philosophie. Jede echte Kritik ist aber auch eine Interpretation, insofern sie sich auf eine bestimmte Interpretation als die Grundlage ihrer Kritik stützt. So wollen wir die Grundlage von Petrić's Aristoteleskritik als jene Renaissance-Interpretation (sowohl allgemeine als auch für Petrić spezifische) der aristotelischen Philosophie verstehen, die dann Petrić's neuplatonische Mißbilligung und Kritik motiviert hat. In diesem Sinne ist diese Interpretation in der Renaissance-Philosophie anwesend und wirksam. Im Rahmen unseres Themas, d.h. hinsichtlich der Rolle der Mathematik in der astrologischen »immanenten Naturkausalität«, die wir aus dem platonischen exemplar-imago-Schema im gegenständlichen Sinne verstehen wollten als Substanz oder Bestandteil der Himmelsbewegungen, möchten wir auf eine andere Mathematikdeutung hinweisen, die aus dem aristotelischen Horizont hervorgeht. Besser gesagt: aus Petrić's neuplatonischer Interpretation und Kritik der Aristotelischen Physik. Petrić will die Aristotelischen Beweise für die Ewigkeit der Bewegung und der Zeit widerlegen und behauptet, daß es in der Aristotelischen Physik eigentlich um eine *μεταβασις εις άλλο γένος* geht, um ein Übergreifen der Kompetenzen der Mathematik in die Naturphilosophie. Pe-

trićs Grundproblem ist die Ewigkeit des Himmels, der Welt, der Bewegung, der Zeit. Die Unschlüssigkeit von Aristotelischen Beweisen begründet Petrić in der Einsicht, daß der Begriff der Unendlichkeit, wie ihn Aristoteles bewiesen haben will, ein mathematisches Problem ist, während das Problem der Unendlichkeit der Welt usw. ein Problem der Naturphilosophie, der Physik ist.⁴⁰

Die Unannehmbarkeit des Übergangs in das andere Genos, d.h. die Untauglichkeit der Mathematik (bzw. des mathematischen Unendlichkeitsbegriffs) für ein Lösung der Probleme der Physik begründet Petrić in der Interpretation des *quid facit*, der Genesis des mathematischen Gegenstandes und in der Deutung seines metaphysischen Status. Der Mathematische Gegenstand entsteht auf Grund einer psychologisch interpretierten Abstraktion und ist deswegen ein *separabile intellectio*ne, ein *ens rationis*. Ein so entstandener mathematischer Gegenstand kann nicht im Sinne einer platonischen Idee notwendig sein.⁴¹ Petrić sagt aber auch nicht, daß er kontingent ist. Die Strenge der mathematischen Beweise gilt auch für Petrić als das wissenschaftliche Verfahren *par excellence*.

Petrić geht aber von einem Problem der Physik, d.h. von Problem der Unendlichkeit der Welt, der Bewegung, der Zeit aus und die Unschlüssigkeit der Aristotelischen Beweise für diese Unendlichkeit will er in der falschen Interpretation eines physischen Problems als eines mathematischen sehen. Aus diesem Horizont aktualisiert sich das Problem der Unendlichkeit bei Aristoteles als das Problem der Kontinuität, als das Problem der unendlichen Teilbarkeit. Der Begriff der Kontinuität ist, meint Petrić, aus der Kategorie der Quantität hergeleitet, ist also auch nur auf das Quantitative anwendbar.⁴² Darüber hinaus ist

⁴⁰ F. Patricius, (= Frane Petrić), *Discussionum peripateticarum T. IV*, Basileae 1581, S. 401: »Sed nos primo loco numeri et magnitudinis infinitatem, quonia mathematica sint, nihil ad rem physicam facere asserimus. Vergleiche auch: op. cit. S. 402: »Non posse naturales res ex mathematicis confici docet ipsemet (sc. Aristoteles).«

⁴¹ F. Patricius, (= Frane Petrić), op. cit. S. 402: »Si in hominis anima mathematica sint, et per abstractionem ab ea fiant, nec per additionem numerus, nec magnitudo per divisionem, infinita esse possunt. Neque enim animae sensus, nec phantasia, nec opinio, nec ratio, nec intellectus infinite aut dividere, aut augere quicquam possunt. Quoniam et finitae potentiae sunt et terminatae actionis, et essentiae itidem finitae.« Vergleiche auch op. cit. S. 223: »Mathematica enim accidens, quantitatem, non substantiam meditatatur (...) Quod si mathematica ratione hac Platonica, et priore illa Aristotelica a scientiis secludatur, tunc eae, quae maxime et visae et habitae et traditae ab omnibus pro certis, veris ac solis scientiis sunt, Arithmetica et Geometria, scientiae amplius non erunt.«

⁴² F. Patricius, (= Frane Petrić), op. cit. S. 402: »Neque ex mathematicis propositionibus naturalis conclusio potest, aut induci aut colligi. Non potuit ergo, per leges suas, ex mathematica magnitudinis divisione infinita, motus infinitas deduci. Neque ex numeri mathematici additione, infinitas temporis concludi.« Auch op. cit. S. 407: »Prioribus verbis docemur, quia magnitudo sit continua motum esse continuum. Et quia motus est conti-

aber der Begriff der Kontinuität auch als ein mathematischer Begriff unmöglich, unhaltbar. Die unendliche Teilbarkeit als ein *ens rationis*, d.h. als ein Begriff des endlichen menschlichen Verstandes kann nie realisiert, nie aktualisiert werden.⁴³ Im Rahmen des Aristotelismus wird dieses Problem so gelöst, daß man behauptet, Kontinuum sei nur potentiell, nicht aber aktuell unendlich teilbar. Dieser Begriff des Potentiellen, das nie wirklich oder aktuell werden kann, ist nach Petrićs Auffassung ein Unsinn.⁴⁴ Und doch kann man diese unendliche Teilbarkeit, die als ein *ens rationis* nie wirklich werden kann, nicht als endlich oder bestimmbar begrenzt verstehen, weil sie immer wieder vollführbar ist. So muß Petrić den Mathematikern, trotz der Endlichkeit ihres mathematischen Gegenstandes als eines *ens rationis*, als eines psychischen, endlichen Phänomens, doch auf eine Weise die unendliche Teilbarkeit gewähren: »Sed esto, concedamus mathematicis... mathematicam magnitudinem divisionis infinitae.«⁴⁵ Mit anderen Worten bedeutet das: das Kontinuum ist weder aktuell noch potentiell unendlich teilbar, das Kontinuum als *ens rationis* kann keine unendliche Teilbarkeit bedeuten, sondern nur eine willkürlich große. Man kann das Kontinuum teilen, wieviel man will und wieviel nötig ist. Und gerade das sagt auch Galilei, aber *expressis verbis*.⁴⁶

Petrić gehört bestimmt nicht zu den Begründern der neuzeitlichen Naturwissenschaft. Die angeführten Thesen Petrićs haben gerade die Aufgabe der Kritik der Mathematik und müssen die Möglichkeit, ma-

nus tempus etiam esse continuum. Secundis, quia magnitudo sit quanta et continua et divisibilis motum quoque et tempus esse quanta et continua et divisibilia. Hinc primum quaero, si motus quantus est, cur in quantitatis praedicamento non connumeratur inter quanta (...) ? Auch op. cit. S. 409, falsch paginiert S. 399: »Nullo igitur modo (...) tempus et motus quantitates sunt: nullo modo continua, nullo etiam modo numeri in re ipsa, sed numeri in anima. Et si aliquid sunt, nullo modo, aut continua, aut numeri sunt.«

⁴³ F. Patricius, (= Frane Petrić), op. cit. S. 402: »negamus tamen nos, ut in genere eodem persistamus, verum esse, mathematicum numerum in infinite vel minui vel dividi posse. (...) Si in hominis anima mathematica infinite vel minui vel dividi posse. (...) Si in hominis anima mathematica sint, et per abstractionem ab ea fiant, nec per additionem numerus, nec magnitudo per divisionem, infinita esse possunt.«

⁴⁴ F. Patricius, (= Frane Petrić), op. cit. S. 403: »Et potentiam istam numquam venturam ad actum, aliis in rebus omnibus maxime absurdam, Peripatus universus, uno ore autumat, contendit, cur hac maxima in re, praecipue probabimus?«

⁴⁵ F. Patricius, (= Frane Petrić), op. cit. S. 403: »Quod quidem verissimum est, quia ut numerus diminutione, et divisione in infinitum non abit, sed in unitate sistitur, sic etiam divisio et diminutio magnitudinis sistitur in puncto (...). Sed esto concedamus mathematicis mathematicum numerum, augmenti esse infiniti, mathematicam magnitudinem divisionis infinitae (...).«

⁴⁶ Galileo Galilei, *Unterredungen und mathematische Demonstrationen* (erster und zweiter Tag), Leipzig 1917, S. 33.

thematische Begriffe in der Naturphilosophie (Physik) anwenden zu können, aufheben. Aber Petrić's Deutung der Mathematik (im Rahmen des Aristotelismus) scheint eben dem faktischen Funktionieren der Mathematik in der neuzeitlichen Naturwissenschaft angemessener zu sein als Grisogonos astrologische, neuplatonische Begeisterung für die Mathematik aus dem Horizont der Platonischen *exemplar-imago* Struktur.⁴⁷

Auf dieser Stelle möchte ich zu den am Anfang gestellten Zitaten zurückkommen. Wie kann man fragend suchen jenes, was man nicht weiß, was es überhaupt ist? Oder, in welcher Beziehung steht die Renaissancephilosophie und -Astrologie zu der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft? In welcher Hinsicht kann man in der Renaissance dem »Werden einer neuen Logik des Naturbegreifens« nachgehen? Auf welche Weise wird dieser neuen Logik des Naturbegreifens als einer *neuen*, d.h. als dem, für das man nicht weiß, was es ist, in der Renaissance der Weg bereitet?

Das schlechthin Unbekannte kann man nicht suchen, was man aber weiß, was es ist, sucht man auch nicht — es ist bekannt. So ist das, was man sucht: das Bekannte-Unbekannte. Weil das Fragen als ein Suchen bewußt auf ein Gesuchtes, auf ein Gefragtes gerichtet ist, liegt der Unterschied: das Bekannte — das Unbekannte wahrscheinlich im Unterschied zwischen dem Gefragten-Gesuchten und dem Erfragten — dem Endresultat des Fragens. Die Identität des »eigentlich Intendierten« (im Sinne des bewußt Intendierten) und des Erfragten ist ein Wesenszug des neuzeitlichen theoretischen Fragens und die Voraussetzung jeder Verifikation und Falsifikation — ist aber kein notwendiges Merkmal jedes Fragens, auch nicht jedes philosophischen Fragens. In der Frage, die nicht exakt und mathematische gestellt wird und die die Möglichkeit einer empirischen Verifikation nicht notwendig voraussetzt, ist es möglich, daß das Erfragte auf mehr hinweist als eigentlich gefragt und gesucht wurde. Auf diese Weise kann das Unbekannte, Ungeachtete und Ungefragte in die Frage kommen. In diesem Sinne möchte ich auch Grisogonos Lob der Astrologie und Petrić's Kritik der Aristotelischen Physik verstehen. Grisogono fragt nach der Astrologie-Wissenschaft, die wir mit Recht aus dem neuzeitlichen Wissenschaftsbegriff als Aberglaube verstehen. Mit dieser Frage erscheint aber auch die Idee einer Wissenschaft, die faktisch, obwohl nicht bewußt, auf der unmittelbaren Manipulation mit den Dingen, auf der »natürlichen Einstellung« aufgebaut ist. Petrić fragt nach der Berechtigung der Aristotelischen Unendlichkeitslehre aus dem Horizont des neuplatonischen Wissenschaftsbegriffs — mit dieser Frage erscheint aber auch ein konstruktiver oder operativer Begriff der Mathematik, der sich mit dem faktischen Funktionieren der Naturwissenschaft im Einklang zeigt.

⁴⁷ Vergleiche: Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, *Aufbau der Physik*, dtv. München, Wien 1988, S. 585.

Ein solcher Zugang bietet sicher keine Möglichkeit von Vorgängertum oder Antizipationen zu sprechen. Das erfragte Neue können wir nur dort feststellen, wo es bewußt intendiert ist. Aber, wenn die wesentliche Frage und Aufgabe ist, dem »Werden neuer Logik des Naturbegreifens« nachzugehen (Cassirer) — dann kann das nur dort geschehen, wo es noch ungefragt, ungesucht und unbekannt ist, wo die künftige Frage nur bereitet wird. Von der geschichtlichen Wirksamkeit ist auf diese Weise auch nicht zu sprechen. Aber, wenn auch das Neue bei Petrić und Grisogono ungefragt und ungesucht ist — so können wir doch ihre bewußte und intendierte Destruktion des Alten (Grisogono: die Destruktion des klassisch-mittelalterlichen Wissenschaftsbegriffs; Petrić: die Destruktion des Aristotelismus im Ganzen) nicht übersehen. Durch diese Destruktion rückt das Ungefragte-Ungesuchte, die neuzeitliche Naturwissenschaft, in die greifbare Nähe.

CASSIREROVA INTERPRETACIJA RENESANSNE ASTROLOGIJE, F. GRISOGONO I F. PETRIĆ

Sažetak

U članku se izlaže Cassirerovo shvaćanje renesansne astrologije te se na primjeru Grisogona pokušava odrediti jedan drugi mogući pristup. Pritom se, kao i kod Cassirera, utvrđuje kao bitan mogući odnos astrologije i buduće novovjekovne prirodne znanosti. Odustajući od pokušaja da se odnos astrologije i buduće prirodne znanosti protumači u smislu anticipacija ili povijesnih djelotvornosti — pokušava se u astrologiji interpretirati jedna nova, u odnosu na klasičnosrednjovjekovni pojam znanosti, ideja znanstvenosti. S druge strane, pojam matematike i matematičkog predmeta u okviru astrologije — usprkos njezinom proklamiranom oduševljenju za matematiku — u manjoj mjeri ukazuje u smjeru novovjekovne prirodne znanosti nego što to možda čini Petrićeva interpretacija aristotelovske fizike. U okviru Petrićeve interpretacije aristotelizma u kojoj se načelno (a ne samo povijesnofilozofski) dovodi u pitanje mogućnost »pitagorovskog« matematičnog predmeta za koji se čini da je primjereniji faktičkom funkcioniranju matematike u novovjekovnoj prirodnoj znanosti nego astrološko-novoplatoński pojam matematike u horizontu *exemplar-imago* strukture.

THE IDEA OF ENCYCLOPEDIISM AND PHILOSOPHICAL THINKING FOUNDERS OF CROATIAN ENCYCLOPEDIAIC THOUGHT

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Within the body of Croatian cultural, literary, linguistic and philosophical tradition, we can encounter works which are encyclopedically conceived both in their substance and method. They appear in Croatian literature, within its Glagolitic literary heritage, as early as the Middle Ages, in the form of »lamps, mirrors and flowers of all wisdom« (*lucidari, zrcala i cvetovi vsake mudrosti*) as moral-didactic and popular-entertaining works, which were not written for the elect any more, but for the common people, as text-books of medieval knowledge, containing its diverse disciplines, ranging from magic, alchemy and astronomy, to geography and economics, medicine and theology, as a mirror of cultural aspirations and needs of man. These aspirations were directed towards the understanding of the world as a *whole*, which »paved the way to Humanistic-Renaissance horizons in Croatian literature«.⁷ They were most frequently written in the form of a dialogue, so that even formally they carried a message to the common reader. They were books which *illuminated* the hidden, a kind of *encyclopedic prose* of »Glagolitic Humanism« (*R. Katičić*).

In addition to numerous theological and philosophical issues which distinguish, for instance, the great work by *Honorius Augustodunensis* (the first half of the twelfth century, Regensburg)², an enigmatic personality, important for the literary-philosophical and ideographic artistic practice of his age and later; his *Elucidarium* was frequently copied, translated and adapted (its translations and adaptations were from Old Slavic, Latin, Italian and Czech) and as an example of a general encyclopedia and a summa of the chronicle of the world, it was

¹ see *E. Hercigonja*, *Nad iskonom hrvatske knjige*, (= From the earliest beginnings of the Croatian book) Zagreb 1983

² *H. Augustodunensis*, *Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique*, Paris 1927

published in numerous editions. In the tradition of the Christian Platonism, under the influence of *Scotus Erigena* and *Abelard's* school, his dialogic work — a dialogue between a disciple and a master, in keeping with the scholastic model of questions and answers, was written by the hand of a tireless reader, scholar and educated thinker, with the clear aim of educating the common people. In distinction from the Latin model, a manual for philosophers and theologians, the German *Lucidarius* was written for the instruction and education of a layman. The Croatian text of *Lucidar* (96 questions and answers of the master and his disciple) has been preserved in two Glagolitic manuscripts (The *Zgombić* and *Petris Miscellany*).³ Owing to the efforts of Croatian Glagolitic priests, an encyclopedic text, a manual of general wisdom and knowledge, illuminated by *Lucidar* (*lucem dare*),⁴ appeared, based on the twelfth century archetype.

If we follow the »adolescent« period of the idea of encyclopedism, we can see that very early on, the shortest treatise or a dialogue contained a rounded model of the concentration towards the whole, and found its reason and meaning *within the whole*.

On the main road of the idea of encyclopedism, we encounter personalities of writers, men of letters, philosophers and lexicographers, from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century: I. *Belostenec*, J. *Bajamonti*, B. *Bogišić*, R. J. *Bošković*, Š. *Budinić*, I. *Crijević*, S. *Čučić*, M. A. *Dominis*, Đ. *Deželić*, J. *Križanić*, B. *Kašić*, I. *Lucić*, M. *Marulić*, I. *Mencin*, M. *Orbini*, I. *Paštrić*, F. *Petrić*, P. *Skalić*, B. *Sulek*, M. *Vlačić*, and many other universally educated authors. Many of these authors participated in practical public life and were confronted with questions of the relationship between the intellectual and useful activities, as a practical test of their own encyclopedic projects.

When discussing the encyclopedism in the works of authors-encyclopedists, polyhistorians and polyglots in their education, lexicographers and diligent compilers of dictionaries and summae, we have in mind the works which advise, inform and instruct, by systematizing vast materials.

³ About the Croatian manuscript, Gverin Tihčić's translation based on the 1533 Italian printed edition (*Lucidario*), see S. Ivšić, *Prijevod »Lucidara« Honorija Augustodunensisa u prijepisu Gverina Tihčića iz godine 1533* (= *The 1533 translation of Honorius Augustodunensis' »Lucidar« by Gverin Tihčić*), *Starine JAZU (Antiquities — The Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences)*, Zagreb 1949, vol. 42.

⁴ »(...) javit sve reči ježe sut va inih knjigah na nebesih i na zemlji i va oblacih i na vodah«, »to ježe jest va ineh knjigah skriveno, to jest Lucidar vse osvetil (...) te knjige sut draže nere zlato i kto je bude čisti, ta bude mnogo mudrosti imeti« (= »(...) all the words written in books about the heaven and earth and clouds and waters« »all that lies hidden in those books, *Lucidar* has illuminated (...) these books are more valuable than gold, and the one who reads them, will gain a great wisdom«) *Elucidarium* by Honorius, Augustodunensis, twelfth century, *The Zgombić Miscellany*, 16th century.

The Encyclopedia by Pavao Skalić

The work of *Pavao Skalić of Lika* (Paulus Scalichius de Lika, 1534—1575) belongs to the succession of the *lighthouses* of this country, as referred to by *M. Krleža*. Having finished his studies of philosophy in Vienna, Skalić went to Bologna where he studied theology, the Renaissance Platonism, as well as the Cabalistic and hermetic tradition, and read one of its first interpreters — namely, Pico della Mirandola, by whom the whole century was enraptured. He obtained his doctoral degree in 1552. For a while he was a court chaplain and a subsidiary bishop to the Emperor Ferdinand in Vienna. His Roman period was closely connected to *J. Loyola* and *Collegium Germanicum* by his study of ecclesiastical history and old writers. Skalić was also connected to the Slavic circle in Urach and Tübingen. He died in Gdansk.⁵

Owing to his works, primarily his *Encyclopaediae, seu Orbis disciplinarum, tam sacrarum quam prophanarum, Epistemon* (1559) and others (namely, *Conclusiones in omni genere scientiarum*, 1553, *Satyræ philosophicae sine miscellaneorum*, 1663, *Miscellaneorum de rerum causis et successibus*, 1570—1571), Skalić is considered to be a predecessor of modern encyclopaedistics. As he said in the Foreword to his *Encyclopedia*, driven by an innate lust for knowledge and understanding (*innatam nobis cognitionis et scientiae cupiditatem*),⁶ as well as by the wish to understand the occult and miraculous things which are useful in human life (*cognitionem rerum aut occultarum aut admirabilium, ad bene beateque vivendum*), Skalić spent »days and nights in the study« of Egyptian and Hebrew theology and wisdom, and of the old doctrine of Orpheus and Pythagoras (in the effort to be *universarum rerum professor*), creating his own vision of an encyclopedia. *Aeterna sapientia* and *philosophia perennis* are the basis for the encyclopedia as the world of sacred and profane disciplines, creating the unique *episteme*, or the absolute science of understanding of the traditional (memory) and the contemporary (a sign-post) and their correspondence. The cycle of sacred and profane sciences, as he refers to the encyclopedia, contains philosophy, metaphysics, medicine, mathematics (which consists of arithmetics, geometry, sferics and music), computation, geodesy, mechanics, astrology, optics, morals, economics, politics, grammar, history, dialectics, rhetoric, and poetics; Skalić searches for »perfectissima ad omne genus scientiarum Methodus« dedicating his days and nights to the study of wisdom and the exploration of the principle of the universe. Educated at the Orphic school, he

⁵ comp. *G. Krabbel*, Paul Scalich. Ein Lebensbild aus dem 16. Jahrhundert, Münster 1916.

⁶ all the quotations in the text are from: Paulus Scalichius, *Encyclopaediae, seu Orbis disciplinarum, tam sacrarum quam prophanarum Epistemon*, Basel 1984 (re-print).

expounds the principles of Orphic philosophy, the first principles of the divine and human soul, the nature of the world, ancient philosophy and the Christian doctrine. The catalogue of arts and the range of knowledge as expounded by this generally acclaimed and famous ambassador of science, includes the knowledge of astrology, geometry, music, geodesy, optics, mechanics, moral science, the science of the state, military tactics, architecture, graphics, scenic arts, sports and economics. Depending on »aut indicat, aut narrat, aut demonstrat, aut suadet, aut oblectat«, Skalić distinguishes between grammar, history, dialectics, rhetoric and poetics. Skalić further divides almost each of these disciplines into their subspecies, so that history, for instance, consists of the history of places (geography), of time, of nature and of planets. Philosophy as »divinum culmen scientiae« is synonymous with the totality of human knowledge. In his gradation of sciences Skalić considers the prophets' doctrines and the Orphic wisdom to be the basis for the understanding of the divine science. From philosophers and theologians of ancient wisdom: Hebrew, Greek, Arabic and Roman, from Brahmans, Gymnosophists, Therapeutae, as well as from *Aminius, Origen, Pythagoras, Plotinus, Heremnius, Porphyry*, including *Plato* and *Aristotle*, and their teachings, frequently veiled with enigmatic images and parables, we have inherited the task to study and interpret their doctrines.

Skalić's *Theses on Occult Philosophy (Occulta occultorum, Occulta, seu mysticae Philosophiae Theses)*, *On the Secret and On Mysteries (De secreto; De Mysteriis)*, *Eulogy or on Soul (Eulogus, seu de Anima)*, as parts of his encyclopedic work, represent a compendium of his knowledge of sciences, arts, magic, the Cabala, man and his spiritual characteristics and finally, of everything profane and divine (»Novem esse omnium rerum subiecta, Deum, Angelum, Coelum, Hominem, Imaginatum, Scientium, Vegetatum, Elementatum, Instrumentatum«) Skalić's inquisitive exploration of the principles of the universe was undertaken with the manifest purpose to present the admirable *workshop of the world* (»de admirabili hac Mundi fabrica«, »mundi machina«).

The encyclopedia of Skalić's time, his own included, was the most perfect *method* of all sciences as well. Mentioning *Petrus Bovillus, Cornelius Agrippa* and *Pico della Mirandola* as the most learned men who are worthy of the greatest admiration, he emphasizes the old *ars combinandi* which he refers to in his *Conclusions (Conclusiones)* as the *alphabetary revolution (Alphabetariam revolutionem)*.

Revolutio Alphabetaria, seu perfectiis, ad omnes scientias Methodus represents the sum of all knowledge and as the *universal encyclopedia* it discusses and constitutes a terminological and analytical compendium of directions (in theology, medicine, philosophy, etc.). Arranging systematically the terms of individual sciences in compiling his subject index, Skalić builds a great edifice of human science.

Theological terms (sacraments, charity, human potencies, intellect, will, memory, imagination, God, Christ, angels, man, spirit, soul, nature, temptation, person, relationship), legal (law, abalienation, injustice, possession, litigation, law, contract, testament, etc.) medical (mind, age, members, operation, illness, crisis, medicine, artery, etc.), natural philosophical (first originator, form, matter, eternity, motion, nature, time, place, sense, intelligence, simple, complex, body, substance, accident, part, whole, desire, act, potency, custom, deprivation, cause, consequence, one, necessary, many, action, passivity, universal, particular, etc.) moral (knowledge, doctrine, contemplation, justice, correction, religion, integrity, power, hope, humility, moderation, caution, leisure, cruelty, superstition, ambition, arrogance, tyrant, punishment, miserliness, meanness, avarice, faith, friendship, patience, freedom, cruelty, ignorance, etc.) are some of the examples from the rich treasury of concepts arranged by Skalić and discussed in parts of his *Encyclopedia*: namely, *Epistemon*, *Eulogus*, *De Illustrium origine* — treatises in which we find the terms of individual sciences dealt with in the encyclopedic order and in a systematic way.

Encyclopedic terms, as referred to by Skalić, to quote but a few out of a large number, are: *accidens*, *appetitus*, *actio*, *attractio*, *agens*, *actus*, *arithmetica*, *compositio*, *circulus*, *corpus*, *color*, *creatio*, *consilium*, *capacitas*, *corruptio*, *conscientia*, *dispositio*, *ens*, *essentia*, *entitas*, *forma*, *figura*, *fortuna*, *genus*, *grammatica*, *geometria*, *habitus*, *idea*, *individuum*, *invento*, *locus*, *linea*, *logica*, *materia*, *metaphysica*, *motus*, *musica*, *moralitas*, *medicina*, *marcatura*, *memoria*, *natura*, *necessitas*, *navigatio*, *obiectum*, *phantasia*, *philosophia*, *pluralitas*, *proprietas*, *passio*, *plenitudo*, *pulchritudo*, *proportio*, *perfectio*, *potentia*, *qualitas*, *quantitas*, *relatio*, *receptio*, *rhetorica*, *species*, *substantia*, *tempus*, *speculum*, *simplicitas*, *theologia*, *triangulus*, *unitas*, *umbra* . . .

In the *key to knowledge* (*clavis scientiae*), as defined by Skalić, i.e. in the way the concepts are defined, it is possible to »spell out« the whole of knowledge: here Skalić develops tables and coordinations of figures, scales, degrees of the world, starting from the basic division, namely: *sensus* — *imaginatio* — *phantasia*, and the derived fields of knowledge, so that his scales and degrees ramify into: the world of archetypes and intellect, the celestial, lower and elementary world (*De scala intellectus: mundus archetypus, mundus intellectualis, mundus coelestis, minore mundus, mundus elementaris, mundus infernalis*), each with its own corresponding law, numbers, figures, in keeping with the law which is the same for all, namely that of sympathy and antipathy in the universe; accordingly, there is *discursus geometricus* (with the circle as the highest figure within this order), *discursus harmonicus*, *discursus artificialis*, *communis discursus*, *discursus clavis scientiae* — containing all the areas of science and art, i.e. the *knowledge of the universal*. The whole exposition of his materials, the whole of *summa* is presented in a new way, in keeping with Skalić's intention

not to expound his materials in a metaphysical way (*revolutio alphabetaria breviter totam summam, non modo Metaphysices verumetiam Alphabetariae revolutionis complexus sum — ut vel hic facile intelligas, quid agendum sit in sublimioribus disciplinis: quis deinde et quantus sit scientiarum habitus*⁷).

Skalić — doctor *artes liberales* and of philosophy, a controversial scholar, but nevertheless a brilliant and ingenious man, a Viennese professor (as attested by in the degree he was awarded in 1552 by »Gloriosa studiorum mater Bononia« (*Bononiensis colegii diploma*) — summarizes all kinds of knowledge (*Conclusiones millequingentae quinquagintatres, in omni genere scientiarum*), human, celestial, elementary, pertaining to all sciences, theology, philosophy, metaphysics, physics, the science of the soul, miracles, thus creating, as a distinguished polyhistor of his age, an encyclopedia of the general type. Participating in academic disputes of his age with other outstanding personalities, he had a rare destiny of a scholar and man of wide interests and an all-embracing curiosity, who wanted to grasp the unknown knowledge and secrets of philosophy and theology (. . . *de profundis Philosophiae et Theologiae mysteriis atque incognitis disciplinis*⁸ . . .) and what is more, who »wanted to know more than he should« as he confessed once in a letter to the chancellor of the Society of Jesus at Castello di Sant'Angello in Rome, in 1553. As a member of symposium of scholars, praising the usefulness and necessity offered by sciences (in *Encomium scientiarum*), Skalić repeats the thought of Pico della Mirandola concerning the dignity of man ennobled by divine and human knowledge which enables him to acquire beatitude.

In addition to the names of *Aristotle, Plato, Scotus, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Ooccam, Cassiodorus, Mainardus* and many others, together with those of *Melanchton*⁹ and *Bacon*¹⁰, Skalić explores numerous doctrines in order to build up a pure science (»ergo puram doctrinam intendo . . .«), the work of the whole of nature (*omnia Naturae opera*) and of the natural laws which are »impressed into human souls«, as well as those concerning human society (laws and cultural institutions: *legis et institutionem civiliū cultura, ex qua tota societas humani generis et similitudo tam morum quam animorum pendet . . .*).¹¹ And finally, he is interested in all that which can help man to extricate himself from perils and harms and which distinguishes him as a human being. By insisting on man's absolute cognition, Skalić insists on his greatness (»Quis hinc non admiretur tantam maiestatem

⁷ P. Skalić, op. cit., p. 547.

⁸ *ibid.*, 645.

⁹ *ibid.*, 695.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, 709.

¹¹ *ibid.*, 712.

homini insistam.«¹²⁾, instructing the readers of his *Encyclopedia* and all those who cultivate and respect the divine knowledge, and teaching the order of all things and their deeper origin, their meaning and understanding — with the perfection of civil science (*civilis scientia*) and reason as the final aim.

The status of Skalić-the encyclopedist and his status as a thinker owe their unity to the general spiritual climate of his century which marked a new chapter in the religious history of the West, to the pluralism of cultures which came into being owing to the Reformation, to the crossing of new ideas, and to all the heritage of thinking, proceeding both from the old and the new world-picture. In the age in which minds accepted Catholicism or were converted to Protestantism, the age in which national consciousness was born, as well as new tendencies of free critical speculation (the interpretation of the Biblical truth), all witnessed against the immobility of tradition. The Humanistic type of culture included comprehensiveness and, accordingly, a heterogeneity of view-points, directions, schools and opinions within a rich tradition of philosophy and theology.

Skalić, a contemporary of *Flacius*, is representative of religious syncretism. His age was marked by the death of great reformers and thinkers, personalities who were the main promoters of the spiritual change: namely, *Erasmus* (1536), *Luther* (1546) and *Calvin* (1564). The age was rich with events which were crucial for the religious and secular history of the West, and which influenced the whole historical, social, political and cultural situation. Skalić belonged to the stream of thinking which looked for the answers to the questions posed by the age in the revival of Christianity. The enthusiasm for remote, ancient traditions, such as: the hermetism, astrology, the Cabala and the Hebraism as the basis and the starting-point on the way to perfect cognition, which characterized the Renaissance as a whole, owed its origin to the translation of two fundamental sources dating from early centuries: *Asclepius* and *Corpus Hermeticum*, as well as *Picatrix*, the twelfth century Arabic manuscript containing doctrines of Egyptian sages and Hebrew prophets, which reached us by way of Plato and the Greek philosophical tradition, as well as Oriental influences, teachings of Christian magi, Platonism and Neo-Platonism. Hermetic literature became the source, inspiration and a component element in works of many authors, like *Campanella*, *Bruno*, *Pico della Mirandola*, *Kepler*, as well as many later philosophers.

The complex: astrology-chemistry-magic was one of the directions in thinking which returned to the Hermetic tradition, to the revival of Antiquity and to the divine books of *Hermes Trismegistus*, a pagan second century prophet, and through him to the conception of the Egyptian magic religion as the only true religion. The doctrine as a

¹² *ibid.*, 715.

whole, as represented by *Picatrix*, is the knowledge of the origin, of the essence of all, of cosmos, of the single truth and the hierarchy of beings, a doctrine of the mind (*mens, nous*) and matter, and as such it will enter fifteenth and sixteenth century treatises as a doctrine of the intuitive cognition of the divine. The enthusiasm of Skalić's age for the religious Hermetic philosophy was hidden behind the robes of »new philosophies«, and it agreed with the Christian religion through various types of thinking (*Petrić, Bruno, Copernicus, Kircher*).

The return to the magic Hermetic philosophy was manifested in the variety and richness of contents and directions. In an age of wars, of conflicts between the Reformation and the Catholic reaction, this return was an attempt to find a way out of the crisis and religious conflicts. The doctrine of universal harmony, through cults of the Egyptian Hermetic tradition arrived at owing to the Christian Neo-Platonism, through the authority enjoyed by *prisci theologi*, through the ideal of magi (*Hermes Trismegisthes, Zoroaster, Orpheus, Pythagoras, Proclus, Plato*) as the only ones to possess the ability of true understanding and have an operative power, became a vital impulse to the original doctrines and discoveries and one of the defining factors of the new relationship of man to the universe and its understanding. This can be seen in Skalić's considerations on kinds of sciences — divine and human, on the method of human understanding of truth, on occult science and on questions of the causes of things (*Certissima methodis, qua hominis . . . ad veritatis viam*, 1570; *Conclusiones in omni genere scientiarum*, 1553; *Miscellaneorum de rerum causis et successibus*, I, II, 1570, 1571; *Occulta occultorum, occulta*, 1566). Skalić's philosophical reflection embraces the whole medieval tradition of thinking, enriched by Hermetic motives, Pythagorean numerical symbolism, the doctrine of the Universal One, of the mystery of Logos and Word, as well as Ficino's occult philosophy and his understanding of occult tradition as the antecedent of Christianity. Skalić expounds the themes of universal sympathy, love and primeval wisdom, of dignity of man (under the direct influence of *Pico della Mirandola*), the doctrine of intellect and matter, of Orphic, Greek, Pythagorean, Persian, Arabic, Chaldean, Egyptian and Hebrew mysteries, of occult science, of philosophy, of the division of the world into the angelic, celestial, human, sensory and vegetative, together with their corresponding scales of the world. Skalić discusses philosophical categories such as: act, substance, potency, material and immaterial world, One and many, harmony, microcosm and macrocosm, free will etc. Skalić regards the whole of Pico's mystical theology, his interpretation of the philosophical-theological tradition, as the prerequisite for the kind of thinking which aspires to be philosophically correct and which can finally be reduced to the teaching of One, required by the Christian doctrine. Skalić the crude is enraptured by the dreams of a symposium of sages and their interpretation of the most beautiful workshop of the world (*Eulogus*,

seu de anima). Skalić also takes over from *Pico* his doctrine of the man-magus, as interpreter and minister of nature (*homonaturae minister et interpres*) as well as that of the role of knowledge as the function of the constitution of *regnum hominis* modelled on *regnum Christi*. Skalić derives the knowledge of the secret basis of all things, of truth and of man's place in the hierarchy of beings, from a synthesis of Platonism and Christianity, relying also on the attitudes of *Ficino* (*De christiana religione*) and *Pico* (*Apologia*). The point in question is actually a synthesis of the whole of knowledge for which Skalić finds a new term: *encyclopedia*. This synthesis is based on the doctrines of *Ficino* and *Pico*, on the understanding of natural philosophy and on *Ficino's* philosophical magic. The praise to the man-magus is the praise to the man-sage, the connoisseur of the highest of secrets, the subject of the universal restoration of knowledge and faith. A thinker of Skalić's age reacts to the rationalism of medieval scholasticism by referring to the most ancient, primeval sources of knowledge. Searching for the key which will open secret doors of the universe, penetrate the secret of the divine rhythm and harmony of all beings, they search at the same time for the unique basis of all the areas of knowledge. The great unity of arts and magic, of music and knowledge, proceeds from the original unity of all knowledge: Skalić's openness towards all opinions, all streams and schools, has its historical and social justification and its reason in the idea of the reconciliation of diverse conceptions in order to create a universal doctrine, a single truth, as a guarantee of security in an insecure age. The fact that Skalić has been denied the qualification of an original thinker and has been considered an eclectic, interested in all kinds of things, does not diminish the fact that Skalić's essential purpose and tendency was to find arguments based on his own theses in the composition of science by using the method which is most appropriate to its content. *Pico della Mirandola* was directed by the same purpose in his conclusions (*Conclusiones*): namely, to base the Christian faith upon Hebrew wisdom, and to elevate magic and the Cabala to the level of sciences which can testify to the truth of Christianity by the mysteries of Logos and Word.

As a follower (or imitator, as he wrote of himself) of the greatest philosophers, like *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, *Aristotle*, *Cicero* and *Pico della Mirandola*, who expressed their ideas in images and poetical-enigmatic language, Skalić wanted to reach to sources of knowledge of the primeval, dark ages, of divine and human sciences, as expressed by the first poets, prophets, theologians and philosophers, which Skalić wished to harmonize with doctrines of holy fathers on the highest knowledge of revelation, of (new) Christian theology as an expression of secret wisdom which had been buried for centuries. Skalić found a treasury of all wisdom and knowledge in Christ's science, and he expressed his admiration for those who followed his doctrine (*Stapulensis*, *Reuchlin*, *Bovillus*, *Mainardus*).

Theology is the first within Skalić's division of sciences, since it considers the first causes of things and the mystery of God. It is followed by law, medicine and philosophy. Skalić's *praise to sciences*, in the last chapter of his Encyclopedia, the *epilogue* of his *nocturnal work* (*hoc scientiarum Encomium, velut epilogum mearum lucubrationum*), is primarily a praise to theology, a praise to thinkers whose doctrines are expounded by Skalić in a systematical way.

Skalić's Encyclopedia, as the aspiration common to thinkers of his age, mirrors the tendency of the age towards an understanding which would enclose the infinity of the world within the confines of its understanding. The mode and method of this understanding, as well as the role of knowledge, meet in the mirror represented by the *man-magus*. Skalić neither considers knowledge in the function of action, which is characteristic of magic, nor the role of knowledge in human life, but is primarily interested in the entirety of knowledge as a prerequisite for understanding of the divine, which is the knowledge possessed by the wise, *aeterna sapientia*, in the function of the conciliation of old and new doctrines in order to discover that which is eternally same in all.

Having neither penetrating, critical intensity of Erasmus nor the depth of his scientific-philosophical method, neither the range of *Ficino's* personal friend *Dragišić*, nor the acclaim of *Flacius*, Skalić nevertheless has his place in the history of philosophical thinking within the Hermetic tradition seen as a restoration of diverse experiences, which had given an impetus to new thinking and to the development of science which occurred in a later age. Working at the moment in the European history when the first question was that of the unity of opinion, when the aspirations of Humanist towards a global and religious peace were united with the ideal (or the understanding) of man as a great miracle, Skalić contributed to the general tendency towards the humanisation of Christianity. As a Counter-Reformation thinker, Skalić remained on the level of theological and philosophical disputes of the time, writing with the purpose of an educated author and polyhistor who concerned himself with the spiritual elite, the community of the wise, as much as with the common (Slavic) language as the power which can still retain the permanent awareness of the past as the awareness of a proper identity.

Marko Marulić — Philosopher and Encyclopedist

A humanist in culture sensibility and education, as well as in interests and aspirations, *Marko Marulić*, although not a philosopher himself, nevertheless offers enough reasons and grounds for the interpretation of his thinking, ideas and motives on account of which he should be included in the body of Croatian philosophical heritage.

With full respect of the results of recent multidisciplinary research and interpretations of this writer (in the light of literary criticism, philology and cultural history), we should follow the direction indicated by the fundamentals of Marulić's thought. Our attempt will be the more paradoxical since Marulić had never been defined as a speculative-theoretical thinker, but he could nevertheless embody his ideas artistically by using the advantage of a writer, sensitive to the problems of his age and to the reality of man. A conceptual definition of that which is outside the sphere of the conceptual, but is nevertheless determined by it, can find its alibi in the author's writing which is never unambiguous and which brings together in a happy conjunction the conceptual generality with the allegorical-poetical expression; the alibi being that Marulić *stands for* a definite philosophy, a philosophical view of the whole, an *explanation* of the world, without formulating it directly, in the same way as his works »à thèse« are in themselves artistically superior to the theses they want to propagate.

A guardian of the European cultural heritage of thinking, comprising both the classical and the medieval system of theology and philosophy, living in the age of religious controversies (Avveroists — Alexandrists, the renewed Greek philosophy versus scholasticism, the Catholic revival), Marulić stands forth as a *critic of philosophy*, or to be more precise, of *worn-out* concepts of scholastic philosophy, and announces fundamental questions and the situation of modern man.

What are the motives which meet in Marulić's reflection that will become a distinctive quality of the whole epoch owing to the programme of Humanism, which is also that of modern sensibility, celebrating its ascent with the Renaissance?

In numerous Marulić's works which are apparently different in their genres and themes, inspiration and reality, in the works which are mutually conditioned and profoundly interrelated, it is possible to discern the unique concept, a basic preoccupation, which is both encyclopedic and lexicological. Before the appearance of the first encyclopedia in this country, written by P. Skalić, who explicitly wanted to »expound all that can be found in all philosophers and theologians, and everything that a general encyclopedia can contain«, driven by »an innate lust for knowledge and science« (*innatum nobis cognitionem et scientiae cupiditatem*) and »for an understanding of those secret and admirable things which are of use in human life (*cognitionem rerum aut occultarum aut admirabilium, ad bene beateque vivendum*)«¹³, i.e. before this intent became apparent in this country, Marulić appeared with his *encyclopedic aspiration*. Dedicating his Epistle to Jerolim Ćipik (*Institucija Jerolim Ćipiku*) who was an expert on ecclesiastical and secular law, Marulić writes:

¹³ *ibid.*, 721.

Here you will perhaps read what you have frequently read elsewhere . . . that which is expounded by other authors without any order and dispersedly, here *is arranged and presented in the form of a summary* (italics Lj. Sch.)

In addition to the work by P. Skalić we have mentioned and to the *Lexicon* by Ilija Crijević, Marulić's work is also basically *encyclopedic* in character. During the centuries of Croatian Latinism, summary works, both general and special (e.g. Petrić's poetic decades), such as those by Ivan Vitez, Janus Pannonius and Frane Petrić, are not rare. Marulić's works *De Institutione bene beateque vivendi*, *Evangelistarium*, *Quinquaginta parabole*, *Multa et varia*, *Regum Dalmatiae et Croatiae Gesta*, are of the same kind. Being a kind of public good, a useful manual of general memory and a mediator of instructions and knowledge, data and incidents, events and terminology, written with the purpose to be *everything* to everybody, embracing in its contents both *humana* and *divina*, and still bearing the mark of medieval classification, they are still marked by a trace of Marulić's contemplative doubt.

If we keep in mind that his spiritual biography was formed on encyclopedic models of medieval *summae* and that he himself learned from the language of theologians, poets and philosophers (his rich library, containing historical, poetical, astronomical, rhetorical, geographical and mathematical works by authors such as Plutarch, Plinius, Plato, Aristotle and Ficino, offers ample evidence to this) we can understand his contemplative orientation, as well as his attitude towards models and actual problems of his age, the relationship between the real and the ideal, between the Christian ideal and the new Renaissance sensibility. These themes are also expressed in psalms, interpretations and disputes on soul or on history of the age to which Marulić belongs¹⁴ We could say that, having acquired an enormous knowledge which he presented to his readers in a popular form, Marulić actually wrote a text-book of *diverse sciences* which could be understood by a common man. As *Giordano Bruno*¹⁵ very well knows, an example formulated in the language of images and symbols enters the brain more easily than philosophy. With regard to this, Marulić says the following:

I have decided to choose virtuous models and propose them as examples to those who have an ardent desire to be holy, since it is in human nature that man is more encouraged to difficult enterprises by the force of examples than by instructions and rules.¹⁶

¹⁴ M. Marulić, *Pouke za čestit život s primjerima* (= Instructions for an honest life with examples), Zagreb 1986, p. 4

¹⁵ G. Bruno, in his philosophical dialogues (comp. Optimizam slobodnog mišljenja /= Optimism of free thinking/, Zagreb 1985) uses the image, symbol and allegorical interpretation of magic and Cabalistic doctrines

¹⁶ M. Marulić, op. cit., ibid.

Marulić's work is a treasury of thoughts and knowledge, and it expresses the author's familiarity with medieval literature, works of Christian authors, preachers and prophets, but also with philosophical tradition, *Bernard of Clairvaux, St. Bonaventura, Thomas Aquinas, Augustine, Plato, Aristotle*, the Stoics, Epicureans, religious writings, with the author's ever-present critical and polemical attitude towards the whole tradition of thought which he inherited and incorporated into his work, sometimes explicitly, and sometimes implicitly. His attitude towards his own milieu and towards the circle of Split Humanists is of indubitable importance for the formation of Marulić's polyvalent interests, as shown by analyses and critical valuations of thinkers, literary historians comparatists¹⁷ in this country.

Marulić's humanistic commitment is crucial for the understanding of his relationship with the European Christian tradition and for the evaluation of his work. Marulić, as a thinker of his age, which meant a turning-point in European history as the age of social turmoil, in his verse and prose touches upon the problems of understanding, of the meaning and purpose of human existence, of anthropological problems, questions of human destiny and value, as the object of the science which guarantees the cognition of the highest good as a prerequisite of human dignity, happiness and bliss. The view-point from which Marulić regards human destiny is therefore not that of a *philosopher's* insight, but of a *poet's* vision. Marulić follows poetically the rhythm of universal life, of »real« man (čovjek »nazbilj«), though not in Držić's sense yet, but nevertheless already a participant in a Dionysian dance, in a carnival parade where the joke and a whole repertory of secularity lightens the sinful soul, liberates the body, in the freedom hidden behind the masks of saints; the poet still has this last chance to penetrate the mystery of man's mission in the world.

Both his *Evangelistar* (Evangelistary) and *Pouke* (Instructions) testify to a deeper meaning of the medieval adequation between poetry and theology (the phrase which *Boccaccio* had applied to *Dante*). The writer's spiritual eye searches for the unique body of the poem, both allegorically and directly: both works we have mentioned celebrate the union of the sphere of thinking which reaches the religious as the highest act and affirmation of Marulić's man, and it is synonymous to the poet's vision, as the area of sacred speech, a meeting-point of the divine and the human. It is significant that for Marulić the Bible is the source and inspiration of the highest poetry, and his creative work is at the same time a contemplative flight *par excellence*, in the same way as, widely speaking, the Christian thought is still alive for a long

¹⁷ see studies by *M. Tomasović* collected in the book *Zapisi o Maruliću i drugi komparativistički priloz* (Records on Marulić and Other Comparative Contributions), Split 1984. On Marulić's contemplative relations and influences, see *T. Ladan*, *Marulićev Syllabus* (Marulić's Syllabus), *Priloz* (Contributions), 1975, 1—2.

time in the period of the Renaissance in conceptions of natural philosophy.¹⁸ Opposing the level of pure philosophical speculation, Marulić's thought is characteristic of his humanistic education and sensibility, which is already Renaissance in character, and his poetic diction unites the world of ideas, opening thus a new page in the culture of this crucial century to which the writer belonged. His thought is a cosmos not only of education as its prerequisite and necessary condition, but also of the change in the spiritual treasury of the century, the mirror of a personality who poured all his passion, all the fervor of his enthusiasm, into a peculiar inner ripening, the harmony of the soul and the world that *E. R. Curtius* speaks about in discussing the conceptual foundations of *Dante's* theological view-point in his poetical growth.¹⁹ Marulić's discourse is semantically rich, reaching further and higher than the theological — from the universal vision in which this world of the temporary and the higher world of the permanent interpenetrate, evading any definition which would tend towards the delimitation between the individual spheres of the sacred and the profane. His discourse is at the same time an image and a speculation, a metaphor and a direct intuition of the reality of the ideal, a subtle reality and a significant hue, the Platonic-Plotinian empire of Beauty and a Split garden, a hymnal hortus deliciarum (*Judita, Suzana*) and still not a luster of the ideal, but luminosity of earthly beauty. *Humanitas* and *doctrina* are borders of a world-view condensed in the conception of poetry as a way of thinking, so that Marulić, in formulating his doctrine of the highest science, expresses it poetically; but what is it, however, that offers itself in the form of example, sub cortice fabularum, in its theological subject-matter, presented through literary optics, as the primeval foundation of thinking and the basis of Marulić's thought? Which spiritual anxieties, which dark awareness of the end and of the limits of the unrepeatable existence of a human being, became the rich soil of Marulić's philosophical cognition?

Marulić's verses about vain glory and pride, about the temporality of the world moving within fast cycles and death, are not the expression of pessimism, but of the feeling for reality which brings forth gentle melancholy:

Taščina od taščin i sve je taščina
*Ovi svit je osin, i magla i tmina.*²⁰
 /Vanity, all is vanity / This world is only mist and darkness./

¹⁸ *R. Bogišić* shows how »the Christian complex, philosophically and intellectually revitalized, entered a part of a multidimensional Renaissance edifice«, see *R. Bogišić, I srednjovjekovni i renesansni (Both medieval and Renaissance)* in: *M. Marulić, Evangelistar II (Evangelistary II)*, Split 1985, p. 18.

¹⁹ *E. R. Curtius Evropska književnost i latinsko srednjovjekovlje, (European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages)* Zagreb, 1971, p. 391.

The awareness of the human end does not diminish his awareness of the fact that fatefulness is of a different nature: if life is given to us (»život zajat nam«) in this valley of tears (»suznom docu«), spheres of reason are still left where the opposites can be reconciled: *Lipo pri-govaran'je razuma i človika* (Nice Discourses Between Reason and Man) proposes a post-medieval way out:

*Smrt, plač, bolizni te, nisu nesriće to,
da voće zemlje su ljudem je dano ko.*²¹
/Death, tears, and illnesses are not misfortunes/
They are given to men as fruits of the earth./

Death is near, as well as the certainty of transience and of bodily fate, and the spirit is the consolation in emptiness:

*Gdi godir ležati bude mrtvo tilo,
crvi će ga znati i biti će gnjilo
Kako tilo umre, tako tudje grdi,
a grob mu se zapre, da živim ne smrdi*
(Wherever a corpse lies, /it will be found and eaten by worms/
When a body dies, the living dislike it, / and shut it in its grave,
so that it would not stink.)
*Ako ležeći van, ptice će ga jisti;
toko je u grob stan, crvi će ga gristi.*²²
(If lying in the open, it will be eaten by birds; / if buried in the
grave, it will be gnawed by worms.)

Also the verses about the richness of poverty, the foundations of faith, about perfect life and seclusion, about soul, love and intelligence, about virtues and the world reason (motives frequent in the fifteenth and sixteenth century Croatian poetry), which are present throughout Marulić's work, comprise, bot allegorically and parabolically, his relationship to philosophical thinking and to his models, and indicate his spiritual affinities. The fact that themes present in Marulić's work are constituent parts of the mirror of wisdom and knowledge, the looking-glass and the theatre of the world of European literature of his century and of the previous one, must have had an influence on the formation of Marulić's spirituality and on the way he accepted the tradition which he followed, but also modified owing to his individual experience, understanding and views. Accordingly, it is possible to regard his work primarily as a thesaurus of anthropological, gnoseological, ethical and psychological insights.

Standing at the cross-roads of the destiny of the European man and his spiritual fate, in the age of crisis which »hardened characteres

²⁰ M. Marulić, *Pjesme* (Poems) PSHK, vol. 4, Zagreb, 1970.

²¹ op. cit.

and prepared the mankind for the big blow which was to throw it from the center of creation onto a small planet revolving in a dark corner of the universe²³ Marulić shared this fate, as a participator in the spiritual efforts of a small nation to establish a proper identity. In the perspective of salvation, the role of man and his place in the actual social and political situation, the crisis of faith and values, dead emotions, futile mental exercises of scholars, existential insecurity and social controversies, between lasciviousness and the stakes, Marulić tries to find his point of support. With regard to all this, the discourse necessarily had to start from the sphere of the moral if it intended to retrieve the lost values and achieve a spiritual transformation. The tribunal of conscience in personal life is one of the ways to reach happiness and bliss: the discourse about human action and self-understanding, starting from Marulić to 18th century Slavonian enlighteners who frequently referred to Socrates (*M. A. Relković*) stands at the root of the high position awarded to the book and to its moral and educational impact. The path from moral philosophy leads to philosophy. For, what Marulić could, but did not necessarily have to recognize as his own language in the course of his Paduan studies, through dialogues on soul, mind, the Christian axis of History, was a great conquest of the human sphere, i.e. the place of *man* as *homo novus*, the master of his own spiritual, and not only animal nature, which necessarily made him subordinate to God's will. In the same way, that which he could recognize as his own in the teachings of the Stoics and Epicureans, mystics and church fathers, was neither positive mysticism, the immersion into the absolute solitude, nor the mysticism of absolute evil, death and destructive forces of being, but their *aura*, the context of tradition used for a personal signature of a humanist. Marulić does not act like a philosopher, but as a thinker belonging to the philosophical heritage, in his enquiry about the place and nature of man, who is not a slave to faith, hope and mercy any more, but a carrier of free will related to the reason as a prerequisite of the spiritual transformation («For the one who has studied the whole of philosophy, but does not live according to its requirements, does not excel in reason²⁴). From the sphere of the Biblical he singles out experience, wisdom and effects upon human nature. In this sense it is possible to decipher the code of holiness and heroism as the Humanistic re-valuation of the world of values.

The verses from the Sunday Gospel and from the Bible, which had resounded in the ears of whole generations, were presented as a picture-book of faith, the spirit of history, as well as the individual and universal drama, close to man on account of this quality, as the place

²³ R. Lopez, *Rođenje Evrope (The Birth of Europe)*, Zagreb, 1978, p. 351.

²⁴ *M. Marulić, Evangelistar (Evangelistary)*, 1, III, 3, Split 1985.

where his individual history began, became a living force of speech to Marulić, in which image is best when in the service of thought. Discussing moral issues through *image*, and not in the way characteristic of a *moral philosopher*, Marulić discovers the truth of the moral, in the same way as writers such as *Bossuet, Pascal, Tolstoy, Ibsen* and *Hegel* did, i.e. that the inner truth, which is to be discovered as freedom of understanding and will, therefore of action as well, is proposed as a perspective of salvation through the communication with the Other throughout history or, in theological terms, as the presence of God in man.

Marulić sees the solution for the fundamental crisis of being, both individual and collective, as well as for the spiritual crisis, in the emancipation of reason as man's distinguishing quality, aware of the fact which had already been expressed, in a way, by *Dante, Erasmus, Savonarola* and *Aretino*. The hell is within us, saints and fools are here, but it is also here that heaven, happiness and bliss are possible. There is too much philosophy, too little philosophical living, the evil is tragically evident, and this is why we need saints and prophets, only if their example keeps us together — as the solution, both existential (the Turkish danger) and spiritual (the return to the culture and philosophy of Antiquity and Christianity). The import of religious literature is to mobilize, through image, the extinguished energy, as an appeal to the human conscience, to penetrate the sclerotic tissue of the old world, to regain the lost balance, to teach simplicity and the highest virtues as a collective catharsis:

I can hear admonishers, but I can see no doers. Do before you command, so that I may not think that it is as difficult as it seems and so that I could believe that it will be of use to the one who does it, as you claim. If I do not realize that your words correspond to your deeds, I shall not take it as your advice, but as ridicule.²⁵

Marulić's answer given to the one whose fate is mortality is: *Happy is the one who constantly keeps thinking of the best way to use his life.*²⁶

The *parable* is wide enough a field for the future to be projected onto the past. The prophetized spiritual genesis of mankind points to the understanding of history as myth: the establishing of unity between the world and man. Linguistic confusion and mutism are external signs of the lost meaning, since the constant need to examine the meaning

²⁵ *M. Marulić*, Pouke (Instructions), p. 3.

²⁶ *M. Marulić*, Pjesma o pouci Gospodina Isusa Krista obješenog na križu (The Poem On the Teaching of Jesus Christ Our Lord Suspended On the Cross) Hrvatski latinisti I (Croatian Latinists), PSHK, vol. 2, Zagreb 1969.

of concepts such as *good, bad, right, should, love, faith*, had been forgotten. Marulić knows that the language of the Gospels still retains this forgotten meaning, although he intuitively already perceives the change in the spiritual situation of the age and the place of classical tradition within this context. By this we mean that aspect which is reflected today in the thought of *Pierre Emmanuel*, which allows him to conclude that:

...ever since the sixteenth century God has been speaking human language less and less: *Bernard of Clairvaux, John the Baptist and St. Theresa* belong to a different age, and we can hardly believe that their Christianity has anything in common with ours except its name.²⁷

Some authors²⁸ think that Marulić's *Pouke* (Instructions), which in their character justify this qualification, sum up Marulić's relationship towards the world of values, and of ethical postulates, analogously to syntheses of knowledge which can be found in a large number of Humanistic texts. By an exemplary exposition of the motives of the Christian doctrine, namely the concepts *Eros — Agape — Nomos — Caritas*, it is possible to gain insight into Marulić's through knowledge of the mentioned complex of problems, the nature, relations and supremacy of concepts and their meaning (faith, knowledge, mind, feelings, cognition intellect, as objects of the theological and philosophical reflection), and finally of truth itself as the supreme category of the human, together with the ways leading to it. Inquiring into the character of the greatest good, Marulić speaks about human happiness and perfection, but not in the way it is done in philosophical treatises (as for instance in those of Croatian thinkers such as *Grisogono, Gučetić, Monaldi, Petrić*), but as a writer, in forewords to his works, epistles, dedications, letters. Without inclinations towards the doctrine of dual truth, Marulić still considers theology to be a guarantee for the realization of the greatest happiness. All human knowledge, as well as the object of study of the philosophers, teachers of human wisdom such as: *Socrates, Plato or Pythagoras*, will be subordinated to it. »Let us say nothing of the astuteness of philosophers«²⁹ because philosophers »know only human things«³⁰, in the same way as poets are merely writers of »ancient follies who talk nonsense, moving among a hardly countable multitude of gods«³¹. Therefore, Marulić says, »let Plato with his discussions, Aristotle with his arguments, and all the philosophers

²⁷ *P. Emmanuel*, *Autobiographies*, Paris, 1947, p. 463.

²⁸ *K. Atanasijević*, *Dalmatinski etičar Marko Marulić (The Dalmatian Ethic, Marko Marulić)*, *Letopis Matice Srpske*, Novi Sad, 1937, p. 270–278.

²⁹ *M. Marulić*, *Pouke (Instructions)*, p. 4.

³⁰ *M. Marulić*, *Evandelistar (Evangelistary) I, 1*, p. 56.

³¹ *ibid.*,

of the old Academy, with the cunning tricks of their sophisms, be gone«. ³² The real wisdom, instead, is to know God, and wisdom is not the object of scholarly philosophy, but is a practical category; it is not contemplation, but an attitude and a behavior which must be in keeping with conscientious, responsible action:

You can be considered wise if you examine your conscience daily, if each time you awake from your sleep you think of what you are going to do, and each time you go to rest you examine what you have done, what you have neglected to do, and what you have done amiss, so that you could tread more carefully in the future . . . If you are wise, you will remember the past, settle the present, and keep the future in mind, and prepare yourself in such a way that when your life comes to its end you can prove worthy of the promised eternity. ³³

Since books consist of »mere words«, to attain spiritual understanding we need instructions which are not normative, but act in an exemplary fashion. Frequently, almost as a rule, Marulić's references to Biblical messages and to the age of prophets and kings, are an expression of a Humanist's longing for the ideal, for the transcendental, as man's real homeland, with the Biblical story understood as a metaphor of human history, love and happiness, offered to mankind by Old Testament heroes. It is only *veritas revelata* that makes spiritual peace possible, as the eternal and constant good which is stored in man as a richness which can not be lost or taken away, which can be attained by means of wisdom and simplicity. Referring to the stoical ethics, ³⁴ Marulić says that »dearness is in you«, alluding to spiritual treasures which have to be taken care of, and to »spiritual eyes« which look beyond the single and the perishable. Virtue as the result of the process of understanding, and beatitude as its final aim, are the solution of the antinomy between knowledge and reason. The reason and meaning of Marulić's criticism of philosophers and philosophy is hidden in activism as the basis of his contemplative commitment, and in the deed as the regulator of thought:

For if someone has studied the whole of philosophy, but does not live according to its requirements, I shall have to admit that he is learned, but I shall not say that he is reasonable. A reasonable man does not fall into vice because he is characterized by virtue . . . We should call reasonable only that man who excels in all spiritual goods and disposes both with knowledge and virtue . . .

³² *ibid.*, II, 4, p. 164.

³³ *ibid.*, III, 1, p. 263.

³⁴ M. Marulić, *Lipo prigovaranje razuma i človlka* (Nice Discourses Between Reason and Man), M. Marulić, PSHK, op. cit.

We say that those people are more reasonable for whom we know that they excel in virtues, and not only in knowledge or education. Without virtue, »knowledge makes one arrogant«, so that the one who is very learned, but not reasonable enough, usurps too much for himself.³⁵

Within Marulić's encyclopedic survey of virtues, knowledge is not its own goal, it is not an aim in itself, as it was in the scholastic classification, but knowledge is education which is helpful in life if man is able to use it, while if it is not so, it can even be pernicious, according to Marulić who joins knowledge to virtue and opposes sophistic quibblings which, though learned, are but an empty word-game, useless and »arrogant« wisdom. Perceiving and referring to the need to develop knowledge as the perfect basis for distinguishing truth from falsehood, Marulić follows the Aristotelian definition of reason as innate to man, through which man originally seeks good, shuns evil, and thus improves his nature:

For although we have a natural inclination towards good, we do not have knowledge which makes man reasonable. And between a learned and an ignorant man there is necessarily as much difference as between knowledge and ignorance . . . Only that man is wise who governs his life and his conduct by taking into account a higher reasonableness, who considers carefully how something is going to end, who knows where his profit lies and is engaged in it and thinks about it, and avoids that which is alien to it, who thinks of man's nature and his end, who understands that he was born for immortality and therefore despises transitory goods and hastens to attain the eternal ones.³⁶

Human profit and human life consist in the search for wisdom and in well-doing, and this is what the sage aspires to, in contrast to Stoical wisdom, which is »not human, but is of stone«.

The Christian wisdom is not so strictly and inhumanly limited as the one followed by the Stoical philosophers who taught that a sage, in order to be blissful, should be without emotions. On the contrary, we claim that a sage can not be blissful unless he is led by the desire for the future beatitude while still leading a corporeal existence.³⁷

Why do you think you have this good, this wisdom . . . if you do not share it with your fellow-creatures, if you lose nothing thereof and if, shared with the others, it even multiplies and grows?³⁸

³⁵ M. Marulić, *Evangelistar (Evangelistary) I, III, 3, p. 267.*

³⁶ *ibid.*, III, 4, p. 271.

³⁷ *ibid.*, III, 6, p. 279.

³⁸ *ibid.*, III, 8, p. 284.

Honest life, as well as persistence in virtuous living, as a spiritual effort, requires its theoretical basis. Although it always relies on the teaching of the Gospels, it does not end with it, but surpasses it: »let nobody serving the Gospels think that he must live constantly of the Gospels« (*Evangelistar*) /*Evangelistary*/; »to live according to reason«, to follow the road of spiritual virtue« means »to gain oneself« and not waste oneself by having spent all of one's richness. The only nobility of man is virtue, and the value of life which, according to Marulić, »is not a joke«.

Being evidently familiar with encyclopedic models (*B. of Clairvaux* whom we have already mentioned, *Jerome*, *Gregory the Great*, *Jacobus de Voragine*, *Migne*) in which their views are expounded »in a more interesting manner, taught by the conviction and experience that a vivid example has a greater impact on common man, Marulić always addresses himself to the common man, without shrinking from criticism and humour where it is necessary, when distancing himself from current ecclesiastical or political circumstances. In writing his short, amusing sketches, even when modelled on Humanists' disputes, Marulić's prime aim is to be accepted by a wide reading public. Reflection is a residue, a background to his verse or prose. Faith as the human attire offers virtue, the ideal of a new asceticism, in the place of feigned holiness, and the ideal of complete man, both in body and soul, who should live happily on this earth, among his friends, havins at the same time the divine city, the city of the sun, as his model which is the Renaissance utopian »topos«. Knowledge as the bearer and realizer of this ideal, and of the prerequisite for the restoration of values, is also the bearer of the assumptions of the so-called »real humanism«:

Therefore we should not always measure human heart according to the appearance of its instruments, but rather according to its deeds and conduct in life. For the quality of a tree is not shown in its leaves, but in its fruit.³⁹

Knowledge is the source of good governance of oneself and of one's living, as well as of the society and the state. The awareness of the need and usefulness of knowledge of real good and virtue, of beauty and harmony in man, as a way to happiness and bliss, the great theme of Renaissance philosophical writers, with all the classification of theological virtues, had a different basis in Marulić. Although some literary historians award him a place within the circle of European medieval mysticism⁴⁰ because of his evident spiritual affinity to writers such

³⁹ *M. Marulić*, *Pouke* (Instructions), V, 1, p. 358.

⁴⁰ *F. Francev*, *Nova poezija Splitsanina Marka Marulića*, (The New Poetry by Marko Marulić of Split), Rad JAZU (Works of the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts), vol. 245, Zagreb, 1933. On Marulić's literary mysticism and the influence of T. Kempis on Marulić, see *M. Srepetl*, *O Maruliću* (On Marulić), Rad JAZU, vol. 146, Zagreb, 1901.

as *St. Bonaventura*, *Bernard of Clairvaux* or even *Johannes Tauler* (which remains to be explored yet. Tauler was an exceptional preacher of the Gospels, and his influence spread beyond the confines of Germany to Italy, England and Spain; he gained a great popularity by spiritual poems on humility and paucity of spirit) Marulić is far from the mysticism of these writers. European poetical, philosophical and theological literature was available to this author who, as he said of himself, »relished the odour of reading«. Church hymnology, poetical paraphrases of the psalms⁴¹ were a source of inspiration of many writers and philosophers, including Marulić.

In his interpretation of Dante, Mandelstam used an analogy: namely, the sight accomodation of a bird of prey which is not adjusted to the orientation within a small radius. Marulić's spiritual eye flies in the same way over a large »hunting area«. Starting from the three Christian categories: *faith*, *hope* and *charity*, he flies over the whole of human knowledge or, to be more precise, over the area of the most distinguished science dealing with the system of values and giving an encyclopedic compendium of ethical doctrines. Starting from the four principal virtues: wisdom, justice, spiritual strength and prudence based on love Marulić, through images of moral instruction, builds a creationist edifice of the world, searching for those imperishable goods which human being uses to create ethos as his true homeland. It is owing to the ethos of his act that man becomes an individuality. Value consists only in that which man is able to give himself, i.e. it consists in what he does, and in how and according to which principles he acts, by the freedom of his power of longing and pleasure, i.e. by his will. Only in this way can his existence have an absolute value, and the world (God) a final purpose. Man becomes the final purpose of creation only as a moral being. The interest of Marulić the writer, poet and exemplary playwright, like that of oldentime »začinjavci« (= writers of early Croatian religious poetry) in the sphere of reflections on morality, could not be interpreted exclusively in terms of an ethicist's attitudes, but rather in terms of the unity of his work as a whole and of the search, within the dense tissue of moral stage instructions, for a living core of philosophical questioning of the highest human qualities as such. For, any great literature questions man's determination and that owing to which, by his habitus and ethos, enables him to live not only only once, in the writer's age, but is addressed to contemporaneity. Such a real humanist could be interesting both to his contemporaries and to us today. Life, man, nation, nature, patriotism, and all those »distant things« or, in Dantesque spirit, the profane and the ideal, are the area which, through his own optics,

⁴¹ *N. Vito di Gozze*, *Discorsi della Penitenza sopra i sette Salmi Penitentiali di David*, Venice 1589; *Commentarii in tres Psalmos XV, XXV, CXXXVI, Venetiis*, 1601.

Marulić fashions in a living word in which the model had already been lost. Even when discussing intellect and faith, reason and emotion, faith and knowledge, life and law, and mentioning religious authors of early centuries, such as *Alcuin*, *Hrabanus*, *Eckhart*, *Bonaventura*, *Thomas Aquinas*, *Thomas à Kempis*, when he translates and assimilates them, transforming their doctrines, he adapts all this immense spiritual, cultural materials, to his own vision. The attitude of a solitary meditating in a bay is not the mystical experience of *Bernard of Clairvaux*; it is neither the same culture, the same ecstatic obsession, nor the language of theologians. He writes about human feelings of saints, the attitude of a monk does not oppose that of a man-writer, who looks for the permanent in the transient, mentioning emperors, history and cities, becoming dazzled by the beauty of walls, church-towers, gates, temples, gardens, flowers and trees, by the beauty of woman and heritage. In contrast to the medieval moralism and ascetic ethics, Marulić's realism, directed towards the regulation of conduct in life, is essentially different in nature: absorbed in the education of individual and society as a whole, his thought and hopes are in the service of their happiness, and this is the importance of Marulić's »manual« of morality and of his ethics of love. Books of virtue, of paucity and of ways to achieve inner peace and happiness, as written by Marulić, are neither mystical ascetic verticals, as held by interpreters of Marulić's ethics, nor simply a reflection of the author's contemplative nature (Tomo Matic), although he was both *pious* and *doctus*. They are a product of a committed humanist who reacts to the existing political and social situation, characterized by crisis — the age of the Catholic restoration. Marulić's fundamental conviction is that *words*, *deeds* and *thought* should be enclosed within the confines of reason.⁴² Marulić's endeavor thus becomes even more philosophically founded if we know that he testifies to the age (both biographical and general) when »everything was cruel, restless, thorny, sad and bitter« and when »much vigil and constant labour was needed to preserve the treasure which the body wants to steal, the devil seeks to destroy, and the world to disperse«. ⁴³ Relishing the pleasures of sciences, Marulić never forgets the relationship between thought and deed, individual and general, the harmony of soul and body. When writing of the first values and spiritual virtues, in a blessed peace of the countryside, among olives, in a bay, *in valle surda*, he does not forget the wordly and he sings of a simple meal, a drink, of squid, fish, wine, and fruit, which makes him close to a series of Croatian thinkers who took a practical part in the life of their towns in which they occupied key positions and showed by example what they were trying to prove in theory. Through their work and impact the confirmed that which is common to and charac-

⁴² *M. Marulić*, *Evangelistar*, II, V, 1.

⁴³ *ibid.*, V, 5.

teristic of Humanistic universalism, namely that the mirror of wisdom and knowledge is the book of life.⁴⁴

For a humanist like Marulić, therefore, past could not mean simply a sequence of authorities who left their precepts for the future, but it meant something that is always newly re-born from human experience. Even when quoting apologetic Christian writers, Marulić's world differs from theirs. It is true that the experience of man can not compete with the Biblical history, in the same way as the explication of classical moralist writers, in analogy to the intense spiritual life of Marulić himself, is not simply a characteristic of the religious and moral-didactic subject-matter of his work.

Since, according to *André Malraux*, in any Renaissance reader there is something of an ethnologist, Marulić as a writer requires an individualized, special reader. An encounter with texts of pagan writers, complex as they were, resulted in criticism. To follow *Malraux's* thought further, namely that a Christian can read Plato and still remain a Christian, but he can not remain the same as the Christian who has studied the work *Summa theologiae* by *Thomas Aquinas* without being familiar with Socrates,⁴⁵ can be discerned in Marulić's example. Marulić restores to life the *Prophet's* words about futility, he quotes extensively religious writers and illustrates with literary examples the order of values as prescribed by the Christian moral theology and its world of values, this world being real as far as it affirms man his dignity, and becomes accessible to all by the evidence of faith, hope, salvation and love. In evoking examples of virtuous men, as on the gold background of a mosaic, human values are always foregrounded: private piousness instead of the bookish dead letter. Owing to his literary talent Marulić transposes the emotive sings of the Christian doctrine into a personal religion of a Renaissance humanist.⁴⁶ Marulić's age is confronted already with the relativity of values and virtues (a lie is permitted if it is useful), of religious norms, which it does not abolish, but which it transfers closer to the human sphere. The sphere of life evokes »theatres« of Renaissance writers fairies and elfs, shepherds of native »groves« (*Lucić, Hektorović, Dr-*

⁴⁴ T. Veres introduces the concept of intensive universality, comp. *T. Veres, Dante Alighieri i Toma Akvinska*, in: *Dante i slavenski svijet (Dante and the Slavic World)*, I, II, JAZU Zagreb, 1984 (vol. II, p. 701—714).

⁴⁵ *A. Malraux, Neizvjesnost čovjekove avanture i književnost (Precariousness of Man's Adventure and Literature)* Zagreb, 1979, p. 20.

⁴⁶ On Marulić as an apologist of Christian faith, comp. *F. lo Parco, Tideo Acciarini umanista marchigiano del secolo XV e le sue attinenze con gli umanisti dalmati, Marco Marulo, Giorgio Sisgorco, Elio Lampridio Cervino*, Archivio storico per la Dalmazia, fasc. 37, Roma, 1929. See also *A. Schneider, Bilješke o Marulićevu djelu »De Institutione...«* (Notes on Marulić's work »De Institutione...«), *Nastavni Vjesnik (Teachers' Gazette)*, vol. XI, Zagreb, 1903.

žić), heroic characters of »saintly widows« and other individuals and adventures in the age when all the ecclesiastical Latin literature dealt with theological issues with the aid of the scholastic method. Marulić is interested in real life, in the nature of man which should be understood. His question underlying the saints' portraits could be formulated as: *how should we live*.⁴⁷ Under the formula of ecclesiastical doctrines the face of the world and man appears — the dichotomy and heteronomy of Christianity — now the searched for secret of the resemblance to the perfect model (religion), now a test of one's own strength and the letter of life by the imperative of reason (ethics).

Finally, Marulić's aspiration to bring the fullness of life closer to its postulates (fraternity, love, faith, hope), to the unique construction of the world, is actually the same spirit of encyclopedism⁴⁸ characterizing both literary work and philosophical speculation of his and the following century. For, Marulić's work *wills* to be a manual, both to the man in the street and to the church-goer:

Through you let it be accepted by the public, through you let it not fear to pass into other hands, through you let it not hesitate to appear in any public place . . .⁴⁹

Finding the meaning of human activity in moral determination, Marulić does not approach the philosophical question of how to perform exemplary moral activity, and avoids futile philosophizing. Promoting the Aristotelian view that it is not necessary to know what virtues are, but be virtuous, in order to achieve happy and honest life, Marulić's prime concerns are permanent values in human life. Through living image, far from difficult thoughts of philosophical discourse, or »drilled intellectual and moral concepts« (*M. Krleža*), Marulić synthesizes concepts of philosophical schools in a book which was to be more easily accessible to the man of his time. The same wish is present in *P. P. Vergeri*,⁵⁰ *Piccolomini*, as well as in those who, like *F. Bacon*, write and act »in the service and to the profit of life, which is the meaning of his great restoration and of the idea of encyclopedism.

⁴⁷ comp. *M. Breyer*, *Prevodi Marulićevih latinskih djela* (Translations of Marulić's Latin works), Zagreb, 1901.

⁴⁸ On Marulić as the author of the Christian moral encyclopedia, see *D. Prohaska*, *Jugoslavenski prethodnici Komenskoga*, (Yugoslav Forerunners of Komensky), *Jugoslavenska Njiva* (The Yugoslav Field), vol. IV, no. 45, Zagreb, 1920.

⁴⁹ *M. Marulić*, *Pouke*, p. 4.

⁵⁰ *P. P. Vergeriis*, *De ingenuis moribus*. This is our translation of the text: »We should love virtue above all things people search for and which ensure man immortality as the permanent and intransient good, in contrast to earthly goods, richness, glory, pleasure«. *E. S. Piccolomini* and many other Renaissance writers of treatises write about virtue as a secure possession and man's characteristic quality.

Sharing the same views with representatives of European Humanistic thought (*L. Bruni, L. Valla, M. Ficino, Pico della Mirandola, M. Veggio, N. Gozze (Gučetić), M. Monaldi, F. Patricius (Petrić)* and others, in his humanistic *ethos*, moral »*philosophy*« which permeates also his religious poetry, in his patriotic feelings and esthetic experience, Marulić belongs to the mainstream of the liveliest currents of ideas of his age, which was the age of treatises on the highest good, reason, beauty, blissful life, happiness, free personality, as well as the age of philosophical controversies and social crisis. Living and writing at the time when *L. Bruni* translated Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics*, thus opening a new chapter in moral and political philosophy, when many »mirrors of honest and good living« came into being, when *Ficino* translated Plato and when questions of the work of art, beauty and poetry, as well as of knowledge in general disrupted the confines of medieval *summae*, Marulić acts primarily as a *reader*. In the same way that Aristotle approached Plato, Marulić approaches the whole heritage of thinking. He assimilates a rich heritage of doctrines, primarily »the four candle-sticks of the Church« as he refers to *Augustine, Saint Ambrose, Saint Jerome* and *Gregory the Great*, being familiar with their teachings from which he adopted that which he could communicate simply to his age through his individual linguistic sensibility, close to the man of his age and to circumstances in which he acts. He moves away from his models, and his poetry is far removed from the Christian ascetism.⁵¹ While singing of spiritual beauty and writing his evangelistaries, about a monk's robe and the Biblical landscape, futile holiness and vanities, death and human transcendence, he writes a praise to human self-understanding⁵² and the intransient trace left by man, always finding the inspiration for his literary eros in the letter of life. Ideological and philosophical foundations of Marulić's world-view, as we have tried to present it, filled his work with a high intensity and ensured him an important place in Croatian, as well as European literature. Writing the praise to man as a being who understands by reason and acts by virtue and who, although limited by his nature and finality of his cognition, in Marulić's vision, in an Aristotelian sense, becomes »almost a mortal, happy god« — in this concrete morality,

⁵¹ *M. Krleža* thinks that Marulić's *Judita* and *Davidijada* represent a logical conclusion and synthesis which have *De Institutione bene vivendi* and *Evangelistarium* as their ideological prolegomena. Comp. *M. Krleža, Sabrana djela (Collected Works), Eseji (Essays), vol. III, Zagreb, 1963. M. Tomasović, reading Marulić as a Renaissance poet thinks that »Judita does not belong to saints' paraphrases either in its metaphors or phraseology, but to the manner of secular poetry«, see *M. Tomasović, Analize i procjene (Analyses and evaluations), Split, 1985.**

⁵² *M. Marulić* says in his Instructions: »they carve letters in stone and write down their names as if it were going to be of any use to their descendants to find out who they were, since while they were alive they did not come to know themselves«.

structured encyclopedically and well laid-out, the autonomy of human personality, comprising Marulić's world-view, is concretized. Through fundamental motives of the Christian philosophy, Marulić's understanding of the Self and the Other, of faith and thinking, emotions and reason, virtue and responsibility, truth and illusion, the transitory and the intransitory, thought and deed, evolves on the vertical axis of *humanum*. This is how he was recognized by his contemporaries, as well as by his later followers and present-day literary historians and scholars. We mean by this his world-view, his activist attitude and his intellectual, practical ethics, based on the principle of judging all human acts according to their consequences, his encyclopedic spirit and finally, his understanding of wisdom as a repository of the common good and of knowledge as the education for life, and not as its own purpose. It is Marulić's invitation to real philosophy to life made meaningful by action which should replace the empty bookish letter, which in our opinion contains the secret of Marulić's continuing presence within the Croatian philosophical heritage.

Frane Petrić: Thesaurus Sapientiae

In one of his dialogues on history, discussing human history or, to be more precise, human activity with regard to the passage of time, *Frane Petrić* says that an act is *always measured by time*.⁵³ Applied to this great personality within the Croatian and European Renaissance philosophy, i.e. measured by time, Petrić's work as a whole displays an encyclopedic character both with regard to the individuality of the author characterized by the encyclopedic erudition as his specific inner structure, and to the formative subject-matter of his numerous works which belong to diverse disciplines. Numerous encyclopedias in this country and in the world, published from the seventeenth century onwards (German, Czech, Italian, French, British, Hispano-American, Catholic), as well as text-books on the history of philosophy, biographical lexicons, lexicons and authors, in dealing with his philosophy, mention him also as an encyclopedist, stating that he was »much more learned than almost all the Italians in every order of excellent arts«.⁵⁴ As a writer — polyhistor, he synthesized a great knowledge of various disciplines with a rare painstaking care for details and originality, deepening the inherited, which had been established by authorities, widening the fragmentary, anticipating the modern, and proving almost completely that »nothing human had remained foreign« to him: from philosophy and history, diplomacy and rhetoric, construction and

⁵³ *F. Petrić, Deset dijaloga o povijesti (Ten Dialogues On History)*, pt. 7, Pula/Rijeka, 1980, p. 38.

⁵⁴ *I. N. Erithraei, Pinacotheca, 1645.*

fortification, grammar and technology, politics and government, crafts and hydraulics, to the occult knowledge and metaphysics; from fifteen books on geometry to an extensive work dedicated to the army. He worked on these for more than two decades, and collected all the knowledge known to his age about the army, both old and new, discussing the disposition, movements, arms, food, clothing, military discipline, the relationship between the army and the state, about generals, types of wars and warring, benefiting from the work of historians, rulers, physicians and philosophers. Even this work, far removed from his essential, philosophical concerns in its interest and issues it discusses, reveals an author absorbed in the practical and, what is more, as we can see from the notes abounding in this work, it was written largely with the purpose of inciting the European spirit to struggle against Turkish conquests. In his already mentioned work on geometry, as well as in his systematically written *New Universal Philosophy* (*Nova de universis Philosophia*, 1583), Petrić voices his intention to create a new method and establish a philosophical relationship towards the whole map of knowledge and make it available to everybody (both in its lay-out and language).

Having given an individual contribution to the history of Croatian philosophy, Petrić contributed to the Croatian encyclopedistics as well. Aware of the wide diffusion of foreign works, mainly compilatory in character, written by authors — interpreters and followers of philosophical authorities of the past, he is aware of the danger for the development of the authentic critical thought. In its purpose (according to his words, the work was to contain old and unusual, as well as unknown materials), in results and influence, in its criterion and the system of values, the work is paradigmatic in this sense.

Learning from teachers of human wisdom, led by a wide curiosity of a Humanist⁵⁵, incited by the joyfulness of discovery of an old fragment or a manuscript,⁵⁶ this ardent polemist and sharp anti-Aristotelian, argumentative attacker, participator in cultural developments in European scholarly circles and a member of numerous academies, Petrić was both respected and attacked (*G. Bruno, T. Angelucci*). A friend of patrons of the arts, bibliophiles and erudites (*G. V. Pinelli, 1553–1601*), of personalities central to the European Renaissance, he left a correspondence from which we can understand the background of his variegated work, the genesis of his views, both philosophical and

⁵⁵ Petrić wrote to M. Sonner, the ambassador of Alfonso II d'Este, that he intended to publish a book entitled *Thesaurus sapientiae*, but only extracts on Zoroaster in his works: *Magia philosophia* and *Nova de Universis Philosophia* remained of the original purpose. 1

⁵⁶ On Petrić as a collector of Greek codices, see *E. Jacobs, Francesco Patricio und seine Sammlung griechischer Handschriften in der Bibliothek des Escorial, Zentralblatt für Bibliothekswesen, XXV, 1908*.

otherwise, since it is full of biobibliographical information about personalities, circles and the totality of the cultural, historical and philosophical heritage. From this correspondence we can learn of the wide circle of his friends and acquaintances — dukes, counts, historians and critics (*G. B. Pigna*), philologists and librarians (*F. Orsini*, 1529—1600), poets (*Tasso*), theologians (*F. Panigarola*, 1548—1594), physicians (*G. Mercuriale*, 1530—1606); a multitude of polygraphists, promoters of culture and sciences (*U. Aldovrandi*, 1522—1605), as well as unknown and mysterious personages of the late sixteenth century, people of the court, secretaries (*B. Valori*), mathematicians (*C. Benedetti*, 1530—1590), writers and poets, people of diverse origins, university professors and experts, orientalists (*G. B. Raimondi*, head of the Medicean Oriental typography), publishers and linguists (*P. Sfondrati*, 1493—1550), antiquarians and musicologists (*E. Bottrigari*, 1531—1612), some of whom entered Petrić's dialogic disputes as his characters.

In writing his *universal histories* (of poetry, oratory, history, philosophy, magic and occultism), Petrić has left a great wealth of materials of historical-documentary importance.

Presenting the purpose, task and importance of collection, transmission and critical selection from the totality of knowledge and human wisdom it contains, pointing to the *cosmopolitanism* of knowledge and the relationship towards philosophical thinking, Petrić writes a work of the kind that »nobody had ever composed before.⁵⁷ Aware of the limits of human understanding and of the fact that »there is no true history written by man«,⁵⁸ intent upon founding a »new, true, comprehensive universal philosophy«, Petrić writes a systematic estimate of the history of philosophy, an encyclopedia of concepts, names, writers, places, works, knowledge of centennial problems, substantiating his statements with arguments, with his experience of a bibliophile, biographer and pedant, though not the conceived *thesaurus of wisdom*, which was nevertheless left scattered in fragments through almost all of his works, starting from the earliest short, but significant dispute on a *Happy City*, to *New Universal Philosophy*, a guide to universal understanding meant both for those who think speculatively and those who need knowledge for practical purposes.

According to the author, the new universal philosophy, systematically expounded, »collects, interprets and arranges the materials according to an exemplary scientific order.«⁵⁹ Petrić asks the Pope *Gre-*

⁵⁷ From *The Dedication of New Universal Philosophy* by F. Petrić to P. Camillo Sfondrato, Cardinal of the Roman Church, a nephew to the pope Gregory XIV, comp. F. Petrić, *Nova sveopća filozofija* (New Universal Philosophy), Zagreb, 1979.

⁵⁸ F. Petrić, *Deset dijaloga o povijesti* (Ten Dialogues On History), *ibid.*

gory XIV to have it »systematically taught in all grammar and monastery schools«. ⁶⁰ The new, true, comprehensive universal philosophy is concerned with the *universality of things* (*rerum universitatis*). It consists of: *panaugia*, *panarchia*, *pampsychia*, and *pancosmia*, i.e. of a synthetic survey of the universality of nature, cosmos and human cognition. Petrić's idea of the *universality* of knowledge, as the basis of his philosophy (*cognitio universitatis*) — the notion which acts as a guiding principle to the idea of universality, is the unity of the cycle of knowledge — from astronomy and mathematics, geometry and optics, physics and nautics, to mention only a few out of many expounded by Petrić, from the universe and the universal order, micro- and macrocosm, to practical matters. However, we are not dealing here with a closed system of knowledge, but with the one which is *creatively open*, in the sense of the creation of the object of cognition: »cognoscere est fieri cognitam«.

The prerequisite for the encyclopedic exposition of the universal order is the perfect form of the world which we understand as *all-unity*, *unomnia*, by means of the intellectual insight. The need for the autonomy of knowledge, emphasized by Petrić, the polyhistor, marks the beginning of modern thinking in which the idea of the circle imposes itself as the spiritual orientation, and not only as a method of exposition. Thinking which starts from the whole, from a rounded system, is the actual starting-point in thematizing of individual fields of knowledge as the unique and the true which makes all of them possible.

Having *collected* the five philosophies and the sacred theology (»our own, as well as the Chaledan, Egyptian, mystical and Platonist«), having *interpreted* and *arranged* them, as he wrote in the dedication of his work to the pope Gregory XIV, according to an exemplary scientific order, Petrić deliberates upon the whole history of the creation of the world and man, and the all-permeation of life:

In other words, since these three — namely being, life and intellect — are everywhere . . . life is Everywhere the seething of the essence and the procreation of the act. And all living beings which are created within it are the essence which seethes and understands. And there is nothing so lowly which participates in being that it would not participate in life and understanding. For all understanding comes from reason, as will soon become evident. And now let us conclude: in the first, ruling Oneness not only the other onesses and ideas of things are contained, but all the truest

⁵⁹ F. Petrić, *Nova sveopća filozofija* (New Universal Philosophy), from »Posveta papi Grguru XIV i ostalim budućim rimskim papama« (A Dedication to the Pope Gregory XIV and the future Popes of Rome).

⁶⁰ *ibid.*

essences and all true beings, as well as the first life and all true lives, which are all at the same time separated and united, so that all are in all, but are also individual unto themselves.⁶¹

Petrić's system of sciences as he expounds it, stems from the two fundamental sciences concerning space — geometry and arithmetics (actinography, gnomonics, meteoroscopies, dyoptics, optics, catoptics, sciography, astrology, pneumatics, music, hydraulics, geography, surveying, barymetry). Expounding the system of the whole corporeal world and the first origin of bodies, as well as the system and the creation of the universe, Petrić revives the centennial philosophical issues: eternity and finality, simplicity and complexity, mortality and immortality, the perishable and the imperishable, the whole and its parts, as the first foundations of philosophy and philosophical proofs (*philosophicis rationibus et experimentis*). Petrić confronts the »delusions of the Aristotelians and the actual ignorance of educated people« with his own experiments. In expounding all the material and immaterial world, critically reviewing opinions of writers, philosophers and wise prophets, both of the past ages and of his own, as well as of scientists (*Tycho Brahe, B. Telesius, N. Copernicus*), Petrić's concern is for the school of truth and not for scholastic philosophy:

Therefore, if they do not bring anything to light or reach any reasonable conclusion, we shall throw them out of the school of truth in which the right way of philosophical thinking is taught.⁶²

Therefore, in Petrić's arguments it is not unusual to encounter on the same level opinions of philosophers and physicians, holy fathers and magi, accounts of chroniclers and observations of common people, together with his own (as for instance in the case of experiments he performed himself, measuring the level of salinity of the sea between Crete and Egypt). Being more apt to believe the testimony of the senses and the reliable judgement of reason than to follow authorities, Petrić gives numerous examples of wrong accords between the authorities and ridiculous controversies which ensued.

Petrić's synthetical work, adopting critically numerous components of the centennial philosophical heritage in the author's vision of the living universe and all-unity, is founded basically on the unity of knowledge, in the spirit of the Renaissance conception of the understanding of the circularity of the world process ranging from the sensory to the intellectual, in the assumption of the universal perfection — the perfection of the world with the circle as its form and essence.

With his idea of the autonomy of human knowledge and the freedom of thought Petrić contributed to the Renaissance spiritual restoration, which included both the imaginative play of poetic ecstasy, the

⁶¹ op cit, *Panarchia*, vol. XIV, p. 28 v.

⁶² op. cit. *Pancosmia*, XXII, p. 119.

utopian phantasy of young sciences (the political science, for instance) and the strict scientific method, modelled upon mathematics, they all being in the service of man.

The totality of knowledge characterizes each Petrić's work. Each work discusses virtually *everything*. Consequently, the dialogues on history »discuss everything that is related to history, writing and the study of history« (purpose, truth, general history, small history, the utility of history, government, warring, arts, crafts, etc.). The dialogues on oratory discuss everything related to oratory and speeches (speech, the object of speech, ornaments, parts of speech, orator, the range of oratory). The Peripatetic discussions concern the sum of Aristotle's philosophy. Working on the »long and tiresome« (*lunga e faticosa*) history of poetry, of poets and poems, which he collected and arranged (*raccolte e ordinate*), Petrić in his *Poetic Decades* expounds doctrines and opinions of writers, discussing in detail foundations of poetry, classical and modern poetic theories, genres and species, analyzing the poetic inspiration, and poetic subject-matter, in brief, all knowledge related to this phenomenon, out of gratitude to those who, according to him »revived many already extinguished disciplines and restored the most useful doctrines« (from the dedication to *Lucrezia d'Este*, the duchess of Urbino).⁶³

Each Petrić's work is a great enterprise and it is not meant only for specialist in individual disciplines (although directed primarily to them), but for any educated person whose concern is not to lose himself and his knowledge which, according to Petrić, »he should value above everything in this world.«⁶⁴ The whole theoretical substance of Petrić's writings, works, dialogues and disputes, by the globality of their solutions derived from the study of the knowledge of previous ages, by the new, individual and critical approach, as well as by understanding of the influence of knowledge on human society as a whole, points to his understanding of science and knowledge as the reality of man's world. In this way the whole of knowledge does not exhaust itself and it is not merely a recapitulation of scientific-theoretical truths but, what is more, the many-sided knowledge presents, in a way, a danger for human mind, a danger for man to get lost »in the darkest night of history«.

In other words, Petrić thinks of man in his historicity, out of obligation to regard the whole of *understanding*, acknowledging thus the importance of the totality of knowledge for man. In considering periods of human history, as well as periods in the history of poetry or oratory, Petrić always keeps in mind the actual development of human spirit in various traditions which is the meaning of his attitude

⁶³ F. Patrizi, *Della Poetica*, Firenze, 1969 (Aguzzi-Barbagli), I.

⁶⁴ F. Petrić, *Deset dijalooga o povijesti* (Ten Dialogues On History) op cit, the dialogue no. 2, p. 69.

towards the totality of knowledge, i.e. the question of *how to learn from history* so that, as the totality of human experience, it could become the fountainhead of the bond which ties humanity together. Converting the unknown into the known, which is made possible by the encyclopedic system of knowledge, it has the human action as its prerequisite, its basis and the test of its truthfulness. Adjusting his own action to knowledge, Petrić intuitively foresees the future of modern individualism. By making meaningful the true knowledge whose roots are in philosophy, by establishing the objective criteria of the scientific, Petrić's work will influence the development of later theories (natural science and historiography). As a representative of Renaissance scientific philosophy, affirming the epistemological character of the totality Petrić, through his world-view makes known his own formula of the idea of encyclopedic knowledge which requires interpretation, objective expoundability and informative quality of the expression of experience of philosophical thinking which has already been reflected in itself.

TRANSLATED BY LELIJA SOČANAC

IDEJA ENCIKLOPEDIZMA I FILOZOFIJSKO MIŠLJENJE

Sažetak

U corpusu višestoljetne hrvatske duhovne povijesti moguće je pratiti kako ideja enciklopedizma ostaje trajnom sastavnicom filozofijskog mišljenja i zaključiti o uzajamnosti filozofijskog i enciklopedijskog nastojanja na obuhvatu cjeline znanja i spoznaje, kao trajne avanture ljudskog mišljenja. Od glagoljske književne baštine, pojave lucidara i zrcala mudrosti, preko djela domaćeg humanističkog latinizata, renesansnih mislilaca i djelatnosti prosvjetitelja, erudita i polihistora, leksikografa, sve do novijega doba /I. Crijević, M. Marulić, P. Skalić, M. Vlačić, F. Petrić, R. Bošković, M. Ujević, A. Bazala, M. Krleža/, naši pisci i mislioci zauzimaju vidno mjesto u povijesti europske i svjetske filozofije i enciklopedistike. Enciklopedijska nastojanja pojedinaca i enciklopedijski pisana djela ostaju dokazom napora jednog naroda za svojom identifikacijom u prostoru i vremenu, osmišljenjem sveukupne zbilje i ogledalom njegove materijalne i duhovne kulture. A time i putokazom vlastita povijesna bića.



HERMANN THE DALMATIAN (11th/12th CENTURY) A SIGNPOST INTO THE DARK ORIGIN OF EUROPEAN SCIENCE

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Original Paper

UDC 1(091) Hermann the Dalmatian

The discovery of multiple layers of meaning of Herman the Dalmatian for the spiritual history of Europe is a peculiar piece of evidence concerning the crisis of European spirit in search for its identity by the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. The situation regarding the discovery of Hermann the Dalmatian as one of the oldest symbols of the Croatian national and cultural identity in the national cultural historiography of this country which, as a consciously outlined programme in the function of creating an awareness of the national »singularity and individuality« (Rački) was conceived with the Croatian national revival in the 1830's.¹

¹ According to the literature which has been published so far, A. Jourdain was the first to refer to the name and importance of Hermann the Dalmatian in his *Recherches critiques sur les plus anciennes traductions latines d'Aristote*, written in 1817. Twenty years later, when his son Charles Jourdain published the revised edition of the mentioned work, now under the title *Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote et sur des commentaires grecs ou arabes employes par les docteurs scolastiques.*, Paris, 1843, Šime Ljubić, having found this work, was the first to »discover« the name of Hermann the Dalmatian in this country, and he included him in his *Dizionario biografico degli uomini illustri della Dalmazia*, Vienna, 1856. A bibliographical insight into the literature on Hermann the Dalmatian, both in this country and abroad, can be gained in the works by Croatian authors, namely M. D. Grmek, *Hermanus Dalmata Slavus (or de Carinthia)*, The Yugoslav Encyclopedia, vol. III, Zagreb 1958, p. 678—679 and more recently in the work by F. Sanjek, *Doprinos Hermana Dalmatinca zbližavanju arapske i evropske znanosti na Zapadu u XII. stoljeću*. (A Contribution of Herman the Dalmatian to the Rapprochement of Arabic and European Science in the twelfth Century West), containing more extensive bibliographical references and annotations. See *Zbornik radova četvrtog simpozija iz povijesti znanosti — Prirodne znanosti i njihove primjene kod Hrvata u srednjem vijeku* (Proceedings of the 4th Symposium on the History of Science — Natural Sciences and their

A historico-philological character of the »critical research« into the beginnings of Latin translations of Aristotle, undertaken at the beginning of the nineteenth century by A. Jourdain who discovered in the process the name of Hermann the Dalmatian and his translations, was conditioned by a deep caesura in the spiritual and historical life of European spirit, not only in philosophy, but in general. After Newton's new physical and cosmological synthesis performed on the Copernican heliocentric basis according to the principles of modern quantitative and mechanically-oriented physics, after the French Revolution which had disrupted the socio-political system of Western Europe that had been the pillar of historical continuity in the life of its spirit for centuries, and after Kant's radical-involutive thinking which broke the innate relationship, not to say the identity, between thought and Being, it has become impossible to read Aristotle so directly, organically and in a philosophically »committed« way as he was able to read his predecessors and as he was read by his commentators, up to the age of the late scholasticism, including perhaps Leibniz as well. In a »more recent world« which came into being after and on account of the developments we have mentioned, that Schelling discusses in his *Lectures on the Method of Academic Studies* held at the Jena University in 1802, as the »world which is divided« into »the past

Applications in Medieval Croatia) (published by The Croatian Society of Natural Sciences, The Section for the History of Science), Zagreb, 1983, p. 69—83. The Symposium was held from 23rd to 25th November 1981 in Zagreb. Among foreign authors whose works contain more recent references to Hermann the Dalmatian, which have not been quoted by the authors dealing with Hermann the Dalmatian in this country, I would like to mention only three who have given an important contribution in promoting and stimulating research on the first identified scientist and philosopher in this country. They are: Richard Lemay, *Abu Ma'shar and Latin Aristotelianism in the twelfth century — The Recovery of Aristotle's Natural Philosophy through Arabic Astrology*, Beirut, 1962 (the second chapter, entitled *The first latin cosmologists clearly inspired by Aristotle's natural philosophy: Herman of Carinthia and Bernard Silvester*, p. 197—257) is of a special interest to us), Charles Burnett, *Hermann of Carinthia: De essentiis — A critical edition with translation and commentary*, Leiden — Köln, E.J. Brill, 1982, and Juan Vernet, *Ce que la culture doit aux Arabes d'Espagne*, Sindbad, Paris 1985, where he frequently mentions Hermann the Dalmatian. Those interested in Ch. Burnett as the editor of the critical edition of Hermann's treatise *De essentiis* can find almost all in the philological article by A. S. Kalenić *Temeljni problemi uspostave teksta rapsrave De essentiis* (Fundamental problems concerning the establishment of the text of the treatise *De essentiis*), published in *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine* (Contributions for the Exploration of Croatian Philosophical Heritage), vol. XII, no. 1—2, 1986. As to the interpretative and commentarial aspect, Burnett relies extensively on the mentioned Lemay's book, i.e. the quoted charpet on Hermann, which is essential to anyone attempting a philosophical interpretation of Hermann's original work *De essentiis*. In this country a survey and review of Burnett's book was written by Josip Curic in the periodical *Croatica christiana periodica*, IX (1985) 15, p. 118—122.

and the present«, this is impossible: to the past which has from then onwards been a »world« irrevocably »destroyed«, we are not related by »an inner link of an organically-progressing education« any more, but only by an »external link of historical tradition«, as Schelling diagnoses the crisis of the *historicity* of the European spirit.

Philosophy has been stricken by this in a peculiar way, the more so since, in addition to theology, it used to function, in its classical form and content, as the »other« spiritual substance of the old, pre-revolutionary eighteenth century Europe, whose spiritual and historical life had been *organically* disrupted. One of the external signs of this was the fact that neither original works by Plato and Aristotle nor their translations consecrated by tradition were trusted any more. Schleiermacher, the translator and interpreter of Plato for the *new* world and, which is more characteristic for the moment of crisis in the historicity of European spirit, the founder of *new hermeneutics* as a fundamental discipline within *historical sciences* into which *spiritual sciences* were transformed, suggested to the Prussian Academy to publish a philological-critical edition of Aristotle. This publishing enterprise of the century was, as we know, entrusted to Immanuel Becker (Aristotelis Opera, Bd. I—IV, 1831—1870).

With the critical-philological reconstruction of the »authentic« Aristotle's text (in distinction from the text which had, supposedly, been theologized and deformed by scholasticism), the question imposed itself more persistently than ever of how it is possible that the »pagan« Aristotle could have become the *Philosopher* of the Latin-Christian West. The critical-philological question was: when, where and how, from which and what kind of models, was Aristotle translated to Latin for the first time? Which and what kind of comments of his works eventually preceded or followed this translation? Almost all these and similar questions relevant for the establishment of the Latin Aristotelianism were posed by the already mentioned A. Jourdan. In his research related to these questions, among other translators connected with large twelfth century translators' centres, especially those in Spanish cities which returned to the Christian world the fall of the Cordoba Caliphate in 1014, he was the first who came across Hermann the Dalmatian. As will be discussed in greater detail later, at the time he translated sacral Islamic, mathematical and astrological texts from Arabic, as well as Greek literature on mathematics and astronomy.

The interest in the Middle Ages, i.e. in the age of Hermann and his work, from the beginning of the nineteenth century onwards has been nourished from various sources: namely, the Catholic stream in Romanticism, the restoration of scholasticism and the birth of neo-scholasticism, followed by an intensified historiography of medieval theology and philosophy, as well as by a powerful and dynamic ascent of the history of science. Judging from the literature in the world and

in this country² it is perhaps owing to the latter that Hermann the Dalmatian has been studied most, and his work has been profiled and made known owing to the fact that it has found its deserved place in the works of such scholars as P. Duhem,³ Ch. H. Haskins,⁴ and L. Thorndike.⁵ Owing to the popularity of their works they have contributed to the awakening of interest in Hermann's work (as well), and have encouraged, directly and indirectly, the publishing of critical editions of his original work *De essentiis*: it was published for the first time by M. Alonso (*Herman de Carinthia, De essentiis*, Santander 1946) this edition has been used by scholars in this country who have been dealing with Herman so far, as well as by Charles Burnett in his recently published *Herman of Carinthia, De essentiis. A critical edition with translation and commentary*. Leiden-Köln, 1982). The work on the preparation of the third, Croatian critical edition is under way.

The spiritual and historical situation in which Hermann was discovered in his own country will be outlined here only briefly, since it has been done more extensively elsewhere.^{5a} Now we shall mention only the most important facts. As one of the oldest symbols of the national cultural and historical identity, Hermann the Dalmatian was brought to light for the first time around the mid-nineteenth century by our historiography, which at the time took it upon itself to help in

² After the quoted article written by Grmek in The Yugoslav Encyclopedia, young historians of science in this country have developed an interest in Hermann, which has found its expression at the mentioned Symposium on the History of Science in Medieval Croatia (see the quoted *Proceedings*). We should mention here, of course, *Povijest egzaktne znanosti u Hrvata* (History of Exact Sciences in Croatia) (Zagreb 1982, 1—2) written by Žarko Dadić in which he gives an account of the life and work of Hermann the Dalmatian together with literature concerning this author (vol. I, p. 19—23).

³ *Le système du monde*, Paris, 1914—1956 (in 7 volumes).

⁴ *Studies in the History of Medieval Science*, Cambridge 1924.

⁵ *History of Magic and Experimental Science*, New York 1923, on Hermann see II vol. p. 83—85.

^{5a} In the paper *Herman le Dalmate et son traité De essentiis* read by author at the international interdisciplinary symposium «La culture croate au Moyen âge — Racines et ramifications» held on 6th and 7th December 1985 at the Paris Sorbonne. The text of the paper, together with other materials from the symposium, will be published in the second volume of the series *Croatica Parisiensia* (II) in Paris. The following question was posed in the paper: «when and how did Herman the Dalmatian become the subject of interest of scholars dealing with Croatian culture?» In answer to this question the cultural-historical context of the *Croatian National Revival* was outlined, which marked the beginning of modern national historiography in the function of identifying the Croatian national culture with regard to its spacio-temporal integration. As has already been mentioned, it was in this context that Šime Ljubić (1822—1896), animator and promoter of the Croatian National Revival in Dalmatia, discovered, among others, the name of Hermann the Dalmatian in the quoted work.

the creation of an awareness of the »individually and singularity« (F. Rački) of its nation, in addition to its critical and scholarly function. We should also say that the initiative to deepen further our understanding to Hermann and his work has not been undertaken by the historiography of Croatian philosophy either with F. Marković as its originator or later. A greater interest in Hermann and his work developed, in analogy to the world situation, with the advent of the history of science which has been developing more intensively in this country in the last few decades.⁶

So much about some of the aspects of spiritual and historical context of research which has discovered and has so far been trying to determine the importance of Hermann the Dalmatian. Further research concerning his work as a whole should profile the function it had in the dramatic process of the creation of (early) European spirit out of heterogeneous elements which from then on it has been supposed to keep in balance in order to preserve its own identity. By his original scholar's initiative undertaken in the *age he lived in*, Hermann the Dalmatian reminds us in a peculiar way of this truth, now that it has been apparently deeply forgotten again.

II

During the past hundred and fifty years or more after Hermann the Dalmatian was discovered as the one who, owing to his translations of Arabic scientific works containing elements of Aristotle's natural philosophy, blazed the trail for the penetration of Aristotelianism to the Latin West, the research has managed rather reliably to shed some factual light on his translator's and original scientific and philosophical work, but very little on his biography. It is supposed that he was born by the end of the 11th and the beginning of the twelfth century in Istria, which is known for certain since he acknowledged it himself. That he acquired, or could have acquired, the elementary and humanistic education at one of the numerous Benedictine mona-

⁶ About the development of the history of science in this country in general, see: Vladimir Bazala *Pregled hrvatske znanstvene baštine* (A Survey of the Croatian Scientific Heritage), Zagreb 1978, especially the last, XI chapter entitled *Rad na sakupljanju hrvatske znanstvene baštine* (Work on the collection of Croatian scientific heritage) (451—473), and *Foreword* and *Introduction* to the already mentioned book by Zarko Dadić. In addition to the purely bibliographical aspect (Š Ljubić, M. Breyer, M. D. Grmek, F. Sanjek) the first historico-scientific analytical approach to Hermann's work was attempted at the already mentioned symposium *Prirodne znanosti i njihove primjene kod Hrvata u srednjem vijeku* (Natural Sciences and their Applications in Medieval Croatia) (see *The Proceedings* we have quoted).

stic centres in Istria,^{6a} most probably with the Benedictines at the Abbey of St. Peter and Paul at Šuma or at the monastery of St. John at Medulin⁷, remains hypothetical. He tells us, however, that his teacher was Thierry of Chartres, known for his collection of texts about seven arts (*artes liberales*) entitled *Heptateuchon*, under whom he studied philosophy, whether in Chartres or Paris, we do not know for certain. We know for certain, however, that on that occasion he was acquainted with the Englishman Robert of Ketton, thus starting a friendship which was to last for the whole of his lifetime. With his friend he shared a great deal of his living and intellectual destiny: they went together to eastern countries by the way of Greece, remaining for a longer time in Syria, where they studied languages, specially Arabic, in order to be able to study the »secret writings« from the »most hidden Arabic treasury«.⁸

To curious intellectuals coming from the Latin Christian West, directed towards the Islamic-Arabic East from which the light of the »new« science — astrology came, the path to Syria, as one of the first »islamized and arabized« eastern countries⁹ with numerous cultural centres rich in writings coming from diverse traditions (early Christian, classical Greek, Hellenistic and Islamic-Arabic), was opened by the First Crusade starting the Christian reconquest. Its first result was the fact that the Christian-Jerusalem kingdom reached its widest expanse under Fulke of Angevins (1131—1143), therefore at the time when Hermann the Dalmatian was staying in Syria with his friend. Judging from the clearly marked later orientation of interest in his study and research, this stay was crucial for Hermann. If we only knew for certain which primary and secondary sources of the mentioned traditions he came across with his friend there, which texts he had studied and the copies of which he probably took on his leave, the discussion on the sources of the inspiration in his writing of the treatise *De essentiis* would have a different problematical structure. We shall discuss it in greater detail later.

After his return to Europe he travelled with his friend to Spain where, as »students of the art of astrology« (*studentes astrologicae ar-*

^{6a} On political, economic and ecclesiastical conditions in Istria by the end of the 11th and the beginning of the twelfth century, therefore at the time when Hermann was born and when he acquired his elementary and humanistic education, see: Nada Klaić *Povijest Hrvata u ranom srednjem vijeku* (A History of the Croats in the Early Middle Ages), Zagreb, 1971, p. 457—473.

⁷ The quoted article by F. Sanjek, p. 72.

⁸ *De essentiis*, Proemium, Burnett, 70—72. I am quoting Ch. Burnett, as well as Kalenić's translation, although not always to the letter. I can not refer to Kalenić's critical-philological version of Hermann's original text, since it has not been published yet.

⁹ As to the terms »islamization« and »arabization«, see: Maurice Lombard, *L'islam dans sa première grandeur (VIIIe—XIe siècle)*, Paris 1971.

tis) they were received by Peter the Venerable (Venerabilis) and were prevailed upon to translate, with an abundant financial compensation, some Islamic religious texts, including Kur'an itself. From this Islamic religious group, Hermann translated the texts entitled *De generatione Machumet et nutritura eius* and *Doctrina Machumet, quae apud Saracenos magna autoritas est*. As one of the contributions of the people of this country to the process of creation of the universal European spirit out of heterogeneous elements, we should point out the fact that the Ragusean Ivan Stojković (1443), during a diplomatic mission, found in Constantinople a manuscript of Hermann's translation of Kur'an, had it copied, and it was on the basis of this copy that Bibliander was to publish it in Baselin 1543, together with Hermann's translations of the mentioned Islamic texts. The main interest of Hermann as a translator, however, went in another direction, and was determined by his own scientific and philosophical interest. Both he and his friend were primarily interested in astronomical and astrological texts coming from the »Arabic treasury«, as well as in scientific texts belonging to the classical Greek tradition.¹⁰

As to the state of the art in research today, a catalogue of Hermann's translations, according to Burnett's classification, would be the following: a) mathematical writings: Euclid, *Geometria, arithmetica et stereometria*, better known under the title *Elementa*; Theodosius, *De Sphaeris*; al Khwarizmi, *Zij* (astronomical tables); Ptolemy, *Planisphaerae*; writings on physics: Saul ben Bishr, *Zaelis fatidica* (or under the titles *Liber sextus astronomiae, Pronostica* and *De revolutionibus*); *De occultis* (opinions of Arabic astrologers on how to find a lost treasure — that is how Burnett describes the content of this work); *Liber ymbrium quem edidit Hermanus* (on forecasting weather according to stars and planets); Abu Ma'shar *Introductorium in astronomiam* (Ausburg, 1489); Abu Ma'shar *De revolutionibus nativitatum*; Abul ibn Casim Maslam, *De usu et de utilitatibus astrolabi*; Ptolemy, *Canones*; Ptolemy, *Almagest*.

A specific complex of problems is related to each of Hermann's translations we have quoted. In some cases the basic questions concerning the authentication of the attribution remain open, since the manuscript or a reliable transcript as the last and the most reliable link in the process of identification has not been discovered (yet). More subtle and exciting questions, and not only those related to the philological science, are those concerning Hermann's translations we have

¹⁰ The main interest of Hermann and his friend is revealed in Robert's dedication of his translation of al-Kindi's *Judicia* to Hermann, as well as in Robert's letter to Peter the Venerable which he sent together with the translation of Kur'an in which he says that this work had taken them away from their main task (Ch. Burnett, op. cit. p. 5—6, and F. Sanjek, the quoted article, p. 83, note 68).

quoted. In other words, it is not always clear whether we are dealing with a free paraphrase or a really literal translation, in the cases where the Arabic (or any other) original is unknown. From comparative analyses of Hermann's translation with those by other translators of the same Arabic texts, e.g. Abu Ma'shar's *Introductorium*, Hermann's tendency to reduce redundancy, characteristic of the language of the Arabic originals from which he translated, in such a way as to »capture« only their core meaning,¹¹ becomes apparent. He had to adopt this approach on account of his literary taste formed on classical Latin literature and on the strictly *objective* type of Greek, as well as by the logically sharpened and perfected medieval thinking in which he was educated. Although interesting, these specific philological problems related to Hermann's work as a translator, are outside the scope of this article.

From the standpoint of the essential meaning of Hermann the Dalmatian and his work as a whole for the development of European scientific and philosophical spirit, among his translations the central place is awarded to his translation of Ptolemy's works, and especially and above all to the translation of Abu Ma'shar's *Introductorium*. This work meant a qualitative turning-point in Arabic scientific literature at the time it appeared, since it introduced for the first time almost all the relevant elements of Aristotle's natural philosophy¹² into Arabic astrology. The earlier orientation of Arabic astrology towards the study of effects of stars and planets upon earthly events, with a pointed and therefore limited interest in the art of medicine, with the appearance of Abu Ma'shar's work was supplemented with Aristotle's natural philosophy, or to be more precise, it found its metaphysical-cosmological foundations there. By translating this classical Arabic astrological work, Herman became acquainted with Aristotle's natural philosophy, so that later, in his original treatise, he even adopted it *before* (i.e. without) a direct contact with Aristotle's works on natural philosophy (*libri naturales*) the titles of which, as it is supposed, he did not even know, with the exception of the work *On Soul*. By translating this Abu Ma'shar's work, and later by his treatise *De essentiis*, he awoke the interest in the new astrological science and thus mediated Aristotle's natural philosophy to the Latin-Christian West, which did not know anything about it at the time (i.e. at the beginning and in the first half of the twelfth century). Up to that time, namely, Aristotle was known only as a great teacher of logic, dialectic, rhetoric, topic

¹¹ Comp. the comparative analysis of Hermann's translation with the translation of the same Abu Ma'shar's *Introductorium* by John of Seville in R. Lemay, *op. cit.* p. 20—40.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 40—132.

and interpretation, but not as a metaphysician and natural philosopher yet.

In spite of its doubtfulness, which will be thematized later, the assumption that Hermann with his translations directly mediated in the establishing of the twelfth century Latin Aristotelianism in the described way, means a significant methodological break-through in the historiography of medieval philosophy in general.¹³ It was necessary to break the »orthodox« methodological scheme in the exploration of the reception of Aristotle's natural philosophy in the Latin-Christian West which proved successful when dealing with the thirteenth century. Together with Grabman, it used to be claimed that the trace of the first Latin translations of Aristotle's »naturalist« works (*Physics*, *On Heaven*, *On Existence and Decay*, *On Soul*, *Meteorology* and, of course, *Metaphysics*) should be followed persistently, together with commentaries of these works of any provenance (Greek, Arabic, Hebrew) according to a scheme which had been applied with success and had been verified in exemplary cases: Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. In these two cases we can speak of the reception of Aristotle's natural philosophy which occurred as a result of a *direct* study of the mentioned works. This was a methodological model which was intended to penetrate a step *backwards*, into the twelfth century, after the discovery of a whole circle of translators, philosophers, theologians and scholars who were, with insignificant exceptions, active around the mid-thelfth century and were, as it is readily observable, directly and indirectly interrelated.¹⁴ In the process a peculiar phenomenon has become apparent: namely, that their writings and correspondence evidently contain elements of an Aristotelian metaphysically oriented cosmology without either quoting or even mentioning any of the respective Aristotle's books. In addition to Bernard Silvester, the case of Hermann the Dalmatian and his work *De essentiis* is exemplary in this respect.

Challenged by this phenomenon, the explorations conducted on the basis of the mentioned methodological scheme, which proved success-

¹³ An account of discussions concerning the »problem of the arrival of Aristotle's *Libri naturales* to the West« during the past »more than a hundred years«, actually starting from the already mentioned A. Jourdain, has been given in R. Lemay's introduction, *ibid.*, p. XIII—XL.

¹⁴ In addition to Hermann, R. Lemay includes in this circle Adelard of Bath (c. 1080—c. 1145), John of Seville (whose work is known fairly well, but almost nothing is known for certain concerning his biography, apart from the fact that he worked in the age of Hermann, see e.g. L. Thorndike, *op. cit.* vol. II, p. 73—78, William of Conches (1080—1145), Bernard Silvester (*De mundi universitate* as his main work; the year of birth and death unknown), Roger of Hereford (his activities reaching their peak around 1170), Daniel of Morley (the peak of activity around 1180), Raymond of Marseilles, the already mentioned Hermann's friend Robert of Chester, Alfred of Sarashel, Alanus de Insulis and Raul Longchamps (*Op. cit.* p. XXIV).

ful when dealing with the thirteenth century, with all the interesting and valuable findings with regard to other aspects of the state of the art in science and philosophy in that century, ended in a blind alley.¹⁵ Having understood this, Richard Lemay thought that a completely different approach should be undertaken: namely, that we should not follow the trace of the translations of Aristotle's works and their commentaries, but the trace of the *new* (at the time) astrological science of Eastern provenance, which was followed by a more pronounced interest in works on mathematics, geometry and arithmetics. One of the classical astrological works of this kind, as we have already described it, is Abu Ma'shar's work, which was translated independently, first by John of Seville, and later by Hermann the Dalmatian. This had the role of the initiation into Aristotle's natural philosophy, not only with respect to his translators and the mentioned circle surrounding them, but also elsewhere in various cultural centres of the twelfth century Latin Christian West. This is where the importance of Hermann's work as a translator lies, seen primarily from the point of view of the history of philosophy. The history of science, such as it is, stresses other aspects both of Hermann's translations and of his original work.¹⁶

III

Reviews and interpretations of *De essentiis*, Hermann's original work, finished in 1143 in Beziers in Southern France, end as a rule in doubt as to the essential characteristic of its content and method. Faced with its atypic quality, in comparison with philosophical-scientific treatises in the first half of the twelfth century in the Latin-Christian West, C.H. Haskins, who was the first to analyze in detail *De essentiis* and who published large fragments of this work, concludes his analysis of Hermann's treatise with this helpless statement: »the global impression is rather confusing since it is a conglomerat rather than a fused whole«. Worked out in detail, the impression of the respected scholar is this:

¹⁵ Many manuscripts, which have been discovered »by chance«, dealing with astrology, alchemy, medicine, mathematics, geometry, botany and mineralogy, have puzzled historians of medieval philosophy and theology who have expected if not exactly the same, than at least a similar model of intellectual curiosity as in the thirteenth century. All these new materials should have been interpreted in a new light, and not merely as »superstition«, as the »orthodox« neo-scholastically-oriented historiography of medieval philosophy was prone to interpret it.

¹⁶ Criticism of the approach of the historians of science in this country to Hermann's work (see the mentioned *Zbornik* (Proceedings) can be found in the author's paper read in Paris which has already been mentioned.

»From the opening pages ... we find a curious mixture of the Platonism of Chartres, the Aristotelian physics, and the Neo-Platonism of Hermes Trismegistus.«¹⁷

These are »very pertinent remarks«, as Lemay comments.

Another interpreter who has, in our opinion, penetrated in greatest depth into the essence of *De essentiis* with regard to its content and method so far, is Richard Lemay.¹⁸ The title of the chapter dedicated to *De essentiis* contains a thesis on the general importance of Hermann the Dalmatian: together with Bernard Silvester, he is »the first Latin cosmologist clearly inspired by Aristotle's natural philosophy«. Therefore, in the introductory part of this chapter already, having paid due respect to his perceptive analysis of details, he opposes Haskins' evaluation of *De essentiis* as a whole. He points out three positive elements characterizing the essence of the whole of Hermann's treatise, which have »escaped Haskins' attention«, namely: first, the exceptionally original character of this first attempt of a Latin scholar to perform »an acceptable synthesis« of the Latin tradition, consisting of the Bible and Platonism on the one hand, and the »new science« coming from the Arabs on the other; second: the synthesis »stands out« as the first significant imbuing of the Latins with Aristotle's natural philosophy«, which is at the same time Lemay's central thesis concerning *De essentiis*, and third: Hermann's Aristotelianism is mostly derived from Abu Ma'shar's *Introductorium* which Hermann had recently translated to Latin (1140). We should also say that R. Lemay could reach an understanding of these essential positive characteristics of *De essentiis* owing to the fact, which had been perceived clearly by Haskins as well and which Lemay has acknowledged, that Abu Ma'shar was the authority most frequently quoted of all (Haskins) in *De essentiis*.

In exploring other possible sources of Hermann's inspiration, both of the Eastern provenance (eg. al-Kindi's work bearing the same title, namely: *Liber de quinque essentiis*) and belonging to the classical Greek and Latin traditions, the experts on which he had the opportunity to meet in Chartres, Lemay establishes, by a comparative analysis, the similarity and difference in plane, thematic and problematical structure, as well as individual deductions concerning each of the five »essences« both in Hermann's treatise and in al-Kindi's work of the same name, together with, as a matter of course, Abu Ma'shar's *Introductorium*, following a strictly strategic line in the argumentation of his main thesis: namely, that the twelfth century Latin Aristotelianism

¹⁷ Op. cit. p. 56—57.

¹⁸ Let us remember that the chapter dedicated to Hermann in the work we have quoted is: *The first latin cosmologists clearly inspired by Aristotle's natural philosophy: Hermann of Carinthia and Bernard Silvester* (p. 197—257).

was mediated by works of Abu Ma'shar, the greatest Arabic authority on astrology from 848 when he wrote his work *Kitab al-mudkhal al-kabir ila 'ilm ahkam an-nujjum* onwards. Lemay follows the trace of the indisputably established fact that this work by the great Arabic teacher of astrology was translated twice during the period of only seven years: first by John of Seville under the title *Liber maior introductorius ad scientiam iudiciorum astrorum* (in 1133) and afterwards by Hermann who translated it in 1140 under the title *Introductorium Maius in Astronomiam*.

The final conclusion of Lemay's analysis of *De essentiis* becomes clearer in the light of this general thesis. We are quoting it in its entirety:«

At no point during our inquiry on the origin of Hermann's Aristotelianism was it possible to find any cogent evidence of a direct knowledge of some of Aristotle's natural works in Hermann. But, thanks to his contact with Abu Ma'shar's *Introductorium* whose significance for natural science and metaphysics he had an opportunity to grasp while translating it, Hermann was afforded the occasion of absorbing a substantial portion of Aristotle's metaphysics and natural philosophy. His *De Essentiis* is a pioneer work of twelfth century Aristotelianism resulting from this contact; furthermore, Gundisalvus' later plagiary of it in the *De Processione Mundi* only enhanced its importance during the twelfth century and long thereafter.

We shall not attempt a detailed analysis of the «strengths» or «weaknesses» of this thesis here. I would nevertheless like to point briefly to the essential problems involved here, with the obvious risk that, without a more extensive elaboration, it might not be sufficiently profiled. First I would like to note that the thesis concerning Hermann's «objective» Aristotelianism *without* Aristotle, seen externally, has been objectively, factually and plausibly documented. However, a deeper hermeneutic problem remains which is usually not thematized by the historiography of philosophy and science, even in cases, such as the present one, when it confronts it directly. In this case, the question would be as follows: what does Hermann's Aristotelianism *before*, or without the knowledge of Aristotle mean? The question might be pinpointed if we mention the fact that Hermann wrote his work in a critical attitude towards Aristotle as a *natural philosopher* meaning, of course, *such as he could have known him and as he actually knew him*. Is not therefore the whole of Lemay's interpretation of Hermann based on the standpoint of the *later* European Aristotelocentrism which definitely prevailed in the following, i.e. the thirteenth century with Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas? Let us repeat once again that the

* Ibid., 257.

standpoint of the later, Christianized West Latin *Aristotelocentrism*²⁰, is not, in our view, adequate for the interpretation and understanding of the authentic Hermann's starting-point, both with regard to themes and problems he deals with, and to its methodology.

After all, it seems that Lemay's basic orientation in his research was conditioned by a wrong methodological orientation in the historiography of medieval philosophy of the time (including even Grabmann who tried to correct it methodologically). That is to say, it started from the assumption, suggested by the model of reception of Aristotelianism in the thirteenth century (Thomas Aquinas!) that Aristotelianism in genere entered the Christian Latin West *through a direct contact* with Aristotle's works on natural philosophy (*libri naturales*), regardless of the text (Arabic, Greek, Syrian etc.) from which they were translated, or at least through a direct contact with commentaries (of any provenance and tradition) of *these* Aristotle's works. It was in this way, it was supposed, that Aristotelianism entered the twelfth century as well, and not through a »new« science called *astrology* which came from the infidel Islamic Arabic East that the Christian West was waging war against, both armed (The Crusades) and doctrinary (*Summa contra gentiles* by Thomas Aquinas). In this respect Lemay's thesis means a decisive break of the methodological scheme used by the historiography of medieval philosophy up to that time, on account of which any productive research into the intellectual situation in the twelfth century was paralyzed.

IV

The study of Hermann's work as a whole (i.e. both his translations and original works) should now follow the trace of *his* own scholarly interest instead of our ephemeral one, and pursue the immanent thematic and problematical starting-point as well as the structure of his work. Here we can only outline both his negative-critical tendencies and his positive-affirmative ones. We believe that they will point sufficiently to the epoch-making horizon in which Hermann's scientific and philosophical interest was constituted both with regard to its object and its methodology in the twelfth century Latin-Christian West dominated by the Neo-Platonist theologized Augustinism and Aristotelian logicism. Hermann's initiative counters, or perhaps only by-passes this domination.

²⁰ The contrary can also be taken as valid, i.e. by the introduction of Aristotle's philosophy, or his metaphysics as »ancillary« to Christian theology, Thomas Aquinas also »aristotelized Christianity« as we have tried to show in our (unsigned) text under the title *Publisher's note in: Thomas Aquinas, Selected works, Zagreb / Globus* (selected and edited by Tomo Vereš), p. VII—XIII).

He gives a critical account of the spiritual and intellectual situation of his age to his friend in this way: »We can see, my Robert, that a great deal of the scholarly effort of ancient wisdom was dedicated to the matter we have been discussing, but that nobody has managed to grasp the obviousness of the whole. Thus Plato, having expounded the original creation, took pains to reach the final, presenting in this way a part instead of the whole. Aristotle, on the other hand, encompassed the whole and the extremes and finally concluded without establishing a mediating link.«²¹

We should note the essential core of Hermann's critical evaluation of the theoretical situation of his age, which was to determine his research in *another* sense. The ancient wisdom, both »eastern and western« had not reached a clear insight into reality as a whole (evidentiam integritas). Plato, presented to the Christian Latin West as the highest authority of ancient wisdom by Greek and Latin Fathers, especially Augustine, by his genealogy of the highest ideas, shed light only on the *extreme* (extremum) propounding it as a part (partem) for the whole (totum). Aristotle, on the other hand, known to the West only by his writings on logic at the time through which, perhaps, it could intuit »another« Aristotle, i.e. Aristotle the physicist and metaphysician, did encompass the whole (totum) or, to put it in the Aristotelian manner, pânta tà aítia, but he neither thematized nor shed light upon the inner context (contextus) of the *middle* (mediorum), tà mēsa aítia, binding the extremes (extremitates) together or tà ákra aítia. (Aristotle's hypothesis being that the one who has understood the extremes has at the same time understood the middle)²².

Put in the most condensed way, Hermann's thematical and problematical starting-point in his negative-critical determination is: in spite of the fact that light has been shed on the extreme parts, the whole has nevertheless not become transparent because the *middle* (medium) in the construction of the universe (in universitatis constructione) has not been either thematized or studied.

This, of course, announces already Hermann's positive determination of his own object of research. It will be precisely the neglected *middle*. Why? Because, Hermann explains, the *middle* (medium) is of a crucial importance for the whole (totum): it is the only binding link (solum compaginis retinaculum) in any composition (in omni compositione) and is therefore »equipoised« within the structure of the world and as such »it is the knot of the primary composition (omnino primariae compositionis nodus).« Since it is »rightfully endowed with such power« the *middle* has been that which »the supreme artificer

²¹ Burnett, op. cit., p. 150.

²² (Anal. post., 89, 23—24)

(*summus artifex*) intended to take as his instrument (*instrumentum*) in the secondary composition (*secundariae compositionis*).²³

A further and more concrete definition of the *middle* as the object of Hermann's exploration in *De essentiis*, either as planets placed between the eight spheres as »the highest extreme« (*suprema extremitas*) and the earth as the »lowest end (*infimus terminus*)« or as »the secondary cause (*causa secundaria*)« with its associated »secondary generation« (*generatio secundaria*) or »primary (*primaria*)« and »secondary (*secundaria*)« composition (*compositio*) in that which is called nature (*naturam vocat*) in common speech (*usualis sermo*)²⁴ would be, without a gradual derivation of the whole, whose place is not and can not be here, only titular and placative in character. We should therefore stick to the following: the *middle* (*medium*) is the actual object of the »new« science called »astrology« which was founded by »wise astrologers« and not by Aristotle with his *libri naturales*. Hermann the Dalmatian, namely, does not know even their titles around the mid-twelfth century, and they are unknown to Paris theologians who were in 1210 and 1215 still pulling the strings to the prohibition of reading, study and diffusion of the »new« Aristotle. Consequently, Hermann's Aristotelianism« as an intentional commitment or orientation is out of the question.

In the end we shall say a few words about Hermann's methodological scheme of deduction in *De essentiis*. Such as it is and as it »functions« in the treatise it can obscure easily the essential determination of its object, i.e. the *middle* (*medium*). The treatise begins with a »definition« of the essence of that which is (*ea quae dicimus esse*). It is that which is *simple in substance* (*simplici substantia*), of the same nature (*eadem natura*), which does not tolerate anything alien to itself (*nichil alienum*). That which exists in this way is referred to by the proper name of essence (*proprie nomine essentiae nuncupatur*).²⁵ He then proceeds to the five principal kinds of essence (*causa, motus, locus, tempus, habitudo*) among which the first two, namely cause (*causa*) and motion (*motus*) with their respective primary generation (*generatio primaria*) make up the first part, or the first book, while the discussion about the remaining three kinds — place (*locus*), time (*tempus*) and habitude (*habitudo*) with their respective secondary generation (*generatio secundaria*) — makes up the second part.

In this scheme we are inclined to read the Christian-theological influence, so that we could conclude that the whole of Hermann's treatise is not strictly and »purely« »natural-philosophical« in cha-

²³ Burnett, *ibid.*,

²⁴ *Ibid.*,

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

racter, like e.g. the already mentioned al-Kindi's writing,²⁶ Abu Ma'shar's *Introductorium*, or Aristotle's »natural philosophy« itself. In principle and without a more extended elaboration, we can answer only this: from the most ancient times onwards, there has been no attempt to explain the integrity of the universe by its »natural« laws which could consider itself to be the science bearing the ancient and lofty name of *astrology* without containing certain theological elements. This can be applied also to Chaldean, classical Greek (Aristotle!), Islamic-Arabic or any other astrology worthy of its name. The fact that Hermann's astrology is more under the influence of a definite theology does not mean that other astrologies are *pure* »natural« philosophies and sciences, i.e. that they are *without* a certain determining theological context.

Although interesting, and not of a minor importance for the constitution of astrology as a science in the ancient sense, such discussion would remove us from our central problem, namely the object of Hermann's treatise *De essentiis*. Our conclusion is that it is the *middle* (medium), instead of that which is *beyond* the highest extreme (suprema extremitas = eight spheres) which theologians under the influence of Augustine thematized, and objectified in their definitive, (formal) logicist manner, inadequate to the matter itself, to such a degree that after Anselm the end was in view of the process of irradiation and formation of the epoch which we refer to as the Middle Ages, which was being extinguished at the time when European counter-humanism was born; neither the highest extreme itself (suprema extremitas = eight spheres) which is only a *part*, admittedly the most elevated, but still only a part, and not the *whole*. Neither the *lowest end* (terminus infimus = the earth), which would in itself be dead and sterile unless connected to the highest by the *middle* which, as a connecting and balancing factor within the whole, encourages mixture and determines the essence of the mixed. Hermann (among others) was enchanted by this specific role of the middle within the whole. After the twelfth and thirteenth century his work will draw the attention enigmatically for three more times: at the beginning and throughout the sixteenth century, when his translations of astrological and scientific works were published, at the beginning of the nineteenth

²⁶ »The latter (i.e. al-Kindi) is a pure metaphysician thoroughly imbued with Aristotelian principles and Aristotle's conception of the World, while Hermann is a theologian confronted with metaphysical notions of diverse origins...« In spite of Lemay's high evaluation according to which Hermann actually wished to reconcile the pure natural-philosophical perspective with the Christian-theological view, his efforts being »original« and »important«, he nevertheless thinks that Hermann's treatise *De essentiis* as a whole is artificial: »Only the result is an artificial whole...«. R. Lemay, op. cit., p. 202—203.

century when his name and the importance of his translator's works were »discovered« in the context of the efforts to reconstruct the genesis of Latin Aristotelianism and finally, in the twentieth century when, exploring the essence of European science and searching for its dark origins, we can determine with greater precision the real object and importance of the treatise *De essentiis*.

TRANSLATED BY LELIJA SOCANAC

HERMAN DALMATINAC (11/12. ST.): PUTOKAZ U TAMNO PORIJEKLO EVROPSKE ZNANOSTI (?)

Sažetak

U prvom dijelu razmatra se duhovni i intelektualni *kontekst* istraživanja u svijetu i u Hrvatskoj koja su od početka 19. stoljeća (A. Jourdain) identificirala ime Hermana Dalmatinca (Hermanus Dalmata) i utvrđivala značenje njegova djela za konstituiranje latinskog kristijaniziranog aristotelizma i aristotelocentrizma. Bitnu karakteristiku tog konteksta vidi autor u *krizi* identiteta evropskog duha koju je izazvala Newtonova nova kozmologijska sinteza, Kantom radikalno uzdrmano povjerenje u teologiziranu metafiziku i francuska revolucija. Ta kriza izražava se u filozofiji prekidom organskog razvoja njezine tradicije, što se kompenzira, na primjer, *kritičko-filologijskim* izdanjima Aristotela i *povijesno-filozofijskim* rekonstrukcijama latinskog aristotelizma.

U drugom dijelu razmatra se Hermanov prevodilački rad, posebno značenje njegova prijevoda aristotelovski utemeljenog Abu Ma'sharovog *Introductorium* preko kojeg je latinskokršćanski Zapad u 12. stoljeću prvi put upoznao Aristotelovu prirodnu filozofiju (R. Lemay). U trećem dijelu razmatra se do sada utvrđeno značenje *De essentiis* (Haskins, Lemay), s posebnim kritičkim osvrtom na tezu o Hermanovom aristotelizmu *bez* poznavanja Aristotelovih *libri naturales* (Lemay).

U posljednjem dijelu raspravlja se o pravom predmetu *De essentiis* i Hermanovoj metodi u tom astrologijskom traktatu. Autor vidi pravi predmet tog traktata u onom *srednjem* (medium) što je između *najviše* krajnosti (suprema extremitas = osam sfera) i onog *najnižeg* (terminus infimus = zemlja), a što snagom svog položaja u *sredini* spaja cjelinu sve-mira (tota universitas), podstiče miješanje čistih elemenata i uobličuje miješano (mixta). To je ujedno predmet astrologije koju Herman upoznaje kao *novu* znanost čiji predmet razvija i samostalno istražuje u *De essentiis*.

THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHIC-PHILOSOPHICAL
ORIENTATION OF MARKO MARULIĆ*

VLADIMIR FILIPOVIĆ †

Original Paper
UDC 17:1(091) Marulić

A great deal, relatively speaking, has been written in this country about Marko Marulić, the pioneer of Croatian literature. His poetical works have been analysed both with regard to their form and content, comparisons have been made of poetical thoughts and expressive devices in order to establish the degree of their originality and see the components and the force of influence of his models. Since his teachers, both in this country and abroad, are well-known, as well as the list of books belonging to his library,¹ which reflects the richness and universality of his classical education, and since he himself does not try to conceal but, on the contrary, mentions his teachers, poets and models from which he sometimes borrows the content, sometimes the form, Marulić's philological analysts have already given many positive data concerning his life's work. Starting from the first great explorer of Marulić's work, namely Ivan Kukuljević Sakcinski,² who collected or at least recorded the largest part of Marulić's works onwards, we still do not have a well laid-out and critically expounded literary heritage of this poet and philosopher so far, since it is still scattered throughout European libraries. Today we nevertheless know the ge-

* Printed in »Zbornik u proslavu petstogodišnjice rođenja Marka Marulića 1450—1950« (The festschrift in honor of the fifth centenary of the birth of Marko Marulić, 1450—1950) published by The Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1950, vol. 39, p. 279—298. It was torn out of the whole edition of the book and replaced by the printed discussion of Vjekoslav Štefanić entitled »Još Marulićevih stihova« («More Verses by Marulić«).

¹ Repertorium librorum — see F. Rački: *Oporuka M. Marulića* (The testament of M. Marulić), »Starine«, published by The Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts, vol. XXV, 1892.

² *Pjesme Marka Marulića*, (Poems by Marko Marulić), collected by Ivan Kukuljević Sakcinski, »Stari pisci hrvatski« (Old Croatian Writers), Book I., published by The Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts, Zagreb, 1869.

neral outlines and principles of his work, so that we can give it a precise historical evaluation.

Marulić's works reflect the cultural and historical, as well as the necessary creative dualism which, being conditioned by education and tradition, on the one hand, is reflected in his Latin linguistic expression, while on the other, the tendencies of the new age, the historical situation marked by crisis and love of his imperilled town and his nation, have conditioned his poetical creation in Croatian. We should not wonder at either. His teachers were Latin, and Latin was written throughout Europe, wherever any scholarly literature was written at all. Latin was used as the universal expression of scientific thought of the age, so that the rarest of exceptions within the whole body of scholarly literature of the age only confirm this general rule. Science as such is universal, and is therefore expressed in Latin. On the other hand, there are truths which are completely practical, so that Marulić expresses them in the vernacular. It is owing to these practical motives that poetry and practical philosophy (ethics) came to be expressed in the vernacular. This continuation of the work of the writers of early Croatian religious poetry (of »naših začinjavci«) is a consequence of a poetical and creative personal aspiration of a gifted poet together with the needs of his environment which is looking for guiding principles as the help in the first line of battle between two cultural-political tendencies in this part of the world. That Marulić loves his people and sings out of this love has found its expression in the following thesis (from his Latin poem *De quattuor Ecclesiae Doctoribus*): »Amor patriae dat animum«. The love of his country and its people is a powerful motive behind Marulić's pioneering work in the vernacular. He is induced to this work by the same enlightener's motives which will condition Kačić's work later. Marulić expresses this in his foreword to »Judita«. The main heroine liberates her country from the »impeding peril«. Marulić says: »Having heard this story I had the idea to re-tell it in our native tongue, so that it could be understood also by those who have not studied Latin nor read scholarly books.« So, let wide reading public find its instruction, consolation and encouragement there. His literary works in the vernacular were the result of the need to awaken national consciousness. His sincere patriotism becomes evident also in his work on collection ancient Salona inscriptions (»Inscriptiones Salonitanae antiquae«), as well as in his efforts to prove, in a controversy with an Italian version, that St. Jerome was from Dalmatia, and not from Italy. All this grew out of his true and sincere patriotism.

It is an established fact that all of Marulić's work, including both his Latin prose and his Latin and Croatian poetry, has didactic and moralistic features. This fact is evident in all the aspects of his work. Milivoj Šrepeš has tried to prove by using documentary evidence that »the poet of 'Judita' is more concerned with moral tendency than with

poetical elaboration«.³ Surmin (in Vijenac, 1900) states correctly with regard to »Historija od Suzane« (»The History of Susanna«): »It results clearly from the whole elaboration of this poem that the only thing Marulić had in mind in writing this poem was to give a moral lesson to his readers«. Little or nothing has been written about this general and fundamental tendency in Marulić's work, and even when this fundamental tendency is characterised, the characterisation is negative. Starting from Branko Vodnik who claimed that Marulić's work was a »reaction against Humanism«⁴ up to Miroslav Krleža who says that the »Humanism in this country was extinguished, stuck in the obedience to the church and true religion«, all authors claim the same. Even when Krleža, a little farther in the text, puts forward the correct thesis that Marulić's works »De institutione bene beateque vivendi per exempla sanctorum« (1506), »Evangelistarium« (1516) and »De humilitate et gloria Christi« (1519) are only the ideological prolegomena for »Judita« as their synthesis⁵ (although it had been published earlier!) he neither at this point nor later gives historical reasons for the need of such cultural orientation; Marin Franičević⁶ who wanted to establish the historico-economical context out of which Marulić's ideology and his creative works were conceived, gave so many quotations and hypotheses concerning the historical circumstances, and derived so many generalized analogies, that the main motive of Marulić's works not become any clearer. Why did all these »dialecticians« and »thinkers« »sail the secure course under the wing of the Inquisition and the patronage of the Society of Jesus« — is not answered either by Krleža or by M. Srepeš, in the same way as M. Srepeš does not answer the question on why »Marulić's literary work does not reflect the Renaissance spirit« although he states it as a fact.

The answer to this question is of the utmost importance within the framework of any historical evaluation and categorization. — Why did this humanist, this disciple of Italian Latin poets and Averroists of Padua, this expert on pagan philosophy, ground all his scholarly works and all his poetry upon the Christian moral theology? — The answer to this question can be found in the historical situation in which

³ Milivoj Srepeš, *O Maruliću. O 400-godišnjici Marulićeve »Judite«*, (On Marulić. On the 4th Centenary of Marulić's »Judita«), »Rad« Jugoslavenske akademije (»Work« of The Yugoslav Academy), vol. 146, Zagreb 1901, p. 59.

⁴ Branko Vodnik, *Povijest hrvatske književnosti* (A History of Croatian Literature), Zagreb, 1913, p. 99.

⁵ Miroslav Krleža, *O Marinu Držiću* (On Marin Držić), »Ogledi iz književnosti« (Essays on Literature), vol. 7, Prosvjeta — Belgrade, 1949, p. 5.

⁶ Marin Franičević, *Marko Marulić i naša književna historija* (Marko Marulić and the History of Literature in This Country), »Republika«, Zagreb, 1946, no. 7—8, p. 574—602.

Marko Marulić, the poet and philosopher, lived and worked, linked to his environment and its destiny in a manifold and intimate way.

Numerous philosophers-humanists of this country who lived and worked abroad, in foreign cultural milieus, have given splendid contributions to the world Humanistic and Renaissance thought within the European framework.

Thus the famous humanist Juraj Dragišić, who was born at Srebrenica in Bosnia († 1520), known under the name of Georgius Benignus de Salvatis (Franjo Marković mentions him under the name of Juraj Dobrotić) fleeing from the Turkish cruelty in Bosnia, arrived to Dubrovnik from where he went to Italian universities (Rome, Florence, Bologna, Pavia etc.) and farther, to Paris and Oxford. He became a pedagogue at the ducal courts of Urbino and a friend of Lorenzo Magnifico, as well as a member of the famous Platonist academy of Gemistos Plethon. As a professor at the University of Pisa and the rector in Florence, Dragišić belonged to the circle of the most famous representatives of Neo-Platonist philosophy of his time as a free anti-Aristotelian stream, which was far removed from the petrified scholasticism. If we take into account the fact that he attacked the rigid scholastic orthodoxy together with famous Ulrich Hutten as well as that he defended Savonarola who died at the stake, we should not wonder that for a whole he had to seek refuge from »the anger of his adversaries« in Dubrovnik (1497—1500). Marković is right when he concludes that Dragišić »had an inclination towards a freer direction in philosophical thinking owing to Bogomolism which, as a young man, he had carried within himself from Bosnia to the world« (p. 21). Owing to his Latin works he entered the history of European philosophy. By mentioning also Dragišić's famous contemporary, Benko Benković (a native of Zadar, † 1525), a well-known Aristotelian of Duns Scotus persuasion, and adversary of Thomism, a professor at the Paris Sorbonne, and the Ragusean Grgur Natalius Budisaljčić († 1550), a famous Thomist and adversary of Neo-Platonists, whose controversy with Agrippa of Netesheim belongs to the most famous disputes of the age, we are pointing to only a few of a whole pleiad of famous and distinguished humanists who came from this country. We could fill pages and pages in just recording the names and works of these prolific humanists. One of them (Vasil Gućetić) was even given this epitaph: »Hic situs est ille, qui scripsit opuscula mille«. They all participated in those decisive ideological struggles with the obsolescent and worn-out scholasticism without which it is impossible to imagine the exponents of the new natural-philosophical European movement, marked by the names of Cardanus (1501—1571), Telesius (1508—1588), Petrić (1529—1597), Campanella (1568—1639) and Giordano Bruno (1548—1600), who laid the foundations for new monistic views in philosophy and science. All these humanists living at the turning point of the millenium of European history revised and broke an obsolescent and petrified ideology,

which was imposed as a superstructure over the social system which could not resist any more the tendencies of development of a new social structure with its related new economic forces. They all nourished their thoughts and ideas on the revival of the Classics on the one hand, and on the powerful ascent of natural sciences and technology on the other. Rigid moulds of ecclesiastic-scholastic wisdom were being broken, while the new faith in man, in his power and value, was growing. New possibilities of life and new hopes opened new perspectives and established new ideals. At this most important turning-point of cultural history so far, this country has given tens and hundreds of people to Europe, whose names have entered the history of West-European culture as important factors in its progress. All these philosophies, however, are neither reflections of life in this country nor the expression of its milieu. All these humanists have given solutions to certain problems which, far from the troubles and problems of this country, represented most valuable contributions and incentives to the universal science of Europe, but without establishing a living link with their own nation.

Forms, tendencies and living conditions of any individual nation are so diverse that, as a result, neither scientific thoughts nor poetry can be transplanted from one environment into another without dying in the process. It is therefore clear that historical criteria and evaluations can not be applied universally without being incorrect and unjust. It is on account of this that the work of Marko Marulić can neither be linked nor compared to works of these compatriots who were living and working far from their country. Marko Marulić therefore has a special place both in Croatian and European cultural history, because he was living and working in his country, in his native town, under its special living and cultural conditions. His works are written for a wide reading public as an answer to the needs of everyday life dictated by serious troubles of his age. They are not needs pertinent to a school, they are not scholasticism, but needs of life, a philosophy of life. They are a reflection of our everyday cares and troubles, answers to the questions of real life.

It is the task of historians and biographers to construct and verify, on the basis of archival materials, all the particulars of great historical events which took place at the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century, the period in which Marko Marulić, a descendant of an old aristocratic family, a nobleman and a dignitary, accumulated his experiences and participated actively in the life of his nation. They have made significant discoveries so far, and have also corrected a great deal, so that today we know for certain, for instance, that former theses according to which Marko Marulić spent the two years when he was away from Split as a friar at Nečujam were incorrect, since at the time there was no monastery there. During his lifetime he had never been a friar or an anchorite, and he had never despired earthly goods. On the contrary! The fact of his living for a while

at Nećujam was actually a consequence of his love of the countryside, where he often invited his friends for entertainment. He held classical writers who praised the countryside in high esteem, such as for instance Catullus («De agri cultura»), Varro («Res rusticae») and Columella («De re rustica»). This literature occupies a prominent position in the list of the books belonging to his library (according to his testament). »As a nobleman he carried out his civil duties, looked after his property, defended the interests of his kin, and went out to market-places and streets and was in constant touch with people«. ⁸ — What about the politico-historical situation? The whole of Bosnia and a large part of Croatia were under the Turkish occupation already. Turkish military units and armed groups came as far as the circumvallation of Split and during Marulić's lifetime bands of Turkish robbers pillaged the fields of Salona and Split, Trogir, etc. Dalmatia was increasingly afflicted with various troubles and misery under the pressure of Turkish raids and pillages. Three Marulić's brothers participated as commanders of Split galleys in battles against the Turks, and were apparently killed there. Split was filled with wounded and sad refugees who had been forced to leave their homes which had been set on fire by the Turks. The same fate was hovering all the time over Split as well.

This difficult and lasting war psychosis, and the imperilled freedom of his town, had a more powerful influence on the problems he dealt with in his works and on the themes of his poetry than economic perturbations of his age, in which the young middle classes with their growing prosperity forced Marulić's noble kinsmen to try to protect their old positions which was accompanied by the greed for earthly possessions which were becoming increasingly scarce. This slow dying out of feudal organizational forms of social economics which could not resist the tendencies of the new middle-class capitalist production any more, which came into being owing to the discoveries and progress of natural sciences and the resulting development of technology, was almost invisible confronted with the vital danger of war that confronted his people. These economic and social problems did not find a direct echo in the content of Marulić's literary works, but were expressed only indirectly and partially when dealing with the issues of the deprivation of monasteries and churches as the leading educational centres of the time.

Without any doubt, Marulić was an expert on all the aspects of public and political life of his town and country. As a member of the municipal council he was involved almost all the time in public affairs. He was also a honorary town judge («iudex honorabilis») and a

⁸ Cvito Fisković, *Prilog životopisu Marka Marula Pečenića*, (A Contribution to the Biography of Marko Marul Pečenić), »Republika«, vol. VI, no. 4, Zagreb, 1950.

member of the court (*»iudex curiae«*) and as such he came to know many aspects of life. He was also a controller of notarial papers, and did other services as a nobleman. His satirical poems, in which he castigates vices of his age, reveal a good knowledge and a critical eye in observing all the phenomena in the life of his milieu. Fisković is right in saying that »The poet was not a solitary and he did not »turn away from people« (Kolendić) but was up to his advanced age constantly in touch with people, and not only those of his own class, but also with craftsmen and peasants from nearer and farther surroundings of Split.«

However, in the serious historical situation, in a lasting war, confronted with the cultural-political alternative: either Islam or Christianity (*tertium non datur*) — Marulić could choose only the latter. In this part of the world at this moment, even the alternative: scholasticism versus Reformation, could not become topical. The Christian idea, in addition to being an express antithesis to Islam, was the only banner of war under which Marulić could invite his nation and its allies (*»In Christo credentium unum est regnum, una ecclesia«*). Marulić actually wrote a missive to the pope Adrian VI because only his word could mobilize the strongest fighting forces in Europe. The inscription on the missive reveals the meaning of his request: *»Epistola Domini Marci Maruli Spalatensis ad Adrianum VI. Pont. Max. de calamitatibus occurrentibus et exhortatio ad communem omnium Christianorum unionem et pacem«*.⁹ In the missive Marulić gives and extensive account of the helplessness of his country, lying from Danube and Belgrade, across Sava and Drava, under the Mohamedan yoke, destroyed, burnt down and weak. While European nations fight among themselves, the barbarian is penetrating Europe. Marulić says in his missive: *»Nam dum alii aliis perniciem mediantur, dum mutuo mordentur, divisos ac debilitatos Barbarus captata occasione invadens facile superabit.«* Marulić's patriotism and his invitation to European nations to stop warring among themselves and start together a war against the Turks, found its clearest expression in the appendix to his work *»De ultimo Christi iudicio«* which says: *»Persecutiones tamen a Mahumetanis patimur, et in dies Christianorum regna Infidelium armis occupantur. Et nihilo minus inter tribulationes istas non minuitur malitia multorum, sed abundat. Neque solum refrixit charitas, verum etiam odia multiplicantur. Haud satis est Christianis, quod ab infidelibus infestantur, inter se dimicant, inter se digladiantur, gens contra gentem, regnum adversus regnum. Nostra quippe memoria, tanta Gallorum, Hyspanorum, Italarumque strages facta est, tot fortium virorum caedes perpetrata, ut ad effugandos ab Europa atque Asia Muhameitanos satis essent. Nunc vero ita adhuc agunt, ut reliquum orbem illis facilius possidendum relinquunt, milite vacuum, ac defensoribus exu-*

⁹ Roma, 1522.

tum.«¹⁰ Marulić points to all the troubles and sacrifices suffered by his nation in its struggle for freedom, which is at the same time the freedom for the rest of the Christian world. («Commune periculum communibus armis propulsandum est»).

In his poems: »Molitva suprotiva Turkom« (A Prayer Against the Turks), »Tuženje grada Hjeruzolima« (Laments of the Town of Jerusalem), as well as in »Judita«, Marulić points to this hard fate under the Ottoman rule, to the tears and dying of children and women under the heel of the merciless pagan, so that he implores the pope to mobilize all, from the Spaniards to Austrians, Czechs and Hungarians, to fight against the Turks. («Skupi sve krstjane, ter se počni rvati, to vidiv pogane, jati će bigati») (= »Gather all the Christians, so that they could fight, when the pagans see it, they will flee in fright«). All Marulić's poetical works contain an explicit historico-political tendency. — Christianity, and nothing but Christianity, can save his people. The united Christians are the only force which can be mobilized to war against the Turks. His greatest literary work in Croatian, his »libar, u kom se uzdrži istorija svete udovice Judit« («book telling the story of the holy widow Judith») is nothing but a story in verse about the Biblical heroine who liberates her people from »velike pogibli« (a great peril). This »great peril« is the main motive of Marulić's literary artistic and scholarly work as a whole. Numerous repeated editions of »Judita« are a clear indication of the topicality of its themes and of a powerful and wide interest, which could grow only out of the needs of life itself.

It is in these historical facts that conditions and sources of Marulić's philosophical or, to be more precise, moral and ethical conceptions can be found. His studies of the Classics could not lead him to religious indifferentism or even paganism, since the circumstances in his country and the suffering of his people could not allow it. He could not even enter the controversies between his teachers — Averroists and Alexandrians. He could not incline either towards Barozzi's Averroism or Pomponazzi's peripatetic school, but not because, as claimed by Šrepel, »all these operations of acute thinking are cultivated at the expense of the heart, emotion and mystical life«¹¹, but because they were unimportant and of no consequence, and even harmful to the needs of his milieu and to the purpose of Marulić's writing. All these »theoretical disputes« were just unimportant nuances from the standpoint necessary for Marulić's living practice, for the life of his country. Consequently, when Marulić translated Thomas à Kempis to Croatian, he did not do it out of theoretical motives, because »Thomas à Kempis

¹⁰ *Grada za povijest književnosti* (Sources for the History of Literature), II, p. 15.

¹¹ *Evangelistarium M. Maruli Spalatiensis, opus vere Evangelicum sub fidei, spei et charitatis titulis VII. libros partitum*, Coloniae, 1529., 4th ed.

was inclined to mysticism« (Šrepol) but for the same reasons for which this work was published in thousands of copies throughout Europe. It won thousands of readers and taught them ideas that Marulić was concerned about. After all, this clear passage from the afterword to his »Evangelistary« bears witness to the fact that he cared more for moral instruction, which he considered more necessary and useful than arid erudition and useless speculation: »Huc igitur vota, huc studia vestra conferantur, ut si minus liceat eruditionem simul et virtutem possidere, magis optetis probitatem sine doctrina, quam sine probitate doctrinam.« This practical creative tendency dominates the whole of Marulić's work, as witnessed by the Latin epitaphs of his friends. Marulić wrote in order to endow his people with a moral force in the struggle against a powerful and merciless enemy. It took lots of moral strength, as well as conscious popular and ideological unity and firmness for the defense of a town and a country on the borders of European civilization. In the age of Marulić it could be given only by Christianity. Therefore the claim of Marin Franičević that Christianity »was linked to an epoch, which had already passed, so that only a bare form, ritual and parade remained, and it became a means to lull consciences to sleep« is arbitrary and historically incorrect. It is certain that Marulić did not moralize and philosophize in the Christian spirit in order to »parade« and »lull individual consciences to sleep« on the contrary, to awaken and strengthen these consciences. In a town of war refugees, of horrors and uneasiness of war, there was no room for »parades« no was it a time when »consciences were being lulled to sleep«. It took comfort, self-confidence and the belief in the victory of good, and these values, although at the turning-point of the millenium, were still clearly defined only by the Christian ideology.

Marulić also condemned Bogomilism which he considered to be a sinful error and a danger which could break the unity of the front of defense against the Turks. He says in his »Prayer Against the Turks« (»Molitva suprotiva Turkom«: »Rasrjen činjaše, da tvojega puka pod vlast stavljaše patarska ruka« (»The Bogomil hand brings ruin by subjugating your people«).

It results clearly from what we have said so far that Marulić is primarily a moralist and not an ethicist. He sets forth and expounds moral principles, gives instructions for everyday life, and criticizes moral deprivations of people, especially of those who are supposed to lead the populace in its moral education. Marulić is very courageous and decided in this criticism. Therefore he theorizes less on the questions of sources, laws and purposes of moral conduct and evaluation, as the object of ethics. This has been also determined by the needs of his environment in which one should not theorize on morality but show practically the path to moral living. This is an urgent need at the moment when it is necessary to be united in the struggle against the enemy, in the town where the economic prosperity of the new middle classes has brought about the bandoning of the framework of

feudal-ecclesiastical, although frequently hypocritical moral rigorism. The new moral practice inclines towards ethical naturalism, hedonism or even utilitarianism, and this standpoint can easily lead from moral relativism to nihilism. Marulić rejects such views because they can not be a firm basis of moral living. It is on account of this that he tends to establish a firmer link between moral views and supernatural ethical conception of Christian dogmatic moral theology and heteronomous ethics. — Thus the principles of his ethics can be perceived both in his theoretical and poetical moralizing. The ethical foundations upon which this moral theology rests are obvious.

His »Evangelistarium«¹² is nothing else but moral theology in which, with regard to essential virtues (*fides*, *spes*, *charitas*), many practical instructions are given which are related to a variety of questions and problems of life. As he points out in the foreword to his work, he considers ethics to be the most important, fundamental philosophical discipline. He says verbatim: »...sicut sol omnium {siderum fulgentissimus pulcherrimusque habetur, ita supra omnes scientias eminet illa, quam ethicem vocant, quia de morum vitaeque cultu pertractat. Cum enim nihil in homine laudabilius virtute sit, nihil vitio detestabilius, quid ea doctrina magis egregium magisque amplectendum videri debet, quae hominem ipsum instruit ac erudit, qua ratione et a malitia declinet et suadeat probitati?« — »Evangelistarium« is actually a »wise guide through the difficult path of human life«. The writer of the foreword to the above quoted edition says about the work: »Taceo multiplicem litterarum cognitionem, ut utrum elegantiore stylo an doctrina magis valeat, non facile possis dijudicare. Donavit itaque nos divino hoc opusculo, ut alias alia. Cui Evangelistarium nomen indidit, ex intimis sacrae theologiae fontibus, abditaque utriusque instrumenti lectione haustum. Totam tripartitam moralem philosophiam complectitur«. On the other hand, Marulić says modestly in his foreword, that there is nothing original in his work, and that everything has been faithfully taken over from holy books.

Problems he deals with encompass a far wider area of moral living than can be detected from the title. Under the first heading, dealing with faith, Marulić transcends the framework of the problem of religiosity, and the titles of individual chapters themselves (»De animi, constantia«, »De animi inconstantia«, »De animi fortitudine«, »De animi imbecillitate«, »De contemptu gloriae«, »De gloriae appetitione«, »De mortis conditione«) reveal the manysidedness of his themes related to ethics.

Marulić juxtaposes the Christian ethics to the Stoical one which he considers to be the highest expression of scholarly, philosophical ethics, and says in the foreword to his »Evangelistarium«: Quibus profecto si obtemperare curabimus, non erit ipsa sibi pretium virtus, ut Stoici dixerunt, sed virtuti merces accedet, pro mortalitate immortalitas, pro corruptione incorruptio, pro miseria beatitudo, denique deo

ipso frui licebit cum dei jussa peregerimus, eiusque perpetuo gaudebimus conspectu, qui sua luce omnia illustrat, sua sapientia omnia gubernat, sua potentia omnia sustentat.«

The problem of eternity and the problem of death, as the highest criteria of moral conduct, are not dealt with in the ancient classical ethics. Marulić, on the other hand, bases the whole of his moral theology upon them, and derives from them his ethics. Here is one of such passages: »Non est ibi stabilis gloria, ubi non est vita diuturna. Nobilem ignobili, liberum servo, divitem pauperi, strenuum ignavo, doctum indocto, sapientem stulto, regem denique privato aequat mors«.—

The work itself, as a practical book of life, soon had ten editions.

Marulić's work »De institutione bene beateque vivendi«¹³ published many times in its Latin original during the period from 1506 to 1796 (in Venice, Solingen, Cologne, Antwerp, Paris) and translated to Italian, German, French and Portuguese, was the work whose success has surpassed all works by the writers of this country, which have been published both before, Marulić and after, up to the present. Forewords to various editions, as well as the diffusion of the work, testify to the high value attributed to the work through centuries. The work itself is even richer than »Evangelistarium«, since it is complemented by ethical views of Greek and Latin writers, and his model was the Roman writer Valerius Maximus.

In a series of examples Marulić shows how noble and wise men renounced all earthly goods (»De terrenis bonis«) and decided in favour of transcendental values, how they fled frivolous happiness (»De inani gloria fugienda«) and desired humility (»De humilitate appetenda«), how they did not long for honors (De dignitatibus non concupiscendis«), avoided avarice (»De avaritia vitanda«), preferred to live in poverty (»De pauperitate servanda«) and solitude (»De vita solitaria«), in order to be as free as possible of all the earthly, transient and worthless. Marulić proceeds so far as to give practical instructions concerning vigilance, dreams and bed (»De vigiliis et somno et strato«) where he says: »Omnes nos filii lucis et filii diei sumus, non noctis neque tenebrae, igitur non dormiamus sicut caeteri, sed vigilemus et sobrii simus.«

At the beginning Marulić always gives a short general introduction on the deficiencies of earthly goods and human weaknesses, and juxtaposes to them the ethical ideal in the sense of the Christian moral theology. He always gives examples from cultural, and especially from ecclesiastical history. First he gives examples for men, and then goes on to give examples for women. Moral instructions are given through images which are supposed to serve as models in the life of all, for all.

¹³ M. Maruli Spalatensis *De bene beateque vivendi*, Basiliae, 1513.

His work thus represents the universal treasury of ethical theories and moral concepts of his age, which are either put into balance or rejected according to the Christian ethical criterion. The work — like the rest of his moral writings — consists of a series of interesting images with telling examples from everyday life and from the lives of exemplary men. These instructive anecdotes (although not completely biographical in character!) are taken mostly from the Bible, but also from other literature in which worthy men are dealt with. The book also gives examples criticizing cases of pharisaism and hypocrisy encountered in those who have accepted faith and the church only externally, for their personal benefit, and do not live accordingly. Marulić described this type of man in his 44th parable entitled: »De doctore, qui aliter docet aliter vivit«. Everywhere we encounter the same moral-didactic tendency: namely, to win over and prevail upon men to accept the principles and values of true Christian life.

Marulić is familiar with classical Greek and Roman ethics. He knows moral principles and ethical concepts of his age. In the affirmation of ethical principles of Greco-Roman cultural circle he sees deficiencies with regard to Christian ethics. His poem: »Stumačenje Kata po Marku Marulu S.« (»The interpretation of Cato according to Marko Marul S.«) is the clearest example of the way in which Marulić adapts the principles of classical morality to the principles of the Christian moral theology.

Franjo Maixner, in his treatise on the translations of Cato in Croatian literature¹⁴ quotes Marulić's amplifications of thoughts in his adaptations of Cato's moral distichs. We shall not enter the discussion concerning Maixner's thesis on the age of these »Dicta Catonis« or »Disticha moralia Catonis«, i.e. whether they date from the end of the fourth, as claimed by Maixner, or from the beginning of the third century which is, apparently, more correct. Neither shall we enter the dispute on whether they are distichs by Cato the Younger or the Older, Seneca, Cicero or someone else, since it is not relevant to our problem. The fact remains that throughout the Middle Ages and up to the 18th century Cato's Latin distichs written in hexameters were used throughout Europe as the book for the study and theoretical exposition of morality. »Dicta Catonis«, were therefore translated to all European languages. They were, for instance, translated to Czech by the great pedagogical reformer Komenský.

The writer of these verses was certainly a pagan, but nevertheless a promoter of strict Stoical principles. These principles were corrected in various ways through centuries, but Marulić's corrections are a re-

¹⁴ Franjo Maixner, *Prijevoditi tzv. »disticha moralia Catonis« u hrvatskoj literaturi* (Translations of the so-called »disticha moralia Catonis« in Croatian literature). — »Rad« Jugoslavenske akademije (»Works« of The Yugoslav Academy, vol. LXXIV., Zagreb, 1885.

flection of his Christian rigor. At every point where a thought is too pagan, he replaces it by a Christian one, and where it is not clear enough in the Christian sense, Marulić supplements and expounds it. In brief, he frequently polishes up the Stoical concept in keeping with the Christian moral theology and Christian world-view. He adds thoughts, which could not have been those of Cato, so that the »interpretation of Cato« is actually a Christian interpretation of Stoical ethics. We shall take as an example Cato's »ne timeas mortem«, as the principle which was accepted both by Stoics and Epicureans, because the fear of death always impairs life's happiness and the necessary peace of mind. These Cato's verses in the sense of the classical Greek ethics are:

»Ne timeas illam, quae vitae est ultima finis:
qui mortem metuit quod vivit, perdit id ipsum«.

Marulić paraphrases or »interprets« them in this way:

*Pripraviti se nastoj tere se ne č' bojat
kad dojde konac tvoj, da s ufanjem stojat;
ufanje će t' podati od grihova kajanje,
jer hog di, da će dat kajanim spasenje«.¹⁵*

/»Try to prepare yourself, not to be afraid,/ to stand up with hope when your end comes;/ hope will give you repentance for your sins/ and God will save those who repent).

This »interpretation« has nothing to do with classical Stoicism. The verses are interpreted in the light of the Christian attitude to the problem of death. The classical concept which says: »While we are alive, there is no death, and when death comes, we are no more« has nothing to do with Christian hope, repentance and salvation, as the addition in Marulić's translation. — When coming across the non-Christian, egoistical principle: »dum fueris felix, semper tibi proximus esto«,¹⁶ he omits it and suffuses the verses with a new meaning. Marulić translates this verse which is a clear expression of Cynical ethics: »Pauperitatis onus patienter ferre memento« adding it his own meaning in this way: »Uboštva težinu s utrpjenjem nosi, a raja višinu razmišljaj i prosi«¹⁷ (Bear patiently the burden of poverty and think and pray for heavenly heights); or he supplements the verse: »Felices obcunt, quodrum sine crimine vita est« in this way: »On blažen i slavan s ovoga

¹⁵ *Stamačenje Kata po Marku Marulu S.* (The Interpretation of Cato according to Marko Marul S.), »Stari pisci hrvatski«, (Old Croatian writers), book I, 1869, p. 129.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

svita gre, ki griha pokajan ispovijen mre.«¹⁸ (He leaves this world in beatitude and glory, who dies in repentance and confession of his sins«).

Marulić translates the whole of Cato in this way in a series of paraphrases, so that we frequently have to ask ourselves why the original Latin verses were quoted at all. — In dedicating these instructive moral verses to a wide populace, Marulić has replaced the classical form of the hexameter by his dodecasyllabic lines rhyming in the middle and at the end of the verse, using this form, which he considers to be more easily accessible, to give practical instructions for life which are not allowed to be paganly ambiguous, but should be clear and precise in the Christian spirit, which is in keeping with Marulić's work as a whole.

In his »Dialogus de laudibus Herculis. Interlocutores Poeta et Theologus«¹⁹ Marulić clearly expresses his attitude concerning the relationship of the Greco-Roman understanding of morality to the Christian moral theology.

The problem of the highest good as the criterion of all ethical values, as set down by the first Socratic schools in antitheses between Cynics, Cyrenaics and Megarans, arrived through the »Christian Renaissance« (from the eighth to the eleventh century) to the secular Renaissance, i.e. the age in which Marulić established his philosophy. Diverse concepts of hedonism and eudaimonism, where the meaning and value of life is found either in bodily pleasures or in the absence of needs and the peace of mind, are all based on the principles of an autonomous morality and subjective happiness which are found in a personally chosen ideal of life. Marulić rejects this moral subjectivism and relativism. He criticizes all forms of moral autonomy, utilitarianism and hedonism. While in »Evangelistarium« he juxtaposes The Gospels to secular philosophy, and in »De institutione« lives of saints to lives of famous men, in this dialogue the theologian is juxtaposed to the poet-humanist.

The dialogue as such is the literary form of Humanism, used to imitate classical Greek and Roman writers, in this case Plato's philosophical way of exposition. By the use of this form special liveliness and persuasiveness in the exposition and defense of ideas is attained. Like Plato, who in his dialogues frequently creates the realistic atmosphere in which a scene (an encounter, a feast, a meeting) is taking place, Marulić describes an encounter between a theologian and a poet under the shades of plane-trees in the summer heat, with the sun already setting at the end of their long dialogue and their departure. The

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 149.

¹⁹ *Liber Marci Maruli Spalatensis, De laudibus Herculis, Interlocutores Poeta et Theologus*, Venezia 1524.

polemical dialogue itself is so lively and realistic that our philosopher presents us even the mood of the poet at the moment when he feels that the theologian is not listening to his words carefully enough.

The dialogue is a discussion between the poet and the theologian. The former is a humanist and a man who values material goods. The theologian voices the idea of the Christian moral theology. When the theologian asks the poet: »Which mortals do poets glorify most? — the poet answers »They sing most of ancient heroes, of Heracles, Jason, Perseus, Diomedes or Argive, Ajax, Meleager, Ulysses, Theseus, Achilles, Aeneas and others. They were heroes greater than ordinary men. The greatest among them was Heracles«. — The poet goes on to glorify Heracles' heroism, which the theologian opposes and shows that the greatest hero is the one who is able to conquer himself. »Fortior est enim qui carnis lascivientis violentiam continentiae virtute calcat, quam qui virium magnitudine aprum superat«. The natural good, such as for instance the lion's courage, is nothing but arrogance. On the contrary, a much greater good is humility. The pagan Cerberus is actually a three-headed devil who captures people by luring them to evil, by ingratiating himself, or by frightening. A real Christian rejects all that, and when the theologian finally convinces the poet that real worthiness and glory can be attained only through wisdom and holiness of spirit, the poet thanks him for this lesson, since he comes to understand himself: if bodily advantages were worthier, a beast would be worthier than man. — The theologian advises to scorn futile fables and accept the rules and regulations set down by the Church. — In brief: Marulić sets down the principles of ascetic-spiritual and heteronomous Christian moral theology as antitheses to the ideals of hedonistic-naturalist and autonomous pagan morality.

Marulić, however, does not stop here. He also attempts the criticism of the theory of moral theology — ethics. In his Latin poem, translated under the title: »Versi, ravno pročtiti, stoički, okomito pročtiti, epikurejski. Marko Marulić složio« (»Verses, if read horizontally — stoical, if read vertically — epicurean. Composed by Marko Marulić) he juxtaposes very wittily the stoical to the epicurean ideal of life. As a matter of course, in keeping with the ecclesiastical Renaissance as a whole, he inclines towards the Stoical ideal. The Stoical ethical ideal, namely, corresponds to the Christian moral ideal in its rigor and the price it requires for the peace of mind and spiritual values, although it does not offer real certitude.

In his Parables²⁰ — especially the tenth — Marulić defines substantially Epicurean and Stoical, as well as Christian ethical values. He juxtaposes concrete, ascetic ideals (poverty, renunciation, restraint,

²⁰ *Marci Maruli Quinquaginta Parabole*, 1518.

humility etc.) to richness, honors, luxury, lust and bodily pleasures. This is where the meaning of ethicality and the value of life is.

Marulić also deals with the psychological problem, still topical today, of the relationship between sensuality and reason, instinct and moral awareness or conscience. In the parable »De quinque sensuum pugna« he depicts in an allegorical way this eternal human struggle and the victory of reason over instincts which can be achieved only by a relentless struggle against all the carnal lusts. »Sin vero fortiter constanterque repugnauerimus, rationis freno carnis appetitum comperentes...«.

We should point out that Marulić frequently gives good psychological analyses, which are often striking if we have in mind the time when he wrote his work. When speaking of human propensity to evil and the possibilities that even small bad influences can greatly damage the whole (... »modicum fermentum totam massam corrumpit«, 20), through vivid accounts of struggles of our conscience, he reveals his familiarity with the living, real, everyday human soul and its perpetual troubles.

In philosophical ethics Marulić always sees doubt as, in his opinion, a characteristic of philosophy which is useless for the living practice, like inconstancy and ignorance. In the first of his parables Marulić says literally: »Dubitare autem philosophorum est, qui nihil certi affirmant.« Or in the introduction to his »Evangelistarium« where he says: »Errare utique ipsi philosophi potuere, sicuti et errarunt in plurimis, quoniam homines erant: deus autem, quia solus consummatissimae sapientiae est, falli aut errare nullo modo potest«. As we can see, he rejects the relativist philosophical ethics in life, since it can establish nothing for certain. In the dedication of his work »De institutione bene vivendi« he equally rejects contradictory, though penetrating philosophical views with these words: »Taceatur philosophorum acumen soli illi, qui deo credidere, veritatem investigarunt«. Relativism is characteristic of almost all autonomous ethics. In Greek philosophy it was prevailed over by Plato's idealism, and in the Christian ethics by the transmundane heteronomy of morality. Even the Renaissance philosophy, whose destructive doubt was to become clearly expressed long after Marulić, in Descartes' »De omnibus dubitandum est« did not apply this doubt to morality. Descartes himself applies his methodic scepticism to all the spheres except to that of morality, aware of the fact that ethical doubt and relativism can easily lead to nihilism, which is theoretically untenable and practically useless. When dealing with morality Descartes resorts to traditionalism.

Marulić, who does not need ethics and moral theology for theoretical meditations, but for the living practice, sees clearly that with relativist views one can not fight the decisive and difficult battles at the bulwark of Christianity. In Christian faith only can one find a firm support for the moral life. Here are some of the theses from his Parables: »Virtutis radix fides est« (2), »Attendite a falsis prophetis« (4).

Faith and caution of error are the basis of moral conduct. Marulić understands and states that human life on this earth is nothing but struggle («... militia est vita hominis super terram...») (16), and one should enter this struggle with resoluteness and courage in order to reach the aim in life and realize its meaning. Therefore in the 16th parable he gives this instruction: »Haec parabola nos omnes respicit quibus in hac vita assidue pugnandum est et, ut vincere valeamus numquam conquiscescendum.« These were all topical moral instructions for the struggles which had to be led against Islam under the banner of Christianity. From the Gospel According to St. Matthew Marulić takes Christ's message: »Qui vult post me venire, abnegat semetipsum et tollat crucem suam et sequatur me« (14). Only through love and virtue can anything valuable be permanently preserved. »Quicquid virtus non sustentat, totum id ruere necesse est« (6).

Marulić's ethics, however, does not enter mystical spheres, but remains mainly intellectual. Only logical consistency can guarantee a sure path in ethical action. Heart must be in harmony with reason which, on its part, must dominate consciousness. »Concordet in te cum ratione voluntas, cum voluntate convenient opera« (8).

According to him, it is on account of this that wisdom is the first human virtue (»Urehe duhovne« = »Spiritual ornaments«). In the poem »Lipo prigovaranje razuma i človika« (»Fine discourses between reason and man«) he shows in a series of questions related to human life that reason is not only the regulator of the natural, but also the cognitive source of the supernatural, so that for Marulić questions of ethics often become questions of theology.

His ethics is not purely intellectual, since in moral considerations religion still has the last word. His ethics contains all the elements of Stoical rigorism, Platonist objectivity and Christian heteronomy. Stoicism, Platonism and Christianity form a harmonious whole, dominated by the Christian idea. Marulić remains a representative of the Christian moral theology and consequently, of heteronomous ethics.

In addition to ethical problems, which are at the heart of Marulić's interest and of his scholarly and poetical work, he does not touch, in a more conspicuous manner, upon other philosophical problems. His cognitive-theoretical views could be derived from his intellectualistic ethics joined to the realist ontological concept of medieval ecclesiastical philosophy. This realism sometimes brings him close to classical materialists. Therefore, when in one of his Latin poems which has been preserved in manuscript,²¹ entitled »Hymnus ad Deum Marci Maruli felicitate incipit«, he gives a description of the universe, he models this description on the Latin materialist Lucretius and poses

²¹ See M. Štepec, *O Marulićevim latinskim pjesmama* (On Marulić's Latin poems), *Nastavni Vjesnik* (Teachers' Gazette), VII, Zagreb, 1899, p. 352.

his cosmological problem while having in mind his work »De rerum natura«. Marulić is certainly familiar with Lucretius whose influence will penetrate European philosophy owing to the materialist Gassendi much later. Marulić places the specific classical cosmogonic view within the Christian framework.

Marulić's philosophical, mainly ethical concepts do not belong to the type of cold monastic meditations characteristic of the age which in their isolation from life reflect all the sterility of lifeless scholasticism even when dealing with old subjects by means of new schemes. His philosophy does not represent either the type of the Renaissance struggle for the freedom of scientific thought, that will be led later by Giordano Bruno in Paris and Oxford. It would have been inappropriate to try to transfer this struggle, although it was being conceived at the time, to this part of Europe and to this place, where the battle was being fought for vital existence, which was imperilled by the cruel Turk. The battle for the freedom from Islam and from the Turkish yoke was fought here, and battles always need ideas. It was possible to defined this existential freedom — without the concept of nationality yet — only under the auspices of the universal idea — Christianity. Marulić's philosophy is therefore an expression of the experience and suffering of his people and his country, the largest part of which had already been trampled down by the enemy, while the rest was in the state of a constant imperillment, which could defend and save its freedom only under one banner — the banner of Christianity and the ethics of renunciation and sacrifice. Marulić found theoretical foundations for this ethics of renunciation and sacrifice in the elaborated and rigorous Christian ethics. That the people of this country were sacrificed so that the others could prosper is not a mere phrase. Marulić's philosophical orientation does not represent either a delusion or a step backwards into the Middle Ages. It is a reflection and an expression of the age and circumstance out of which it grew and for which it was created. Without taking into account specific conditions of development of the life and culture in this country, one would not take into consideration the specific and the individual without which historical categories remain empty stereotypical schemes which mean nothing and explain nothing. Whoever interprets phenomena of life without taking into account such specific characteristics, by applying mechanically fictive and fabricated criteria, speaks about life without understanding it.

How his philosophical orientation was used in the struggles in modern Europe is another question. In the antitheses between the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation on the one hand and paganism and Christianity on the other, it meant the defense of an »old concept« and was therefore so topical, and his works were translated so much to almost all European languages because they contained the ideology of Christian understanding of the world and life, resurrected and deeply experienced, rejuvenated and imbued with humanism, which was

under permanent attack from all sides. Protestantism was young, and Catholic faith rejuvenated. Thus, Marulić's works, according to the saying: »Habent sua fata libelli« had a different role in European cultural controversies from the one intended by the author in his own cultural milieu. Marulić's work was created with a different task, it had a different meaning in the environment in which it was created from the one that was attributed to it in the countries where it was translated. Marulić's »infelix atquae calamitosum saeculum« by which he meant the attack of the merciless, bloody and deathly half-moon, which he saw Islam as the antithesis to Christianity, was interpreted in Europe by the disturbed, official Catholic church, tottering with the immorality of its clergy and violently attacked by the Reformation, as a century in which the true religion is attacked by heresy, and in which »novorum dogmatum absurditatem« (of Luther and others) should be refuted by valuable modern theological and ethical studies — Marulić's work being one of them. In the light of the need for a moral and general spiritual revival both of believers and of the clergy, Marulić's books were assigned a special educational and instructive task. Only the morally renewed and spiritually revived Christianity could preserve and defend its position against the Reformation. Marulić's work could therefore be used as an excellent instrument to this purpose. It is in this spirit and with this task that Marulić's moral-theological writings were published in the West.

There is still one point to make. With all his Christian views, Marulić is not a medieval, but a Renaissance thinker.

It would be unhistorical, since it would mean to regard the whole of Renaissance in one aspect only, using one criterion in exploring the subject by applying the standards of the future to the past, and it would also be unjust to evaluate Marulić's work from the standpoint of the late Renaissance values. The Renaissance as a movement was not the same everywhere, it did not take place at the same time, the early and the late Renaissance were not the same, since conditions and possibilities were different everywhere. Concepts and achievements could not have been transplanted from peaceful European background to the turbulent Balkans, to the first line of battle both on the military and ideological front. The critically destructive and demoralizing component of Humanism could not have been transferred to Marulić's wide populace. Marulić was too realistic in his views and knowledge of the critical situation and of the needs of his readers for whom he wrote all his works, including the Latin ones, to be able to adopt a new, critically-destructive course. — The tendencies inherent in the Renaissance enthusiasm are nevertheless present in Marulić's works, insofar as they were possible in the difficult circumstances. Insofar as we can encompass the idea of the Renaissance by designations such as: the awakening of the sense of the beauties of nature, the revival of the pagan joy of living and the rise of the interest in Antiquity, the birth of the idea of individualism and a natural relationship towards the world, Marulić

can be considered a Renaissance poet and philosopher. In his works he has given »unusually vivid observations of reality, more vivid than can be encountered in any of the older poets of this country«,²² which is a result of the awakened feeling for the beauties of nature. In Marulić's Christianity we do not encounter medieval supernaturalism, but the Renaissance aesthetic awareness which is reflected in a developed feeling for the beauties of nature and of the events in the earthly, real life. Kombol gives numerous examples of this »observation of reality, the reality which he experienced and lived with intensity«. His feeling for beauty is so strong that he actually practices painting as well. He appreciates, observes and describes realistically the beauties of nature, as well as the inner spiritual conflicts of everyday life. He was thoroughly familiar with Antiquity and even his theological works abound in names and views of classical writers. By reconciling Antiquity and Christianity, he enriches and freshens Christian literature and enriches it with classical wisdom. The joy of living could not find its full expression in his poetry on account of the existential difficulties, but he nevertheless always retained his enthusiasm and optimism, so that he worked, wrote and looked towards the future with confidence and hope that the struggle against evil will finally bring a better life. This »better life« is not meant in the sense of the medieval exclusive transmundane concept, but in the sense of the defense against evil on this earth and of the creation of peace and well-being for people.

In his works Marulić has given outlines of a philosophical concept, of an idea which represents the highest synthesis which his age and environment were able to give. The fact that in this special synthesis made by a Renaissance humanist the medieval Christian ideology prevailed, is a result of specific circumstances and fate which were conditioned by the historical space and by the fatal task of being »antemurale Christianitatis«. Therefore, his work unites, in a specific way, both the Renaissance aspirations and the medieval heritage resulting, although frequently antithetical, in the unique personality of the author as a reflection of conditions, needs and possibilities of his age and environment. It is on account of this that Marulić was a representative figure in the culture of both his town and of his age in general, while his works today act as a key to the understanding of the spirit and circumstances of the age of Marulić in the cultural history of this country.

TRANSLATED BY JELIJA SOCANAC

²² M. Kombol, *O Marku Maruliću* (On Marko Marulić), »Republika«, IV, 1950, p. 183.

OSNOVI ETIČKO-FILOZOFSKE ORIJENTACIJE MARKA MARULIĆA

Sazetak

U svom pjesničkom opusu, kao i u značajnim latinskim etičko-filozofskim djelima, Marulić daje klasičnu sintezu u kojoj pomiruje antički svijet i kršćanstvo. On je tipični renesansni filozof koji ujedinjuje stoičku strogost, platonističku objektivnost i kršćansku heteronomiju u etici, osobito u moralu.

U teškim povijesnim prilikama (Turci pred Splitom) u kojima je životna egzistencija hrvatskog naroda bila ugrožena, Marulić se nije mogao prikloniti novom relativizmu; umjesto toga, on stvara sintezu kojom bi kršćanstvo moglo pronaći rješenje u obnovljenom poganizmu, kako bi time pružio podršku mogućoj oslobodilačkoj borbi svojega naroda. Njegove knjige na latinskom doživjele su brojna izdanja i prevedene su na njemački, talijanski, francuski i portugalski. U Evropi su tumačene kao borba protiv Luthera prije negoli protiv Turaka. *Habent sua fata libelli.*



DAS KONZEPT DER RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE BEI ANTUN FERDINAND ALBELY

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Nachdem, infolge des umsichgreifenden Partikularismus und Relativismus als Ergebnis der positivistischen Ausrichtung des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, die zeitgenössische Wissenschaft und Philosophie ihre realen Grundlagen verloren haben, streben sie nun erneut nach Legitimität und versuchen, ihr traditionelles Korpus zu rekonstruieren. Ein Prozeß des Zurückgreifens auf geschichtliche Ursprünge ist nicht zu übersehen. So wurden erst in den letzten Jahrzehnten eine ganze Menge vergessener Disziplinen, Methoden und Wissenschaften wiederentdeckt, die die Entwicklungsgrundlage des abendländischen Denkens bildeten.

Durch positivistisches Säubern und Formalisieren wissenschaftlicher Paradigmen wurden wissenschaftliche Aussagen unifiziert, Schlußfolgerungen wurden auf die einfachste Form des Syllogismus reduziert, methodische Exaktheit und die apodiktische Natur der Wahrheit vertrieben alle anderen Formen von Intellektualität aus dem wissenschaftlichen Diskurs. Ohne erst von den fatalen Konsequenzen zu sprechen, die sich in einer allgemeinen Konfusion der zeitgenössischen Wissenschaft äußerten, genügt es, auf die neuen Impulse hinzuweisen, die sich beim erneuten Vorstellen von Argumentationstheorien, Rhetorik, Topik, Hermeneutik, hypoleptischer Methode, praktischem Syllogismus etc. melden.

Vom positivistisch-szientistischen Zerstören des traditionellen Wissenschaftskorpus sind wohl am meisten die Disziplinen der praktischen Philosophie betroffen. Ebenfalls betroffen sind die Sphäre der Ethik, die fast zerstört und auf eine Metaebene reduziert worden ist, sowie die Sphäre der politischen, Rechts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften, die sich ständig selbst hinterfragen und redefinieren. Neue Stimuli kamen unter anderem nach der Wiederentdeckung früherer Formen und Kategorien der praktischen Philosophie auf. Bedeutend sind in diesem Kontext vor allem jene Denker, die in form eines systematischen Denkens

die Philosophie ihrer Epoche zusammenfaßten. Hierbei ist in erster Linie von Aristoteles und Hegel die Rede. Als ebenso bedeutend erwiesen sich jedoch auch die Konzepte wissenschaftlicher Korpora, die eine weitverbreitete Anwendung in den philosophischen Systemen verschiedener Strömungen fanden. In den rezenten Versuchen der Erneuerung der praktischen Philosophie nimmt so die universelle praktische Philosophie Christian Wolffs und seiner Schule, die Kant durch seine Kritik und die Grundlegung einer reinen Ethik für einige Zeit zu Vergessenheit verdammt hatte, einen bedeutenden Platz ein.

Wenn wir die Disziplinen der praktischen Philosophie innerhalb unseres geschichtlichen Erbes untersuchen, müssen wir Antun Ferdinand Albely, einem der ersten Rechtsphilosophen bei uns, einen bedeutenden Stellenwert zuerkennen. Albely wurde 1794 in Varaždin geboren, wo er auch das Gymnasium besuchte. Später war er Schüler der Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften in Zagreb. Nachdem er 1814/15 die Prüfungen bestanden hatte, setzte er das Studium in Budapest fort, wo er auch zum Doktor der Philosophie und der Rechte promoviert. Im Jahre 1819 kehrte er an die Zagreber Akademie zurück und hielt Vorlesungen in Griechisch. Gleichzeitig war er auch Supplent für Naturrecht. Aus der Zeit seiner Lehrtätigkeit an der Königlichen Akademie in Zagreb stammen, außer dem unveröffentlicht gebliebenen und in Manuskriptform¹ erhaltenen Lehrbuch für Finanzwissenschaften *Rudimenta politicae universalis aerarii*, auch die Postulate und Entwürfe zu seinen Hauptwerken, die er nach seiner Versetzung nach Győr im Jahre 1828 in Ungarn veröffentlichte: *Encyclopaedica in iuridico-politicum studium introductio* (Comaromii 1830) und *Philosophiae iuris praecognita* (Comaromii 1831). 1835 wurde Albely nach Požun versetzt, wo er sehr früh, im Jahre 1848, pensioniert wurde und bis zu seinem Tod im Jahre 1875 seinen Wohnsitz hatte. Interessant ist, daß Albely schon im Jahre 1871 seine gesamte Bibliothek (571 Bände), sämtliche Handschriften und Familienporträts der Universitätsbibliothek in Zagreb vermachte.

1.

Das bedeutendste Werk Albelys ist zweifelsohne das Buch *Philosophiae iuris praecognita*. In den folgenden Erörterungen soll das in diesem Werk begründete Konzept der Rechtsphilosophie Albelys darge-

¹ Vgl. Zlatko Herkov, »Financijska znanost kao predmet visokoškolske nastave u Hrvatskoj do polovice 19. stoljeća« (»Die Finanzwissenschaft als Unterrichtsfach an Hochschulen in Kroatien bis zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts«), in: *Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu*, 20 (1970) 1, S. 56—59. Von der nur wenig umfangreichen Literatur über Albely wollen wir nur einige Werke nennen: Vjekoslav Klaić, *Preteče Sveučilišta. Sveučilište Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca u Zagrebu 1874—1924*. Zagreb 1925, 27, 29; József Szinyeyi: *Magyar írók élete és munkái*, 1. Budapest 1891, 103; Hrvatski biografski leksikon, 1, Zagreb 1983, S. 55.

legt werden. Hierbei wollen wir von der Analyse des überaus aufschlußreichen Vorworts (*praefatio*) ausgehen, welches beweist, daß Albely umfassende Einsicht in die geschichtliche Entwicklung der Rechtsphilosophie beziehungsweise die Grundlegung der praktischen Philosophie hatte. Zunächst wollen wir die Knotenpunkte betrachten, mit Hilfe derer Albely die Hauptkoordinaten der Geschichte der Rechtsphilosophie als praktischer Philosophie erläutert.

Die systematische Erforschung des Bereichs des freien menschlichen Handelns sowie der Lehre von den Handlungsnormen in Beziehung zu den übrigen philosophischen Disziplinen begann natürlich mit Sokrates, Plato und Aristoteles. Die weitere Entwicklung wird ferner anhand der Lehre vom Handeln innerhalb der stoischen Philosophie und römischen Rechtswissenschaft verfolgt. In diesem Zusammenhang wird auf die Lehre Ciceros von den Rechten und Pflichten verwiesen. Danach wird die Grundlegung der Erforschung der Rechtsphilosophie resolut innerhalb der christlichen Sittlichkeitslehre angesetzt. Eine Zusammenfassung des derzeitigen Entwicklungsgrads von Rechtswissenschaft und praktischer Philosophie ist in der umfassenden Justinianischen Kodifizierung, die die weitere Entwicklung von philosophischen und Rechtslehren im Mittelalter und in der Neuzeit wesentlich mitbestimmte, enthalten. Die Abrundung einer solchermaßen profilierten Rechtsphilosophie trifft Albely an der Wende vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit bei Autoren wie I. Oldendorp (1539), N. Hemming (1564), M. Stephani (1615), B. Winkler (1615) und anderen an.

Die neuzeitliche Wende innerhalb dieser Entwicklung vollzieht sich in der systematischen Grundlegung der Rechtsphilosophie im Werk Hugo Grotius' *De iure belli ac pacis* (1625). Diesbezüglich weist Albely ausdrücklich darauf hin, daß Grotius die Rechtsphilosophie in erster Linie mit Hilfe von Vernunftsprinzipien erläutert: »Primus enim, qui philosophiam iuris, ceu quoddam sana ratione peruiorum principiorum systema scripsit, fuit Hugo des Grotus«.²

Den nächsten bedeutenden Schritt auf dieser Spur des neuzeitlichen Vernunftrechts unternahm Thomas Hobbes. Albely weist ihm den zweiten Platz zu und führt zwei wichtige Werke dieses Autors an: »Alter, qui hanc salebrosam ingressus est viam, fuit Thomas Hobbes, qui iurium ciuiliū publico-internorum systema duplici dissertatione, quarum prior Parisiis (1642) sub inscriptione *elementorum philosophiae*, posterior vero Amstelodami (1667) sub intitulatione *Leviathan* conspexit lucem, scribere, et in sui conseruatione fundare adlaborauit.«³ Als dritter wichtiger Begründer der neuzeitlichen Rechtsphilosophie wird Puffendorf genannt: »Tertius, qui in hac sphaera semet distinxit, fuit Samuel Puffendorf; quia praeter iura ciuilia publica adhuc iura extraciuilia du-

² *Philosophiae iuris praecognita*, Comaromii 1831, S. 6.

³ *Ibid.*, S. 7.

plici suo opere, libro nimirum *de elementis iurisprudentiae uniuersalis* Hagae Com. (1660), et libris octo *de iure naturali et gentium* Londini Scan. (16/2) in systema redegit.«⁴

Nach Erläuterung der Hauptpostulate der Puffendorfschen Theorie stellt Albely den weiteren Verlauf der rechtsphilosophischen Lehren dar und weist auf Leibniz, Christian Wolff, Gottfried Achenwall und Carolus Antonius L. B. Martini hin.

Christian Thomasius hingegen zählt er zur Schule der Sittlichkeitslehrer: »Ad hanc quoque moralistarum scholam pertinet Christianus Thomas, qui *institutionibus iurisprudentiae diuinae*, Lipsiae (1688) editis, socialitatem, deinceps *vero fundamentis iuris naturalis, et gentium*, Halae (1705) impressis, felicitatem cum subordinatis honesti, decori et iusti principii ceu suae philosophiae iuris fundamentale principium assumsit.«⁵

Albely verweist ferner auf die große Bedeutung der Kantschen Philosophie der reinen Vernunft für die weitere Entwicklung der Rechtsphilosophie. Unter Kants Einfluß bildete sich eine kritische Schule der Rechtsphilosophie, von deren Anhängern außer Theofil Hufeland auch T. Schmalz, I. C. Hoffbauer, R. L. Pörschke, L. H. Jakob und andere genannt werden. In diesem Zusammenhang wird besonders auf die Bedeutung der Kantschen *Metaphysischen Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre* für die Grundlegung und Ausführung der Rechtsphilosophie aus reinen Vernunftprinzipien hingewiesen.

Interessant ist die Art und Weise, in der Albely die großen philosophischen Nachfolger Kants kategorisiert. Als Kants Schüler werden u.a. Fichte den »Idealisten«, Schelling und Hegel den »Mystikern« zugeordnet: »Sunt quoque *idealistae* (I. T. Fichte [1796. 1797], G. Bay dein Köppen [1819], etc.), et *mystici* (F. I. Schelling [1796. 1797. in scriptis periodicis, a Fichte, et Niethammer editis], I. Thanner [1801], I. Nibler [1805], Troxler [1820], G. W. F. Hegel [1821], etc.), qui eandem officiorum sphaeram cum philosophiae iuris critica schola tenent quidem, principii tamen ab eadem admodum diurgunt, ac propterea, dum superiores ideales regiones petunt, iurisconsultis, realitatem quaerentibus, exilem praestant vsum.«⁶

Albely verfolgt die Entwicklung der Rechtsphilosophie bis hin zu den aktuellen Debatten seiner Zeit und beweist, daß er einen guten Überblick hat und die Disziplin mitsamt der allerneuesten Literatur gründlich kennt. Auf dieser weit abgesteckten geschichtlichen Grundlage fußt nun also Albelys Konzept der Rechtsphilosophie.

⁴ A.a.O.

⁵ Ibid., S. 9.

⁶ Ibid., S. 11/12.

2.

In der Schrift *Philosophiae iuris praecognita* wird das gesamte Konzept der Rechtsphilosophie als praktischer Philosophie im traditionellen Sinne ausgeführt. Die Rechtsphilosophie wird als Bestandteil der praktischen Philosophie (*philosophiae practicae pars integrans*) bestimmt, der die menschlichen Tathandlungen, Pflichten sowie den Begriff des Moralgesetzes und der Gesetzgebung überhaupt untersucht. In diesen Zusammenhang gehören, gemäß der Gliederung Albelys, folgende Inhalte:

1. über Handlung, Pflicht und Moralgesetz sowie Zurechnungsfähigkeit (*de actione, de obligatione ac lege morali, et de imputatione*);
2. über Grundsätze und verschiedene Arten moralischer Gesetzgebung, die der reinen Vernunft *a priori* ersichtlich sind (*de principiis, et differentia specierum legislatonis moralis, sana ratione a priori peruiuae*);
3. über die Anwendung der Rechtsphilosophie, ihr Umfeld und ihre allgemeine Gliederung (*de philosophiae iuris vsu, subsidiis, et generali partitione*).

Bezeichnend für das Verständnis des Albelyschen Konzepts der Rechtsphilosophie ist freilich, daß es sich innerhalb der klassischen Tradition der praktischen Philosophie bewegt. Das bedeutet vor allem, daß das Recht in unmittelbarem inhaltlichen Bezug zur Moral betrachtet wird. Bezüglich des gemeinsamen Ausgangspunktes im menschlichen Handeln gehören die Sphären von Recht und Moral zum einheitlichen Komplex der praktischen Philosophie. Dies ist eine spezifische Tradition der praktischen Philosophie, die von Aristoteles begründet wurde und bis zum Wolffschen System der universalen praktischen Philosophie reicht.

Wenn man sich Albelys Konzept der Rechtsphilosophie näher betrachtet, erkennt man eine grundsätzliche Zugehörigkeit zum Umkreis der Wolffschen Schulphilosophie. Außer in der Ähnlichkeit hinsichtlich der Grundlegung der praktischen Philosophie im freien menschlichen Handeln offenbart sich der Einfluß, den das Konzept der universalen praktischen Philosophie auf Albely hatte, insbesondere in der Inhaltsgliederung der Rechtsphilosophie. Ähnlich wie Wolff, der von den verschiedenen Arten menschlichen Handelns ausgeht, leitet auch Albely die Untersuchung der Rechtsphilosophie aus den Begriffen der Freiheit und des Handelns ab: »*Philosophia iuris, ceu philosophiae practicae pars, tractat certam libertatis, actionumque liberarum normam.*«⁷ Neben der Untersuchung des Begriffs des Handelns umfaßt der erste und zentrale Teil außerdem die Erläuterung der Begriffe Pflicht, Moralgesetz und Zurechnungsfähigkeit.

⁷ *Ibid.*, S. 13.

Albely bezeichnet die Rechtsphilosophie als Teil der praktischen Philosophie und expliziert in der Schrift *Philosophiae iuris praecognita*, dem Beispiel des enzyklopädischen Modells folgend, die einzelnen Teile der praktischen Philosophie und die Art ihres Bezugs zur Rechtsphilosophie. Eine Gesamtgliederung des Korpus der praktischen Philosophie liefert sein Werk *Encyclopaedica in iuridico-politicum studium introductio*. Albely sondert das Gebiet der praktischen Philosophie von der Sphäre der theoretischen Philosophie, zu der die Logik und Anthropologie gehören, und leitet das Basisgefüge aus dem Begriff des menschlichen Willens ab.

Die praktische Philosophie behandelt nämlich die Modi zur Formung und Steuerung des menschlichen Willens (*moderatur hominum voluntatem*). In diesen Umkreis gehören drei Hauptdisziplinen: die Aretologie oder Philosophie der Tugend, die Dicaeologie oder Rechtsphilosophie und die Phroneseologie. Diese Gliederung der praktischen Philosophie erklärt Albely folgendermaßen:

1. *philosophia virtutis* (a priori deducta) seu *aretologia docet*, quid homo velle debeat, vt summum consequatur bonum;

2. *philosophia iuris* (aeque a priori deducta), seu *dicaeologia* exponit, quid homo velle possit, vt reliquis socialiter coëxistat;

3. *philosophia vtilitatum hominis* (alioquin empirico-rationalium), seu *phroneseologia* tradit, quid hominem velle expediat, vt suis correspondeat vtilitatibus:

- politica,
- oeconomia nationalis,
- paedagogia etc.⁸

Ausgehend also vom gemeinsamen Ursprung im Begriff des menschlichen Willens und Handelns, sondert man die Rechtsphilosophie von der Moralphilosophie im engeren Sinne oder der Aretologie, da sie in einem breiteren Gefüge intersubjektiven Handelns verankert ist. Während sich die Philosophie der Tugend oder Aretologie wesentlich auf die Grundsätze und die Gesetzgebung von Pflichten und Handeln des moralischen Subjekts als Individuum konzentriert, untersucht die Rechtsphilosophie oder Dicaeologie den Begriff des menschlichen Handelns im weitläufigeren Gefüge der gesellschaftlichen Koexistenz des Menschen. Die Elemente dieser Unterscheidung legt Albely in §9 von *Philosophiae iuris praecognita* dar. Zunächst wird der Begriff der Gesellschaft bestimmt, den Albely mit folgenden Worten charakterisiert: »*Societas est collectio hominum, obligatione tendendi ad certum quemdam communem finem obstrictorum.*«⁹

⁸ Vgl. *Encyclopaedica in iuridico-politicum studium introductio*, Comaromii 1830, S. 16 u.ä.

⁹ *Philosophiae iuris praecognita*, S. 39.

In diesem Sinne stellt die Gesellschaft den Untersuchungsgegenstand der Philosophie der Tugend dar, sofern vom Begriff des Guten die Rede ist, auf das sich das innerliche Handeln des sittlichen Subjekts bezieht; die Rechtsphilosophie hingegen forscht im Bereich des äußeren sittlichen Handelns des gesellschaftlichen Lebens. Albely sagt: »Societatis conceptus in suo ortu constituit quidem philosophiae virtutis obiectum, quia societas est medium consequendj summi boni, quatenus homines, in societate existentes, in consequenda moralitate, eive iuncta felicitate sibi mutuo adiutorio esse possunt, ast in suo progressu, quatenus libertatis in actionibus externis, coactione etiam mediante materiali effectuj mancipandam, postulat, euadit quoque philosophiae iuris obiectum.«¹⁰

Da der Begriff des menschlichen Handelns das Elementarverbindungsglied ist, aus der sowohl die eine als auch die andere Sphäre der praktischen Philosophie abgeleitet werden, müssen diese im gegenseitigen Zusammenhang betrachtet werden. Insofern ist die Philosophie der Tugend eine notwendige Voraussetzung, die der Rechtsphilosophie vorausgeht und sie übersteigt: »Atque ideo societatis cuiusdam *absolutae*, quae absque omni praeiue posito consociationis facto, et societatis *relatiuae* seu hypotheticae, quae nonnisi praeiuae posito consociationis facto existerre intelligitur, in philosophia virtutis, ceu in philosophiae practicae parte, philosophiam iuris praecedente, explicatio iam superari debet.«¹¹ Die Unterscheidung zwischen Rechtsphilosophie und Philosophie der Tugend hingegen gründet auf dem klassischen Prinzip, das Kant mit seiner Sonderung der innerlichen moralischen Gesetzgebung und des äußerlichen rechtlichen Handelns philosophisch gefestigt hat. In diesem Sinne bezeichnet Albely die rechtliche Gesetzgebung oder das rationale Recht als äußerliche Moralität:

»*Libertas, quae sociali hominum coëxistentiae, sana ratione peruiuae, non repugnat, est moralitas externa rationalis, seu ius rationale.*«¹²

Dieser Standpunkt zeigt an, daß der Ausdruck Moralität nicht in der engen Bedeutung des innerlichen Handelns, so wie Kant ihn bestimmt, aufgefaßt wird, vielmehr ist die Moralität ein weiterer Begriff, innerhalb dessen innere und äußere Gesetzgebung ineinandergreifen. Dies ist die gemeinsame Grundlage, aus der das Recht und die Moral hervorgehen. Der Albelysche Begriff 'moralitas' verweist so auf die Nähe des Hegelschen Sittlichkeitsbegriffs, der durch den Kantschen Gegensatz von Recht und Moral, von äußerlichen und innerlichem Handeln vermittelt und dem Beispiel der klassischen Tradition der Aristotelischen praktischen Philosophie nachgebildet worden ist.

¹⁰ A.a.O.

¹¹ Ibid., S. 39 u.ä.

¹² Ibid., S. 40 u.ä.

3.

In § 11 erläutert Albely die Bezeichnung der Disziplin Rechtsphilosophie in den verschiedenen, geschichtlich und inhaltlich profilierten Ausformungen. Neben anderen Bezeichnungen für den Terminus Rechtsphilosophie führt er folgende Syntagmen an, die — jedes auf seine Weise — eine andere Bestimmung der Disziplin ausdrücken: *ius naturae*, *scientia iuris*, *dicaeologia*, et *iurisprudentia rationalis*, *vniuersalis ac naturalis*. Die Bezeichnung *Naturrecht* hält er für weniger gerechtfertigt, da der Begriff der Natur nicht der Sphäre des Rechts entspreche. Eine angemessene Bezeichnung ist seiner Meinung nach *Rechtswissenschaft*, was er folgendermaßen erklärt: »*Philosophia tamen haec bene vocatur scientia iuris rationalis; quia quaeuis philosophia est scientia, et quia haec scientia e reliquis partim suo obiecto, quod est ius, partim suo fonte, qui est sana ratio, discrepat.*«¹³

An interessantesten ist freilich der Ausdruck *dicaeologia*, der aus dem zeitgenössischen Gebrauch völlig verschwunden ist. Albely verweist darauf, daß diese Bezeichnung wegen ihrer Etymologie angemessen sei: »*Philosophia haec etiam dicaeologia rationalis, vniuersalis atque naturalis recte cognominatur; quia dicaeologia ex sua etymologia est scientia iuris, et quia haec philosophia pro suo habet obiecto ius, utpote rationale, vniuersale ac naturale.*«¹⁴ Albely führt außerdem noch den Ausdruck *iurisprudentia* an, doch sei *Rechtsphilosophie* die angemessenste Bezeichnung: »*Philosophiae tamen iuris nomenclatio videtur reliquis praestare; quia haec iurium rationalium scientia ipsius philosophiae est continuatio, partemue integram philosophiae practicae, fatentibus ita cunctis huiusce scientiae magistris, omnino efficit.*«¹⁵

Schließlich faßt Albely alle dargelegten Bestimmungen zusammen und definiert die *Rechtsphilosophie* als System rechtlicher Gesetzgebung. Die wesentlichen Charakteristiken dieser Definition sind in den Begriffen des Handelns und der Freiheit sowie der gesellschaftlichen Koexistenz der Menschen enthalten. Albelys Definition lautet: »*Philosophia iuris (. . .) est legislationis iuridico-rationalis systema, seu systematicus complexus principiorum (pure rationalium), quorum ductu facultas suscipiendi actiones quasius liberar, sociali hominum coexistentiae, per sanam rationem peruiar, non repugnant, homini plene innolescit.*«¹⁶

Eine grundsätzlichen Unterscheidung der Disziplinen der praktischen Philosophie wird in § 14 durchgeführt. Ausgehend vom umfassenden Begriff der *Moralität* wird hier die a priori hergeleitete *moralisch-*

¹³ Ibid., S. 46.

¹⁴ A.a.O.

¹⁵ Ibid., S. 46 u.ä.

¹⁶ Ibid., S. 44.

-rationale Gesetzgebung einerseits von der Herleitung a posteriori andererseits abgesondert. In die erste Sphäre gehören Rechts- und Tugendphilosophie, in die zweite empirisch-rationale Disziplinen, die unter der gemeinsamen Bezeichnung *Phroneseologie* zusammengefaßt sind. Dies sind Disziplinen des universellen Systems der praktischen Philosophie. Die Rechts- und Tugendphilosophie beziehen sich auf die Steuerung des menschlichen Willens und auf freies menschliches Handeln.

Albely stellt vier Prinzipien auf, nach welchen die Rechtsphilosophie und die Philosophie der Tugend unterschieden werden. Ihre Systeme unterscheiden sich zunächst im Hinblick auf die jeweils charakteristische Gesetzgebung. Die spezifische Gesetzgebung der Rechtsphilosophie wird aus folgendem Imperativ abgeleitet: »*Omitte illas liberas externas actiones, quae sociali hominim coëxistentiae, sana ratione peruias, repugnant.*«¹⁷ Die Philosophie der Tugend folgt, im Unterschied dazu, diesem Imperativ: »*Pone omnes illas liberas actiones, quae cum summo hominis bono, sana ratione peruias, moralitate nimirum ac eidem iuncta felicitate, conciliari possunt, et omitte contrarias.*«¹⁸ Das zweite Kriterium zur Unterscheidung von Rechts- und Tugendphilosophie beruht auf dem jeweils spezifischen Zweck. Der Zweck der ersten ist auf das äußere Gute ausgerichtet, während der Zweck der Philosophie der Tugend im Guten im Innern des Menschen enthalten ist. Dem dritten Unterscheidungsprinzip zufolge schreibt die Rechtsphilosophie notwendige moralisch-rationale Pflichten vor (*obligationes necessitatis = officia coactiua*), während zu dem Bereich der Philosophie der Tugend die freien Pflichten gehören (*obligationes omnimodae libertatis = officia non coactiua*). Nach dem vierten Kriterium unterscheiden sich Rechts- und Tugendphilosophie schließlich im Hinblick auf die jeweils zugehörige *Sphäre*: »*Quia philosophia iuris solum eas actiones externas respicit, quae ad socialem hominum coëxistentiam procurandam pertinent, philosophia vero virtutis quasuis actiones internas et externas, quae ad moralitatem, ac huic iunctam felicitatem consequendam spectant, praecceptionibus suis complectitur.*«¹⁹

Andererseits wiederum erörtert Albely den Unterschied zwischen Rechtsphilosophie und *Phroneseologie*. Bei seiner Argumentierung geht er von der apriorischen und empirischen Grundlegung aus: »*Haec phroneseologia a philosophia iuris differt; quia phroneseologia ad illam philosophiae practicae partem referri debet, quae empirico-rationales complectitur veritates, ex experientia nimirum per sanam rationem a posteriori deriuatas, philosophia vero iuris ad illam spectat philosophiae practicae partem, quae veritates, pure a priori peruias, continet.*«²⁰

¹⁷ Ibid., S. 58.

¹⁸ Ibid., S. 58 u.ä.

¹⁹ Ibid., S. 62.

²⁰ Ibid., S. 64.

Aufgrund dieser in wenigen Zügen dargelegten Analysen der Grundlegung der Rechtsphilosophie bei Albely wird deutlich, daß man ein solchermaßen klar und systematisch präsentiertes Konzept der Rechtsphilosophie als Disziplin der universellen praktischen Philosophie im philosophischen Erbgut nur selten wird antreffen können. Im Rahmen seiner systematischen Forschungsarbeit hat Albely Gegenstandsgebiet und Inhalt der Rechtsphilosophie vorgestellt, sie aus dem Korpus der praktischen Philosophie hergeleitet, gegen die anderen Disziplinen abgegrenzt, ihren eigentümlichen Charakter und ihren Umkreis erklärt sowie ihre Aufgliederung erläutert. Das in der Schrift *Philosophiae iuris praecognita* vorgestellte Konzept der Rechtsphilosophie darf daher nicht nur im Zusammenhang mit der historischen Entwicklung der Lehrtätigkeit Albelys betrachtet werden. Seine Bedeutung beruht ebensosehr auf dem Umstand, daß er zur Hinterfragung der zeitgenössischen Erörterungen über die Disziplinen der praktischen Philosophie beitragen und bei den aktuellen Debatten über die Grundlegung der Rechtsphilosophie unzweifelbar von großem Nutzen sein kann.

ÜBERSETZT VON SILVIA SLADIC

KONCEPT FILOZOFIJE PRAVA ANTUNA FERDINANDA ALBELYJA

Sažetak

U sklopu razmatranja disciplina praktične filozofije u našoj povijesnoj baštini značajno mjesto pripada jednom od prvih filozofa prava u našim krajevima — Antunu Ferdinandu Albelyju (Varaždin 1794. — Požun 1875.). U sustavnom razmatranju Albely je izložio predmetno područje i sadržaj filozofije prava, izveo je iz korpusa praktične filozofije, ograničio prema ostalim disciplinama, obrazložio njezinu osebnost i okružje te razložio raščlambu. Značenje je Albelyjeva koncepta filozofije prava, izložena u glavnom djelu *Philosophiae iuris praecognita*, ne samo u sklopu historijskoga razvoja nastavne djelatnosti nego i u aktualnim raspravama o utemeljenju filozofije prava.

ON THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

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As it is well-known, the relationship of the history of philosophy to philosophical thinking is specific with regard to philosophy itself, and particularly with regard to other sciences. While it can be generally said that in various sciences their own history is more or less a history of former views and obsolete or refuted concepts, the situation in philosophy is completely different. Namely, the history of philosophy is an indistinguishable constitutive part of philosophical thinking as such, which results in the fact, amazing at first sight, that in the course of its long history philosophy has known only a small number of questions which have been really new. It is certainly a state which might seem irritating to the common sense, but on account of this it is necessary to stress that despite this fact philosophy does not deal, as it is generally thought, with so-called eternal questions. On the contrary, human spirit is always, over and over again, from its specific general historical and existential situation, confronted with questions requiring answers to the essential controversies of its historical existence, its relationship to the world and to the original, all-founding first principle. The history of philosophy is therefore an effort and a sign-post towards the understanding of ourselves and of our destiny in the world, an effort which can never become obsolete or completely surpassed, but can only be thought again, and repeatedly experienced.

Bazala was definitely deeply aware of this problem (which his *Povijest filozofije* /A History of Philosophy/ convincingly confirms) which has become, after Hegel, one of the props of philosophical thinking. We should point out, however, that this attitude towards philosophy and its history was open to all kinds of severe criticism and called into doubt at the turn of the century, with the growing importance of positivist spirit. Bazala obviously did not succumb to this spirit, not only in his relationship towards the history of philosophy, so that the whole of his philosophical work started, in a way, with his writing of an ambitious

history of philosophy as a prerequisite and an indispensable condition for the development of philosophical thinking.

Bazala's *Povijest filozofije* (A History of Philosophy) is his youthful work, which came into being before his main theoretical works, so that it does not reveal immediately the fact that he judges the history of philosophy from his own philosophical standpoint. His *Povijest filozofije* was certainly written from the standpoint of the »philosophical spirit of the age« and it should be regarded especially with regard to the framework of ideas of his teachers. But this is definitely the fate or »deficiency« of any history of philosophy. It is quite understandable, however, with regard to Bazala's views on the role and importance of philosophy and its history, that the work of this kind marks the beginning of his creative activity. Namely, the history of philosophy enables both the individual, and what is even more, the nation, to approach the world of knowledge, of moral postulates and a scholarly founded world-view, offering thus specific instructions and help in the orientation for action within the circle of civilized nations. Or, put in Bazala's words: »Mankind requires of all knowledge both a value for the actual practical life in the material sphere, in order to live more comfortably and easily and to facilitate its struggle for survival, and in the ideal sphere, in order to achieve better mutual relations among its members and to determine the aims in the work of an individual and of community as a whole, according to the development of education and culture.¹ Philosophy, as the most universal of sciences, is the observation of the world, and since it also gives a form to life, it is basically congenial with art. Bazala therefore, in the Kantian tradition, points out that philosophy can not be only an understanding of the world, since in that case it would only be a »school of wisdom«, but that it must be formed in the global sense (the Kantian *senso cosmico*) which means that it should give answers to the questions: what should we do; what can we hope for, and finally, what is man? Only the answers to these questions constitute real philosophy as the most universal of sciences which reduces general questions posed by individual sciences to a founded and meaningful »unique whole without contradictions«. According to Bazala, however, it can not be only a science but it should equally be a scientifically-founded world-view, meaning that it should be related to ideals and values, i.e. to various cultural aspirations of mankind. It is not exclusively a cognitive activity responding to the »mind's requirements« but, having a crucial influence on the formation of the worldview, it also responds to the »needs of the character and heart«. It is interesting that Bazala, in as early as his *Povijest filozofije* (A History of Philosophy), therefore in an early work, in the same way as he will do many years later, thematized the relationship between philosophy and science, awa-

¹ A. Bazala: *Povijest filozofije* (A History of Philosophy), p. 17, I, Zagreb, 1906.

re of the danger of losing insight into the meaning, aim and unity of human knowledge. He discusses very instructively and argumentatively, understandably using terminology different from that which is used today, the relationship between science and philosophy. In his opinion, the link between science and philosophy is the prerequisite for the possibility of national progress, and where this link is lacking, only an »illusion of culture« is created. It is only in their unity that the living »needs and aims of a nation« can be accomplished, i.e. distinctive qualities of a nation can be promoted and its distinctive culture can be formed. According to him, sciences (meaning primarily the humanities and the social sciences) have to be closely related to the life of a nation, i.e. to its needs and wishes, creating in the process also a philosophy which will therefore be able to act as »an image of the world and life seen in the mirror of a nation's soul.«² Only such philosophy can become a real factor in the development and enrichment of »general educational thought«. We should stress once again at this point Bazala's explicit anti-positivist attitude, which was certainly unusual at the time. He evidently intuited and, what is more, he understood the dangers of a complete independence of science and of the creation of a scientistic world-view.

Stressing the special importance of the history of philosophy for philosophy as such, and pointing out its specific quality with regard to other individual sciences, Bazala sets down a dual task of the history of philosophy: first, it should be an immanent analysis of individual philosophical systems, an analysis of their origin and their relationship to tradition. Second, it should assess the values of individual systems and their specific contribution to the development of philosophy in general. He stresses especially the hermeneutic view according to which it is much more important, in the assessment and evaluation of individual philosophical systems, to see their »greater aspects«, i.e. their advantages, than to criticise individual solutions, which he formulates beautifully in the following way: »in philosophy, as in the arts, great criticism does not deal with errors but with beauty«³. In his assessment of philosophical systems, as well as of individual philosophers, he also takes into account the importance of the socio-cultural factor, and rejects complete individualism according to which individual systems are »histories of ingenious thoughts and sentences of individuals«. On the contrary, he considers that they should be placed within »the development of universal consciousness«, i.e. that these systems, although products of individual creative energy, nevertheless depend on wider cultural-scientific world-views which, on the other hand, gain their specific basis and importance within and according to »the national character«.

² Bazala, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

³ Bazala, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

Bazala mentions three principles in the interpretation of philosophical systems: the first is the biographical factor in the widest sense, which he calls »the psychological interpretation«; the other is »the cultural-historical observation«, and the third is the question of the continuity of philosophical problems, meaning that philosophical tradition is and gives the necessary framework for philosophical thinking, which he calls »the pragmatic interpretation«. (The term »paradigmatic« is certainly a little confusing). Bazala places a special emphasis on Hegel's contribution in the dismissal of the purely individualistic understanding of the history of philosophy as a conglomerate of private opinions and incidental thoughts, but at the same time he criticizes the schematism of the other extreme, i.e. the view that »the development of systems in time must coincide with their development in content«.⁴ These and similar lapidary objections to Hegel are typical objections indicating a lack of understanding of Hegel's philosophy of »philosophical spirit« at the beginning of the century. Bazala finally emphasizes the principle of »the intellectual fertility« in the assessment of the value of individual systems, stressing the heuristic importance and the role of error in the development of views on world and life, since errors have frequently been an important impetus in the reaching of truth. At this point he quotes Windelband's thought that in the history of philosophy great errors have been more important than small truths. Bazala generally relies on Windelband's historico-philosophical works, which can not be taken as a drawback on account of their generally acknowledged value. (After all, Windelband's highly esteemed *A History of Philosophy* was translated in this country in 1956). Bazala explicitly considers the history of philosophy to be the incentive to positive intellectual and moral qualities since its knowledge dissuades from »the one-sidedness and intolerance of dogmatism« as well as from »the spent impotence of scepticism« since it is »the means to give faith in the intellect and hope to mankind that truth is not unattainable«. These words reveal clearly the open optimism with regard to the intellectual development of man, both of his theoretical abilities and of his power and ability to achieve a reasonable organization of his own life and of the life of community. The historical experience of the past seventy years has certainly modified greatly our approach, especially the answers to the four famous Kant's questions, but in spite of this, we could say that the classical European faith in the ideal of reason and its development is, in spite of all the negative experience, and certainly not without a reason, still attractive and consoling.

Bazala wrote his *Povijest filozofije* (*A History of Philosophy*) with the help of all the fundamental works of historico-philosophical literature which are still topical today. As to the Greek philosophy, the fragments of works by the Presocratics edited by Diels-Kranz, had already

⁴ Bazala, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

been published, as well as the Zeller's classical history of Greek philosophy, together with H. Gomperz's important work on Greek philosophers, to mention only the most important, frequently quoted by Bazala. As to the history of modern philosophy, K. Fisher's famous history of modern philosophy had also been published, as well as numerous specialized studies, especially those concerning the Neo-Kantians, which have become more or less standard works in the history of philosophy today. We should point out immediately that Bazala's *Povijest filozofije* is a very learned work revealing the great erudition of its author. He had evidently studied vast materials related to historico-philosophical research, and he quoted all the relevant literature there. We must emphasize this to avoid the impression that we are dealing here with the work which, being the first history of philosophy written in Croatian, which was finished seventy five years ago, is today only an obsolete or just a praiseworthy beginner's piece of work. On the contrary, despite these circumstances, which should not be underestimated, this work, created by a single author, is completely on the level of European historico-philosophical research of the time. Besides, we should also say that either today or at the time there have not been many works which have been so ambitious and complete.

Having decided to start writing his *Povijest filozofije* (A History of Philosophy), Bazala was faced with at least two fundamental problems, or impediments: namely, with an almost complete lack of historico-philosophical works in this country (with the only exception, in a systematical sense, of the works by his teacher Franjo Marković) on esthetics, and the work entitled *Filozofija drevnih Helena* (The Philosophy of Ancient Greeks) by Ljuboje Dlustuš (1850—1901), published in 1898—1901). The second problem, closely related to the first one, was the lack of Croatian philosophical terminology. The relative scarcity of philosophical terminology in Croatian was certainly a great and serious problem, whereas the lack of historico-philosophical research could have been made up for in a way. Consequently, it is in the creation, in the systematical building up and establishment of the Croatian philosophical terminology, based on the materials from the whole of the history of philosophy, that one of Bazala's greatest and lasting merits should be looked for. We must have in mind »the difficulty of the material« or the difficulty of the linguistic expression of individual philosophers, as well as the difficult and complex way of thinking and expounding problems which Bazala was able to formulate and express in a simple and brilliant way, working, as he says »on the untrodden paths through which our philosophical efforts have been fighting their way little by little«.⁵

With regard to the problem of language, the first volume and the first part of the second volume, dealing with Greek philosophy, are especially important. Namely, at the time when Bazala was writing his

⁵ Bazala, *op. cit.*, Vol. III p. 6.

book there were really very few translations of Greek philosophical texts, and therefore there was no adequate terminology for Greek philosophical concepts. Knowing how difficult it is, both from the philological and philosophical point of view, to translate from Greek, Bazala's work acquires an even greater importance, despite the existing translations. Since, as we can see, in the parts of his work dealing with Greek philosophy, Bazala supplemented his discussions of each philosopher with translations of fragments or passages from his works, sometimes quite extensive, which was not usual in works of this kind. He was doubtlessly induced to do this by the circumstances, but his translations are nevertheless easy to read and understand, and are certainly an acceptable and very useful addition and instruction in the understanding of views of the philosophers he was dealing with. He was both a specialist in Greek studies and a philosopher, which is certainly an ideal combination for translating Greek texts, which is not always the case when translations of these texts are concerned. Various objections can be made to Bazala's translations, but their importance is quite relative if we take into account the fact that the real progress and improvement in new translations is primarily a result of the consideration and acceptance of the results of new philologico-historical research, which is frequently essential in any new philosophical approach to a text, i.e. in its different interpretations. We can say that Bazala's interpretation of Greek philosophy is a standard and correct view of the development and of essential problems in Greek thinking, from the Presocratics to Neo-Platonists. In his interpretations he relies most on the works of Th. Gomperz which are an acknowledged result of philologico-philosophical studies and scholarship in the nineteenth century. There is no doubt that, both owing to the development of historico-philosophical research in this country and to the questions of the development and foundations of Greek thinking, as well as to the task and the fate of its appropriate metaphysics, today we see and evaluate many questions and problems in a different way. It would be sufficient to remind the reader of the immense importance of Heidegger's works for our understanding of the range and fate of Greek thinking. This, however, can not be taken as a proof of the obsolescence or inacceptability of Bazala's interpretations. They are an expression and a manifestation, in the best sense of the word, of »the spirit of the age« as the classical humanist concept, and as such they have a lasting value as an indispensable part of our living spiritual tradition.

What we have said so far with regard to the interpretation of Greek philosophy can be applied mostly also to the remaining two parts of Bazala's *History of Philosophy*. The second volume deals with medieval philosophy and modern philosophy up to Kant. These are equally reliable accounts of these periods in the history of philosophy in which he refers to standard interpretations and to the relevant literature of the time. We should also say that extensive notes with evaluations and references to secondary literature are an extremely useful, as well as

the most complete accompanying scholarly apparatus supplied in this language so far.

The third volume is the account of philosophy from Kant to the most recent schools and thinkers at the time. The third volume is especially interesting for several reasons: namely, dealing with the development of philosophy from Kant to the beginning of the twentieth century, it gives interpretations of philosophical systems which are in various ways still topical today, by creating in different ways our contemporary philosophical consciousness. The volume begins with a very extensive, systematically clear and well laid-out account of Kant's philosophy. We should not wonder that the interpretation of Kant is so exhaustive and disproportionately long in comparison with other philosophers of the period, since at the beginning of the century Kant was considered to be definitely the greatest thinker of the modern age, and the whole classical idealism, especially its later development, was understood merely as a successful or unsuccessful development of Kant's concepts and standpoints. Naturally, we could say that this standpoint has become obsolete today, but only conditionally, since even today it has numerous proponents. Fichte's philosophy is also interpreted extensively, revealing a special congeniality and affinity of Bazala for Fichte as a thinker and man, which should not be taken as its negative aspect. As it is well-known, after the decadence of Neo-Kantian schools, the role and importance of individual philosophers within the framework of classical idealism, were seen and evaluated in a different way, and we should mention especially the peculiar renaissance of Hegel and of the influence of his philosophy in general. It is obvious that this change in the general standpoint of philosophical consciousness, which occurred in the 1930's, and is very important to us today, could not affect Bazala's *Povijest filozofije* (*A History of Philosophy*).

The epoch-making change of philosophical consciousness which occurred in the 1930's can be seen in the interpretation of the place and importance of Hegel's philosophy, both within the framework of German classical idealism and with regard to its later influence. We shall mention only a few key works which have given impetus to this process, as for instance W. Dilthey's *Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels*, published in 1906; in 1910 W. Windelbald, as one of the most prominent Neo-Kantians, proved the untenability of many Neo-Kantian views; in 1924, R. Kroner's *Von Kant zu Hegel* was published; in 1929 N. Hartmann's *Die Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus*, Hegel was published and finally, Marx's *Early Works* (published by Landshut, one of Heidegger's disciples!) saw light, which gave a specific and wide impetus for the study of Hegel's philosophy.

In the interpretation of the development of philosophy after classical idealism we should mention three facts: namely, that an extensive account of Herbart's philosophy is given, which is understandable and valid since we know that, not so long before, Bazala's teacher Franjo Marković had chosen Herbart's philosophical system as exemplary for

the introduction to philosophy and philosophical education at the University of Zagreb. Second, the views of Karl Marx are designated as historical and economic materialism or mere economic determinism. It is certain that a schematized and simplified Marx's concept, which was a more or less generally accepted view at the time, did not seem to Bazala to be especially philosophically stimulating. It is important to mention, however, that the most important Marx's philosophical texts had not been published yet at the time, and prominent »Marxist« philosophers, as for instance Kautsky, Bernstein or Plehanov, did not make this philosophy especially attractive. Third, his interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy is a relatively short, but still a very stimulating text, especially if we take into account how much our understanding of Nietzsche's philosophy and its importance has changed in the last fifty years.

In the end an account of other schools and philosophers from the end of the nineteenth century is given and, what is more, even the authors and works of philosophers who were Bazala's contemporaries are mentioned. We should say that the last part deals with a certain number of authors who are almost unknown today, especially in this country. It is certainly a consequence of the mentioned radical change in the understanding of fundamental philosophical problems which occurred in the 1930's so that many different schools and philosophers fell into oblivion, because their views could not be incorporated productively into the essential development. However, Bazala was thoroughly familiar with this development at the end of the century, which was his formative period as a philosopher, which makes his account a reliable and trustworthy guide through this almost forgotten period. At the time his book was published the situation was different, since these parts had a special educational value because they enabled students and intellectuals in general to get acquainted with the most recent developments in speculative thinking.

In the foreword to the third volume of his *Povijest filozofije* (A History of Philosophy) Bazala expresses his regret at not being able to include in his work the history of Slavic philosophy. The first and principal reason for the exclusion of Slavic thinkers was his intention to give an account only of »the philosophical endeavors of world importance«. He was afraid that Slavic thinkers who would probably find their place in his work would find themselves in an unfavourable position, since their undeniable importance for the culture and philosophy of their nations could be diminished compared to »the brilliance of great minds belonging to far more enlightened nations«. He therefore suggested that a special history of philosophy of the Slavic nations be written by experts, representatives of each individual nation. The historicocultural circumstances were not favourable to this definitely noble slavic idea, so that his proposition, given in 1912, has not been realized so far. In principle, however, we think that Bazala's standpoint was correct, because a general history of philosophy should be written only and

unconditionally from the standpoint of »the development of universal spirit«. It is another question, of course, to what degree various histories of philosophy have complied with this rigorous criterion. Certainly not completely. We should point out, however, that in his account of Renaissance philosophy Bazala dedicated several very good and informative pages to the philosophical work of Franjo Petrić (F. Petriša) concerning whom he correctly stated that »in the series of excellent thinkers at the beginning of the new age, our compatriot also acquired fame«. ⁶

Bazala outlines briefly the basic theses expounded in the two main works by Petrić, namely *Discussiones peripateticae* and *Nova de universis de philosophia*. It is obvious that Bazala does not repeat only generally accepted views, which were few at the time anyway, but that he had really studied original works by Petrić. It is especially true of his account of *Nova de universis philosophia* which he analyses concisely and systematically, giving an evaluation of its historico-philosophical importance, which has been mainly confirmed by the contemporary research. In the notes for the period he mentions the work of the Croatian Renaissance philosophers, namely Juraj Dubrovčan, Juraj Dobrotić, Antun Medus, Nikola Gučetić and Benedikt Stay and points out that their works had, unfortunately, not been studied yet as the philosophical heritage of this country. It is surprising, though, that he does not mention Ruder Bošković at all, but it is probably because he considered him to be primarily a mathematician and a physicist.

Today, after many decades, we finally have at our disposal again Bazala's *Povijest filozofije* (A History of Philosophy). This work is of an immense importance for the cultural heritage of this country, not only as a valuable document of its philosophical tradition, but as a work of scholarship which is still important today. Many chapters of Bazala's *Povijest filozofije* are among the most beautiful pages of philosophical literature written in this country, as for instance the chapters on Plato, Stoa, Kant and Fichte. For us, especially his original and distinctive language can be stimulating today, by its being far from any jargon which burdens a great deal of contemporary writing.

Bazala was definitely one of the most versatile Croatian intellectuals in the first half of this century. His contribution as Professor in Philosophy at the University of Zagreb and as a popularizer of the humanities on the high who saw it as his duty to improve the level of public education in the country, was crucially important for the intellectual life of Croatia at that time. His *Povijest filozofije* (A History of Philosophy) was a very competent and reliable introduction to the study of philosophy, which set very high standards for later work in the history of philosophy in this country. This book and his forty years of philosophy teaching helped to develop a philosophical atmosphere and phi-

⁶ Bazala, *op. cit.*, Vol. II p. 204.

losophical thinking which, in a relatively short span of time between Franjo Marković and himself, brought Croatian philosophy to the level of contemporary European philosophy.

The interest in historico-philosophical research at the University of Zagreb is still strong, thus reflecting and continuing the tradition started by Bazala with his book *Povijest filozofije* and by his teaching and research.

TRANSLATED BY LELIJA SOČANAC

O ULOZI I ZNAČENJU POVIJESTI FILOZOFIJE

Sažetak

Bazala je bio nedvojbena jedna od najsvestranijih osoba duhovnog i kulturnog života Hrvatske u prvoj polovici ovog stoljeća. Njegova uloga i značenje kao profesora filozofije zagrebačkog sveučilišta, ali isto tako i kao popularizatora humanističkih znanosti na visokoj razini, u smislu njegovog shvaćanja poticanja narodne prosvijećenosti, od osobitog su značenja za razvitak i promicanje duhovnog života u nas. Svojom *Povijesti filozofije* on je kulturnoj javnosti dao vrlo stručan i pouzdan uvod u studij filozofije, a tim je djelom istovremeno postavio visok standard povijesnofilozofijskog rada. Posebice to njegovo djelo kao i njegov četrdesetogodišnji rad kao profesora filozofije stvorili su uvjete i omogućili da se u našoj sredini u kratkom razdoblju, od Franje Markovića pa do njega, razvije filozofijska atmosfera i filozofijsko mišljenje koje je u potpunosti bilo na evropskoj razini.

I danas se jamačno može lako uočiti značajan interes za povijesnofilozofijska istraživanja na našem sveučilištu, a to je svakako dio tradicije koja je zasnovana Bazalinim djelom *Povijest filozofije*, kao i njegovom cjelokupnom djelatnošću.

DIE ÄSTHETISCHEN ANSCHAUUNGEN ALBERT BAZALAS ZUR ZEIT DER KROATISCHEN MODERNE

ZLATKO POSAVAC

(Zagreb)

Original Paper
UDC 111.852:1(091) Bazala

1.

Als Bazala (geb. 1877 — gest. 1947) im Jahr 1902 in der Zagreber Zeitschrift »Vienac« seinen Artikel *Spencer und Wundt* veröffentlichte und über die beiden Namen erörterte, die sich zu jener Zeit internationaler Popularität erfreuten, hörte man in kroatischen gebildeten Kreisen über diese zwei unterschiedlichen Theoretiker durchaus nicht zum ersten Mal, sondern sie waren auch schon vorher sehr wohl bekannt. Während Wundt mit seinem Voluntarismus wahrscheinlich in gewissem Maße auf Bazala Einfluß hatte, weshalb er hier sofort genannt zu werden verdient, liegt die Bedeutung Spencers darin, daß er einen Vorgänger Bazalas, einen kroatischen Theoretiker, beeinflusste, der, wie es scheint, keinen direkten Einfluß auf Bazala hatte, sondern einige theoretische Wege und Probleme eröffnete, die, unter anderem, auch die Gestaltung von Bazalas Sicht ermöglichten und zugleich zum Beginn des gedanklichen, theoretischen und ästhetischen Wirkens der kroatischen Moderne standen. Denn Spencer war eines der inspirativen Vorbilder Ljudevit Dvornikoviés.

Zu Beginn der 90-er Jahre des 19. Jahrhunderts begann Ljudevit Dvorniković mit dem Ausbau seiner positivistischen psychologischer-biologischer Ansicht, in dem er dem damals in Kroatien herrschenden Herbartianismus die Ideen Herbert Spencers hinzufügte. Das geschah sozusagen zur selben Zeit und fast als eine Art Antithese zu den neothomistischen Auffassungen, die Antun Bauer theoretisch vertrat und untermauerte, als er 1892 in *Naravno bogoslovlje* (Natürliche Theologie) und 1894 in *Opća metafizika ili ontologija* (Allgemeine Metaphysik oder Ontologie) veröffentlichte, zwei Werke, die auch für die Ästhetik relevante Kapitel enthalten. Dabei ist festzustellen und als charakteristisch zu erachten, daß gerade Bauer ein Autor ist, der kritisch über Wilhelm Wundt schreibt. Wundt stand jedoch Bazala näher — wenn-

gleich Bazala gegen Bauer nicht polemisierte — weil Wundt ein »Mittler zwischen der spekulativen Philosophie und dem Positivismus« war und da er »einen gerechteren Standpunkt gegenüber den Geisteswissenschaften einnahm als Spencer«, bei dem »wegen eines zu großen Einflusses der Naturwissenschaften auf sein System die Geisteswissenschaften nicht immer gut wegkamen«.¹

Das angedeutete Beziehungsgefüge ist mehr als interessant, weil es symptomatisch ist und keineswegs zufällig sein wird. Dieses Gefüge, als nur eine von einer größeren Anzahl von Komponenten, gehört zu einem Mosaik von Ideen- und Theoriekonzepten, die einem Teil der gedanklichen Unterlage und des Hintergrunds einer Periode, genauer gesagt, einer Epoche bilden, die wir die »kroatische Moderne« nennen; einer Periode, für die es gute Gründe gibt, sie als eine integrale Einheit in der Zeitspanne von etwa 1890 bis abschließend 1910 zu bezeichnen. Dieser Einheit gehören auch die ästhetischen Abhandlungen des jungen Albert Bazala an, obwohl er de facto erst ab 1901 publiziert. Doch Bazalas Ausgangspunkt steht immanent mit der theoretischen Eröffnung neuer Wege im letzten Jahrzehnt des 19. Jahrhunderts in Verbindung, wo außer Ljudevit Dvorniković auch Gjuro Arnold mit seiner *Psihologija* (Psychologie) von 1893, wie auch die Antithetik gegenüber Positionen von Typ Kržan, Bauer, Segvić und Stadler berücksichtigt werden muß; ohne all dies würden nicht nur manche Thesen der Moderne schlicht unhistorisch in der Luft hängen bleiben, sondern auch Bazalas theoretisches Profil bliebe vollkommen unverständlich und unbestimmbar. Und wenn bei Bazala vom Aspekt der ästhetischen Anschauung die Rede ist, so ist er im Wesentlichen geformt und abgerundet im Rahmen der Moderne. Denn Bazalas ästhetisch-theoretisches Engagement ist zu der Zeit ein integraler Teil der kroatischen Moderne und eines der Schlüsselmomente für ihr Verständnis.

Der Umstand, daß der junge Bazala innerhalb der Moderne der Gruppe der »Alten« angehörte, die die Gegenseite in verbalen Angriffen häufig als »reaktionär« bezeichnete, sowie der Umstand, daß Bazala auch später die Thematik der Ästhetik berühren wird (wie z.B. in seinem Vortrag *Važnost i značenje umjetnosti* (Wichtigkeit und Bedeutung der Kunst) von 1931 oder in der Schrift *Značenje umjetnosti u životu naroda* (Die Bedeutung der Kunst im Leben des Volkes), 1935² ändert

¹ BAZALA, Dr. Albert, *Spencer i Wundt*, Vienac, Zagreb XXXIV/1902, Nr. 50, S. 796.

² BAZALA, Dr. Albert, *Značenje umjetnosti u životu naroda* (Bedeutung der Kunst im Leben des Volkes), Vortrag auf der Jubiläumssitzung anlässlich der 50-Jahrfeier der Strossmayer Galerie am 18. 5. 1935; in *Spomenica o 50-godišnjici Strossmayerove galerije*, JAZU, Zagreb 1935, SS. 35—49. Für Bazalas Vortrag in der Volksuniversität *Važnost i značenje umjetnosti* (Wichtigkeit und Bedeutung der Kunst), s. Novo doba, Split, XIV/1931, Nr. 44, S. 3.

nicht wesentlich die hier antizipatorisch ausgesprochene These. Abgesehen davon, daß bewußt gemacht werden muß, daß die Einteilung in »Alte« und »Junge« als Ideologisierung der Generationen reiner Voluntarismus ist, vollkommen fiktiv und historiographisch-interpretativ nur bedingt und im Wesentlichen eigentlich gar nicht verwendbar ist, muß noch darauf aufmerksam gemacht werden, daß es in der Polemik des jungen Bazala von der Position der »Alten« her zu einer klaren Identifizierung einer bisher noch nicht fixierten und auf den ersten Blick unwahrnehmbaren ideologisch-philosophischen Unterlage und des theoretischen Hintergrunds kommt, den sich — häufig verständnislos, falsch und nicht immer zu Recht — die »Jungen« zuschrieben. Identifiziert wurde der sog. europäische und damit auch der internationale Kontext der Moderne. Mit anderen Worten war Bazala von der Position der »Alten« aus einer der seltenen und wenigen faktischen theoretischen Interpreten der Ideen der »Jungen«. Und was die später veröffentlichten Schriften betrifft, so wäre es nicht schwer zu zeigen, daß Bazalas Grundeinstellung aus der Zeit der Moderne nur teilweise modifiziert wurde durch eine erneuerte Einsicht in die neuere Literatur durch Zugabe einiger neuerer Ergebnisse zwecks Abmilderung des jugendlichen Radikalismus, wobei die Struktur seiner ästhetischen Auffassung und im Wesentlichen identisch blieb, identisch in Stellung, Horizont und Konsequenzen. Weder darf aus diesen Gründen Bazala in einer Darstellung der Moderne übergangen werden, weil er sich für das Konzept der »Alten« entschloß, noch darf die Feststellung, Bazalas ästhetische Anschauung sei funktionell oder historisch im Gebiet der Moderne erschöpft, als interpretative Gewalt betrachtet werden. Da die neuere Literatur und theoretische Ereignisse zu verfolgen nicht dasselbe bedeutet wie an diesen Ereignissen auch teilzunehmen, was eigentlich für Bazalas Ausflüge ins Gebiet der Ästhetik nach der Moderne charakteristisch ist, so ist dieser Teil der ästhetischen Erwägungen Bazalas von zweitrangiger Bedeutung. Dieses Urteil gilt natürlich nicht für Bazalas übrige theoretische Arbeit, doch bleibt es für das Gebiet der Ästhetik ausschlaggebend.

Um Bazalas ästhetische Zugehörigkeit zur Zeit der Moderne zu verstehen und besser würdigen zu können, muß darauf aufmerksam gemacht werden, daß es für das Verstehen jener Zeit notwendig ist, eine enge Verbindung der Ereignisse im Bereich der Kunst mit denen in Theorie und Kritik, wie auch umgekehrt festzustellen. Und während Bazalas frühe Bemühungen in der Kritik überwiegend mittelmäßig waren, muß dem Verständnis seiner theoretischen Gedanken eine weit größere Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt werden. Und diese können nur dann im richtigen Licht gezeigt werden, wenn wir all jenes berücksichtigen, was zu jener Zeit parallel auf dem Gebiet des künstlerischen Schaffens, bzw. der künstlerischen Wirklichkeit geschah: auf dem Gebiet der gesamten Kunsttheorie, und insbesondere der Kunstkritik und der Kunstpraxis.

Die Existenz einer profilierten theoretischen Grundlage für die Epoche oder den Zeitraum zwischen 1890 und 1910 in der kulturel-

len Historiographie Kroatiens wie auch in den Historiographien einzelner Zweige der kroatischen Kunst bleibt in der Hauptsache unerwähnt. Nur hin und wieder wird etwas über diesen oder jenen Aspekt des allgemeinen Geisteslebens angedeutet oder es werden einige deutlichere Thesen genannt, aus den gegenwärtigen weltweiten theoretischen, bzw. programmatisch-künstlerischen oder auch nur kritischen Trends. Eine Bearbeitung des Standes der Theorie, eine Identifizierung der verschiedenen gedanklichen Richtungen und ihrer gegenseitigen Beziehungen im In- und Ausland, eine Wechselbeziehung von Theorie und Kunst, eine Aufzählung einflußreicher Autoren, all dieses wurde bisher in Beziehung auf die Moderne in Kroatien hintangestellt. Unbearbeitet. Als käme es bei einer gegenseitigen Beleuchtung von Theorie und der Kunst nicht zu tieferen Einsichten sowie einem besseren Verständnis auf der einen wie auch auf der anderen Seite! Ist schon alles andere als gut, daß diese Arbeit weder formell noch faktographisch erledigt ist, lediglich aus allgemeiner Unterschätzung der heimischen Bemühungen, die keine Anerkennung fanden, so ist es weit schlimmer, daß es aus mangelnder Kenntnis des theoretischen Denkens in Kroatien zu ungeheurem Unverständnis, zu einer Fülle von Irrtümern, Fehlleistungen, Unzulänglichkeiten und Mißgestaltungen in der historiographischen Bearbeitung der Wende vom 19. zum 20. Jahrhundert auf fast allen Gebieten der kroatischen Kunst kam, da in falsch durchgeführten vergleichenden Einsichten die Erkenntnis der wahrhaften geistigen und auch theoretischen Ereignisse in der Welt, des wahren Horizonts der Moderne ausbleibt.

Um das postulierte Verständnis der Jahrhundertwende allgemein und damit auch Bazalas theoretischen Anteils zu sichern, gerade aus der ausgesprochenen Verbundenheit von Theorie und der Kunst, und umgekehrt, ist es unverzichtbar, in kurzen Zügen die wesentliche theoretische und kategoriale Wende zu skizzieren, die sich zur Zeit der kroatischen Moderne um die Jahrhundertwende, in dem Zeitraum zwischen etwa 1890 und etwa 1910 abspielte.

Betrachtet man das Profil der kulturellen, künstlerischen und theoretisch-ästhetischen Phänomene, die in Kroatien unmittelbar dem letzten Jahrzehnt des 19. Jahrhunderts vorangehen, wird eine sorgfältige Analyse eine Reihe wesentlicher Momente ergeben, die das *fin de siècle* deutlich von dem vorhergehenden Epoche unterscheiden. Wenn diese Unterschiede analytisch am besten in der Literatur ausgeprägt waren, in der, wenigstens was die Ambitionen betrifft, Realismus und Naturalismus antithetisch dominieren, und wenn diese bisher verhältnismäßig am erfolgreichsten interpretativ gerade auf der Ebene der Literatur erkannt wurden, so bedeutet dies nicht, daß sie nicht vorhanden sind oder daß sie keine Bedeutung haben für andere Künste, insbesondere für die bildende Kunst. Dasselbe bezieht sich ebenfalls auf die theoretischen Einflüsse und schließlich auch für die vollere kulturelle Profilierung diese Zeitraums als einer Einheit.

Deskriptiv könnten diese Unterschiede mit einer Reihe von Kontrapunkten zusammengefaßt werden. Statt der Szenen aus dem Leben als einer der charakteristischen Forderungen der Kunst des 19. Jahrhunderts in der realistischen, biedermeierlichen, impressionistischen, naturalistischen, u.a. Version, werden um die Jahrhundertwende Erlebnis, Gefühl, Stimmung, Laune, nuancierte Emotionalität, individualisierte Eindrücke, subjektive Impressionen, Sinn für das gefühlvolle Detail gefordert; statt der nüchternen objektivistischen Wahrnehmung die psycho-subjektive Einfühlung; statt der Trivialität der alltäglichen Wirklichkeit gewählte Empfindsamkeit und Phantasie selbst Pathos des Neoromantismus; statt eindeutige buchstäbliche Realität symbolistische Mehrdeutigkeit und »Tiefe«, Eingriff in das »Jenseits« und das Undurchsichtige, und statt der »treuen Nachbildung«, statt getreue »Abbildung« und »Nachahmung der Natur« entdeckt die Sezession (art nouveau, Jugendstil) den modernen Funktionalismus, eine neue Stilisierung und erneuert gleichzeitig auf neue Art die ursprünglich als Gesamtkunstwerk bezeichnete Idee. Der Realismus selbst wurde nicht über Bord geworfen, sondern mit Innovationen und Modifikationen weitergegeben. Statt des positivistischen Szientismus werden durch verbale und theoretisch nicht sehr fest grundierter Lärm über den »Bankrott der Wissenschaft« Ästhetizismus und Artismus hervorgehoben, was zu einer gewissen Neubestätigung der Kategorie des Schönen führt. Die »Wahrhaftigkeit« des Realismus und einige seiner anderen Versionen geraten dabei in den Hintergrund. Auch der Historismus erhält zur Jahrhundertwende eine besondere Nuance; der vertiefte Sinn für Geschichte hat keine philologischen noch positivistischen Einschränkungen mehr. Statt des Soziologismus wird der Psychologismus hervorgehoben und in den Vordergrund gerückt, und, obwohl das Problem der National- und Volkskunst als Formen des kollektiven Bewußtseins und des objektivierten Geistes stark aktualisiert wurde, wird die objektivistische Ästhetik durch eine subjektivistische ersetzt. Es kommt zu heftigen Konfrontationen zwischen Verstand und Gefühlen, dem Irrationalen und dem Rationalen, der Wahrheit und der Schönheit, nicht nur in sich diachronisch entgegengesetzten Konzepten, sondern auch im Konflikt zeitgenössischer gleichzeitiger, antithetischer Positionen. Eternalismus und Relativismus sind jetzt nicht mehr lediglich positivistisch einander gegenübergestellt, sondern ihre Reflexe auf die Kunst sind dem Postulat der authentischen Existenz unterworfen: statt universeller Allgemeingesetze konkrete und einzelne Individualität. Doch da es bis zum Existentialismus noch ein weiter Weg war, wurde die theoretische Stellung ausgedrückt durch die Förderung eines authentischen Lebens. Die Kunst nimmt Bilder und Szenen nicht mehr einfach aus dem Leben, so wie es ist, sondern sie setzt sich für seine authentischen Formen ein, für die »Fülle des Lebens«. Neben »Gefühl« und »Schönheit« gehört das »Leben« ebenfalls zu den zentralen Kategorien der Jahrhundertwende, und deshalb ist es kein Zufall, daß die repräsentative Zeitschrift der kroatischen Moderne »Život« (»Leben«) heiß. Im Umlauf befinden sich verschiedene Ideolo-

gien des Vitalismus, so daß neben dem Psychologismus (mit seinen Antithesen!) in philosophischer Hinsicht unterschiedliche Versionen der sog. »Lebensphilosophie« vielleicht eine der dominierenden Grundlagen oder Hintergründe der Jahrhundertwende bilden, sowohl europa- und weltweit als auch im Rahmen der kroatischen Kultur.

Die genannte Phänomenologie der Epoche der Moderne als eines geschichtlichen Zeitraums um die Jahrhundertwende ist gewiß das Ergebnis jüngerer Forschungen, nicht ohne daß auf einigen spezifischen Thesen des Verfassers dieser Abhandlung bestanden wird und teilweise zusätzliche Argumente als Früchte der nachfolgenden Abhandlung vorweggenommen werden.³

In der kulturgeschichtlichen und künstlerischen Atmosphäre der Jahrhundertwende vom 19. zum 20. Jahrhundert beginnt der junge Bazala mit seiner Arbeit auf der ästhetischen Ebene. Dabei muß, natürlich, parallel zu den europäischen Einflüssen, die konkrete spezifische theoretische Situation berücksichtigt werden, so wie sie in Kroatien bei allen, genannten relevanten Komponenten jener Zeit vorlag, sowie die Konstellation einiger betont profilierter und allgemein einflußreicher Positionen, worüber noch zu sprechen sein wird. Doch ist gleichermaßen ständig daran zu denken, daß wir, insbesondere zu Beginn, die beschriebene »Atmosphäre« als eine komplexe theoretisch bewußtgemachte Gegenwart nicht haben, sondern daß sie nur allmählich artikuliert und abgerundet wird. Mithin ist auch Bazalas Anteil als ein nicht unwesentlicher Teil in der theoretischen Artikulierung der Bewußtmachung der Anschauungen, Ansichten und Ereignisse der Epoche der kroatischen Moderne zu sehen.

Beschränkt man sich methodologisch auf die wirklich optimale Relevanz von Bazalas ästhetischen Schriften, so sind taxativ diejenigen Titel zu nennen, die der Moderne angehören. Es handelt sich um die folgenden Texte: *Psihologija u hrvatskom umjetnom pjesništvu* (Die Psychologie in der kroatischen Dichtung), veröffentlicht 1901 im »Vijenac« (auch separat); ein Jahr später, 1902 ebenfalls im »Vijenac« *Estetska čuvstva* (Ästhetische Gefühle); dann 1904 in der Zeitschrift »Hrvatstvo« (doch auch separat) die engagierte Polemik »*Moderni« i narodna književnost* (Die »Modernen« und die Volksliteratur), sowie schließlich die umfassende Abhandlung *O umjetnosti* (Über die Kunst) in der Zeitschrift »Glas Matice Hrvatske«, 1906.

Es muß gesagt werden, daß der erste Text des jungen Bazala, *Psihologija u hrvatskom umjetnom pjesništvu* (Die Psychologie in der kroatischen Dichtung) ästhetisch nur mittelbar und bedingt aber nicht auf Grund der Formulierung der Thesen relevant ist. Diese Abhandlung ist

³ Die phänomenologische Beschreibung ist eine erweiterte Strukturierung der »Formation« der Moderne, wie sie im Buch *Estetika u Hrvata* (Ästhetik bei den Kroaten) von Zlatko POSAVAC, Zagreb 1986, skizziert ist.

zu schulmäßig, enthält keine Erklärung der theoretischen Position, und besitzt keinen theoretischen, sondern mehr pädagogischen, didaktischen Charakter. Doch auch in der Auswahl dichterischer Beispiele hat er kein Glück; die Beispiele sind größtenteils in keiner Hinsicht »anthologisch«, sie sind kein »florilegium«. Was dennoch als Qualifikat aus der genannten Abhandlung gesehen werden muß, ist die Orientierung, die Interessenrichtung, das Berühren des Gebietes; die dichterische, künstlerische und ästhetische Sphäre wird auf die Ebene der Psychologie gehoben, und gerade dieses Moment der Aufhellung, der Entwicklung und des Verständnisses der Kunst durch das Prisma der Psychologie ist eines der wesentlichen, betont hervorgehobenen Charakteristika der Epoche. Daß die Prädominanz der Kunstbetrachtung durch das Prisma der Psychologie der heute renommiertesten theoretischen Doktrin und Philosophie für falsch gehalten wird, ist ein vollkommen anderes Problem.

Eine Bestätigung für die Orientierung des Interesses durch die Berührung der ästhetischen Sphäre mit der Psychologie stellt Bazalas erster, ästhetisch wirklich theoretischer Artikel unter dem Titel *Estetska čuvstva* (Ästhetische Gefühle) von 1902 dar. Symptomatisch ist, daß auf psychologischer Ebene in der emotionalen Sphäre als besondere Form des Gefühls das Ästhetische identifiziert wird, und zwar als spezifische psychische Tatsache. In dieser Richtung sagt Bazala über ästhetische Gefühle Folgendes: »Daß sie nicht das sind, das sinnliche Empfindungen sind, ist leicht bereits daraus ersichtlich, daß wir nicht fest sagen können, weshalb uns etwas angenehm oder unangenehm ist, und für sie gilt der Spruch 'de gustibus non est disputandum'. Bei ästhetischen Gefühle können wir hingegen Gründe nennen, was schon daraus erkennbar ist, daß es zu Diskussionen, zu Auseinandersetzungen darüber kommen kann, was schön und was nicht schön ist. Damit ist nicht gesagt, daß derjenige, der keine Gründe dafür zu nennen vermag, warum er etwas mag oder nicht mag, keine ästhetischen Gefühle haben kann. Denn es muß unterschieden werden zwischen dem ästhetischen Geschmack, d.h. der Fähigkeit, das wahrhaft Schöne als solches zu empfinden, und der ästhetischen Kritik, d.h. der Fähigkeit, Gründe dafür anzugeben, ob etwas schön ist und warum.«⁴

Die gerade erwähnte These sowie auch andere Thesen des sehr kurzen Artikels, die eine einigermaßen ganzheitliche ästhetische Position bezeichnen, sind ursprünglich nicht Bazalas Thesen. Es wäre anmaßend und unangemessen, die Spuren der Aspekte dieser Position bis in die Ausgangspunkte aus der großen Weltphilosophie und -ästhetik zu verfolgen, aber in jedem Fall ist es nützlich und wichtig, auf die heimischen Quellen hinzuweisen. Bazalas Artikel ist in seiner Gesamtheit buchstäblich von der Ansicht Gjuró Arnolds beeinflusst, wie er sie erstmals in seiner *Psychologie* 1893 darlegte. Wenngleich Bazalas These, daß sich

⁴ BAZALA, Dr. Albert, *Estetska čuvstva* (Ästhetische Gefühle), Vienac, Zagreb XXXIV/1902, Nr. 11, S. 171.

»an unsere Gedanken, mit deren Hilfe wir die Beziehungen zwischen den Gliedern einer Einheit erkennen und verstehen, ästhetische Gefühle binden«⁵, auch Franjo Marković, also dem traditionellen Herbartianismus nahestehen, unterliegen Physiognomie und Charakter des Artikels deutlich dem Einfluß des Konzepts Gjuro Arnolds. Insofern gehört der Text *Estetska čuvstva* nicht zu denjenigen, die Bazalas ästhetisches Denken als seine abgeschlossene Position charakterisieren. Indessen ist der Artikel historiographisch von außerordentlicher Bedeutung: indem das ästhetische Gefühl in den Vordergrund gerückt wird, beweist sich theoretisch der authentische Bedarf der Epoche an der Jahrhundertwende an Identifizierung der Kategorien von Gefühl, Emotion, Stimmung, Erlebnis u.a.m. parallel zu den Ereignissen auf dem Gebiet von Kritik und Kunstpraxis. Indem der Ursprung von Bazalas Inspiration in seiner Abhandlung von 1902 in Arnolds *Psychologie* von 1893 erkannt wird, zeigt sich, daß in Kroatien jener Zeit die theoretischen Postulate der Ästhetik nicht nur durch den Import aus dem europäischen theoretischen Bestand verwirklicht werden, sondern daß sie auch auf Grund einheimischer Voraussetzungen Gestalt annehmen. Die »Verwendbarkeit« dieser Thesen, nennen wir sie mit Vorbehalt als Arnolds Thesen, zeigt Kontinuität, historische Homogenität und Einklang des letzten Jahrzehnts des 19. Jahrhunderts mit dem ersten Jahrzehnt des 20. Jahrhunderts, womit sie gleichzeitig Arnolds wie auch Bazalas Position als konstitutiv für die Anschauungen der kroatischen Moderne qualifiziert. Im Jahre 1893 ist es bereits ein kohärenter, mit den Tendenzen seiner Zeit übereinstimmender theoretischer Standpunkt, was in der kroatischen Ästhetik und Kunst im vorhergehenden Zeitraum charakteristisch war. Deswegen lassen sich weder Arnolds Auffassungen noch Bazala Ausgangspunkte als etwas Veraltetes und Überholtes herabwürdigen — wie das im allgemeinen die kroatische Historiographie zu tun pflegt — nur weil sie der Position der »Alten« darstellen; denn sie sind jeweils nur eine von mehreren möglichen Anschauungen, die gegenseitig antithetisch den authentischen theoretischen Ausdruck des geschichtlichen Augenblicks darstellen, jener Epoche, nämlich, die unter anderem auch mit Arnolds Formulierungen beginnt; also nur eines unter mehreren unterschiedlichen Konzeptionen, die in ihrer Gesamtheit die pluralistisch strukturierte Gestaltung der Moderne konstituieren.

Streng genommen kommen indessen unter allen genannten Schriften Bazalas jedoch lediglich zwei für eine relevante Betrachtung in Frage. Und zwar die polemische Schrift »*Moderni*« i narodna književnost (Die »Modernen« und die Volksliteratur) (1904), sowie die rein theoretische Schrift *O umjetnosti* (Über die Kunst) (1906). Es handelt sich um Abhandlungen, die Bazalas eigenen Standpunkt und eine endgültige Formulierung seiner Ansicht enthalten. Sie entstehen aus der Beobachtung aktueller Probleme und aus einer umfassenden Einsicht in

⁵ Op. cit., I. c.

die aktuelle ästhetische Literatur vom Ende des 19. und Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts. Sie stehen unmittelbar unter dem Einfluß bestimmter dominanter europäischer, bzw. weltweiter Gedankenströmungen; gleichwohl bleibt dabei das Profil von Bazalas Position in seiner Gestaltung nicht ohne gewisse selbständige Züge.

2.

Obwohl sich die zwei Abhandlungen Bazalas, aus der oben erwähnten engsten Auswahl, sowohl in der Intonation als auch in Absicht und Ziel voneinander unterscheiden, ergänzen sie sich ebendeshalb; ihre Thesen ergeben eine kohärente Einheit, sie bilden einen identischen Standpunkt, indem sie in relevanten Konsequenzen eine differenzierte theoretische Position zu durchdenken suchen, eine Position, die mit der zeitgenössischen historischen Epoche ihrer Entstehung übereinstimmt und ihr angemessen ist, während sie von ihren Referenzen, ihren Wechselbeziehungen und ihrer Struktur her in einen europäischen, bzw. eine weltweiten gedanklichen Zusammenhang eingebunden ist, in die Abläufe künstlerischer Praxis, Kritik und natürlich auch in die Abläufe der Ästhetik als der Theorie ihres Zeitalters. Trotz identischer Position unterscheiden sich die beiden genannten Texte jedoch nicht nur in der Intention, bzw. der Intonation, also ihrem Charakter, sondern, bedeutender noch, thematisch. Die Polemik »Moderna« i narodna književnost erfaßt unmittelbar die künstlerischen, kritischen und ästhetischen Ereignisse in Kroatien, nicht nur theoretisch, sondern auch praktisch und besteht auf der Thematisierung der Bezeichnungen Kunst-Volk, Kunst-Nation. Wenn man die Beschäftigung der Abhandlung *O umjetnosti* mit dem Problem, bzw. dem Thema der Subjektivierung der Kunst, des Subjekts als eines Individuums, eines Schöpfers oder eines Empfängers, sowie mit den psychischen Archetypen und Modalitäten der individuellen Psychologie, bzw. der Geistigkeit antizipiert, so ist es verständlicher, daß in der Polemik mit den »Modernen« die Seele des Volkes noch immer theoretisch thematisiert wird, das kollektive Subjekt, die kollektive Psychologie und die psychische Tatsächlichkeit des Lebens in einer bestimmten geschichtlichen Gemeinschaft, so daß auch die Kunst in der Funktion der Nation oder der Nationalität betrachtet wird.

Wenn Bazalas Polemik nur eine von vielen Artikeln und Broschüren über die Konfrontation der »Alten« und der »Modernen« wäre — die meisten dieser Texte sind bis heute leider weder interpretatorisch und historiographisch benutzt, noch objektiv beurteilt — dann würde es vielleicht genügen, nur die Titel seiner Werke zu erwähnen. Bazalas Polemik bietet jedoch mehr: neben einer eigenen Position deckt sie, wie schon angedeutet, eine theoretische Profilierung für die Epoche der Moderne auf, ein Profil aktueller Probleme und umstrittener Fragen; weiterhin wird in der Polemik der historische gedankliche Kontext Europas

identifiziert, den es unbedingt festzustellen gilt, auch wenn man nicht mit Bazalas Anschauungen, bzw. Lösungen übereinstimmt.

Aus dem Titel »*Moderni*« i narodna književnost (Die »Modernen« und die Volksliteratur) läßt sich bereits erahnen, daß Bazala den »Modernen« die Entfernung von der Volksliteratur und weiterhin allgemein die Trennung der Kunst von »der Seele des Volkes« oder »der völkischen Seele« und dem nationalen Leben vorwerfen wird. Durch diese Entfernung, glaubt Bazala, werden Kunst und Kultur als Einheit entwurzelt! (Bazala benutzt den etwas ungeschickten Ausdruck »Auswanderer«-Kultur, was heute in diesem Sinne mit nicht-authentischer und in unserer zeitgenössischen Bedeutung entfremdeter Kultur bezeichnet würde.) Doch wäre auch dieser Aspekt von Bazalas Polemik kaum von Interesse und nicht besonders neu, erinnerte man sich nicht, daß des gesamte 19. Jahrhundert außer als »das Jahrhundert der Wissenschaften« schon zu Beginn, und insbesondere um die Mitte des Jahrhunderts, auch noch als »das Jahrhundert der Nationalitäten« betrachtet wurde. Der gesamte Themenkomplex dieser Polemik wird jedoch von einer Reihe von Implikationen getragen, die gerade für die Jahrhundertwende spezifisch sind. Denn auf theoretischer und philosophischer Ebene wird eine Reihe von Thesen erörtert, die die »Modernen«, bzw. die »Jungen« vertraten: Freiheit des Schaffens, Individualismus, Subjektivismus, Rechtfertigung der Behauptung der Instinkte, Sinne, Gefühle und Gemütsbewegungen, Feinfühligkeit, betonter Ästhetizismus, ein gewisser ästhetischer Aristokratismus und Amoralismus, sowie schließlich selbstverständlich auch Kosmopolitismus.⁶

In seinen kritischen Einwänden wird Bazala selbstverständlich nicht gegen den allgemein menschlichen, allgemein menschheitlichen Charakter der Kunst eintreten, doch wird er die Kunst — die sich aus der »Seele des Volkes« formt, aus der Nation als einer konkreten geschichtlichen Gemeinschaft einer konkreten geschichtlichen Wirklichkeit von Ort und Zeit — dem abstrakten Kosmopolitismus gegenüberstellen, wie es auch Gjuro Arnold tat; von dem Kosmopolitismus, bzw. dem allgemein menschlichen, allgemein menschheitlichen Charakter der Kunst glaubt Bazala, wie auch Arnold, daß er inhaltlich erfüllt, bzw.

⁶ An zahlreichen Stellen wird erkennbar, daß sich Bazalas polemische Anspielungen unter anderen ganz gezielt auf Branimir Wiesner-Livadić und dessen Äußerungen beziehen; unter anderem auf seinen Hedonismus und die »gewaltige Fähigkeit zu genießen«. Bazalas Polemik zum (kroatischen) nationalen Charakter der Kunst gehört dem Kategoriensystem der Moderne an und sollte von der vollkommen unterschiedlichen Problematik des jugoslawischen Nationalismus vor (»Pokret«), um und nach 1910 unterschieden werden, als gegen eine solche nationalistische Instrumentalisierung der Kunst außer Livadić auch A. G. Matos, Iso Kršnjavi u.a.m. schrieben, die ähnlich, ja, identisch mit Livadić und dem Ästhetizismus der Moderne dachten, und sich nur in Fülle, Artikuliertheit, Biegsamkeit und Reichtum von Livadić Thesen unterschieden.

erfüllbar ist, nur insofern er über wirkliche menschliche, sich immer mehr weitende Kreise konkreter Gemeinschaften erreicht wird, in denen dem Volk, bzw. der Nation eine besonders bedeutende Rolle zufällt, wegen der geschichtlichen Realität und realer Kohäsiver Momente, wegen des in einem Volk oder einer Nation geschichtlich bereits wirklich Gemeinsamen einer Gemeinschaft.⁷ Bazala ist weiterhin überzeugt, daß das Postulat der Freiheit nicht verabsolutisiert werden kann, daß das Subjekt eine Individualität ist, die sich als Einzelnes nur in einer konkreten Gemeinschaft mit anderen Subjekten verwirklicht unter Respektierung von deren Existenz, Eigentümlichkeit und Individualität; deshalb befürwortet Bazala statt eines ästhetischen Aristokratismus Volksgemeinschaft und Demokratismus. Gerade aus dieser Abhängigkeit des einen Menschen vom anderen innerhalb konkreter geschichtlicher Gemeinschaften erstrebt der Mensch in seiner gerechtfertigten Suche nach der Freiheit auf ungerechtfertigte Weise nach ihr »jenseits von Gut und Böse«. Daher läßt sich nach Bazala das Ästhetische nicht absolut vom Ethischen trennen.

So interessant es auch sein mag, in einer komparativen und genetischen Studie jedes der ästhetischen Probleme, die Bazala anspricht, zu besprechen, scheint uns dies aus unserer Interessensphäre bislang noch nicht ausschlaggebend. So weit es, weiterhin, auch Sinn hat, historiographisch Bazala vorzuwerfen, daß er auf der philosophischen Ebene für Kunst (wahrscheinlich beeinflußt durch Wundts Ausdruck »Volkseele«) den Begriff (oder die Metapher?) »Volkseele« benutzte, indem er dem Psychologismus ontologische Dimensionen beifügte, anstatt aus Hegels Tradition säkularisierte Tendenzen in der Gestaltung eines Kulturreverständnis als einer objektivierten Vergeistigung bzw. eines objektivierten Seelen- oder Geisteslebens abzuleiten, so scheint auch dieses bei der betrachteten Schrift Bazalas in diesem Augenblick für den Zweck dieser Erwägung nicht entscheidend zu sein.⁸ Aber deswegen ist als wesentlich der Umstand anzusehen, daß in der polemischen Schrift »*Moderni i narodna književnost* (Die »Modernen« und die Volksliteratur) die Philosophie bzw. der Philosoph identifiziert wird, der sich in der Funktion eines mehr oder weniger bewußtgemachten gedanklichen Hintergrunds der kroatischen Moderne als Gesamtheit befand. Das war Friedrich Nietzsche, mal besser, mal schlechter, mal richtiger, mal vollkommen falsch verstanden, ein philosophischer Schriftsteller, der als

⁷ Dieselbe These verteidigt Bazala konsequent auf theoretischer Ebene auch später. Z.B.: BAZALA, Dr. Albert: *O umjetnosti* (Über die Kunst), Glas Matice Hrvatske, Zagreb 1/1906, SS. 151 und 153—155; ebenfalls *Narodna kultura* (Volkskultur), Hrvatsko kolo, Bd. III, Zagreb 1907, SS. 269—270.

⁸ Über die Umwandlung des Begriffs »Volkgeist« von Anfang und Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts in »Volkseele« um 1900 in kürzesten Zügen, siehe Friedrich DORSCH, Hrsgb. Werner Traxel, *Psychologisches Wörterbuch*, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 1970, S. 447.

einer der wichtigsten geistigen Determinanten der Moderne zu sehen ist.⁹

Bazala steht nicht frontal und massiv gegen Nietzsche. Er zeigt vor allem, daß sich die »Jungen« und die »Modernen« der Thesen Nietzsches auch dann bedienen, wenn sie nicht von ihnen wissen oder sie nicht richtig verstehen. Er selbst kritisiert Nietzsche selektiv, und ist überzeugt, daß Nietzsche eigentlich »mehr Künstler als Philosoph ist und deshalb zu *ästhetischer Welt- und Lebensanschauung*« neigt.¹⁰ In Bazalas Augen übertrieb Nietzsche gerade deshalb »die *ästhetische Seite des menschlichen Wesens*: und wie nach Sokrates und Platon das Leben nur im Vernünftigen seinen Wert hat, so besteht bei Nietzsche die einzige Möglichkeit in der Kunst.«¹¹ Bazala zielt offensichtlich auf den Geist von Nietzsches Position, die in dem berühmten Satz in seinem *Der Wille zur Macht* (Af. 822 von 1888) kulminiert: »wir haben die Kunst, damit uns die Wahrheit nicht vernichtet«; eine These, die auch Heidegger in seiner Schrift *Nietzsches Wort »Gott ist tot«* erwähnt.¹² In diesem Zusammenhang und um eine Verbindung Nietzsches mit der ästhetischen Ideologie der Kroatischen Moderne herzustellen, sei an Nietzsches Satz erinnert: »Die Kunst ist das große Stimulans zum Leben.«¹³

⁹ Natürlich haben europaweit bereits seine Zeitgenossen die Rolle kritisch ins Auge gefaßt, die Nietzsche für das ästhetische Verständnis der Jahrhundertwende spielte. So z.B. Samuel LUBINSKI in *Der Ausgang der Moderne, Ein Buch der Opposition*, Dresden 1909. In Jüngerer Zeit wird darauf aufmerksam gemacht, daß die stilisierte Rhetorik Nietzsches in *Also sprach Zarathustra* als Prototypenomen mit dem Jugendstil in Verbindung gebracht werden kann. Siehe z.B. Dominik JOST, *Literarischer Jugendstil*, Stuttgart, 1969 S. 29 und andernorts. — Eine Variation der Andeutung von Nietzsches Einfluß auf die kroatische Literatur gegen Ende des 19. und zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts gibt in Anknüpfung an Bazalas Identifikationen Cherubin SEGVIC in seiner Studie *Geneza najnovijih pojava u hrvatskoj književnosti* (Die Genese der jüngsten Erscheinungen in der kroatischen Literatur). Hrvatsko kolo, Bd. I, 1905, wo er sagt: »Auf zwei Strömen bewegt sich unsere neueste Literatur. Obwohl in keinem Werk ausschließlich jeweils ein Strom zum Ausdruck gelangt, da der menschliche Geist ein Gemisch aus Widersprüchen ist, ist doch auf den ersten Blick zu erkennen, ob ein Werk auf den modernen 'reaktionären' Prinzipien Nietzsches oder Carlyles fußt« (op. cit. S. 461). »Der Nietzscheismus trat von acht Jahren in unserer Literatur in Erscheinung.« (op. cit. S. 461).

¹⁰ BAZALA, Dr. Albert, »*Moderni*« i narodna književnost, (Die »Modernen« und die Volksliteratur), »Hrvatstvo«, 1904, Sonderdruck, SS. 32–33.

¹¹ op. cit., S. 34.

¹² HEIDEGGER, Martin, *Nietzsches Wort »Gott ist tot«* in *Doba slike svijeta* (Die Zeit des Weltbildes), übersetzt von Boris Hudoletnjak, Zagreb 1969, Bibliothek »razlog«, Bd. 20, S. 88; in der Belgrader Ausgabe *Der Wille zur Macht* von 1972 befindet sich die genannte Stelle auf Seite 362 und lautet in der Übersetzung Dr. Dušan Stojanovićs: »Mi imamo umetnost da ne bismo propali zbog istine.«

¹³ NIETZSCHE, Friedrich, *Götzen-Dämmerung oder Wie man mit dem Hammer philosophiert. Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässen* 1888; Nietzsches Werke, Bd. 8, Kröner Verlag Leipzig 1923, Fragment 24, S. 161; auch: *Der Wille zur Macht*, Leipzig 1923, Frag. 503 und 510, SS. 278 und 285.

Wenn wir Nietzsche zitieren (mit dem Bazala einen Dialog herstellt, indem gegen die »Jungen« polemisiert), wollen wir nicht sagen, daß Bazala als Interpret oder vielleicht Kritiker Nietzsches bekannt ist. Nein. Doch mit der Beobachtung der Reflexe von Nietzsches Thesen im Kunstverständnis zur Zeit der Jahrhundertwende verweist uns Bazala auf ein direktes Kategoriensystem, das für das Verständnis nicht nur der Positionen der »Jungen« und der »Modernen«, sondern der kroatischen Moderne als Ganzes berücksichtigt werden muß, will man die Ästhetischen Kontroversen der Jahrhundertwende wirklich verstehen. Wichtig ist jedoch, Alles dies — das sei besonders betont — gilt nicht nur für die mehr oder weniger günstigen Gegebenheiten der Kultur in Kroatien, sondern ist den europäischen Gegebenheiten mehr als analog. Im weltweiten und europäischen Kontext ist dies eigentlich ein historischer Augenblick Europas, der sich auf eigene Art strukturell auch im Rahmen der kroatischen Moderne exemplifiziert. Neben anderen einflußreichen Denkern der großen Welttradition der Philosophie sowie einigen angesehenen zeitgenössischen Ästhetikern und Philosophen hat Nietzsches Einfluß offensichtlich einen schicksalhaften Anteil an der Entdeckung und Aufdeckung des Charakters der Moderne und des geschichtlichen Standortes ihrer ästhetischen Horizonte in der Kulturegeschichte im allgemeinen und der Philosophie und Kunst im besonderen.

Zum bisherigen Verlauf der Interpretation von Bazalas Ansicht ist ein kritischer Einwand möglich: daß es sich nämlich bei der Betonung der theoretischen Problematik der Beziehung von Volk und Nation zur Kunst und umgekehrt um eine verspätete, eigentlich historisch verspätete Thematik handelt, die nicht der Zeit der Moderne angehört oder für sie zumindest nicht charakteristisch ist und nicht in Verbindung gebracht werden kann mit den großen Namen der europäischen, bzw. weltweiten Philosophie.

Dieser Einwand greift jedoch nicht. Seit der Zeit des klassischen deutschen Idealismus, als die Beziehung von Volk und Nation zur Kunst in den Bereich der Philosophie erhoben wurde, läßt sich dieses Thema von diesem theoretischen Aspekt aus nicht plötzlich eliminieren, indem man es willkürlich für veraltet erklärt, ungeachtet dessen, auf welche Art und wie stark es später explizite bemüht wurde. Erinnern wir uns an die Stelle in Hegels Ästhetik, an der er unter anderem sagt, daß die Entwicklungsstufen der symbolischen, klassischen und romantischen Kunst wie »verschiedene Weltanschauungen die Religion, den substantiellen Geist von Volk und Zeit bilden und sich in der Kunst wie auch in der alltäglichen Wirklichkeit des Lebens finden. Wie jeder Mensch in seiner Tätigkeit, sei sie politisch, religiös und künstlerisch oder wissenschaftlich, ein Kind seiner Zeit ist, und die Aufgabe hat, ihren wesentlichen Inhalt und auf Grund dessen auch ihre notwendige Form auszuarbeiten, so ist es auch die Bestimmung der Kunst, für den Geist

eines Volkes den entsprechenden künstlerischen Ausdruck zu finden«¹⁴ Aufschlußreich ist es, hier Stellen aus dem 3. Band anzufügen, wo Hegel über das Drama spricht, da diese Stellen offensichtlich nicht ohne Bezugsbedeutung für Nietzsches Sicht sind.¹⁵

Der Einwand, das Thematisieren der Beziehung von Volk und Kunst bedeute bei Bazala ein provinzielles Abschiebegleis, ist noch weniger stichhaltig, wenn Nietzsche als Kronzeuge beschworen wird. Gerade Nietzsche spricht an vielen Stellen die schicksalhaften Beziehungen der Kunst mit Volk und Nation an, was er ausdrücklich bereits in der Schrift *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, 1872, tat: »Durch ein merkwürdiges Auseinanderreißen beider künstlerischen Urtriebe (d.h. des dionysischen und des apollinischen) mußte uns der Untergang der griechischen Tragödie herbeigeführt erscheinen: mit welchem Vorgange eine Degeneration und Umwandlung des griechische Volkscharakters im Einklang war, uns zu ernstem Nachdenken auffordernd, wie nothwendig und eng die Kunst und das Volk, Mythos und Sitte, Tragödie und Staat, in ihren Fundamenten verwachsen sind«.¹⁶ Und gerade aus dem Unvermögen, die hohen Leistungen der Kunst im allgemeinen und die der Tragödie im besonderen als Resultanten der Beziehung zwischen Volk und Kunst zu verschweigen bzw. nicht zu sehen, »und so bricht immer von Neuem«, so Nietzsche, »einmal der herzliche Ingrimm gegen jenes anmaßliche Völkchen hervor (Nietzsche denkt dabei an das antike Griechenland), das sich erkühnte, alles Nichteinheimische für alle Zeiten als 'barbarisch' zu bezeichnen«.¹⁷ Und damit ist die Bedeutung der angesprochenen Thematik klar als etwas ganz Wesentliches belegt.

Wenn die Thematik der Beziehung von Volk und Kunst in die theoretische Denkstruktur des Philosophen inkorporiert ist, der mit seiner Sicht als gedanklichem Hintergrund die ästhetischen Aspekte der Moderne mitbestimmt, dann ist sie auch für die Moderne als Epoche zwangsläufig konstitutiv und typisch. Selbstverständlich ist es nicht un-

¹⁴ HEGEL, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, *Ästhetik*, Bd. I, Teil III, Kap. III, 3, c; zitiert nach der Übersetzung, Belgrad 1955, Bd. II, S. 288.

¹⁵ Hier handelt es sich um Stellen, an denen Hegel über das Drama (als der höchsten Form der Dichtkunst und der Kunst als solcher) sagt: »Das Drama ist das Erzeugnis eines solchen nationalen Lebens, das in sich selbst bereits 'vollkommen' ist.« (*Ästhetik*, Bd. III, Teil III, Kap. III, 3, I.a, S. 539) und fortfährt: »In erster Linie (muß der Dramatiker) die Grundlagen derjenigen Bestrebungen erfüllen, die sich in der dramatischen Handlung gegenseitig durchdringen und auf diese Art den Kampf untereinander lösen (so daß die Grundlage des Dramatischen) entweder a) das allgemeine Interesse des Menschen ausmaschen muß oder b) ein Pathos, das ein substantielles, vollgültiges Pathos für das Volk ist, für das der betreffende Dichter schafft«; *Ästhetik*, Bd. III, Teil III, Kap. III, I.c, SS. 555–556; der Text in Klammern zwecks Herstellung des Zusammenhangs beigefügt von Z. P.

¹⁶ NIETZSCHE, Friedrich, *Geburt der Tragödie*, Zagreb 1983, Kap. 23, S. 138; hier *Nietzsches Werke*, Bd. I, Leipzig 1922, S. 190.

¹⁷ Op. cit., Kap. 15, S. 91; hier *Nietzsches Werke*, Bd. I, Leipzig 1922, S. 131.

wesentlich, wo, wie und in welcher ideologischen Version es zur Aktualisierung kommt. Deshalb ist es eine Verfälschung der geschichtlichen Periode der Jahrhundertwende, wenn z.B. im Namen von Ästhetizismus und planetarischen Dimensionen einiger Begriffe der Moderne die Komponente der nationalen Funktion der Kunst vollkommen eliminiert wird. Daß zahlreiche Künstler der Moderne auf der ganzen Welt, in Europa und auch in Kroatien in ihrem Schaffen mit der nationalen Dimension befaßt waren, die in ihrem Werk unmittelbar zum Ausdruck kommt, läßt sich mit etlichen Beispielen, vielfach belegen, was jedoch nicht Gegenstand dieser historiographischen Studie ist. Für die Gegebenheiten in Kroatien ist es wichtig hervorzugeben, daß Nationalisten vom Rang eines Matoš und Kršnjavi kritische Distanz gegenüber der Identifizierung des Nationalen und des Ästhetischen halten und dabei die nationale Komponente als eine der bedeutenden, gleichwohl aber nur als eine der möglichen, natürlich nicht verwerfen.

Daß diese spezifische Beziehung von Nation und Kunst zur Zeit der Moderne als Problematik durchaus kein peripheres kroatisches Spezifikum ist und nicht im Rahmen einer vergangenen Realität abgeschottet blieb, zeigen auch weltweite Untersuchungen. Identifiziert wird sie von bedeutenden Interpretationen aus der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts, und zwar nicht nur auf regionaler, sondern auch auf europäischer Ebene. Um den Einwand der Isolation innerhalb der Geschichte und der kleinen lokalen Gegebenheiten Kroatiens zu entkräften, werden wir uns mit der Nennung wenigstens eines modernen Buches aus der zeitgenössischen Welt bescheiden, dessen Thema die *Stilkunst um 1900* ist und dessen Verfasser Richard Hamann und Jost Hermand sind, und das im Kapitel *Der Gedankenkreis der Fortschrittlichen Reaktion* unter anderem die Beziehungen *Volk statt Masse* und *Rasse statt Völkerchaos* thematisiert.¹⁸ Daß das Interesse an diesem Aspekt der Moderne nichts von seiner theoretischen Relevanz einbüßte und im 20. Jahrhundert nicht erlosch, bezeugt die Tatsache, daß er ständig von neuem thematisiert wird. Daß der thematische Verbindung von Volk und Kunst selbst in den bedeutendsten Denkerkreisen des 20. Jahrhunderts Beachtung zukam, beweist auch der Name Martin Heideggers.¹⁹

¹⁸ HAMANN, Richard u. HERMAND, Jost, *Stilkunst um 1900, Epochen deutscher Kultur von 1870 bis zur Gegenwart*, Bd. 4, München 1973.

¹⁹ HEIDEGGER, Martin, *Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung*, Rede gehalten 1936 in Rom und erstmals in München 1937 veröffentlicht; »So ist das Wesen der Dichtung in die Gesetze göttlicher Zeichen und der Stimme des Volkes eingebunden, in Gesetze, die sich zu trennen und zu verbinden suchen. Der Dichter selbst steht in der Mitte zwischen Göttern und Volk. Er ist jemand, der in dieses Dazwischen, zwischen Götter und Menschen, geworfen ist. Aber nur und in erster Linie in diesem Dazwischen wird entschieden, was der Mensch ist und wo er seine Existenz ansiedelt. 'Dichterisch wohnt der Mensch auf dieser Erde'.« Zitat nach *Helderlin i suština poezije* (Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung) in dem Band *Mišljenje i pevanje* (Denken und Dichten), übersetzt von Božidar Žec, Belgrad, 1982, S. 146, (ad 5).

Und wenn ein Thema in der Philosophie lebendig ist, ist es kein Wunder, daß wir es, mit unterschiedlicher Provenienz, explizite auch in der Kunst finden. Was Kroatien betrifft, muß bei der immer ausgeprägteren Tabuierung der Probleme und der wachsenden Einschränkung der theoretischen Einsichten zitiert werden, was Krleža 1976 sagte: »Nation und Nationalität sind Themen, die mich ständig beschäftigen.«²⁰ Und Krleža kann offensichtlich nicht etwas angelastet werden, was in nicht wohlmeinendem Eifer Heidegger manchmal vorgeworfen wird. Aus dieser Sicht, aus der Perspektive des späten 20. Jahrhunderts muß, unserer Meinung nach, die wahre Bedeutung von Bazalas einstiger Polemik verstanden werden.

3.

Mit noch weiterreichenden Referenzen auf das 20. Jahrhundert waren die Ausführungen aus Bazalas — wie man wohl sagen darf — wichtigster ästhetischer Schrift von 1906 *O umjetnosti* (Über die Kunst). Mit ihr scheint zugleich auch der theoretische Kreis der Moderne abgeschlossen, in dem gleichzeitig ihre Thematik ausgeschöpft ist und an die kommenden Jahrzehnte und die neuen Generationen weitergegeben wird. Hiermit und mit der Polemik von 1904 wird Bazala endgültig zu einem der unumgänglich relevanten Theoretiker und Ästhetiker der Moderne, der nicht übergangen werden kann. Wenn Franjo Marković zur Zeit der Moderne das größte systematische Werk über die Ästhetik schrieb, ohne die Thesen der Moderne zu vertreten, wenn Ljudevit Dvorniković zu Beginn der Periode eine Abweichung von der im 19. Jahrhundert in Kroatien etablierten ästhetischen Ansicht andeutete, wenn Pilar erfolgreich das Programm der »Sezession« artikuliert, wenn auch Kršnjavi die früheren Thesen fallen ließ und die Relevanz der Kategorie des Gefühls für die Jahrhundertwende entdeckte, wenn Matoš den am höchsten entwickelten, erfolgreichen Theoretiker und Praktiker des Ästhetizismus darstellt, dann muß zu diesen und anderen Autoren der Moderne auch Bazala gezählt werden. Denn Bazala hat die zeitgenössi-

²⁰ ČENGIĆ, Enes, *S Krležom iz dana u dan* (1975—1977) (Mit Krleža tagaus-tagein (1975—1977)), Bd. 2: *Trubač u pustinji duha* (Trompeter in der Wüste des Geistes), Zagreb 1985, S. 74; die Eintragung bezieht sich auf den 23. Januar 1976. — Zwecks besseren Verständnisses der Beschäftigung mit dieser spezifischen Thematik sollte ein weiteres Moment hinzugefügt werden: für Bazala ist der theoretische Aspekt der Beziehung von Volk und Kunst nicht nur intellektuelle Kombinatorik und Abstraktion, sondern sie ist durch das Prisma der Realität, das Prisma der praktischen Wirklichkeit und der konkreten geschichtlichen Tendenzen der Entvölkerung gedacht, in denen laut Bazala für die Kroaten »die berechnete Furcht zu sehen ist, ob sie ihr völkisches Wesen zu bewahren wissen werden, und wenn ja, ob sie es auch werden bewahren können«; A. BAZALA, *O umjetnosti* (Über die Kunst), 1906, Nr. 17—20, S. 155.

sche Thematik der Ästhetik seiner Zeit weder übersehen noch ignoriert. Bazalas Engagement in der ästhetischen Aktualität seiner Zeit entdeckt im Nachhinein auch für uns einige wichtige Deutungsmöglichkeiten der kategoriellen Struktur der kroatischen Moderne; umsomehr als es solche Versuche bisher kaum gab, als sie vereinzelt waren und als Ergebnis nichts anderes als Andeutungen gaben, die aus den langjährigen Interpretationsgewohnheiten der kroatischen Historiographie — nach unkritisch übernommenen und nicht analysierten Annahmen — zu keineswegs harmlosen, bis heute weit verbreiteten Irrtümern führen konten und auch führten. Ermöglicht Bazalas Hauptschrift — wenn auch in einer post-festum gelieferten historischen Interpretation — nur diese Einsicht, so ist sein Beitrag von nicht zu verschweigender und unumgänglicher Bedeutung.

Oberflächlichen Beobachtern sowie voreingenommenen Interpreten — um Simplifizierungen in der Historiographie gar nicht erst zu nennen — könnte es scheinen, als ob Bazala wegen seiner Polemik gegen die »Jungen« im Namen der »Alten« in seiner wichtigsten ästhetischen Schrift veraltete und dem Geist der Moderne vollkommen unangemessene Thesen verträte. Inwiefern? Weil er sich öffentlich gegen die Modernisten aussprach und mit den »Alten« in den Institutionen der »Alten« zusammenarbeitete und seinen bedeutendsten ästhetischen Traktat in der Zeitschrift der »Alten« veröffentlichte. Diese Annahme ist jedoch oberflächlich und fern der Wahrheit. Der polemische Ton von 1904 wird in der Abhandlung *O umjetnosti* (Über die Kunst) 1906 fallengelassen. Auch einem weniger aufmerksamen Leser muß es auffallen, daß viele von Bazalas Thesen, wenngleich er von den Hauptpunkten seiner Polemik nicht abläßt, eigentlich zum Teil auch Thesen der »Jungen« sind und in ihren Grundlagen die epochalen Charakteristika der Moderne als Gesamtheit in sich tragen. Während Bazala 1904 beispielsweise gegen die Art und Weise polemisiert, in der die »Jungen« das Prinzip der Freiheit verkündeten, können wir im Traktat von 1906, in dem er nicht polemisiert, zeigen, daß er nicht gegen Freiheit und auch nicht gegen schöpferische Freiheit war. An mehreren Stellen ist sogar ausgesprochen sichtbar, daß Bazala jetzt die Meinungsverschiedenheiten abzumildern, die Konfrontationen aufzuheben bestrebt ist, jedoch so, daß er das Postulat der Einsicht in Sinn, Ziele und Argumente nicht aufgibt. Bezeichnend ist daher die Zusammenfassung der Abhandlung über die Freiheit, die Bazala fast zur Sentenz macht: »Jede Kunst reicht so weit, wie die Freiheit reicht, jede Kunst ist so, wie ihre Freiheit ist.«²¹ Von einer auf diese Weise durchdachten Modulation des Standpunkts kann nicht behaupt werden, sie sei angeblich gegen den Standpunkt der Jungen zur Freiheit des Schaffens gerichtet. Im Gegenteil, Bazala bestätigt ihn, algerdigis mit einem Kommentar, der nicht nur Kommentar zu

²¹ BAZALA, Dr. Albert, *O umjetnosti* (Über die Kunst), Glas Matice hrvatske, Zagreb 1/1906, Nr. 13—16, S. 129.

den Texten der Jungen in Kroatien ist (z.B. Branimir Wiesner-Livadics), sondern auch maßgeblicher Kommentar neben der weltberühmten Maxime der Wiener Sezession: »Der Zeit ihre Kunst, der Kunst ihre Freiheit.« Denn, in sein geflügeltes Wort interpolierte Bazala die Frage nach Qualität, Charakter, Sinn und von hier aus auch die Frage nach dem Umfang der Freiheit.

Da hier nicht beabsichtigt wird und es auch nicht möglich ist, dogmographisch die Gesamtheit von Bazalas Anschauungen mit allen ihren einzelnen konkreten Lösungen darzulegen, ist es daher auch nicht angemessen, auf alle Stellen aufmerksam zu machen, an denen Bazala offensichtlich die Unterschiede gegenüber den Jungen mildern wollte. Da gesehen werden muß, daß die Jugend kein exklusives Recht auf das ganze, der Epoche der Moderne angemessene Thesenregister, eine Art Monopol auf die Modernität hatte, weil sie sie weder erreichten noch auch wirklich benutzten, und besonders in der theoretischen Erklärung Schwächen zeigten, ist es umso wichtiger zu zeigen, daß Bazalas Ansichten wirklich — und auf theoretischer Ebene — dem »Zeitgeist« angehörten und ausdrückten, was die Moderne seinerzeit wollte.

Theoretisches Kernstück, der Ausgangspunkt und Ziel von Bazalas Ansichten bestehen in der Abrechnung zwischen der sog. »objektiven« (Objekt-, objektivistischen) und der »subjektiven« (Subjekt-, subjektivistischen) Ästhetik. Die traditionelle Ästhetik ist dem Charakter ihrer Konzeptionen nach hauptsächlich »objektiv«, weshalb Bazala ihre theoretischen Schwierigkeiten und die Unmöglichkeit aufzählt, auf die Hauptfragen der Ästhetik zufriedenstellende Antworten zu geben. Bazala nimmt rückhaltlos die Position der subjektiven Ästhetik ein, indem er sie als ihrer Gegenwärtigkeit angemessene Erkenntnis postuliert. »Die Kunst«, sagt er, »ist nicht etwas, was unabhängig von uns existiert; Kunst, die unabhängig von einem künstlerischen Bewußtsein besteht, ist keine Kunst.«²² Der Ausbau einer solchen subjektiven Ästhetik erfolgt bei Bazala, auch wenn es auf den ersten Blick nicht so scheint, in psychologischer Version. Darum geht es in einer Reihe von Momenten, u.a. auch an folgender Stelle: »Der Mißerfolg der objektiven Ästhetik zeigt, daß es unmöglich ist, ein Kunstobjekt zu erkennen, bevor wir eine Analyse des psychischen Zustandes durchführen, bevor wir die Eigentümlichkeit des Eindrucks erkennen, der durch bestimmte Objekte in uns entsteht.«²³ Deswegen muß die Ästhetik »eine Analyse des künstlerischen Bewußtseins durchführen«, die »zwei Seinsformen hat: in der Seele des Künstlers als schöpferische Kraft, als Tätigkeit der Phantasie und in der Seele des Empfängers als 'Genuß'«.²⁴ In beiden »Seinsformen« manifestiert sich das künstlerische Bewußtsein im We-

²² BAZALA, Albert, op. cit. S. 122.

²³ Op. cit., Nr. 13—16, S. 124. Kursiv im Zitat A. Bazalas.

²⁴ BAZALA, Albert, op. cit., S. 126, Kursiv im Zitat A. Bazalas.

sentlichen als Gefühl, denn »die Kunst vermittelt in den Gefühlswerten ein Bild von der Welt«, »und darum muß untersucht werden, was für eine Art des Gefühls dies ist und welches seine Bedingungen sind.«²⁵ »Die psychologische Kunsttheorie fragt nach den Bedingungen zur Entstehung des Erlebnisses, das weder Erkenntnis, noch Wollen ist, sondern Gefühl, Leben im Fühlen . . .«²⁶ Auf diese Weise bestimmt Bazala seine psychologistische Position und bestätigt zugleich seinerseits, daß zur Zeit der kroatischen Moderne die Kategorie des Gefühls, der Emotion für die Epoche eine charakteristische Kategorie ist, und die Ästhetik des Gefühls eine sehr typische Ästhetik, die wir in verschiedenen Versionen im Rahmen der kroatischen Moderne bei Ljudevit Dvorniković, Gjuro Arnold, Milan Suknić, in der zweiten Phase Isidor Kršnjavi usw. finden.

Bazala hält Gefühl für konstitutiv für das ästhetische Bewußtsein und die ästhetischen Phänomene überhaupt. »Kunst«, sagt er ausdrücklich kurz und bündig, »ist Seele, Gefühl.«²⁷ Doch damit tritt er in eine theoretische Polemik mit dem Herbartismus ein (und natürlich mit dem noch lebenden Franjo Marković), wo in den Analysen des Ästhetischen das affektive Moment lediglich als »emotiver Zusatz« funktioniert. Zugleich polemisiert Bazala hier auch gegen Kant, dem er, nachdem er ihm zugesteht, daß er definitiv für die moderne Zeit die Bedeutung des Subjekts in den ästhetischen Analysen entdeckt hat, dessen Intellektualismus zum Vorwurf macht! Bazalas Haltung ist radikal: »die Werte der Kunst zeigen uns die Welt im Licht des Gefühls, nicht als Objekt der begrifflichen Erkenntnis, sondern als Objekt des Gefühls«, folglich kann »keine Erkenntnis über den Wert oder Unwert der Kunst entscheiden.«²⁸ Der auf Kant gerichtete kritische Pfeil ist nicht nur ein Seminardialog (wir untersuchen nicht, inwieweit er berechtigt ist), sondern impliziert die Einnehmung deutlichen, festen antiintellektualistischen, antirationalistischen Position: »wo rationale Motive zu wirken beginnen, da hört der Kunst 'genuß' und damit auch die Kunst auf — gleich ob durch die Schuld des Schaffenden oder die des Rezipienten.«²⁹ Die These ist allgemein eine Antithese zum simplifizierten, im positivistischen 19. Jahrhundert so sehr betonten wissenschaftlichen Rationalismus, doch ist sie unter anderem auch deutlich gegen den starken rationalistischen Strom anderer Provenienz von der Jahrhundertwende gerichtet, der in Kroatien bei Antun Kržan, Josip Stadler und Cherubin Segvić wirksam ist (der Letztere wirkt in derselben Zeitschrift im selben Jahr, als Bazala die Abhandlung *O umjetnosti* veröffentlicht). In

²⁵ Op. cit., l.c.

²⁶ Op. cit., l.c. Kursiv im Zitat Bazalas.

²⁷ Op. cit. S. 127.

²⁸ Op. cit. S. 125.

²⁹ Op. cit. S. 125.

diesen Antithesen ist dann vielleicht der Ausgangspunkt für die später gleichermaßen radikale, antirationalistische Haltung im Kroatien der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts bei solch unterschiedlicher Position wie der Albert Halers (mit starkem antipositivistischen und antipsychologischen Zug) und Miroslav Krležas (mit starkem vitalistisch-soziologischen antimetaphysischen Zug) zu sehen.³⁰

Identität mit den Konzeptionen der Moderne zeigt Bazala auch in bestimmten Voraussetzungen der subjektiven Ästhetik: »Der Künstler kann nichts anderes wollen, als seine Erlebnisse in Formen einzubringen, mit denen er uns bewegt, dasselbe zu erleben, was er erlebt hat«³¹, doch so, daß »der Künstler die Gegenstände zu Quellen neuer Empfindungen macht« und dabei »Gesetze des Gefühls offenbart«³²; »wenn er ein wahrer, geborener Künstler ist«, wird er »Kraft und die Fähigkeit besitzen, das alte Gesetz zu Fall zu bringen und sein eigenes aufzustellen, nachdem er dem Gefühl neuen Ausdruck gegeben hat«³³ — worin unschwer Echos von Kant wie von Nietzsche zu erkennen sind! Da er jedoch auf der Behauptung besteht, »Kunst ist die Seele, die sich zu offenbaren sucht«³⁴, wird analog auch auf seiten des Empfängers subjektiver Einsatz gefordert. Dieser geschieht als *Einfühlung*, so daß Bazala unter Zitierung von Th. Lipps (1851—1914) und anderen Autoren in Kroatien eine für die damalige Zeit außergewöhnlich aktuelle Theorie einführt, die Einfühlungstheorie. Für Bazala besteht eine bestimmte Korrespondenz zwischen Schaffendem und Rezipienten und er bringt eine These Croces zum Ausdruck (die es bei Bazala an mehreren Stellen gibt): »der künstlerische Genuß ist nicht nur ein Empfangen, sondern auch ein Nach-schaffen«.³⁵ Natürlich gehört zu dieser Annäherung an die Modernisten mit modernen Thesen auch der kritisch-sarkastische Kommentar, den es auf das Konto der Modernisten und Zeitgenossen Bazalas abzubuchen gilt, und der bis heute nichts an aktueller Brisanz

³⁰ Bazala erachtet es als notwendig, »den künstlerischen Wert vom Ästhetischen zu unterscheiden«, denn der Ästhetische Wert »ist bestrebt, in der Betrachtung, mit der wir eine Werkanalyse durchzuführen suchen, in allen Wechselbeziehungen eine vernünftig konzipierte und komponierte Anschauung darzustellen und in ihm Neues zu entdecken« (S. 125), so daß die Folge d(ies)er Rationalisierung . . . die Übermacht des Eindruck der Kritik über den der Kunst ist« (S. 125).

³¹ BAZALA, Albert, op. cit., I/1906, Nr. 17—20, S. 153.

³² BAZALA, Albert, op. cit., I/1906, Nr. 13—16, S. 127.

³³ Op. cit., S. 128.

³⁴ Op. cit., S. 127.

³⁵ BAZALA, Dr. Albert, op. cit., I/1906, Nr. 17—20, S. 152; ebenfalls S. 154; Ganz Croce ist auch die Aussage auf S. 149, wo Bazala sagt, daß »ein wahrer Künstler nichts kennt außer der Bemühung, für seine Eindrücke einen adäquaten Ausdruck zu finden (Kursiv von Z. P.). Positiv wird Croce von Bazala im Jahr 1935 in der oben in Fußnote 2 genannten Abhandlung zitiert.

verloren hat: »Jede Kunst hat das Publikum, das sie verdient«³⁶; ein Satz, der — bekannt aus anderem Zusammenhang — als Paraphrase natürlich die berühmte Umkehrung implizite enthält: »Jedes Publikum hat die Kunst, die es verdient.«

An dieser Stelle bietet es sich an, ein großes Mißverständnis, und auch eine Ungerechtigkeit auszuräumen, wenn von Arnold als von einem Ästhetiker gesprochen wird, der, wie bekannt (zur Zeit der Moderne wohl gemerkt!) sagte, zum Schaffen brauche der Dichter »gehaltvolle, bedeutende Ideen«. Indessen nimmt Bazala dieselbe Haltung ein, wenn er sagt, daß »ein Werk seine innere Kraft aus der Bedeutung des Gefühls bezieht, deren Formwerte Symbole sind. Selbstverständlich kann nur ein bedeutender Mensch bedeutende Gefühle in sein Werk einbringen.«³⁷ Doch obwohl Bazala in seiner Forderung nach »bedeutendem Inhalt« von Schiller ausgeht,³⁸ lassen sich weder seine noch Arnolds Stellung ironisieren (wie das mit Gjuro Arnold in Kroatien ohne jegliche Argumente praktiziert wird!) als überholt, veraltet, naiv-schulmeisterlich und der modernen und (für sie) zeitgenössischen Kunst unangemessen. Selbst wenn hier von einer möglichen Suche nach Inspirationsquellen für diese Haltung bei Nietzsche abgesehen wird, muß darauf aufmerksam gemacht werden, daß das Postulat in der Ästhetik darüber, daß etwas als ästhetisch lediglich dann in Frage kommt, wenn es *bedeutungsvoll* ist, von niemand anderem als dem Begründer der modernen Erlebnistheorie und der modernen Hermeneutik, Wilhelm Dilthey (1833—1912) ausgesprochen wurde. Offensichtlich handelt es sich nicht um eine alte Rangeinteilung alter Poetiken nach Stilarten, 'Würde' bzw. 'Eignung' dieser oder jener Inhalte für bestimmte Gattungen, Personen oder Gegenstände. Ohne auf die Diskussion über den Charakter der These einzugehen, muß betont werden, daß die kroatische Historiographie offensichtlich bereits Arnold falsch interpretiert hat, was sich mechanisch auf Bazala ausweiten ließe — aus der offenbar falsch verstandenen Bedeutung des Wortes 'bedeutend' heraus. Heute ist es nach den offenen Horizonten existentieller Analysen begreiflichen, daß mit dem Wort 'bedeutend' im Ästhetischen die Relevanz des Sinns identifiziert werden solle als etwas Essentielles, Existentielles, Wesentliches und dem 'Sturz' in Mittelmäßigkeit und Durchschnittlichkeit Entgegengesetztes, in das Unauthentische der Existenz des 'Man' bei Heidegger. Was Bazala betrifft, so wollte er, abgesehen von dem Gegensatz zu den Modernisten, die behaupteten, daß auch das unbedeutendste Erlebnis Gegenstand eines ästhetischen Werkes sein kann, mit der Einführung des Wortes 'bedeutend' den Psychologismus der eigenen Position wahrscheinlich abmildern, der die Gefahr droht, die Ästhetik plötzlich in nichts

³⁶ Op. cit., Nr. 17—20, S. 153.

³⁷ Op. cit., Nr. 13—16, S. 127.

³⁸ BAZALA, Albert, op. cit., Nr. 13—16, S. 125.

anderes als Psychologie umzugestalten. Wie Bazala diese Forderung nach bedeutender Empfindung, bedeutendem Inhalt usw. begreift, erklärt er selbst und sagt, er denke an das Menschlichbedeutungsvolle.³⁹

Das Moment der Annäherung an die Jungen und Modernisten statt eines Mißverständnisses mit ihnen muß bei Bazala auch noch in dem Bestreben gesehen werden, die Kategorie des Ästhetischen und der Kunst in eine Beziehung zur kategorie 'Leben', der zentralen Kategorie der Moderne, zu bringen. So sagt Bazala, »der Kunst dürfe kein Inhalt vorgeschrieben werden«, da »die ganze Natur und der ganze Mensch Gegenstand ihrer Darstellung sind, und daß wir, vielmehr, das Recht haben, von ihr zu fordern, daß sie *das Leben von allen Seiten zeigt* . . .«.⁴⁰ Unter Berufung auf Hoffding, sagt Bazala sogar, »Kunst sei nicht nur ein Bild, sondern auch ein Vorbild des Lebens«, gleichwohl bleibt er aber bei der Ablehnung des Ästhetizismus als »sog. ästhetischer Weltanschauung«. Denn Bazala glaubt, daß »die ästhetische Funktion nicht neben den anderen Lebensfunktionen steht, sondern nur eine Sonderform von ihnen ist, und daß es einfach nicht möglich ist, mit einer von ihnen in Konflikt zugeraten, wenn ihre Existenz richtig begriffen wird.«⁴¹ In seiner affirmativen Beziehung zum Leben als dem Mittelpunkt folgte Bazala im Grunde, mit wenigen Modifikationen, einer kontinuierlichen Linie: wie für ihn im Jahr 1904 die Kunst im Leben »ein 'Erfrischungstrränk' war, das zu weiterer Arbeit erquickt«⁴², so hält er 1935 die Kunst sogar *expressis verbis* »für ein ewiges Stimulans des Lebens«, weil »der Mensch ohne sie eine 'bestia die lavoro' wäre«.⁴³ So ist der »künstlerische Wert notwendig auch der Lebenswert«⁴⁴, und Bazala erachtet es für logisch zu schlußfolgern: »Kunst ist ihrer Natur nach sozial bedingt, sie wirkt sozial, doch ist sie deshalb auch sozial verantwortlich. Die Kunst ist die ernste Lebensaufgabe ernster Persönlichkeiten, die sich nicht nur ihrer Rechte, sondern auch ihrer hohen Pflichten bewußt sind.«⁴⁵

³⁹ Op. cit., Nr. 17—20, S. 154. Seine Haltung zu Dilthey siehe in BAZALA, *Povijest filozofije* (Geschichte der Philosophie), Bd. III, Zagreb 1912, SS. 315—316.

⁴⁰ BAZALA, *O umjetnosti* (Über die Kunst), Glas Matice Hrvatske, I/1906, Nr. 17—20, S. 156. Kursiv im Zitat von Z. P.

⁴¹ Op. cit., Nr. 17—20, S. 156.

⁴² BAZALA, Dr. Albert, *»Moderni« i narodna književnost* (Die »Modernen« und die Volksliteratur), Hrvatsko, 1904, Sonderdruck, S. 7—8.

⁴³ BAZALA, Dr. Albert, *Značenje umjetnosti u životu naroda* (Die Bedeutung der Kunst im Leben der Nation), Gedenkbuch anlässlich der 50-Jahrfeier der Strossmayer-Galerie, JAZU, Zagreb 1935, S. 44; vgl. Fußnote 13 und den dazugehörigen Text, wo Nietzsches Aussage — Kunst als »Stimulans des Lebens! — angeführt wird.

⁴⁴ BAZALA, Dr. Albert, *O umjetnosti* (Über die Kunst), Glas Matice Hrvatske, Zagreb I/1906, Nr. 17—20, S. 156.

⁴⁵ Op. cit., I.c.

In dem Wunsch, die Würde der Kunst im allgemeinen und der modernen Kunst im besonderen zu wahren, versucht Bazala in Anlehnung an die Tradition, komplex alle ihm zeitgenössischen, also für die Moderne relevanten Probleme zu umfassen und greift dabei ausgiebig zur ihm zeitgenössischen, modernen ästhetischen Literatur Europas. Bedenkt man Bazalas Position, wenn auch in der nur angedeuteten Einheit seiner hier nur skizzierten Thesen, so läßt sich die Behauptung, Bazala habe im Widerspruch zur Zeit und den Tendenzen der Epoche gestanden, nur schwerlich verteidigen. Also steht er offensichtlich auch nicht unbedingt im Widerspruch zur Moderne. Die Konfrontationen einzelner Thesen und Personen, wie im übrigen auch der Konflikt mit den »Jungen« und den »Modernisten«, sprechen von möglichen Unterschieden in den Anschauungen, jedoch nicht über »das Herausfallen aus der Geschichte«, aus dem Rahmen seiner Zeit; und noch weniger lassen sich — wie manchmal nicht gerade wohlwollend die Konflikte der Moderne zeigen — alle diejenigen, die keine »Modernisten« waren, als Reaktionäre, als störende Elemente in der Entwicklung, als Veralterte oder »Verspätete« und ewig Gestrige abtun. Weit mehr als um eine Konfrontation der Generationen handelte es sich um dem Bezug unterschiedlicher Positionen, Standpunkte und Ansichten mit ideologischen und politischen Implikationen, was für eine Epoche, die sich geschichtlich als Pluralismus strukturiert, nicht ungewöhnlich, sondern gerade höchst charakteristisch ist, jedoch unter der Voraussetzung, daß wegen bestehender Vorurteile keines der Momente grundlos disqualifiziert werden kann. Die Aufteilung der Moderne in eine diachronische Reihe von Generationen verhüllt oder negiert durch Verfälschung ihre typische, wesentliche, geschichtlich-epochale Struktur, den Pluralismus.⁴⁶

Um bisher weit verbreitete historiographische Clichées abzubauen, muß die Optik der Betrachtung auf den konkreten europäischen Kontext und auf den Schauplatz erweitert werden, und man muß sehen, in welcher Beziehung sich Bazala zu den Autoren auf internationaler Ebene und zu deren für die Geschichte der Ästhetik relevanten, einflußreichen Anschauungen und Thesen befindet. Zu diesem Zweck seien einige namhafte Beispiele genannt.

Berücksichtigt man, wie groß der Einfluß und — auch dies sei gesagt — die Berühmtheit von Wilhelm Worringers *Abstraktion und Einfühlung* von 1908 war, und bedenkt man die für ein theoretisches Werk unglaubliche Zahl der Wiederauflagen dieser Schrift, so wird und kann

⁴⁶ Zur Genese des Pluralismus an der Kroatischen Kultur-, Ästhetik- und Kunstgeschichte siehe Z. POSAVAC *Problemi estetike i poetike u Hrvatskoj sredinom 19. stoljeća* (Probleme der Ästhetik und Poetik in Kroatien um die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts), *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, Zagreb XII/1986, Nr. 23—24, SS. 127—154. Zur pluralistischen Struktur der kroatischen Moderne siehe die Liste von Abhandlungen in Z. POSAVAC: *Estetika u Hrvata* (Ästhetik bei den Kroaten), Zagreb 1986, Fußnote 69, S. 281, wie auch Fußnote 3, S. 271 und Fußnote 25, S. 274.

die von Worringer ausgesprochene Diagnose der geschichtlichen Lage der Ästhetik nicht übersehen werden, die er als Faktum nimmt und von denen er ausgeht. Worringers Beurteilung der Situation stimmt in unmittelbarer Weise mit Bazalas (Abhandlung *O umjetnosti* (Über die Kunst) in dem Maße überein, daß es fast so aussieht, sie sei aus diesem Anlaß geschrieben worden. Worringer sagt: »Die moderne Ästhetik, die den entscheidenden Schritt vom ästhetischen Objektivismus zum ästhetischen Subjektivismus tat, d.h., die bei ihren Untersuchungen nicht mehr von der Form des ästhetischen Objekts, sondern vom Verhalten des betrachtenden Subjekts ausgeht, gipfelt in einer Theorie, die mit einem allgemeinen und weiten Namen als Einfühlungslehre bezeichnen kann«; (gewöhnlich findet das Wort Einfühlungstheorie Verwendung).⁴⁷

Kehren wir nun die Betrachtungsrichtung um, so könnten wir sagen, daß Bazala Worringers Feststellung als maßgebend annahm und sich von ihr leiten ließ — wäre nicht Bazalas Abhandlung *O umjetnosti* (Über die Kunst) zwei Jahre vor Worringers Buch geschrieben worden. Deshalb ist die normalste Schlußfolgerung die, daß Worringers Einschätzung der Situation genau die Schläge trifft und einen der wesentlichen Strömungen der Ästhetik zur Zeit der kroatischen Moderne bzw. um die Jahrhundertwende apostrophiert. Dabei entspricht Bazalas Abhandlung vollkommen dem Geist der Zeit, und zwar dem Geist der modernen Zeit, dem Geist der damals modernen zeitgenössischen Ästhetik.

Worringer ist kein einzelnes Beispiel, keine einsame, außergewöhnliche Erscheinung, noch ist seine Meinung nur seine Privatansicht. Mit noch größerem Gewicht muß als Beispiel Johannes Volkelt (1848—1930) genannt werden, und zwar sowohl wegen seines Einflusses als auch als Autor des vielleicht umfangreichsten *Systems der Ästhetik* zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts. In seinem Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts sehr aktuellen Buch *Ästhetische Zeitfragen*, das aus einer Reihe von Vorträgen besteht, trägt der Vortrag den Titel *Die gegenwärtigen Aufgaben der Ästhetik*, wo Volkelt wörtlich sagt: »Soll der Charakter der zeitgenössischen ästhetischen Forschung bezeichnet werden, so ist zuerst auszusprechen: die Ästhetik beruht durchweg auf psychologischer Grundlage, ja ihr Verfahren ist in allen ihren Teilen — mit Ausnahme eines einzigen — geradezu psychologisches Analysieren. Diese Ausnahme bildet die abschließende Behandlung der ästhetischen Fragen, ich kann auch sagen: die Metaphysik der Ästhetik.«⁴⁸ Zu dieser Ausnahme ergänzt Volkelt die Erklärung noch im Vorwort zum ersten Band des *Systems der Ästhetik* von 1905, in dem er über die eigene Ästhetik sagt, sie sei psychologisch ausgelegt, und er fährt fort, er habe »innerhalb der modernen psychologisch-zergliedernd ver-

⁴⁷ WORRINGER, Wilhelm, *Abstraktion und Einfühlung*, 1908; zitiert nach der Ausgabe München-Zürich 1987, S. 36.

⁴⁸ VOLKELT, Johannes, *Ästhetische Zeitfragen*, München 1895, S. 200; gesperrt Gedrucktes von Volkelt.

fahrenden Art« die Achtung von den Resultaten einiger spekulativer Ästhetiker wie Schiller, Hegel, Friedrich Viescher u.a. wahren wollen.⁴⁹ Doch ungeachtet des Respektes und des Gefühls der Notwendigkeit einer abschließend philosophischen (metaphysischen) Beleuchtung war Volkelt Psychologist: »Um einzusehen, daß die Ästhetik eine *psychologische Wissenschaft* ist, braucht man sich nur auf den durch die Erfahrung gegebenen Gegenstand der Ästhetik zu bestimmen. Dieser Gegenstand tritt uns in zwei Gestalten entgegen: als ästhetisches Schaffen und als ästhetisches Aufnehmen.«⁵⁰

Da Bazala in der Abhandlung *O umjetnosti* (Über die Kunst) Volkelt zitierte — und die *Ästhetischen Zeitfragen*, deren er sich weitgehend bedient, sowie das *System der Ästhetik* — ist es nützlich, zwecks Identifizierung des »Aromas« des Zeitgeistes eine weitere, für die Jahrhundertwende und die Moderne sehr typische Stelle aus dem Vorwort zum *System der Ästhetik* anzuführen, um zu sehen, daß bestimmte Erscheinungen und Dinge in Kroatien, daß bestimmte Züge der kroatischen Moderne, durchaus keine besondere Variante der Provinz, oder Zagrebs, jedoch auch nicht nur keine Wiener Variante sind. Denn Volkelt erklärt mehrere spezifische Absichten in seiner Ästhetik und sagt unter Betonung der Rolle der Empfindung und des Sinnlichen: »Ich suche einerseits, der Stimmung zu ihrem ästhetischen Recht zu verhelfen, und will andererseits dem Ästhetischen doch der großen menschlichen Gehalte gewährt sehen. Ich betrachte es als eine *charakteristische Aufgabe einer Ästhetik gerade der heutigen Zeit*, die künstlerischen Gefühle bis in ihre allersubjektivsten Regungen, bis in die feinsten Stimmungsverwebung hinein zu verfolgen; wie ich denn die Fortschritte in der Verfeinerung und Verwicklung der *Stimmung* und in der Fähigkeit der *Stimmungsausdruckes* für eine wichtige Errungenschaft der modernen Kunst halte.«⁵¹

Einige wenige Zitate Volkelts, dessen Arbeiten, ungeachtet ihrer heutigen Einstufung, zweifellos charakteristisch für die Epoche sind, in der sie entstehen und die er selbst mitausbaut, genügen, um zu zeigen, daß Bazalas Ansichten derselben geistigen Struktur derselben Zeit angehören. Und wenn dem Umstand Rechnung getragen wird, daß es bei Bazala nicht um einen reinen Import von Ideen geht, sondern um eine Aufnahme mit voller Einsicht in die Aktualität, mit Verständnis für die zeitgenössischen Probleme und mit bewußt gemachten eigenen Intentionen, dann ist in dieser Zugehörigkeit zur Epoche das Profil von

⁴⁹ VOLKELT, Johannes, *System der Ästhetik*, Bd. I, München 1905, Vorwort, S. IV.

⁵⁰ VOLKELT, Johannes, *Ästhetische Zeitfragen*, Sechster Vortrag: *Die gegenwärtigen Aufgaben der Ästhetik*, München 1895, S. 200.

⁵¹ VOLKELT, Johannes, *System der Ästhetik*, Bd. I, München 1905, Vorwort, S. V.; wegen der spezifischen Bedeutung und Rolle in der Zeit der Moderne wird das Wort *Stimmung* im Original, ohne Übersetzung, verwendet, Kursives in Zitat von Z. P.

Bazalas Ansichten noch stärker umrissen. Es wäre nicht angemessen zu verschweigen, daß Bazala nicht der Urheber der von ihm vertretenen Ideen ist; stattdessen ist er für unsere Bedürfnisse derjenige, der den authentischen Zeitgeist und die spezifischen ästhetischen Probleme der kroatische Moderne erkannte. Schon ein flüchtiger Vergleich mit Volkelts Zitaten zeigt bei Bazala ein klares Verhalten zu den ihm zeitgenössischen theoretischen Hauptrichtungen, jedoch auch Unterschiede gegenüber verschiedenen Hauptgedanken Volkelts. Ist indessen, in Volkelts Bestrebungen für das ästhetische Gebiet »große Menschheitsthemen« zu bewahren, eine aktuelle Verwandtschaft mit dem Postulat Arnolds und Bazalas zu sehen, daß die Dichtung »bedeutende Ideen«, »bedeutende Gehalte«, »bedeutende Personen« braucht? In der kroatischen Historiographie wurde dieser Gedanke, wie wir gesehen haben, ironisiert, was im Ausland im Falle Volkelts — und auch Diltheys — niemandem eingefallen wäre, zumindest nicht, was diese Idee betrifft. (Dazu sei vermerkt: selbstredend weiß die Kunst auch um Schönheit, um die Bedeutung »kleiner Dinge« wie auch um das tägliche Bedürfnis nach Ironisierung der »großen Themen«, insbesondere in geschichtlichen Augenblicken, wenn das Bedürfnis besteht sie abzuwägen, bzw. durchzuventilieren.

Bedeutende Zeichen für das »Diagnostizieren« des Zustands der Ästhetik an der Jahrhundertwende finden wir auch bei Wilhelm Jerusalem (1854–1923), dessen außerordentlich populäre *Einführung in die Philosophie* zum erstenmal 1899 in Wien veröffentlicht wurde. Die dritte Ausgabe 1906, die fünfte 1913! Jerusalem habilitierte sich 1891 in Wien für Philosophie;⁵² insofern ist er umso bedeutender, weil der Einfluß der Wiener Komponente auf die kroatische Moderne einer der stärksten ist. Es wird sogar von einer »Wiener Gruppe« der kroatischen Modernisten gesprochen, wenngleich die kroatische Kunst- und Kulturgeschichte bis dahin die rein ideologischen und theoretischen Einflüsse Wiens (wie auch Münchens) vernachlässigt hatte. Die Beachtung dieser Komponenten wäre wahrscheinlich auch im Fall Jerusalems nicht nur nützlich, sondern auch erforderlich, namentlich wenn wir an die seinerzeit große Verbreitung von Jerusalems *Einführung in die Philosophie* erinnern, über die Franjo Jelašić als Übersetzer sagte: »Einige Stellen dieses Buchs sind gerade wegen der Art der Darstellung und ihres besonders Resultats geradezu populär geworden; ich brauche nur zu erwähnen, daß *der Abschnitt über die Ästhetik*, in einem Separatdruck, fast würde ich sagen in einer Art Flugschrift, in tausenden von Exemplaren bei allen Interessenten in der Welt verbreitet ist.«⁵³ Die Quali-

⁵² ZIEGENFUSS, *Philosophen-Lexikon, Handwörterbuch der Philosophie nach Personen*. I Bd. A—K, Berlin 1949, S. 594.

⁵³ JELAŠIĆ, Franjo, *Predgovor prevodiočev* (Vorwort des Übersetzers), S. IX, in W. Jerusalem, *Uvod u filozofiju* (Einführung in die Philosophie), Zagreb 1915; Kursives von Z. P.

fikation von Jerusalems Philosophie sowie deren Reichweite und Einfluß kann hier nur gestreift werden; von Interesse ist hingegen seine Auffassung der Ästhetik im Sinne einer der möglichen Ausdrucksweisen der Zeit. Für Jerusalem sind »die subjektiven Bedingungen der ästhetischen Haltung *psychologisch* und die objektiven historisch und soziologisch zu untersuchen. Wenn hier einmal positive Angaben gefunden werden, wird es vielleicht möglich sein, im Weltall Keime des Ästhetischen zu finden und damit zu einer Philosophie der Schönheit und Kunst zu kommen«, wobei er die Disziplin selbst wie folgt definiert: »Ästhetik ist die *Philosophie des Gefühls*, und ihre Aufgabe ist es, die *psychologischen*, soziologischen, geschichtlichen und nicht zuletzt die kosmischen und metaphysischen Voraussetzungen einer ästhetischen Haltung zu untersuchen.«⁵⁴

In diesem Zusammenhang und zur Charakterisierung des spezifischen theoretischen, also auch des ästhetischen Horizontes der Moderne, sei ein weiterer Autor der Moderne besonders hervorgehoben, der gleichzeitig ein erklärter Theoretiker der Moderne war, damals sehr populär war, und neuerdings der Vergessenheit entrissen: Georg Simmel. Willy Moog ordnete Simmel 1922 in seiner *Geschichte der Deutschen Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts* in das Kapitel *Geisteswissenschaftliche Richtungen* mit der Bezeichnung *Relativistische Kulturphilosophie* ein mit der Bemerkung, er stehe »ganz auf dem Boden ... des modernen Lebens« und könne »Vertreter des modernen großstädtischen Geistes« genannt werden.⁵⁵ In neuerer Zeit wird Simmel indes von David P. Frisby in dessen Studie *Georg Simmels Theorie der Moderne*, gleichzeitig als »erster Soziologe der Moderne« gesehen.⁵⁶

Erschließt sich heute mit dem Namen G. Simmel ein ganzer Komplex seinerzeit aktueller Themen, so ist uns Simmel hier doch in erster Linie wegen einer interessanten Aussage beim Diagnostizieren der Moderne interessant: »Das Wesen der Moderne überhaupt ist Psychologismus, das Erleben und Deuten der Welt gemäß den Reaktionen unseres Inneren und eigentlich als einer Innenwelt, die Auflösung des festen Inhalte in das flüssige Element der Seele, aus der alle Substanz herausgeläutert ist, und deren Formen nur Formen der Bewegungen sind.«⁵⁷ Eine solche Definition regt zu kritischen Betrachtungen der Mo-

⁵⁴ JERUSALEM, Wilhelm, *Uvod u filozofiju* (Einführung in die Philosophie), Zagreb 1915, Paragraph 35, SS. 184 u. 185. Kursives von Z. P.

⁵⁵ MOOG, Willy, *Die deutsche Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts in ihren Hauptrichtungen und Grundproblemen*, Stuttgart 1922, S. 77.

⁵⁶ FRISBY, David P., *Georg Simmels Theorie der Moderne* in *Georg Simmel und die Moderne, Neue Interpretationen und Materialien*, Hrsgb. Hans-Jürgen DAHME und Otthein RAMMSTEDT, Suhrkamp Taschenbuch, Wissenschaft, Bd. 499, Frankfurt/Main 1984, S. 16.

⁵⁷ SIMMEL, *Die Kunst Rodins und das Bewegungsmotiv in der Plastik*, 1. Auflage 1909, erweiterte Auflage 1911; zitiert nach H. J. DAHME und O. RAMMSTEDT, *Georg Simmel und die Moderne*, Frankfurt/Main 1984, SS. 9 u. 19 (in der oben erwähnten Studie David P. Frisbys).

derne in einem breiteren Aspekt an, in dem die erste Stelle unangefochten der Satz einnimmt: »Das Wesen der Moderne überhaupt ist Psychologismus«. Und wie sehr sich auch Simmels Denkweise in seiner Physiognomie von der Bazalas unterscheidet, legitimiert dieser einst sehr einflußreiche Theoretiker sehr stark auch Bazalas Psychologismus als eine authentische Mitbestimmungslinie der Moderne, als die Moderne an sich.

Fassen wir kurz die Lehre aus einigen der erwähnten Beispiele (Worringer, Volkelt, Jerusalem, Simmel) zusammen, so drängt sich sehr deutlich die Schlußfolgerung auf, daß Bazalas mit seiner Abhandlung *O umjetnosti* (Über die Kunst) 1906 entwickelte Position durchaus keine Irrfahrt auf Nebengleisen ist, sondern sich im Gegenteil in der Richtung der bedeutendsten, dominantesten, verbreitetsten und zugleich für die Moderne offenbar authentischsten Linie bewegt. Es ist hier nicht die Rede davon, wie »gut« diese Wege vom heutigen Standpunkt aus waren — das ist ein ganz anderes Thema — sondern davon, daß wir eine Theorie im Kontext ihres Zeitgeistes zu verstehen versuchen, wie auch umgekehrt, die Wirklichkeit und den Zeitgeist der Moderne mit den aktuellen Aspekten ihrer eigenen Theorien zu beleuchten versuchen, und in beiden Fällen, den Horizont unseres jetzigen Moments und unserer jetzigen Einsicht zu berücksichtigen. Und so zeigt sich, daß die Umkehrung der objektivistischen Ästhetik in eine subjektivistische wichtig, ja wesentlich ist für die Strukturierung des Geistes der Moderne überhaupt und daher besonders auch ihrer Kunst. Sie ist von epochalem Charakter: durch das Wesen der Moderne spricht das epochale Wesen der modernen Zeit im Kontext der westeuropäischen Neuzeitlichkeit. An der Jahrhundertwende wird dieser Subjektivismus wiederum wesentlich enger als Psychologismus gesehen, und das ästhetische Phänomen, die Kunst selbst als Erlebnis und Gefühl, die vom Emotionalen determiniert werden. Daraus folgen, natürlich, Interpretations- und Periodisierungs-Konsequenzen der Qualifizierung respective ein Katalog der Richtlinien und der Bedingungen der Strukturierung, ja auch der Auffassung der kroatischen Moderne. Folglich muß Bazala selbst sowie auch der geschichtliche Kontext, in dem er wirkte, als Teil der Geschichte in der Richtung auf die These neu interpretiert werden: Bazala ist, wenngleich Anhänger der »Alten«, ein legitimer Theoretiker der ästhetischen Auffassungen der kroatischen Moderne.

4.

Werden die Resultate einiger früherer und der hier durchgeführten Untersuchungen gewürdigt unter Berücksichtigung eines gegenseitigen, doch nicht auch buchstäblichen Parallelismus der Wechselseitigkeit von künstlerischer Praxis und Theorie der Moderne, so ist es offenbar möglich und notwendig, die kroatische Moderne mit Korrekturen und stärkeren historiographisch-interpretativen Innovationen gegenüber

den gewohnten bisherigen Darstellungen zu beschreiben. Damit — so ist zu hoffen — hat die auf den einleitenden Seiten dieser Studie vorgetragene antizipierende Skizze der Epoche ihre Rechtfertigung erhalten. Die Argumentation. Theoretisch wie faktographisch. Aber damit ist zugleich auch die Möglichkeit eröffnet, Bazalas Anteil zu beleuchten und dann möglichst gerecht zu würdigen, da wir gezeigt haben, keine Rechtfertigung besteht, ihm unbedeutend und nebensächlich zu halten. Daß sich aus den ästhetischen Thesen Bazalas diejenigen Aspekte aus dem Korpus der Thesen der kroatischen Moderne herauslesen lassen, die diese Moderne epochal und dann auch als historiographische Periodisierung mitbestimmen, kann auch an dem Material aus der Kunstgeschichte gezeigt werden, wenn dieses als echter Sinn der Moderne im Gedanklichen und Erkenntnistmäßigen korrekt dechiffriert wird, wie dies beispielsweise der Fall ist mit dem Beginn der Moderne um 1890 in der Geschichte der kroatischen Literatur. Beispiel bei Ivo Frangeš: »angeregt durch das *Psychologisieren* (in diesem Augenblick kündigt sich im Rahmen des kroatischen Postrealismus die *psychologische Novelle* an, deren Hauptvertreter Gjalski ist, und der auch der besorgte, rationale Kozarac nachgibt), behält Leskovar auch in den Romanen dieselbe Haltung bei.«⁵⁸ Daß Bazalas Thesenkomplex außer der Anfangsdatierung, wenn auch mit anderen Inhalten, ebenso an der Bestimmung der oberen Grenze der Moderne um 1910 teilhaben kann und muß, ist ebenfalls an der geschichtlichen Struktur verschiedener, d.h. aller Zweige von Kritik und Kunst beweisbar.⁵⁹

Heute ist es ohne konkretere Forschungen nicht möglich, aus dem Stegreif zu sagen, wie positiv oder negativ das Echo der Moderne in Kroatien in den späteren Jahrzehnten war. Global gesehen reichte es in beide Richtungen. Nach dem, was heute bekannt ist, hat die These

⁵⁸ FRANGES, Ivo, *Povijest hrvatske književnosti* (Geschichte der kroatischen Literatur), Zagreb 1987, SS. 228—229. Kursives im Zitat von Z. P.

⁵⁹ Jede historiographische Interpretation der Kroatischen Kunst, die die Epoche der Moderne nicht mit der Grenze »um 1910« abschließt, hat, unserer Überzeugung nach, das vollkommen unangemessene Stereotyp der Periodisierung des 20. Jahrhunderts mit der Bezeichnung »Zwischen den beiden Kriegen« nicht beseitigt, gleich ob es sich um 1914, 1916 oder 1918 handelt. Unsererseits machen wir auf die Argumente in folgenden Texten aufmerksam: Zlatko POSAVAC, *Načela ekspresionizma* (Prinzipien des Expressionismus), »15 dana«, Zagreb SVIII/1975, Nr. 6, SS. 21—27. Zlatko POSAVAC, *Odjeci futurizma u hrvatskoj književnosti* (Das Echo des Futurismus in der kroatischen Literatur), *Odjek*, Sarajevo XL/1987, Nr. 3, SS. 7—9 und Zlatko POSAVAC, *Fran Galović — jedan od promotora hrvatske književnosti 20. stoljeća* (Fran Galović — einer der Förderer der kroatischen Literatur des 20. Jahrhunderts), »15 dana«, Zagreb XXX/1987, Nr. 8. — Für das Gebiet der bildenden Kunst vgl. das Referat des Autors auf dem 5. Kongreß der Kunsthistoriker in Zagreb am 26. 6. 1988 unter dem Titel *Teorijsko-historiografska problematizacija hrvatske likovne umjetnosti na razmeđu 19. i 20. stoljeća* (Theoretisch-historiographische Problematisierung der kroatischen bildenden Kunst um die Wende des 19. zum 20. Jahrhundert), »Peristil« (Sammelband), Zagreb XXXII/1988—89, Nr. 31—32, SS. 45—50.

der Subjektivität des ästhetischen, die Komponente des Psychologismus, die Ästhetik der Einfühlung und des Erlebens in der Kultur Kroatiens in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts eine bedeutende, sogar wichtige und teilweise — wie man sagen kann — nicht rundum glückliche und fruchtbare Rolle gespielt.⁶⁰ Bislang ist es nicht möglich, zuverlässig zu sagen, wieviel dabei auf die Rezeption von Bazalas Ideen entfällt; umso mehr, als Bazala in späteren Jahrzehnten hier und da in diesem oder jenem Sinn einige seiner ästhetischen und — so will es scheinen — wenn dies von ästhetisch-theoretischer Relevanz sein kann, auch seiner politischen Überzeugungen änderte.

Die hier vorgetragener Betrachtungen berücksichtigen natürlich, daß der Psychologismus, auch der ästhetische, bereits zu Beginn und im Laufe der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts kritisiert wurde; daß die Resultate des modernen philosophischen Denkens, etwa seit der Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts, von einer kritischen Beziehung getragen sind, zu einem übertrieben philosophischen und insgesamt weltanschaulichen Anthropozentrismus, zu verabsolutisierter Subjektivität, also auch in der Ästhetik zu einem Subjektivismus, zur Erlebnisästhetik, usw. Dabei muß methodisch beachtet werden, daß diese Implikationen nicht Ziel und ausdrückliches Thema der hier durchgeführten Darstellung von Bazalas ästhetischen Anschauungen waren. Natürlich wird die Präsenz der erwähnten Typs des zeitgenössischen Denkens notwendigerweise respektiert, um eine Verschleierung oder gar eine Verschüttung des Zugangs zu Albert Bazalas Ästhetik zu vermeiden bzw. um von vornherein mögliche Deformationen in der Interpretation seiner Anschauungen auszuschalten; respektiert und berücksichtigt auch aus dem Grunde, damit als Kontrast noch stärker die einstige Betonung, ja Wucht von Psychologismus und Subjektivität als spezifisches Bewußtsein von der wahren Modernität der Moderne, von der einstigen Auffassung der Authentizität des menschlichen Daseins und der Gestalt der Wahrheit zum Ausdruck kommt.

Ohne Bewußtmachung der Haupt-, Grund- und noch einiger »Neben«-Implikationen und -Kontrapunkte bleibt nicht nur die Kenntnis des Thesenkorpus der kroatischen Moderne unvollständig, sondern wird auch die tatsächliche Zusammensetzung der Struktur ihres Pluralismus nicht deutlich, den u.a. Bazalas Anteil mit aufbaut und aus dem heraus Bazalas Anteil — um es noch einmal zu sagen — einzug und allein auch zu verstehen ist. Und dieser Anteil ist nach den erfolgten Erörterungen unseres Erachtens unbestritten: obwohl er der Gruppierung der »Alten« angehörte, wirkte er aktiv auch bei der Formulierung gerade des ästhetischen Geschehens der Moderne mit. Ihm dies abzusprechen

⁶⁰ Vgl. Zlatko POSAVAC, *Ususret psihologizmu Moderne* (Auf dem Weg zum ästhetischen Psychologismus der Moderne), *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine*, Zagreb XV/1989, Nr. 29–30, besonders Kap. 4, SS. 40–40.

wegen der völlig unpräzisen Bezeichnung der »Alten« käme der Aberkennung der Bedeutung von Bazalas Anschauungen gleich, weil er — sagen wir — Croce oder Bergson nicht folgte. Denn ebenso wie die Verwendung der Generationsbezeichnung zu interpretatorischen Zwecken unzureichend ist, so ist auch der Vorwurf der Unverhältnismäßigkeit gegenüber später berühmten Namen unangemessen: Croces berühmte Ästhetik, die wirklich historisch lediglich die Jahrhundertwende vom 19. zum 20. Jahrhundert kennzeichnet, gewann ihren Einfluß, und zwar, wie wir wissen, sehr großen Einfluß, erst in späteren Jahrzehnten, während Bergsons Hauptwerk *L'evolution créatrice* — neben seiner Abhandlung *Le rire*, die sich großer Beliebtheit erfreute — erst 1907 erschien, also ein Jahr nach Bazalas Abhandlung *O umjetnosti* (Über die Kunst).⁶¹

Trotz möglicher und unmöglicher Einwände, trotz der Unterschiede in der Position (oder gerade wegen ihnen) muß deshalb der junge Bazala — und wir sind überzeugt, daß das hier hinlänglich mit Argumenten belegt wurde — wie im übrigen auch Ljudevit Dvorniković in seinen späteren Jahren, Gjuro Arnold und Iso Kršnjavi zusammen mit einem Ivo Pilar und anderen, in Zukunft als authentische und keineswegs weniger bedeutende theoretisch-ästhetische Stimme der kroatischen Moderne gelten. Natürlich nicht in einer nur isolationistischen Bedeutung der Theorie. Denn es liegt auf der Hand, daß die folgende Schlußfolgerung nicht nur erlaubt, sondern auch notwendig ist: in der vorliegenden Darstellung und in Analysen sowohl des Problemkomplexes der Beziehungen zwischen Nation und Kunst als auch der grundlegenden theoretischen Schicht von Subjektivismus und Psychologismus hat sich uns, dessen sind wir sicher, ein historischer Raum, ein Wertehorizont von Bazalas ästhetischen Abhandlungen aufgetan, die mit der Aktualität ihrer Thesen, ihrer Orientierung und ihrem theoretischen Rang dem authentischen europäischen Kontext der Wende vom 19. zum 20. Jahrhundert angehören.

ÜBERSETZT VON KSENIJA IVIR

⁶¹ Croce begann erst 1898 mit der Niederschrift seiner Ästhetik, die dann 1902 in Druck erschien. Bergsons Abhandlung *Le rire* wurde 1900 veröffentlicht und erlebte bis 1925 24 Ausgaben! Angaben nach ZIEGENFUSS, Werner, *Philosophen-Lexikon, Handwörterbuch der Philosophie nach Personen*, Bd. 1, A—K, Berlin 1949, S. 113 und S. 211.

ESTETIČKI NAZORI ALBERTA BAZALE U DOBA HRVATSKE MODERNE

Sažetak

Autor polazi od historiografske konstatacije kako se na razmeđu 19. i 20. stoljeća oblikuje specifično strukturirano razdoblje što ga, između ostalog, za područje umjetnosti karakterizira pluralizam »izama«. Riječ je o intervalu od otprilike 1890. do zaključno oko 1910, koje hrvatska kulturna, a osobito književna povijest izvorno i opravdano naziva Moderna. U toj epohi početkom 20. stoljeća svojim radovima kao aktivni sudionik djeluje mladi Albert Bazala.

Autor smatra da su za Bazalin estetički koncept, no i za njegov udio u javnom djelovanju, navlastito relevantne dvije rasprave: polemička »*Moderni*« i *narodna književnost* 1904, te pretežno teorijska *O umjetnosti* 1906. U spisu iz 1904. Bazala prigovara modernistima neopravdano udaljavanje od nacionalnog karaktera umjetnosti, čime je ušao u važne probleme koji su s mnogim drugim tad izbijali u prvi plan pobuđujući trajno živo zanimanje sve do danas. Upozoravajući na neke puke nesporazume u shvaćanjima što ih zastupahu modernisti, kao i, po Bazalinu mišljenju, na pretjeranost njihova zahtjeva apsolutne slobode stvaranja, bez obzira čak i na etičke norme, Bazala identificira odjeke Nietzscheove filozofije kao idejnu pozadinu Moderne, što je od izuzetne važnosti za naknadne interpretativne pristupe. U traktatu *O umjetnosti* Bazala sasvim u duhu Moderne provodi obrat od tzv. »objektivne« u »subjektivnu« estetiku. Subjektivnost Bazala poima psihologistički uvodeći u hrvatsku estetiku doktrinu Einfühlungstheorie. Psihologizam je tu etabliran kao modernost.

Projicirajući Bazaline nazore u europski kontekst autor ilustrira njihov povijesno-relevantan aktualitet paralelama s nekad glasno dominantnim tezama Worringera, Volkelta, Jerusalema i Simmela. Iz svega navedenog slijedi zaključak: iako je mladi Bazala u sukobu »mladih« i »starih« bio protiv modernista na strani »starih«, ipak je u dvije svoje ovdje razmatrane estetičke rasprave, a posebice onoj *O umjetnosti*, na teorijskoj razini jedan od legitimnih eksplikatora i tumača bitnih teza Moderne, zapravo teoretičar Moderne.

Book Reviews



*Franjo Zenko, ARISTOTELIANISM FROM PETRIĆ TO BOŠKOVIĆ
ESSAYS ON OLDER CROATIAN PHILOSOPHY, Globus,
Zagreb 1983.*

The knowledge of the history of philosophy of one's own nation seems to be the essential component of philosophical thinking in these post-Romantic days. This history, in order to be revealed in all its topicality, either as a challenge to assume a critical attitude, or as a stimulus to follow its motives must, first of all be available. Despite the awareness, however, of the importance on the careful work on the introduction to the Croatian philosophical heritage,¹ which has developed rather recently, we are still getting acquainted with it slowly and fragmentarily. For all that has become known owing to the efforts of the Department of the History of Philosophy, we can not judge the extent to which this knowledge has become crucial for contemporary thinking in this country. Regardless of that, it has become increasingly evident that research which has been undertaken at the Department of the History of Philosophy requires such methodological deliberation and systematical information on the present state of the art in the exploration of the history of philosophy in this country, that it can not remain without influence on its philosophy.

The book by Franjo Zenko is a thematically related collection of his contributions to periodicals, related exclusively to the period of Croatian philosophy preceding the Croatian National Revival, and it deals with the fate of Aristotelianism in this country. In his Introduction the author informs us about the reasons why we can not except »works containing more general conclusions« in nearer future, and why the research he has undertaken is only in the function of establishing the prerequisite conditions necessary for synoptic works about the presence of the main directions in classical philosophy of this country. Aristotelianism appears here first as the object of Petrić's radical criticism, and then under the aspect of the doctrinary transformation of physics as a subject of instruction in the first public institution of higher education in this country.

The first four articles are dedicated to Franjo Petrić. They survey his life and work in the light of his basic motive, namely the overcoming of Aristotelianism in »the context of the spiritual agitation in the troubled

¹ See Franjo Marković's Rectorial Speech reprinted in *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine* (Contributions for the exploration of Croatian Philosophical Heritage) Zagreb, 1—2/1975, p. 273.

sixteenth century«. Petrić tries to identify the need for a general spiritual revival in its very roots, which he sees in the fact that Christianity had adopted a philosophy which is essentially naturalistic and atheist, namely, that of Aristotle, which had caused the extreme spiritual stagnation, so that he outlines a programme of the revival of philosophy on the basis of Plato's doctrine which is congenial to Christianity. By the revival of philosophy he wants to reach the prerequisite for the revival of spiritual life in general. He will insist, accordingly, on the further removal of the origins of philosophy to Ethiopian, Egyptian and Chaldean sages and thus, according to Zenko, he will contribute to a more precise reconstruction of the genesis of philosophy.

The second article, together with the analysis of the Renaissance thematic context of the treatise *Ten Dialogues on History* develops some of the questions which are relevant to contemporary historiography as well. Since Petrić is more austere with regard to the sources than Humanist historiographers and Renaissance theoreticians of historiography, he seems to be closer to contemporary scientific and critical historiography. In addition to this, he tries to discover that which makes the historical understanding possible, entering thus, in a way, into the problem of historicity. For all the thematic links with contemporary historiography and philosophy, it is not possible to prove by documentary evidence that any of these have developed owing to his influence. Such as they appear in *Dialogues* they point to some of his motives, inter alia, to his intention to establish historiography as «a strict science».

The third article is: «Petrić's criticism of (classical) rhetoric». In this discussion he confronts the idea of historical openness to the principle of imitation, to «this cult of classical rhetoric», trying to destroy rhetoric as an art and discipline from within. Because of the fact that he is trying to find his way towards the new philosophical-scientific spirit, he requires that the art of rhetoric should be the perfect knowledge of all the causes of things it discusses.

The last article on Petrić is dedicated to the object and method of Panarchia. As a whole, it is an attempt to secure a more adequate position for the interpretation of Petrić's philosophical-theological intent, than that presented by earlier commentators, e.g. P. O. Kristeller. Since the real object of Panarchia is «the first and only origin» and not «the first principles of things», it is by no means a «natural philosophy or cosmology». Zenko points in the end to Petrić's initiative which consisted in the intention to «re-establish the tradition of the interpenetration of philosophical and religious spirit which had been abolished by the rationalism of decadent scholasticism by «reforming» philosophy as onto-theology» (72—73). The starting-point of this «first philosophy» or «philosophical theology» is the conceptual pair «one-many», which should replace the Aristotelian one of «moved-the-mover». It is thus as late as in Panarchia that he offered an original antithesis to peripatetic metaphysics, in which we can discern Petrić's positive potential.

The essay on the natural-scientific research of M. A. Dominis is an interesting analysis of the gnoscological and methodological situation at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century in which the spirit, principles and methods of modern natural science were formed. It is interesting because Dominis was one of those who started from Aristo-

telian philosophy and participated as such in the new kind of natural-scientific research. When applied to people like Dominis, the thesis on »progressive« Platonists and »reactionary« Aristotelians certainly loses its persuasive power. Zenko discusses two treatises by Dominis: namely, *O zraka-ma vida i svjetlosti u lećama i dugi* (On the Rays of Sight and Light in the Lenses and in the Rainbow) (1611) and *Eurip ili nauka o plimi i oseki* (Eurip or the science of the Tides) (1624) from the point of view of their method. It is especially prominent in his treatise on the rainbow where he characteristically lingers at the point where he explains the colours of the rainbow, not because of the obstacles presented by the scholastic-philosophical authority of Aristotle, but because to him, as well as to the whole classical way of thinking, the experience of macroscopic observation is the only and final authority. Nevertheless, an important step forward has been made with regard to the scientific-cumulative contribution from the methodological point of view by the fact that in his »special physics« he does not resort to theological method.

»The Fate of Aristotelianism in Natural Philosophy at Neoacademia Zagrabien-sis 1669—1773« is the central text in this book representing in many respects a discovery on how and when the crucial caesura in natural-philosophical thinking occurred in this country. This ambitious study offers specific evidence that the decision to adopt a different methodological orientation from that which insists only on the important isolated names and works of definite importance for the world philosophy, has been correct. By taking the category of philosophical life to detect the object of the historiography of national philosophy, he successfully proved that »focal points of such life had a continuous existence in this country« (17). This life in northern Croatia becomes the object of research here insofar as it is related to Neoacademia Zagrabien-sis. Zenko first presents the system of Jesuit studies of philosophy and the place of physics within it, referring to *Ratio studiorum*, the constitution of the Jesuit teaching system as a whole. Physics, accordingly, was to be taught as it used to be done by teachers of high scholasticism: by joint reading and interpretation of the prescribed Aristotle's text. The second part of the study analyzes the logical structure of scholastic physics. The character of physics as a teaching subject in the 1660's is revealed by the work *Philosophia peripatetica* by Franjo Jambrehović, especially by its largest, central part entitled *Physica*. The analysis shows that it was of an evidently classical philosophical character, and its thematic structure reveals evidently its fidelity to scholastic-Aristotelian tradition. Even here, however, characteristics can be discerned which will contribute to the corrosion of the peripatetic doctrinary corpus: first, it starts from the thing itself and not from Aristotle's texts; second, eclecticism, which means here the effort to regard critically also the earlier ways of formulating problems and their solutions. Francis Suarez had a considerable influence on the development of these characteristics in Jesuit schools. It has been proved that they facilitated the penetration of new physical theories into the instruction in Jesuit academies. The penetration of new views into the Zagreb Academy occurred, as proved by polemics and thesauri, before the decree of Maria Theresa (1752) reforming the Jesuit type of the three-year study of philosophy and dividing physics into general and special. Zenko analyzes in detail the polemics between Antun Terzij and Luka Bakranin, who were teachers at the time, concerning the ontological status of accident with regard to transubstantiation, showing in as early as 1726 the pene-

tration of Cartesianism to Neoacademia. The liveliness of the Zagreb intellectual circles of the time was encouraged by those individuals who declined from *doctrina communis* and advocated modern solutions. A good example of the fact that »the crisis of European consciousness« (Paul Hazard) affected Zagreb milieu as well are the thesury from 1758, dating therefore from the first years of the crucial period (defended by Adam Mikulić under the patronage of Kazimir Bedeković), and from 1771 (defended by Franjo Županić under the patronage of Franjo Volković). No thesis is related any more to the first principles of bodies. The last chapters of the study demonstrate how physics definitely lost its classical philosophical character, which meant the discrediting of Aristotle in this country. An important result of Zenko's research is certainly the fact that »the abandoning of the »discredited« Aristotelianism as a teaching subject was started and finished by Jesuit teachers themselves . . .« (131).

The last text in the book deals with the reception of Bošković's ideas at Neoacademia Zagrabiensis in the eighteenth century. It is really an interesting attempt to reach some more reliable indication on the real course of this reception on the basis of extremely scarce evidence, but using a very subtle methodology. The research of this type is a prerequisite for a possible reconstruction of the interweaving of that which was being created as »the philosophy of this country«. For the time being it seems that we can speak of continuity only in the sense of participation in great streams of philosophical thinking. In a historiographically correct and methodologically modern way Zenko has elaborated those aspects of »Aristotelianism« in this country which he has chosen for his subject. In this way we can get acquainted basically with all that which could become our heritage. Its real adoption — if possible at all — is still a task which remains to be accomplished.

IVAN NOVAKOVIĆ

TRANSLATED BY LELIJA SOČANAC

Zlatko Posavac, AESTHETICS IN CROATIA, Istraživanja i studije (Researches and Studies), Nakladni zavod MH, Zagreb, 1986, 305 p.

Having in mind the results of the years of research of this author in an effort to mark the fundamental theoretical conceptions of Croatian art and to gain insight into the history of aesthetic philosophical reflection, as well as his critical portraits (the studies of Haler, Sladović, Macun), and interpretations of the phenomena belonging to the cultural history of this country and its periods, we shall examine the book by Zlatko Posavac which has been recently published (in the series *Studije, monografije, kritike* (Studies, monographs, criticism), by »Nakladni Zavod MH«). We should say that in its basic orientation, structure and character it does not aim to be a chronology of ideas and thinkers belonging to the aesthetic tradition of this country, but a view of historical proportions in its presented selection of some

Ivan Novaković

the key themes of the historiography of Croatian aesthetics. In his interpretative starting-point with respect to the creative reconstruction of the corpus of aesthetic views, the author adhered to the principle of *openness*, i.e. the *problematic* relevance of aesthetic phenomena. Pointing out the function of cultural-historical and aesthetic interpretations in the creation of a *world-view*, the author in his review of text-critical studies gives his own contribution to the filling up of gaps, together with his unannounced historiographic task: to bring us closer to this aesthetic reality as a manifold totality of cultural-historical materials through aesthetic *fragments*. By drawing our attention to the fact that his explorations and studies *mark* the problems rather than give a complete picture and critical synthesis, collecting and examining documents of aesthetic reflection which have been neglected in many respects so far, the author primarily enables us to gain *insight* into the richness and variety of doctrines and problems.

The author's main concern as a proficient reader and critical thinker is »to recognize the authentic processes in the historical developments within the Croatian cultural history« and »to gain a clearer insight into the historical reality and historical fate of the culture we live with« (p. 148). Avoiding any exaggeration and overstatement the author's explorations have been undertaken with the motive of founding the history of Croatian aesthetics »without unnecessary pessimism, but also without illusions and mystification that we are equal to Europe and the world« (p. 8). In the production of explorations of literary-historical and cultural-historical problems which has been rather small so far, we are faced with the fact of the non-existence of a more systematic program of the exploration of aesthetics in Croatia. In this sense, the task which has been set down and gradually followed by the author, has resulted in new cultural-historical conceptions for a more adequate interpretation of political and cultural history as shown by texts which have been collected in this book. They frequently have the character of monograph analyses, enriched by extensive references to authors, critically elaborated and well documented.

In their contribution to the historiography of Croatian culture and of individual branches of art, the studies of Z. Posavac, as a result of the years of his research, as he points out in the foreword to the book, are »without a precedent and preliminary« and are in this sense »ground-breaking in character«. In order to fill the complete lack of *historical insight* into the state of theoretical understanding of Croatian art, through a methodologically modified approach to the factually exact materials, to a corpus of aesthetic views, the author discovers new possibilities of understanding of all the complexities of the inception and genesis, as well of the importance of individual theoretical contributions. Using modern linguistic interpretations, as well as text-critical studies of scholars from this country and abroad, the author extends the horizon of his research, especially pointing out the need to shift the chronological boundaries which have been established and accepted by traditional literary historians. With his conception of the need of a different approach to the problem of *periodization*, opposing the arbitrariness in the denomination of periods, inadequate interpretations and mistakes resulting from unambiguous parallelism between cultural and political history, and espousing new historical truths, as well as the need to reconsider the historical assignation of stylistic formations, the author adheres to the well-founded judgements of periods, styles, individuals

and circles. The identifications of aesthetic awareness and reflection within the history of Croatian culture contribute in this context to the essential task of gaining a more complete insight into some of the periods and their styles. Without neglecting individual and rare contributions and relevant surveys of the history of individual arts, and the verified statements which can be used as a starting-point in the understanding of phenomena and importance of historical changes in aesthetic reflections, their content and meaning, the author contemplates the specific quality of such a task.

Thus the considerations of aesthetic views of individual periods, with all the unevenness in their elaboration and on the level of their exploration, will retain the necessary critical discernment and above all the *openness* for a creative reconstruction owing to the author's approach. Thus, for instance, when the point in question is the author's relationship to the medieval heritage and to constitutive terms of reference with regard to medieval art, the author's concern is not »the elaboration or a final draft for the history of aesthetics of the Middle Ages« (p. 19). With a short survey of medieval aesthetic theses contained in the texts written in the vernacular, as well as of conceptions of art, of the function of the book and literature, of medieval encyclopedias of knowledge, of works, miscellanies, and cultural circles, the author follows the continuity of Croatian cultural history through its associated questions about the aesthetic horizon and cultural influences. Furthermore, the fragmentary incorporation of aesthetic ideas in the works of Renaissance authors gives us an idea of the dimensions of Renaissance thought, of terminological and lexicographical conceptual standards, of the spheres of interpretation and influence, of reception, in brief, of all the complexity and multiplicity of the Renaissance period in Croatia, as well as of the problematically open questions of historiographical regionalization, typological differentiations and finally the elements for an integral review of Croatian aesthetics which will have to be worked out. Perceiving the methodological problems in the approach to the study of the complexes of Croatian aesthetic thought, both in his studies of medieval and Renaissance aesthetics, the author limits himself methodologically to the fragments written in the vernacular, interpreting some of the culturological details from their traditional angle, as well as the reasons of theoretical limitations which have been neglected or which have not been perceived so far, or less-known components (e.g. Lucić's aesthetics), taking into account the historical perspective of the developed theoretical reflection (e.g. the Baroque kajkavian prose).

Exploring the aesthetico-stylistically integral formation of the Romantic Classicism, or to be more precise its contribution to the 18th century aesthetics, and referring to the historical content and meaning of this period characterized by a coherent structure with its specific qualities, discovering some of the authors who have been overlooked and neglected so far in the cultural and literary historiography of this country as well as the roles of the circles such as those of Slavonia, Dubrovnik and Rome, the author emphasized the creative aspects of the period (from R. Kunić to B. and Ch. Štay) and carried out stylistic-thematic analyses of the complexes both of the theory and practice of art (for instance the historical importance of the most beautiful treatises expounding Neo-Classical doctrine by Ch. Štay.) On the basis of critically deepened analyses, the author was able to form the conclusion which is rather committing, about »the participation of this country in the intellectual developments of the age, which was by no means pro-

vincial«. According to the author, »we still do not have interpretations which are historically and aesthetically founded« (p. 136) concerning this period. The author also concludes that this country was not historically »late« as it used to be claimed. Finally, the author's diagnosis is unambiguously harsh in this respect: he states that »we are late in recognizing their age and including their work and their ideas into the active cultural-historical corpus« (p. 136).

Studies concerning theater and the aesthetics of Croatian playwrights, as a paradigm of the Classicist poetics, are in the focus of the author's interest. This area has recently received its scientifically founded analyses which the author uses in his research. The exposition of the aesthetic views of literary playwrights, either on the basis of their dramatic texts or from indirect sources, and frequently also of their role and influence upon the artistic and the aesthetic as a whole, together with the opening of new vistas, make the author's work, in addition to its being theoretically and philosophically well-founded, also a useful tool, an informative manual. Attention has been drawn to numerous new aspects of the meaning of some works (e.g. of A. Starčević who inaugurated new conceptual structures, political and intellectual positions, and is important for the interpenetration of tradition and modernity in Croatia, or to aspects of the work of some aestheticians of music like P. Štoos or F. Kuhač), or their work has been reconsidered on the basis of the exploration of some of their views which have not been taken into account by the historiography in this country so far.

Referring to the unnaturalness of usual divisions, such as the introduction of delimitations between more recent and older cultural history, and to the inappropriateness of certain terms (e.g. the Croatian Illyrian Movement as a style or aesthetic conception), the author points to the fictitiousness and artificiality of such delimitations in the explorations which have been undertaken so far (e.g. differences of opinion concerning the term »Romanticism«).

The author, on the contrary, supports those tenets of contemporary literary theories which point out the contiguity of style-generating features, namely the concepts of Classicism and Romanticism, the Illyrian Movement and Realism.

By qualifying historically the period at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the nineteenth century as the Romantic Classicism marking the end of the centuries of European traditions, the author collects diverse phenomena and divergent tendencies in the Croatian cultural history under the common denominator of historical synonymes within which the art of the theatre should be treated by means of the same criteria as aesthetics.

The author's interpretations of Croatian Literary Modernism, for instance, as well as of the trends in thentieth century art, of the heterogeneity of their attitudes, wishes and orientations, and of the individuals who occupied a prominent position from the historical and aesthetic point of view, represent theoretically and philosophically founded judgements of the complex reality at the turn of the century, with wide objections to corresponding European developments. This does not prevent the author from pointing out also the other, indigenous components of the historical reality of this country as in the author's opinion, just »the outlines of individual critical co-ordinates and the most necessary marks of the orientation of our

judgement« (p. 196). By the insight into aesthetic doctrines and their intellectual, philosophical structure, the author's intention has evidently been to diminish the contradictions and obscurity of the periods characterized by the specific quality of the media production (radio, film, comic strip, television), and finally, to deal with the themes of the fate of art in the modern world, of its problematic quality and crisis, in one word, of aesthetic sterility (as shown by M. Krleža whose work the author discusses in a separate chapter).

The efforts of Zlatko Posavac to explore the aesthetic thought in Croatia and its constituted historical development, his approach to theoretical organization of the phenomenon of the aesthetic, is appropriate to the conception of the development of the reflection on the character of art. We are aware of the range of the problems that have been outlined, and by the very evaluation of aesthetic problems as a whole a wide area has been opened to modern thinking.

The actual key problems of the life of art and its relation to the actual developments of the intellectual situation of the age as a whole have been set down in such a way as to point to the inexhaustibility of aesthetic problems. Having been given this survey, philosophically problematized and manifoldly incentive primarily, though not only, to the philosopher-aesthetician, the task to search for the historical questioning of the indigenous heritage of this country has been promoted by its complementary pair: namely, to reach the prerequisite for our own deliberation, i.e. the modernization of the aesthetic problems through the relationship towards the understanding of our precedents. On the level of the advanced results of the histories of individual arts today, as well as of aesthetics and methodology of criticism which are more appropriate to estimate the importance of a contribution, but also of the limits and delusions inherent in certain positions, the author's work contributes to the understanding of the structure of the aesthetic history of Croatia and of the intellectual history in general. Thence the author's efforts to find those points of orientation which are indispensable in the new conception of historical delimitations and of the division of individual fields of art. Within this framework all the associated phenomena in the artistic creation and experience, forms and contents with respect to their value, the source and reception, polysemantically understood in the optics of the author's considerations, acquire their meaning within the horizon of philosophical interest, its relevance and scope. Especially prominent is the importance of the works representing a message to us, retaining those constant qualities in thinking to which this survey can serve as a reliable guide.

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TRANSLATED BY LELIJA SOCANAC

Damir Barbarić: *THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANDRIJA DOROTIĆ, The Department of the History of Philosophy, The University of Zagreb Institute for Historical Sciences, Zagreb, 1987.*

The manuscripts of Andrija Dorotić (1761—1837), preserved at the Franciscan monasteries in Makarska and Sumartin, contain more than 4250 pages dealing with various disciplines and subjects: physics, logic, psychology, theology, ethics, metaphysics, mathematics, rhetoric . . . Moreover, in 1795 Dorotić published a short essay entitled *Philosophicum specimen de homine* in Venice.

Barbarić's monograph dealing with this ample philosophical heritage is divided into three parts. The first part describes the present state of the preserved manuscripts and discusses their authenticity. The second part Barbarić endeavours to decipher »the internal centre« (comp. p. 172) of the whole of Dorotić's philosophical thinking.

In this survey we shall confine ourselves to the philosophical content of Dorotić's manuscripts and expound it in accordance with Barbarić's division into basic problematic and disciplinary complexes. After that we shall also expound the basic characteristics of Barbarić's interpretation.

1. Dorotić's *ontology* is under the influence of school metaphysics of the so-called German Enlightenment. His direct support was certainly the ontology of M. F. Ch. Baumeister, whose work *Institutiones Metaphysicae complectentes Ontologiam, Cosmologiam, Psychologiam, Theologiam denique Naturalem, Methodo Wolffii adornatae* has been found among the books which had belonged to Dorotić: »A comparison of Baumeister's ontology with that of Dorotić points to an almost complete correspondence in the structure of tenets and argumentation.« (p. 174). Barbarić therefore concludes »that ontology is not his (i.e. Dorotić's) genuine and distinctive interest.« (p. 173).

However, »in looking for the internal centre and delineating the contours of the whole« (comp. p. 172) of Dorotić's philosophy, Barbarić returns in the first place exactly to the first two principles of Dorotić's ontology — namely, to the principle of contradiction and to the principle of sufficient reason.

Dorotić, namely, distinguishes between accidental and necessary truths. Accidental truths are those which may and may not be. Their first principle is the principle of sufficient reason. Necessary truths, on the other hand are such that they can not be otherwise and their essential principle is the principle of contradiction. The principle of contradiction is at the same time the first principle of our cognition. Eliminate it, and we have eliminated any possible certainty. Furthermore, from the principle of contradiction it follows: »first, each being enjoys (*gaudet*) its essence; and second, no being can dismiss (*amittere*) its essence.« (p. 89). In other words: »essences of beings are absolutely necessary, inalterable and eternal.« (p. 89). The principle of sufficient reason, on the other hand, relative to the being and change of beings, does not contribute anything essentially new. In other words: »Being and change remain something merely accidental, something that supervenes only secondarily to that which is identical to itself and therefore to necessary, eternal and unchangeable essences.« (p. 194).

This »spirit of essential static quality, i.e. of unchangeability of everything« (comp. p. 194) present in Dorotić's ontology, is the first and essential element which Barbarić points out in his interpretation of the whole of Dorotić's philosophy. He therefore ends his discussion of Dorotić's ontology by stating: »it was precisely this unprobed ontology that offered (to Dorotić) a basic support in the founding and development of other sciences, especially ethics and physics.« (p. 176).

On the one hand, therefore, we encounter this unprobed quality, while on the other, the centrality of ontology with regard to Dorotić's philosophical thinking as a whole.

2. Dorotić's *physics* was written within the context of seventeenth and eighteenth century physical theories, with the only exception of the traditional doctrine of the four causes. All the rest is, from the point of view of the history of philosophy, completely close to Descartes or Newton, and most of all to Gassendi with whom Dorotić shares his essential doctrine, namely — physical atomism.

In keeping with his interpretation, Barbarić sees the static quality as the basis of Dorotić's physics, which he endeavors to corroborate with its first axiom, which is: that something does not proceed from nothing, as well as with Dorotić's doctrine on inertia, which would correspond to »the essential unchangeability of the essences of beings, ascertained in ontology«; (p. 194); and finally, with his doctrine on the un-procreativity and imperishableness of the first matter, according to which all changes are actually merely changes in the composition of its atoms, being therefore unessential.

3. *Theological and ethical problems.* According to Barbarić's interpretation, the two main attributes of this problematic-disciplinary complex are metaphysical voluntarism and intellectualism.

The metaphysical voluntarism — Dorotić in his definition of freedom emphasizes both the will-power to resist external compulsion and its *power to resist its own nature*. In this sense freedom would possess the power to dismiss its own nature and thus transgress the limit of unchangeability and eternity as set down in ontology. Furthermore, conceived in this way, freedom would find itself at the point of transition from the unchangeable and eternal into the changeable and temporary, namely, at the point of the birth and becoming of all creation. In other words, with his definition of freedom Dorotić does not only step beyond the above mentioned spirit of the essential static quality, i.e. unchangeability of all, but he adds to it a metaphysical dimension. Barbarić therefore recognizes it as »a reversal towards a specific metaphysical voluntarism.« (p. 177). This reversal is the second basic element of Barbarić's interpretation.

Intellectualism — Dorotić's metaphysical voluntarism, consequently rooted in theological and ethical considerations, had been stopped, however, by his clear commitment to the primacy of reason over will, on account of which there is »almost no word« about freedom in Dorotić's ethics. Everything is directed towards the obedience to law. Natural law, implanted in people on their creation from nothing, is of the same kind as their reasonable nature and is, together with it, eternal and unchangeable.« (p. 178).

Consequently, with respect to ontology, we encounter on the one hand a radically new element of metaphysical voluntarism, while on the other we

come across the repeated element of the static quality and unchangeability in the form of intellectualism.

To these two elements Barbarić will add another one manifested »primarily in the principled transphysical and transontological agnosticism« (p. 199).

Namely, Dorotić teaches that we can not understand the essence of physical body, expounding his doctrine in terms of ontology and cognitive theory.

In terms of ontology, »the inner nature and essence of physical body should not be placed within any of its attributes we have come to know so far.« (p. 138). Namely, if extension were its essence — as claimed by Descartes — we could not distinguish it from mathematical bodies, whereas the essence of physical body must make it different from other beings. It also has to be the source of the rest of its attributes. To that extent Gassendi is wrong as well in considering solidity to be the essence of physical body. Solidity, namely, will not result in weight, inertia or attraction, which are all attributes of physical body. In addition to that, there is no other attribute which could fulfill both these conditions so that we could consider it to be its essence.

In terms of cognitive theory: »we can not discover, or even hope to discover in far future, anything in the inside of the body.« (p. 137—138). Actually, we know nothing about bodies »except that which we can observe (*conspicimus*) with our senses« (p. 137). To that extent, with regard to them, we are not familiar with »any effect which has not been detected (*detectus*) by means of experience or observation (*observatione*)«, (p. 137). Even that which we know about bodies is very obscure (*valde obscure*).« (p. 137).

Therefore: »the essence of body generally speaking should be placed in that which is concealed and uncertain.« (p. 152).

4. *The theory of cognition* — the subject under discussion are actually the themes and problems which are close to us from the point of view of the history of philosophy (though not with respect to scientific disciplines), namely the problem of the nature and origin of ideas, the problem of innate ideas, the problem of unity of soul and body, the problem of the Cartesian doubt... In addition to physics, these problems are certainly in the focus of Dorotić's interest.

Dorotić is a proponent of dualism. On the one hand the understanding of the external world by means of the senses as the direct or indirect origin of all our ideas. On the other hand, the inner sense (close in its definition to Descartes' *cogito*), intellection and intuition as the basis of metaphysical truth.

Barbarić's opinion about these Dorotić's considerations is: »In no other aspect has he been so modern, so deeply immersed into the most decisive developments of his own philosophical contemporaneity whereas, on the other hand, nowhere has he reached so little completeness, clarity and profundity of explication.« (p. 186).

Finally, we shall isolate the essential features of Barbarić's interpretation.

1. Dorotić's philosophy has been divided into separate disciplines, each elaborated independently of the others. Disconnected. With regard to this disconnectedness, however, Dorotić is silent: »He has never explicitly posed either the question of the internal connectedness among principles of indi-

vidual disciplines, or of the possible integrality of his own philosophy.« (p. 172). Thence the essential problem of Barbarić's interpretation namely, the problem of a possible systematic quality and integrality of Dorotić's philosophy. Barbarić recognizes some designations of the systematization which has been started, though not finished, in the three above mentioned elements.

2. The first element, namely »the spirit of the essential static quality« proceeds from Dorotić's ontology and extends to physics and theological and ethical considerations. The second element, namely Dorotić's metaphysical voluntarism, is the consequence of his definition of freedom, but does not extend to all of his considerations on theology and ethics, but turns up here and there »in short flashes« (comp. p. 195) in physics or ontology (the doctrine on metaphysical observation of primary matter, »the mystery of creation«...). The third element, namely that of agnosticism with regard to the essence of physical body — is most closely related to Dorotić's cognitive-theoretical, methodological and physical considerations which at the time had modern attributes.

3. Finally, we should not omit Barbarić's historico-philosophical approach. Namely, Barbarić regards some problems and disciplines within the context of historico-philosophical traditions to which they belong: namely, he considers ontology within the context of school metaphysics of the so-called German Enlightenment, ethics and theology within the scholastic context, physics and »cognitive theory« within the context of modern physical, cognitive-theoretical and methodological explorations. In this respect, Barbarić distinguishes between Dorotić's ontological and theological-ethical considerations, almost completely taken over from tradition, and his noticeably more original and extensive physical and »cognitive-theoretical« considerations, on the basis of which he concludes that the latter belong to the centre of Dorotić's interest. Consequently, we have on the one hand the tradition of scholasticism and school metaphysics of the German Enlightenment which had been taken over rather uninventively, but in a complete form, while on the other we encounter a very lively interest in modern philosophical developments, which had, however, not been completely formulated and deepened (we should recall the fate of metaphysical voluntarism or of Dorotić's cognitive-theoretical considerations). Thence Barbarić's final thesis on the historico-philosophical »essential ambiguity and internal fracture« (comp. p. 198) of Dorotić's philosophical thinking which can be »characterized as an explicit example of a transitional form of late scholastic doctrine into the initial, metaphysical rationalism which had been systematized still only in principle (p. 199).

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TRANSLATED BY LELIJA SOCANAC

Mihaela Girardi Karšulin, THE PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT OF FRANJO PETRIĆ, The Department of the History of Philosophy, The University of Zagreb Institute for Historical Sciences, Zagreb 1987

In this book — one of the rare and therefore welcome comprehensive studies of the philosophy of Franjo Petrić, we can distinguish three directions in interpretation followed by the author in her approach to the problem. The first is manifested in the placing of Petrić's work in the context of a spiritual climate in which it was created as well as in the climate of corresponding Platonist and Aristotelian tendencies. The second direction follows Petrić's thinking in his work *Discussionum peripateticarum* and his characterization of Aristotle's philosophy, especially his *Metaphysics*. The third is that of the author's interpretation concentrated on the main problems of the work *Nova de universis philosophia* which is, according to many interpreters, Petrić's main work. The directions of research and the subject matter, systematized in this way, are divided in the book into two main parts: »I The Reception of Plato's and Aristotle's Philosophy in the Middle Ages and Renaissance« and »II The Philosophical Thought of Franjo Petrić«. We shall try to discuss the main tenets of the book in the same order.

Since the work of Franjo Petrić belongs to the Renaissance culture and philosophy, the author's task in the first part of the book has been to thematize one of the most significant aspects of the period, namely the conflict between the authorities, Plato and Aristotle: »Petrić deals, directly or indirectly in all of his philosophical writings, with this question, which was topical in the Renaissance« (57). However, it is not a completely original Renaissance subject, since the process of »assimilation«, »Christianization« and »criticism« (13) of Plato's and Aristotle's philosophy started at the moment when Christianity was faced with the necessary task to interpret rationally the content of belief. The author points out that the first attempt to establish Christianity philosophically was based on the adoption of some of the basic tenets of Neo-Platonism, primarily because the Neo-Platonist tradition had existed continuously up to the abolishment of schools of philosophy in 529. Neo-Platonism, however, is not completely adequate for the philosophical interpretation of the Christian belief. The characteristic examples are those of Origenes and Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita. Origenes attempted to adapt the Christian doctrine to the emanational system of Neo-Platonism which brought him close to some gnostic theses on account of which he was officially rejected by the Church. Some of Areopagitas' followers had a similar fate. The case of st. Augustine was different. His case shows that Neo-Platonism was acceptable for Christianity »not as ontology or cognitive theory, but as a theory of mysticism (21).

The Christian reception of Aristotle occurred later, which the author explains by the fact that the reception of Aristotle in the Antiquity was not so continuous as Platonism. She briefly outlines the development of Aristotelianism up to st. Thomas Aquinas and W. Ockham, giving a short survey of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Averroes, Philoponus (with the emphasis on his interpretation of the object and name of Aristotle's metaphysics, which

is especially important with regard to Petrić and Abaelard, and concludes with late scholastic nominalism.

These are the main outlines of the horizon within which Petrić's work came into being. A more direct source of his philosophy is represented by Renaissance disputes on the relationship between the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, initiated by G.G. Pletho, which M. Girardi Karšulin discusses in the final chapter of the first part of the book. In addition to Pletho, she also discusses Georgius of Trebizont, Bessarion and Pico della Mirandola.

The second part of the book is dedicated to that which, in the author's opinion, is one of Petrić's cardinal problems: namely, to his anti-Aristotelianism. She expresses her general standpoint in the following way: »On the one hand, Petrić interprets Aristotle's philosophy as a profanation of philosophy, and on the other, as 'positivism', i.e. as a philosophy which does not reach true philosophical problems, and he interprets it in part as . . . plagiarism . . . Petrić's wish to prove that some of Aristotle's theses are plagiarism (i.e. false) can lead us to the conclusion that Petrić wishes to preserve some of the elements of Aristotle's doctrine in order to integrate them into another (Neo-Platonist) tradition. This fact in itself speaks against the thesis on Petrić's radical anti-Aristotelianism . . .« (260). The thesis concerning the profanation of philosophy rests on the Petrić's new delimitation between Aristotle's exoteric and acroamatic writings between which, in his opinion, there are no differences in content; it follows that Aristotle does not possess any secret doctrine. Petrić is exceptionally critical with regard to Aristotle's logic and his ethics, his general thesis being that all which is of any value in Aristotle is not his work, but that of his predecessors, whereas only that which is of no value whatever is his. The author points out that in all this we should not look exclusively for the negative aspects, but that we should also see it as an attempt to »integrate« Aristotle's doctrine into the Neo-Platonist philosophy.

The central place, however, in the criticism of Aristotle in *Peripatetic Disputes* is dedicated to his *Metaphysics*. From a multitude of aspects analysed by M. Girardi Karšulin, we shall single out the two which we consider to be the most interesting. The first is related to the unity of Aristotle's science of metaphysics and the second to its title.

According to Petrić, Aristotle's metaphysics is not a science and it does not have a unique object. Between ontology, dealing with common being (*ens commune*) and theology (»Sophia«), dealing with God, there is no correlation: »The being as such, as the most general term, is revealed to Petrić as *ens rationis*, i.e. as the un-real being. Such un-real being can not be the unique object of a science dealing with the object of ante-physics (Aristotle's wisdom) as a real and super-natural object« (261). This interpretation and criticism of Aristotle indicates to Petrić the way of his own philosophical thinking by integrating, as we have just seen, some of the elements of Aristotle's philosophy into his own conception, one of its most important aspects being the postulating of the mode of cognition from the sensory (which is primary to us) to super-sensory (which is primary in nature).

In this context M. Girardi-Karšulin also refers to some of the immediate reactions to *Peripatetic Disputes*: namely, she problematizes the polemics between Petrić and Theodor Angelucci and the influence of Petrić's *Peripatetic Disputes* on *Exercitationum paradoxicarum contra Aristoteleos*

by Gassendi. As to the discussion with Angelucci, she points out that »It . . . reveals the fact that Petrić's interpretation (i.e. of the object of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* — F. G.) clashes with (peripatetic) views of the time and that it was felt to be new (and incorrect)« (145). With regard to Gassendi it is shown that he derived a great deal of his criticism of Aristotelianism from Petrić's views but, under the influence of the new natural science, he offered a concept which was considerably different from that proposed by Petrić.

The author dedicates a special chapter of her book (157—172) to the reaction to Petrić's definition of the term 'metaphysics' to designate Aristotle's books on the first philosophy: »A late reaction. Petrić defined (again) as the originator of the theory of the library origin of the title *Metaphysics*«. We are dealing here with the polemics with H. Reiner who, in his articles published in the 1950's¹ attempted to prove, both on the basis of ancient commentaries and of Aristotle's distinction between *proteron phusei* and *proteron pros hēmas* that the term 'metaphysics' was not created by chance, owing to the order of books in Aristotle's library, but that it was a result of Aristotle's definition of the object of this science. He shows that Petrić was the first to expound the thesis on the library origin of the title *Metaphysics*. He considers, however, that he did not formulate his thesis completely and that it was based exclusively on historical criticism. On the other hand, M. Girardi Karsulin thinks that Petrić's thesis »follows clearly from a definite interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy, as well as from a definite understanding of what philosophy is« (170) which is clear from the fact that the distinction between that which is primary to us and that which is primary in nature has a very important role in Petrić's work as a whole.

The author characterizes the transition towards *Nova de universis philosophia* in the following way: »The chosen way of interpretation of Petrić's philosophy, from *Peripatetic Disputes* to *Nova de universis philosophia*, determines essentially also the understanding of *Nova de universis philosophia*, i.e. it indicates the possibility of interpreting *Nova de universis philosophia* primarily with regard to the method used by Petrić. Each of the four parts of *Nova de universis philosophia* (namely, »Panaugia«, »Panarchia«, »Pampsychia«, »Pancosmia«) is characterized, depending on the subject it deals with, by a certain method. In other words, we encounter on the one hand the Aristotelian method — the path leading from that which is primary to us to that which is primary in nature — which characterizes the analysis of light in »Panaugia«. On the other hand, »Panarchia« and »Pampsychia« were written in keeping with Petrić's own method containing the elements of the Aristotelian sequence from entity to cause, together with the Platonist ones starting from the cause of the totality of the caused. A special role is awarded to beings in the middle position which act as mediators, i.e. which participate both in the sensory and in the super-sensory world (i.e. soul). As to »Pancosmia«, its subtitle suggests the Platonist method (»... methodo platonica, rerum universitas, a conditore Deo deducatur«), but the author departs a little from this method, since the basis of his deductions are still the four principles: space, light, warmth and flund.

¹ The articles in question are: »Die Entstehung und ursprüngliche Bedeutung des Namens Metaphysik« (ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG VIII/1954, p. 221—237) and »Die Entstehung der Lehre bibliothekarischen Ursprung des Namens Metaphysik« (ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG IX/1955, p. 77—99).

The last chapter of the book is dedicated to the concept of universality (*universitas*). »Petrić's definition of philosophy as an effort to reach wisdom, i.e. an effort to understand the universality... is the essential characteristic of Petrić's philosophical project which is at the same time its most controversial point — with regard to the traditional, Christian, dogmatically established relationship between reason and faith, philosophy and theology« (255). Universality is the point which both philosophy and theology have in common (»Philosophy encompasses the universal, therefore also God is revealed in their method — theology, namely, discusses the divine *ex* as the first universality«) (257), and the difference between the two sciences *aequo* (i.e. in accordance with the object and coming from it) while philosophy is determined, on the basis of the mentioned three methods, as »the study« (*studium*) of the way towards universality.

M. Girardi Karšulin has analysed in her book all the important aspects of Petrić's philosophy. In spite of some methodological incompleteness in the order of presentation and the organization of the text (the transition from the first to the second part of the book, for instance, is not marked sufficiently; besides, I think that the whole of the first part should be organized as the introduction and entitled accordingly), the argumentation is coherent and clear. As the most distinctive and valuable aspects of the book I would point out her rejection of the thesis on Petrić's radical anti-Aristotelianism, the polemics with Reiner and the problematization of the method. I believe that these qualities — in addition to many others — will make this study an essential contribution to the study of Franjo Petrić and his work.

FILIP GRGIĆ

TRANSLATED BY LEIJA SOCANAC

Erna Banić-Pajnić, THE MEANING AND IMPORTANCE OF THE REVELATION OF HERMES, THE ROLE OF THE ELEMENTS OF HERMETIC PHILOSOPHY IN THE WORKS OF CROATIAN RENAISSANCE PHILOSOPHERS, Globus/Institut za povijesne znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu (The University of Zagreb Institute of Historical Sciences), Zagreb 1989.

Hermes Trismegistus is the name given by the Greeks to the Egyptian god Thoth, a deity of measure, number, letters and libraries to whom writings of the most diverse content, ranging from astronomical and astrological to philosophical and theological, began to be ascribed in the Hellenistic period. As late as the beginning of the seventeenth century, these writings, the collection of which was called after Hermes *Corpus Hermeticum*, were considered to be extremely old, and their author was proclaimed a sage and a prophet. Throughout the centuries, and especially in the Renaissance period, the influence of the Hermetic writings became remarkable indeed. Thus, for instance, Marsilio Ficino interrupted his work on the translation

of Plato's works he had been entrusted with by Cosimo Medici, in order to translate the writings which had been ascribed to Hermes. It is only after the exact date of the inception of the work was established (which has so far been placed into the period from the 1st to the third century) thus destroying the Hermes myth, that the fame of *Corpus Hermeticum* began to fade.

In this book E. Banić-Pajnić has undertaken a historico-philosophical research both of the general framework which had conditioned the influence of Hermetic literature on philosophical ideas in the Renaissance, and of the elements of the Hermetic doctrine in the works of Croatian Renaissance philosophers. Having outlined the problem of the division and of the date of inception of these writings, as well as the difficulties in their specification, she expounds briefly the main tenets we encounter there: namely, god as the principle and source of all, the divine character of mind, matter and cosmos as a whole, the world as creation through which god wishes to become visible, man who was born in order to understand divine works, etc. The author concludes that these writings represent a specific novelty (*novum*) with respect to the Greek philosophical heritage, since they interpret in a different way »the specific conception of the relationship god-the divine origin-world-man, the specific understanding of cognition as gnosis, of cognition as salvation, of cognition of the mind which is made possible by god's mercy (. . .), the specific interpretation of creation as conceived in the myth, with numerous much more philosophical elements appearing in a completely new role, and expounded in a completely new way.« (65–66)

The author proceeds with the main characteristics of the reception of Hermetic writings in early Christian, medieval and Arabic thinkers, discussing, naturally, the Renaissance in the greatest detail. Thus she examines the Hermetic elements in the work of the already mentioned Marsilio Ficino (who used the Hermetic tradition, together with other similar doctrines, especially Zoroaster and *Chaldean Prophecies* ascribed to him, in the establishment of his philosophy of religion), in that of Pico della Mirandola (who points out the idea of the divinization of man based on the Hermetic doctrine as well as on a specific mystical reading of Plato), as well as in Giordano Bruno, and Nicolaus Cusanus. The common characteristic of all these links between Renaissance and Hermetism is, on the one hand, their emphasizing of mysticism, and on the other the interest in the elements of magic, astrology, alchemy, etc.

The central part of the book is dedicated to the reception of the Hermetic writings in the works of Croatian Renaissance philosophers. Croatian Renaissance philosophy is not considered here as a whole, either with regard to its geography or its ideas. On the contrary, each author and his work is dealt with individually and separately from the views of others, exclusively within the context of the given theme. Thus the Hermetic elements in the work of Juraj Dragišić (Georgius Benignus de Salviatis) can be seen primarily in his understanding of divination and of the world order. Federik Grisogono is close to some Hermetic concepts in his view of mathematics, which is related to astrology and to the animistic world-view, as the fundamental science. Juraj Dubrovčanin (Georgius Raduseus) also speaks about divination and astrology. The author goes on to mention Nikola Gučetić who in his theological and philosophical writings »speaks of 'the salutary' path of man which consists in the immersion of soul into itself as the prerequisite

of reaching its divine source«. (111). The Hermetic elements were built into the very basis of the philosophical thinking of Frane Petrić (Franciscus Patricius), the most prominent Croatian Renaissance philosopher. First of all, Franjo Petrić published some Hermetic writings in the supplement to his main work *Nova de universis philosophia*, which was first published in 1591 in Ferrara, and then in 1593 in Venice. They appeared in a separate edition in 1593 in Hamburg. In both cases they were in the Greek original and Latin translation. Which motives induced Petrić to undertake this task? E. Banić-Pajnić examines thoroughly these motives taking into consideration Petrić's work as a whole and concludes in the end: namely, Petrić tries to establish »the general framework for the realization of the project of the revival of Christianity, which found its full expression in his *Nova de Universis philosophia*. In this work the role of those pagan revelations in the formation of his own 'pious philosophy' (142) was completely brought to the surface; Petrić's main concern as a philosopher was to point out, by placing the Hermetic 'revelation' into the roots of the tradition which includes the Christian revelation as well, that the essence of that 'revelation' is that it equates *religio* with *pura philosophia*, that it is permeated both with divine inspiration, the revelation of the Mind as the source of knowledge of the divine, and with the philosophical insight into the divine and the rational, through the whole of creation, that it develops pioussness within the framework of the rational cognition with regard to a content which actually represents a 'secret knowledge' of the divine which can be reached only by philosophical insight« (ibid.,). Two more authors are mentioned in the end: namely, Pavao Skalić, who touches upon almost all the themes of Renaissance philosophy, including Hermetism, and Giulio Camillo Delminio who in his main work *Theatrum mundi* adopts the Hermetic conception of the organization of the world, of the divine as the primary element in man, and of the magical influence in things.

E. Banić-Pajnić has proved with success that an apparently marginal subject (marginal with regard to our usual notions of the Renaissance) with the emphasis on man's rationality and divinity can become an indispensable factor in the formation of that which we refer to as »modernity«. On the other hand, this book is a powerful and valuable incentive not only for further exploration of Croatian philosophical heritage, but also for its evaluation within the context of the dominant streams of European philosophy.

FILIP GRGIĆ

TRANSLATED BY LELIJA SOČANAC

Goran Gretić, SOUL AND REASON. THE THOUGHT OF FRANJO PETRIĆ IN THE OPPOSITION BETWEEN PLATONISM AND ARISTOTELIANISM, Globus/ The Zagreb University Institute of Historical Sciences, The Department of the History of Philosophy, Zagreb, 1989

The book by Goran Gretić is an attempt to interpret Petrić's philosophy and evaluate its importance within the context of a special historico-philosophical situation, namely with regard to the opposition between Platonism and Aristotelianism, as indicated in the subtitle. For all that, according to the author's methodology and understanding, the relationship between the heritage of Plato's and Aristotle's philosophy, has not been singled out arbitrarily, but this choice has been the result of the insight into the essence of the history of philosophy, in that which represents its constant quality: namely, »the history of philosophy as a whole . . . is nothing else but a long and continuing series of controversies between Plato's and Aristotle's philosophical thinking« (*Soul and Reason*, p. 10). The philosophical work of Franjo Petrić is therefore a typical episode in the history of philosophy, in the same way as Renaissance philosophy to which it belongs, since Petrić as an explicit Platonist attempts a radical criticism of Aristotelianism as a whole (*Discussiones peripateticae*), but at the same time, according to Gretić, his *Nova de universis philosophia* is basically dependent on this criticism, incorporating within itself some of the essential components of the Aristotelian origin. The subtitle of the book does not indicate just one of the possible approaches to Petrić's work, but pointing to its crucial dimension, refers to an interpretation which is especially appropriate.

The title of the book offers at first sight considerably fewer information than the subtitle. The key for its reading is nevertheless given by the quotation from Schelling's *Bruno* which Gretić uses as the motto for his book: »The soul as the idea of the thing is only a part of an infinite possibility, which God sees as timelessly actual: an individual soul has in its share only the actuality of that which is contained within itself as a possibility«. The essential concepts expressed in this passage, namely *the human and the divine, finality and infinity, possibility and actuality*, are at the same time co-ordinates of the theme which Gretić's book has tried to articulate. »Soul and Reason« is therefore a synthetic formulation which stands for the group of problems which have absorbed the whole of classical, medieval, and Renaissance philosophy as a whole, and to a large extent, modern philosophy as well.

The book is thematically divided into two parts: in the first an account is given of historical transformations of Platonism and Aristotelianism up to the Renaissance period; the second is dedicated to Petrić's philosophy, its place and importance within Renaissance philosophy, its relationship towards Aristotelianism, as well as the influence it produced.

The author has directed his attention mainly to the development of Platonism. It is certainly necessary for establishing of a context of interpretation of Petrić's work, but it is also in keeping with the considerably greater diffusion and dominance of Platonism with respect to Aristotelianism in the Hellenistic and early medieval period, when crucial changes for the

whole of European philosophy occurred. According to Gretić, in this period Aristotelianism was by no means inactive, but its impact was merely concealed. The eclecticism of Neo-Platonist philosophy does not mean only that Platonism was open only to various gnostic, mystical, religious and other irrational movements, but that it was even more open to the adoption of the key elements of the Aristotelian paradigm. We can therefore say that so far any Platonism is actually concealed Aristotelianism, which Gretić sees very perceptibly in the case of Porphyry's rehabilitation of Aristotle's logic and the ensuing discussions concerning its Neo-platonist domestication. All Neo-Platonist efforts to reach the real, esoteric Plato in his undiscovered hermetic writings have been futile and useless, since we can get to the »real« Plato — Gretić rightly refers here to Gadamer's opinion — through Aristotle's criticism. What is more, Plotinus as an exemplary figure of Platonism, attempts »the speculative mastering of the phenomenon of noetic essence« (op. cit., p. 41) within the horizon of eminently Aristotle's terms, namely *dynamis* and *energia*. In Plotinus' description of the emanation of One (which is *energia*) Gretić finds symptoms of the decline of the Aristotelian paradigm, announcing the modern primacy of possibility and the metaphysics of subjectivity: »Thus, the essence of being is DYNAMIS, the creative constitution from a being-that-thinks-from-within-itself into an immanent action of the self as the manifestation of its power.« (op. cit., p. 42).

It is therefore impossible to understand Plato and Platonism without Aristotle. This is certainly a posterior insight of historical consciousness, inaccessible to Platonists of the earlier periods. Even in their efforts to follow the original Plato's doctrine, Neo-Platonists were not aware of their deviation from the paradigm, although, together with Petrić, they tried to present their philosophy merely as interpretation of old writings. This can be seen very well in the successiveness of the basic Neo-Platonist required reading, namely in the Plato's dialogues *Timaeus* and *Parmenides*. The Neo-Platonist search for the real meaning of *Parmenides* in Plotinus' interpretation which awards One with an unambiguously *positive* predication, represents *speculative* overcoming of the negative dialectics of this dialogue. Having obviously Hegel in mind, Gretić deepens his fundamental historico-philosophical conviction stated at the beginning, namely that »From the modern perspective, viewing the fate of Platonism retrospectively, we can say that any interpretation that wishes to . . . step the dialectic movement, consciously moves in the direction of Plotinus' interpretation or, when the dialogue *Parmenides* is interpreted speculatively, it becomes *Neo-Platonist* in character (the author's emphasis; op. cit., p. 44)«. I could almost say that at this point even Gretić acts in a Platonist way in the spirit of *philosophia perennis*, as formulated by Platonism, finding the germs of modernity in older Platonist philosophy and reading within it the problems characteristic of a more recent philosophy; in the same way, he understands modernity as a manifestation of Neo-Platonism, allowing even the possibility of comparison between Hegel and Plotinus.

Gretić's insight into the continuity of the dialogue between Platonism and Aristotelianism has been materialized in a rich and exhaustive historical survey of philosophy up to Petrić. It is not possible to give a more detailed account of this survey here, but we should say that, starting from the first concentration in the form of Neo-Platonism, Gretić has used his

model of interpretation also in the account of the historical encounter between philosophy and Christianity, and therefore in all the important phenomena in medieval and Renaissance philosophy. To that extent he can speak of the Platonism of Augustine («the Plato of Christianity») and of Nicolaus Cusanus, as well as of the Arabic and Thomist Aristotelianism, having constantly in mind the difference between diverse »isms« and the original doctrines.

Franjo Petrić entered the history of philosophy in an age (the second half of the 16th century) characterized by the revival of Platonism and by the work of Pleton, Pico della Mirandola, Marsilio Ficino, Giordano Bruno, and other important Platonists. The fundamental »metaphysical situation«, as formulated by Gretić, is still that of the Aristotelianism, which was the dominant orientation at all universities. The philosophical activity of this »vehement Platonist« is therefore primarily directed towards a radical criticism of Aristotelianism, in his *Discussiones peripateticae*. Gretić sees the main motive of this attack in Petrić's efforts to refute the dominant Aristotelianism (though not so much Aristotle himself), i.e. the scholastic philosophy, in order to promote Platonism at universities, so that it could become a philosophical supplement to Christian theology. Continuing the Platonist tradition of comparing the philosophy of Plato with that of Aristotle (*comparatio*), Petrić tried to extract the true, genuine Aristotle («Aristoteles mysticus») whom he knew from the Neo-Platonist commentaries and from some of Aristotle's apocryphal writings. As the criterion of authenticity, naturally, Aristotle's concurrence to Plato was taken. Gretić perceives well the confusion dominating this criticism (which is especially true of Petrić's misunderstanding of the necessary connection between, as formulated by Petrić, sciences »de ente« and »de sapientia«, the difference between which he wishes to establish in *Metaphysics* of the »true« Aristotle), which sometimes ends in ordinary abuse (e.g. when he says that Aristotle burned the books of his precursors to gain the exclusive right to their interpretation).

In his *Nova de universis philosophia* Petrić made more considerable efforts to approach Aristotle. His »metaphysics of light« is a continuation of the tradition of Platonism representing the realization of Plato's basic metaphor, but its ambition at the same time is to suppress Aristotle's model in metaphysics. The unmoved mover is thus replaced by *lux* or *lumen*, light which is at the same time the principle and a physical phenomenon. Expounding extensively the main theses of Petrić's principal work, Gretić does not neglect to point to some of the basic difficulties inherent in this concept. They can be found in inconsistent definitions of the nature of light, in discrepancies between Panaugia and Pancosmia, and especially in the meaning of the concepts of infinity and incorporeality, by means of which Petrić attempts to explain another principle — namely, space. »The incorporeal corporeality and corporeal incorporeality« is the paradoxical expression of the border-line ontological position of light and space, as well as the indicator of Petrić's inability to give a satisfactory non-Aristotelian metaphysical description of principles and causes. Gretić finds the cause of this confusion in the discrepancy between old philosophical categories and attempts to form a new conception of nature: »Petrić frequently adapts the ideas and terminology of the Platonic and Hermetic tradition within his system without elaborating clearly the immense difference between the old

and the new context« (op cit, p. 239). This new context is constituted by modern mathematical natural science while Petrić's philosophy, with its mystical mathematics and unelaborated ontology, could not respond completely either to the requirements of natural science or to those of metaphysics, which is essentially Aristotelian in character.

Petrić was closer to the Aristotelian model than he was prone to admit: »Since Petrić does not believe that finite natural bodies possessing resisting power can exist outside the earthly sphere, his concept of the infinity of the universe (of the infinite cosmos) is paradoxically closer to the spirit of Aristotle and Grosseteste than to his contemporaries and Neo-Platonists, as for instance Giordano Bruno. Although Petrić's world is infinite in its extension, it is nevertheless the unique geometrical universe situated in a non-body, i.e. in space.« (op cit, p. 243).

In the final chapter of his book Gretić elaborates probably the most interesting part of the historico-philosophical context of Petrić's work, namely the one related to Petrić's influence on the philosophers of his age. His cosmology and his theory of the infinite and empty space had the greatest impact on his contemporaries. According to the results of Gretić's research, Petrić had a considerable influence on Commenius; Hobbes included two of Petrić's works into his »ideal library«, and Gassendi explicitly confirmed the affinity of his views on space to those of Petrić. Through Gassendi and Henry More, a Cambridge Platonist, he had an indirect influence on Newton and his model of absolute space. Gretić sees the full realization of Petrić's philosophy, whose influence had been neglected and whose work had been suppressed, in Newton's natural philosophy. It is not incidental, therefore, that in the age of the institutionalized dominance of Aristotelianism, Petrić became the first university professor of Platonist philosophy.

The importance of Gretić's book surpasses the role of filling the void in the literature on Plato and Platonism in this country which he has given as one of the motives in his writing of this book. Starting from the ambition to reconstruct the historical transformations of Platonism in its permanent opposition to Aristotelianism, with Petrić as one of the protagonists of these developments, the author has found himself confronted with the necessity of an integral and profound intervention into the problem of the articulation of transitory moments, in which the epoch abounds. Gretić has not allowed them to remain »blank spaces« in his account, but has aptly responded to their discontinuous character by the continuous writing of a historian of philosophy. On the basis of this account we can reach an insight into the historicity of philosophy, so that its merit is not only historiographical, but also philosophical. If we add the extensive bibliography and references to relevant literature, we can say that »Soul and Reason« can have the role of a stimulating manual for further research.

ZVONIMIR ČULJAK

TRANSLATED BY LELIJA SOCANAC

**Publications of the Department of the History of Philosophy,
Institute of Historical Sciences, University of Zagreb**

I. PRILOZI ZA ISTRAZIVANJE HRVATSKE FILOZOFSKE BASTINE

1. *Prilozi* 1—2 (1975)
2. *Prilozi* 3—4 (1976)
3. *Prilozi* 5—6 (1977)
4. *Prilozi* 7—8 (1978)
5. *Prilozi* 9—10 (1979)
6. *Prilozi* 11—12 (1980)
7. *Prilozi* 13—14 (1981)
8. *Prilozi* 15—16 (1982)
9. *Prilozi* 17—18 (1983)
10. *Prilozi* 19—20 (1984)
11. *Prilozi* 21—22 (1985)
12. *Prilozi* 23—24 (1986)
13. *Prilozi* 25—26 (1987)
14. *Prilozi* 27—28 (1988)
15. *Prilozi* 29—30 (1989)
16. *Prilozi* 31—32 (1990)

II. »TEMELJI« LIBRARY
(Latin and Croatian)

1. J. R. Bošković, *Teorija prirodne filozofije*
(Latin and Croatian)
2. Frane Petrić, *Nova sveopća filozofija*
(Latin and Croatian)

III. MONOGRAPHTES

1. Albert Bazala, *Filozofijski portret Franje Markovića*
2. Erna Banić-Pajnić, *Antun Medo, Dubrovački filozof XVI stoljeća*
3. Marija Brida, *Pavao Vuk-Pavlović. Čovjek i djelo*
4. Branko Despot, *Filozofija Đure Arnolda*
5. Branko Despot, *Filozofiranje Vladimira Dvornikovića*
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